The document discusses factors that influence whether the US helps its allies in international crises. It proposes three hypotheses: 1) if the challenger has military advantage over the defender, it decreases US support; 2) if the regime type of the defender is similar to the US, it increases US support; and 3) changes in US leader support decrease support. It analyzes crises like the Falklands War using these hypotheses, examining variables like military strength, regime similarity, presence of other allies, and stability of US leadership.
The document discusses factors that influence whether the US helps its allies in international crises. It proposes three hypotheses: 1) if the challenger has military advantage over the defender, it decreases US support; 2) if the regime type of the defender is similar to the US, it increases US support; and 3) changes in US leader support decrease support. It analyzes crises like the Falklands War using these hypotheses, examining variables like military strength, regime similarity, presence of other allies, and stability of US leadership.
The document discusses factors that influence whether the US helps its allies in international crises. It proposes three hypotheses: 1) if the challenger has military advantage over the defender, it decreases US support; 2) if the regime type of the defender is similar to the US, it increases US support; and 3) changes in US leader support decrease support. It analyzes crises like the Falklands War using these hypotheses, examining variables like military strength, regime similarity, presence of other allies, and stability of US leadership.
The document discusses factors that influence whether the US helps its allies in international crises. It proposes three hypotheses: 1) if the challenger has military advantage over the defender, it decreases US support; 2) if the regime type of the defender is similar to the US, it increases US support; and 3) changes in US leader support decrease support. It analyzes crises like the Falklands War using these hypotheses, examining variables like military strength, regime similarity, presence of other allies, and stability of US leadership.
The topic is raised by observing the history of international relations. On March 31, 1982, the Falkland crisis broke out. The United States chose to support British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. But imposed sanctions on another ally Argentina. The U.S. suspended military exports and security assistance to Argentina. On May 14, 2002, a crisis broke out in India and Pakistan in the territorially disputed Jammu and Kashmir region. The Indian military camp in the Indian-controlled Kashmir region suffered a terrorist attack. The United States continued to pressure its ally--Pakistan. The U.S. involved and publicly called on Musharraf to stop infiltration into Indian-controlled Kashmir. The research question is: Given the different behavior patterns of the United States in international crisis in history. Why does the U.S. help allies in international crises? What are the factors that influence the behavior of the U.S. in international crises? Existing international relations literature provides three explanations of the reason that a country to help its allies. Namely, position of strength, values of alliance and reputation. But these three explanations focus much on the areas of research such as extended deterrence, war, or international crisis, but not the studies on alliance politics. It is limitary to explain why does a country help its allies. Intuitively, the premise of a country's assistance to other countries is that the potential donors themselves have sufficient strength. But, under the other conditions that' s same, great powers are more likely not to help their Allies. The cost of a great power to betray its allies is much lower than that of a small power. In terms of the value of alliance, it cannot explain why a country does not help its allies in times of war. Scholars of international relations continue to debate whether international reputation matters. It is worthwhile to fulfill the obligation of helping allies to build a reputation for reliability. But a country can hardly gain a reputation for reliability. When a country helps its allies, the allies usually think of it as a situational cause. and the donor country is rarely considered as a reliable ally. It is necessary to consider the characteristics of the U.S. and its alliance policies to analyze why the U.S. helps its allies in international crises. The U.S. power advantage is almost constant. Intuitively /ɪnˈtuːɪtɪvli/, when the allies of U.S has military disadvantage over the challenger, the U.S. is more likely to use its military advantage to deter the challenger. But, if the challenger has the military advantage over the defender, the U.S may not willing to fight with challengers. Hypothesis 1: If the challenger has the military advantage over the defender, it will decrease the likelihood of the U.S. to help allies in international crises. For the regime types, some allies of the U.S are democratic states. There are different regime types between the US and the rest of its allies. What kind of regime type increase the likelihood of the U.S to help allies in international crises? So, I come up with Hypothesis 2: If the regime type of the U.S. is similar to the defender, it will increase the likelihood of the U.S to help allies in international crises. Considering the American domestic politics, I come up with Hypothesis 3: Change in source of leader support of the United States will decrease the likelihood of the U.S. to help allies in international crises.
The dependent variable is “the behavior of the United States in international
crises” and it comes from icb2. values of allies: This article uses “the similarity of foreign policy Positions” to measure the value of allies to the United States. The variable “Reputation” comes from “direct contiguity (/ˌkɑːntɪˈɡjuːəti/)3.1” in COW. Only when there are other allies around the crisis's ally will the United States have a greater incentive to assist the allies in order to gain a credible reputation for reliability. “If a dyad share a land border and is also separated by a stretch of water, that dyad will be coded based on the closest from the contiguity (the land border)” (2) According to Atop data sets, Other Allies are counted. bilateral alliance: When the alliance has more than two members, it is a multilateral coalition and coded with 0. For example, it can explain “the Falkland crisis” well. The U.K has military advantage over Argentina. The regime score of the U.K. is 10, the same as the United States, but the polity score of Argentine is -8 in 1982. Also, there is no change in source of leader support of the United States in 1982.