Vanishing Marginals in State Legislative Elections

Author(s): Ronald E. Weber, Harvey J. Tucker and Paul Brace

Source: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), pp. 29-47
Published by: Comparative Legislative Research Center
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 RONALD E. WEBER
Universityof Wisconsin-Milwaukee
HARVEY J. TUCKER
TexasA&M University
PAUL BRACE
Universityof Illinois-Chicago

VanishingMarginals
InState LegislativeElections

An analysisof competition in the lowerhouses of 20 state legislaturesshows

that in almost everystate therewasa declineover the 1950-86 periodin the proportions
of marginalseats and of contested seats. A regressionanalysis conducted in 14 of the
states showsthat therewas less competitionin stateswith largerlegislativeresources,in
states using multimemberdistricts,and to a smallerextent in states wherea higherpro-
portionof incumbentssoughtreelection.In 6 of the 14 states,reapportionmentalso con-
tributedto the decliningproportionof marginaldistricts,thoughit had less effect on the
proportionof contestedraces.

Electoralcompetition for national legislative offices has been

the focus of widespreadscholarlystudy in recent years, with much of
the researchsuggestingthat marginalelectoralconstituencieshavebeen
in decline (particularlyfor the U.S. House of Representatives)during
the past severaldecades.While scholarsof congressionalelections have
debated whether marginaldistricts are vanishing and, if so, why they
are vanishing, students of state legislative elections have pondered
whethersimilarquestions might be worththeir study.Lackingdata, we
havelearnedlittle about the dynamicsof state legislativeelections, and
competition has been studied in only a few states at a few time points.
Since we know little about the extent to which competition varies in
state legislative elections, it has been impossible to even begin to ex-
plain the reasons for differencesin that competition.
The purposeof this paperis twofold:first, we will examine the
degreeofmarginalityin electionsto the lowerhousesof selectedstateleg-
islaturesfrom 1950 to 1986;second, we will make an exploratoryeffort
to explain differencesin marginalityover time in a number of those
houses. The focus will be upon whetherfactorssuch as incumbency,leg-
islative institutionalization,legislative performance,and redistricting

LEGISLATIVE
STUDIESQUARTERLY,XVI, 1, February1991 29

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30 Ronald E. Weber et al.

affectcompetition.Finally,we will speculateon other factorsthat might

be incorporatedin morecomprehensiveattemptsto explainwithin-and
across-statevariationin state legislativeelection competition.

ElectoralCompetitionin State LegislativeElections

Constituency-level electoral competition is probably more

common overallin state legislativeelections than in congressionalelec-
tions. Some state legislatures,however,resemblethe U.S. Congressin
their levels of competition, while others have more competitive elec-
tions. Jewell(1982) reportsdataon competition in the 1970s for legisla-
tive seats in eight states. His data show that competition was highest in
California, Colorado, Indiana, and Ohio-midwestern and western
states;competition was lowerin Kentucky,North Carolina,Tennessee,
and Texas-border and southern states. Ray and Havick (1981), in a
study of changesin electoralcompetition in eight state legislaturesover
80 years, found an overall decline in party competition for legislative
offices. They report,however,that competition rose duringperiods of
national party realignment (the 1890s and 1930s). Competition de-
clined over the 80-year period in six of the eight states Ray and Havick
studied. Tidmarch,Lonergan,and Sciotino (1986) examined competi-
tion in the 1970s for legislativeelections in the 49 states for which data
were available.They found that the degreeof marginalityin these elec-
tions varied considerablyacrossthe states. Competition for state legis-
lative seats was lowest in some southern states and in Massachusetts.
Smallerand more homogeneous states like Iowa, Montana, Nebraska,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyomingtended to have higherlev-
els of competition. Tidmarchet al. also detected that marginalitywas
less common at the end of the decade than at the beginning.
Making comparisons among these studies is difficult because
the investigatorsemploy differentoperationaldefinitions of marginal-
ity to measure constituency electoral competition. Ray and Havick
(1981) and Tidmarch, Lonergan,and Sciotino (1986) define as mar-
ginal or competitive those seats in which the winning candidates poll
55%or less of the majorparty vote; Jewell(1982) defines competitive
seats as those in which the winner receives 60%or less of the major
partyvote. Whenwe can reachconclusionson the basis of these studies,
it appearsthat competition does vary across the states, althoughsome
evidence points to declines in competition for legislativeseats in some
states over time.
Several years ago, Tucker and Weber (1985) made the first
attempt to determine how legislative election competition varied

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 Vanishing Marginals 31

across time in some 13 states. LikeJewell(1982) and most leading stu-

dents of marginalityin congressionalelections, they employed a cutoff
point of 60%of the majorpartyvote as their definition of marginality.
Where the winning candidate won 60%or more of the two-partyvote,
the seat was classified as safe; where the winning vote was below 60%,
the seat was classified as competitive or marginal.The procedurefor
multimember districts was somewhat different. In those situations,
they used the procedureemployedby Jewell(1982, 193) in his study of
legislative elections: they aggregatedthe votes for all the candidates
runningwithin the constituencyand then divided each candidate'svote
by that total. The resultwas multiplied by the numberof seats allotted
to the constituency, to produce a figure for each candidate that was
roughlyequivalentto the percentagefiguresfor single-memberconstit-
uencies. Then the same 60% cutoff point was used to determine
whetherthe seat was competitive or safe.
The originalTuckerand Weberstudy(1985) revealedthat in the
1950-80 period only four states-California, Michigan,Missouri,and
New York-had levels of electoralcompetition for lowerhouse seats at
or near the low level for U.S. House seats duringthe same period. In
those four states,less than 40%of the seats on averageweremarginal.At
the other extremeweretwo states-Colorado and Wyoming-in which
over 60%of the seats on averagewerecompetitive.They also found that
the percentageof lower house seats that were marginalor competitive
was increasingin some states, though competition was basicallystable
across the period. The marginalswere on the decline duringthe three
decades in Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania,and
Washington.In the other seven states the degreeof competitivenessfor
lowerhouse seats was essentiallyunchangedduringthe period.
As anotherindex of competition, Tuckerand Webermeasured
the percentageof state legislativeseats that werecontested.The average
for the threedecadeswasveryhighin Connecticut,Iowa,Michigan,New
Jersey,New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.It was lowest in Missouri,
whereabout 7 of 10 lowerhouse seats werecontested on average.They
also documentedthat contestedelections wereon the decline in several
of the states-Colorado, Michigan,Missouri,New York,Pennsylvania,
Washington,and Wyoming.In the remainderof the 13 states,the level of
contestedelections was basicallystableover the three decades.
We have updated the findings of Tuckerand Weber(1985) on
marginalityand contested seats by extending the time-series through
1986 and by adding several more states to the data base, so that more
states with low levels of statewidecompetition are included.These data
are reported in Tables 1 and 2. In terms of marginality,over 50%of

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32 Ronald E. Weber et al.

TABLE1
AverageLevel of Constituency-LevelPartisanCompetition for
the LowerHouse in 20 State Legislatures,1950-86
(in percentages)

State MarginalSeats ContestedSeats

California 32.1 86.1
Colorado 55.2 85.3
Connecticut 50.3 96.0
Iowa 56.4 87.7
Kansas 42.7 72.3
Maine 39.4 76.8
Massachusetts 24.1 63.2
Michigan 32.1 94.5
Missouri 32.9 68.6
New Jersey 55.2 99.7
New Mexico 46.3 74.2
New York 30.7 97.9
Ohio 43.3 91.0
Oregon 52.8 90.7
Pennsylvania 43.8 94.1
Tennessee 21.6 44.7
Washington 48.1 90.5
WestVirginia 50.2 82.6
Wisconsin 38.6 88.4
Wyoming 55.3 81.6

lowerhouse elections duringthe 1950-86 time periodwerecompetitive

on the averagein Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey,Oregon,
WestVirginia,and Wyoming.Between40 and 50%of lowerhouse seats
weremarginalin Kansas,New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania,and Wash-
ington. Between 30 and 40%of such raceswerecompetitive in Califor-
nia, Maine, Michigan,Missouri,New York,and Wisconsin.The lowest
degreeof marginalityon averagewas found in Massachusettsand Ten-
nessee, whereonly one in four seats was competitive. On the contesting
measure,Connecticut,New Jersey,New York,Ohio, Oregon,Pennsyl-
vania, and Washingtonwere the most competitive, with between 90
and 100%of seats contested. Between 80 and 90%of lowerhouse seats
werecontested on the averagein California,Colorado,Iowa,Michigan,
WestVirginia,Wisconsin,and Wyoming.The states of Kansas,Maine,
and New Mexico are in the 70 to 80%categoryof contested seats, and
Massachusettsand Missouri are in the 60 to 70%category.In Tennes-
see, only 4 of 10 lower house seats are contested on the average.As in

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 Vanishing Marginals 33

TABLE2
Simple Correlationof Indicatorsof Constituency-Level
PartisanCompetition for the LowerHouse in 20 State
Legislatureswith Time, 1950-86

Percentageof Percentageof
State MarginalSeats ContestedSeats
California -.292 .638*
Colorado -.890* -.806*
Connecticut -.354 -.633*
Iowa -.483* -.431"
Kansas -.494" -.247
Maine .231 .233
Massachusetts -.935* -.933*
Michigan -.671* -.466"
Missouri -.884* -.632*
New Jersey -.388 -.345
New Mexico -.895* -.603*
New York -.462" -.723*
Ohio -.913* .038
Oregon -.793* -.399"
Pennsylvania -.942' -.762*
Tennessee .206 .469"
Washington -.663* -.191
WestVirginia -.545* -.724*
Wisconsin -.461* -.464"
Wyoming -.506" -.663*

*p C .01.
** p < .05.

previous studies, it is clear from Table 1 that the degreeof marginality

andcontestingon the averagedoes varyconsiderablyacrossthe 20 states.
Has partisan competition for lower house seats changed over
time? To answerthis question, we correlatedthe two indicatorsof elec-
toral competition with the date of the election. If competitivenesswere
increasingover time, we would expect the correlationto be positive; if
decreasing,it should be negative.
The resultsof this analysisare reportedin Table2. Almost all of
the correlationcoefficients for the marginalseats indicatorof competi-
tion are negative, indicating that marginalityis decreasing.The rela-
tionship is stronglynegativein eight states-Colorado, Massachusetts,
Michigan,Missouri, Ohio, Oregon,Pennsylvania,and Washington.In
another six states-Iowa, Kansas, New York, West Virginia, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming-the evidence is that marginalityis on the decline,

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34 Ronald E. Weberet al.

but not at the same rate as in the stronglynegative states. In the other
four states, marginalityis generallystablebetween 1950 and 1986. The
data in Table 2 also suggest that lower house seats are contested less
often in a majorityof the 18 selected states. The proportionof general
election contests has been decliningparticularlyin Colorado,Connecti-
cut, Massachusetts,Missouri,New York,Pennsylvania,WestVirginia,
and Wyoming. Only in California and Tennessee has contesting been
on the increase, and the Californiafinding is largelya consequence of
that state's decision to ban cross-filingin both party primariesduring
the middle 1950s. Generalelection contestingjumped dramaticallyin
California with the abandonment of the cross-filing system. Only in
New Jerseyarethe patternsof legislativeelection competitiongenerally
stable, with both indicators of competition having low correlations
with time. With this exception, the evidence points to a lessening of
competition for lower house legislative seats, with marginalseats van-
ishing in about two-thirdsof the states studied. The pattern of vanish-
ing marginalsreported by some congressionalelections scholars also
seems to apply to some state legislative elections.

ExplainingChangesin State LegislativeElection Competition

Having established that marginal seats are indeed vanishing

fromthe lowerhouses of some state legislaturesand are stayingstablein
only a few others, we now explore factors that may be associated with
this changein competition. Wefocus on only fourpossibleexplanations
for changeand two control factors,in orderto reducethe complexityof
the analyses. These factors either have been associated with vanishing
marginals in the U.S. Congress or seem plausible from previous re-
search on state legislative elections. The four explanationsare incum-
bency, legislative institutionalization, legislative performance, and
redistricting.The two control factorsare presidentialelection year and
use of multimemberdistricts.

Incumbency
The literatureindicates that incumbency may have an impor-
tant effect on state legislative elections. Calvert (1979) reports that
more than 80%of incumbentsseekingreelectionin 29 states duringthe
late 1960s and the early 1970s retained their legislative seats. Jewell
(1982) revealsthat in eight selected states duringthe middle 1970s, few
incumbents were defeated in either the primary or general elections;
Giles and Pritchard(1985) show similar results for the Floridalegisla-

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 Vanishing Marginals 35

ture duringthe 1970s. Jewelland Breaux(1988), who makethe first use

of data from the ICPSR State LegislativeElections project,find a high
rate of incumbencywins in 14 single-memberdistrict states from 1968
to 1986. They also reportthat incumbents won at a stable rate across
time in those 14 states. On the other hand, they find that the marginof
victory for incumbents increased across time, meaning that incum-
bents were reelectedwith increasedpercentagesof the vote.
When incumbency is considered along with factors like poli-
tical partystrengthand campaignfinancing, it becomes less important
as an explanation of state legislative election outcomes. Only Welch
(1976) finds, in analyses of data from California and Oregon, that
incumbencyhas an effect on state legislativeelections when campaign
expendituresand political party strengthare considered as variables.
Other studies (Owens and Olson 1977; Caldeiraand Patterson 1982;
Giles and Pritchard 1985; Tucker and Weber 1987) report that the
effect of legislative incumbency on electoral success is outweighedby
other factors.
Although incumbency does not explain state legislative elec-
tion outcomes as well as congressionaloutcomes, we explore whether
the frequencywith which incumbentsseek reelectionin lowerhouses is
related to changes in legislative election competition over time. The
proportionof legislatorsseeking reelection was calculatedas the num-
ber of such legislatorsdivided by the numberof seats in the chamber.

LegislativeInstitutionalization

The literature identifies institutionalization as explaining

changes in competition for congressionalseats. Little is known, how-
ever, about the possible impact of legislative institutionalization on
competition in state legislativeelections. Chubb(1988), in an aggregate
study of state legislativeelection outcomes from 1940 to 1982, reports
that institutionalizationhas given state legislatorsthe resourcesto pro-
vide constituent services and thus to insulatethemselves from success-
ful electoral challenge. Chubb finds that "where the incentives and
resourcesfor electoral protection are high, the rate at which the prior
share of seats is normallymaintained is 50 percentgreaterthan where
incentives and resourcesare low"(1988, 146). The only other evidence
on the impact of institutionalization is found in Jewell and Breaux
(1988). Examining the margin of victory for incumbents in the 14
single-memberdistrict states in the ICPSR State LegislativeElections
data base, they reportthat the least institutionalizedlegislaturesshow
the strongest increases in the average vote margin for incumbents.

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36 Ronald E. Weber et al.

Incumbentwin marginswerealreadyhigh in the more institutionalized

state legislatures,and hence there was not as much potential for change
in those states.
We operationalize institutionalization in two ways. The first
approach is Chubb's (1988) measure of legislative compensation, in
which reelectionincentives serveas a proxyfor institutionalization.To
obtain his indicator, Chubb first calculates the sum of annual salary,
benefits, and cash allowances.This measureis used with state median
family income to distinguish states that offered legislatorscompensa-
tion at least equal to median family income from states that did not.
Our measureof legislativecompensationis calculatedsimilarly,except
that we classify the legislatureson the basis of the ratio between com-
pensation and median family income.
The second approachoperationalizeslegislativeinstitutionali-
zation through a measure of the resources that the state legislature
spends on its own activities both collectively and individually.We cal-
culate an index of expenditureper legislatorby dividing the total of leg-
islative expenditures in the biennium previous to the election by the
numberof membersof the legislature.

LegislativePerformance

How legislative performanceinfluences electoral competition

has not been the subjectof much empiricalinvestigationin state legisla-
tures.Quite simply,legislatorsmaybe punishedor rewardedat the polls
for their individual or collective behaviorwhile in office. In particular,
a desire to punish legislatorsmay lead to short-runincreasesin compe-
tition for legislativeoffice. Strongerchallengersmayrunagainstincum-
bents, transformingsafe seats into marginalseats in the short term.
In a recent study,Tuckerand Weber(1987) examined how one
indicator of legislative performance-votes on tax and revenue legis-
lation affected election outcomes for individual legislatorsin the state
of Washington.They found that the legislative performancevariables
wereweakand inconsistentcorrelatesof the proportionof the vote won
by incumbents.
What we do know about the impact of performancefactors
comes mainlyfromthe gubernatorialelectionliterature.Pomper(1980),
in a chapter first published in the late 1960s, studied fiscal policy-
particularlytaxingpolicy-in orderto accountfor reducedelectoralsuc-
cess among incumbent governors.Contraryto conventionalwisdom,
Pomperfinds thattax increasesarenot detrimentalandtax decreasesare
not beneficial for future campaigns. He also reports that changes in

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 Vanishing Marginals 37

spending policies do not seem to have much impact on gubernatorial

election outcomes. Othershave found a link betweengubernatorialtax
policies and subsequentelection outcomes. Eismeier(1979, 1983) sug-
gested that governorsand candidateswho propose or enact tax initia-
tives are more likely to lose the next election than are those who forego
any tax initiatives. The studies of Jewelland Olson (1982) and Sabato
(1983) both indicated that tax issues were linked to gubernatorial
defeat. A preliminary analysis by Tompkins and Smith (1982) con-
cluded that increasesin taxestend to depressshort-termelectoralgains,
while decreasesin taxes do not appearto have much political benefit.
These studies of how fiscal policy performanceaffects gubernatorial
election outcomes suggest that some collective measure of legislative
performancemay have an impact on competition in the short-term.
We define legislative performancein terms of enactment of
major increases in state taxes. We expect that such tax increases will
increase competition for legislative office in the subsequent election.
Major tax increases were coded 1, and the absences of any major tax
increase were coded 0. Information to create this variable was taken
from various issues of TheBook of the States. Thus, we expect to see a
positive correlationbetweenthe legislativeperformanceindicatorand
the measuresof legislativecompetition.

Redistricting
When state legislative seats are reapportioned after the de-
cennial census, the context for legislative electoral competition is
altered. In most states the legislatureitself does the redistricting,and
legislatorshavethe opportunityto drawdistrictlines that may advance
partisanor incumbent interests(see Erikson 1971; Uslaner and Weber
1977; Scarrow1983). When one party is in control of the redistricting
process, there is evidence that district lines are redrawnto give the
majority party an advantageover the minority party, in particularto
aid the incumbentsof that majorityparty.When no one partyis in con-
trol of the reapportionmentprocess, two different scenarioshave been
observed.In some cases, the partyin controlof each chamberis permit-
ted to drawthe lines to favorits partisaninterestand its incumbents.In
othercases, districtsare redrawnto makeseats saferfor the most power-
ful incumbentsof both partiesand to leave only a few seats that can be
competed for by candidates from either party. Under all scenarios in
which the legislature does the redistricting, the competitiveness of
some of the incumbents'districts tends to diminish.

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38 Ronald E. Weber et al.

We expect competition for legislative office to decreasein the

elections immediately after each reapportionmentin states where the
legislature is responsible for redistricting. We employ Multiple In-
terruptedTime Series (MITS) analysis to evaluate the effects of reap-
portionment.Specifically,we havecoded each occurrenceof a reappor-
tionment in a series of dummy variables.Yearsprior to each reappor-
tionment werecoded 0, and the yearsaftereach reapportionmentwere
coded 1. These variablesestimatethe effects of reapportionmenton the
overall level of competition. Each time a reapportionmentoccurred
such a dummyvariablewascreated,exceptthat we do not includea var-
iable for the redistrictingsof the 1980s because only two or three elec-
tions have been held underthose new plans. If a redistrictingincreased
the subsequent level of electoral competition, the coefficients associ-
ated with these dummy variableswill be positive. Beyondthe impact of
reapportionmenton the overall level of competition, we are also inter-
ested in trends in competition that follow reapportionments.To evalu-
ate these trends,we multiplythe dummy variablesmentioned above by
a year-countervariable.If a reapportionmentcontributedto decreased
electoralcompetition, the coefficients associatedwith these trend vari-
ables will be negative.

ControlFactors

We include two control factorsin our analysesthat may be sys-

tematicallyrelatedto changesin marginalityand contesting.The first is
a presidentialelection year dummy variable(1 = presidentialelection
year, 0 = nonpresidentialelection year), included to capturepossible
surge and decline effects. The number of votes cast in state legislative
elections should surgein presidentialyearsand decline in nonpresiden-
tial election years (see Austin et al. 1990, for a demonstrationof this
phenomenon). The partisancomposition of the electoratemay vary as
the number of those voting increases or decreases;this variation may
influence the degree of competition for legislative seats. This variable
also controls for presidentialcoattail effects. The degreeof marginality
and contesting of state legislative seats may vary with the fortunes of
presidentialcandidatesand the resourcesthat those candidatesexpend
on turningout partisansupport.
The second control factormeasureswhethera state had multi-
member districts during all or part of the time period covered by this
research.This variableis calculatedas the numberof lowerhouse seats
divided by the number of lower house districts. A district magnitude
figure of 1.0 indicates the use of all single-memberdistricts;any figure

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 Vanishing Marginals 39

greater than 1.0 indicates some combination of single-memberand

multimemberdistricts. The greaterthe size of this figure, the greater
the use of multimemberdistricts.In this analysis,the value of the varia-
ble ranges from 1.0 (pure single-memberdistrict plans in California,
Missouri, New York, and Wisconsin) to 2.6 (extensive use of multi-
memberdistrictsin Wyoming).Since severalof the 14 states employed
some multimember districts during the early part of the 1950-86
period and later went to single-memberdistricts only, incorporating
this control variable in the analyses enables us to see whether such a
change had any impact on marginalityor contesting.

Findings
To explore what factors affect changes in legislative competi-
tion, particularlychanges in marginalseats, we turn to a within-state
regressionanalysis for 14 states-California, Colorado, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Washington,West Virginia,Wisconsin, and Wyoming.We presentour
analysesin two parts.First,we reportregressionresultsfor the variables
representingincumbency,institutionalization,and legislativeperform-
ance and for the control variableson the two measuresof state legisla-
tive electoral competition. We are unable to include the redistricting
dummy variablesin this first analysisbecauseof problemswith degrees
of freedom. Since thereare only 19 or 20 election observationsfor each
state, we are alreadyat the degreesof freedomboundarywith five or six
independent variables.
Second, we analyze how the redistrictingvariables by them-
selves influence the changein legislativeelectoralcompetition. As was
noted above, MITS analysisis designedto measurenot only the imme-
diate impact of redistrictingupon state legislativemarginalityand con-
testingbut also the persistenceof that impact duringthe periodthat the
particularredistrictingplan was used (see Garandand Gross 1984 and
Garand 1985 for examples of the use of the MITS technique). This
second analysis enables us to determine the joint impact of the major
redistrictingsof the 1960s and 1970s on changingmarginalityand con-
testing, but it does not give us much opportunityto determinewhether
the redistrictingvariables explain more of the variation in electoral
competition than do the other factors.
The regressionresultsare reportedin Table 3 for the 14 states.
Ourregressionanalysisrevealsthat the legislativeresourcesmeasureof
legislative institutionalizationhas a statisticallysignificant impact on
changesin marginalityin 9 of those states. In each case the influence is

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 TABLE 3
Regression Analysis of Indicators of Constituency-Level Partisan Competition for t
Legislatures with Independent Variables, 1950-86
(standardizedcoefficientsin parentheses)
Presiden
Legislative Legislative Legislative Electio
State Intercept Incumbency Compensation Expenditures Performance Year
California
MarginalSeats .675 -.351 -.197 -.00006 -.005 -.003
(-.374) (-.081) (-.393) (-.030) (-.015)
ContestedSeats .923 -.431 .146 .00008 .021 .029
(-.233) (.305) (.271) (.053) (.076)
Colorado
MarginalSeats .894 -.433*** -.302 -.001* -.041 -.011
(-.244) (-.212) (-.474) (-.129) (-.037)
ContestedSeats .934 -.134 0.74 -.001* -.014 -.019
(-.137) (.095) (-.830) (-.081) (-.114)
Iowa
MarginalSeats .313 -.098 .192 -.002** .057 -.010
(.081) (.283) (-.760) (.215) (-.039)
ContestedSeats .548 -.019 .398* -.002* .073*** -.010
(-.021) (.792) (-1.12) (.376) (-.055)
Maine
MarginalSeats -.476 .543 -.239 -.0003 .039 -.039
(.684) (-.503) (-.075) (.210) (-.215)
ContestedSeats -.237 .446 .349 -.00004 -.015 -.042
(.542) (.254) (-.011) (-.078) (-.224)
Michigan
MarginalSeats .545 -.147 -.046 -.0002 -.009 -.011
(-.210) (-.158) (-.625) (-.066) (-.082)
ContestedSeats .520 .128 .091 -.00004 -.033 .026
(.221) (.375) (-.168) (-.297) (.236)

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 TABLE 3
(continued)

Preside
Legislative Legislative Legislative Electi
State Intercept Incumbency Compensation Expenditures Performance Yea
Missouri
MarginalSeats .431 .007 -.023 -.002 .029 .004
(-.008) (-.042) (-.909) (.126) (.020
ContestedSeats .581 .075 .229 -.002 -.029 -.001
(.068) (.371) (-.872) (-.111) (-.005
New Mexico
MarginalSeats .601 -.454** 1.151 -.002** .042 .000
(-.482) (.181) (-.447) (.146) (.000
ContestedSeats .611 .170 -.255 -.003* .051 .045
(.068) (.371) (-.872) (-.111) (-.005
New York
MarginalSeats .820 -.466*** -.041 -.0002* -.026 .024
(-.298) (-.088) (-.766) (-.141) (.134
ContestedSeats 1.041 -.025 -.018 -.00006* .003 .006
(-.063) -.153) (-.897) (.077) (.135
Ohio
MarginalSeats .391 -.498*** .065 -.0007* .043*** -.038
(-.184) (.065) (-.397) (.127) (-.123
ContestedSeats .993 .044 -.064 -.0001 .034 -.040
(.051) (-.205) (-.277) (.313) (-.401
Pennsylvania
MarginalSeats .249 .0004 -.010 -.0006* -.008 -.036
(.0001) (-.012) (-.726) (-.023) (-.118
ContestedSeats 1.457 -.249*** -.083*** -.0005* .027*** -.016
(-.159) (-.164) (1.079) (.136) (-.094

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 TABLE 3
(continued)

Presid
Legislative Legislative Legislative Elect
State Interce,pt Incumbency Compensation Expenditures Performance Yea
Washington
MarginalSeats -.395 -.363 -.283 -.0001 .024 .022
(-.232) (-.369) (-.115) (.109) (.099
ContestedSeats .672 -.289 -.263 .0003 .014 .039
(-.340) (-.627) (-.673) (.121) (.328
WestVirginia
MarginalSeats .504 .318 -.286 -.001 .008 .051
(.389) (-.232) (-.604) (.046) (.299
ContestedSeats 1.186 .124 -.041 -.0001 -.004 .058
(.139) (-.030) (-.062) (-.023) (.313
Wisconsin
MarginalSeats .661 -.583* .296* -.0004* .020 -.082
(-.575) (.467) (-.465) (.113) (-.465
ContestedSeats .975 -.049 -.024 -.0003* .041 -.046
(-.065) (-.052) (-.569) (.317) (-.358
Wyoming
MarginalSeats 1.210 -.085 -2.863 -.002 .029 .019
(-.067) (-.269) (-.318) (.082) (.066
ContestedSeats 1.221 -.152 -.609 -.001 -.029 .046
(-.237) (-.113) (-.446) (-.163) (.310
'p <.01.
"p < .05.
**p ' .10.

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 Vanishing Marginals 43

negative:as expendituresper legislatorincrease,the proportionof mar-

ginal seats decreases.The control variablefor extent of multimember
districtshas some impact on marginality:use of multimemberdistricts
is associated with higherlevels of marginalityin 5 of the 10 states that
employedsuch districtsduringall or partof the periodunderstudy.In 5
of the 14 states, a higherproportionof incumbentsseekingreelectionis
associatedwith declining marginality.The other three variablesdo not
influence marginalityin the 14 states. The legislative compensation
measureof legislativeinstitutionalizationis importantonly in Wiscon-
sin, where it is associated with increasedmarginality.The presidential
election dummy variable is important only in Pennsylvaniaand Wis-
consin, wheremarginalitydecreasesin presidentialelection years.The
legislative performancevariable emerges as significant only in Ohio,
where it is positively relatedto marginality.
Changein the level of legislativeresourceshas a strongimpact
on the level of contestingfor lowerhouse seats in 7 of the 14 states, with
the coefficients indicatingthat increasedresourcesare associated with
declining levels of contested elections in those states. The multi-
member district control variableinfluences the level of contesting in 4
of the 10 states that employed such districts during the period of this
study. The influence of multimemberdistricts is positive in two states
(Maine and Washington)and negativein two others (Pennsylvaniaand
WestVirginia).The legislativecompensationmeasureof institutionali-
zation has a positive, statisticallysignificantimpact in two states (Iowa
and Missouri), a result which suggests that higher compensation has
made contested elections forthe lowerhouse more likelyin those states.
Legislativecompensation was inverselyrelated to contesting in Penn-
sylvania, however.The legislative performancevariablehas a positive
impact in two states(Iowaand Pennsylvania),with taxingactions by the
legislaturestimulatingcontestedelections for the lowerhouse in the fol-
lowing election. The presidentialelection dummy variablehas a statis-
tically significant impact on contesting in two states: it appears that
more seats are contested in West Virginia in presidential years and
fewer seats in Wisconsin. The incumbency variable was inversely re-
lated to contesting in Pennsylvania, suggesting that incumbency
reducedthe level of contesting in that state.
The evidence from Table3 then is that the legislativeresources
aspect of legislative institutionalization has the greatest influence on
state legislative electoral competition in these 14 states, with the dis-
trict magnitude variable also affecting levels of marginalityand con-
testing. The other four variableswere much less importantin explain-
ing variation in state legislative electoralcompetition in those states.

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44 Ronald E. Weber et al.

In the analysisof reapportionmenteffects, the coefficients esti-

mated for the counter variable indicate the trends in marginalityand
contesting acrossthe period in each state. The reapportionmentvaria-
bles estimate the shift in the intercept that occurredas a result of the
redistricting.The interaction terms combining the counter and reap-
portionment variablesestimate the shift in slopes resultingfrom a re-
apportionment and represent ensuing trends in legislative electoral
competition under the new districtingplans.
The coefficients associated with the counter variable reveal
general trends in competition over the course of the period. In 6 of 14
states (California, Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, New York, and Wyo-
ming) marginalitywas estimated to have increased over the course of
the period. In two states (Californiaand New Mexico), contesting was
estimated to be on the rise. In Pennsylvaniamarginalitydeclined at a
statisticallysignificantlevel over the period;in Coloradolevels of con-
testing also declined significantly.
The change in the level of competition is capturedin the reap-
portionment variables.Reapportionmentsin Californiain 1962, New
Mexico in 1956, and Wyoming in 1972 all contributedto statistically
significant shifts in the level of marginality.The reapportionmentin
Californiain 1962 was also estimatedto increasethe level of contesting
in that state. Reapportionmentwas not estimated to reducethe level of
marginalityor contesting in any of the 14 states.
Finally,the trends in competition resultingfrom reapportion-
ment indicate that in 6 states (Californiain 1962, Iowa in 1964, New
Mexico in 1956, New York in 1966, Maine in 1958, and Wyoming in
1972) reapportionmentcontributedto declining levels of marginality.
Reapportionmentin Californiain 1962 was also estimatedto havecon-
tributed to declining levels of contested elections. Reapportionment
was estimated to have contributedto a trend towardgreatercompeti-
tion in only one state (Washington), where contested elections in-
creased after the reapportionmentof 1958.
The MITS analysis provides clear evidence that reapportion-
ment altered levels of competition, but the effects were largelylimited
to marginality.In three states, reapportionmentswere estimated to
have increased the level of marginality.However, following selected
reapportionmentsin 6 of the 14 states, there was a significant trend
toward declining marginality.Furthermore,reapportionmentwas not
significantlyrelatedto an increasingtrend in marginalityin any state.
Finally, in those states where reapportionment had a significant
impact, it reducedthe marginalityof state legislative seats.

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 Vanishing Marginals 45

Conclusion

The exploratory analysis reported in this paper indicates

clearly that marginallegislative seats are vanishing in some U.S. state
legislatures,just as they have been vanishingin the U.S. Congress.Fur-
thermore,contestingfor seats in the lowerhouse of state legislatureshas
declined over time in aboutthree-fourthsof the 20 stateswe selectedfor
our study. Although we did not focus on cross-state differences, it is
clear that there is considerablecross-statevariationto be explained in
the changesin marginalityand contesting.
Instead,we focusedon within-statevariationin marginalityand
contestingin the 14states,most of whichshowedsome decreasesin these
measures of legislative competition during the 1950-86 period. We
found that the legislativeresourcesmeasureof institutionalizationand
the districtmagnitudevariabledisplayedthe strongestrelationshipswith
marginalityand contesting.Wealso foundsome evidencethat frequency
of incumbentcontesting was relatedto decreasingmarginality.On the
other hand, we saw little evidence that marginalityor contesting was
influenced by the legislativecompensation,legislativeperformance,or
presidentialdummyvariables.Finally,we foundsome evidenceof redis-
trictingeffects on state legislativeelectoralcompetition, with the long-
term impact producingdecreasesin marginalityor contesting.
We see three furthersteps in this researcheffort. First, we will
need to expand the number of states in our regression analyses, to
include both other states where the marginalsare vanishing and some
states where legislative competition has been more stable across time.
Second, enlargingthe number of states will permit the use of pooled
cross-sectional time-series analysis techniques to assess both within
and across-statesourcesof variationin legislativeelectoralcompetition
in state lower houses. Third, we will need to explore other possible
explanations for change in legislative competition in the states. We
think that the size of legislativeconstituencies may have an impact on
competition, with competition more likely in largerconstituencies.We
will also need to include variablesthat may help to account for cross-
state differencesin legislativeelectoralcompetition. Wethinkthat vari-
ables that measuredifferencesin populationdiversityin the states and
variables that capture the overall degree of statewide competition
betweenthe partiesmaybe relevantin a pooled time-seriesanalysis.We
would posit patternsof legislativeelectoralcompetition to be higherin
more diverse states and in those states with strongertraditionsof com-
petition for statewideoffice.

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46 Ronald E. Weberet al.

RonaldE. Weberis Professorof Political Science, Universityof

Wisconsin,Milwaukee,WI53201. HarveyJ. Tuckeris ProfessorofPolit-
ical Science, TexasA&M University,College Station, TX 77843. Paul
Brace is AssociateProfessorof PoliticalScience, Universityof Illinois at
Chicago,Chicago,IL 60680.

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