People of the Philippines vs.

Nazareno Villareal
G.R. 201363. March 18, 2013

Facts:

On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon)
was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of
about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de
Leon alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant who upon seeing him, tried to
escape but was quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver.

Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board appellant onto his
motorcycle, confiscated the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession, and brought to the Police
Station. The plastic sachet was tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug. Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs in an Information.

The RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the elements of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs have been established, and sentenced the latter to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. the CA also sustained appellant’s conviction, finding "a
clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest". The accused then appealed with the Supreme
Court assailing the decision of CA which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.

In its petition with the Supreme Court, the appellant averred that the CA erred in affirming in toto
the RTC’s decision convicting him of the offense charged.

Issue:

Whether the warrantless arrest of the appellant was lawful.

Ruling of the Court:

No, the warrantless arrest of the appellant was unlawful. The Court finds it inconceivable how PO3
de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a
negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet
allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu,
is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was indeed
shabu.

Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be
properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he
(appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per
se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s hands cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at
the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de
Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.

The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge
that a crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon
had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact
have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon
was merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous charge for the
same offense.

It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on
"personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record," as this is
unquestionably not what "personal knowledge" under the law contemplates, which must be strictly
construed.

Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be
construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed
to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for
even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for
speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully
apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is
susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify
innocence.

In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they
appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by
themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to
justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood
to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.