25thMay 2012

ARISTOTLE ON INCOMPLETE DEFINITIONS (TOPICS VI.8)

Annamaria Schiaparelli, Université de Genève, CH

HANDOUT

1. Discussion of incomplete definition in the Topics VI: the structure of chapter 8.

The discussion of incomplete definition in Topics VI.8 has three main parts:

(1) The first deals with accounts of different types of relatives (146 a36-146b19); it is divided
in three sub-parts: 146a36-146b9; 146b9-12; 146b13-9.
(1.i) Lines 146a36-146b9 distinguish two types of relatives: things that are in themselves
relatives and those whose genus is a relative.
(1.ii) Lines 146b9-12 discuss a special sort of relatum, namely the end (telos) in relation
to which a definiendum can be.
(1.iii) Lines 146b13-9 introduce a rule that is linked to the previous one. If the relatum
of the definiendum happens to be a becoming (genesis) or an activity (energeia), then
the definition is incomplete. This depends on Aristotle’s view that a becoming and an
activity cannot constitute an end (telos). The argument is support of this view is not
very strong, but, as we shall see later, Aristotle introduces an interesting exception to
the rule.
(2) The second part deals with proposed accounts that are incomplete because they do not
specify the quantity or the quality or the place or others (146b20-35); it consists of three
subparts: 146b21-24; 146b24-37; 146b27-35. In each of the three subparts the term diafora is
used. The analysis of the meaning of this term’s occurrences constitutes a key point in
understanding Aristotle’s concept of incomplete definitions
(3) The third part is concerned with proposed accounts that are not adequate because they
fail to add the qualification ‘apparent’ (146b36-147a11).
2. Definitions of relatives in Top. VI.8 and Cat. 7 and 8.

T1: Top. VI.4, 142a28-9:

142a28 ...the double without the half, and all the things that are called relatives in their
own right. For all such things to be is the same as to be in a certain relation to
something
T2: Top. VI.8, 146b3-4:

146b3 The substance of each relative is in relation to another since for each of the
relatives to be was precisely the same as to be in a certain relation with something
T3: Cat. 7.8a31-2:

8a31 They [sc. relatives are those things] for which being is the same as being somehow
related to something

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 T4: Cat. 7.6a36-7:

6a36 We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than
other things, or in some other way in relation to something else.
T5: Cat. 8.11a24-6:

11a24 For knowledge, a genus, is called just what it is of something else (it is called
knowledge of something), but none of the particular cases is called just what it is,
of something else.
T6: Top. VI.8, 146a36-146b6:

146a36 If what is being defined is a relative either with respect to itself or with respect to
the genus, examine if the definition does not mention that in relation to which it is
146b1 said either itself or with respect to the genus; for example if he has defined
knowledge as a belief that is incontrovertible or wish as a desire that is harmless.
For the substance of each relative is in relation to another, since for each of the
relatives to be was precisely the same as to be in a certain relation with something.
5 Thus he should have said that knowledge is a belief of a knowable and that wish is
a desire for a good.
On the one hand, (a) Aristotle’s group of relative definienda contains things that are in
themselves relatives. On the other hand, (b) this group contains things whose genera are relative as
he specifies in the following lines:

T7: Top. VI.8, 146b6-8:

146b6 Similarly see also if he has defined literacy as knowledge of letters. For in a
definition he should have given either that in relation to which itself is said or
whatever the genus is in relation to.
4. The role of the relatum in the definiens.

T8: Top. VI.7, 146a33-5:

146a33 Furthermore, examine if some discrepancy arises when he produces the accounts
instead of the names of the genera and differentiae and all the other things given in
35 the definitions.
5. An objection to the proposed interpretation.

A certain reading of the second part of lines 146b20-35, in chapter 8, might seem to support the
idea that the relata of the definiendum and those of its genus in so far as it is the genus of that
definiendum are differentiae. More precisely, since the term diafora occurs three times one might
be induced to think that Aristotle wants to assimilate the relata to differentiae. This objection,
however, can be answered.

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6. The answer to the objection.

Let us analyse the three occurrences of the term diafora.

6.1. The first occurrence of diafora.

T9: Topics VI.8, 146b20-1

146b20 Again in some cases see if he has not distinguished the how much, or the of-what-
sort, or the where or according to the other differentiae (kata tas allas diaforas);

6.2. The second occurrence of diafora.

T10: Topics VI.8, 146b21-4

146b21 ...for example whoever has desire for honour of a certain sort and of a certain
quantity is an honour-lover. For all have desire for honour, so that it is not
sufficient to say that an honour-lover is whoever has desire for honour, but we
must add the differentiae mentioned (tas eirêmenas diaforas).

T11: NE IV.5, 1125b7-9

1125b7 in a desire for honour (orexin timês) there is the more and less than it is needed
(...); for we blame the honour-lover for longing for the honour (efimenos timês)
more that it is needed

T12: Metaph. V.15, 1021b6-8

1021b6 there are properties in virtue of which the things that have them are called
relative, e.g., equality is relative because the equal is, and likeness because the
like is.

T13: Topics VI.8, 146b5-6

146b5 wish is a desire for a good (orexin agathou)

T14: Topics VI.8, 146b21-2

146b21 whoever has a desire for honour of a certain sort and of a certain quantity (o poias
kai o posês oregomenos timês)

6.3. The third occurrence of diafora.

T15: Topics VI.8, 146b30-1

146b30 Similarly also in all the cases of this sort; for having left aside a differentia,
whichever it might be, (diaforan hêntin’oun) he does not mention the what-it-is-
to-be. 1

1 The phrase ‘what-it-is-to-be’ renders (and is grammatically close to) the Greek to ti en einai; it is equivalent to
‘essence’ (ousia).

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 T16: Metaph. VII.12, 1038a18-20 and 27-30

1038a20 The last differentia will be the substance (ousia) and the definition of the object
(...)
a
1038 30 The definition is the account composed of the differentiae, and – if it is correctly
performed – just one of the last differentiae

APPENDIX I

The analysis of relative definienda in Top. VI.5.

Top. VI.5, 140b30-3

140b30 Furthermore, consider whether, although what is being defined is said in relation
to several things, he has not given its account in relation to all, for example if
literacy is defined as knowledge of writing what is dictated; for its being of reading
is also needed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

EDITIONS

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