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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Fisheries Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/fishres

Fishers, Fair Trade, and finding middle ground

Megan Bailey a,∗ , Simon Bush b , Peter Oosterveer b , Laksmi Larastiti b
a
Marine Affairs Program, Dalhousie University, 1355 Oxford St., Halifax, NS B3H4R2, Canada
b
Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, Wageningen, 6700 KN, Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The goal of Fair Trade certification is to contribute to sustainable development by offering trading con-
Received 15 May 2015 ditions that are transparent and equitable. One important condition is improved market access and
Received in revised form strengthened producer organizations. In regions like Southeast Asia this goal can be hard to achieve
27 November 2015
in value chains where local middlemen play a central role in not only trading fish, but also providing fish-
Accepted 30 November 2015
ers with access to capital, infrastructure and essential services. Despite these contributions, Fair Trade
Available online xxx
principles presume that middlemen adversely control market benefits that should accrue to primary pro-
ducers. The social and economic contributions of middlemen, and the potentially dependent relationship
Keywords:
Fair Trade
fishers have with them, is therefore a controversial issue if Fair Trade fish is going to be marketed as a
Certification product capable of improving fisher livelihoods. In this paper, we explore the role of middlemen in the
Patron–client first ever Fair Trade USA fishery: handline-caught yellowfin tuna from Molucca in Indonesia. Interviews
Middlemen with fishers, middlemen, the local processor and those involved in Fair Trade implementation were con-
Value chains ducted and analzed to understand changes to the organization of the value chain and of the community
Small-scale fisheries by defining how middlemen contribute to the assets and capabilities of fishers. The results indicate that
middlemen contribute but also control the full range of assets required to enable fishers to fulfill their
value chain functions. Introduction of Fair Trade has facilitated a rapid reorganization of value chain struc-
ture in the fishery with notable impacts on fisher perceptions of the resource and the market. However, it
remains unclear what this value chain reorganization means for community structure. The opportunities
and challenges for Fair Trade USA fish to be an empowering force depend heavily on fisher-middlemen
dynamics being adequately considered.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction inclusion of developing country fisheries due to its payment struc-

Seafood consumer awareness campaigns and eco-labels
attempt to harness the power of the market to encourage consump-
tion decisions more aligned with sustainability goals, and in doing
so promote improved production practices (Jacquet et al., 2010a).
There is evidence for their successful role in shifting purchas-
ing decisions and in helping seafood producers improve practices
(Gutiérrez et al., 2012; Agnew et al., 2013). But there is also
evidence that they are limited in reaching a critical mass (Bush
et al., 2013a), providing legitimate policy outcomes (Christian et al.,
2013; Jacquet et al., 2010b; Konefal, 2012) and ultimately effect-
ing change to resource health (Froese and Proelss, 2012; Jacquet
et al., 2010a). Perhaps most notably, leading eco-labels like the
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), have also been criticized for
their failure to develop social sustainability criteria and the weak
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: megan.bailey@dal.ca (M. Bailey).
ture and data intensive assessment criteria (Gulbrandsen, 2012;
Ponte, 2012).
Calls for inclusion of social standards and improved engagement
of developing country fisheries have continued largely because of
they contribute 54% of the global seafood trade by value and more
than 60% by volume (FAO, 2014). Various approaches for improv-
ing the inclusion of small scale developing country fisheries have
been developed. One prominent example are fishery improvement
projects (FIPs), which are seen as a way to offer market access
for fisheries that are guided through a set of stepwise improve-
ments that are most commonly aimed at complying to standards
like the those of the MSC. While less than 10% of the 200 MSC
certified fisheries come from developing countries (MSC, 2014),
developing countries account for about half of all registered FIPs
(Sampson et al., 2015). But while their potential impact on fish-
ery sustainability in developing countries is potentially large, their
effectiveness in really incentivizing sustainability gains has been
questioned (Sampson et al., 2015). Another emerging strategy to
include small-scale producers is the introduction of Fair Trade cer-

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2015.11.027
0165-7836/© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article in press as: Bailey, M., et al., Fishers, Fair Trade, and finding middle ground. Fish. Res. (2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2015.11.027
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tification. After a decision by Fair Trade International to not engage
with fisheries (because of the complexity of the trade, lack of brand-
ing, and risk of entering into a sector dominated by the MSC, Auld,
2014), Fair Trade USA developed a fisheries standard (not recog-
nized by Fair Trade International) certified the Moluccan yellowfin
tuna handline fishery in Indonesia in 2014.
Fair Trade certification supports social sustainability, encour-
ages environmental protection, and attempts to redress power
imbalances in international trade and global value chains between
traders and processors in the global North and producers in the
global South (Bacon, 2005; Goodman, 2004; Nicholls and Opal,
2005). For developing world fishers, such producer empowerment
is a notable challenge given the existence of middlemen, known
by a variety of names throughout Southeast Asia (e.g., punggawa,
tengkulak, mee kha or cassas). These actors play key roles in the value
chain and often control access to fisheries and markets. As identi-
fied by various scholars (Amarasinghe, 1989; Bush and Oosterveer,
2007; Bush, 2004; Crona and Bodin, 2010; Kusumawati et al., 2013;
Pauwelussen, 2015; Platteau and Abraham, 1987; Ruddle, 2011),
middlemen are tied to credit and social welfare in communities
that are geographically isolated, as well as politically and economi-
cally marginalized. Empowering fishing communities through Fair
Trade therefore appears to be inevitably tied to addressing the role
and function of these middlemen, and the norms and arrangements
that enable them to control fisheries and trade.
In value chain terms, Fair Trade is a strategy of upgrading that
aims to reposition and empower producers vis-a-vis conventional
trade relations in at least two ways. First, by creating more tangi-
ble links between producers and markets (Riisgaard et al., 2010),
and second, by improving the ability of developing country pro-
ducers to achieve higher economic returns (Gibbon et al., 2008).
By creating direct links between producers and markets and by
improving functional capabilities beyond production, upgrading
can enable producers to realize higher benefits from trade by
excluding the middlemen (Mitchell and Coles, 2011). However,
while these middlemen exhibit rent seeking behavior from their
profitable position within the chain, they also play an important
facilitative role in fishing and trade, which questions whether they
can simply be removed from the value chain (Amarasinghe, 1989;
Bush and Oosterveer, 2007; Kusumawati et al., 2013). If the Fair
Trade model is to empower small-scale fishers in regions such as
Southeast Asia, not only should the rent seeking behavior of these
middlemen be removed, but the capabilities and assets that they
provide in fishing communities should be accounted for at the same
time.
In this paper, we explore the extent to which the Fair Trade strat-
egy of by-passing middlemen from the fishery value chain actually
empowers small-scale fishers in the Molucca handline tuna fish-
ery. Using an assets and capabilities framework, we analyze what
will be lost to fishers if these middlemen are excluded. In doing
so, we contribute to a wider understanding of the social relations
of production and trade in small-scale developing world fisheries,
and provide key insights for the future development of Fair Trade
certification as it relates to sustainable fisheries.
2. Functional upgrading, assets and capabilities
Fishers are often identified as particularly vulnerable actors in
global value chains, because while they provide an essential role in
the chain, they may be locked in a position where they are unable to
independently make decisions regarding their own welfare (Becx
and Eenhoorn, 2009). This type of inequality in value chain gover-
nance can have a strong influence on the economic development of
poor people (Nissanke and Thorbecke, 2006). New opportunities to
redress an inequitable distribution of power and financial benefits
Please cite this article in press as: Bailey, M., et al., Fishers, Fair Trade, and finding middle ground. Fish. Res. (2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2015.11.027
in favor of disadvantaged groups such as small-scale fishers may
open up via shifts in value chain based governance arrangements
such as certification. In this paper we use the concept of value chain
upgrading, defined as capturing more value in the chain by balanc-
ing a range of economic, environmental, and social benefits and
risks (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000), to identify and understand
the conditions under which such opportunities can be realized.
2.1. Fair Trade as a functional upgrading mechanism
Functional upgrading refers to one type of upgrading that
involves a chain actor (such as a fisher), adopting additional func-
tions that might reduce their overall vulnerability and/or enable the
capture of a greater proportion of value generated in one or more
segments of a specific chain (Ponte and Ewert, 2009; Riisgaard et al.,
2010). One functional upgrading strategy that Fair Trade attempts
to facilitate is the establishment of direct market access for small-
holders by increasing their skills and knowledge and strengthening
their organization. In some cases, the adoption of such new func-
tions might lead to the redundancy and therefore exclusion of
chain intermediaries such as middlemen (Mitchell and Coles, 2011).
Building on the wider literature on functional upgrading (Renard,
2005; Khiem et al., 2010; Fischer and Quaim 2012), the exclusion of
intermediaries is seen as desirable because they are considered to
take advantage of the weaker position smallholders have in access-
ing credit, key inputs and ultimately markets.
Functional upgrading is concerned with two fundamental
themes: identifying sources of producer capabilities, and promot-
ing the economic and social development of small-scale producers
(Lee and Gereffi, 2015; Ponte and Ewert, 2009). Fair Trade certi-
fication can be considered an example of a functional upgrading
mechanism aimed at addressing these concerns. Introduced as a
product label for coffee in 1988 by the Dutch Max Havelaar Foun-
dation, Fair Trade sought to differentiate products according to
particular guidelines on producer price and smallholders’ organiza-
tion from conventional coffee (Oosterveer and Sonnenfeld, 2012).
It has since expanded to include a wide range of products, reaching
over D 5.5 billion in sales by 2011, up from D 217 million in 2001
(Fair Trade International, 2014, 2011). In some value chains, mid-
dlemen are being eliminated. In their place, financial, technical and
organizational capacities are built that allow for distributing a social
premium to be used for community development and related envi-
ronmental purposes. Organized groups of producers are certified
against the Fair Trade standard by an independent certification and
verification agency. When certified, these producers are allowed
to trade their products to importing organizations that sell them
under the Fair Trade label. Long-term partnerships with importing
country buyers contribute to stability and security for producers
giving them the opportunity to make investments in the future of
their enterprise and of their family and local community.
The only recent inclusion of seafood can be explained by the
nature of the resource and organization of production. First, fish
are captured at sea, often in open access conditions. Thus, fish-
ing behavior is often unobservable for outsiders, making it hard
to control and verify whether fishers actually perform according
to specific standards. Second, the tight linkages between financing,
technology and marketing complicate improvements to producer
empowerment based on market demand alone. Third, as a fresh
product, seafood needs rapid processing and sale meaning that
attention to details, such as those included in certification stan-
dards, can be difficult as the extra time needed to meet Chain
of Custody requirements may compete with maintaining product
quality. Fourth, all of these above-mentioned complexities may dif-
fer substantially for each species, gear type, and place of origin,
making the setting of generic standards for seafood particularly
problematic. And finally, redefining the social organization of fish-
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ing communities may require a considerable time investment given
the common existence of strong social and cultural norms.
Despite these challenges, Fair Trade USA developed a standard
independently of Fair Trade International and assessed a small-
scale yellowfin tuna fishery in Molucca in 2014. The standard aims
to strengthen the position of the fishers within the value chain by
requiring them to reorganize harvest and post-harvest activities,
and in doing so take on functions that create economies of scale and
increase benefits through improved bargaining power. By setting
key principles of empowerment and social responsibility Fair Trade
USA operationalizes the involvement of local producers through
the formation of associations that can provide a forum for train-
ing and capacity building (Table 1). Under Fair Trade USA, fishers
are awarded a social price premium from each transaction (called
the Fair Trade premium). With increased information and market
access in addition to a price premium, Fair Trade USA expects to
contribute to improved economic conditions of local producers.
By complying with the Fair Trade USA Capture Fisheries Stan-
dard, fishers are entering into a form of functional upgrading. That
is, they are required to reorganize the social relations of produc-
tion and trade in a given community, by taking on functions beyond
production, such as trade, transport and even credit provision. Con-
ceptually this offers new insights into upgrading. The literature
focuses predominantly on the role of lead firms in coordinating
and facilitating upgrading of other value chain actors (Gereffi et al.,
2005). In many cases upgrading is seen as a rational choice—as
matching the goals and requirements of producers and lead firms
in order to ensure efficiency in future transactions. Less attention
has however been given to the capabilities that producers require
in order to take on new functions, nor to the local conditions which
allow producers to develop these capabilities. To analyze these we
draw on the capabilities approach within the sustainable liveli-
hoods literature.
2.2. Capabilities, assets and upgrading
Sen’s capabilities approach to development focuses on the
ability of individuals or groups to fulfill the functions necessary
to reach economic and social goals (Sen, 1985). The ‘functions’
that Sen refers to include a wider range of roles and practices,
that enable economic and social activities to be undertaken, and
in doing so improve wellbeing by expanding the potential for
self-determination (Sen, 1985). However, he also argues that
developing the capabilities required to fulfill these functions is
dependent on a dialectic relationship with an individual’s or group’s
endowment of assets; referring explicitly to things that commu-
nities and households own, control or access (Bebbington, 1999;
Emery and Flora, 2006; Moser, 1998). Assets are not only resources
or capitals in and of themselves, but they also provide the capabil-
ity to act (Bebbington, 1999). The extent to which these assets are
accessible determines whether capabilities can be developed, and
the degree of access to these assets is, in turn, partially determined
by capabilities.
The composition of capabilities and assets required to repro-
duce the functions necessary for coping with and recovering from
environmental, social and economic vulnerabilities has been devel-
oped further in one of the more established bodies of livelihoods
literature (Chambers and Conway, 1992, p. 6). Here assets, or ‘capi-
tals’, are generally grouped under five categories: physical, human,
social, natural and financial (Allison and Ellis, 2001; Ellis, 2000).
Physical assets refer to infrastructure and public goods; human
assets include skills and knowledge; social assets reflect norms,
networks and relations that facilitate social organization and access
to information; natural assets refer to the natural resource stock
upon which production is based; and financial assets refer to actual
or accessible income, savings and credit (see Table 2 for detail).
Please cite this article in press as: Bailey, M., et al., Fishers, Fair Trade, and finding middle ground. Fish. Res. (2015),
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3
Together these asset groups provide a snapshot of how an indi-
vidual or group, such as a fisher or a fishing community, builds
a livelihood. But perhaps more importantly it also enables us to
analyze how policy instruments such as Fair Trade certification
(Scoones, 2009) influence the means by which these livelihoods
can be improved.
We apply this capabilities framework to analyze whether the
application of the Fair Trade standard in a small scale developing
world fishery strengthens the capability to upgrade fishers’ position
in the global value chain for tuna. We examine how existing value
chain relations, centered around the role of middlemen within
these communities, are by-passed and altered under Fair Trade cer-
tification. Given that middlemen play a key role in aggregating fish
to sell to downstream actors, and often control local financial sys-
tems (Ruddle, 2011), they are problematized by Fair Trade as rent
seeking actors who keep fishers poor by controlling their endow-
ment of assets and therefore limiting their capability to acquire
new (value chain) functions (Nicholls and Opal, 2005; Nussbaum,
2003). We therefore focus on what assets middlemen contribute to
the Molucca tuna hand-line fishers and fishing community, and the
extent to which the intervention of Fair Trade replicates or alters
access to these assets. Clarifying this will contribute to our under-
standing of the contested role of middlemen in seafood value chains
and the prospects for functional upgrading through Fair Trade.
3. Materials/methods
A first round of interviews and ethnographic observation were
conducted in Central Molucca villages and in Bali between January
and May 2014. This initial study provided a baseline before Fair
Trade certification. Interviewees were selected through purposive
sampling based on the point of entry for value chain analysis (i.e.,
in this case, fishers, middlemen and processors) as elaborated on
by Kaplinsky and Morris (2001). Value chain interviewees included
fishers, middlemen, the local processor and the international pro-
cessor (market partner) who is also the Fair Trade certificate holder.
Staff from the implementation partner and from Fair Trade USA
were also interviewed in what Raworth et al. (2012) refer to as a
‘conversational style’. Two of the authors returned to the field in
January 2015, after the certification had been awarded. Due to the
risk of interview fatigue in the villages, as noted by the implemen-
tation partner, focus group discussions with the implementation
partner were instead held over a weeklong period. During this visit
the local processor and market partner were also interviewed again.
Table 2 outlines the different actors and sample sizes used in this
analysis. In total over the three different field visits, sixty indi-
vidual interviews took place. The interviews for fishers included
thirty-seven out of the ninety-six total fishers involved in the fisher
associations, while three out of a total of four middlemen were
interviewed in 2014. The 2015 focus group meeting for the imple-
mentation partner included six individuals, which were all field
staff working full time on Fair Trade implementation, as well as
supporting field and office staff, thereby involving everyone who
has worked, or currently works, with the Fair Trade fishery.
Interviews with middlemen and fishers took place in Indonesia,
with the help of a translator when led by MB and/or SB, or directly in
Indonesian when led by LL. Questions focused on four different cat-
egories or topics, but not all topics were asked of all interviewees:
(1) General activities and organization of the tuna fishery and value
chain (e.g., the role of different actors, flows of fish, daily/monthly
fishing activities); (2) Relationships between different value chain
actors (e.g., the importance of the relationship, positive, negative or
neutral value of the relationship); (3) Knowledge about the value
chain and global tuna markets (including where the tuna goes when
it leaves the village and Indonesia); and (4) Contributions of mid-
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Table 1
Objectives of the Fair Trade USA capture fisheries standard.

Objective Description

Empowerment Supports fishers to develop skills necessary to effectively negotiate with those who have an influence on the buying,
processing, and marketing of their products. This is done through the process of organizing a Fisher Association,
electing a Fair Trade Committee, creating a Fair Trade Premium Plan, and making decisions on how to spend the Fair
Trade Premium

Economic Aims to increase income of fishers by ensuring a transparent and stable trading relationship with buyer(s) and by
development requiring payment of a Fair Trade Premium on every product sale. The Standard establishes wage requirements for
workers employed by the registered fishers and the certificate holder in order to increase their income

Social Protects the human rights of those involved in the fishery. For fishers and their employees, health and safety measures
responsibility are established in order to avoid work-related injuries. Fishers are encouraged to use the Fair Trade Premium to
provide greater access to, or improved quality of, healthcare and education

Environmental Fishers must adopt responsible fishing practices and protect biodiversity, including through data collection and
stewardship monitoring, recognizing that small-scale fisheries often face challenges with data availability and management. A goal
of the Capture Fisheries program is to have fisheries improve over time and eventually reach a level of environmental
sustainability consistent with Marine Stewardship Council certification. In addition, the certificate holder and Fisher
Association(s) work with government agencies and other stakeholders to jointly improve fishery management

Adapted from Fair Trade USA (2014).

Table 2
Actors interviewed in this study, with interviewer noted (MB = Megan Bailey, SB = Simon Bush, LL = Laksmi Larastiti).

Time period Technique Actors Number of subjects Conducted by

January–February Interview Middlemen 3 MB, SB

2014 Fishers 6
Local processor 1
Certificate holder: implementation partner 2
Certificate holder: market partner 2

March–May Interview Fair Trade USA employee 1 LL

2014 Fishers 37
Middlemen 3
Certificate holder: implementation partner 2
Local processor 1

January Interview Local processor 1 MB

2015 Certificate holder: market partner 1
Focus group Certificate holder: implementation partner 6

dlemen to fisher livelihoods (e.g., contributions by middlemen to
the financial, physical, human, social and natural capitals of the
community), and asked about ways in which middlemen helped
or hindered the capabilities of fishers. Ethnographic observations
also occurred during field visits, where processes of negotiation and
community meetings were observed.
4. Results
The results are presented in three parts. First, we provide a
description of the local chain dynamics in the Molucca tuna han-
dline fishery. Second, we analyze the contribution and control of
fisher assets by middlemen before the Fair Trade intervention.
Third, we analyze how the intervention of Fair Trade certification
has led to a reorganization of the social relations of production and
trade in the fishery and explore the potential consequences of these
changes on fisher assets and capabilities.
4.1. Local value chain dynamics
The Molucca tuna fishery is dominated by artisanal fishers using
small vessels of about 8 m in length (1–2 gross tons capacity) har-
vesting fish with handline. Fishing activities are located out of
several small communities, but the initial Fair Trade USA value
chains are organized around two main landing sites: Assilulu and
North Buru Island. Daily catch is 0–3 fish per fisher, with seasonal-
ity and weather identified by fishers as having the biggest influence
on fisheries production.
In Molucca, adult tuna are brought on board the vessel, cleaned,
dressed and loined at sea (heads and tails cut off, gutted, and cut
into four pieces), and stored in a cold box. This practice of loining at
sea is due to the small size of the fishing vessels, where a whole fish
may take up too much room. When the fishing day is over, the fish-
ers and their catch return to the landing site associated with their
middleman,1 around whom much of the fishing activity is orga-
nized. Fishers and middlemen are bound to each other by social
conditions and cultural norms. These middlemen hold an important
position in the value chain through their role in facilitating produc-
tion, assisting in financing, controlling flows of commodities, and
moving raw product from fishers to processors. Fishers are paid US
$3.70–4.00 per kilogram of tuna landed, but did mention during
interviews that the price changes daily, and is not openly commu-
nicated to fishers by the middlemen. During interviews, however,
middlemen claimed that they would disclose market information
if fishers asked, but noted that they rarely get questioned by fishers
about prices.
At the middleman’s landing facility, called a mini-plant, the fish
are lightly processed, which in some cases just means rinsed and
bagged, and in other cases, the loins are cleaned of bones, skin, and
brown meat, rinsed and bagged. All loins are also graded, which
is the practice of selectively distinguishing good and poor quality
harvest based on color, firmness and texture of the meat. Grades
1
In Molucca, these middlemen are specifically referred to as suppliers, but to
reduce confusion, we maintain use of the term middlemen throughout the paper.

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Fig. 1. Molucca yellowfin tuna value chain actors and product flow. Fair Trade actors are bold and in italics.

A through C will continue on through the FT value chain. Anything others allow fishers to slowly pay off the boat and engine, and
under grade C will be redirected to the local market. hence to become boat owners at some point in the future. There
Middlemen occupy the second node in the value chain, as a sort is some amount of tension around these relationships because,
of aggregator, amassing product from different fishers and getting as the implementation partner explained, for the duration that a
fish from the villages to the processor in Ambon (Fig. 1), where the fisher is borrowing the boat from a middleman he remains indebted
loins are cleaned, packaged, and flash frozen for export. The frozen and therefore bonded to that middleman, who also provides other
tuna loins are shipped to Vietnam where, at a processing/trading necessary equipment such as life jackets, ice, Styrofoam boxes,
facility, they are cut into steaks and packaged as either “Fair Trade knives, and plastic bags. One middleman himself admitted that
Certified Ahi Tuna Steaks” if they originate from the Fair Trade line, these contract-free financial and technological loans are a form of
or otherwise simply as ahi tuna. From Vietnam, the products are control used to “prevent the fishermen from selling his fish to other
exported to the US market. Because of the low expected volume middlemen”. The provision of community physical assets includes
of raw material, conservatively estimated at less than 100–150 t of examples such as building of a new mosque through the help of
cleaned product per year, only Safeway stores in the United States a middleman who contributed 0.2% of monthly sales over several
currently sell the Fair Trade USA product. years, and in another case, one middleman donated material (sand,
paint) for mosque repairs, provided fuel for materials shopping, and
encouraged his fishers to take days off from fishing to provide labor
4.2. Role of middlemen before Fair Trade
for the repairs.
An endowment of natural assets in fisheries relates to the status
Middlemen, in general, contributed directly and indirectly to
of the resource itself. Middlemen may influence the natural assets,
each of the five asset categories as reported in Table 3. Interviews
the fish stocks and their status, in three ways. First, by reacting to
demonstrated, however, that there was considerable variation in
the demand from the market they facilitate access and exploita-
the way in which middlemen contributed to livelihoods of fishers
tion of that resource (decreasing it). Second, and more positively,
by controlling the endowment of assets. Similarly there was varia-
they influence the information available to fishers, for example by
tion in the extent to which these middlemen were included in, and
encouraging fishers to only catch adult tuna and to avoid juve-
had influence on, the Fair Trade process. Given that such variation
nile catch and the catch of non-target endangered, threatened and
is found within a fishery, variation between fisheries about the role
protected species (ETPs)—both of which are key issues in tuna
of middlemen is likely to be large.
fisheries in Indonesia and the Western Pacific (Bailey et al., 2012;
Perhaps the most direct means of middleman control is over
Bush et al., 2013b). Third, because they have a higher community
the endowment of financial assets. Because of the small amount
standing than fishers do, they are more able to engage with the
of tuna caught per fisher, and the distance to the processing com-
government on sustainability conversations related to tuna fishing.
pany, middlemen explained that fishers are unable to create and
The implementation partner has witnessed middlemen in Molucca
maintain a relationship with the processor. Middlemen therefore
representing their fishers and promoting handline fisheries as a
facilitate access to this actor, and in doing, argue that they sup-
sustainable fishing method to the government. In doing so, they ful-
port logistics such as ice and transport, as well as enable market
fill a spokesperson role against the use of fish aggregating devices
information and ultimately a flow of income for fishers. They also
(FADs) by purse seiners, which are perceived to have a dispro-
control the endowment of financial assets through what are termed
portionately high amount of non-target catch compared to other
quasi-credit relations (Platteau and Abraham, 1987). According to
fishing methods (Bailey et al., 2012).
the implementation partner, credit is provided at the start of each
Middlemen contribute directly and indirectly to the endowment
season and also provided throughout the fishing season to cover
of human assets. Directly, by facilitating informal training of fish-
unforeseen costs. In contrast to loans from community members,
ing and post-harvest handling practices for their fishers. High grade
which can cost up to 20% per month in interest, middlemen offer
tuna, based on the quality of the tuna meat, commands the highest
interest free loans, with no time requirement for repayment, and
price and is exported. If poor fishing techniques and post-harvest
often include some form of loan forgiveness depending on the
handling are employed, there is a high likelihood of lower graded
fishing. Finances are provided, but fishers have little to no insight
fish (grade B to grade D) and although lower grade fish can still be
into how much debt they have accumulated. This may result in an
exported, it is worth less for fishers. According to the local proces-
outcome seen elsewhere, where finances become a means of ‘clien-
sor in Ambon, the right practices can ensure their supply of the best
telism’ (Acciaioli, 2000) within these communities that severely
quality fish is met, and fishers can receive a higher price for every
limits any form of empowerment or self-determination.
kilogram of tuna that they land. In the past two years, the local
Middlemen also directly provide physical assets for fishers,
processor has noticed a decrease in the supply of high quality tuna
including fisheries-related equipment and supplies, as well as
to his plant, which he attributes to poor weather, while fishers we
community-based infrastructure. The provision of fishery related
interviewed attributed this to competition by foreign fishing ves-
equipment is an extension of the quasi-credit relations (Platteau
sels operating legally and illegally in Indonesian waters. According
and Abraham, 1987), and in this case some middlemen let fishers
to one fisherman, he used to be able to fish as often as three to four
use their boats and engines, while maintaining ownership, while

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Table 3
Asset categories and some examples provided to interviewees.
Asset Responses of interviewees
Financial Income, interest free loans, risk mitigation
Physical Mosque repairs, labor, paint, sand, boats, gear, engines, ice, plastic
Human Training/knowledge for fish handling, uniforms for school, medicine, rice, search and rescue
Social Provide networking and houses function as sort of community centre, help family members of fishers
Natural Encourage adult catch, support anti-FADs campaign
times a day, but presently one trip a day may still yield no catch.
This declining catch rate may mean that it is more important than
ever for fishers to concentrate on the quality of their catch, rather
than the quantity.
Middlemen contribute indirectly to human capacity of the com-
munity by fulfilling social welfare functions. For example, they
contribute to school uniforms for the families of fishers, help to
distribute medicine to fisher families, and provide rice at times (or
provide loans for these items). According to the implementation
partner, middlemen have also, at times, given immediate loans
for fishers to pay for hospital visits or school fees for their chil-
dren. Middlemen also offer financial and physical aid for search
and rescue operations in the event of missing fishers. Again reflect-
ing the patronage networks they create around them (Adhuri et al.,
2015), these wider services are a responsibility the middlemen take,
whereby they contribute to community wellbeing.
Interviews revealed that the contribution of the middlemen to
the endowment of social assets, such as the organization of produc-
tion and trade, is one of their most important but also controversial
functions. Middlemen are often key social actors in the community,
creating social ties between fishing families and offering physical
space for community members to meet, and as interviews with
the implementation partner revealed, the middleman’s house may
serve as a kind of community and cultural center. These strong
links can be important in times of crisis, as observed by the imple-
mentation partner when one middleman arranged responses on
behalf of the fishers when authorities confiscated boats and equip-
ment. However, their control over the endowment of social capital
through such activities can also be detrimental to fishers. All of
the lending, debt forgiveness and risk mitigation means fishers
face a continuous risk of marginalization. Additionally, the imple-
mentation partners have observed middlemen exploiting their
relationships with fishers for political gain, which was also wit-
nessed during interviews in March–May 2014. This exploitation
does not happen symmetrically with all fishers, but rather some
middlemen strategically choose and support fishers that can best
be used to reach particular goals. We witnessed that these relation-
ships were abandoned in times without relevant political dynamics.
4.3. Reorganization under the Fair Trade USA intervention
At the onset of the Fair Trade USA assessment, three middle-
men in Assilulu and one on an adjacent smaller island (Buru) were
engaged in the program. Fig. 2 summarizes the situation prior to
certification. We observed during the field study in early 2014 that
there was little cooperation between middleman-fisher units, but
high levels of cooperation, communication and organization within
units. For Fair Trade, however, fishers should be more or less self-
organizing in fisher associations. In the Molucca fishery, the only
way to create such associations has been through the already-
established middleman units (Fig. 2). According to the Fair Trade
implementation partner, despite the middleman no longer having
direct control over how fishers are organized, they remain integral
to the formation of these fisher associations. The four associations
in the initial certification linked together by the two Fair Trade
committees in Assilulu (Ambon) and Buru represented 96 fishers
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2015.11.027
and communicate directly with the certificate holder. During the
initial round of fieldwork, it was the so-called ‘market access part-
ner’ that was the identified as responsible for connecting fishers
with downstream markets. However, upon return to the field in
2015, the name had changed to certificate holder, which is now
made up of two entities. The first entity is the market partner, who
buys certified product and is responsible for upholding values in
its relations with upstream value chain actors. The second entity is
the implementation partner, who is responsible for on-the-ground
implementation and facilitation of the entire process, including
supporting the various actors to meet their responsibilities.
Each of these actors and actor groups—fishers, fisher associa-
tions, Fair Trade committee and certificate holder—have different
responsibilities, as negotiated under the registration agreement
between the certificate holder and the fishers (Table 4). These
responsibilities can be related to the concept of capabilities in
the sustainable livelihoods framework in that they are roles and
actions that fishers are expected to deliver in the context of Fair
Trade. A long process of negotiations and meetings took place
between January and August 2014 with fishers, middlemen and
the implementation partner discussing the formation of the asso-
ciations, committees and developing the documentation on roles
and responsibilities.
Interestingly, we observed no specific roles or responsibilities
laid out for middlemen in the Agreement (Table 4). So while they
have an obvious role in the value chain, they have no explicit roles
in the Fair Trade USA scheme. When asked about the absence of
middlemen in most documentation, the certificate holder recog-
nized the importance of these actors, but stressed that they do not
actually receive any price premium from Fair Trade, and in fact,
have no formal change in their economic practices under certifi-
cation. The premium passes directly from the certificate holder to
the Fair Trade committee, thus truly bypassing the middlemen. The
fisher associations then make recommendations to the Fair Trade
committee about how they would like their premium used. A risk
assessment was conducted for each mini-plant, however, and nec-
essary improvements required of middlemen facilities were noted
in documents provided by the implementation partner, such as
repairing stairs for safety, strengthening the foundation, creating
small roads for distribution, and in one instance relocating to an
area less prone to flooding.
The only place where middlemen are referenced in the Agree-
ment is the requirement to have a written statement about fishers’
responsibilities when it comes to loan repayments, as negotiated
in the registration agreement with the certificate holder (Point
13). Indeed, according to the implementation partner, auditors
identified the lack of documentation between fishers and middle-
men as a point of vulnerability. While best practices would likely
include having a contract between each fisher and middleman, the
implementation partner sees this as unfeasible and so the fisher
association serves as the legal body to formalize agreements. The
contracts contain information about the ownership of machines
and boats, loans and repayments, and are facilitated by the imple-
mentation partner.
Fishers stated that, while not implicitly part of the fisher associ-
ations, middlemen still have the power to steer meetings, and often
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Fig. 2. Evolution of value chain and social structure under Fair Trade USA for the Molucca yellowfin tuna fishery.

communicate directly with the implementation partner about Fair
Trade concerns or issues. Having followed this process from early
2014 to early 2015, it is clear that gaining the trust and coopera-
tion of middlemen has been essential to implement the standard,
which is in part attributed to the painstaking efforts of the imple-
mentation partner to be transparent about the goals and clarifying
that certification is not meant to weaken the role of middlemen.
However, middlemen currently benefit from the very things that
the Fair Trade standard tries to correct, so a weakening, or at the
very least, a change in the role of middlemen seems unavoidable.
In fact a strong implementation partner that is capable of wading
through the complexities of social organization, power relations,
and the Fair Trade intervention may be one of the more important
pieces of the intervention puzzle.
Despite the key role of middlemen in fishers’ livelihood in
Molucca, certification has already led to some changes in this rela-
tionship. Prior to certification, not one of the interviewed fishers
knew where their fish was destined. This attitude has already
changed with the Fair Trade committee receiving their first Fair
Trade premium check in January 2015. According to the imple-
mentation partner, fishers have begun talking about the fairness
of the premium, now knowing that the fish is destined for the US
market, and discussing ways to best spend it. The fisher association
in Buru, for example, has discussed starting a cooperative without
the influence of the middleman, where fishers can access bait and
tackle, and perhaps take on processing duties of cleaning the loins.
Whether or not fishers can perform these middlemen roles does
not seem to have been explicitly considered, but raises the issue of
how easily financial assets gained through the Fair Trade premium
can be turned into value chain capabilities.
The implementation partner has also observed that fishers in
Buru have developed a sense of resource ownership since discus-
sions around Fair Trade begun. In the past when the fishery shut
down for the season in Assilulu, the Buru middleman had encour-
aged fishers to move over to Buru to increase his supply. Prior to
certification, this was a non-issue. However, the implementation
partner reported that Buru fishers have now staked a claim to the
physical fish in the sea, arguing that part of the Fair Trade premium
Assilulu villages would be getting should in fact accrue to them,
even if it’s an Assilulu fisher who lands the fish. This caused initial
conflict between the Buru middleman and his Buru fishers, with the
middleman threatening to cancel the entire Fair Trade intervention
if the Assilulu fishers were not given permission to fish. The threat
proved empty, however, and the Assilulu fishers have agreed to pay
20% of their premium to the Buru fishers. Thus, the Buru middleman
still gets his fish, both villages benefit from the fishery, and Buru
fishers have been empowered to bargain and fight for what they
now consider to be their resource rights. From discussions with
the Buru middleman, the implementation partner senses that he
recognizes that while Fair Trade may weaken some of his control,

Table 4
Actors and responsibilities under Fair Trade USA scheme. Summary text is from Registration Agreement, developed and implemented by the implementation partner.

Actor Responsibilities

Fishers (F) Participate in, and follow rules of, FA and FTC; make effort to strengthen knowledge and capacity; willingly contribute
socio-economic data; engage in environmentally safe method of fishing; understand environmental aspects of FT
standard; never engage in child labor; ensure crew safety; support implementation of traceability; uphold catch share
agreements

Fisher associations (FA) Represent fishers; help fishers remain independent (non-partisan); implement standard; liaise between CH and F;
conduct informal education; improve human resources; mobilize activities for benefit of future generations; support
activities to increase capacity of F; keep detailed information; report all vessels; keep data on vessel size/GT, and
guarantee vessels are licensed

Fair trade Committee (FTC) Maintain system of democracy; develop cooperation between fishing groups; increase quality of living for F; establish
board of decision-making; Remain independent and non-partisan; liaise between CH and FAs; use informal education
to guarantee safety; support activities to improve human resources; keep database of each fisher and vessel size/GT,
and guarantee all vessels are licensed

Certificate holder (market
partner and implementation
partner) (CH)
Ensure FT premiums (FTP) are applied to new contracts; ensure FTP is paid to FTC (and is directly traceable); source all
FT product and sell to market; promote environmentally safe method of fishing; support efforts to ensure other actors
have information about FT concept; ensure traceability; grant access of information to interested F; ensure catch
share agreements are upheld; ensure safety at sea; no payments between CH and F; support F to ensure loans
between F and middlemen are upheld; Develop annual sourcing plan

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the advantages to the community and to his operation in the short
term outweigh this potential cost.
5. Discussion
Functional upgrading through Fair Trade is aimed at elimi-
nating the role of intermediaries in the global value chain and
strengthening the position of smallholders by supporting them to
organize themselves and create direct relationships with proces-
sors and traders. Arguments have been made both for the exclusion
of middlemen in promoting small-scale producer empowerment
(Mitchell and Coles, 2011) and for a better appreciation of their
importance in providing financial and social support (Bush and
Oosterveer, 2007; Kusumawati et al., 2013; Ruddle, 2011). In this
paper, we have investigated these two claims with specific refer-
ence to an evolving dynamic in the world’s first and only Fair Trade
USA certified fishery and conclude that these arguments are, in fact,
two sides of the same coin. Our results suggest that middlemen
in Molucca have a large role in providing inputs into the fishery,
getting fish to the market, and organizing the community. They
also provide a central source of support in times of need. But they
may also contribute to an environment of ignorance and depen-
dence. While these results are only based on one fishery, we can
ask what this contested role of middlemen means for fishers and
functional upgrading specifically, and for Fair Trade certification
more generally?
5.1. Contested role of the middleman in functional upgrading
This study has found that in the case of the first and only Fair
Trade certified fishery, middlemen contribute to the assets of fish-
ers, and perhaps in ways that the Fair Trade premium alone cannot
immediately replace, for example by providing search and rescue
support, and advocacy for fishers at the government level. The
functional upgrading argument may need to better nuance the
assumption that middlemen are ‘disposable’ actors. Echoing the
findings of Taylor (2005), the question that ultimately emerges is
to what extent assets and capabilities can be delivered through
a market-oriented tool like Fair Trade certification, instead of
through community actors like middlemen. Observations from this
first Fair Trade intervention show that it has in fact facilitated a
rapid change in how the value chain is organized by removing mid-
dlemen as the central actor around whom the fishery is organized.
What this value chain reorganization will mean to social relations
in the community has yet to be fully realized.
The capabilities and assets framework can help to provide a
snapshot to assess under which conditions poor people benefit
from trends in global value chain governance, such as functional
upgrading. Yet in systems with strong patron–client relations, this
would require those implementing Fair Trade to: (1) Compen-
sate fishers for the current material contributions that middlemen
make; and/or (2) allow for fishers to acquire the capability to take
on the value chain activities that middlemen currently perform
and fulfill the responsibilities required of them for compliance in
the Fair Trade standard. Before Fair Trade the functions of fish-
ers and middlemen in the Molucca handline fishery were distinct,
reproduced by the social relations of production controlled by the
middlemen. Under these conditions, fishers could only upgrade
through the accumulation of enough financial capital to by-pass
the quasi-credit relations under which they were subjected to by
middlemen. In contrast, the Fair Trade Premium allows a wider
group of fishers to accumulate enough financial capital to secure
fisheries-related physical assets such as equipment and gear inde-
pendent of middlemen. In doing so Fair Trade provides fishers with
the capabilities to reproduce those assets.
Please cite this article in press as: Bailey, M., et al., Fishers, Fair Trade, and finding middle ground. Fish. Res. (2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2015.11.027
Our results also show that the fishers association enabled fishers
to gain control over the endowment of key assets that were previ-
ously in the hands of middlemen. Fishers have become more likely
to develop not only individual but what have been referred to as
collective capabilities (Stewart, 2005) that enable them to upgrade
their position in the value chain. It is also foreseeable that collec-
tive capabilities will influence the adaptability of the communities
to social and/or environmental change (Crona and Bodin, 2010).
However, there may also be trade-offs between these individual
and collective capabilities. For example, increasing the value of tuna
to the individual through these associations may come at the cost
of investing in communal capabilities that may reduce the over-
all risk and vulnerability of the community. Over the long term it
is yet to be seen whether the fisher associations can replicate the
same risk reduction functions that middlemen were able to pro-
vide, such as diversifying the employment opportunities of fishers
in times of low fish abundance. If so, then does value chain upgrad-
ing through Fair Trade threaten these risk mitigation roles that
middlemen play?
5.2. The future for Fair Trade
Fair Trade is argued to offer a certification approach that can
include social issues and be accessible to developing country fish-
eries where other certification schemes have failed. As such, Fair
Trade may appear attractive for those in export seafood markets
seeking a response to the growing list of acute social issues in fish-
eries, including theft, slavery and violence (Couper et al., 2015). But
many of these social issues are not poorly addressed because they
are unimportant, but because they remain off-shore and largely
invisible to regulators, and involve social relations that are embed-
ded in (often predatory) local cultural norms and practices (see
Béné and Merten, 2008; Hauck, 2011). At best, Fair Trade might be
able to successfully redress these norms and practices. However,
at worst, the imposition of very westernized views that assumes
away the importance of local social relations in the context of global
market-based governance arrangements may in fact undermine
fisher empowerment. In negotiating these norms and practices, and
in doing so upscaling Fair Trade as a fisheries certification solu-
tion, we argue the generalizability of patron–client relationships,
the lack of organizational strength among fishers and the credibility
of the implementation partner need to be addressed.
There are many studies characterizing the dynamics of
patron–client relationships (Acciaioli, 2000; Kusumawati et al.,
2013; Platteau and Abraham, 1987), and the diversity in rela-
tionships and structures makes it difficult to generalize their
significance for Fair Trade. Small-scale fisheries are diverse and
embedded in social and cultural systems that are neither easily
nor quickly changed—especially some patron–client relations are
intergenerational (Pelras, 2000). For Fair Trade, these systems of
rules and norms need to be carefully handled in implementing
the standard. Automatically assuming that elimination of middle-
men will be better for fishers is perhaps too simple, as evidenced
by our results. Rather, upgrading should not be understood only
in economic terms but should include social dimensions as well
(Lee and Gereffi, 2015), and global value chains should necessar-
ily be understood as involving local dynamics with complex social,
cultural as well as economic interactions between chain and non-
chain actors (Bush and Oosterveer, 2007). Balancing the facilitative
and exploitative role of middlemen in fisheries in Southeast Asia is
bound to be complicated, but recognizing this double-edged sword
instead of pretending that middlemen are expendable is a neces-
sary first step.
Three key characteristics have been identified as particularly
important to Fair Trade success, namely favorable economic and
political conditions, shared producer commitments and values, and
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strong internal organization. This third factor was clear in an anal-
ysis of successful coffee Fair Trade initiatives, where the authors
found that almost all of the studied value chains had strong inter-
nal cooperative partnerships 5–10 years prior to the introduction
of Fair Trade (Raynolds et al., 2004). For the Molucca fishery, and for
other fisheries with strong middlemen, this particular characteris-
tic is missing. The fisher associations were only formed in order to
implement the standard, and were done so with support and per-
mission of the middlemen—as apparent throughout our study. In
this way, cooperative middlemen, and not strong fisher organiza-
tions, appear to be the more important factor for long-term success.
This is particularly relevant for Fair Trade in fisheries given that, at
least in this first case, there does appear to be a gap between the
current capabilities of fishers and the responsibilities outlined by
the registration agreement.
In the case of Molucca, cooperation from middlemen was likely
due, in large part, to the perseverance of the implementation part-
ner. In January 2014 fishers had no knowledge of, or interest in,
where their fish was marketed. Fair Trade could not possibly have
infiltrated such a value chain without a strong and trusted imple-
mentation partner. This partner had good relationships both with
fishers and middlemen, and also a long-standing relationship with
the market partner. The characteristics that make up the certifi-
cate holder, the implementation and the market partners, and their
internal and external relationships, are perhaps equally important
to the scalability of Fair Trade as the producer characteristics them-
selves. For future success, effective implementing relations appear
to be a fundamental first step.
6. Conclusion
Our results demonstrate the paradoxical role of middlemen in
fishery value chains. On the one hand they create exploitative social
relations with fishers, and in doing so directly control the endow-
ment of assets fishers need in order to develop the capabilities
necessary to be beneficially involved in the global value chain. On
the other hand, middlemen facilitate access to these assets and in
doing so enable the reproduction of social and economic practices
that underlie handline tuna fishing as a livelihood. This nuanced
distinction between exploitative and facilitative roles is the key
challenge to the success and impact of Fair Trade certification, as
well as one of the likely reasons why other environmental certi-
fications, such as the MSC have struggled to be make headway in
small-scale developing country fisheries.
While only analyzing one fishery, our results hold wider conse-
quences for rolling out Fair Trade certification, as well as for how
the certification is organised in developing countries in general. The
standard and successful certification of the Moluccan handline tuna
fishery partly addresses criticisms that other seafood certification
schemes, such as the MSC, are not designed with small-scale and
developing countries in mind. Fair Trade has taken up this challenge
in response to the rising concern of social issues, including empow-
erment and wellbeing, in fisheries where this demand is likely to
increase. As market pressures to deal with social issues in fisheries
increases, questions about the likely impact of market-based tools
like certification on fishing communities will become more promi-
nent. The Fair Trade USA standard has made an important first step
in addressing value chain upgrading by small-scale seafood pro-
ducers by experimenting with how trade and traders should be
reorganized. In doing so, they have begun to address the very issues
that have held back Fair Trade from entering into fisheries before
this standard was developed. In terms of value chain upgrading, this
first Fair Trade fishery appears to be a success, but the scalability
of Fair Trade remains unclear. We observed fairly rapid evolutions
within communities and value chains in the Molucca fishery, but
Please cite this article in press as: Bailey, M., et al., Fishers, Fair Trade, and finding middle ground. Fish. Res. (2015),
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9
much of this seemed to be dependent on the relationship between
the implementation partner and middlemen, and also on a cooper-
ative and transparent local processor. Middlemen were explicitly
left out of formal documentation around roles and responsibilities,
but were of paramount importance to get Fair Trade running. Our
results show that a degree of experimentation is required with the
organization of fishery certification systems, as well as rethinking
the ways in which existing middlemen can be incorporated.
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge Adessium Foundation for funding. We
also humbly thank the fishers, suppliers and implementation part-
ners that were willing to share their thoughts and experiences with
us for the purposes of this research. Special thanks to Momo Kochen
for her on the ground expertise, help in arranging field visits, and
comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript. The manuscript
was improved through the helpful comments of two anonymous
reviewers.
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