The legal issue that arises from this question is whether Bowpaul Company can be held liable

towards Amir, Baba and Chin under strict liability under the rule of Rylands v Fletcher.

Strict liability is a term used to describe liability which is imposed on the defendant
without any proof of fault on his part. The landmark case in this branch of tort law is Rylands v
Fletcher. In the case the defendant employed independent contractors to construct a reservoir
on their land. The contractors found a disused mineshaft when digging but believed it was filled
with earth and failed to seal them properly. They filled the reservoir with water. Unknown to the
defendant or the contractors, this mineshaft connected to the plaintiff’s coalmine on
neighbouring land causing the plaintiff’s mine to be flooded when the reservoir was filled with
water. The court held that the defendants themselves were not negligent and neither were they
vicariously liable for negligence of their independent contractors, but the house of lords held
them liable to the plaintiff. However, for the defendant to be liable under strict liability, there are
four elements needed to be satisfied.

The first element is the defendant brought something onto his land. For this element to
be fulfilled there must be an accumulation by the defendant. Accumulation here refers to the
action of the defendant must bring something onto his or her land for his or her own purposes
that does not naturally occur there. In the case of Ang Hock Tai v Tan Sum Lee & Anor, the
defendant stored petrol for the purposes of his repairing and distributing tyres business. One
morning the defendant premises caught on fire and the fire spread to the first floor where the
plaintiff lived causing his wife and child to die in the tragedy. The court in this case held that the
defendant is liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher as the petrol was a dangerous thing.

Applying to this case, Bowpaul Company had bought something on his land where their
factory produces chemicals for their own profit and benefit. The factory also is not being built
naturally as it is being built by Bowpaul Company itself for their chemicals manufacturing
project. This shows the company had purposely brought something to the land for their own
purposes. Hence, the first element is fulfilled.

The second element is there must be a non-natural use of land by the defendant. The
definition of non-natural here is subject to change. However, Lord Moulton in the case of
Rickards v Lothian defines non-natural use as “there must be some special use bringing with it
increased danger to others and it must not be merely ordinary use of the land or such use as is
proper for the general benefit of the community. In Abdul Rahman bin Che Ngah & Ors v Puteh
bin Samad, the plaintiff’s rubber trees were destroyed as the ignition escaped onto the plaintiff’s
land after the bushes and weeds on the defendant’s land were negligently set on fire. The court
in this case held that the defendant is liable in negligence and under the rule in Rylands v
Fletcher for the escape of fire resulting from a non-natural use of the land.

In this case, the manufacturing factory of Bowpaul company can be considered as

non-natural use of the land. This is because when Bowpaul Company factory manufactures the
dangerous chemical it constitutes a non-natural use of land. Following the words of Lord
Moulton, the Chemical manufactures will bring more danger towards the other people and it will
not bring benefit for the community at all. Hence, the second element is fulfilled as there is a
non-natural use of land by the defendant.

The third element is the thing brought onto the land by the defendant is likely to do
mischief. This means that it must be foreseeable that the thing brought onto the land by the
defendant is likely to do mischief if it escapes. In the case of Ang Hock Tai v Tan Sum Lee &
Anor, the defendant stored petrol for the purposes of his repairing and distributing tyres
business. One morning the defendant premises caught on fire and the fire spread to the first
floor where the plaintiff lived causing his wife and child to die in the tragedy. The court in this
case held that the defendant is liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher as it is foreseeable
that the petrol is likely to do mischief if it escapes from the defendant’s property.

In this case, Bowpaul company is manufacturing dangerous chemicals. Hence, it is clear

that if the chemical escapes from the manufacturing factory it would cause danger and damage
to other people as a chemical is toxic and can cause danger to people. Hence, the third element
is fulfilled as it is foreseeable that the dangerous chemicals are likely to do mischief if it
escapes.

The fourth element is the thing brought by the defendant onto his land must escape onto
other land. In the case of Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board, the plaintiff’s cattle died as it ate
the branches of a poisonous tree hanging from the defendant’s land into the plaintiff’s land. The
court in this case held that the defendant is liable because protrusion of branches outside his
property were considered as escaping from his property. In contrast, in Ponting v Nookes, the
plaintiff’s horse intruded over his boundary and ate poisonous leaves of the defendant’s tree.
The court held that the defendant is not liable as there was no escape.

In this case, it is clear that the chemical which is dangerous had escaped and caused
danger to others. This can be proved when there are people who were injured by the escape of
the chemical from the factory which had caused injury when they inhaled the toxic fumes. As the
thing had escaped and clearly caused injury to others this proves that this fourth element is
fulfilled.

However, if the escape of the thing brought onto the defendant’s land himself is caused
by the third party, the defence of the act of a stranger may be raised. The court in the case of
Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd then went on to deal with the defence of Act of Stranger. They
said that a stranger was a person over whose acts the occupier of the land had no control. They
then went on to say that the defence will not be applicable if the act of this stranger was one
which the defendant could reasonably have anticipated and guarded against. It was not
sufficient to show that the defendants knew that the children played in the vehicle park. The
plaintiff must show “that the defendants reasonably should have anticipated an act of a kind
which would cause the escape.” The appeal was dismissed and the defendant was allowed to
rely on the act of a stranger defence to escape liability.
 In this case, if the escape of the chemicals had been caused by the malicious act of
Ivan, a rival of Bowpaul Company, then Bowpaul Company can raise the defence of the act of
stranger to escape liability.

In conclusion, Bowpaul Company can be held liable towards Amir, Baba and Chin as all
the elements under strict liability had been fulfilled by the Bowpaul Company.