The Social System and the Utility of the Collectivity in Vilfredo Pareto's Sociology

Author(s): Gabriele Pollini

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Revue européenne des sciences sociales, T. 37, No. 116, L'équilibre Général Enter
économie et Sociologie: Colloque du Center d'études interdisciplinaires Walras-Pareto de
I'Université de Lausanne (1999), pp. 191-207
Published by: Librairie Droz
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 des sciencessociales,TomeXXXVII, 1999,N° 116,pp. 191-207
Revueeuropéenne

GabrielePOLLINI

THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

AND THE UTILITY OF THE COLLECTIVITY
IN VILFREDO PARETO'S SOCIOLOGY

1. THE TYPES OF ABSTRACT SOCIETY

AND CONCRETE HUMAN SOCIETY

Thereare, accordingto Pareto,« two extremetypesof abstractsocieties»

(Pareto,1916: § 240) or ideal typesof society:on theone hand,ideal typeA)
« wherethesentiments actentirelyalone,without reasoning ofanysort»(Pareto,
1916: § 2141); on theother, idealtypeB), whichis «determined exclusively by
logico-experimental reasoning»(Pareto,1916: § 2141).
Type A) abstractsocietycan be relatedto animal societiesand human
societies,on theabstract hypothesis thatindividuals perform solelynon-logical
actionsbelonging togenusI andgenusIII (thelatterarealso termed puretypesof
non-logical action) (Pareto,1916: § 155) (bothcharacterized by the absenceofa
subjectively logicalend). The typeB) abstract societycan insteadbe relatedto
thosesocietiesin whichindividualsact onlylogically(logicalactions)on the
basis of a logical-experimental reasoning(subjectivelylogical ends) which
enablesthemeffectively to achieveobjectively logicalendscoincident withthe
former.
In otherwords,in idealtypeA) «theabstract formofsocietyis determined if
thesentiments are giventogether withtheexternalcircumstances in whichthe
societyexists; or if onlythecircumstances are givenand the sentiments are
considered as beingdetermined by the circumstances» (Pareto, 1916: § 2142). As
an example of a theoryof this ideal type of societyParetocites «social
Darwinism»,whichpropounds the«theoremofthesurvivalofthoseindividuals
bestadaptedtothecircumstances» (Pareto,1916: § 2142).
As regardsideal societytypeB), instead,its formis not determined by
environmental conditionsorby« external circumstances », butrather bytheendto
be pursuedby meansof logico-experimental reasoning(Pareto,1916: § 2143).
The Frenchtranslation of theTrattato di sociologíagenérale(1917), revisedby
Pareto,states« le butque doitatteindre la societéau moyenduraisonment logico-
»
expérimental(Pareto, 1917: § 2143).
Ifthesearethetwo« extreme typesofabstract society», arguesPareto,human
society«lies in an intermediate statebetweenthe two typesjust indicated»
(Pareto,1916: § 2146),andalthough itcannotbe either clearlyidentified withthe
extremetypeof 'animal' societyor madeto coincidewiththeextremetypeof
'technological'society, because- andthisis one ofthePareto'scentraltenets-
« logico-experimental reasoning hasingeneralplayedlittlepartintheordering of
society» (Pareto, 1916: § 2146).The same applies to the logical actions based
192 G.POLLINI

upon it, and this «not because the 'prejudices' of men prevent them from
followingthedictatesof 'reason' butbecause thedata are lackingfortheproblem
which it is desired to solve by logico-experimentalreasoning» (Pareto, 1916:
§ 2143).
If 'animal' society or type A) abstractsociety comprises exclusively non-
logical actions of genus I and genus III, both characterizedby the absence of
subjectivelylogical ends, and in one case, thatof genus III, by the presence of
objectivelylogical ends, which,in thecase in question,can only be practical,not
imaginaryor ideal, and if 'technological' or type B) abstractsociety comprises
only logical actions in which both objectivelyand subjectivelylogical ends are
presentand coincide, thenconcretehumansociety,as definedby Pareto,clearly
comprises both logical and non-logical actions, and among the latterthe four
genera. However, as Pareto specifies and emphasises on several occasions, not
only are non-logical actions prevalent and preponderantin society, but
predominantamong them are those in which the subjectively logical end is
present(genera II and IV) because, Pareto maintains,men cannot do otherwise
thanrepresentcourses of action to themselvesex ante in theirminds,and justify
themex post by means of pseudo-reasoningof variouskinds.In particular, among
generaII and IV actions,theones relativelymorewidespreadand moreimportant
for human co-living are those belonging to genus IV. Because these latter,are
definedby thepresenceof bothsubjectivelyand objectivelylogical ends,theyare
distinguishedfromlogical actionsbecause an objectivelylogical end differsfrom
a subjectively logical one, and does not coincide with it. Anotherfeatureof
actions in concrete human society is that,as a consequence of the prevalence
withinit of genus IV non-logicalactions,subjectivelylogical ends may be - and
frequentlyare - imaginaryor ideal. Thus, unlike both 'animal' and 'techno-
logical' societies, where ends, when present(respectivelygenus III non-logical
actions and theclass of logical actions),are in all cases practical,concretehuman
society is constitutedby human actions undertakento attainboth practicalends
and imaginaryor ideal ones.
A further observationis in order.Whilstin concretehumansocietynon-logical
actions are notonly quantitatively preponderant butalso qualitativelyimportant-
despite various attemptsby philosophers and thinkers to gainsay thisimportance
(Pareto, 1916: § 306 ff) by formulatingthe most diverse of non-logico-
experimentaltheories- theyconcernnotsolely therealmstudiedby sociology but
also thatconsideredby economics. Predominantin the latter,in fact,are logical
actions,as in thespheresof warfareand thescience of government(Pareto, 1916:
§ 2146). Yet non-logicalactions are also presentand widespread,and especially
some of those classifiable in genus IV, where the actor's formulationof the
subjectivelylogical end is followed by attainmentof a objectivelylogical end
different fromtheformerand notforeseenby theactor.
To illustratethis case of objectively produced effectsbut not subjectively
foreseen,Paretocites an example drawnfromtheeconomic sphere,whereitoften
happens thatentrepreneurs operatingin conditionsof freecompetitionundertake
non-logical actions. He writesin Manuale di economia política (1906) that«in
this way competingfirmssucceed where theydid not minimallyintendto go.
Each of themhas only been interestedin its own profit[subjectivelylogical end]
and has only concerneditselfwithconsumersto the extentthatit could exploit
SOCIAL SYSTEM AND UTILITY OF THE COLLECTIVITY IN PARETO 193

them;andyetbyvirtueofthesuccessiveadaptations andre-adaptations imposed

by competition, all this endeavourhas provedto the benefitof consumers
[objectively logical end]» (Pareto,1906: chap.V, § 11, p. 277 and also § 74,
p. 315).
Conversely, one mayalso arguethattherealmconsidered bysociologymay
comprise logicalactions,especiallywhenitis viewedfromthemicro-sociological
perspective (thatis, fromthestandpoint of thesocial actorand withattention
restrictedtosimplechainsofsocialactionsoreventoindividual ones),ratherthan
fromthemacro-sociological one (thatis, fromthepointof view of thesocial
system).
concretehumansocietyis a societycharacterized
In short, mainlybythenon-
logical actionsof individuals,
although italso comprises logicalactionswhichcut
acrossall theambitsand sectorsof humanactivity, albeitto differingextents.
Particularly evidentamongtheformer arethosethatbelongto genusIV, where,
although'rationality' subjectively understood à la Weberis present, notso is
'logicality'objectively understood à la Pareto(Pollini,1984).Fromthisonemay
inferthatconcretehumansocietyis characterized mainlybysubjectively logical
actions(bothlogicalandnon-logical belonging totheII andIV genus),orinother
wordsbyactionstoattainsubjectively logicalends.

2. HUMAN SOCIETY AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM

The formassumedbya humansocietyis determined bya variety ofelements

whichoperateuponit.Paretofirstdistinguishes theseelements betweenexternal
andinternal.He thendividestheexternal elements intothosethatare«externalin
space» and those thatare «external in time». Amongtheformer are,on theone
hand,elementsof an ecological-territorial nature,like«thesoil,theclimate,the
flora,thefauna,geological,mineralogical, and so on, circumstances» (Pareto,
1916: § 2060) and,on theother, socialelementslike«othersocieties».Among
theelementsthatare«externalin time»,thesebeingprincipally socialin nature,
Paretoconsidersthe« anterior state» ofsociety.
The internalelements,whichare identified froman analytical-structural
perspectiverather thana simplydescriptive-classificatory one,aremainlybutnot
exclusively (c) derivations
(a) residues,(b) interests, and(d) socialheterogeneity
and circulation amongthevariousparts(Pareto,1916: § 2205 and §§ 2025 if).
Withan interesting annotation Paretopointsout thattheactionof external
elementswillnotbe considered directly in hisanalysisofthesocialsystem, but
onlyindirectly «assumingas giventheresidues, inclinationsandinterests ofmen
subjectedtotheactionoftheseelements»(Pareto,1916: § 2064).
I shallcomment onlybriefly oneachoftheelements thatconstitutesthesocial
system.
As regardsinterests - whichParetodefinesas a « setofspurstoactionon the
partoftheinstinct orreasoninordertoacquireusefulmaterial goods,orevenonly
-
pleasurableones,andto achieveesteemandhonour»(Pareto,1916: § 2009) if
thespurto actionderivesfromthereason,theyareprimarily elementsoflogical
action,and theirstudyis overwhelmingly thetaskof economics,whichhe also
callsthe«generalscienceofinterests» (Pareto,1916: § 2146).
194 G.POLLINI

Residuesandderivations arecomponents drawnfrominductive analysisofthe

non-logico-experimental theories,consideredas facts,whichaccompanynon-
logical actions,and in particular thoseof genusII and IV wheresubjectively
logicalendsare present.Sinceresiduesandderivations are bothcomponents of
non-logico-experimental theories,theyare the expression,manifestation and
symbolic-linguistic-social precipitate of individualsentiments. The difference
betweenthemis thatwhereasresiduesare the mostconstantcomponentof
theories- thatis, thecomponent thatvariesless withvariationamongseveral
theories atthesametime,andinonetheory atdifferent times- derivations arethe
mostvariablecomponents oftheories. Theycorrespond to thepseudo-reasoning
bywhichindividuals seekto maketheiractionsplausibleandtojustifythemin
subjectively logicalmanner tothemselves andtoothers, wheninfacttheyarenot
logical.If we arrangethecomponents of non-logical actionalonga continuum,
thesentiments standatoneextreme, thatoftheindividual's psychicstate,andare
therefore nottheconcernof sociology,residuesat thecentre,and derivations -
distinguished betweenderivations properandderivations -
manifestationsat the
otherextreme. Here,however, theresiduesandderivations lie ona differentplane
fromtheindividual psychic sentiments : they do not coincide withthelatterbutare
insteadcomponents of non-logico-experimental theorieswhich,besidesbeing
characterizedlinguistico-symbolically, are socially determined, given that
language is «one of the social phenomena».
Finally,the fourthinternalelementof the formof society,namelysocial
heterogeneity and circulationamongparts,is substantially differentfromthe
previous three because it involves themanner in which individuals actin society
- thatis tosay,themanner inwhichtheyaggregate intosocialgroupsandclasses
internally to societyitself.Paretothusdistinguishes twolevelsofthesocial: the
properly societal one,or that ofa society as a whole, and thatofsocialaggregates,
whichare situatedin an intermediate positionbetweenindividuals, on theone
hand,andtheoverallsocietalcollectivity, on theother.
The otherfeature highlighted byParetobesidessocialheterogeneity is thatof
social circulation, or social mobilityfromone aggregateto another.Social
heterogeneity, withitsassociatedsocialmobility, is a specificandcharacteristic
variablein determination of theformassumedby a society,and as suchit not
reducibletoanyother.
Havingsingledout thefourinternal elementsthatoperateon theformof
society,Paretoarguesthattheyarenotindependent. Instead, theyarecharacterized
by reciprocalrelationsor relationsof interdependence whichcome together to
constitute a system,and specifically a social system. Paretothusabandonsthe
descriptive-classificatory perspective andadoptsananalytical-structural onewhich
considershumansociety,withthefeatures describedabove,as a social system.
The main featureof thissystemis, as noted,the interdependence of the
elementsof whichitis composed.Each ofthefourelementsactsupontheother
three,givingriseto fourpossiblecombinations (Pareto,1916: § 2206),butnone
ofthemtakenindividually can be considered unilaterally thecause oftheothers,
becauseitis initsturninfluenced anddetermined by them (Pareto,1916: § 2206)
anddependsuponthem(Pareto,1916: § 2097).
A secondfeatureof humansocietyas a social systemis theexistenceof a
particularrelationship betweenenvironment and system. The external elements
SOCIAL SYSTEM AND UTILITY OF THE COLLECTIVITY IN PARETO 195

of the ecological-territorial environment,forexample, are not consideredalone

and directly,but ratherindirectlythroughinternalelements like residues and
derivations,in whichit is possible (especially in theformer)to discernthevarious
ways in which the externalelementsexerttheirinfluence(see, forexample, the
residue of class II 'persistence of aggregates' genus alpha 2: 'relations with
places').
A third feature of society used by Pareto to analyse human society is
equilibrium,and specificallythe state of equilibrium,which he defines as that
statewhich «if a modificationwere artificiallyintroducedin it unlikethatwhich
it in realityundergoes,immediatelya reactionwould be produced which would
tendto bringitback to thereal state» (Pareto, 1916 : § 2068). In otherwords,since
the systemis determinedby its elements,once each elementhas done its work,
«society by itselfcannotassume any otherformthanthis [XI], and should it be
artificiallyshiftedaway from this form,it will seek to returnto it, because
otherwiseits formwould notbe entirelydeterminedby theelementsconsidered»
(Pareto, 1916: §2070).
The state X of equilibriumdiscussed by Pareto is evidentlythatof dynamic
equilibrium, where states X 1, X 2, and so on, correspond to successive
equilibrium positions or states of equilibrium and, as such, do not cause a
'breakdown' in the equilibriumor impede the use of theconcept of equilibrium.
Thus, identifyingthe state of equilibriumof the social system and using this
conceptto analyse itdoes notobstructexaminationof change in thesocial system
or of social change. The lattercoincides with the various positions assumed
throughtimeby the stateof equilibrium,notwithvariationin theelementsof the
systemnor witha different formof the system,because in thiscase it would not
be determinedby theelementsconsidered.
Human society,therefore, is neithera societyin whichonlythesentimentsand
instincts(non-logical actions of genera I and III) operate,nor is it one in which
only logico-experimentalreasoning(logical action) operates,but rathera society
in which both logical and non-logical actions are at work (especially those
belonging to genus II and genus IV). Consequently,the systemic-analytical
perspectiveassumed by Pareto statesthata centralrole is played by the residues
and derivationsin thepatternof determination, and notby interests.By ascribing
a significant function to residues in determiningthe social equilibrium
[combinationI - where(a) acts upon (b), (c) and (d) - « is an extremelyimportant
partof the social phenomenon» (Pareto, 1916: § 2206)], while at the same time
fullyacceptingthe interdependenceamong theelementsof the system,Pareto is
also obliged to emphasize thatthederivationsdetermineresidues- althoughthis
determination is «the least importantof all» (Pareto, 1916: § 2206) - or in other
words thatthelatterdepend on theformer[combinationIII: (c) acts upon (a), (b)
and (d)].
I shall brieflydiscuss thislattercombinationof interdependencebelow. First,
however,I shall introducethe concept of utility,and of utilityof a collectivity,
particularlyin relationto non-logicalactions.
196 G. POLLINI

3. UTILITY AS A PROPERTY OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

Havingassumedan analytical-structural perspectiveon thesocial systemin

orderto analyseconcretehumansociety, andhavingidentified themainfeatures
of the systemand the principalinterdependent elementsthat combineto
determine itsstateofequilibrium,
Paretofollowstheroutealreadymarkedoutby
thenaturalsciences(physicsespecially)as wellas byeconomics, tointroduce the
conceptofutility as a property
ofthesocialsystem. He definesutility
as follows:
Thus, having fixed the normsby which we choose to determinea certainlimitingstate
which we suppose an individual or a collectivityapproaches, and afterhaving given to
the differentstates which approach this limitingstate more or less closely a numerical
index such thattheneareststatehas a higherindex thanthefarthest, we will say thatthese
indexes are those of a state X (Pareto, 1916: § 21 11).
Or:
When an individual, a collectivity, know or think they know that a thing 'is
advantageous' to them,theysay thatit is 'useful'. Both tryto attainthis thing,and they
estimate that the utilitythey enjoy is the greater the more nearly they approach its
possession (Pareto, 1916: § 2111).

The entity X thusdefinedis called 'utility*.

The stateX discussedbyPareto
mayalso correspond to theendorgoal whichindividuals orcollectivitiespursue
or 'oughtto' pursue,an end whichmaybe absolutebutalso, and especially,
relativewithrespectto thejudgementof a particular individual(Pareto,1916:
note1,§ 2111).
My intention hereis to examinetheconceptofutility inrelation to thesocial
systemas a whole.Beforedoingso,however, I mustbriefly considerutilityinthe
economy, whichcan be considered tobe a subsystem ofthesocialsystem.
Paretodefinesthe economicconceptof utilityfirstin Cours d'économie
politique(1896-97),thenin Manualedi economiapolítica(1906) andfinallyin
Trattato di sociologíagenérale(1916). To do so heemploystheterm'ophelimity'
(fromGreek ooye^irioÇ),whichexpresses«the relationship of convenience
wherebya thingsatisfiesa need or a desire,whether or notit is legitimate»
(Pareto,1896-97: p. 10).Withreference totheeconomy, therefore,I shalluseonly
thisconceptandnotthatofutility inthebroadsense.
From the pointof view of the «economic system»,or the «economic
organism»as Paretoalso calls it(Pareto,1896-97:p. 496), andnotsimplyfrom
thatof theindividualeconomicactor,at issue is determining themaximum of
ophelimity fora collectivity. Underwhatconditions can thiscomeabout?
Firstof all, a collectivity consistsof an aggregateof individuals, each of
whomactsin logico-experimental mannersolelyon thebasisof his or herown
satisfaction, and whereeach is «the sole judge» of thissatisfaction. Fromthe
economicpointof view,therefore, ophelimity is an entirely subjectivequality
which is relativeto each individual,who naturallyseeks the maximumof
ophelimity. If thisis thecase, thenhowis itpossibleto talkofthemaximum of
for a
ophelimity collectivity ?
« If theutilities ofsingleindividuals werehomogeneous quantitiesandcould
therefore be comparedand summed»,repliesPareto,«theirstudywouldnotbe
difficult, at least theoretically: one wouldsumtheophelimities of thevarious
SOCIAL SYSTEM AND UTILITY OF THE COLLECTIVITY IN PARETO 197

individuals and thus obtain the utilityof the collectivitythat they constitute»
(Pareto, 1916: § 2127). «But matters are not so straightforward»,Pareto
continues.«The utilitiesof the various individualsare heterogeneousquantities,
and a sum of such quantitiesis a thingthathas no meaning: thereis no such sum,
and none such can be considered» (Pareto, 1916: § 2127), unless one resortsto
considerationsforeignto economics. In fact,in economics,« betweentwo distinct
subjects no comparison of ophelimityis, strictlyspeaking, possible» (Pareto,
1896-97: § 645: p. 52). In economics, the maximum of ophelimityfor a
collectivityis obtainedwhena pointP is reachedbeyondwhichnotall individuals
would achieve the maximum of ophelimity,or in otherwords, a point beyond
which one individualwould be betteroffbut anotherindividualwould be worse
off.
Pointsof typeP are suchthatit is notpossibleto divergefromthemand benefitor
; itis onlypossibletodivergefromthemand
inall itscomponents
damagethecollectivity
someindividuals
benefit whiledamagingothers(Pareto,1913: p. 338).

The maximum of ophelimityfor a collectivityis thereforethe point of

equilibriumwhich marksthe maximumof ophelimityof each individual in the
collectivityrelativelyto theotherindividualsin thesame collectivity, accordingto
the state or the condition or the regime of free competitionand economic
exchange.
But besides theeconomic conceptof ophelimity, and of maximumophelimity
for a collectivity- a topic already treatedin his writingson economics and
resumed in his sociological work par excellence, the Trattatodi sociología
genérale - Pareto was also and especially interested,as regards the notion of
social systemthathe assumed in orderto analyse concretehumansociety,in the
concept of utilityin sociology.
Unlike in economics, however, where it is only possible to talk about
ophelimityfora collectivity,in sociology it is necessaryto distinguishbetween
two senses of theterm'utility': utilityfor a collectivityand utilityofz collectivity.
Utilityfor a collectivityand the maximum of utilityfor a collectivityin
sociology is determinedaccordingto thepatternof ophelimityfora collectivityin
economics. The features shared by the notions are (a) a conception of the
collectivity as an aggregate of individuals, and (b) the logical actions of
individuals.The fundamentaldifferencebetweenophelimityfora collectivityin
economics and utility for a collectivityin sociology is interventionby the« public
power», which, operating logico-experimentallyand adopting a particular
criterion,compares among individual utilitiesand decides to go beyond the
hypotheticalpointof maximumophelimity, or to distanceitselffromit,in orderto
benefitsome individuals and to damage others; and does so for the sake, for
example, of the materialprosperityof the collectivity,as the end to be pursued.
Thereforethe maximum of ophelimityfor a collectivityin economics is
obtainedon thebasis of themaximumophelimityof each individual,and without
intervention by any criterionof comparisonamong individualophelimities,given
thatit is notpossible to compare among heterogeneousquantities,each of which
depends on thenormfixedby each individualforhis or herfullsatisfaction.And
it coincides, as we have seen, withthe point fromwhich any divergencewould
mean therewas no longer maximumophelimityfor all individuals. Maximum
198 G.POLLINI

utilityfora collectivity in sociology,on theotherhand,is madepossiblebythe

assumption on thepartofsomeactor- usuallythosewhopossesspoliticalpower
withinthe collectivityin question- of a yardstickwhichenables logical
comparison amongindividual utilities andtherefore leadstoa choiceinfavourof
thegreater utilityofsomeindividuals andthelesserutility ofothers.Thischoice
is providedwithsomesortoflegitimation anditis often, Paretowriteson several
occasions,mademorein theinterests of thepower-holders thanin pursuitof a
presumed orpurported « publicgood», recourse towhichmaysometimes serveto
disguisethesepartisaninterests ideologicallyby meansof variousderivations.
In anyevent,oncethe« objectiveend» hasbeenfixed- anendwhichmayfor
instancebe thecollectivity's prosperity - thegovernment, forexample,decides
thatit is necessaryto «dispersethemalefactors; it therefore resignsitselfto
causingsuffering to humanitarians, andtherefore assignsverysmallcoefficients
beta'l, beta"l, beta'"l to theirsufferings ... while assigninglarge ones
beta'"""l, beta""""!... tothesufferings ofthemalefactors' victims.By means
of these coefficients the quantitiescorresponding to equations(8) can be
compared, theycan be summedafterbeingmultiplied bybeta'1 beta"1,to yield
(9). [....] The government thathas fixedequation(9) mustinducethecollectivity
tocontinue movinguntilitreachesoneofthesepointsP,andthenstop,becauseif
itgoesfurther itwillcontradict itselfbysacrificing thosethatitdeemsshouldnot
be sacrificed»(Pareto,1913: 394).
Thus,whereeconomicsstopswithdetermination ofthemaximum ophelimity
fora collectivity, sociologytakesoverbycomputing themaximum utility fora
collectivity on thebasisofelements andfactors extraneous toeconomics.
But themostinnovativesense of utility- indeedtheone of fundamental
importance foranalysisofconcrete humansocietyas a socialsystem- is thatof
utility a.
of collectivity, which differs frombotheconomicophelimity and utility
fora collectivity in thesociologicalsense.Unlike,in fact,bothophelimity fora
collectivity andutility fora collectivity, ofa.collectivity
utility involvesa different
conception ofthecollectivity itself,whichis no longerviewedas an aggregate of
individuals but« ifnotas a personatleastas a unity » (Pareto,1916: § 2133).This
aspectrequiresbriefdiscussionbeforeI continuewithexamination of theother
specificfeatures ofthisconcept.
By consideringthe collectivity as a unity- as a realitysui generisin
-
Durkheim'sterminologyParetointroduces one of thecornerstones of theso-
called 'sociologistictheorem'distinctiveof the sociologicaltraditionfrom
Spencer,Simmeland Durkheimup to Parsons.For Paretoit is indisputably
possibletoconstrue a collectivityas a unityina certain sensedistinct froma mere
collection or aggregateof individuals,and endowed with non-derivable
properties, by generalizingfromthe unitsof whichit is constituted, or its
emergingproperties.I shall reviewthe stages in the argumentthatPareto
advancesin support ofthisview.
In his definition of utilityfor a collectivity in sociology,Paretoalready
mentions thepossibleexistenceofan « objectiveend» orofa collectiveendtaken
intoaccountby thepublicpowerwhenitdetermines theequation.Thiselement
does notseemto be problematic in Pareto'sanalysis,eitherifone considersthe
Frenchtextof theTrattato, whichis muchmoreexpliciton thematter (« il taut
encore indiquerquel est le but que doit atteindre la société au moyendu
SOCIAL SYSTEM AND UTILITY OF THE COLLECTIVITY IN PARETO 199

raisonnement logico-expérimental »), or if one considersthe previoustextin

Italian,whichis less explicitbutnotforthisreasonmoreequivocal: « it is also
necessaryto indicatetheend to be pursuedby meansof logico-experimental
reasoning»(Pareto,1916: § 2143).
However,thecontextfromwhichthislatterquotation is drawnrelatesto the
type B) abstract society determined" exclusively by reason ( technological'
society).It also relatesto Pareto'streatment of utility for a collectivity in
sociologywhenthe«public power» is able to comparelogico-experimentally
amongindividualutilities witha viewto attaining a collectiveend,oronethatis
allegedlysuch. Moreover,Pareto's statements concerningthe collectivity's
commongoal, or its collectivegoal, indeedprovidevalid groundsfor the
existence;as regardsconcretehumansociety,of a collectivity as a unity, rather
thanonewhichconsistssimplyofan aggregate ofindividuals eachwithhisorher
ownends.Buthisargument cannotbe takentodemonstrate theunivocalnatureof
thewaysinwhichthisendcanbe attained inlogico-experimental manner. This,in
fact,pertainsto utility fora collectivity, as describedabove,whichassumesthe
presenceoflogicalactionsin theabstract contextofa technological society.The
tasknowis toconsiderthecollectivity qua unityin the context of concrete human
society,where althoughlogical actions exist, it is non-logicalones that
predominate.
In thisconnection, Paretowritesin an otherpassageoftheTrattato that:«lo
studiaregli individuinon vuole puntodireche piü individuimessiinsiemesi
debbanoconsiderare comeunasemplicesomma;essiformano uncomposto, che,
come i compostichimici,può avereproprietà che non sono la sommadelle
proprietàdei componenti»(Pareto,1916, § 66). And also «La societàè un
aggregatedifferente degliindividuiche lo compongono, ma ció nonvuoledire
che la società possa esistereindipendentemente dagli individui.Cosi dicasi
dell'acquacheha proprietà differenti da quelledei suoicomponenti : l'ossigenoe
l'idrogeno, senzapoterconcludere eheessa possaesisteremancandol'ossigenoe
l'idrogeno»(Pareto,1905: pp. 351-352).
Besides thisdifferent notionof thecollectivity, thereis a further specific
feature thatdistinguishes utilityofa collectivity frombothutility fora collectivity
andophelimity fora collectivity. I refertothenon-logicality ofthesocialactions
whichqualifyconcretehumansocietyas a social systemwhichdetermines the
maximum utility ofa collectivity.
The problemnow arises,therefore, of specifying the ways in whichthe
maximumutility of a collectivity is achievedwhentheprincipalreference is to
concretehumansociety,whichcoincidesneither with'animal'societynorwith
'technological' societybutpossesseselements ofeach.In particular, prevalent in
concretehumansocietyare non-logicalactionsof genusIV comprising both
subjectively logicaland objectively logicalends(thoughthesediffer fromeach
other),as well as both ideal or imaginary ends and practical empiricalones.
or
Withoutdwellingon Pareto's exposition,for which he also uses graphic
I shallmovedirectly
illustrations, tohisconcluding thesistotheeffect thatgreater
practicalutility (objectively is
logicalend) indirectly achieved by the individual
as s/hepursuesan imaginary end (subjectively logical end), theobtainingof
whichwouldindeedcorrespond to greaterutility, buta utilitywhichis purely
fanciful,while the indirectly achieved end, although less thantheimaginary end,
200 G. POLLINI

is neverthelessgreaterthan thatcorrespondingto the initial starting-point. By

means of this dynamic, which unfolds in the broader contextof the practical
relevance of ideal ends, Pareto identifiesthe latentfunctionof practicalutility
performedby imaginaryends fromthe individual actor's point of view (latent
because it is not envisaged by the individual) and it is an unforeseen,though
practicallyand materiallypositiveconsequence of thepursuitof theimaginaryor
ideal end.
Moreover, the imaginaryor ideal ends made manifestby the non-logico-
experimentaltheoriesassociated withnon-logicalactions are expressed through
both residues and derivations(Pareto, 1916: §§ 1871, 1874, 1877, 1878, 2152;
Pollini, 1987). While as derivations they are more mutable, variable,
differentiated and also contradictory,owing to the multitudeand frailtyof the
pseudo-reasonings with which men seek to justify in a subjectively logical
(rational) way what is not objectively logical, as residues they are more
permanent,more constant,more homogeneous, as well being more closely
integrated,owing to the existence of social sentimentsor social attitudes(of
whichresiduesare thelinguistic-symbolic indices) relativeto thecollectivityas a
unity sui generis and as distinctfrom the individual sentimentsproper to the
mental state of each memberof thatcollectivity(Parsons, 1937; Pollini, 1998).
In sum,and to move to Pareto's firstconclusion withoutcoveringall themain
stages of his argument,thecomponentcommonto theimaginaryor ideal ends of
individual members of the collectivityis the «social sentiments» or «social
attitudes»made manifestby theirunderlyingresidues.These inherein the social
collectivityas such, and because theyare sharedby theindividualswho belong to
that collectivity,they are expressed throughresidues ratherthan throughthe
derivationsthatin any case depend upon them.
In Pareto's words: «the largest and most efficacious part of the residues
existingin a given societycannotbe residueswhollycontraryto its conservation,
forifthishappened,societywould dissolve and no longerexist,butitis necessary
thatthese residues should be, at least in part,favourableto the conservationof
society; and observationconfirmsthatthe majorityof the residues existingin a
societyare favourabletowardsit» (Pareto, 1916: § 1932).
From thispointof view, and to returnto thedynamicmentionedabove of the
practicalutilityobtainedby the individualactorwhen s/hepursuesan imaginary
end - the latterbeing manifestthroughtheresidues when it motivatesthe action
and the residues are the symbolic-social expression in language of social
sentimentsor attitudesrelative to the collectivity(that is, the set of emerging
propertieswhich springfromthereciprocalrelationsamong individualsin space
and time) - the upshotis thattheremustbe some relationbetweenutilityand the
residues,when the emphasis shiftsfromthe actor or individualwho operates in
non-logico-experimentalmanner (genus IV of non-logical actions) to that of
concretehuman society viewed as a social system.The elementsnow available
and fromwhich we may startin demonstrating the theoremare the following:
a) theinterdependenceof theelements(residues,derivations,interestsand social
heterogeneity)distinctiveof thesocial system;
b) theconceptof utilityo/a collectivity,
whichimplies(i) thecollectivityas unity
and (ii) non-logicalactions;
SOCIAL SYSTEM AND UTILITY OF THE COLLECTIVITY IN PARETO 20 1

c) the relationbetween residues and utilitywhich operates throughthe relation

between the ideal end and practicalend identifiedwhen utilityis considered
fromtheindividual'spointof view as individualutility.

By combiningthese elements,and omittingdiscussion of the entirechain of

reasoning,it is possible to derive theconcludingtheoremrelativeto the utilityof
a collectivityin sociology. This utility,and also the maximum utilityof a
collectivity,«depends on theresultantof theforcesmanifestedby theresidues; it
does not depend on the imaginaryresultant(althoughthis indeed exists) of the
derivations» (Pareto, 1916: § 2153).
Thus, themaximumutilityofa collectivityconstitutesthepointof equilibrium
of concretehumansocietyas a social system,wheredespitethe interdependence
among its elements,the residues performthe decisive functionin determining
utility; and theydo so ratherthan the derivations,fromthe existence of which
« one can deduce littleor nothingabout utility» (Pareto, 19 16 : § 2 154), since they
indicate« onlythegeneraldirectionofthemovement,notthelimitwhereitcarries
theindividual» (Pareto, 1916: § 2153).
In Pareto's sociological theory,whichis indeed derivedfromeconomics but is
extended and given furtherspecification,the maximum utilityof a collectivity
-
depends - accordingto a non-logicalbut subjectivelyrationalmodality on the
balanced compositionof theforcesor intensitiesof thevariousgroupsof residues
presentin that collectivity,and thereforeon the social attitudesor sentiments
relativeto it as a unity.It does not depend,by contrast,eitheron the instinctsor
appetites(non-logicaland non-rationalactions)or on theinterests(logical actions),
individuals,or in thebroad sense on strictly individualmentalsentiments.
In short,utilityofa collectivityin sociology is analogous to ophelimityforthe
collectivityin economics, whentheformeris obtained 'mechanically' in a sortof
'symbolic social marketof residues'. The analogy,however,does not hold in so
faras it does not depend on the logical actions of individuals,but ratheron the
non-logico-experimental operationof theresidues,definedas thesymbolic-social
expression of sentiments and thereforeindicative of the existence of social
sentimentsrelativeto thecollectivityas such or unitysui generis.In thissense the
utilityis ö/the collectivitybecause the residues are the collective elementsthat
exist in the minds of individuals as the symbolic-social precipitate and
sedimentationof the normativelystructuredrelationsamong individuals living
togetherin the same space and throughtime,even beyondthephysicalexistence
of each of them.

4. THE FUNCTION OF RESIDUES AND DERIVATIONS

IN RELATION TO THE UTILITY OF THE COLLECTIVITY

At thispointof theanalysisat least two issues arise whichshouldbe addressed

and tentativelyresolved.The first,giventhefunctionalimportanceof theresidues
in determiningthemaximumutilityof a.collectivity,concernsthedynamicof the
mutualdependence of residues and residues (firsttypeinterdependence),and in
particulardependence among the various classes intowhich Pareto distinguishes
theresidues as a whole.
202 G.POLLINI

The secondissue,giventhefunctional importance oftheresiduesvis-a-vis the

otherelementsof thesocial system,thederivations in particular, is thatof the
mutualdependenceof residuesandderivations (so farnotconsidered)whereby
the latteract upon the former(derivations ö residues= III combination of
interdependence) rather thantheformer uponthelatter(residuesÖ derivations =
I combination ofinterdependence).
As regardsthefirst question,we mustfirst identify a possiblelogicwhichties
the six classes of residuestogether, beyondthatof theirpurelydescriptive
itemization. Thislogic,whichI havealreadyproposedelsewhere(Pollini,1994a)
on thebasisofspecificindications providedbyParetohimself, providesthatthe
firstthreeclasses- i.e. I. instinct forcombinations ; II. persistence ofaggregates,
andIII. Need forexpressing sentiments by external acts - lie at the samelevelof
analysisor generality concerning the aspectsof the overallsystemof (non-
logical) social action,while the remainingthreeclasses - i.e. IV. residues
connectedwithsociality(or residuesof sociality) ; V. integrity of theindividual
andhisappartenances ; VI. sexualresidue- morecloselyconcernthelevelofthe
social system, thatis, ofthesocialandsocietalcollectivity. In otherwords,class
I, II andIII residuesaretheprerequisites fornon-logical actions,ortheconditions
sinequa nonofsociallypreponderant actions.Theymaybe relatedrespectively,
following Parsons's quadrifunctional scheme(Parsons,1951; 1953) onlyin part,
withthefunctional prerequisitesofadaptation (A), pattern maintenance (L), and
goal attainment (G). On thebasis of variouspassagesin Trattato di sociologia
genérale,not quoted here because theyhave alreadybeen cited elsewhere
(Pollini,1994c),one maytherefore establisha congruence amongthefirstthree
classes,at thesame level of generality, whichcan be definedas follows: the
propensityto combinationsgives rise to aggregates,perceptionof whose
persistence permitsactionto be directedtowardsattainment of the goal, and
through theneedtooperatewhich,initsturn, is manifest infurther combinations.
Here,however, thefunction of goal attainment - attributed to class III, needfor
expressingsentiments by externalacts - shouldbe understood in thespecific
contextof non-logicalaction,or in otherwords,mainlysymbolic-expressive
rather thanlogico-experimental (instrumental) action.
Thispattern ofrelations amongthefirst threeclassesofresiduesis flanked by
a second one which directlyconcernsintegration (I), which is the fourth
prerequisitein Parson's model of the social system: «the utilityof the
collectivity». Therefore, theoveralldynamic ofthesystem of(non-logical) social
actionconsistsofthefollowing sequence:instinct forcombinations (adaptation)
(A) Ö persistence ofaggregates (pattern maintenance) (L) Ö needforexpressing
sentiments by externalacts (goal attainment) (G) Ö utilityof thecollectivity
(integration) (I), wherethelattercomprisesthethreeclasses: IV. residuesof
sociality,V. theintegrity oftheindividual andhisappartenances, andVI. sexual
residue(Pollini,1994c).
Underthisinterpretation of Pareto's theory, someof theresiduesaredistinct
fromtheothersin thattheyserveto integrate thecollectivity as a socialsystem.
Theytherefore contribute morespecifically thantheotherstoachievement ofthe
maximumutilityof the collectivity, but withinthe relationof functional
interdependence thattiesthemto theotherthreeclasses,and without whichit
wouldbe impossibleforthemtoperform thisspecificfunction.
SOCIAL SYSTEM AND UTILITY OF THE COLLECTIVITY IN PARETO 203

If we take as our referencethelevel of analysisof thethreeclasses of residues

which performthe functionof integratingthe social system,it is possible to
identifya furtherpattern of interdependenceamong them, once we have
distinguishedclass V (integrityof the individual) into two sub-classes, the first
comprising«sentimentsopposing alterationsin the social equilibrium» and the
second «restorationof integrityby operationson the subject of change». Once
again applying Parsons's sequence of functionalprerequisites,it is possible to
define the followingdynamicinternallyto the integrativefunctionof the social
system: (VI) sexual residue (A) ö (V a) sentimentsopposing alterationsin the
social equilibrium(L) Ö (V b) restorationof integrityby operatingon thesubjects
of change (G) Ö (IV) residuesof sociality(I).
Continuingwith the same logic it is possible to sub-divide the residues of
sociality (integrativefunctionwithin the social system which also integrates
social action) accordingto thespecificfunctionsperformedby thevarious genera
of thisclass. Thus one has thefollowingoverall pattern(Pollini, 1994c):

(A) adaptation: «particularsocieties» (TV-alfa)or «the need forparticular

associations»,
or,put otherwise,theresidueof associative enterprise;

(L) pattern
maintenance: « pityand cruelty» (YV-gamma)
« self-pityand pityforothers» (JV-gamma1)
«instinctive repugnance to sufferingin general» (IV-
gamma 2),
«reasoned repugnanceto useless suffering»(TV-gamma3),
« self-sacrificeforthegood of others» (TV-delta)
«riskingone's life» (TV-delta1)
« sharingone's goods withothers» (TV-delta2)
or,in short,theresiduesof pityand altruism;

« sentimentof hierarchy» (TV-epsilon)

(G) goal attainment:
«sentimentof superiors» (TV-epsilon1)
» (TV-epsilon2)
« sentimentof inferiors
« need forsocial approval» (TV-epsilon3)
«asceticism» (lY-zeta),
or,putotherwise,theresiduesof power and dominanceover
oneselfand others;

(I) integration: « need foruniformity» (IV-beta)

« uniformityobtainedby self-discipline» (IV beta 1)
« uniformityimposed on others» (TV-beta2)
«neophobia» (IB-beta 3)
or,put otherwise,the residues of uniformity,social control
and theconservationof social forms.

From the foregoingdiscussion it is thereforepossible to draw the conclusion

thattheresiduesas a whole assume greaterimportanceas regardstheutilityof the
204 G. POLLINI

collectivity. Yettherearesomeofthemthatperform thisrolerelatively morethan

the others,and specifically thosewhichconcerntheintegration of the social
system:primarily the residuesof socialityand then,more specifically, the
residuesofthe«need foruniformity», whichcan also be termedtheresiduesof
«uniformity, socialcontrolandtheconservation ofsocialforms ».
As regardsthesecondquestion,namelythemutualdependencewhereby the
derivationsact upon theresidues(III combination), a numberof preliminary
remarks areinorder.Although Paretostateson severaloccasions,especiallywith
reference to themaximum utility ofa.collectivity, thatthederivations countfor
« littleornothing » - giventhatofcentralimportance is theworkoftheresidues,
and in particularthe resultantof all the forceswith whichtheymanifest
themselvesand operate(Pareto,1916: §§ 2153, 2154) - he nevertheless also
argues,inkeepingwiththepattern ofinterdependence intherelations amongthe
elementsof thesocial system, that«if theeffectof thederivations is muchless
than thatof the residues,it is not non-existent, and the derivationsserve
principally to givegreaterforceand efficacy to theresiduesthattheyexpress»
(Pareto,1916: §2201).
In support ofthislineofargument I adducesomeelements thatemergefrom
Pareto'streatment of non-logico-experimental theories,wherehis inductive
analysisdistinguishes two components:thatof the residuesand thatof the
derivations.
Each non-logico-experimental theoryis characterizedby a particular
combination of relativelymoreconstantand homogeneous elements(residues)
and bymorevariableandrelatively moreheterogeneous ones(derivations).But
the variability of non-logico-experimental theoriesis due principally - in a
particular timeandcontext - tothederivations, whiletheresiduesrepresent what
is relatively morecommonamongthem.On thisbasis,non-logico-experimental
theoriescan be classifiedaccordingto theirimportance forutility,
startingfrom
the hypothesis thatwhatdifferentiates one of thesetheoriesfromthe others
dependsmoreon thederivations thantheresidues.Thus,classifying non-logico-
experimental theories according towhether ornottheyfavourtheachievement of
utilityindirectly helpsus to determine theinfluenceof thederivations on the
utility ofthecollectivity, notdirectly butindirectly, as Paretostates,through their
operation on theresidues.
Paretofirstdistinguishes betweentwogeneralperspectives : on theone hand,
theperspective thatconfusesand therefore tendsto assimilateideal ends and
practicalones; on theother, theoppositeviewwhichtendsto « separateentirely
anda priori»idealendsfrompractical utility(Pareto,1916: §§ 1883ff).
The firstperspective comprisestwodifferent approachesto theproblem : the
first(A) assumesthattheorientation to theidealend is thebestwayto achieve
«one's own utilityand thatof others»;the second (B) insteaddirectsthe
orientation of actiontowardsattaintment oftherealendandthesearchforone's
ownutility andthatofothers, as wellas theillusory andjustificatory appealtothe
ideal end.Characterized by(A) arethosedoctrines knownas «utilitarian ethical
systems»,someofwhichcanbe called«theologicalandmetaphysical systems of
ethics».Characterized by(B), Paretomaintains, arethosedoctrines likesocialist
utopias,Marxism,democratic or socialistradicalismwhichtendto « conceal» a
utilitarian searchformaterial satisfaction behindidealends.
SOCIAL SYSTEM AND UTILITY OF THE COLLECTIVITY IN PARETO 205

Passing to the second general perspective,this distinguishesbetween two

kinds of ends, so thatthereare two furthermodalities.The first(alfa) involves
considerationonly of ideal ends and makes no referenceto utilityor practical
ends. Belonging to this categoryare those doctrines,above all «theological and
metaphysicalsystemsof ethics», which«by makingutilitywhollyan abstraction,
impose in absolute mannerwhatman mustdo, as well as ascetic,mysticand other
similar systemsof ethics» (Pareto, 1916: § 1886). The second modality(beta),
which assumes the unyieldingoppositionbetween imaginaryends and practical
utility,is thatof the «purely ascetic» doctrineswhich,since theydo not pursue
«the end of achieving an other-worldlyhappiness» (Pareto, 1916: § 1887),
deliberatelyrejectutility,and of the «pessimistic» doctrineswhich «assert that,
whateverthe end may be, it will never be possible to achieve happiness, which
hereis confusedwithutility»(Pareto, 1916: § 1887).
Againstthisbackgrounditis possible to make interesting comparisonbetween
Pareto's classification of the doctrines that have developed on the relations
between the ideal end and practicalutilityand Weber's typologyof the formsof
adaptationand rejectionof the world manifestin the «religions of redemption»,
which he constructedon the basis of his analysis of the economic ethic of the
«universal religions» (Weber,1915-16; Pollini, 1987).
Pareto's classification,finally,shows thattherelativelymore variable content
of non-logico-experimental theoriesexpressedthroughthederivationsrelatingto
the pseudo-reasoningsof individualsacquire specificweightin determination of
the utilityof the collectivityby operatingon the residues and thenceon the non-
logical actionsof individualsand on theequilibriumof thesocial system.In other
words,not all thederivationsact indirectlythroughtheresiduesto determinethe
maximum utilityof a collectivity.Those thatdo so are the derivationswhich
envisage, owing to the pseudo-reasoningsof men, thatsuch utilitycan and must
be achieved.

CONCLUSIONS

Pareto,as we have seen, adopts themethodof scientificinquirywhichranges

fromthe inductiveclassificatoryapproach to the analytical-structural one, and
thenceto the functionalperspective,graduallynarrowingthefocus on the object
of inquiry,whichbecomes increasinglyspecific,circumscribedand detailed.The
object of inquiryis thendecomposed and analysed, and thereafter recomposed
and studiedfromthesyntheticand deductivepointof view. In thismanner,Pareto
propounds the sociological theorythatin concretehuman society,viewed as a
social system constituted by interdependentelements and endowed with
particularproperties,the maximum utilityof the collectivityderives fromthe
resultant of the intensities of the various groups of residues within that
collectivity. These groups of residues are influenced both by the mutual
interdependencecharacteristic of theirinternalrelationsand thespecificfunctions
of each of them in relation to the utilityof the collectivity,and by their
interdependencewith otherelements of the social system,and especially with
derivations- where the latteract upon the former.In differentways and to
different extents,the derivationslegitimateor otherwisethe pursuitof practical
206 G. POLLINI

fromthepointofviewofboththeindividual
utility in so far
andthecollectivity,
as individuals
arethe«moleculesof thesocialsystem»(Pareto,1916: § 2080).

FacultyofSociology
DepartmentofSociologyand Social Research
University
ofTrento,
Italy

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