THE SERBIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS

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ACADEMIC CONFERENCES
Volume LXI
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORICAL SCIENCES
No 20

SERBS AND
THE ALBANIANS
IN THE 20th CENTURY
SERIES OF LECTURES
MAY 7-10, 1990

Accepted at the fifth session of the Department of historical sciences

on the 27th of June 1990, at the recommendation of Academicians
Milo? Macura and Vladimir StojanZeviC and Corresponding member of
Academy Andrq. MitroviC

Editor
Corresponding member of Academy
ANDREJ MITROVIC

BEOGRAD 1991
 SERBIAN GOVERNMENT
AND ESSAD-PASHA TOPTAN I

DUSAN T. BATAICOVIC

The study of Serbo-Albanian relations in the first decades

of the 20th century is merely one chapter in a history long rnarkcd
with conflics which in their stronyest current bore traits of
lasting political confrontation and religious intolci-ance which had
deepened over the centuries. Thus thc need for precisely defining
in perspective the processes under study, imposes itself as the
primary obligation. Favoring a national and ideologically neutral
reflection is not simply an implicit inclusion of historiographical
principle, but an aspiration enabling a stratified accoupt o l
never unambiguous historical content, instead of a reduced ilnagc
of the past. Viewed from that angle, the figure of Essad Pasha
Toptani, whom entire Albanian historiography condemned as the
biggest traitor of his own people (for cooperating with Serbia),'
emerges in a different light, ideologically impartial, alien to every
industrious work on history.

The era delimited with the beginning of the Ralhan Wai-s and
the end of the Paris Peace Conference was marked by a fresh surge
of old conflicts between thc Serbian and Albanian peolples. The
centuries-long commitment of most Albanians in the Ottoman
Empire to an Islamic structure of society (where the Moslcm
belonged to a privileged status to which the Christian was neces-
sarily subordinate), was a major obstacle to any attempt at crea-
ting more permanent political cooperation, and achieviilg national
and religious tolerance. In the first decade of the 20th century,

Kristo Fraslieri, The Histor!) a( Albatiicr, Tirana 1964, pp. 163-212;

Aleks Buda (ed.), Historia e ~ o p ~ ~ l sl hi qt ~ l i ~ t u 11,
r Prishtine 1969, pp.
371-516; Stefanaq Pollo-Arben Puto (ed.), Histoirc r!e 1':1IDnnie, Roanlie
1974, pp. 181-212; Muin Cami, Sllqiperia 112 ii~rci-rcdlzenict i ~ t l r ~ ~ l t o t ~ ~ h e t u r e
(1914-1918), Tirane 1987, pp. 43-15, 107-1 12, 240-243, 280-281, 31 3-31 5.
58 Dugan T. Batakovid

the Albanian natio~ial question began to undermine the very

foundations of Ottoma[t rule in the Balkans; subsequent to the
great upnisings against the Young Turk pan-Ottoman policy, it
was supposed to end with the creation of an autonomous Albanian
unit within the frame of the empire - in the spirit of the deci-
sioils reached by the Albanian League in Prizren in 1878. Demands
were made to the Portc that an autonomous Albania be formed
from the Kosovo, Scutari, Bitolj and Jailina vilayets - ethnically
mixed areas to which all the surrounding Balkan states (for many
a good reason) lay claim. Rejecting cooperation offered by the
Balkan allies, primarily Serbia and Montenegro, the leadership of
the Albanian national movemeilt decided, by defending Turkey,
to by the idea of an ethnic, Great Albania."
The proclaination of the independent state of Albania in
Valona on November 28, 1912, showed that despite the tremendous
snccess of the Balkan Alies at war against Turkey, the balance of
forces in the Balkans depended on the will of the most influential
big power in the peilinsula - Austria-Hungaiy. Created primarily
with support from the Dual Monarchy, Albania was to serve as a
dam to Serbia's major war objectives in the First Balkan War -
obtaining a territorial access to the Adriatic Sea at the coastal
belt between Duvarro and St. Giovanni di Medua.
Serbia's diploinacy watched with strong suspicion the develop-
ment of the situation in Albania. Territorial access to the Albanian
coast was jointiy assessed by all relevant political factors (the
c o ~ ~ r the
t , government, the army, the civil parties and public
opinion) as the only possible way to avoid the fatal embrace of
the Dual Monarchy. By encroaching upon ethnically different lond,
in Northern Albania, Serbia violated a principle to which it
appealed thereuntil - the principle of nationality. State reason
tipped the balance which was justified by strategic needs and a
historical right as well as by the struggle for survival imposed
by Austria-Hungary.
In fall, 1912, the Serbian troops took Alessio, Elbasan, Tirana
and Durazzo with quick c-ctions and little resistance; the men
ecsatatically jumped into tllc Adriatic, rejoicing over Serbia's
sea. The ultimatum prescilted by Austria-Hungary, threatening
to attack the northern borders of Serbia, compelled the Serbian
government to renounce the access. Thc Great Powers acknowledged

"tavro Skendi, Albanian Notional Awitkciting 1878-1912, Prince-

ton 1967, pp. 438-463; Peter Bartl, Die Alba.izi.sche~z Muslime zur Zeit
der nntiorzalen Unnbhangigkeitsbeweg~lz~ (1878-1912), Wiesbaden 1968, pp.
173-184; Bogurnil Hrabak, Ai~banc!Ski trstanci 1912. godine, Vranjski
glasnik, XI (1975), pp. 323-350; Dorde Mikid, The Albanians and Serbia
dzli.iixg the Balkun Wars, in: East Central European Society a n d the
Balkan Wars (ed. Bela I<. Kiralv - Dimitrije Dordevid), New York
1987, pp. 165-196; Kosovo L L M ~ Metochien iiz der serbischen G e s ~ h i c h t ~ .
I-ausannc 1989, pp. 311-323 (Dugan T. Batakovid).
Serbian govcrnmeil'l and Essad P a s l ~ lToptani 59

the creation of the autonomous state of Albania at the Ambassado-

rial Conference in Loizdon (1912-1913), initially under the sove-
reingty and suzerainty of the sultan, and subsequently under
their control. Serbia was given trade access to the sea via a
neutral and free port in the north Albanian coast. The Moiltenegrin
army, bolstered by Serbian troops, managed to take Scutari after
exhausting battles and many victims, but was forced under a
decision reached by the Conference to abandon it and surrender
it to the international forces."
The new state was a cat's-paw in the hands of Vienna. The
ministers of Ismail Kemal's interim government were forced to
draw up the declaration on independence in Turkish, and write
the provisions in Turkish letters, since none of the government
members were literate in the Albanian Latinic alphabet. The
markedly pro-Austrian orientiation of Kemal's government did
not meet with support from the wider population, which was
through centuries-long traditions attached to the Ottoman state
and its ideology. Muslims wcre in the majority in Albania (around
70Vo of the population), and to them the only acceptable solution
to the national question was to set up a state under the rule of
the Turkish prince, a demand which the government in Istanbul
was quick to point out. In northern Albania, the Catholic Mirdits
strove to create an independent state under the wing of the
Catholic powers: King Nikola I of Montenegro merely nurtured
their demand for independence. To the south, northern Epirus
had little in common with the tribes of central and northern
Albania, being under Greek influence and of Orthodox majority."
Religious and tribal differences, an insufficiently formed
national awareness, a completely underdeveloped economy, illite-
rate masses and their ignorance in politics held meagre promises
for a future stable state community. Albanian tribal and feudal
chiefs, who were accustomed to reversing their positions and
allies under the Turks for a handsome gratuity, demonstrated
neither enough political maturity nor national solidarity. Clashes

Xmojurx E a ~ y r w h , Kad ce cTttapmu AnGa~uja, Cpncicu K ~ M -

;KeBHEI rAacHuK, 52 (1937), pp. 518-523; l joep h e ~ h ,Nsnasalc
A m ~ l ~ p ~B
CpGuje Ha Jabpa~cuohiope 7: Ko~@epelit(tljaa~Sacadopay A o ~ d o ~1912, y
Eeorpap, 1956, pp. 83-86; Muxaruo B o j ~ o ~ u hCuadapclca
, ~ p u s a 1913. zo-
~ U H CEeorpap,
, 1973, pp. 125-137, 145-151. Cf. i Ismail Qemali (Perm-
bledhje dokumentesh) 1889-1919, Tirane 1982. An elaborate insight in
the documents is also provided by the Aouy,~terrr~~ o crzo.arroj nonuTuyu
Kuamest~ne C l 6 z ~ i e1903-1914, VI-1. Eeorvaa 1981. Doc. Nos. 135. 389-393.
395, 411, 415,'46& 464, 469, 495-496, 506: 521, 527; VI-2, Doc. ~ b s 23, . 43,
80, 87-89, 108, 124.
M m o p a ~E K M ~ Y N P ~ T, H U
yumesu CpGuje 1914, l j e o r p ~1973, pp.
372-377; Joseph Swire, Albania, The Rise o f n Kingdom, New York, pp.
183-240; D. Mikid, op. cit., pp. 185-191; Michael Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung
und Ausbatl der Kiinigsdiktatur in Albnnictz (1912-1939), Miinchen 1987,
pp. 25-40.
of different conceptions on the future of the country, the involve-
ment of the big powers and strife over power between regional
chiefs drew Albania into a whirlpool of civil war, even belore its
status was defined and its borders fixed. Austria-Hungary bene
fited mostly from the anarchy, with its consular and intelligence
agenicies encouraging a vengeful policy of Albanian officials,
flaring up old hatreds between the Serbs and Albanians, and
building outposts for undermining and then destroying the Serbian
administration in the newly-liberated territories - Old Serbia
and Macedoi1ia.j
The strengthening of influence by the Dual Monarchy in
Albania, which was threatening to become a tangible means of
political and military jeopardy to Serbia, disputes over demar-
cations and the status of individual adjacent regions instructed
the Serbian government to seek among prominent Albanian tribal
chiefs those who would be ready to resolve the issues within
the Balkan framework. The figure most suitable for that purpose
emerged - Essad Pasha Toptani, a Turkish general who gave
Scutari over to the Montenegrins in April 1913, and was allowed
in return to leave the town with his army and all their weapoiiry
to become involved in the struggle over power in central Albania.

The career of Essad Pasha Toptani (born in Tirana, 1863)

was similar to the careers of the biggest Albanian feudal lords.
As the owner of vast chifliks in central Albania, Essad Pasha
quickly climbed up the Turkish administrative heirarchy. At the
opening of the century he was a gendarmery commander in the
Janina vilayet. He supported the Young Turk movement in
1908, and represented Durazzo as deputy to Turkey's Parliament;
in 1909 he was entrusted with the ungrateful duty of handing
Sultan Abdul Haminid I1 the decree on his deposition. Prior to the
Balkan wars, hc held thc post of gendarmery cominander in the
Scutari vilayet where he successfully engaged in trade with the
Italians, giving them concessions for the exploitation of forests.
He took over command of Scutari in early 1913, demonstrating
all tho qualities of a great military leader. He decided to surrender
the city only when the garrison, broken by famine and disease,
decided, together with the city chiefs, to stop resisting. The

Eoponrih, O d r t o c ~ ~CpSz~je u .!li,crpo-T(zapc~e v X X

".\ac\rr~.rrrp
pp. 396-410; Mi.rko Gutid, 0vuZani sukobi n u s ~ p s k o -
t . c ~ , y ,G e o r p a ~1936,
-01 bnrzskoj gvc~nici L i jt.seiz 1913. godine, Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 1 (1985)
pp. 225-275; Bogumil Hrabak, AvbanaSki zrpadi i pobutze nu Kosovu i LL
.Makedo;~iii od kraia 1912. do kvaja 1915. godine, Vranje 1988; D. T. Ba-
takovic, Podaci s/.]~sl;ilzi ~ o j n i h vlasli o c~rDa~znSkit~z pvvacin7n 1913. go-
rline, MeSovita g1-ada, XVII-XVIII (1988), pp. 185-206.
Serbian government and Essad Pasha Toptani 61

London Ambassadorial Conference of the Great Powers had already

decided that Scutari remain within the Albanian composition.
In those circumstances, surrendering Scutari in late April 1913
on honorable conditions was a wise political decision."
Essad Pasha evaluated that to rely chiefly on Austria-Hun-
gary when Italy and Greece were laying open claims to the
territory of the Albanian state, would be fatal to his country's
survival. By cooperating with the center of the Balkan alliance
- Serbia - and through it with Montenegro, he was seeking
ioundations to build a stable Albanian state with a Moslem
majority, in which he would rely on the large beylics in the
central and northern parts of the country. Essad Pasha possessed
the characteristically Moslem trait of distrusting fellow-countrymen
of another religion. The bearing of the northern Albanian Catholic
tribes, which aspired to separate from Albania, and the pro-Hellenic
orientation of the Orthodox population in northern Epirus, were
the reasons why he consented to adjust the border to the benefit
of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece: he believed that an Albania
smaller than the one stipulated in 1913 would, once homogeneous
in religion, be a much more stable country. The development of
international circumstances urged a closer cooperation with
Serbia: Albanian territories were an object of aspiration and,
when World War I broke out, compensation in the cabinets of
European Powers.'
Already in early May, 1913, Essad Pasha informed the
Montenegrin king of his intentions to proclaim himself King
of Albania, and of his readiness to cooperate with the Balkan
alliance. He said the Albanians owed their freedom to the Balkan
peoples and that he would establich with them the borders of
Albania without the mediation of other powers. Essad Pasha
told Serbian diplomat ilivojin Ba!ugdiic at a meeting in Durazzo,
that he wanted an agreement with Serbia. Hesitant at first, the
Serbian government consented, assessing that the Pasha had
showed by his bearing that he really wanted an agreement with
Serbia, which he regarded, Balugdiic quoted, as the nucleus for
mustering Balkan force^.^
I t was crucial to the Serbian government shortly before
the Bulgarian attack to neutralize preparations in Albania against

Biogruplzisclies L ~ ~ i k o zur
l i Geschiclitc S i i t l o s t c ~ ~ r o pIV, ~ ~ ,Miinchcn
1981, pp. 340-342; JIb~oc.rpa~z~ (Josa1-1 M. J o s a t l o ~ ~ i h )6,e n e u c ~ e o ApGa-
I L ~ LI ~, L ~,
Cpnclili KI~,I~;I<CBHII~ ~ C H M Kbook
, 25 (1909), p. 518. For details
FCC: DuSan T. BatakoviC, Ecc~d-PLUZLLLL Tonra~ur t i Cpu't~ju 1915. ~ o d l f ~ in: e,
,.Cp6uja 1915", 36opl11iri paAona I / I c ~ . o ~ E I ~ cTiIfCTZITyTa,
Ko~ NO. 4, Beograd
1986, pp. 299-303.
; A. T. Ea~ario~rili. Ecud-17aurcl Tori.cu~~u. Cnu't~in t1 a n G a t ~ c ~i7zLz-aFbe
o
11916-1918), in: ,,CpSrrja 1918", Zh. radova ' ~ s t b r i j s k o instituta,
~ 7, Reo-
grad 1989, p. 346.
AolCyi~eH~lf0 C I Z O ~ H OMOflL4FLlL{U
~ Kpa.beuz~ff~' Cp6lljc, VI-2, DOC.
135; X. Ea,\vrv~:ii, op. cit. 521-522.
raids into Serbian territory - espccially in Kosovo, Metohija and
western Macedonia. Around 20,000 men were in arms in the
Albanian territory, mostly refugees from Old Serbia and Macedo-
nia whose leaders, Hasan Prishtina and Isa Boljetinac, were close
associates of Ismail Kemal. They strove to fight the iilflueilce of
Essad Pasha, agitating an attack on Serbia and stirring up an
uprising of the Albanian people there.
The Bulgarian komitajis trained Albanians for guerrilla ac-
lions, with money and arms coming from Austria-Hungary. Essad
?asha refused to join them and warned the Serbian government
not to approve of their action.Qt the end of September, 1913, a
forceful raid was carried out into Serbian territory. The around
10,000 Albanians, who charged into the territory from three
directions, were lead by Isa Boljetinac, Bairain Cur and Casim
Lika. Aside to them, Bulgarian officers also commanded troops.
Their troops took Luma and Djakovica, and bcsieged Prizren.
They were crushed only after two Serbian divisions were sent to
the border.1°
Essad Pasha used the crushing of ihe pro-Austrian forces
to proclain~himself (with the support of Moslem tribal chiefs and
the big beylics in the central parts of the country) governor of
Albania in Durazzo, in Iatc Sepiember, 1913. Vienna assessed the
act as positive proof of his pro-Serbian orientation. Official Ser-
bia simultaneously helped a number of other small tribal chiets
who resisted Kemal's government, directing them towards coope-
ration with Essad Pasha. The alliance bciween the Serbian
government and Essad Pasha was not stipulated in a special
treaty: Pasic nevertheless ordered that his followers be aided in
money and arms. To the Serbian prime minister, Essad Pasha
served as a counterbalance to the great-Albanian circles around
Ismail Kemal.
The new princc of Albania, Wilhelm v o i ~Wied, backed the
revanchist aspirations of Albanian leaders from Kosovo and
Metohija. As the most influential man in his goverinnent, Essad
Pasha held two important portfolios - the army a i d interior
ministries. When the unresolved agriarian question, urged by
Young Turk officers, grew into a massive pro-Turk insurrection
against the Chi-istian prince, Essad Pasha supported the insurgents
and in a clash with the Princc sought backing ai the Italian
mission. After the arrest in Durazzo, Essad Pasha lelt for Brindisi
under protection of the Italian legate in Durazzo at the end ol
May 1914. Aftcr his departure, border raids into Serbia assumed
greater dimension and intensity."

". XpaGa~,Ap6n~atuuil !)?ladl1 11 1706yfid lfa ~ < O C O G ~pp.

, 52-64.
loIhid, pp. 33-38, 60-61.
" A. T . ~ x r a ~ o ~ l cEcad-liazr~a
h, Ton-rafizc I L CpBtlja 1915. zoOrr~ie,
p. 305.
Serbian government and Essad Pasha Topiani 63

The threat Albania posed for Serbia abruptly increased at

the beginning of the world war. The relationship between different
political trends within the Albanian society towards the Central
powers and the Entente powers was to a large extent determined
by their commitment towards Serbia. The pronounced tendency
towards pro-Austrian political circles grew with the continuous
influx of Albanian refugees from Serbia. Their revanchist policy
was the prime mover of a strong anti-Serbian movement in the
war years, and became after its end a basis for national forgather.

The beginning of the "Great War" left open the question

about a precise demarcabioln between Serbia and Albania. The
International Demarcation Commission discontinued work in
mid-1914, thus state borders in areas of dispute i-cmained to be
fixed. War caught unguarded the Serbo-Albanian border.
Austria-Hungary, not heeding for money, prepared fresh raids
into Serbian territory. Pa.5id rightly anticipated the intention of
Vienna's diplomacy to open, aided by the Young Turks, another
front and flank Serbian lands: he feared that the Albanian leaders
financed by Vienna - Hasan Prishtina, Isa Boljetinac, Bairam
Cur and Riza Bey Krienu - would "attack Serbia when they
receive orders from Turkey or Eulgaria and weaken Serbian
military action on the other side"." Concerned with reportings
about incessent unrest in the border belt and endeavors to
foment an Albanian uprising in Serbia, military circles in the
New Region Troops in Skoplje proposed preventive military action.
Essad Pasha strove to preserve an independent position,
crossing thus from Italy to France. He planned to confront, with
the help of the Entente, Austria-Hungary's efforts to completely
subjugate his country. He made enquiries from Paris on the
conditions upon which the Serbian government would aid his
return to Albania. In 1914. Pasic imposed the following conditions:
that he sign a political-customs treaty with Serbia on a joint
defense, that Albania acknowledge the customs union at the
chiefs' assembly, and that a solution be reached at the following
stage on formling a personal olr real union with Serbia. Essad
Pasha confirmed by cable his acceptance in principle of PaSiC s
conditions and immediately set off to Serbia.l3
Arhiiv Srbije, Ministarstvo inostranih dela, Strogo poverljivo
(dalje u tekstu, AS, MID, Str. pov.), 1914, No. 233. For details on joint
work among Austro-Hungarian, Young Turk and B ~ l g a r i a n services in
Albania see: A i ~ ~ p eMPIT~OBPI~I,
j Cjx'31lju y I I P ( ? O M COCTCICO,M
paxv, Eeorpa,~
1984, pp. 218-229.
1". XpaGarc, M~~c.i~r.irnritl
c c e e p ~ e A,zo'a~it~jcvoLrir ttso'ujama para
1914. zodulie, 3 6 0 ~ ~ 13a1 ~rlc~:)pii,iy Ma~llixe cprrcr:~, 22 (1980), pp. 53,
66-67.
 The Serbian goternment policy towards Albania was aimed
at prevsnting subversive actions frolm Albania and creating
preconditions to exert influence at the end of the war on the
dcrnarcation of its borders, particularly in the strip towards
Serbia. Shortly belore Essad Pasha' s arrival to Serbia, PaSid was
i~lterestedin learning the stand of the Tripartite Treaty powers
towards Albania: would they oppose "if Albania as a Tui-kish-
Bulgarian-Austrian instrument now attacked the Serbian border
- could we now not only fend them off, but incapacitate them for
attacks in connection with Turkey, occupy certain strategic
points and bring them under our influence until the time comes
\-.illen Europe would again resolve that issue, and probably reach a
better solution, which would ensure peace in Europe and the
Ealkai~s".'~
Essad Pasha obtained permission in Athens from the Greek
diplomacy to work in agreement with the Serbian government.
At the same time he secured backing from Italy, which hoped to
have an open road to permanently occupying Valona (Vlore) once
his re::ime was established in Albania. The government in Rome
saw Essad Pasha as the most appropriate figure to oppose grow-
ing Austr-Hungarian and Turkish influence on conditions in
Albania.'"
Essad Pasha did not give up his claim to the Albanian
throne. He warned the Serbian consul in Salonika that it would
be perilous to Albania if its prince came from the sultan's family,
as that would, through detrimental influence from Istanbul, open
new hostilibies towards Serbia and other Balkan states. He thus
pointed out himself as the most appropriate figure to rule Albania.
He sent messages to PaSid on the need them to conclu(de a
special treaty before his departure for Albania.lG
Upon arriving in NiS, Essad Pasha signed a secret alliance
treaty with PaSid on September 17. The 15 points envisaged the
setting up of joint political and military institutions, but the
most important provisions focused on a military alliance, the
colnstruction of an Adriatic railroad to Durazzo and guarantees
that Serbia would support Essad Pasha's election as the Albanian
rulcr. l h e treaty left open the possibility that Serbia, at the invi-
tation of Essad Pasha, carry out a military intervention to protect
his regime. The demarcation between the two countries was to be
drawn by a special Serbo-Albanian commission. Essad Pasha

AS, MID, Str. pol., 1914, No. 23.1.

Gcorge B. Leon, Grecce and l i ~ c A!hullzan Quest~orz at ilze Oul-
htealc of the First I4 orld IYnr, Balkan Studies, 1/11 (1970), pu. 69-71.
I G AS MID, Str. pov., 1914, No. 290, 308. Essad Pasha also had an
arrangement with klontenegrin uiplomats on principlc to settle the
controversial border i<sue by agreement, tllus from Athens he requested
ct the Serbian goverl~inent to i d o r m Cetinje that he would ,leave for
Montene~ro later o n , as he had promised<(. (Ibid, No. 250)
Serbian government and Essad Pasha Toptani 65

was to confirm the treaty only upon being elected ruler, with
consent from the National Assembly: this left maneuvering space
for revising individual provisions. Serbia was obligated to
finance Pasha's gendarmery and supply the necessay military
equipment by paying off 50,000 dinars per rnanth.l7
After the defeat of Prince Wilhelm wom Wied in clashes
with pro-Turk insurgents and his escape from Albania, anarchy
broke out in the country. The insurgents hoisted the Turkish
flag, demanding that the country preserve its Moslem quality.
The senate of free towns in central Albania invited Essad Pasha
to take over power. With over 4,000 volunteers mustered in the
vicinity of Debar, Essad Pasha marched peacefully into Durazm at
the beginning of Octaber 1914, set up hils government and proclai-
med himself supreme commander o~f the Albanian army. He did
not question the ties with Istanbul, and the ocmsent in principle ta
the sovereignty of the sultan over Albania. As the lord of central,
particularly Moslem parts of the country, Essad Pasha was
compelled to approve of the pro-Turkish beylics who had invited
him to take over power. His first measures were directed at
protecting the Serbian border from raids of troops lead by Young
Turk and Austro-Hungarian officers in the northern parts of the
country. He informed the Serbian government of his move on
the Catholic tribes to subdue Scutari and capture Albanian leaders
Isa Boljetinac, Bairam Cur and Hasan Prishtjina who were in
hiding in the northern Has.ls
Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria believed that under
the rule of Essad Pasha Albania would come closer to the powers
of the Tripartite Treaty on a European war. Germany and Aus-
tria-Hungary immediately recalled their legates in Durazzo, and
Bulgaria withdrew its diplomatic agent. At the same time Austro-
-Hungarian and Young Turk officers stepped up joint work on a
preparation to raid Serbia. In keeping with the provisions of the
Nis agreement, Essad Pasha undertook action to prevent the
t m p s from crossing over to Serbian territary, but he was soon
thwarted by a new pro-Turk insurrection.lg
In early November 1914, Turkey engaged in a war with the
Central powers, and included among the enemies of Islam
Essad Pasha Toptani, as an ally to Serbia and therefore the
Entente. The declaration of jihad stirred up a new pro-Turk
insurrection of the Moslem population. The "Board for Uniting
Islam" from Istanbul called for another conquest of Kosoml:

fl Shukri R a h i , Marreveshjet e qeverise serbe me Esat pashe

Toptanit gjate viteve 1914-1915, Gjurmime albanologjike, V I (1976), pp.
125-127; A. T. E a ~ a ~ o s u hEcad-natua
, T o n T a ~ uu Cp6uja 1915. z o d u ~ e ,
p. 306.
la AS, MID, Str. pov. 1914, No. 438.
IB A. T. E ~ T ~ K O BEcad-natua
H~, TOIIT~H u LCp6uja
~ 1915. z o d u ~ e ,
p. 307.
"Hey Moslems! The until recently part of our fatherland - Ko-
sovo - where the Holy Tomb of Sultan Murat lies, where the
flag of the crescent moon and star fluttered, now flies the fiag
of the hateful Serb, who is turning mosques into churches and
seizing everything you have. That low people is forcing you to
fight in arms against allies and Mohammedail regents"." The
illiterate Albanian mob was easily fanaticized with pro-Turk
and pan-Islamic slogans, thus the insurgents succeeded in winning
over part of Essad Pasha's followers. With regular supplies of
money, arms and ammunition from Austria-Hungary, the insur-
gents, commanded by Young Turk officers, posed an increasing
threat to Essad Pasha's territory. The entire movement gained an
expressly anti-Serbian character: demands were made that regions
Serbia had liberated in the first Balkan war be annexed to auto-
nomous Albania under Turkish sovereingty. Italy and Greece
cleverly benefited from the whole confusion: Italian troops disem-
barked on Saseno island, and then took Valona and the hinter-
land, while Greek units marched into northern Epirus and set up
full authority there.?'
Essad Pasha's position in Durazzo continuously deteriorated.
Pressured by the success of the insurgents, he called the Serbian
government more than once to intervene in Albania. A tacit agree-
ment with Italy to fend off Austria-Hungary occasionally provided
money. Not only did request guns from Greece, but demanded that
its troops encroach upon those regions where his enemies mus-
tered.22
The Serbian government ordered in December 1914 that
preparations begin for a military interventrion in Albania. As the
allied diplomacies at the time exerted strong pressure upon the
Serbian government to make territorial compensation for Bul-
garia, offering in return some substitutes in Albania, Pasic wanted
to incapacitate h r t h e r bargaining over Macedonia with in inter-
vention in Albania. Yey only the Russian diplomacy approved his
plan. Legate Mix-oslav SpalajkoviC from St Petersburg informed
in early January 1915 that the Russian diplomacy was not opposed
to a Serbian intervention in Albania as long as it did not affect
the course and scope of operations against Austro-Hungarian
troops. There was even mention that the Russian diplomacy !hoped
an occupation of some parts of Albania wo~lld "this time be

- M.-EKhIe~~d~Fop.-cii., p. 387. The insurgents in no] them Albania

declared holy war against Serbia. Public Record Oflice, Foi-eign Office
(later in text PRO, FO), vol. 43814, No. 1071.
G. B. Leon, 017. cit., pp. 78-80; kI. E~.\re~rrlh,
op. cil., pp. 38.5-386.
Cf. Pietro Pastorelli, Albania nelln poliricn esiera italia??a 1914-1920, Na-
poli 1970, pp. 19-32; James H. But-gwyn, Sorznino e la diplol?lcr:in itczliana
del tempo doi gtrerra ]lei Balcnni nrl 1915, Storia Contemporane~, XVI,
1 (1985), pp. 116-118.
22 G. B. Leon, op. rit., p. 79.
Serbian government and Essad Pasha Toptani 67

constant m d definiti~e''.~aWhen Serbian armies broke off am

Austro-Hungarian offensive )in the north, PaSiC's government feared
that politicians and military circles tin Vienna would use the lull
to open war against Serbia.
Raids organized sporadically by fugitive leaders of the
Albanian movement in Kosovo and Metohija, and carried out in
coaction with Young Turks and Austro-Hungarian officers, were
not of wide scope, but roused nervousness among Serbian mili-
tary circles on the Albanian border. The insurgents besieged
Essad Pasha in Durazzo and demanded of him to acknowledge
the sultan's rule and declare war on Serbia. PaSiC then eveluated
it was Wiser to intervene immediately than wait for a bulk army
to muster in Albania with which an entire Serbian army would
be forced to fight.24
The allied diplomacies warned the Serbian government that
military intervention in Albania would strike an unfavorable
response. The Russian diplomacy advised Serbia to be content
with the occupation of the strategic points it had already occupied
and refrain from actions that Italy might regard as measures
directed againts its interests.'"
In late May, 1915, the Serbian diplomatic representative in
Durazzo informed that Essad Pasha's position was critical: two
new raids into Serbian territory had taken place. Despite warnings
from the allies, PaSiC decided on a military interventi0n.~6
Over 20,000 Serbian soldiers armed with guns marched into Alba-
nia from three directions at the beginning of June, and took
Elbasan and Tirana - the hotbeds of rebellion - suppressed the
Young Turk movement, liberated the besieged Essad Pasha in
Durazzo and turned over the captured insurgent leaders. A special
Albanian Detachment was set up to implement a thorough paci-
fication of Albania and consolidate Essad Pasha's rule. The
regions inhabited by Mirdits, where Isa Boljetinac, Hasan Prishtina
and Bairam Cur were in hiding, remained out of reach for the

TJ AS, MID, Sltr. pov., 1914, No. 863, tel. hl. Spalajkovik to MID,
Petrograd 25. decembar 191417. januara 1915. Cf. 6. XpaGa~c, AnGaiiuja
od jyizclce lcpuse do nponelia 1916. z o d u ~ etin O C H O H ~p y x d t l n n o ~ a ~ c ~ e
zpaAe, I, OGenez~~cja5 (1973), pp. 71-75.
24 AS MID, Str. pov., 1914, No. 810, 877: E. XpaGa~c,EnaGopar cpn-
clcoz w u ~ u c ~ a p c r U~HaO C T ~ C I I I ~ IOeila
X o Izpunpe,iia.lm cpnclce o~ylzayuje
cesepHe AnGa~uje1915. ?odli~rc,r o ~ ~ r r r r ~Apxrlna % a ~ Kocosa, 11-111 (1966-
-1967), pp. 7-35.
25 Arhiv Jugoslavije, 80-2-604. Tel. M. Spalajkovik from St. Peter-
sburg of April 231 May 6 1915, No. 704; PRO, FO, vol. 43813, No. 100, 118.
26 The most vicious raid into Serbian territorv was lead a t the
beginning of February 1915 by Hasan PriStina who attempted with
about 200 people to stir up the tribes around Prieren, but his host was
crushed near the village of Zur. The Serbian government informed the
allies that around 1,000 armed Albanians had crossed the border (PRO,
FO, 43815, No. 53; A. Mrr~posah,op. cit., pp. 225, 230-231).
Serbian troops; Ahmed Bey Zogu, lord of the Matis, who was
the closest relative to Essad Pasha, attempted to reach an agree-
ment with the Serbian government on his own, contrary to the
Pasha: he set off to NiS on his own accord for negotiations with
PaSic." The Montenegrin army took advantage of the favorable
situation and marched into Scutari, officially still under inter-
national regime.
Serbia's military intervention roused strong disapproval
from the allied diplomacies, especially Italy, whose claims to the
Albanian coast and central parts of the country, guaranteed under
the secret London Treaty, ensured its domination in Albania.
PaSid replied to protests from the allies that a temporary action
was at stake and that the Serbian troops would withdraw as soon
as Essad Pasha's rule was con~olidated.~~ The Serbian prime
minister evaluated that the timing was right to permanently tie
Albania to Serbia, through Essad Pasha.
Serbian Internal Minister Ljubomir Jovanovid arrived in Ti-
rana and on June 28, 1915, at St Vitus' Day, signed a treaty with
Eslsad Pasha on a real union between Serbia and Albania. Essad
Pasha obligated himself to adjust the border to Serbia's advan-
tage on the strip between Podgradec and Has. Serbia was to acqu-
ire the towns of Podgradec, Golo Brdo, Debarska Malissia, Luma
and Has to SpaC, until the international powers drew the new
borders. Joint institutions envisaged an army, customs administra-
tion, national bank and missions to other countries. The Serbian
government was to place at Essad Pasha's disposal experts to set
up the authorities and state institutions. With Serbia's help,
Essad Pasha was to be elected prince (mbret) of Albanila by an
assembly of chiefs, he was to draw up a constitutional draft in
agreement with Serbia and form a government of people who
would represent the idea af Serbo-Albanian unity. The treaty
anticipated that the Serbian army remain in Elbasan and perhaps
in Tirana until the provisions of the treaty were executed, to
persecute and destroy joint enemies. If Essad Pasha was to learn
of Italy's intent to occupy Durazzo, he was under the obligation

27 Essad Pasha complained about the conduct of the Serbi'an military

authorities who pursued thair own policy in Ma'ti and other regions
and attempted to agitate among individual Albanian chiefs for acknow-
ledging as ruler of Albania a Serbian prince. (A. T. I i a ~ m o s d i ,CeAa~ba
zeHepana A p a Z y ~ t l ~ f~l U A ~ T U H OHa~ Utconia~doea~be
~ ~ a n b a ~ c r uTpyna-
Ma 1915. z o d u ~ e ,Memosu~a rpaba, XIV (1985), pp. 128, idem, A x ~ e d - 6 e z
302y u Cpbuja, in: ,,CpGuja 1916. ro~uae",36. paaosa EIc~op~ljc~or NH-
CTNTYTa, V O ~ . 5, k o r p a ~1987, pp. 165--177), Cf. lv. E i m e s ~ h , Op. tit.,
pp. 394-395.
28 PRO, FO, vol. 371, Nos. 184, 187, 200, 624; vol. 43815, No. 75;
~ 0 1 .43816, NO. 1444; M. EKhteWifi, Op. cit., pp. 392-394; A. MHTPOBN~,
op. cit., pp. 230-232.
Serbian government and Essad Pasha Toptani 69

to call the Serbian army which would do so before the Italian

troops.2g
The Tirana Treaty was the best political option for PaSid's
government in resolving the Albanian question. It stipulated to
the end Serbia's war aims towards Albania. The real union was a
political form allowing Serbia to influence the fate of those
Albanian regions to which it lay claim prior to and during the
Balkan wars. Expecting that the fate of Albania would again be
discussed at a peace conference at the end of the war, the Serbian
government wanted a tangible ground with the union project
when putting forth its demands on Albania.
The Austro-Hungarian-German offensive on Serbia and
Bulgaria's engagement in the war with the Central powers helped
- with frequent news about the defeats and withdrawal of
Serbian troops - the mustering again of Essad Pasha's opponents
in northern Albania. It was proposed at an assembly in Mati that
Serbia be attacked when a favorable condition rose and Albania
be expanded to Skoplje. Ahmed Beg Zogu, who through a commi-
ssioner, had constant connection with the Serbian government,
opposed their plans. No joint action against Serbia took place
but clashes with Essad Pasha's followers and smaller Serbian
units in the border belt again became frequent.30
A decision by the allies to deliver to Serbia aid in arms and
ammunition via Albanian ports suddenly increased the importance
of Essad Pasha's alliance. Already at the beginning of November
1914, Essad Pasha examined with the Serbian representative in
Durazzo the possibility of keeping Albania a safe base for the
Serbian army. Fearing another pro-Turk insurrection, Essed Pasha
requested of the Serbian government that a French or British
regiment disembark in Durazzo and be deployed to strategic
positions throughout the country; he would in return prepare
detachments to aid the Serbs in combating the Bulgarians. The
Serbian prime minister, however, proposed that Essad Pasha
receive a battalion of the Serbian army in Durazzo to thus prove
that SerbeAlbanian interests stood before the interests of the
Fourpartite Treaty. PaSid feared that Italy would use the plight
of Serbian armies in the north to land its troops in Albania and
occupy the whole territory. PaSid pointed out to Essad Pasha that
the Fourpartite Treaty considered him a friend and a "kind of
ally", and that after their victory his alliance would be rewarded
with guarantees from the powers.31

2o Sh. Rahimi, op. cit., pp. 137-140; A. T. E a ~ a ~ o a ~Eca6-natua

fi,
TonTaHu u Cp6uja 1915. zodtltie, p. 309-310.
" A..T. E ~ T ~ K o BEca6-nntua
H~, T o n ~ a ~ZL uCp6uja 1915. z o d u ~ e p.
, 312.
:jl Ibzd, pp. 313-314.
 DuSan T. Batakovic

The retreat of the Serbian army into Albania in late 1915

and early 1916 put the alliance of Essad Pasha to a serious test.
In regions whereto his authority did not extend, particularly
Catholic tribes in the northern parts of the country, the Serbian
troops were forced to shoot their way through to the Adriatic
ports where allied ships were waiting for them. Essad Pasha's
gendarmery aided the Serbian army, secured safe passageways,
accommodation and food, and engaged in squirrnishes with Alba-
nian regiments that attacked Serbian units and pillaged unarmed
refugees. Essad Pasha issued a special proclamatioil calling Alba-
nians to help the Serbian army, and informed military com-
manders about the advancement of enemy forces, the emergence
of rebellious regiments and the mood of individual tribes.3"
The Albanian golgotha was the greatest war trial of the
Serbian people. Of the 220,000 soldiers which brake through
Albania towards Corfu and Bizerta, only 150,000 reached the
destination; of about 200,000 refugees spread along Albailian
crags and marshes by the coast barely a third (60,000 people)
escaped death.33 Serbia's losses would have been much heavier
were it not for Essad Pasha and his followers during the retreat
and embarkation.
During the retreat Essad Pasha maintained contact with the
Serbian government. He rejected PaSid's proposals to proclaim
his treaty with the Serbian government and admit Serbian officials
in his administration, explaining that his enemies were already
calling him Essadovic because of his alliance with Serbia. He
wanted the allies to guarantee that Italy would not occupy entire
Albania after the retreat of the Serbian army. Realizing that
Austro-Hungarian troops would soon take Durazzo, Essad Pasha
proposed to PaSid that he be conveyed to Corfu with hiis govern-
ment and gendarmes, so as to be able, when the allied offensive
was launched, to take up positions on the left flank of the Serbian
army and operate towards Albania. At the demand of the Italian
diplomacy, Essad Pasha and several hundred gendarmes crossed
at the end of February 1916 to Brindisi escorted by Serbia's charge
d'affaires. Prior to his departure, he declared war on the Central
powers, thus taking upon himself full responsibility for his coope-
ration with Serbia and the Entente p0wers.3~

S2 Zbid, pp. 315-317.

SS B e n u ~ u paT Cpduje 3a ocnodoherbe u yjedufbese Cpda, X p e a ~ a
u Cnoeenaya, vol. XIII-XIV; Kpos An6anujy 1915-1916, S e o r p a ~ 1968;
h4m.a~ X. %sa~osHh, 0 eeauyayujtr cpncue eojcue u3 AnGanuje u
fienoj peopza~c~3ayujuIia KpqSy (1915-1916) npeMa + ~ ~ H U Y C K I I M AOKY-
MeHTHMa, ~ I C T O ~ H ~YaCOIlHC,
CKH XIIT-XV (1963-1964), pp. 231-307.
A. T. S a ~ a ~ o s u hEcad-nalua
, T o n ~ a n u u Cp6uja 1915. z o d u ~ e ,
p. 321-324.
Serbian government and Essad Pasha Topta~ii 71

Despite promises that he would be recognized as the Alba-

nian prince, and faced with open endeavors by the Italian govern-
ment to exert complete influence over him, Essad Pasha continued
on to France to seek backing from the allied diplomacy. Political
circles in Paris admitted him as the prime minister of a legitimate
government. Military experts evaluated that Albania was a
reservoir of good soldiers which could be winged over for the
allied cause by Essad Pasha only. In late August, Essad Pasha
reached Salonika in a French vessel. Through the mediation of the
Serbian and Greek diplomacies, his government acquired the
status of an exiled alliance cabinet. Essad Pasha's camp was set
up at the Salonilca battlefield from 1,000 gendarmes and followers
under the mmmand of Allbanian officers. Deployed to positions
towards Albania, he operated within the composition of the
French eastern army. According to PaSid's intentions, lzis camp
was to operate mixed with Serbian troops towards Kosovo and
northern Albania.35
During work in Salonika, Essad Pasha continuously strove
to obtain firm promises from France and Great Britain that
when the war was over rule over Albania would not be given to
Italy, and that he would be allowed to reinstate his administration
in the country. At the end ol 1916, Korca was proclaimed an
autonomous republic under the protection of French military
authorities, and power was given to the local liberals. Essad
Pasha complained to PaSic about the actions o l the French
military command, and warned of Italy's web of intrigues,
emphasizing that he had tied his fate to Serbia. He feared that
the Italian troops in Argirocastro were preparing an assassination.
Instead, General Giazzjnto Ferrero proclaimed the state of Alba-
nia, in early June, 1917, under the Italian p r ~ t e c t o r a t . ~ ~
The Serbian government lollowed with anxiety the consoli-
dation of Italian positions in Albania. Immediately after the
protectorat was proclaimed, the Serbian government protested
to the allied powers calling on the decisions of the Ambassadorial
Conference in London, to which Italy was a signatory, and
warned that the one-sided proclamation of Albanian independence
violated the "Balkans to the Balkan peoples" principle. The news
that the Italian military authorities were promising the Albanians
considerably wider state borders than those established in
London in 1913 aroused particular concern. PaSid therefore made

9j A. T. E a ~ a ~ o n u h Ecud-11ufuu
, Torzrur~ll,Cpo'lrja ~i a,z6aticuo nuraFbe
(1916-1918), pp. 348-349.
3O AS, MID, Str. pov., 1917, No. 232, Repolt: Proglas protektorata
Iialije nad Albanijom i uopstc 3 acl Italije, 1917, Krf; A. T. I j a ~ a ~ o s u l i ,
Ecad-natua T o n r a ~ i u , Cpo'rrja 11 a . ~ r 5 a ~ l ~ ~izura%e
:o (1916-1918), pp. 350-
-351; P. Pastorelli, op. cit., pp. 36-41. 1 documenti diplomatici italiani,
Quinta serie, vol VI, Roma MCMLXXXVIII, Nos 119, 390, 394, 427, 438
445, 448, 831.
72 DuSan T. Batakovid

it especially clear that the Italian protectorat resembled a similar

attempt by Austria-Hungary to "secure for itself a protectorat
over Albania, and indirectly over the other Balkan peoples by
creating a new Great Albania to the detriment of other Balkan
people^"?^
Essad Pasha also protected to the Italian government.
Dissatisfied with the development of the situation, he resolved
to set off for Switzerland, the center of various Albanian
committees, and through the French government to secure backing
from the British diplomacy which supported Italy's policy in
Albania. He obtained no guarantees in Paris, and failed to secure
backing from the Geneva committees, tied f i m l y to Austria-
-Hungary which financed them.38
Increasingly insecure about winning support from the
allies and concerned over implications that his special obligations
towards Serbia were no longer a secret, Essad Pasha demanded
of PaSid that the government provide more money and secure
after the war his administration in Albania within the borders
drawn by the Ambassadorial Conference in London. On his
return to Salonika at the beginning of 1918, Essad Pasha in talks
with Regent Aleksandar linked the distrust of the French diplomacy
with the Tirana Treaty and Italy's endeavors to compromise
France. In talks with other Serbian diplomatic officials, Essad
Pasha complained that the provisions in the Tirana Treaty impeded
him in political work. Finally, he made a demand to the Serbian
government to procure permission from the French military
authorities for [introducing his administration in the Korsa Re-
public, where Italians were freely agitating against him. The
French command, however, dissolved the Korqa republic in
February 1918, and took over command of Essad Pasha's units,
which held the front between Podgradec and Shkumbe, dile to low
combat morale.39
The Serbian government strove to aid Essad Pasha as
appreciably as possible within its means. Its policy towards Alba-
nia was, in principle, to any thwart plans on foreign protectorats
and reinstate the regime that existed prior to the withdrawal of
the Serbian army. The Serbian government protested several
times against the consolidation of Italian positions in Albania,
striving to give as much promi~nenceas po~ssibleto Essad Pasha
and prepare the conditions for his return to power. Essad
Pasha realized himself that Serbia was his last outpost and
that without its support he had no chance with the allies to

37 AS, MID, Str. pov., 1917. NO. 182. PaSid's note dated May 30
/June 13, 1917.
38 A. T. ~ T ~ K O B HEcad-nama
~ , T o n ~ a ~ uCp6uja
, u a~16a~czconu-
Ta%e (1916-1918), pp. 351-352.
S V b i d , pp. 353-358.
Serbian government and Essad Pasha Toptani 73

win back his return to the country. Thus in a message to United

States President Woodraw Wilson in the summer of 1918, he
said that only a future Yugoslav state could guarantee for the
integrity and independence of his country.40
In the event that Pasha's return to power was not possible,
Pasic was preparing to leave open the question of the border
with Albania. (The Entente had prior to the breakthrough of the
Salonika front signed an agreement in Paris on the division of
spheres of interest whereby Albania was ceded to Italy.) In
early November 1918, Pasic sent the following message: "Our
policy in Albania is to establish, if possible, the situation as it
was prior to the evacuation, when Essad Pasha was the Albanian
prime minister, and occupy ternitories from the Mada river beyond
and in agreement with the tribal chiefs, reestablish local admini-
stration which will act on the instructions of our authorties."4l
He called Essad Pasha - at the time in France seeking backing
- to return to Salonika and at the same time demanded that
territories taken in Albania be occupied by mixed allied forces:
he proposed also that the Albanian camp be used, mixed with
Serbian officers. The French command, however, disbanded Essad
Pasha's troops on October 12. By a decision of the interallied
Supreme War Council, Albania was to be controlled by the Italian
army up to the Maca river.42
Still, the Serbian prime minister did not rule out the
possibility that the situation would develop enabling the leturn
of Essad Pasha to Albania, to the region nortli of the Mada river
which Serbia considered its sphere of interest. Italy persecuted
Pasha's followers in the occupied parts of the country, and at
one particular time made a demandi to France for his internment.
It all ended with the withdrawal of the French representative
to his government?"

After the war, Italy became the main rival of the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) in Albania. Rome strove to
use the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy to step up its positions
in the Balkans and turn the Adriatic Sea into an Italian lalte.
Albania was in its schemes the country wherefrom Italian influence
would be wielded onto the neighboring regions. The Italian troops

Ibid, p. 359.
Ibid, p. 360.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, pp. 361-362; cf. B. Hrabak, Reokupacija oblasti srpske i
crnogorske driave s arbanaSkom vedinom stanovniStva u jesen 1918.
godine i drianje Arbanasa pre-ma zrspostavljenoj vlasti, Gjurmime alba-
nologjike 1 (1969), pp. 262-265, 285-286.
74 DuSan T. Batakovid

occupied the largest part of Albania and, by meeting the demands

of various com~nittees (particularly the Kosovo Committee) in
annexing to Albania Metohija, Kosovo and western Macedonia,
they presented themselves as the protector of the interests of
all the Albanian people. An interim government of Turhan Pasha
Permeti was set up in Durazzo under the wing of Italy at the end
of December 1918, which was ready to recognize as its ruler a
prince from the House of Savoy. At the Peace Conference in
Paris, Italy strove to secure the possession of Valona and hinter
land and obtain a mandate over the other parts of Albania.44
The envoys of the pro-Italian Durazzo government demanded at
the Peace Conference a revision of the 1913 borders - they
wanted Prizren, Djakovica, Ped, PriStina, Mitrovica, Skoplje, Te-
tovo and Debar to be included in the composition of the Albanian
stat^.^"
The policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
towards Albania did not deviate much from that of PaSiC's govern.
ment. Belgrade evaluated that the consolidation of Italian posi-
tions in Albania would be a source of continual threat to Kosovo,
Metohija and the neighboring regions. Head of the delegation to
the Conference, Nikoila PaSid, also shaped the policy of the new
state as regards Albania. In order to repress Italian influence in
the Balkans, he demanded the restoration of Albania within the
1913 borders, as an independent state with autonomous and
national rule. If the big powers should nevertheless decide to
divide the Albanian territories among the neighboring states, the
delegation demanded that the Yugoslav state be given northern
Albania from the Veliki Drim to S~utari.~6
Under the aegis of the Kingdom of SCS, Essad Pasha brought
his delegation to the peace Conference in Paris. Having submitted
a memorandum to the Conference at the end of April, he called
on the legitimacy of his government, its allied status in Salonika
and the declaration of war on the Central powers. Seeking the
restoration of independent Albania within the 1913 borders, Essad

4 4 P. Pastorelli, op. cit., pp. 63-86; B ~ J KH~il~apcp,kf~u,~lljartck-u

ak-yuja npostis Jyzocnasuje HU cut6a~cr~o-jyz0cno6e1ic1:o] zpaHrlr{ti 1919-
-1920. aanucu, XXIII, 3 (1966), pp. 477-515;
zod., M c ~ o p ~ j c m Zivko
Avramovski, Albanija izrned~a JtcgosZavije i Ztalije, Vojnoistorijski glasnik
3 (1984), pp. 164--166.
4J Arhiv Jugoslavije, Delegacija Kraljevine SHS na konferenci j i
mira u Parizu (later in text AJ. Delegacija), f-27, No. 296; Desanka Todo-
rovic, Jugoslavija i balkartske drz'ave 1918-1923, Beograd 1979, p. 50.
4' T h e Qtlestion of Sctctari, Paris 1919; A. Mitrovid, Jtcgoslavija iza
konferenciji mira 1919-1920, R e o ~ r a d 1969, pp. 169-176; Documentation
in: B. Krizman-B. Hrabak, Zapisrzici sa sednice delegacije Kraljevine
S H S na mirovnoj konferenciji ti Pariztc 1919-1920, Beograd 1960, pp.
321-324, 365-366.
Serbian government and Essad Pasha Toptarli 75

Pasha demanded to be recognized as the only legal representative

of his people.47
The Peace Conference. however. did not officiallv discuss
the fate of Albania as it was formally considered a neitral state
during the war. The question of its future was being resolved at
the Ambassadorial Conference of the big powers. The diplomatic
circles of the Western allies assessed that Albania was insuffici-
ently nationally constituted and that its development had to be
under the control of a big power. As time ~ a s s e d the
, representa-
tives of the big powers saw the solution to the Albanian question
in granting a mandate to Italy - its troops controlled the largest
part of the Albanian territory and its diplomats persisted on the
allies meeting the provisions taken over by the 1915 London
Treaty.18
PaSid evaluated that the Albanian question was to be resolved
soon. He strove to set it apart from its natural linkage with the
Adriatic question, which was considered an object of compensa-
tion. Even though France and Great Britain paid heed to the
interests of the Kingdom of SCS, PaSid believed that the key role
in resolving the Albanian question would be assumed by United
States President Woodraw Wilson and Italy. He persistently
maintained the stand that the Delegation of the Kingdom of SCS
demanded the restoration of Albania within the 1913 borders,
and that border alteration towards Serbia and Montenegro be
resolved in agreement with the tribes that lived there. If the stand
prevailed that the provisions of the London Treaty should be met,
Pasic demanded - as a big power was coming to the Balkans
and in the immediate vicinity of the Yugoslav state - stronger
stragetic borders as compensation. "The Main (Veliki) Drim from
the sea to the confluence of the Crni Drim, then the Crni Drim
up to a point beneath Debar, to the confluence of the Zota river
left of the Crni Drim, encompassing entire Lake Ohrid with the
watershed to remain on our side."49
Since Valona and the hinterland was being ceded to Italy
under the 1915 London Treaty, as well as protectorat over central
Albania, while Northern Albania was intended for Serbia and

47 Memoir Presente a la Conference de la Paix a Paris par son

Excellence le general Essad Toptani, president du gouvernement d'Albanie,
Paris, 16 Avril 1919. Essad Pasha's correspondence with the Serbian
government and his letters addressed to the Conference in: AJ. Delega-
cija, f-27. The same file contains the memoirs of Leon Krajewski dated
January 2, 1919, focusing mainly on Essad Pasha's relations with France.
48 AJ. Delegacija, f-27 No 7259; P. Pastorellil, op. cit., pp. 189-225;
D. Todorovid, oy. cit., pp. 53-44. Cf. also Paskal Milo, L'attitude d u
Royaiize serbo-crroato-slovene a l'egard de I'AlSanie a la Conference dc
la paix a Paris (1919-1920), Studia albanica, 1 (1989), pp. 37-57.
4u AJ. Delegacija, f-28, PaSid-Predsedniku Ministarskog saveta, liE.
no, strogo poverljivo, bez datuma.
76 DuSan T. Batakovid

Montenegro, Pasic proposed that the northern Albania tribes be

given the right to self-determination, "to say themselves if they
wish to join the central Moslem Albania under the Italian pro-
tectorat, or to form a separate small state - some sort of small
'buffer state', or if they desire to join our state as a small auto-
nomous state".50 Thus from the beginning of 1919, petitions of
individual Catholic tribes demanding to be annexed to Serbia
were collected at the border belt, with backing from the military
and civil authorities of the Kingdom of SCS.51 This way Pesic
wanted to parry the pro-Italian delegation to the Peace Conference
and deputies of the American Albanian society "Fire", which
demanded the forming of a Great Albania inclusive of considerable
regions of the former Serbian and Montenegrin state. Thus he
supported those groups of Albanian delegates in Paris that
maintained it would be the most benefitial for Albania if it came
to terms with the Kingdom of SCS, and accepted a border
alteration to its advantage, in keeping with the wish of the local
population. PaSic set out they believed that their independence
"would best be ensured if they entered into a alliance with us,
especially to set up a customs union. The group comprises Essad
Pasha's followers and those opposing the Italian p r o t e c t ~ r a t " . ~ ~
On the ground, particularly those areas in Albania under
occupation (by agreement with the French army, after the Austro-
-Hungarian troops were driven out) - PiSkopeja, Gornji and Dolnji
Debar and Golo Brdo - the Serbian military authorities, and
subsequently those of the Kingdom of SCS, tried to help organize
Essad Pasha's followers. A committee in Debar was entrusted
with the task of setting up rule in the border areas and preparing
the conditions for Pasha's return to the countrv. His cornrnission-
ers exerted the strongest influence in regions between Golo Brdo
and Gomji Debar, in Podgradec and Starova while deep into the
country, in the central parts, Italian troops gradually and
successhlly checked Es~sadPasha's followers. Despite continuous
dissipation, Essad Pasha still enjoyed considerable support
especially among the old Moslem beys, who viewed with distrust
the consolidation of Italian positions in central Albania.53
Beside the Conference, Italy and Greece signed in late July
1919 a secret treaty - the so-called Tittoni-Veniselos Treaty -
on the division of the Albanian territory. At the beginning of
December the allied powers recognized Italy's sovereinty over

.50 Ibid.
D. Todorovid, op. cit., pp. 49. The originals of a number of
petitions (submitted to the Peace Conference) on the annexation of the
northern Albanian tribes to the Kingdom of SCS are kept in: AJ,
Delegacija, f-28.
5"ame as footnote 49.
SS AJ. Delegacija, f-28. Nos. 1516, 1654, 1885, 2352, 3592, 3945, 5204,
6466.
Serbian government and Essad Pasha Toptani 77

Valona and the hinterland, and offered it a mandate to set up

administration in the remaining part of Albania under the control
of the League of Naticms. The same memorandum envisaged and
defined territorial compensations to the advantage of Greece.
PaSid again set out that in that case the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes had to stand by their demand for more favorable
borders towards Albania. He proposed that the region of the
entire length of the Mada river to the Crni Drim be demanded as
the maximum, and the stretch along the Crni and Veliki Drim
rivers to their confluence as the minimum.54
Cooperation with Essad Pasha never ceased for a moment.
The delegation of the Kingdom of SCS backed his demands that
he be paid war reparations as an ally to the Fourpartite Treaty
and thus indirectly acquire an allied status. Pasha's followers in
the country dissipated and gathered again, depending on current
circumstances, and were unsparingly helped in actions against
those supported by the Italians. He sent messages several times
to his followers that he was returning to the country and advised
them to act in cooperation with Serbia and todecisively oppose
the Italian o c c ~ p a t i o n . ~ ~
While a bitter diplomatic battle over Albania's destiny was
being waged at the Conference, a movement rose against the
Italian occupation in the country. The government in Durazzo was
condemned and replaced at a national congress of Albanian
chiefs in Lushanj in early 1920, and strong protests were lodged
that the Italian troops be routed. Ahmed Zogu, the interior minister
demanded the creation of a Great Albania; command over the army
was entrusted to Bairam Essad Pasha's followers tho con-
vened at the People's Assembly in March made strong demands
that the Italian troops be routed. Ahmed Zogu, the intenior minister
in the government of Suleyman Delvin, strove to neutralize Essad
Pasha, sending to that end special emissaries to Paris at the
end of May. The delegation offered Essad Pasha the post of prime
minister, on the condition that he abandon aspirations to rule
Albania.57 At the time Bairam Cur lead a decisive battle against
the detachments of Pasha's followers. Finally, on June 13, 1920,
an Albanian student, Avni Rustemi, by order of Suleyman Delvin
government killed Essad Pasha In front of the Continental Hotel
in Paris, believing that as an ally to Serbia, and then to the
Kingdom of SCS, he had betrayed the interests of the Albanian
people. Essad Pasha was buried with the last honors in the
Serbian army cemetary in Paris.

5' i. Avramovski, op. cit., p. 167.

56 AJ. Delegacija, f-27, Nos. 5504, 5376, 6275, 6451, 6589.
58 AJ. Delegacija, f-27, Nos. 5484-5489; 2. Avramovski, op. cit, pp.
169-170.
AJ. Delegacija, f-28, Nos. 6724, 6725.
76 DuSan T.Batakovid

The cooperation of the Serbian government and subsequently

the government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with
Essad Pasha is an important chapter in the history of Serb-Al-
banian relations. It was the first joint effort to resolve issues
of dispute between two peoples in the Balkans to the Balkan
peoples principle, in a manner that was, with certain territorial
concessions to Serbia, and subsequently to the Kingdom of SCS,
to wipe out old hotbeds of mutual conflict. The strategic aspira-
tions of the Serbian government to curb the influence of big
powers in Albania did not emanate solely from old aspirations
to permanently master northern Albania, but from actual political
estimates that under the influence and protectorat of a big power,
the Albanian state would pursue the course of maximalist and
national claims to territories that were inhabited, aside to the
Serbian people, by Albanians - Kosovo, Metohija and western
Macedonia.