5natural Accession

PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATION 233
OWNERSHIP
Right of Accession General Provisions
parties acted in bad faith (Art. 448, in relation to Art. 453); and (4) if the
landowner acted in bad faith and the builder, planter or sower acted in
good faith (Art. 447, in relation to Art. 454).
[51.3.3] Subsidiary Liability of the Landowner

The landowner is subsidiarily liable for the payment of the value
of the materials.311 This subsidiary liability, however, of the owner of
the land is only available if the following conditions are met: (1) in
case of insolvency of the builder, planter or sower; and (2) the owner of
the land appropriates the building, planting or sowing.312 A fortiori, the
owner of the land is not liable to the owner of the materials if the former
chooses to order the demolition of the construction or the removal of
the building, planting or sowing which he has the right to do in case
the builder, planter or sower acted in bad faith.313 If the landowner pays
for the value of the materials, he becomes the owner thereof. In such a
situation, he may demand damages from the builder, planter or sower
if the latter acted in bad faith, or pay the builder, planter or sower a
reasonable compensation for his labor if the latter acted in good faith.
B. NATURAL ACCESSION
§ 52. Natural Accession
[52.1] Four Forms
As discussed in supra §40.2, there are four forms of natural
accession:
(1) Alluvion;
(2) Avulsion;
(3) Natural change of course of river; and
(4) Formation of island.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters. (366)
311
Art. 455, NCC.
312
Id.
313
Id.
234 PROPERTY
Art. 458. The owners of estates adjoining ponds or lagoons do not

acquire the land left dry by the natural decrease of the waters, or lose that
inundated by them in extraordinary floods. (367)
§53. Alluvion
[53.1] Definition
Alluvium or alluvion has been defined as the gradual and imper-
ceptible addition to the banks of rivers314 or as the increment which
lands abutting rivers gradually receive as a result of the current of the
waters.315 Alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river
bank, while accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited.316
[53.2] Riparian Owners Distinguished From Littoral Owners

The owner of the estate fronting the river bank is called the
riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from
littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of
the sea or lakes or other tidal waters.317
[53.3] Rule on Alluvion

The rule on alluvion is embodied in Article 457 of the New Civil
Code which states that “to the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.”
The riparian land, or the land adjoining the bank of the river is the
principal and the alluvial deposits accumulated gradually along such
riparian land constitute the accessory. The alluvium, by mandate of
Article 457 of the New Civil Code, is automatically owned by the ripar-
ian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen.318 The same
rule applies even if the riparian land was bought under installment plan,
in which case, the benefits of accretion belong to the purchaser even
when said accretion took place before the last installment was paid.319
3 Manresa, 6th ed., 235.

314
2 Castan, 8th ed., 218.

315
316
Heirs of Emiliano Navarro v. IAC, 268 SCRA 74, 85 (1997).
317
Id., at p. 85, citing Santulan v. The Executive Secretary, 80 SCRA 548, 556 (1977).
318
Id., at pp. 85-86.
319
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the President v. CA, 169
SCRA 27 (1989).
OWNERSHIP
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right
to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for
the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land.320
If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils
produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful
provisions, said estates are subject to encumbrances and various kinds
of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice
the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion.321
[53.4] Requisites of Alluvion

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that
it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the
land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the
river.322 These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case,
give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams
any accretion gradually received from the effects of the currents of
waters.323
[53.4.1] First Requisite

A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the
alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the New Civil Code.
It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits
that the law grants to the riparian owner.324 This is what distinguishes
alluvion from avulsion. In alluvion, the deposit of soil is gradual and
imperceptible; whereas in avulsion, it is sudden and abrupt.
[53.4.2] Second Requisite

The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the
current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Article 457 of
the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion
320
Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA 514 (1984).
321
Id.
322
Heirs of Emiliano Navarro v. IAC, supra., at p. 85; Vda. De Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA
589 (1996); Meneses v. CA, 246 SCRA 374 (1995); Reynante v. CA, 207 SCRA 794 (1992); Bina-
lay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374 (1991).
323
Vda. De Nazareno v. CA, supra., at p. 597.
324
Binalay v. Manalo, supra., at p. 386.
236 PROPERTY
must be the exclusive work of nature.325 Hence, the riparian owner does
not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly
intended or designed to bring about accretion.326 Thus, in Tiongco v.
Director of Lands, et al.,327 where the land was not formed solely by the
natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is
also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man,
it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public
domain.328
Vda. de Nazareno v. CA
257 SCRA 598 (1996)
In this case, Antonio Nazareno, the predecessor-in-interest of
Desamparado Vda. De Nazareno, caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands
of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting
his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. The accretion was formed
by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding Nazareno’s land. Before
the approved survey plan could be released to Nazareno, it was protested by
his lessees. Acting upon such protest, the Regional Director of the Bureau of
Lands ordered the amendment of the survey plan by segregating therefrom
the areas occupied by the lessees. Thereafter, the Director of Lands ordered
Nazareno to vacate the portions adjudicated to the lessees. Upon the death of
Antonio, Vda. De Nazareno went to court to question the action taken by the
Bureau of Lands. The resolution of this case hinges on the question of whether
or not the subject land is public land. Vda. De Nazareno claims that the subject
land is private land being an accretion on Antonio Nazareno’s titled property,
applying Article 457 of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court HELD: Since the
subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art. 457 does not apply.
Ergo, the subject land is part of the public domain.
Republic v. CA
132 SCRA 514 (1984)
In this case, the Tancincos were the registered owners of a parcel of
land bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. In 1973, they filed an
application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property.
325
Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA 514, 520 (1984).
326
Id.
327
16 C.A. Rep. 211.
328
Cited in Vda. De Nazareno v. CA, supra., at pp. 598-599.
OWNERSHIP
The Assistant Provincial Fiscal opposed the application. Upon the advise of the
Commissioner appointed by the court, the applicants withdrew their application
with respect to one of the lots. Thereafter, the lower court rendered a decision
granting the application. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto. The Republic appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Republic claimed that there was no accretion to speak of
under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened was
that the Tancincos simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of
the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there was any accretion to speak of, it was
man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible
sedimentation by the waters of the river. In ruling for the Republic, the Supreme
Court held —
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:
“To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.”
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three
requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision
is said to have taken place. They are: (1) that the deposit be gradual
and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect
of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from
Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In
the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that
the addition to the said property was made gradually through
the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is
preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came
into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. The lone witness of the private respondents who happens
to be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their
father noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare
fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim that at this point in
time, accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness was
incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to
their land in the years before 1939. However, the witness testified
that in that year, she observed an increase in the area of the original
fishpond which is now the land in question. If she was telling the
238 PROPERTY
truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that

the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not
the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because
of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the
transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The
land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly
and gradually by the river’s current on the fishpond adjoining it.
It is under two meters of water. The private respondents’ own
evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two meters deep
on the side of that pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter
deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river.
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the
right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate
him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location
of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods
and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters
and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to
encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the
risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be
compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila,
10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the
additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended
or designed to bring about accretion. When the private respondents
transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant
for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the
destructive force of the waters of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General
that the testimony of the private respondents’ lone witness to the
effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such alleged
alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that the
lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent
property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey
of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between
the years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for
taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had supposedly
permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that
the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only
after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the
bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents
claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation.
OWNERSHIP
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots

1 and 2 in the names of the private respondents. These lots were
portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore
classified as property of the public domain under Article 420,
paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land
Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as
private property in the names of the private respondents is null
and void.
[53.4.3] Third Requisite

Under Article 457, the accretion must take place on a land
adjacent to the banks of the river. Note, however, that while Article
457 mentions only of accretions on the banks of rivers, this must be
interpreted in conjunction with Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters
which provides:
“Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous
to creeks, streams, rivers and lakes, by accessions or
sediments from the water thereof, belong to the owners of
such lands.”
But with respect to a creek, it must have regular and continuous
current. The rule does not apply to canals or esteros which are not creeks
and have no current but are simply drainage system.329
In the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano,330 the
Supreme Court considered the Manila Bay as a sea for purposes of
determining which law on accretion is to be applied. Hence, an accretion
that takes place on the shore of the Manila Bay, it being an inlet or an
arm of the sea, is part of the public domain pursuant to Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which provides as follows:
“Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial
deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the
public domain. When they are no longer washed by the water
of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility,
329
Guison v. City of Manila, (CA) 40 O.G. 3835; Ronquillo v. CA, 195 SCRA 433, 443
(1991).
330
108 Phil. 335 (1960).
240 PROPERTY
or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast

guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the
property of the owner of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof.”
The Laguna de Bay, on the other hand, is a lake, the accretion
on which, by the express mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law
of Waters cited above, belongs to the owners of the land contiguous
thereto.331
Heirs of Emiliano Navarro v. IAC

268 SCRA 74 (1997)
Sometime in 1960, Sinfroso Pascual, the predecessor-in-interest of the
heirs of Emiliano Navarro, filed an application to register and confirm his title
to a parcel of land situated in Sibocan, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-
175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed
that this land is an accretion to his property situated in Barrio Perto Rivas,
Balanga, Bataan. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the
western side by the Bulacan River, on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The
Director of Lands opposed the application contending that the subject land is
part of the public domain. The evidence, however, shows that the accretion
took place on the northern portion of Pascual’s land which is adjacent to the
Manila Bay. It was — HELD: The third requisite of accretion, which is, that the
alluvion is deposited on the portion of claimant’s land which is adjacent to the
river bank, is lacking. The claimant’s own tract of land where the accretion has
taken place adjoins the Manila Bay, which is not a river but a sea. The disputed
land, thus, is not an accretion on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used
to be the foreshore of Manila Bay. As such, the applicable law is not Art. 457 of
the Civil Code but Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides
that “lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by
the action of the sea, form part of the public domain.”
Government of the P.I. v. Colegio de San Jose

53 Phil. 423 (1929)
The plaintiff opposed the registration by defendant of a parcel of land
which borders the Laguna de Bay. The plaintiff claimed that the parcel of land
belonged to the public domain. According to the evidence, the waters of the
331
Government of the P.I. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423 (1929); Republic v. CA, 131
SCRA 532 (1984).
OWNERSHIP
Laguna de Bay receded from the land in question but during rainy season the
land was flooded by its water. Inasmuch as under the Civil Code, the owners
of tenements bordering on ponds or lagoons do not acquire the land left dry by
the natural decrease of the waters, then it is of primary importance to determine
whether the body of water called the Laguna de Bay is naturally and legally
a lake or a lagoon. It was — HELD: Laguna de Bay is a body of fresh water
formed in depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water coming from rivers
and brooks or springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. It
is a lake. Lakes and their beds belong to the public domain. The bed of a lake
is the ground covered by its waters at their highest ordinary depth. The waters
of Laguna de Bay at their highest depth reach no further than the north eastern
boundary of the land in question and therefore said land is outside the bed,
and belongs to the defendant, who continues to be the owner of same, even if
accidentally inundated by the waters of the lake. Even if the land in question
had been formed by alluvion, it still belongs to the defendant as owner of the
land which borders on the lake.
[53.5] Right of Riparian Owner to Alluvium Is Ipso Jure

The right of the owners of the bank adjacent to rivers to the
accretion which they receive by virtue of the action of the waters of the
river is ipso jure and there is no need of an action of the owner of the
bank to possess the new addition since it belongs to him by the very fact
of the addition.332
However, such accretion does not automatically become registered
land just because the lot which receives the same is covered by Torrens
title.333 Thus, the accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition
of the additional area by another person through prescription.334 In
Grande, et al. v. Court of Appeals,335 the Supreme Court explained —
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration
under the Torrens system of that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining
a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration
under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest
332
Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408.
333
Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989).
334
Reynante v. CA, 207 SCRA 794, 799-800 (1992).
335
5 SCRA 524, 530 (1962).
242 PROPERTY
or give title to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter,

protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain
this protection, the land must be placed under the operation
of the registration laws, wherein certain judicial procedures
have been provided.
In the same vein, the registration under the Torrens system does
not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his
registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining
stream.336
[53.6] Exception to the Rule on Alluvion

Article 458 of the New Civil Code serves as an exception to the
general rule on alluvion.337 It is noteworthy that this article refers only
to ponds and lagoons but is not applicable to a lake since with regard to
a lake the rule of alluvion is applicable in accordance with the Spanish
Law of Waters.338 A lake has been defined as body of water formed in
depressions of the Earth, ordinarily fresh water, coming from rivers,
brooks or springs and connected to the sea by them. A pond or lagoon
on the other hand is a small body of water, ordinarily of fresh water,
and not very deep, fed by floods, the hollow bed of which is bounded
by elevations of land.339
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segre-

gates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it
to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same
within two years. (368a)
Art. 460. Trees uprooted and carried away by the current of the wa-
ters belong to the owner of the land upon which they may be cast, if the
owners do not claim them within six months. If such owners claim them,
they shall pay the expenses incurred in gathering them or putting them in
a safe place. (369a)
336
Viajar v. CA, 168 SCRA 405, 413 (1988), citing Payatas Estate Improvement Co. v.
Tuazon, 53 Phil. 55 and C.N. Hodges v. Garcia, 109 Phil. 132.
337
3 Manresa, 6th ed., 239-240.
338
Government of the P.I. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423.
339
Ibid.
OWNERSHIP
§ 54. Avulsion
[54.1] Definition
Avulsion has been defined as the accretion which takes place when
the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates a known portion of
land from an estate on its banks and transfers it to another estate.340 Or,
the accretion taking place in the estate on the bank of a river caused
not by the slow and constant action of the waters but by the violent and
sudden action of a torrent.341
[54.2] Comparison With Alluvion

Alluvion and avulsion share the following similarities: (1) that
they both take place only along the banks of rivers, creeks, streams and
lakes; and (2) that they are caused only by the force of the current of the
waters independently of the act of man. But they differ, as follows:
(1) In alluvion the deposit of soil is gradual; whereas, in avulsion
it is sudden and abrupt;
(2) In alluvion the deposit of soil belongs to the owner of the
property where the same was deposited but in avulsion the owner of
the property from which a part was detached retains the ownership
thereof;
(3) In alluvion, accession takes place immediately upon the
deposit of the soil; whereas, in avulsion the right of accession takes
place only after two years from the attachment or incorporation of the
segregated portion of land to the riparian land and only if its owner fails
to remove the same within said period; and
(4) In alluvion, the soil cannot be identified; in avulsion, the
detached portion can be identified.
In the absence, however, of evidence that the change in the course
of river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption
is that the change was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion.342
340
341
2 Castan, 8th ed., 218-219, citing Sanchez Roman.
342
C.N. Hodges v. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133.
244 PROPERTY
[54.3] Rule on Avulsion

According to Article 459 of the New Civil Code, avulsion takes
place “whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from
an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another
estate.” In such a case, the owner of the land from where the portion
is detached retains the ownership of the segregated portion but he is
required to remove the same within two years.343 Note that the article
requires the owner to physically remove the portion detached from his
land, a mere claim being insufficient.344 Should the owner fail to remove
the detached portion within two years, the same shall belong to the
owner of the land to which it is attached following the principle of ac-
cession.
In the case of avulsion, therefore, accession does not as yet take
place at the time the segregated portion is transferred to another estate
since the owner of the land from where the portion is detached retains
ownership of the same. In avulsion, accession takes place only after two
years from the attachment or incorporation of the segregated portion of
land to the riparian land upon failure of its owner to remove the same
within said period.
[54.4] Avulsion With Respect To Uprooted Trees

If trees are uprooted and carried away by the current of the waters
to another estate, the owner of the tree retains ownership of the same
but he is required to claim them within a period of six months.345 Note
that while avulsion with respect to a segregated portion of land requires
actual physical removal of the portion detached within two years, the
avulsion with respect to uprooted trees merely require the owner of the
tree to make a claim for the same within a period of six months.
If the uprooted trees have been transplanted by the owner of the
land upon which the trees may have been cast and said trees have taken
root in said land, then the owner of the trees, upon making the claim, is
required to refund the expenses incurred in gathering them or in putting
them in a safe place, including the expenses incurred by the owner of
the land for the preservation of the trees.346
343
Art. 459, NCC.
344
II Caguioa, Civil Code, 1966 ed., 103-14.
345
Art. 460, NCC.
346
Id.
OWNERSHIP
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose
lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. How-
ever, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right
to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not
exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed. (370a)
Art. 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural causes,
opens a new bed through a private estate, this bed shall become of public
dominion. (372a)
§ 55. Change of Course of River

[55.1] Effect of Change of Course of River
If there is a natural change in the course of the waters of the river,
the abandoned riverbeds shall ipso facto belong to the owners whose
lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.347
For example, if a river passing through the property of “A” changed its
course due to natural causes and opened a new bed on the adjoining land
belonging to “X,” the abandoned river bed (which is inside the property
of “A”) automatically or ipso facto belongs to “X” in proportion to
the area lost by the latter. This is an innovation of the old rule under
Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 where the abandoned
river beds shall “belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout
the respective length of each.”348 According to the Code Commission,349
the new solution is by way of compensation for the loss of the land
occupied by the new bed and that it is more equitable to compensate the
actual losers than to add land to those who have lost nothing.
Note, however, that at this point, no accession has yet taken place
because the owner of the land occupied by the new course is merely
compensated for the area that he lost. Since nothing has been added to
his property, there is no accession yet since this concept connotes an
addition to one’s property. Accesion continua takes place only if the
owner of the land adjoining the old bed will exercise his option “to
acquire the abandoned bed by paying the value thereof, which value
shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.”350 In
347
Art. 461, NCC.
348
Art. 370, Spanish Civil Code of 1889.
349
Report of the Code of Commission, 96.
350
Art. 461, NCC.
246 PROPERTY
the above example, while “X” automatically becomes the owner of the
abandoned river bed, “A,” however, can compel X to sell to him the
abandoned bed at a price not exceeding the value of the area occupied
by the new bed.
Note that under Article 461, the owners of the land adjoining the
old bed have the right to compel the owners of the land occupied by the
new bed to sell to them the old bed at a price not greater than the value
of the land occupied by the new bed. Such option is granted to them
by law and not to the owners of the land onto which the river changed
its course. In other words, the owners of the land onto which the river
changed its course cannot compel the riparian owners (the owners of
the land adjoining the old bed) to buy the old bed. The reason for the
law in giving the riparian owner the right to buy the abandoned river
bed is because the latter is in a better position to make use of the land
for agricultural purposes.
[55.2] Applicability of Article 461

The present article (Article 461), as well as Article 370 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, speaks of a “natural change” in the course
of the waters. Hence, in the case of Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals,351 a
case applying the provisions of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code
of 1889, it was held that Article 370 applies only if there is a natural
change in the course of the waters and since the drying up of the Estero
Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man — due
to the dumping of garbage therein by the people of the surrounding
neighbourhood — the said law was not applied and the dried-up portion
of Estero Calubcub was instead declared as forming part of the land of
the public domain.
In the subsequent case of Baes v. Court of Appeals,352 however,
the Court applied the provisions of Article 461 of the Civil Code even
if the change in the course of the waters was effected through artificial
means. The Court explained that “if the riparian owner is entitled to
compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural
causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change
in the course of the river is effected though artificial means.”
195 SCRA 433 (1991).

351
224 SCRA 562 (1993).

352
OWNERSHIP
Note, however, that the factual milieu in Ronquillo and Baes are
not the same. In Baes, the change in the course of the waters of the
creek was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the government
resulting in a prejudice to the interest of Baes because the man-made
canal totally occupied his property. In Ronquillo, however, there is no
showing that the change in the course of Estero Calubcub prejudiced
the Del Rosarios. Moreover, the change in Ronquillo was without the
intervention of the government. It was, in fact, due to the dumping of
garbage therein by the people of the surrounding neighborhood. Hence,
if the change in the course of the waters is due to a deliberate act of the
government resulting in prejudice to a private individual, the latter is
entitled to avail himself of the benefits under Article 461 of the Civil
Code.
Baes v. CA
224 SCRA 562 (1993)
In this case, a portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek was diverted to a man-
made canal which totally occupied Lot 2958-B (with an area of 3,588 sq.m.)
belonging to Felix Baes. The diversion was resorted to by the government to
improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. Baes and his wife claim that
they became the owners of the old bed (which was eventually filled up by
soil excavated from Lot 2958-B) by virtue of Article 461. In agreeing to the
contention of the Baes spouses, the Supreme Court explained —
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the
damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is
all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the
course of the river is effected though artificial means. The loss to
the petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the result of
a deliberate act on the part of the government when it sought to
improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore
obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.
Ronquillo v. CA
195 SCRA 433 (1991)
In this case, Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a parcel of
land at Sampaloc, Manila. Adjoining said lot is a dried-up portion of the old
Estero Calubcub occupied by Mario Ronquillo. The Del Rosarios claim that
long before the year 1930, Rosendo had been in possession of his parcel of land
including the adjoining dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub. Because
Ronquillo refused to vacate, the Del Rosarios filed an action in court to be
248 PROPERTY
declared the rightful owners of the dried-up portion. Ronquillo, on the other
hand, argued that the dried-up portion is part of the land of the public domain.
After trial, the lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the Del Rosarios,
which judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, Ronquillo
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court required the Solicitor
General to comment on behalf of the Director of Lands. In his comment, the
Solicitor General contends that the subject land is part of the public domain. It
was — HELD: The change in the course of Estero Calubcub was caused, not
by natural courses, but due to the dumping of garbage therein by the people
surrounding the neighborhood. Hence, Art. 370 of the Old Civil Code (now
Art. 461) does not apply. It applies only if there is a natural change in the
course of the waters. Consequently, the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub
should be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain.
[55.3] Extension of Ownership Ipso Jure

Once the river bed has been abandoned through the natural change
of the course of the waters, the owners of the land through which the
new river bed passes become the owners of the abandoned bed to the
extent provided by Article 461. There need be no act on their part to
subject the old river bed to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso
jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident, without
need of any formal act of acquisition.353 Such abandoned river bed had
fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the land through which
the new river bed passes even without any formal act of his will and
any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser.354
The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory,
as it is a mode of acquisition provided by law, as the result of the right
of accretion.355 Since the accessory follows the nature of the principal,
there need not be any tendency to the thing or manifestation of the
purpose to subject it to our ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure
from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident.356 And the
failure of the owners of the land through which the new river bed passes
to register the accretion in their names and declare it for purposes of
taxation does not divest it of its character as a private property.357
353
Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990), citing Sanchez v. Pascual, 11
Phil. 395 (1908); Pascual v. Sarmiento, et al., 37 Phil. 170 (1917).
354
Ibid.
355
Ibid.
356
Ibid., citing Villanueva v. Castro, 23 Phil. 54.
357
Ibid., at p. 806.
OWNERSHIP
[55.4] Restoration of the River to Its Former Course

In interpreting the provisions of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889, our Supreme Court held in Panlilio v. Mercado358 that
in the event of the change of the course of the stream, its former bed
cannot be regarded as definitely “abandoned” and the public divested of
its ownership therein until there is some indication of an intention of the
government to acquiesce to the change of the stream. Hence, it was held
that there was no abandonment of the old bed if the government took
practicable steps to return the stream back to its old course.
According to Dean Capistrano,359 a member of the Code Commis-
sion, the word “ipso facto” was introduced in Article 461 in order to
precisely repudiate the ruling of the Court in the Panlilio case because
the Commission considered it unsound. Hence, after the enactment of
the New Civil Code, there was doubt as to whether the government can
return the river bed back to its old course since in so doing, the govern-
ment would be invading private property because the owner of the land
through which the new river bed passes ipso facto owns the old river
bed.
The foregoing uncertainty was settled with the enactment of
Presidential Decree 1067, otherwise known as “The Water Code of
the Philippines,” which modified the provisions of Article 461 of the
Civil Code.360 Under Article 58 of the Water Code of the Philippines,
the owners of the affected lands (referring to the owners of the land
where the new river bed passes) cannot “restrain the government from
taking steps to revert the river or stream to its former course” but they
“may not compel the government to restore the river to its former bed.”
And if the government decides to revert back the river or stream to its
former course, “the owners of the lands thus affected are not entitled
to compensation for any damage sustained thereby.” In fact, under the
provisions of Article 58361 of the Water Code of the Philippines, the
358
44 Phil. 695.
359
Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. 1, 430.
360
See Footnote No. 56 in Celestial v. Cachopero, 413 SCRA 469, 487.
361
“Art. 58. When a river or stream suddenly changes its course to traverse private lands,
the owners or the affected lands may not compel the government to restore the river to its former
bed; nor can they restrain the government from taking steps to revert the river or stream to its
former course. The owners of the lands thus affected are not entitled to compensation for any
damage sustained thereby. However, the former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the
abandoned bed in proportion to the area lost by each.
250 PROPERTY
affected landowners may themselves undertake the return of the river

to its old bed subject to the following conditions: (1) they shall secure
a permit from the Department of Public Works and Highways; (2) the
undertaking shall be at their expenses; and (3) the work pertaining
thereto must be commenced within two years from the change in the
course of the river or stream.
[55.5] When River Dries Up

If the river simply dries up and did not change its course or without
opening a new bed, it is clear that the provisions of Article 461 will
not apply. To whom will the dried up river bed belong? According to
Senator Tolentino, the dry bed will continue to remain property of public
dominion.362 Since rivers and their natural beds are property of public
dominion, in the absence of any provision vesting the ownership of the
dried up river bed in some other person, it must continue to belong to
the State.363
The foregoing opinion of Senator Tolentino was quoted with
approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Celestial v. Cachopero,364
where the Court held —
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations
where there has been a change in the course of a river, not
where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is
not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course.
In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the
dry river bed remains property of public dominion.365
[55.6] Status of New Bed

In event of a natural change in the course of the waters of the
river, Article 462 of the New Civil Code expressly declares that the
The owners of the affected lands may undertake to return the river or stream to its old bed
at their own expense; Provided, That a permit therefore is secured from the Minister of Public
Works, Transportation and Communication and work pertaining thereto are commenced within
two years from the change in the course of the river or stream.”
362
II Tolentino, Civil Code, 1992 ed., 137-138.
363
Id.
364
413 SCRA 469, 489 (2003).
365
Id., citing II Tolentino,Civil Code, 1992 ed., 137-138; II Paras, Civil Code, 2002 ed.,
275.
OWNERSHIP
new bed passing through a private estate shall become property of

public dominion. This rule is consistent with the provisions of Article
502(1) of the New Civil Code and Article 5(a) of the Water Code of the
Philippines.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches,
leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land re-
tains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated
from the estate by the current. (374)
Art. 464. Islands which may be formed on the seas within the juris-
diction of the Philippines, on lakes, and on navigable or floatable rivers
belong to the State. (371a)
Art. 465. Islands which through successive accumulation of alluvial
deposits are formed in non-navigable and non-floatable rivers, belong to
the owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of them, or to the
owners of both margins if the island is in the middle of the river, in which
case it shall be divided longitudinally in halves. If a single island thus
formed be more distant from one margin than from the other, the owner of
the nearer margin shall be the sole owner thereof. (373a)
§ 56. Formation of Island

[56.1] Three Kinds of Islands
In connection with accesion continua, there are three kinds of
islands that may be formed pursuant to the provisions of the Civil
Code:
[56.1.1] Island Formed Under Article 463
In Article 463, the current of a river simply divides itself into
branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, thereby
forming an island. Since the land has not been permanently invaded by
the waters of the river, no natural expropriation will occur. The island
thus formed remains to be the property of the owner of the land where
such island has been formed. This is expressly recognized in Article
463.
Under the provisions of the same article, he also retains ownership
of the portion of his land separated from the estate by the current. This
rule is an extension of the rule on avulsion since the process takes place
abruptly and the segregated portion is required to be identifiable. Hence,
if known portions of land are segregated from a tenement and deposited
252 PROPERTY
in the middle of a river, thus forming an island, the provisions of Article

463 and not Article 465 will apply.366 Note that the rule in this article
applies whether the river is navigable or floatable or not since the article
does not make any distinction.
Strictly speaking, however, no accession has taken place in the
situation contemplated in Article 463 because no new property has been
added or attached to the property of any person. As stated earlier, the
owner of the property simply retains ownership of his land, with the
difference that it has just been converted into an island.

Article 464 provides for a real case of accession compared to the
previous article (Article 463). In Article 464, an island is formed on a
sea, lake or navigable or floatable river through whatever cause. Thus,
the article clearly speaks of an addition to the property of the State
since the island thus formed is expressly declared to be property of the
latter. It has been said that the island formed pursuant to the provisions
of Article 464 forms part of the patrimonial property of the State and,
therefore, may be sold by the State.367
Article 464 speaks of an island formed on a navigable or floatable
river. A river is considered to be navigable or floatable if it is able to
carry the produce of the land along its banks to the market.368

Article 465, in turn, speaks of an island formed in non-navigable
or non-floatable rivers through successive accumulation of deposit in
the same manner as alluvion. Hence, if the island is formed in navigable
or floatable rivers, it is Article 464 that will apply and not this article.
If the island is formed through a sudden and abrupt process due to
segregation of identifiable portions of land from an estate, it is Article
463 that will likewise apply and not this article, whether the river is
navigable or floatable or not.
366
II Caguioa, Civil Code, 1966 ed., 110.
367
368
Commonwealth v. Meneses, (CA) 38 O.G. No. 23, 2839.
OWNERSHIP
If the requisites of Article 465 are complied with, the ownership of

the island thus formed shall be governed by the following rules:
(1) It shall belong to the owner of the margins or banks nearest
to the island;
(2) If the island is in the middle of the river, the same shall be
owned by the owners of both margins, in which case it shall
be divided longitudinally in halves; or
(3) If the island be more distant from one margin than from the
other, the owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner
thereof.
The reason for this article is the same as in alluvion in that the
owners of the bank nearer the islands are in the best position to cultivate
and attend to the exploitation of the same.369 In fact, no specific act of
possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian
owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse
possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under
the Torrens system must itself be registered.370
Jagualing v. CA
194 SCRA 607 (1991)
Between the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a
non-navigable and non-floatable river (who has been in possession of the same
for 15 years) and the owner of the land along the margins nearest to the island,
who has the better right thereto? Under Art. 465 of the Civil Code, the island
belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof.
His ownership, however, may yield to the adverse possession of third parties.
But in this case, the third parties were presumed to have notice of the status of
the owner of the land along the nearer margin as riparian owners, hence, they
did not qualify as possessors in good faith. They may acquire ownership of the
island only through uninterrupted adverse possession for a period of thirty (30)
years. By their own admission, they have been in possession of the property for
only about fifteen years. Hence, the island can properly be adjudicated to the
owner of the land along the nearer margin.
369
Jagualing v. CA, 194 SCRA 608, 614-615 (1991).
370
Ibid.
254 PROPERTY
Section 3. — Right of Accession with

Respect to Movable Property
Art. 466. Whenever two movable things belonging to different own-
ers are, without bad faith, united in such a way that they form a single ob-
ject, the owner of the principal thing acquires the accessory, indemnifying
the former owner thereof for its value. (375)
Art. 467. The principal thing, as between two things incorporated, is
deemed to be that to which the other has been united as an ornament, or
for its use or perfection. (376)
Art. 468. If it cannot be determined by the rule given in the preceding
article which of the two things incorporated is the principal one, the thing
of the greater value shall be so considered, and as between two things of
equal value, that of the greater volume.
In painting and sculpture, writings, printed matter, engraving and
lithographs, the board, metal, stone, canvas, paper or parchment shall be
deemed the accessory thing. (377)
Art. 469. Whenever the things united can be separated without in-
jury, their respective owners may demand their separation.
Nevertheless, in case the thing united for the use, embellishment or
perfection of the other, is much more precious than the principal thing,
the owner of the former may demand its separation, even though the thing
to which it has been incorporated may suffer some injury. (378)
Art. 470. Whenever the owner of the accessory thing has made the
incorporation in bad faith, he shall lose the thing incorporated and shall
have the obligation to indemnify the owner of the principal thing for the
damages he may have suffered.
If the one who has acted in bad faith is the owner of the principal
thing, the owner of the accessory thing shall have a right to choose be-
tween the former paying him its value or that the thing belonging to him
be separated, even though for this purpose it be necessary to destroy the
principal thing; and in both cases, furthermore, there shall be indemnity
for damages.
If either one of the owners has made the incorporation with the
knowledge and without the objection of the other, their respective rights
shall be determined as though both acted in good faith. (379a)
Art. 471. Whenever the owner of the material employed without his
consent has a right to an indemnity, he may demand that this consist in
the delivery of a thing equal in kind and value, and in all other respects, to
that employed, or else in the price thereof, according to expert appraisal.
(380)
OWNERSHIP
§ 57. Adjunction or Conjunction

[57.1] Forms of Accesion Continua With Respect To Movables
As discussed in supra § 40.2, there are three forms of accesion
continua with respect to movable property:
(1) adjunction or conjunction;
(2) commixtion or confusion; or
(3) specification
[57.2] Adjunction or Conjunction, Explained

Adjunction (or conjunction) takes place when two or more
movable things belonging to different owners are so united that they
cannot be separated without causing injury to one or both them, thereby
giving rise to a new thing.371 If separation is possible without causing
a substantial physical or juridical injury to any of the movables, then
there is no accession. Hence, in the first paragraph of Article 469 which
contemplates of adjunction through inclusion and soldering,372 the
respective owners may demand separation whenever the things united
can be separated without injury.
The distinguishing features of adjunction are the following: (1)
that the two or more movables form a distinctive new thing; and (2)
that each one of the things making up the new one preserves its own
nature.373 The latter characteristic serves to distinguish it from confusion
which implies a greater degree of identification and in certain cases
even a decomposition of the things which have been confused.374
[57.3] How It Takes Place

Adjunction may take place in either of the following ways:
(1) inclusion or engraftment;
(2) soldadura or attachment;
(3) tejido or weaving;
371
3 Sanchez Roman, 98.
372
3 Manresa, 6th ed., 284-285.
373
3 Manresa 272.
374
II Caguioa, Civil Code, 1966 ed., 111, citing 3 Manresa, 6th ed., 275.
256 PROPERTY
(4) pintura or painting; and

(5) escritura or writing.375
[57.4] Legal Effects of Adjunction

The legal effects of adjunction will depend on how the union or
attachment was effected — whether in good faith or in bad faith.
[57.4.1] If Effected In Good Faith
This situation is governed by Article 466 of the New Civil Code,
which reads:
“Art. 466. Whenever two movable things belonging to
different owners are, without bad faith, united in such a way
that they form a single object, the owner of the principal
thing acquires the accessory, indemnifying the former owner
thereof for its value. (375)”
Thus, if the union or attachment was effected in good faith
— whether by the owner of the principal or by the owner of the
accessory — the rule is that the owner of the principal thing acquires
the accessory376 following the principle in accesion continua that the
accessory follows the principal (“accession cedit principali”), but he
must indemnify the owner of the accessory for its value following the
principle that no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another. The union or attachment is deemed to be effected in good faith
if the person responsible therefore honestly thought that the movables
involved really belonged to him.
However, if the accessory is much more precious than the principal
thing, its owner may demand its separation, even though the principal
may suffer injury.377
[57.4.2.] If Effected In Bad Faith

If the union or attachment was effected in good faith, it is immaterial
as to who was responsible for it. The rule shall be the same as stated
above in supra § 57.4.1 regardless of who was responsible for such
375
3 Manresa, 6th ed., 275-276.
376
See Art. 466, NCC.
377
Art. 469, 2nd par., NCC.
OWNERSHIP
union or attachment. But if the union or attachment was effected in bad

faith, the legal effects shall vary depending as to who was responsible
for it, as follows:
[i] If Effected In Bad Faith By the Owner of the Principal

This situation is governed by the second paragraph of Article 470
of the New Civil Code, which reads:
“Art. 470. xxx
If the one who has acted in bad faith is the owner of the
principal thing, the owner of the accessory thing shall have
a right to choose between the former paying him its value or
that the thing belonging to him be separated, even though for
this purpose it be necessary to destroy the principal thing;
and in both cases, furthermore, there shall be indemnity for
damages.”
Following the principle of accesion continua that bad faith
subjects a person to damages and other unfavorable consequences, the
options in this situation are given to the owner of the accessory and not
to the owner of the principal as a way of penalizing the latter. Hence,
the owner of the accessory may choose between the following options:
(1) to demand payment for the value of the accessory, with a right to
be indemnified for damages; or (2) to demand for the separation of the
accessory, even though for this purpose it be necessary to destroy the
principal thing, with a right to be indemnified for damages.
The second option, however, does not apply if the same is not
practicable as in the case of painting (which cannot be separated from
the canvass) or writing (which cannot be separated from the paper). In
such a situation, the owner of the accessory is limited only to the first
option mentioned above.378
[ii] If Effected In Bad Faith By the Owner of the Accessory

This situation is governed by the first paragraph of Article 470,
which reads:
378
258 PROPERTY
“Art. 470. Whenever the owner of the accessory thing

has made the incorporation in bad faith, he shall lose the thing
incorporated and shall have the obligation to indemnify the
owner of the principal thing for the damages he may have
suffered.
x x x.”
Following the principle of accesion continua that bad faith subjects
a person to damages and other unfavorable consequences, if the union
or attachment was effected by the owner of the accessory in bad faith,
he shall lose the thing incorporated (the accessory) and shall be liable
to pay damages to the owner of the principal.
[iii] If Both Acted In Bad Faith

The third paragraph of Article 470 provides that “if either one of
the owners has made the incorporation with the knowledge and without
the objection of the other, their respective rights shall be determined
as though both acted in good faith.” In such a case, the provisions of
Article 466 will apply. Hence, whatever has been discussed in supra §
57.4.1 shall also apply to this situation.
In the foregoing situations, whenever the owner of the material
employed without his consent has a right to an indemnity, he may
demand that the same consist either: (1) in the delivery of a thing equal
in kind and value, and in all other respects, to that employed; or (2) in
the payment of the price thereof according to expert appraisal.379
[57.5] Tests In Determining The Principal

In determining which of the movables so united is the principal
(and which is the accessory), the following tests shall be applied:
(1) First test — that to which the other has been united as
ornament or for its use or perfection is the principal, the thing added is
the accessory;380
(2) Second test — if the first test cannot be applied, then the
thing of greater value is the principal and the other the accessory;381
379
Art. 471, NCC.
380
Art. 467, NCC.
381
Art. 468, NCC.
OWNERSHIP
(3) Third test — if both things are of equal value, then the one
of greater volume is the principal and the other the accessory.382
However, in the case of painting, sculpture, writings, printed
matter, engraving and lithographs, the board, metal, stone, canvas,
paper or parchment shall be deemed the accessory thing.383
Art. 472. If by the will of the owners two things of the same or differ-
ent kinds are mixed, or if the mixture occurs by chance, and in the latter
case the things are not separable without injury, each owner shall acquire
a right proportional to the part belonging to him, bearing in mind the value
of the things mixed or confused. (381)
Art. 473. If by the will of only one owner, but in good faith, two things
of the same or different kinds are mixed or confused, the rights of the
owners shall be determined by the provisions of the preceding article.
If the one who caused the mixture or confusion acted in bad faith,
he shall lose the thing belonging to him thus mixed or confused, besides
being obliged to pay indemnity for the damages caused to the owner of
the other thing with which his own was mixed. (382)
§ 58. Commixtion or Confusion

[58.1] Commixtion or Confusion, Explained
Commixtion or confusion refers to mixture of two or more things
belonging to different owners. If the things mixed are solid, it is called
commixtion; if the things are liquid, it is called confusion.
[58.2] Legal Effects of Commixtion or Confusion

The legal effects of commixtion or confusion are provided in
Articles 472 and 473 of the New Civil Code. Based from these two
Articles, the effects of commixtion or confusion shall depend on the
manner by which the mixture occurs:
[58.2.1] Co-ownership
If the mixture takes place by reason of the following: (1) by will of
both or all owners of the things mixed;384 (2) by will of only one owner
382
Art. 468, NCC.
383
384
Art. 472, NCC.
260 PROPERTY
acting in good faith;385 or (3) by chance or fortuitous event,386 a state of

co-ownership with respect to the mixture shall arise and each owner
“shall acquire a right proportional to the part belonging to him, bearing
in mind the value of the thing mixed or confused.”387 Strictly speaking,
the situations contemplated are not really cases of accession since the
persons involved did not gain anything. Instead, these situations will
give rise to a state of co-ownership.
[58.2.2] If Caused By Only One Owner Acting In Bad

Faith
This situation, on the other hand, is a true case of accession.
Pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 473 of the
New Civil Code, if the mixture is caused by only one owner acting in
bad faith, he loses the thing belonging to him thus mixed or confused,
besides being obliged to pay indemnity for the damages caused to the
owner of the thing with which his own was mixed or confused.388
Art. 474. One who in good faith employs the material of another in
whole or in part in order to make a thing of a different kind, shall appropri-
ate the thing thus transformed as his own, indemnifying the owner of the
material for its value.
If the material is more precious than the transformed thing or is of
more value, its owner may, at his option, appropriate the new thing to
himself, after first paying indemnity for the value of the work, or demand
indemnity for the material.
If in the making of the thing bad faith intervened, the owner of the
material shall have the right to appropriate the work to himself without
paying anything to the maker, or to demand of the latter that he indemnify
him for the value of the material and the damages he may have suffered.
However, the owner of the material cannot appropriate the work in case
the value of the latter, for artistic or scientific reasons, is considerably
more than that of the material. (383a)
Art. 475. In the preceding articles, sentimental value shall be duly
appreciated. (n)
385
Art. 473, 1st par., NCC.
386
387
Arts. 472 and 473, 1st par., NCC.
388
OWNERSHIP
§ 59. Specification
[59.1] Specification, Explained
Specification takes place whenever the work of a person is done
on the material of another, such material, in consequence of the work
itself, undergoing a transformation.389 It is the imparting of a new form
to the material of another person.390 Hence, specification involves: (1)
the labor of the worker, and (2) the materials of another.
[59.2] Legal Effects

The legal effects of specification shall depend on the good faith
or bad faith of the worker. Of course, the worker is in good faith if he
honestly believed that the materials were his at the time that he made
use of them; otherwise, he shall be considered in bad faith.
[59.2.1] If the Worker Acted In Good Faith

One who in good faith employs the material of another in whole
or in part in order to make a thing of a different kind, shall appropriate
the thing thus transformed as his own, indemnifying the owner of the
material for its value.391
The exception to the foregoing rule is when the material is more
precious than the transformed thing or more valuable, in which case, its
owner may, at his option: (1) appropriate the new thing to himself after
paying indemnity for the value of the work; or (2) demand indemnity
for the material.392
[59.2.2] If the Worker Acted In Bad Faith

If in the making of the thing bad faith intervened, the owner of
the material has two options: (1) to appropriate the work for himself
without paying anything to the maker; or (2) to demand of the latter
(worker) that he indemnify him for the value of the material and the
damages he may have suffered.393
389
390
3 Sanchez Roman 100.
391
392
393
Art. 474, 3rd par., NCC.
262 PROPERTY
However, if the value of the work, for artistic or scientific reasons,

is considerably more than that of the material, the owner of the material
cannot appropriate the work.394 In such a case, the owner of the material
can only demand from the worker the value of his materials and the
damages he may have suffered.
Chapter 3
QUIETING OF TITLE (n)
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any
interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudi-
cial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast
upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest
in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. He need not
be in possession of said property.
Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud
therefrom when the contract, instrument or other obligation has been ex-
tinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescrip-
tion.
Art. 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant all benefits he
may have received from the latter, or reimburse him for expenses that
may have redounded to the plaintiff’s benefit.
Art. 480. The principles of the general law on the quieting of title are
hereby adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with this Code.
Art. 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or the removal of a
cloud therefrom shall be governed by such rules of court as the Supreme
Court shall promulgate.
§ 60. Quieting of Title

[60.1] Action to Quiet Title
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real
394
Art. 474, last par., Civil Code.
OWNERSHIP
Quieting of Title (n)
property.395 Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure

an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse
to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those
claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of
hostile claim.396 In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the
one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the
other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would
see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to
use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best.397 Such remedy
may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in Article 476 of
the New Civil Code, as follows:
“Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is appar-
ently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, inef-
fective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud
or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud
from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.”
In Realty Sales Enterprises v. IAC,398 the Supreme Court held that
suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly
speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res,
these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem and the judgment in
such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.399
395
Baricuatro v. CA, 325 SCRA 137 (2000), citing Vda. de Aviles v. Court of Appeals, 264
SCRA 473, 478 (1996); see also Divinagracia v. Cometa, 482 SCRA 648, 654 (2006) and Calacala,
et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005.
396
Id., citing II Tolentino, Civil Code, 137.
397
Id., citing II Paras, Civil Code, 13th ed., 270.
398
154 SCRA 328, 348 (1987).
399
See also Seville v. National Development Company, 351 SCRA 112.
264 PROPERTY
[60.2] Requisites of Action to Quiet Title

For an action to quiet title to prosper, the following indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action;400 (2) there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein;401 and (3) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.402
[60.2.1] Legal or Equitable Title

For an action for quieting of title to prosper, it is essential for the
plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.403
On this score, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
“Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable
title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-
matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said
property.”
It is not necessary, therefore, that the person seeking to quiet
his title be the registered owner of the property in question.404 When
Article 477 speaks of “title” to property, it does not necessarily denote
a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the suit.405 It can
connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner
thereof.406 Hence, in Chacon Enterprises v. Court of Appeals,407 the Court
considered the action to be one for quieting of title where the plaintiffs
alleged ownership and actual possession since time immemorial of the
property in question by themselves and through their predecessors-in-
interest, while defendants secured a certificate of title over said property
through fraud, misrepresentation and deceit. Indeed, under Article 477,
400
Calacala, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, supra.
401
MBTC v. Alejo, 364 SCRA 812.
402
403
Id., See also Robles v. CA, 328 SCRA 97, 108-109.
404
Mamadsual v. Moson, 190 SCRA 82.
405
Maestrado v. CA, 327 SCRA 678, 689; also in Mamadsual v. Moson, supra.
406
Mamadsual v. Moson, supra.
407
124 SCRA 784 (1983).
OWNERSHIP
one who has an equitable right or interest in the property may also file
an action to quiet title.408
[60.2.2] “Cloud” on Title

Equally important, an action for quieting of title is filed only when
there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein.409 As
defined, a “cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some
legal form but which is in fact unfounded.”410
In the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Alejo,411
the Supreme Court held that an action to quiet title is not an appropriate
remedy there being no cloud on Metrobank’s title. In this case, the
Spouses Acampado were borrowers of Metrobank, for which reason
they executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank as security
for their mortgage indebtedness. The said mortgage was registered and
annotated on the title of the property subject matter thereof. Subsequently
thereafter, a third person filed an action against the Spouses Acampado
for declaration of the latter’s title, for which a favorable judgment was
obtained by said third person. Despite being the registered mortgagee
of the subject property, Metrobank was not notified of the existence of
the said proceedings. Because of the failure of the Spouses Acampado
to pay their mortgage obligation, Metrobank foreclosed the mortgage
and when it was about to consolidate its ownership over the foreclosed
property, it learned of the existence of the decision annulling the title of
the Spouses Acampado. Upon such discovery, Metrobank filed a petition
for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals to declare the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court null and void. However, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of Metrobank on the ground,
among others, that the bank should have filed a petition for relief from
judgment or an action for quieting of title before the Regional Trial
Court instead of the petition for annulment of judgment. On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that an action to quite title is not an appropriate
remedy in this situation. The Court explained —
Equally important, an action for quieting of title is filed
only when there is a cloud on title to real property or any
408
Mamadsual v. Moson, supra.
409
MBTC v. Alejo, supra.
410
Id., citing II Tolentino, Civil Code, 1992 ed., 150.
411
Supra.
266 PROPERTY
interest therein. As defined, a “cloud on title is a semblance

of title which appears in some legal form but which is in
fact unfounded.” In this case, the subject judgment cannot
be considered as a cloud on petitioner’s title or interest over
the real property covered by TCT No. V-41319, which does
not even have a semblance of being a title.
It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment
as a cloud that would warrant the filing of an action for
quieting of title, because to do so would require the court
hearing the action to modify or interfere with the judgment
or order of another co-equal court. Well-entrenched in our
jurisdiction is the doctrine that a court has no power to do
so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder
the administration of justice. Clearly, an action for quieting
of title is not an appropriate remedy in this case.
In fine, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff

must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow
upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property.412 The ground or
reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be “an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.”413 Under the
maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive
so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not
be considered valid for the same action. Consequently, in the cases
of Vda. de Aviles v. Court of Appeals, supra, and Titong v. Court of
Appeals, supra, the Court held that an action for quieting of title may
not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute. In Vda.
de Aviles, the Court explained further —
From another perspective, we hold that the trial court

(and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for
quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of
the claimed property, as that would be tantamount to award-
ing to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an
412
Vda. de Aviles v. CA, 264 SCRA 473; also in Titong v. CA, 278 SCRA 102.
413
Titong v. CA, supra., citing Vda. de Aviles v. CA, supra.
OWNERSHIP
action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instru-

ment, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved
constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners’ interest or title in
and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is
appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or
ownership may properly be considered and where evidence
aliunde, other than the “instrument, record, claim, encum-
brance or proceeding” itself, may be introduced. An action
for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period pre-
scribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto,
also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the
petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may
be fully threshed out.
The foregoing rule, however, is subject to qualification. As a
general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is
not created by mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an
interest in property.414 Where there is a written or factual basis for the
asserted right, the same will be sufficient.415 Thus, a claim of right based
on acquisitive prescription or adverse possession has been held to
constitute a removable cloud on title.416
[60.2.3] Deed, Claim, Etc. Must Be Invalid or Inoperative
Also, for an action for quieting of title to prosper the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff’s
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.417 This requirement is clear
from the provision of Article 476.
[60.3] Prescription
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiff need not be in possession

of the property.418 If the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title,
414
Tandog, et al. v. Macapagal, et al., G.R. No. 144208, Sep. 11, 2007; citing II Tolentino,
Civil Code, 152.
415
Id.
416
Id.
417
418
Art. 477, NCC.
268 PROPERTY
however, is in possession of the property being litigated, the action is

imprescriptible.419 The rationale for this rule has been aptly stated thus:
The owner of real property who is in possession there-
of may wait until his possession is invaded or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. A person
claiming title to real property, but not in possession thereof,
must act affirmatively and within the time provided by the
statute. Possession is a continuing right as is the right to
defend such possession. So it has been determined that an
owner of real property in possession has a continuing right to
invoke a court of equity to remove a cloud that is a continu-
ing menace to his title. Such a menace is compared to a con-
tinuing nuisance or trespass which is treated as successive
nuisances or trespasses, not barred by statute until continued
without interruption for a length of time sufficient to affect a
change of title as a matter of law.420
The rule that the Statute of Limitations is not available as a defense
to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a
complainant when he is in possession. One who claims property which
is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within
the statutory period.421
Even if the complaint of the plaintiff is captioned or denominated
as one for “Annulment of Title and/or Reconveyance”422 or one to compel
the defendant to execute a deed of conveyance423 but the averments
therein show that plaintiff is claiming lawful ownership of the property,
is in actual possession and seeks to remove a cloud over his title, the
action is to be considered as an action for quieting of title or removal of
a cloud over such title and as plaintiff is in possession of the land, the
action is imprescriptible.424 It is a settled rule that it is not the caption of
the pleading, but the allegations thereof that determines the nature of
419
Sapto v. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683; Faja v. CA, 75 SCRA 441, 446 (1977); David v. Malay,
318 SCRA 711.
420
Pingol v. CA, 226 SCRA 118, 129-130; See also Faja v. CA, supra.
421
Mamadsual v. Moson, supra, 88.
422
See Chacon Enterprises v. CA, G.R. No. L-46418-19, Sept. 29, 1983.
423
See Gallar v. Husain, 20 SCRA 186.
424
Id.
OWNERSHIP
Ruinous Buildings and Trees in Danger of Falling
the action; that even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper
relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the
complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant.425
Chapter 4
RUINOUS BUILDINGS AND TREES
IN DANGER OF FALLING
Art. 482. If a building, wall, column, or any other construction is in
danger of falling, the owner shall be obliged to demolish it or to execute
the necessary work in order to prevent it from falling.
If the proprietor does not comply with this obligation, the admin-
istrative authorities may order the demolition of the structure at the ex-
pense of the owner, or take measures to insure public safety. (389a)
Art. 483. Whenever a large tree threatens to fall in such a way as to
cause damage to the land or tenement of another or to travellers over a
public or private road, the owner of the tree shall be obliged to fell and re-
move it; and should he not do so, it shall be done at his expense by order
of the administrative authorities. (390a)
§ 61. Ruinous Buildings and Falling Trees

[61.1] Exercise of Police Power
The provisions of Articles 482 and 483 are necessary consequences
of the limitations inherent in the exercise of the right of ownership.
As discussed in supra § 37.3, every holder of property holds it under
the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of
their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.426 As a
consequence, if the property of a person poses danger to other people
or their property, such as in the situations contemplated in Articles 482
and 483, the State may validly exercise its police power to prevent the
occurrence of such injury.
425
Chacon Enterprises v. CA, supra, citing Ras v. Sua, L-23302, Sept. 25, 1968, 25 SCRA
153, 158-159, citing People v. Matondo, February 24, 1961; Cajefe v. Fernandez, Oct. 19, 1960;
Rosales v. Reyes, 25 Phil. 495; Ibañez de Baranueva v. Fuster, 29 Phil. 606; Cabigao v. Lim, 50
Phil. 844.
426
Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 250.
270 PROPERTY
[61.2] Obligations of Owners of Ruinous Buildings

Owners of buildings, walls, columns or other constructions in
danger of falling are obliged to either demolish it or to execute the
necessary work in order to prevent it from falling.427 If he does not
comply with this obligation, the administrative authorities may order the
demolition of the structure at his expense, or to take measures to insure
public safety.428 Since this is an exercise of the police power of the State
intended to secure public safety, the condemnation of the property is not
compensable. As stated in supra § 37.1.1, in police power, if property
is condemned for the purpose of promoting the general welfare, the
owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in
consequence thereof.
Further, if by reason of lack of necessary repairs, a building or
structure causes damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, the
proprietor thereof shall be responsible for the damages.429 However,
if the reason for the collapse should be any defect in the construction
mentioned in Article 1723,430 the liability shall fall upon the engineer
or architect or contractor in accordance with the said article, within the
period therein fixed.431
[61.3] Obligations of Owners of Falling Trees

Whenever a large tree threatens to fall in such a way as to cause
damage to the land or tenement of another or to travellers over a public
or private road, the owner of the tree shall be obliged to fell and remove
it; and should he not do so, it should be done at his expense by order of
the administrative authorities.432
427
Art. 482, par. 1, NCC.
428
Art. 482, par. 2, NCC.
429
Art. 2190, NCC.
430
“Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a
building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same
should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the
ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same
period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished
by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises
the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of
action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)”
431
Art. 2192, NCC.
432
Art. 483, NCC.
OWNERSHIP
Ruinous Buildings and Trees in Danger of Falling
In paragraph 3 of Article 2191 of the New Civil Code, proprietors

are liable for the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if
the same is not caused by force majeure. Note, however, that if it is the
tree contemplated under Article 483 which falls and causes damage to
another, the owner thereof shall be deemed liable even if the reason for
the fall be fortuitous event, such as typhoon or earthquake, because in
this case the owner is already negligent for failing to take the necessary
measures to insure public safety.
Capili v. Sps. Cardaña

G.R. No. 157906, Nov. 2, 2006
On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter

fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree
located within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death.
Her parents sued the principal of the school for damages. It turned out that as
early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay already reported to
the said principal on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby but the
latter did nothing. The Court, in this case, held the principal liable for damages
because of her negligence. The Court explained: “The probability that the
branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a
danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to
see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within
the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree
whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge
of the responsibility of her position.”
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PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATION 233

[51.3.3] Subsidiary Liability of the Landowner

Art. 458. The owners of estates adjoining ponds or lagoons do not

[53.2] Riparian Owners Distinguished From Littoral Owners

[53.3] Rule on Alluvion

3 Manresa, 6th ed., 235.

2 Castan, 8th ed., 218.

[53.4] Requisites of Alluvion

[53.4.1] First Requisite

[53.4.2] Second Requisite

truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots

[53.4.3] Third Requisite

or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast

Heirs of Emiliano Navarro v. IAC

Government of the P.I. v. Colegio de San Jose

[53.5] Right of Riparian Owner to Alluvium Is Ipso Jure

or give title to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter,

[53.6] Exception to the Rule on Alluvion

Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segre-

[54.2] Comparison With Alluvion

[54.3] Rule on Avulsion

[54.4] Avulsion With Respect To Uprooted Trees

§ 55. Change of Course of River

[55.2] Applicability of Article 461

195 SCRA 433 (1991).

224 SCRA 562 (1993).

[55.3] Extension of Ownership Ipso Jure

[55.4] Restoration of the River to Its Former Course

affected landowners may themselves undertake the return of the river

[55.5] When River Dries Up

[55.6] Status of New Bed

new bed passing through a private estate shall become property of

§ 56. Formation of Island

in the middle of a river, thus forming an island, the provisions of Article

[56.1.2] Island Formed Under Article 464

[56.1.3] Island Formed Under Article 465

If the requisites of Article 465 are complied with, the ownership of

Section 3. — Right of Accession with

§ 57. Adjunction or Conjunction

[57.2] Adjunction or Conjunction, Explained

[57.3] How It Takes Place

(4) pintura or painting; and

[57.4] Legal Effects of Adjunction

[57.4.2.] If Effected In Bad Faith

union or attachment. But if the union or attachment was effected in bad

[i] If Effected In Bad Faith By the Owner of the Principal

[ii] If Effected In Bad Faith By the Owner of the Accessory

“Art. 470. Whenever the owner of the accessory thing

[iii] If Both Acted In Bad Faith

[57.5] Tests In Determining The Principal

§ 58. Commixtion or Confusion

[58.2] Legal Effects of Commixtion or Confusion

acting in good faith;385 or (3) by chance or fortuitous event,386 a state of

[58.2.2] If Caused By Only One Owner Acting In Bad

[59.2] Legal Effects

[59.2.1] If the Worker Acted In Good Faith

[59.2.2] If the Worker Acted In Bad Faith

However, if the value of the work, for artistic or scientific reasons,

§ 60. Quieting of Title

property.395 Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure

[60.2] Requisites of Action to Quiet Title

[60.2.1] Legal or Equitable Title

[60.2.2] “Cloud” on Title