Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research

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Philosophical Paradigms in Qualitative Research

Methods Education: What is their Pedagogical
Role?

Corrado Matta

To cite this article: Corrado Matta (2022) Philosophical Paradigms in Qualitative Research
Methods Education: What is their Pedagogical Role?, Scandinavian Journal of Educational
Research, 66:6, 1049-1062, DOI: 10.1080/00313831.2021.1958372

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00313831.2021.1958372

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SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
2022, VOL. 66, NO. 6, 1049–1062
https://doi.org/10.1080/00313831.2021.1958372

Philosophical Paradigms in Qualitative Research Methods

Education: What is their Pedagogical Role?
Corrado Matta
Department of Pedagogy and Learning, Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

In this paper, I discuss and critically assess how the relationship between Received 28 January 2021
philosophy of science and qualitative methods is presented and discussed Accepted 9 July 2021
in research on qualitative research methods education (QRME) and
KEYWORDS
qualitative methods textbooks. I argue that both typically convey the Qualitative research
idea that philosophy of science guides or influences the use and choice methods education;
of qualitative methods but are often unclear about how this influence paradigm; qualitative
works. I propose two conceptualizations of the relationship between research methods textbooks;
philosophy of science and qualitative methods: philosophical critical thinking;
assumptions can either explicate or explain qualitative methods. I argue interpretivism; naturalism
that both approaches have pedagogical rewards, but that whereas the
explanation approach is explicitly or implicitly used in many examples
of research on QRME and textbooks, the explication approach has not
had wide application. I conclude by arguing that the lack of clarity and
the absence of discussion about explication are potential problems for
qualitative research methods education.

1. Introduction
This paper discusses and critically assesses how the relationship between philosophy of science and
scientific practice is conceptualized in qualitative research methods education (QRME).
QRME has in the last years drawn the attention of researchers (Lewthwaite & Nind, 2016;
Wagner et al., 2019). This field has focused on several aspects of the practice of methodological
teaching and learning. In this context, even if researchers seem to acknowledge that philosophy
plays a crucial role in QRME (e.g., Kawulich, 2009; Poulin, 2007), the pedagogical implications
of the relationship between philosophy and methodological practice have not yet been discussed.
In the context of QRME, researchers’ beliefs about the philosophy of science are often referred
to as “paradigmatic beliefs” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Apparently, research on QRME and the text-
books that are used in research methods courses express the idea that researchers’ paradigmatic
beliefs might explain, or even guide the practice of qualitative methods. Paradigmatic beliefs are
the reasons why researchers choose or use certain qualitative methods (paradigms are answers to
why-questions). Another way of conceptualizing this relation seems instead to be virtually absent
in QRME but is often discussed in philosophy (Audi, 2015; Brandom, 1998). According to this
alternative conceptualization, paradigms explicate, or define, or rationalize qualitative methods.
To explicate is to make something explicit (Brandom, 1998), that is, to provide a conceptualization
or definition that can put into words what is implicit, and, at the same time, providing a story of
methods that makes their choice or use rationally justified (answering to what-is-questions).

CONTACT Corrado Matta corrado.matta@lnu.se Department of Pedagogy and Learning, Linnaeus University, Universi-
tetsplatsen 1, 351 95, Växjö, Sweden
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
1050 C. MATTA

My subjective experience of having used the tool of explication in the philosophical analysis of
qualitative methods (Matta, 2015, 2019), and at the same time, of teaching qualitative methods,
made me wonder why explication has been so neglected. I do not aim to defend explication against
explanation but instead to argue that the distinction between explanation and explication is relevant
to QRME and worth the attention of researchers and practitioners. I explore the possible pedago-
gical function of these two meta-philosophies and discuss the advantages that explanation and
explication might entail for research methods learners. I am not trying to make people abandon
explanation, but rather showing that all those interested in QRME could benefit from discussing
the tension between explication and explanation.
I start by providing examples of how the relationship between philosophy of science and methodo-
logical practice has been discussed in research on QRME and in a selection of qualitative research
methods handbooks. Then, I conceptualize this relationship in two alternative ways (explication and
explanation), discussing the pedagogical role of philosophy of science that follows from each of the
two conceptualizations. I conclude the paper with two critical remarks that emerge from the two con-
ceptualizations. I argue that the selected textbooks typically fail to provide a clear account of the relation
between philosophy of science and research methods and that the absence of discussions about the expli-
cative role of philosophy of science might suggest that qualitative research methods have no rational
foundations but those that are negotiated within research practices. This is a legitimate claim, but one
that does not represent accurately the ongoing debate in the philosophy of qualitative methods.

2. Qualitative Research Methods Education and the Role of Paradigms

Throughout the text, I will use the term paradigm to intend any loosely consistent set of ontological,
epistemological, or methodological assumptions, claims, or beliefs about social research (Kuhn,
1962; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This terminology is coherent with the use of the term in QRM text-
books. I represent in Table 1 a classic example of paradigmatic differences.
The term method is used in this article to refer to concrete procedures of qualitative data collec-
tion (such as focus groups, interviews, or qualitative observations) or qualitative data analysis (such
as the concrete techniques for the manipulation and interpretation of qualitative data related to
broader methodological frameworks such as grounded theory, discourse analysis, conversation
analysis and more).
As an initial step in my argumentation, I consider how the relationship between philosophy of
science and the choice and use of qualitative methods is conceptualized in QRME research and
QRM textbooks. Considered as a specific research field, QRME focuses on teaching and learning
qualitative research methods, intersecting different themes and perspectives (for two recent over-
views, see Wagner et al. (2011, 2019)). Among these themes, the role of philosophical theories in
QRME has received some attention (Kawulich, 2009; Maree, 2009; Niglas, 2007; Poulin, 2007;
Sever, 2001). For instance, Kawulich (2009) argues that:
One’s philosophical and theoretical perspectives, both tacit and overt, drive one’s approach to research […]. It
is important for students to learn that this applies to any published research literature; they must also be aware
of the theoretical frame they bring to their own research. (2009, p. 39).

Similar recommendations are found in Wagner et al.’s systematic review, which identified sev-
eral studies that recommended that “students should be exposed to philosophy of science and epis-
temological debates related to qualitative research” (2019, p. 12), and that “paradigms linked to
qualitative research be introduced in the first year and sustained throughout a curriculum”
(2019, p. 12). Poulin (2007) describes the objectives of an ideal “rigorous introductory course” in
qualitative methods (2007, p. 436). One of these objectives is “a basic understanding of the philo-
sophical assumptions that form the foundation of interpretive inquiry offers the interpretive
researcher a conceptual basis for selecting research methods, thus promoting methodologically
sound research design.” (2007, p. 437)
 SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 1051

Table 1. A classic example of paradigmatic claims (Lincoln et al., 2018, p. 111)

Type of Belief Positivism Postpositivsm Critical theory et al. Constructivism Participatory
Ontological Naïve Realism – Critical realism – Historical realism – Relativism – local Participative reality
“real” reality but “real” reality but virtual reality and specific co- – subjective-
apprehendible only imperfectly shaped by social, constructed objective reality,
and political, cultural, realities co-created by
probabilistically economic, ethnic mind and given
apprehendible and gender cosmos
values;
crystallized over
time
Epistemological Dualist objectivist; Modified dualist/ Transactional/ Transactional/ Critical subjectivity
findings true objectivist; critical subjectivist; subjectivist; co- in participatory
tradition/ value-mediated created transaction with
community; findings findings cosmos; extended
findings probably epistemology of
true experiential,
propositional, and
practical knowing;
co-created
findings
Methodological Experimental/ Modified Dialogic/dialectical Hermeneutical/ Political
manipulative; experimental/ dialectical participation in
verification of manipulative; collaborative
hypotheses; critical mutiplism; action inquiry;
chiefly falsification of primacy of the
quantitative hypotheses; may practical, use of
methods include qualitative language
methods grounded in
shared
experiential
context

Maree (2009) takes a different stance. He argues that the philosophical theory of critical realism
provides a correct rationalization of scientific practice and that this motivates teachers of research
methods in using it as a framework for the definition and explication of research methods. He does
not argue that critical realism guides research, but that, as critical realism provides an appropriate
picture of science, it should be used as a basis for teaching methods. Finally, Niglas (2007) argues
that philosophical issues should not be considered as directly related to methodological choices, as
the same method can rest on apparently contrasting philosophical assumptions. Niglas argues that
the connection between philosophy and methods should be conceptualized in more flexible terms
in research methods courses.
Put together, these contributions show that the issue of the role of philosophy in QRME is typi-
cally discussed in normative terms and that there seems to be a lack of descriptive results. Philoso-
phical issues seem any way to be relevant to QRME.
This picture is consistent with what can be observed looking at qualitative methods textbooks,
which seem to ascribe philosophical paradigms a primary role in understanding and choosing
methods.
Below I have considered a convenience sample of 23 qualitative methods textbooks. I used the
Swedish national union library catalog LIBRIS (libris.kb.se), which contains approximately 7
million titles. The catalog searches involved the following terms: “Research Methods”, “Qualitative
Research”, “Qualitative Methods” and “Qualitative Data”, and the years 2005 to 2018. The number
of books resulting from the LIBRIS queries published between 2005 and 2018, totaled 713 books.
The search was restricted to English-language books, for simplicity. From these first 713 books, I
selected a sample of 23 textbooks, focusing on textbooks that are commonly employed. I used
the following selection criteria: highly cited1 textbooks, textbooks of which several editions exist,
and textbooks that are used in methodology courses in a selection of universities in the Nordic
1052 C. MATTA

countries.2 I have searched in each of these textbooks for expressions about the relationship
between philosophical theories and methods and reported the most relevant citation for each text-
book in Table 2. The citations in the table are intended to illustrate the general explicit perspective of
the textbook concerning the relationship between philosophy and methods. This means that, for
each citation, no other claim was found in the same textbook that directly contradicted it. The
sample is not statistically representative and is only intended to provide a picture of how the
relationship between philosophy and qualitative methods is expressed in these particular textbooks,
whenever the relationship is expressed explicitly. The fact that the sample consists of reasonably
popular textbooks can give a possible indication of a trend in QRME, but it is important to remem-
ber that other textbooks might either provide a very different conception of the relationship
between philosophy and qualitative methods or simply not discuss the issue at all. Also, some text-
books might implicitly contradict the citations, when considering the whole book.
In the following lines, I comment on the citations in Table 2. First of all, many of the citations,
e.g., Bryman (2016, p. 30), Creswell and Poth (2017, p. 15), Lyons and Coyle (2016, p. 4, 12–14),
Lapan et al. (2012, p. 69), Bazeley (2013, p. 1), seem to express a descriptive claim that paradigmatic
beliefs guide the use and choice of qualitative methods. According to these authors, the researchers
“choose” methods that “accord” to, or “depend” on, or are influenced by philosophical beliefs.
Ellingson (2009, p. 8) makes a similar but rather prescriptive claim, apparently arguing that
some paradigmatic commitments are not consistent with a certain methodological approach in
qualitative research, what the author calls “crystallization”. All these citations express some idea
of guidance or influence and have been grouped using the code G in Table 2. In a couple of
cases, the relationship between paradigms and methods is expressed in terms of assumptions
upon which method choices rest, such as in Lyons and Coyle (2016) and Brinkmann (2017, p. 60).
In the example by Lyons and Coyle, the authors talk about methods assumptions or presupposi-
tions that guide researchers’ methodological choices. Brinkmann’s quote seems to suggest that cer-
tain research practices, that is, certain uses of qualitative methods have emerged from some shared
philosophical assumptions (that might have been either implicit or explicit). Crucially, Brinkmann
does not seem to claim that these philosophical assumptions guide qualitative practice, but rather
that they are a lens through which we can understand how methods are used. Brinkmann’s textbook
is similar to the normative approach Maree (2009) argues for. Both Brinkmann and Maree seem to
use philosophical theories to understand methods, even if these theories do not guide researchers’
choices. Therefore, I have put this textbook in an own group, using code E.
Miles et al. (2014, p. 341), Patton (2015, pp. 89–90), and Roller and Lavrakas (2015, p. 20) put
forward similar claims, arguing – consistently with Niglas (2007) – that paradigmatic beliefs should
have limited or no importance for the choice or use of qualitative methods. These textbooks are
grouped using the code N. Finally, Packer (2010, p. 40) and Alvesson and Sköldberg (2018, p. 9),
argue for a relationship between philosophical theory and qualitative methods that is neither guid-
ing nor explicating. According to these authors, qualitative methods are philosophical in nature,
and the analysis of social phenomena is essentially a philosophical interpretation (Packer uses
the concept of “historical ontology” to describe the rationale of qualitative analysis). This position
transcends the tension I consider and deserves a particular discussion that unfortunately cannot
find a place in this paper. Therefore, I have coded these textbooks with an X.
Only one of the G-textbooks provides a detailed account of how paradigmatic beliefs are capable
of informing or guiding method choices, that is, what kind of inference is made from paradigms to
methods, that is, Denzin and Lincoln’s edited handbook (2018, ch.5). As for the other G-textbooks,
the relationship is unspecified or associative, in a way similar to that of Table 1, and often restricted
to very short discussions which are easily summarized using the citations in Table 2.

1
The number of citations was retrieved using Google Scholar.
2
Stockholm University, Uppsala University, University of Oslo, The Artic University of Norway, Copenhagen University, University
of Aalborg and University of Aarhus.
 SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 1053

Table 2. A sample of citations about the relationship between philosophy and methods from qualitative research methods
textbooks.
Reference Quote pp. Code
Alvesson and Sköldberg “In our view it is not methods but ontology and epistemology which are the 9 X
(2018) determinants of good social research.”
Bazeley (2013) “Analysis is laid on the foundation of our understanding about how the world 1 G
works, what makes it what it is (ontology); and of how we, as human beings, can
understand and learn about that world and especially about the world of people
(epistemology). For example, our understanding of the nature of reality and truth
and whether we discover, interpret, or construct realities and truths influence our
choices of topic, methods, and conclusions. Although these foundations may
remain implicit rather than explicit, thinking about them sharpens and enriches
our analysis, and our understanding of these things impacts on how we assess the
trustworthiness of our conclusions.”
Brinkmann (2017) “In many contemporary applications of CAQDAS—that is, computer-assisted 60 E
qualitative data analysis software—often developed along the line of grounded
theory methodology, there are inbuilt presuppositions that resemble positivism.
The idea that data are in principle separable from the contexts in which they were
produced, from the persons producing them, and from theoretical frameworks
that are used to make sense of them seems to apply to many uses of CAQDAS.”
Bryman (2016) “questions of social ontology cannot be divorced from issues concerning the conduct 30 G
of social research. Ontological assumptions and commitments will feed into the
ways in which research questions are formulated and research is carried out.”
Corbin and Strauss “Probably most researchers who use our methodology (and certainly those who use 5 G
(2015) only its procedures) have not reflected upon the assumptions that underlie the
method presented in this book. Perhaps they assume that methodology evolves
strictly from practice. Though it does to some degree, it is also considerably
influenced by worldview, or the beliefs and attitudes about the world we live in.”
Creswell and Poth “The research design process in qualitative research begins with philosophical 15 G
(2017) assumptions that the inquirers make in deciding to undertake a qualitative study.
[…] Five philosophical assumptions lead to an individual’s choice of qualitative
research: ontology, epistemology, axiology, rhetorical, and methodological
assumptions. The qualitative researcher chooses a stance on each of these
assumptions, and the choice has practical implications for designing and
conducting research.”
Denzin and Lincoln See section 3.2 on explanation. Ch.5 G
(2018)
Ellingson (2009) “[Qualitative research] Eschew positivist claims to objectivity and a singular, 8 G
discoverable Truth in favor of embracing knowledge as situated, partial,
constructed, multiple, embodied, and enmeshed in power relations.”
Flick (2014) “the theory of qualitative research is characterized by three perspectives, each with 52 G
distinctive implications for the research methods do be used. These perspectives
may be characterized in terms of basic assumptions.”
Hammersley (2012) “This chapter will look at some of the philosophical ideas that have shaped the 21 G
practice and development of qualitative research, and that continue to do so.
These ideas, which relate to the nature of the social world (ontology), how
knowledge of it is possible (epistemology), and to the purpose(s) of inquiry
(which might be seen as an aspect of politics), can be complex and difficult.”
Lapan et al. (2012) “The process of data collection varies depending on which scientific paradigm the 69 G
researcher prefers.”
Lichtman (2013) A table similar to tab.1 is presented on p. 9. 9 G
Lune and Berg (2017) “methods impose certain perspectives on reality. For example, when researchers 14 G
canvass a neighborhood and arrange interviews with residents to discuss some
social problem, a theoretical assumption has already been made -specifically, that
reality is fairly constant and stable, and that people can reliably observe and
describe it.”
Lyons and Coyle (2016) “[D]ifferent research approaches and methods are based on different philosophical 4, 12 G
assumptions concerning how we should produce psychological knowledge and
what can be known and have different scientific goals and guidelines for good
practice […].” “Researchers may have a favored epistemological position and may
locate their research within this, choosing methods that accord with that position
(or that can be made to accord with it).”
Maxwell (2012) The book is an argument for using a philosophical theory (critical realism) as a guide Preface G
for qualitative research.

(Continued )
1054 C. MATTA

Table 2. Continued.
Reference Quote pp. Code
Merriam (2015) “The qualitative, interpretive, or naturalistic research paradigm defines the methods 2 G
and techniques most suitable for collecting and analyzing data.”
Miles et al. (2014) “We […] don’t think that good qualitative analysis necessarily calls for formal 341 N
prerequisites (e.g., long ethnographic experience, knowledge of scientific logic,
and a deep background in philosophy, ontology and epistemology). […] Working
without them, at least initially, is not fatal.”
Packer (2010) “Rather than paying attention to ontological and epistemological assumptions, we 40 X
should look at the practices actually engaged in by communities of researchers
[…]. But an important point of Kuhn’s analysis was that practices and ontological
and epistemological commitments are not separate. His view was that scientific
practices require and embody such commitments: they are commitments made
in practice.”
Patton (2015) “It is not necessary, in my opinion, to swear vows of allegiance to any single 89–90 N
epistemological perspective to use qualitative methods. […] There is a very
practical side to qualitative methods that simply involves asking open-ended
questions […]. In short, in real-world practice, methods can be separated from
the epistemology out of which they have emerged.”
Roller and Lavrakas “[Our approach focuses] on issues related to methodological choices that 20 N
(2015) researchers make […] in their efforts to generate data that are fit for the purpose
for which a study is intended. [Our approach] also focuses on issues related to the
choices that qualitative researchers make […] in their efforts to makes sense of
[…] the data that their studies generate. It does not focus on any theoretical
paradigm that might guide qualitative researchers in deciding how to identify
and formulate the questions they seek to answer with their research or how to
make their findings useful.”
Schutt (2018) “Scientific paradigms are sets of beliefs that guide scientific work in an area.” 37 G
Wertz (2011) “One of the most exciting and challenging dimensions of the qualitative movement 79–80 G
is its common consensus that philosophy matters and is relevant to empirical
research with humans. […] [A]ll research makes basic philosophical assumptions
about existence (ontology), knowledge (epistemology), value (axiology), and the
good (ethics).”
Willig (2013) “I have proposed that every qualitative research project is informed by a research 19 G
question (about human experience, about the construction of meaning, about
social and/or psychological processes, etc.) which is itself based upon some
assumptions about the world and about people. These assumptions can be
described as ontological. Every research question also makes assumptions about
knowledge, about what can be known and how."

In sum, three themes seem to emerge from the research on QRME and the sample of textbooks.
Either a) paradigmatic beliefs guide qualitative methods, or b) beliefs work as assumptions that
rationalize or provide understanding about methods, or c) issues concerning method choices
should be kept independent from paradigmatic beliefs. The details of the relationship between para-
digm and methods are mostly unspecified, both in textbooks and in the research articles. In the next
section, I attempt such clarification.

3. Two Possible Relationships between Paradigms and Methods, and their

Pedagogical Function
In this section, I present two conceptualizations of the possible relationship between paradigms and
methods. Let us assume a paradigm and a method (defined as above); then, the relationship between
these two can be understood in two ways described in the following subsections:

a. Paradigms explicate method choices

b. Paradigms explain method choices

These terms are conceptualized as contrasting in the philosophical literature (Audi, 2015; Bran-
dom, 1998). In my discussion, I will adhere to Audi and Brandom’s concept of explication, but the
 SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 1055

tension I discuss is different. In the philosophical literature, explanation and explication are two
forms of philosophical methodology. For instance, according to Audi, explanation is a way of redu-
cing a concept to more basic ones, whereas explicating is a way of defining or making explicit some-
thing that is implicit. In this paper, I use the term explanation in the empirical sense. Meaning that if
p explains q, then p causes or is a reason for q.3 Therefore, the tension that I propose is not between
two methods of philosophical analysis that are used in qualitative methods textbooks. Instead, I
propose that the tension that is concretized in the textbooks is between an empirical vs. a philoso-
phical role of philosophical theories for methods. If philosophical theories explain methods, then
the focus is on how researchers’ philosophical commitments motivate method choices. If philoso-
phical theories explicate methods, then they do it as philosophical theories, that is, by clarifying, con-
ceptualizing, and making explicit what methods are and should be.
I should clarify also that what follows is itself an explication, as I try to define the concepts of
explication and explanation.

3.1. Explication
Philosophers of science try often to reconstruct the conceptual foundations of scientific methods.
This operation is described using different terms such as rationalization, conceptualization, recon-
struction, and interpretation. The term explication is used here to group all these terms under one
common umbrella term. Thus, to explicate a method or a method procedure means to provide a
narrative that rationally justifies the method by showing that it rests on sound conceptual foun-
dations. This narrative consists of claims (ontological, epistemological, or methodological claims)
and argumentations in favor of these claims. The conceptual nature of reconstructions entails
that explication focuses on what competent researchers should do or by necessity must do when
applying methods, rather than what researchers usually do. In the following lines, I describe a
case of philosophical interpretation related to qualitative methods.
One of the recurring methodological claims discussed concerning qualitative methods is the idea
that understanding is a distinct methodological operation – that is, a methodological norm for the
manipulation of data – and qualitative methods are supposed to exemplify this methodological
norm (Martin, 2000). A long discussion in the English-speaking philosophy of social science has
concerned the correctness of this claim of distinctness (Rosenberg, 2012). According to the natur-
alists,4 there is no real distinction between understanding and, for instance, explanation of natural
phenomena, whereas the anti-naturalists argue that there are exceptional or distinct methodological
rules that social scientists must (at least in certain cases) use and that understanding is one of these
rules (Feest, 2010; Roth, 2003).
The tension between naturalist and anti-naturalist interpretations of methods has concerned
qualitative methods. For instance, Zahle (2016) discusses whether the application of the method
of understanding in ethnographic participant observation is indispensably distinct from the meth-
odological rules of the natural sciences. Understanding is conceptualized here as the method of re-
enactive empathy (Stueber, 2012). Whenever ethnographers try to understand people’s actions, they
simulate in their minds what it would feel like to be in those people’s situations. Re-enactive empa-
thy is the explication here, as it is a way of making explicit or providing a concept of what ethno-
graphers do. It is not a description of ethnographers’ concrete actions, but a theoretical
conceptualization of – a way to provide a language for – their method. This capacity of simulating
3
The formulation “causes or is a reason for” is included in case reasons explain and are not causes and to cover all kinds of expla-
nations including natural, historical, hermeneutical, psychological and social. If reasons are causes, or, if reasons cannot explain,
then to explain something is only to present its causes.
4
The term naturalism here can cause confusion. Naturalism, as it is used in the context of the philosophy of social sciences, it is
not the same term as the approach to qualitative research originally developed by Lincoln and Guba (1985). The former is a
thesis of ontological or methodological continuity between the natural and social sciences that in the context of qualitative
research would easily be associated with post-positivism. The latter is a constructivist approach to qualitative methods.
1056 C. MATTA

other people’s feelings is then used to make sense of their possible beliefs and desires. Zahle argues
that this methodological rule can be thought of as being central to participant observation, as the
ethnographers observe people’s behavior and try to reconstruct these people’s motives and ideas,
i.e., their reasons. Moreover, according to the anti-naturalist, re-enactive empathy is distinct
from the methodology of the natural sciences, because explanations of natural events neither
require nor allow that explainers simulate what it is to be an instance of that natural phenomenon.
Zahle criticizes this anti-naturalist claim and argues that participant observation is best interpreted
as supporting naturalism. She argues that, if the anti-naturalist is right, then the ethnographer using
participant observation must necessarily employ re-enactive empathy to understand the observed
people’s behavior. This does not seem to be correct. In fact, in cases in which the ethnographer
is familiar with relevant conventions, she will be able to form an interpretation based on these con-
ventions, without the need for reenactment. Basing an interpretation on a conventional generaliz-
ation does not violate the methodology used in the natural sciences, in which theories are used to
explain singular observations. In cases in which the ethnographer is not familiar with the relevant
convention, re-enactive empathy will not be possible anyway, as it requires some conception of how
people usually act in certain situations. The ethnographer will typically try to acquire further experi-
ence to develop familiarity with the relevant convention, making re-enactive empathy redundant.
Finally, in cases in which the observed individuals act unconventionally, re-enactive empathy will
not be of any help, as the simulation will be blocked by the unconventional behavior. Even in this
case, the ethnographer will typically try to acquire further observations, such as observing how indi-
viduals that are competent in the local conventions react to the unconventional behavior to recon-
struct what the behavior is aimed at. This will also make re-enactive empathy redundant.
Zahle concludes that re-enactive empathy is not necessary for participant observation, and that
participant observation it is not distinct. Participant observation, according to Zahle, is best inter-
preted as a special case of explanation and rests on the same methodological rules of the methods of
the natural sciences. Therefore, this example shows how an example of a qualitative method is expli-
cated in terms of a methodological claim (participant observation is not re-enactive empathy).
Apart from the example above, the explication of qualitative methods in philosophy of science is
restricted to a few examples (Kaidesoja, 2019; Matta, 2015, 2019; Ruzzene, 2012; Ylikoski, 2019).
Crucially, the same method procedure can be explicated in different and sometimes concurring
ways. Moreover, explication is independent of what researchers believe, either implicitly or expli-
citly. This means that most or all researchers might choose a method on the grounds of some
implicit or explicit commitment, but that a reconstruction of that method could reveal that the
method must rest on other (and possibly contradicting) philosophical assumptions. This is the
case of the example of participant observation I discussed in this section: whereas Zahle argues
that it should be interpreted naturalistically, this method is typically associated with either interpre-
tivist or constructivist claims in qualitative methods textbooks.

3.2. Explanation
Paradigmatic assumptions may explain method choices. Researchers believe implicitly or explicitly
in a set of philosophical claims, and these beliefs might explain the choice of method. In short,
researchers choose methods because of their philosophical commitments. All these are descriptive
and contingent claims that get support from evidence about researchers’ preferences and choices
rather than from conceptual arguments. Preferences and motives are historically and culturally
located factors. For this reason, explaining method choices on the grounds of researchers’ philoso-
phical beliefs requires collecting evidence about the social context in which the scientific practice
takes place.
Although this approach can conceptually be construed both in terms of individual beliefs (which
explain individual method choices) and shared beliefs (which explain method choices within
research communities), only the latter construal has received large attention in the literature on
 SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 1057

qualitative methods. Shared commitments can constitute a context or a possibility space for method
choices. The fact that enough researchers share certain ideas about ontology or epistemology,
restricts or broadens the possible choices that are considered as available, for instance by providing
a vocabulary of possible choices. Therefore, a community of researchers sharing positivistic com-
mitments about causality, interventions, and effects provides the researchers with a language that
contributes to forming certain preferences towards statistical methods.
Alternatively, shared commitments might influence method choices and uses, in force of a sys-
tem of expectation beliefs accepted by the members of a method practice. Participants to a specific
practice might in this case choose not to use a specific method because of their belief that choosing
that method might lead to unwanted consequences. The vocabulary and the expectation hypotheses
are two examples of how the mechanism of influence and guidance could be explained. As I men-
tioned, textbooks that suggest that paradigms influence method choice typically fail to clearly state
which of these (or other) mechanisms characterize that influence.
If we consider qualitative methods, then the most discussed sources of this approach are two.
One is the work of Tomas Kuhn (1962), whose work, although mainly focused on natural science,
has been used as a framework for qualitative research (Donmoyer, 2006; Packer, 2010). The other
source is the framework developed in the ’80s by Lincoln and Guba (1985) and developed by Lin-
coln, Denzin, and colleagues in the subsequent years (Denzin, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Guba
& Lincoln, 1988, 1994; Lincoln et al., 2018). This latter framework is especially popular in qualitative
research methods textbooks and frequently cited as the source for the discussion of philosophical
assumptions underlying methods.
Both approaches are based on the concept of paradigm, and both approaches rest on the same
basic idea, nicely summarized by Kuhn in the following way:
[I]t should be clear that the explanation [of scientific process] must, in the final analysis, be psychological or
sociological. It must, that is, be a description of a value system, an ideology, together with an analysis of the
institutions through which that system is transmitted and enforced. Knowing what scientists value, we may
hope to understand what problems they will undertake and what choices they will make in particular circum-
stances of conflict (Kuhn, 1962, pp. 20–21).

In the following discussion, I will only focus on Guba and Lincoln, because their approach coheres
to a large extent to that of Kuhn while at the same time being much more specifically focused on
qualitative methods than Kuhn’s theory.
According to Guba and Lincoln, paradigms consist of “basic beliefs” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994,
p. 107). Researchers hold beliefs about what exists and how knowledge is possible, and these beliefs
determine how researchers choose to conduct inquiry. These beliefs are, according to Guba and
Lincoln “accepted simply on faith […]; there is no way to establish their ultimate truthfulness”
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 107). This seems to suggest that researchers cannot update, adjust, or
reject any of these principles on empirical or conceptual grounds. In their 1985 work, they further
qualify the status of paradigmatic assumptions as “accepted by convention” (Lincoln & Guba,
1985, p. 33).
According to Guba and Lincoln’s theory, the connection between paradigms and methods
should be interpreted as socially constructed within scientific practice. The participants in the prac-
tice negotiate about certain beliefs, and when consensus is established or when a dominant position
emerges, then a connection between philosophical assumptions and methods is socially constructed
as logical, natural, or necessary. Being part of the practice means accepting the right kind of beliefs
and making inferences from beliefs to methods that are permissible within the practice. Being a
positivist means, according to this claim, being a part of the social practice of positivism. Within
this practice, the choice of statistical method is permissible, and, maybe, the choice of critical dis-
course analysis is not permissible. The social practice of Positivism entails that the participants in
the practice have expectations about the other participants such as “others will probably choose this
method” or “if I don’t conform, I expect others to react with suspicion or even with ostracism”.
1058 C. MATTA

These expectations explain why researchers with positivist beliefs might typically favor statistical
methods, but at the same time, they do not exclude that some positivists might choose some
other method. Hence, Guba and Lincoln seem to subscribe to an expectation-based mechanism
of influence.
Although Guba and Lincoln’s claim about the relationship between paradigms and methods
seems to be empirical, they do not provide evidence for these. To my knowledge, the only empirical
investigation of qualitative researchers’ philosophical commitments and their role in method choice
in the literature is Bryman’s (2006) study of paradigmatic commitments among mixed-methods
researchers. According to Bryman, the discussion of the philosophical foundations of social
research methods has lost its popularity among social researchers. To substantiate this claim, Bry-
man collects evidence from a purposive sample of 20 social researchers. In addition, Bryman ana-
lyzes the content of 232 research articles published between 1994 and 2003 in which mixed methods
were used. The results indicate that the articles do not discuss philosophical assumptions and that
such assumptions are claimed to be of secondary importance in the interviews. Bryman interprets
the result as supporting the claim that philosophical assumptions are not the main reason for choos-
ing methods. Instead, Bryman argues that the main reason for choosing methods is their instru-
mental capability of solving a problem and answering a research question.

4. The Pedagogical Role of Explication and Explanation in Qrme

Although explication seems to have an intuitive value for understanding methods, this approach is
virtually absent in qualitative methods textbooks. None of the examples I provided in section 2
reflect explicitly the idea that philosophical theories can be used to explicate, understand and
conceptualize methods practices. Maree’s article (2009) and Brinkmann’s textbook (2017) can be
interpreted as implicitly providing a similar claim, but the meta-philosophical concept is not
expressed clearly.
This is especially odd considering that explication seems to have an intuitive pedagogical value
related to critical thinking (Bailin, 2002; Siegel, 2013). If we accept that one of the main instrumen-
tal goals of research methods education is to foster critical thinking, then one way of cultivating
such an attitude is to subject the methods’ basic assumptions to rational scrutiny. By unpacking
the assumptions that underlie a certain method and identifying the arguments in support of
these assumptions, explication enables such scrutiny. Therefore, explication can channel a critical
attitude towards method use and choice. Considering the example of participant observation,
Zahle’s argument shows that the method of participant observation can withstand critical scrutiny,
which supports the idea that the method rests on solid conceptual grounds.
In contrast, all G-coded textbooks and several examples of research on QRME discussed in sec-
tion 2 (Kawulich, 2009; Poulin, 2007; Wagner et al., 2019) can be interpreted as at least consistent
with the explanation approach. If these textbooks indeed intend to make claims similar to Guba and
Lincoln’s, then these claims have a justifiable pedagogical function. In fact, in the same way as expli-
cation, explanation entails also rewards relative to critical thinking. The virtues of the constructivist
attitude towards qualitative methods can be spelled out with the help of Hacking’s discussion about
the critical nature of constructivism (1999). As Hacking puts it, “Social construction work is critical
of the status quo” (1999, p. 8). Constructionist analyses typically entail that “[the object of analysis]
need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is”, or that “[the object of analysis] is not determined
by the nature of things; it is not inevitable” (1999, p. 8). By highlighting the socially constructed
dimension of methodological norms, QRME might help research methods learners developing a
healthy form of skepticism regarding all methodological conventions. As products of practices,
method procedures are not universal truths of nature. Instead, they are contextual and contingent.
The examination of how shared commitments constrain or influence method choices is a way of
becoming aware of the contextual and contingent nature of the rules and norms regulating research
methods. Such awareness might reveal the possible problematic or unfair sides of methodological
 SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 1059

rules. In other words, Guba and Lincoln’s approach commends us to consider the politics of method
choices.
Therefore, explanation and explication entail two forms of critical attitudes towards research
methods and method choices. Explication recommends subjecting the method’s assumptions to
scrutiny. This scrutiny should rest on the rules of logic and rational argumentation. If a method
cannot stand this scrutiny, we should be skeptical about it. Explanation, on the other hand, requires
researchers to see methods as results of contextual and contingent practices, to avoid accepting the
prescriptions of methodological practices dogmatically. This analysis requires revealing how
choices are constrained and influenced by shared commitments.
These two forms of critical attitude can coexist or exclude one another depending on the
strength of the explanation claim. In fact, the explanation approach can be further qualified as a
critique of explication. The explication approach was up to the ’50s some kind of standard view
about the relationship between philosophy and science. After that, this view started to receive criti-
cism as providing an excessively normative narrative of scientific progress. In the context of this
criticism, several approaches arose that attempted to explain science as a human practice. This is
the case of the Strong Program in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Bloor, 1976). According
to the Strong Program, there is no logical relation between paradigmatic assumptions and methods
other than that which is socially constructed within research practices. Therefore, the Strong Pro-
gram took a strong form of the explanation approach as a basis for rejecting the project of explica-
tion. Questions of ontology, epistemology, and methodology cannot help us in finding the ultimate
rational foundation upon which science rests. Only the contextual meanings that researchers con-
struct and attribute to scientific practices can provide a satisfying account.
The strength of the explanation approach determines a difference concerning how the pedagogical
value of philosophy of science in QRME is conceptualized. If it is assumed that the examination of the
shared commitments underlying methods exhausts method choices, then, the critical scrutiny of
research methods by means of rational reconstruction and explication has no pedagogical value. As
Guba (1990) puts it, “If inquiry is not value-free, is not all inquiry ideological?” (1990, p. 11). This
quote suggests that Guba, Lincoln, and colleagues endorsed a strong interpretation of explanation.
This could explain the unpopularity of the explication approach in qualitative methods textbooks.

5. A Concluding Critical Remark about Qrme

In the above sections, I have attempted to conceptualize how philosophical claims can be related to
qualitative methods and their use. I have also argued that the two conceptualizations entail different
pedagogical rewards, and therefore could be useful tools for QRME.
Before concluding, two possible problems affecting QRME become visible from the vantage
point of this paper. The first problem concerns the lack of clarity about the relationship between
philosophy and methods in most of the examples in the G and E-coded textbooks. Looking back
at the examples in section 2 from the perspective of explication and explanation, the formulations
contained in many G-textbooks appear unclear and possibly confusing. Consider Bazeley’s claim
that ontological beliefs “influence our choices of topic, method, and conclusion” (Bazeley, 2013,
p. 1). Without a detailed account of how this influence might work, and the condition on which
this may fail, it is difficult for learners to make use of this knowledge. Moreover, the descriptive
tone of many textbooks is a further source of possible confusion. For instance, the claim that
“data collection varies depending on which scientific paradigm the researchers prefers” (Lapan
et al., 2012, p. 69) might only provide a description or could suggest that students should also
choose data collection methods on the ground of their paradigmatic beliefs.
The main problem here is that these qualitative methods textbooks fail to clarify their meta-phil-
osophy. Packer (2010), Alvesson and Sköldberg (2018), Denzin and Lincoln (2018) are fortunate
exceptions, and this problem does not affect the textbooks in the N-group. However, most text-
books in the G-group did not contain any discussion of paradigms other than the claims presented
1060 C. MATTA

in Table 2. Yet, it is plausible that the use of paradigms in textbooks would fulfill its pedagogical
function for QRME more effectively if textbooks would discuss their meta-philosophical approach
in detail and the pedagogical rewards that are expected from it. For instance, if a textbook suggests
that paradigmatic commitments influence method choices and uses, it can be instructive for lear-
ners to discuss which mechanism explains this influence. If it is suggested that the mechanism is
expectation-based, then it can be instructive for learners to discuss these expectations, the various
payoffs that are attached to deviation or conformity, and how methodological norms may change.
More importantly, learners must be aware that methodological norms are at least in part socially
negotiated, and of the importance of a critical attitude towards such methodological norms.
These issues are just as important as the specification of which assumptions characterize the differ-
ent paradigms. It is easy to see that many of the G-coded citations in Table 2 seem simply to
acknowledge that paradigms guide method choices (which is only consistent with the explanation
approach). Consider for instance Schutt (2018, p. 37). However, to have a pedagogical role, the con-
cept of guidance must be framed in critical terms and discuss the risk of simply accepting the nego-
tiated standards within methodological practices. Simply acknowledging that paradigms guide
methods seems to go against Guba and Lincoln’s original constructivist and critical approach.
The second and related problem is the apparent absence of the explication approach in textbooks
in the sample. Brinkmann (2017) provides an example in which explication is implicitly assumed,
and Maree (2009) argues in favor of Critical Realism as an explicative framework in QRME. How-
ever, even in these two cases, the pedagogical value of explication and its relation to critical thinking
are not made explicit. The problem with this absence is not only the fact that textbooks seem to
provide only a particular perspective on the relation between philosophy and research methods
but also that if a textbook only presents the explanation approach, students might interpret this
as according to the strong interpretation of this approach. If paradigms are only presented as expla-
natory factors for method choices, then students might believe that there is nothing more to know
about the foundation of qualitative methods other than what is negotiated within research practice.
Although this is a legitimate claim, it does not make justice to the ongoing debate in philosophy of
science, in which explication is considered as just as crucial. QRME could benefit from providing a
more balanced picture of the relation between philosophy of science and research methods, which
could be achieved by presenting students with both the explication and explanation approach and
by discussing the tension between them and the importance of both approaches to critical thinking.
The scope and generality of these two problems are of course very much dependent on how repre-
sentative the selected sample of textbooks is. I have tried to provide a picture of the state-of-the-art
of current qualitative methods textbooks, but the sample is limited in size and non-random. There-
fore, rather than a discussion of two confirmed generalized problems of QRME, this last section
should be interpreted as a warning for two possible pitfalls and a call to researchers and prac-
titioners of QRME for discussing the tension between explication and explanation and its reward
for learners’ critical thinking. We should always ask ourselves, why do we teach philosophy to stu-
dents learning qualitative research methods?

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

ORCID
Corrado Matta http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2282-8071

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