PRE-WEEK AND PREDICTIONS FOR REMEDIAL LAW

2023 Bar Exams

_____________________________________________________________________________________________
COVERAGE OF THE LMT FOR REMEDIAL LAW:
(a) The factual circumstances and the doctrines cited in the decisions penned by J. Hernando.
(b) New topics that were particularly emphasized in the Bar syllabus.
(c) Recent Bar questions that cover the frequently asked topics in the Bar.

FORMAT:
(1) Short factual circumstances gathered from Chair’s cases and Bar questions
(2) Followed by answers using the ACLA (Answer, Conclusion, Legal Basis, Application) Method

WHY?
Because we have two (2) main goals:
(1) Predict a lot of topics that will be asked in the Bar
(2) Show you how to answer these topics once they are asked.

We will not just give you the abstract principles.

We will show you how to answer the questions, so you will have GUARANTEED POINTS in the Bar!

GUARANTEED POINTS must be our DREAM OUTCOME!

PREDICTED TOPICS THAT WILL BE ASKED IN THE 2023 BAR!

CIVIL PROCEDURE
1. B.P. 129, as amended
2. Differentiate the jurisdiction of first-level courts and DARAB
3. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
4. Splitting of a single cause of action
5. Res judicata, litis pendentia, and forum shopping
6. Misjoinder of causes of action
7. Who may be parties to a suit; Indispensable parties
8. Real action and personal action (Venue)
9. Affirmative defenses (Formerly covered by Rule 16 – Motion to Dismiss)
10. Summons; Substituted service of summons
11. Intervention
12. Judgment on the pleadings
13. Summary Judgment
14. Judgment
15. Appeals
16. Annulment of Judgment
17. Execution by motion or independent action
18. Execution pending appeal

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES/SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION/SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

1. Preliminary attachment
2. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65
3. Forcible entry/Unlawful detainer
4. Writ of kalikasan
5. Extrajudicial foreclosure
6. Habeas corpus

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
 1. Ombudsman
2. Arraignment; Plea of guilty to a capital offense
3. Motion to quash
4. Examination of witnesses; Suppletory application of the rules on deposition in criminal cases
5. Appeals in criminal cases
6. Search and seizure

EVIDENCE
1. Original document rule
2. Hearsay/Independently relevant statements
3. Dying declaration v. Part of res gestae
CIVIL PROCEDURE
1. B.P. 129, as amended
a. Ricardo filed Civil Case No. 196, the complaint for partition of Property and Damages,
against the heirs of Modesto before the MCTC. The assessed value of the real property is
P19,000. The MCTC ruled in favor of Ricardo. On appeal, the RTC reversed the ruling of
the MCTC. However, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and reinstated the ruling of
the MCTC. Before the CA, the heirs of Modesto contended that the MCTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. To address this contention, the CA
clarified that Ricardo's action for partition is "an action involving title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein." Since the real property has an assessed value of
P19,100.00, the jurisdiction properly falls with the MCTC. Does the MCTC have
jurisdiction over the subject matter?
i. Yes, the MCTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
ii. Under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, the first-level courts have jurisdiction over
actions involving title to or possession of real property or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed P400,000. Further,
case law dictates that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the primary relief sought in the complaint.
iii. Here, the MCTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter, because an action for
partition of real property is an action involving title to or possession of real
property or any interest therein, and the assessed value of the real property was
only P19,100.00.||| (Willy v. Julian, G.R. No. 207051, [December 1, 2021])
2. Differentiate the jurisdiction of the first-level courts (MTC, MCTC, and so on) and DARAB.
a. The first-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in
character as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public character of the land
does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases.
b. However, if the ejectment case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will
be divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended. Further, the CARL,
as amended states that the judge or prosecutor shall automatically refer the case to the
DAR if there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature, and
one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker or tenant.
c. An “agrarian dispute” is defined as any controversy relating to, as related to the instant
case, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture and transfer of ownership from landowner
to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries.
d. Thus, the controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not)
and not the character of the subject land. ||| (Dayrit v. Norquillas, G.R. No. 201631,
[December 07, 2021])
3. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
a. On July 5, 2011, respondent Dayamon Didato Alo (Alo) was formally charged with
unprofessional conduct and/or dishonorable conduct before the Board for Professional
Teachers (Board), which operates under petitioner Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC), for using fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration and professional
license. Later, the Board rendered a decision against Alo. Dissatisfied, Alo filed a motion
for reconsideration with the Board but it was denied. ithout elevating the case to the PRC,
Alo directly filed a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Should the petition for review be dismissed?
i. Yes, it should be dismissed.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 applies to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized
by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Meanwhile, case law dictates that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is grounded on practical reasons, including allowing the administrative
 agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as
affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief through the
administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious and costly resort to
courts.
iii. Here, the petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 must be dismissed,
because although the CA has appellate jurisdiction over judgments by a quasi-
judicial agency, such as the Board for Professional Teachers, Alo failed to follow
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Alo filed the instant petition
without any justification or reason on why she did not file an appeal with the PRC
instead. Not only is this a blatant disregard of procedural rules, but also a denial
of an opportunity for the PRC to review the Board's decision and if necessary,
correct or modify the same, without resorting to the judiciary and unnecessarily
adding to the courts' already clogged dockets.||| (Professional Regulation
Commission v. Alo, G.R. No. 214435, [February 14, 2022])
4. Splitting of a single cause of action
a. Mr. A obtained a loan of P5M from Mr. B. To secure the loan, Mr. A executed a real estate
mortgage on parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 129163
and 74496, a chattel mortgage on a rice mill, and a Comprehensive Surety Agreement.
Later, Mr. A failed to pay upon demand. Thus, Mr. B filed a petition for extra-judicial
foreclosure under Act No. 3135 before the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Further, Mr. B filed
an action for collection of sum of money against Mr. A. Should this be considered as a
splitting of a single cause of action?
i. Yes, it should be considered as a splitting of a single cause of action.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, a cause of action is an act or omission by which a party
violates the rights of another. Further, a party may not institute more than one suit
for a single cause of action and if, two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as ground for the dismissal of the others. Lastly, case law dictates
that one cause of action can give rise to multiple alternative reliefs or remedies.
iii. Here, it should be considered as a splitting of a single cause of action, because the
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage and the action for collection of
sum of money arose from a single cause of action, which was Mr. A’s failure to
pay the loan upon demand. Thus, Mr. B can institute two alternative remedies
against Mr. A: either a personal action for the collection of the promissory notes
issued under the loan agreement or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but
not both, simultaneously or successively. ||| (Asset Pool A (SPV-AMC), Inc. v.
Spouses Berris, G.R. No. 203194, [April 26, 2021])
1. NOTE: The right of the mortgage creditor to recover the deficiency, when
the mortgaged properties were not enough to satisfy the entire obligation,
was recognized in this case. However, the action is only instituted after
the termination of the foreclosure proceedings and not during its
pendency, so as not to violate the prohibition against splitting of cause of
action.
5. Res judicata, litis pendentia, and forum shopping
a. Mr. A filed an action for reconveyance of real property against Mr. B. The trial court ruled
in favor of Mr. A. The judgment became final and executory. Thus, the trial court issued
an order of execution on March 5, 2004. During the execution stage, Mr. A moved that Mr.
B be divested of his title over the subject property and that it be transferred to him.
However, Mr. B manifested that he could not surrender the title because it was already
mortgaged to Mr. C before the issuance of the order of execution by the trial court. Thus,
on July 23, 2004, Mr. A filed a motion praying for the delivery by Mr. C of the title in the
name of Mr. B. The trial court issued another order granting the motion of Mr. A. However,
Mr. C filed a petition under Rule 65 before the appellate court, assailing that the trial court
 did not acquire jurisdiction over his person as he was not a party to the case and was not
given a day in court. Thus, he could not be subject of the order. Could Mr. C be a subject
of the order?
i. Yes, Mr. C could be the subject of the order.
i. Under the Rules of Court, in other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in
the same capacity.
ii. Here, Mr. C could be the subject of the order, because he was the successor-in-
interest of Mr. B. Thus, Mr. C, being a privy to the judgment debtor, Mr. B, can be
reached by an order of execution, even though he was not impleaded in the action.
||| (Calubad v. Aceron, G.R. No. 188029, [September 2, 2020])
b. Does res judicata apply to impeachment proceedings?
i. No, it does not apply.
ii. Case law dictates that forum shopping exists with the concurrence of the following
elements: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless
of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under
consideration. Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former
suit. Impeachment being sui generis, its final culmination, whether a dismissal or
a conviction, would not constitute res judicata for the basic reason that the
principle of res judicata does not find application in purely political processes.|||
(Re: Ma. Cristina Roco Corona, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, [January 12, 2021])
c. Mr. A filed an action for annulment of deed of absolute sale, reconveyance of real property,
and damages against Mr. B. Mr. A alleged that the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Ganap involving a
real property was falsified. On the other hand, Mr. B, in his answer with counterlcaims,
prayed that a Deed of Sale must be executed as he is the true owner of the real property.
The RTC dismissed the action. However, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, and
ruled that the Kasulatan was falsified. After the appeal was denied by the Supreme Court
based on technicality, the decision became final and executory. Later, Mr. B filed an action
for specific performance against Mr. A, praying that Mr. A must execute the appropriate
documents, particularly a Deed of Absolute Sale, to affirm the past transaction, i.e., the
Kasulatan, entered into by the parties and to effect the formal transfer of the property to
Mr. B. Mr. A filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Should the action for
specific performance be dismissed?
i. Yes, the action should be dismissed.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, in other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been [missed] in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in
the same capacity. Further, In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. Case
law dictates that these quoted provision embraces two concepts of res judicata: (1)
bar by prior judgment; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. Further, the elements
 of res judicata are (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment
on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res
judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the
two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action,
then res judicata as 'conclusiveness of judgment.'
iii. Here, the action should be dismissed, because a careful examination of the two
civil cases shows that the cases involve the same parties, same subject matter, and
same cause of action: (1) in the first action, the plaintiff is Mr. A while the
defendant is Mr. B, and in the second action, the plaintiff is Mr. B and the
defendant is Mr. A, (2) in both cases, the subject matter was the real property that
was covered by the Kasunduan, and (3) in the first action, Mr. B filed an answer
with counterclaim, praying that a Deed of Sale be executed in favor, as he is the
true owner of the real property, and in the section action, Mr. B prayed for the
execution of a Deed of Sale to confirm the past transaction they entered into.|||
(Villaroman v. Estate of Arciaga, G.R. No. 210822, [June 28, 2021])
6. Misjoinder of causes of action
a. Mr. A filed an action for annulment of title and partition of real property against Mr. B
with the RTC. The assessed value of the real property was P1Million. The trial court ruled
in favor of Mr. A. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA ruled that the
misjoinder of the causes of action of Mr. A was not a ground to dismiss the action. Later,
Mr. B appealed to the Supreme Court. Should the action be dismissed because there was
misjoinder of causes of action?
i. No, the action should not be dismissed because of misjoinder of causes of action.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, a misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action and that a misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a
party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
Further, case law dictates that absent any objection on the part of the defendant
or a directive from the lower court for the severance of the causes of action, the
misjoined causes of action can be validly adjudicated upon, if the lower court
has jurisdiction over both causes of action. Meanwhile, under B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and actions involving title to or possession of real property,
where the assessed value of the real property exceeds P400,000.
iii. Here, the action should not be dismissed because even though the lower court
overlooked the misjoinder of causes of action, such fact is not a ground to assail
the validity of the decision or a ground for the dismissal of the case. Thus, both
causes of action were validly adjudicated upon by the RTC, considering that the
RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of title and
actions for partition of real property, where its assessed value exceeds
P400,000.||| (Delmolin-Paloma v. Delmolin-Magno, G.R. No. 237767, [November
10, 2021])
7. Who may be parties to a suit; Indispensable parties
a. Mr. A and MAPI entered into an employment contract. Later, Mr. A filed a complaint for
unpaid wages and benefits against Marble Center and its supervisor, Mr. B with the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Mr. A. The
decision became final and executory, and a writ of execution was issued. However, the
sheriff was denied entry to the premises of the Marble Center to enforce the judgment. The
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) filed an appeal
memorandum in intervention, contending that Marble Center is a non-juridical entity. It
 was merely the training center that was constructed by TESDA, DTI, and the Province of
Bulacan, and was managed by MAPI. Thus, TESDA, DTI, the Province of Bulacan, and
MAPI should have been impleaded as the real parties-in-interest in the complaint and not
Marble Center. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) granted TESDA's
appeal and reversed the ruling of the Arbiter. However, the CA reversed the NLRC's
decision, and reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision. Thus, TESDA filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Some of the contentions before the
Supreme Court are (1) Marble Center cannot become a party to a suit, and (2) TESDA is an
indispensable party to the suit.
i. Does the first contention deserve merit?
1. Yes, it deserves merit.
2. Under the Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action and every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest.
3. Here, it deserves merit, because the Center which Mr. A seeks to hold
liable has no juridical personality nor is it an entity authorized by law to
be a party to any action; it has no legal capacity to sue or be sued and
should not have been impleaded as defendant in the instant case.|||
(Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. Abragar, G.R.
No. 201022, [March 17, 2021])
ii. Does the second contention deserve merit?
1. Yes, it deserves merit.
2. Under the Rules of Court, parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. Further, case law dictates that indispensable Indispensable
parties are parties whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary
that 'the action cannot be finally determined' without them because their
interests in the matter and in the relief are so bound up with that of the
other parties.
3. Here, the second contention deserves merit. TESDA must be considered
as an indispensable party as its interest in the controversy is such that a
final adjudication cannot be made in their absence, without injuring or
affecting its interest. Mr. A’s claims are anchored in his employer-
employee relationship with the Center. In view of the lack of juridical
personality of the Center, any judgment against the Center would have to
be enforced against TESDA. ||| (Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority v. Abragar, G.R. No. 201022, [March 17, 2021])
b. Mr. A owned a 10-hectare agricultural lot. Mr. B was his agricultural tenant, which is
defined under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Later, Mr. A died. Thus,
the heirs of Mr. A executed an Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate which provided that all
properties of Mr. A shall be owned in common by the heirs. However, one of the heirs filed
an action for partition before the RTC, impleading all the other heirs, as defendants. Is Mr.
B an indispensable party in the action for partition?
i. No, Mr. B is not an indispensable party.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. A necessary party is one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be
accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement
of the claim subject of the action.
iii. Here, Mr. B is not an indispensable party, because he is a stranger to the estate of
Mr. A, and the estate of Mr. A is the subject matter of the action for partition.
 However, in relation to the 10-hectare agricultural lot, Mr. B must be considered
as a real party in interest, since he is an agricultural tenant under the CARL. Thus,
Mr. B must be considered as a necessary party, because a complete relief for the
parties impleaded or the complete determination of the claim could be had, if Mr.
B, the agricultural tenant, would be impleaded in the action for partition.|||
(Silva v. Lo, G.R. No. 206667, [June 23, 2021])
8. Real and personal action (Venue)
a. Differentiate action to cancel a real estate mortgage and an action for foreclosure of real
estate mortgage
i. Case law dictates that the action to cancel the mortgage is a personal action, as
compared to an action to foreclose such mortgage, which is a real action that
involves real property||| (PNB-Republic Bank v. Sian-Limsiaco, G.R. No. 196323,
[February 8, 2021])
1. NOTE: Thus, Sec. 1 of Rule 4 applies to action for foreclosure of real estate
mortgage, while Sec. 2 of Rule 4 applies to action to cancel a real estate
mortgage.
9. Affirmative defenses
a. Mr. A filed before the RTC of Manila, a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 250439 against Mr. B. Both Mr. A
and Mr. B reside in the city of Manila. Mr. B, in his answer, alleged that the action must be
dismissed, because Mr. A failed to refer the case to the barangay for conciliation. Should
the action be dismissed?
i. Yes, the action should be dismissed.
ii. Under the Local Government Code, all disputes involving parties who actually
reside in the SAME city or municipality may be the subject of the proceedings for
amicable settlement in the barangay, except: (1) when one party is the government;
(2) when one party is a public officer, and the dispute relates to the performance
of his functions; (3) for offenses where there is no private offended party; (4) for
offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 1 year or a fine exceeding P5,000;
(5) for real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon; (6) for parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon; and (7) such other classes of disputes which the President may determine
in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Meanwhile, case law dictates that a party's failure to comply with the requirement
of prior barangay conciliation before filing a case in court would render his
complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a condition
precedent.
iii. Here, the action should be dismissed, because a complaint for recovery of
possession of a parcel of land is not covered by those cases exempted under the
Local Government Code, and Mr. A failed refer the case to the barangay for
conciliation before he filed it in court.||| (Ngo v. Gabelo, G.R. No. 207707,
[August 24, 2020])
b. On June 11, 2012, petitioner East West Banking Corporation (Bank) filed a Complaint
before the RTC for Sum of Money with Application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against Ian Y. Cruz (Ian) and Paul Andrew Chua Hua (Paul), seeking to
recover the total amount of P16,054,541.66. In the same Complaint, the Bank impleaded
herein Francisco T. Cruz (Francisco), Ian's father, and Alvin Y. Cruz (Alvin), Ian's brother,
as unwilling co-plaintiffs. Apparently, Ian, Francisco, and Alvin maintained separate
accounts at the Bank's Davao-Lanang Branch. Paul, as the Bank's Sales Officer, handled
their deposit accounts. The Bank alleged that Paul debited P16,054,541.66 from the
 accounts of Francisco and Alvin and then credited the same amount to Ian's account by
representing that Francisco and Alvin undertook to "regularize" the transactions later on.
Using the debited amounts, Ian successfully obtained a "back-to-back" loan from the Bank.
Ian then purportedly used the same amount to pay for the said loan. However, instead of
"regularizing" the transactions, Francisco and Alvin demanded the payment of
P16,054,541.66 from the Bank as evidenced by Foreign Exchange Forward Contracts
(FEFCs). The Bank, however, rejected Francisco and Alvin's demand stating that the FEFCs
are spurious. The incident prompted the Bank to conduct an audit of all the transactions
of the respondents. The Bank asserted that the issuance of spurious FEFCs was part of the
scheme of Ian and Paul to defraud Francisco, Alvin, and the Bank. If the defendants will
allege in their answers that the complaint states no cause of action, will the complaint be
dismissed?
i. Yes, the complaint will be dismissed, if the defendants will allege in their answers
that the complaint states no cause of action.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, a defendant can raise his affirmative defenses in his
answer, which includes the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action. Further, under the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest.
iii. Here, the complaint will be dismissed, if the defendants will allege in their answers
that the complaint states no cause of action, because in deposits of money, a bank
is considered as the debtor while the depositor is the creditor. The Bank would not
stand to be injured as it is merely maintaining or keeping the money in trust for
the depositors. The party that would be injured was the depositors. Thus, the cause
of action belongs to the depositor, and not the Bank. ||| (East West Banking Corp.
v. Cruz, G.R. No. 221641, [July 12, 2021])
10. Summons; Substituted Service of Summons
a. Mr. A was allegedly hired by ABC Australia Corp. He was dismissed from service. Thus,
Mr. A filed an action for illegal dismissal against ABC Australia Corp., the alleged
employer, and ABC Philippines Corp., the Philippine subsidiary of ABC Australia Corp.
ABC Australia Corp. contended that the NLRC cannot acquire jurisdiction over ABC
Australia Corp. because it is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines.
Can the NLRC acquire jurisdiction over ABC Australia Corp.?
i. No, the NLRC cannot acquire jurisdiction over ABC Australia Corp.
ii. Case law dictates that a non-resident foreign corporation which is not doing
business in the Philippines, may be served with summons by extraterritorial
service, to wit: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2)
when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the
Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or
contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines;
and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the
Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of
court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Extraterritorial
service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem but
not if an action is in personam. If the action is in personam, jurisdiction over the
non-resident foreign corporation which is not doing business in the Philippines
can only be acquired if it voluntarily appears in court. Lastly, an action in
personam is an action against the defendant on the basis of his personal liability.
 iii. Here, the NLRC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of ABC Australia
Corp., because (1) a complaint for illegal dismissal is an action in personam, (2)
ABC Australia Corp. did not voluntarily appear in court, and (3) there is no valid
service of summons to acquire jurisdiction over ABC Australia Corp.
Consequently, no judgment can be issued against it, if any.||| (Gesolgon v.
CyberOne PH., Inc., G.R. No. 210741, [October 14, 2020])
1. NOTE: For non-resident foreign corporations, extraterritorial service of
summons will apply if the action is in rem or quasi in rem. It will not apply
if the action is in personam.
b. Asya, Inc. sued Kobe, a resident of Bukidnon. To serve summons, the sheriff waited in the
lobby of Makati Hotel (MH), where Kobe stays whenever he is in Manila. The sheriff failed
to serve the summons because Kobe left the hotel for an emergency. Hours later, the sheriff
asked the front desk about Kobe’s whereabouts and his room number. The hotel refused
to disclose on grounds of confidentiality. The sheriff tried again the next day, but Kobe
was in a conference until midnight. So, the following day, the sheriff left the summons and
a copy of the complaint with MH's chief security officer (CSO), even as the CSO refused
because Kobe had already checked out by then. The sheriff thereafter filed his return,
stating the dates, times and places of his attempts, the name of the CSO, and the fact that
the complaint was served with the summons. When Kobe did not file an Answer, Asya,
Inc. moved to declare him in default. Was there a valid substituted service of summons?
Explain briefly. (2022 Bar Examination)
i. No, there was an invalid substituted service of summons.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
personally after at least three (3) attempts on two (2) separate dates, service may
be effected: (a) By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence to a
person at least eighteen (18) years of age and of sufficient discretion residing
therein; (b) By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. A competent
person includes, but not limited to, one who customarily receives correspondences
for the defendant; (c) By leaving copies of the summons, if refused entry upon
making his or her authority and purpose known, with any of the officers of the
homeowners' association or condominium corporation, or its chief security officer
in charge of the community or the building where the defendant may be found;
and (d) By sending an electronic mail to the defendant's electronic mail address, if
allowed by the court.
iii. Here, there was an invalid substituted service of summons, because MH was not
the place of residence or office or regular place of business of Kobe.
11. Intervention
a. Mr. A filed a petition for declaratory relief against Shell Philippines, Petron, and Caltex,
collectively known as the “Big 3,” because the latter allegedly increased the prices of their
petroleum products whenever the price of crude oil increases in the world market despite
that fact that they had purchased their inventories at a much lower price long before the
increase. Thus, Mr. A contended that this practice constitutes monopoly and combination
in restraint of trade, prohibited under Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC
issued an Order, directing the COA to open and examine the books of the Big 3. Later,
Pasang Masda, a public transport group, filed a motion for leave of court to intervene,
contending that it had legal interest over the subject matter of the case, since its members
are consumers of gasoline and diesel. Should RTC grant the motion of Pasang Masda?
i. No, the RTC must deny the motion of Pasang Masda.
ii. Case law dictates that the following are the requisites for a valid intervention: (1)
the movant must have a legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) the
intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the parties; and (3) the claim of the intervenor must not be capable of being
 properly decided in a separate proceeding. Further, legal interest must be actual,
substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant
iii. Here, the RTC must deny the motion of Pasang Masda, because its allegation that
its members consume petroleum products is not sufficient to show that they have
legal interest in the matter being litigated considering that there are other oil
players in the market aside from the Big 3. Further, there is no showing that Pasang
Masda has something to gain or lose in the outcome of the case. ||| (Commission
on Audit v. Pampilo, Jr., G.R. Nos. 188760, 189060 & 189333, [June 30, 2020])
12. Judgment on the pleadings
a. Ms. A filed a complaint for damages against Ms. B, alleging that Ms. B negligently caused
the demolition of her house's concrete fence, the top half of which fell on the front portion
of Ms. A's car and permanently damaged its engine. In her answer, Ms. B denied any
personal liability for the damage caused to Ms. A's car, averring that she merely acquiesced
to the advice of her contractor, XYZ Construction Co., to have the concrete fence
demolished. Thus, damages, if any, should be collected from it. Thereafter, Ms. A filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that Ms. B's statement in her answer is
actually a negative pregnant. Ms. B opposed the motion, reiterating her defense in her
answer which purportedly rendered judgment on the pleadings improper. Ms. B also
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of non-joinder of XYZ Construction Co.,
which she alleged is an indispensable party to the case. Is Ms. A's motion for judgment on
the pleadings proper? Explain. (2019 Bar Examination)
i. Yes, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, the court may motu proprio or on motion render
judgment on the pleadings if it is apparent that the answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleadings.
Meanwhile, a negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts
alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of action.
Material averments in a pleading asserting a claim or claims, other than those as
to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not
specifically denied.
iii. Here, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper, because Ms. B’s
allegation that she “denied any personal liability for the damage caused to Ms. A's
car, averring that she merely acquiesced to the advice of her contractor, XYZ
Construction Co., to have the concrete fence demolished,” was not a specific
denial. It was an admission that the car of Ms. A was damaged by her, due to the
advice of XYZ Construction Co. Thus, Ms. B’s answer admitted the material
allegations of Ms. A’s complaint.
13. Summary judgment
a. Aljem’s Credit Investors Corporation (petitioner) alleged that a parcel of land owned by
the spouses Bautista (respondents) was mortgaged to it as security for a loan. The Bautistas
failed to pay the loan; thus, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage. As the spouses Bautista did
not redeem the property within the reglementary period, title to the property was
consolidated in petitioner's name. When petitioner was about to take possession of the
property, Catalina Bautista (Catalina), the wife, offered to repurchase the property.
Petitioner accepted the offer, so they entered into a Contract to Sell on August 29, 2000.
The Spouses Bautista, however, failed to comply with the Contract to Sell resulting to its
cancellation. The parties entered into another Contract to Sell on September 27, 2001;
however, despite several demands to pay or vacate the property, the spouses Bautista still
failed to comply even with a new contract. Thus, petitioner sent demand letters to Catalina
to vacate the property. The last demand letter to vacate was sent on January 18, 2006. 15
All demands were to no avail, resulting to petitioner's filing of an accion publiciana,
rescission of contract, with damages and attorney’s fees against the respondents. In their
 answer, the spouses Bautista alleged that the mortgage contract was forged, as it did not
bear the conformity of Porferio Bautista (Porferio), the husband. They also contended
that the contract to sell contains a provision on pactum commissorium, which is illegal,
and that the contract should be considered as an equitable mortgage. They likewise
contested the high interest rates imposed. Petitioner filed its Reply. Subsequently,
petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging that there is no genuine issue of
fact because: (a) the spouses Bautista admitted that the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
of the property is in petitioner's name; (b) the defense of the spouses Bautista are legal
issues, not factual; and, (c) there is no genuine issue of fact. Should the motion for summary
judgment be granted by the trial court?
i. No, the motion for summary judgment should be denied.
ii. Case law dictates that summary judgment is a procedural device that allows
parties to avoid long litigation and delays, where the pleadings show that there
are no genuine issues of fact to be tried. A genuine issue of fact is "such issue of
fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived[,] or false claim." As such, an issue of fact is genuine if it
requires presentation of evidence to be resolved. Thus, when a party moves for
a summary judgment, the trial court is duty-bound to examine the motion and the
supporting documents, as well as the corresponding opposition thereto, to
determine if there are genuine issues of fact that should be resolved by the trial
court. The trial court shall not limit itself to the tenor or contents of the pleadings.
iii. Here, the motion for summary judgment should be denied. First, even though the
respondents admitted that the TCT is in the petitioner’s name, this is only one of
the issues in the case. Second, the respondents’ contentions that the contract was
an equitable mortgage and it has a pactum commissorium provision are questions
of fact, not of law. For both contentions, there is a need for the trial court to review
evidence, including the assailed document itself, and the intent of the parties, to
determine if there is an equitable mortgage or a pactum commissorium provision.
Third, the issue of forgery is a question of fact. ||| (Aljem's Credit Investors Corp.
v. Spouses Bautista, G.R. No. 215175, [April 25, 2022])
14. Judgment
a. Differentiate interlocutory orders and final orders of the court.
i. Case law dictates that an interlocutory order is an order referring to something
between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or
matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy. It does not
terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to
be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. On the other
hand, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve
the case. ||| (Silva v. Lo, G.R. No. 206667, [June 23, 2021])
15. Execution by motion or independent action
a. Explain execution by independent action.
i. Under the Rules of Court, A final and executory judgment or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse
of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations. Meanwhile, under the Civil Code, an action
upon a judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues. Thus, case law dictates that once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party has two remedies: (1) [To have the judgment]
executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of
entry of judgment; or (2) If the prevailing party fails to have the judgment enforced
by motion after the lapse of five years, to have the judgment enforced as a right of
 action by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within 10 years from the
time the judgment became final. The revival action is a new action altogether; it
is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or
enforced. It is a new and independent action, wherein the cause of action is the
decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought
to be enforced is rendered. ||| (Pineda v. Miranda, G.R. No. 204997, [August 4,
2021])
16. Execution pending appeal
a. Mr. A filed an action for collection of sum of money against Mr. B. The trial court ruled in
favor of Mr. A. Thus, Mr. A filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court
granted the motion because Mr. A was already 65 years of age at the time of the filing of
the motion. Did the trial court err in granting the motion?
i. Yes, the trial court erred in granting the motion.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, on motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in
possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may
be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order
execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to
appeal. After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court. Discretionary execution may only issue
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. Further, case
law dictates that the execution pending appeal, due to the old age and life-
threatening ailments of a party to the case, must be supported by special
reasons.
iii. Here, the trial court erred in granting the motion, because even though Mr. A was
of advanced age, such will not be considered as a good reason by itself, in the
absence of special reasons.||| (Heirs of Casiño, Sr. v. Development Bank of the
Philippines, Malaybalay Branch, Bukidnon, G.R. Nos. 204052-53, [March 11, 2020])
17. Appeals
a. Mr. A filed a petition for settlement of estate of Mr. B with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. Mr.
C filed a motion for intervention in the estate settlement case. The RTC denied the motion.
Mr. C filed a notice of appeal without filing a record on appeal with the RTC. Should the
CA dismiss the appeal due to Mr. C’s failure to file a record on appeal?
i. Yes, the CA should dismiss the appeal.
ii. Case law dictates that the remedy of appeal in special proceedings is not limited
to appealable orders and judgments rendered in the main case, but extends to
other orders or dispositions that completely determine a particular matter in the
case. This includes the denial of a motion for intervention. Meanwhile, under the
Rules of Court, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special
proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which
to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a
record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the
adverse party. Case law dictates that the Rules are clear. While it is not necessary
that a notice of appeal and a record on appeal be filed simultaneously, the rule
is unequivocal that the notice of appeal AND record of appeal shall be filed
within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order.
iii. Here, the CA should dismiss the appeal, because both a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal are required for appealing final orders in a special proceeding
case. Mr. C's failure to file the record on appeal without any justifiable reason
clearly violated this settled rule.||| (Brual v. Contreras, G.R. No. 205451, [March
7, 2022])
18. Annulment of judgment
a. Mr. A and Mr. B obtained a P10Million loan from Mr. C. Mr. A and Mr. B did not pay upon
demand, so Mr. C filed an action for collection of sum of money against Mr. A and Mr. B
with the RTC. Mr. A never received any summons from the trial court. Meanwhile, the
sheriff was able to serve summons upon Mr. B. However, Mr. B never filed an answer.
Later, the court rendered a judgment of default against Mr. A and Mr. B. This judgment
became final and executory. A week later, Mr. A filed a petition for relief from judgment
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person. This petition was denied. Can Mr. A
file a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals?
i. Yes, Mr. A can file a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, the annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground
if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or
petition for relief. Further, case law dictates that "Lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner." On the other hand, "[t]he overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in court." At this
juncture, worth reiterating is the rule that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid
ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial
or petition for relief. This means that the remedy of annulment of judgment, albeit
a "last remedy," is not an alternative remedy to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, or a petition for relief. It must show or allege that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of petitioner. Notably, we have held in Jose v. Intra
Strata Assurance Corporation that "it is only extrinsic fraud, not lack of
jurisdiction, which is excluded as a valid ground for annulment if it was availed
of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief." This is because a judgment rendered without jurisdiction by the trial
court is fundamentally void or non-existent, and therefore, can be "assailed at
any time either collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such judgment or
final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked."
iii. Here, Mr. A can file a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of
Appeals, if the ground he will rely upon is lack of jurisdiction over his person. His
previous filing of a petition for relief from judgment would not prohibit him from
filing this petition. ||| (Ancheta v. Cambay, G.R. No. 204272, [January 18, 2021])
b. Procopio Borras (Procopio) was the owner of several parcels of land, one of which was Lot
No. 5275 located at Barrio Bigaa, Legazpi City, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. [NA] 2097. Upon Procopio's death, the properties were inherited by his five
children namely: Inocencio, Vicente, Aurelia, Severina and Leonila. Upon the death of all
the siblings, the properties were inherited by their respective children, including Eustaquio
Borras (Eustaquio), son of Inocencio. On April 10, 2004, the Heirs of Eustaquio Borras
(respondents) claimed ownership of Lot No. 5275. This was contested by Heirs of Procopio
Borras (petitioners). It was discovered later that Lot No. 5275 is already registered in the
name of Eustaquio Borras. It appears that during his lifetime, Eustaquio claimed
ownership over Lot No. 5275 when he filed a petition for reconstitution before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay, Branch II, docketed as Cad. Case No. RT-1998 for
the reconstitution of OCT No. [NA] 2097, with prayer for issuance of a transfer certificate
of title in his name. 7 On July 7, 1980, the CFI issued an Order transferring the certificate
of title in the name of Eustaquio Borras. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 21502 was issued in the name of Eustaquio. Upon learning of the existence of TCT
No. 21502, petitioners filed an action for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 2, on October 12, 2004, which docketed as Civil Case No.
10402. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Heirs of Procopio Borras (petitioners).
However, on appeal, the CA ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of TCT No. 21502 in an action for quieting of title. The CA ruled that while a TCT
should not have been issued to Eustaquio in an action for reconstitution, the declaration of
its nullity can only be had either in an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court before the CA. Thereafter, petitioners filed before the CA a petition
for annulment of judgment, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 124946. Petitioners
sought the annulment of the July 7, 1980 Order of the CFI insofar as it ordered the
cancellation of OCT No. [NA] 2097 in the name Procopio and the issuance of a TCT in
favor of Eustaquio. Should the petition for annulment of judgment be dismissed?
i. Yes, the petition for annulment of judgment should be dismissed.
ii. Case law dictates that annulment of judgment may either be based on the ground
that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained
by extrinsic fraud. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment
refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over
the subject matter of the claim. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on
lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional
discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence
of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the
petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter
iii. Here, the petition should be dismissed, because even if the the CFI (now, the RTC)
acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the issuance of a new TCT in
favor of Eustaquio, nevertheless, such order of the CFI was done in the exercise of
its jurisdiction and not the lack thereof. ||| (Heirs of Borras v. Heirs of Borras,
G.R. No. 213888, [April 25, 2022])
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES/SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS/SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
1. Preliminary attachment
a. On November 23, 2009, Dumaran filed a Complaint for Sum of Money, Damages and
Attorney's Fees with a Prayer for the Ex-Parte Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta alleging, among others: that
Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta opened a joint account in Peninsula Rural Bank and with
post-dated checks from that account, purchased on credit diesel and gasoline fuel from
him; that they incurred an outstanding obligation of P7,416,918.55 in October and
November 2009 alone; that the post-dated checks Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta issued
to pay the obligation were dishonored for insufficient funds/account closed; and despite
demands, they failed to pay the total outstanding obligation. Dumaran further filed an
application for writ of preliminary attachment as provided under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 57.
On December 7, 2009, the RTC issued a Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy on
Attachment. Subsequently, Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta filed their Very Urgent
Motion to Quash Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy on Attachment, 12 alleging that
the said Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy on Attachment is illegal, improper and
unjustly issued in violation of their right to due process; has no basis in fact and in law,
therefore, null and void. Did the RTC err in issuing a writ of attachment and notice of levy
on attachment?
i. Yes, the RTC erred.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, at the commencement of the action or at any time before
entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the
adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered in an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is
brought, or in the performance thereof. Case law dictates that “fraud” is deemed
to comprise anything calculated to deceive — including all acts and omission and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence
justly reposed — resulting in damage to or in undue advantage over another.
iii. Here, the RTC erred in issuing a writ of attachment and notice of levy on
attachment, because non-payment of debt does not automatically equate to a
fraudulent act. Dumaran failed to show that he was defrauded into accepting the
offer of Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta; and that Llamedo, Magallanes and
Cubeta intended from the beginning to not pay their obligations. ||| (Dumaran
v. Llamedo, G.R. No. 217583, [August 4, 2021])
2. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65
a. What is the mode of appeal applicable to the following cases, and what issues may be
raised before the reviewing court/tribunal? (a) The decision or final order of the National
Labor Relations Commission. (2017 Bar Examination)
i. Case law dictates that the remedy from the decision or final order of the National
Labor Relations Commission is filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the Court of Appeals.
3. Forcible entry/Unlawful detainer
a. Mr. A filed an action for forcible entry against Mr. B. Mr. A also filed an action for
reconveyance of property against Mr. B. Later, in the action for forcible entry, the trial court
ruled that Mr. A is the rightful owner of the property, so he has the right to possess the
same, to the exclusion of Mr. B. The judgment of the trial court became final and executory.
Because of the ruling in the forcible entry case, Mr. A filed a manifestation with motion to
dismiss with the trial court in the action for reconveyance, alleging that the ownership of
the property was already resolved in the forcible entry case. Thus, the action for
reconveyance must be now be dismissed. Should the manifestation with motion to dismiss
be granted?
i. No, the manifestation with motion to dismiss should not be granted.
 ii. Case law dictates that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material
possession of the subject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the
parties. However, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that where
the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication
of the issue on ownership is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose
of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership
is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. Thus, a separate action to directly attack the
validity of the title must be filed.
iii. Here, the manifestation with motion to dismiss should not be granted, because the
decision of the trial court, in the forcible entry case, as to the ownership of the
property was only provisional. ||| (Tiña v. Sta. Clara Estate, Inc., G.R. No. 239979,
[February 17, 2020])
b. Differentiate forcible entry cases and unlawful detainer cases.
Forcible entry Unlawful detainer
Possession
The possession of the The possession is
defendant or the intruder previously legal but
is illegal from the eventually becomes
beginning because his/her unlawful upon the
possession of the property expiration of one's right to
is against the will or possess the property after,
without the consent of the for instance, the
plaintiff or the former termination or violation of
possessor. a lease contract.

Thus, plaintiff must allege Thus, the plaintiff need not

Demand to vacate
in the complaint and prove
that he/she was in prior
physical possession of the
property in litigation until
he/she was deprived
thereof by the defendant.
No previous demand to
vacate is required before
the filing of the action.|||
have prior physical
possession of the property.
Prior to the filing of the
action, plaintiff must issue
a demand to vacate to
defendant, which the latter
fails to comply.

Prescriptive Period In general, the one-year The one-year period in

prescriptive period is
reckoned from the date of
actual entry on the
property. However, if
forcible entry is done
through stealth, the period
is counted from the time
the plaintiff discovered the
entry.|||
unlawful detainer is
counted from the date of
the last demand to vacate.
|||(Palajos v. Abad, G.R.
No. 205832, [March 7,
2022])

4. Extrajudicial foreclosure (Act No. 3135)

 a. When can a writ of possession be issued?
i. The general rule is that in extra-judicial foreclosures, a writ of possession may be
issued to the purchaser in two different instances, and based on two different
sources: (1) within the redemption period, in accordance with Act No. 3135,
particularly Section 7, as amended; and (2) after the lapse of the redemption
period, based on the purchaser's right of ownership.
ii. In the first instance, Section 7 of Act No. 3135 provides that the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing an ex parte motion
under oath. The provision also requires that a bond be furnished and approved,
and no third person is involved.
iii. In the second instance, a writ of possession may also be issued after consolidation
of ownership of the property in the name of the purchaser. The purchaser becomes
the absolute owner of the property purchased in the foreclosure sale, if it is not
redeemed during the one-year period after the registration of the sale. After
consolidation of ownership in the purchaser's name and issuance of a new TCT,
possession of the land too becomes an absolute right of the purchaser. Thus, the
issuance of the writ of possession to the purchaser, upon proper application and
proof of title, merely becomes a ministerial duty of the court which cannot be
enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity
of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale. Any question regarding the
regularity or validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a
justification for opposing the issuance of the writ. ||| (Spouses Torrecampo v.
Wealth Development Bank Corp., G.R. No. 221845, [March 21, 2022])
5. Writ of Kalikasan
a. The municipality of Danao, Cebu was a quiet and peaceful town until a group of miners
from Denmark visited the area and discovered that it was rich in nickel. In partnership
with the municipal mayor, the Danish miners had to flatten 10 hectares of forest land by
cutting all the trees before starting their mining operations. The local DENR, together with
the Samahan Laban sa Sumisira sa Kalikasan, filed a petition for writ of kalikasan against
the municipal mayor and the Danish miners in the RTC of Cebu. Does the RTC of Cebu
have jurisdiction over the petition? (2018 Bar Examination)
i. No, the RTC of Cebu has no jurisdiction over the petition.
ii. Under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, the petition for writ of
kalikasan shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the
Court of Appeals.
iii. Here, the RTC of Cebu has no jurisdiction over the petition, because the petition
for writ of kalikasan must be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.
6. Habeas corpus
a. On 1980, Mr. A was punished by the RTC to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On
2007, he filed a petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court.
Should the petition be granted?
i. No, it should be dismissed.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of
Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so
granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First
Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also
be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any
time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.
Further, case law dictates that mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford
parties absolute freedom to choose the court with which the petition shall be
filed. Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all, the
 hierarchy of courts 'serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitioners for the extraordinary writs.
iii. Here, the petition should be dismissed, because Mr. A should have filed the
present petition before the RTC, absent any showing of special and important
reasons warranting a direct resort to the Supreme Court. ||| (Miguel v. Director
of the Bureau of Prisons, UDK-15368, [September 15, 2021])
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1. Ombudsman
a. The OMB Field Investigation Office filed a complaint against Congressman A for violation
of RA 3019. Later, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution, which states that it found probable
cause to file a criminal action for violation of RA 3019 against him. Congressman A filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Resolution. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for certiorari filed by Congressman A, because of lack of jurisdiction. Thus,
Congressman A filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Did
Congressman A err when he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to
assail the Resolution of the Ombudsman?
i. Yes, Congressman A erred when he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals to assail the Resolution of the Ombudsman.
ii. Case law dictates that, with respect to criminal charges, the remedy of the
aggrieved party from a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or
absence of probable cause is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and the petition should be filed not before the CA, but before the
Supreme Court.
iii. Here, Congressman A erred when he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals to assail the Resolution of the Ombudsman, since he filed the petition
with the Court of Appeals, and not with the Supreme Court.||| (Patdu, Jr. v.
Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 230171, [September 27, 2021])
b. An administrative complaint was filed by Mr. A against the local government officials of
Marinduque. The Ombudsman found merit in the complaint, so the Ombudsman imposed
upon them the penalty of suspension of six months. The motion for reconsideration of the
officials were also denied by the Ombudsman. Thus, the officials filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court. Should the petition be dismissed?
i. Yes, it should be dismissed.
ii. Case law dictates that appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
the provisions of Rule 43.
iii. Here, the petition should be dismissed, because the officials availed of the wrong
remedy. They should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 to the Court
of Appeals.||| (Monterde v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 214102, [February 14, 2022];
Province of Bataan v. Casimiro, G.R. Nos. 197510-11 & 201347, [April 18, 2022])
2. Arraignment and plea; Plea of guilty to a capital offense
a. During Mr. A’s arraignment on August 20, 2009, he pleaded "guilty" to the crime of
murder. The RTC found the plea to be voluntary and with full understanding of its
consequences. Thus, it directed the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of
Mr. A and to determine the exact degree of his culpability. However, the prosecution did
not present evidence. Mr. A also chose not present evidence due to the prosecution’s non-
presentation. Did Mr. A enter a valid plea of guilty?
i. No, Mr. A did not enter a valid plea of guilty.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, in case of plea of guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Case law dictates that the term “capital offense” includes reclusion perpetua and
life imprisonment. Further, in case of plea of guilty to a capital offense, the
confession ALONE cannot sustain conviction. The trial court must (1) conduct a
searching inquiry as to the voluntariness and full comprehension of the plea,
(2) direct the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
(3) allow the accused to present evidence, and (4) if the accused does not choose
 to present evidence, the trial court must observe a procedure, similar to a
searching inquiry, as a prerequisite for the validity of the waiver.
iii. Here, Mr. A did not enter a valid plea of guilty, because (1) the facts do not show
that the trial court conducted a searching inquiry as to the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the plea of guilty of Mr. A, (2) the prosecution failed to prove
his guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and (3) the trial court did not inquire as to
why Mr. A failed to present evidence. ||| (People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257,
[September 29, 2020])
1. NOTE: The ponente of this case is C.J. Gesmundo.
3. Motion to quash
a. Radaza was charged with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The information was filed
by the Deputy Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan. Later, Radaza filed a motion to
quash, contending that the information must be quashed for lack of the written authority
or approval of the Ombudsman at the time the information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Should the motion to quash be granted?
i. No, it should be denied.
ii. Case law dictates that a handling prosecutor's lack of prior written authority from
the head prosecutor in the filing of an Information does not affect a trial court's
acquisition of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the
accused. Such handling prosecutor who filed an unauthorized Information but
without bad faith or criminal intent is considered as a de facto officer coated with a
color of authority to exercise acts that remain valid and official. If the unauthorized
filing was done with malice, the erring officer may be held criminally or
administratively liable for usurpation of official functions at most. Intentional or
not, this deficiency remains formal, non-jurisdictional, and curable at any stage of
the criminal proceedings.
iii. Here, it should be denied, because the lack of approval of the Ombudsman can be
cured at any time during the criminal proceedings.||| (Radaza v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 201380, [August 4, 2021])
b. Does double jeopardy apply to impeachment proceedings?
i. No, it does not apply.
ii. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. The right against a second conviction for
the same offense shall not be imperiled upon a mere judgment of impeachment.
Suffice it to state that a first jeopardy finds no opportunity to arise at that point, as
the essence of impeachment is not criminal in nature.||| (Re: Ma. Cristina Roco
Corona, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, [January 12, 2021])
c. Is absence of probable cause a ground of a motion to quash under Rule 117?
i. No, Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court lists the grounds for the filing of a
motion to quash which should distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The
grounds under Rule 117 are EXCLUSIVE. ||| (Wu v. People, G.R. Nos. 207220-
21, [March 16, 2022])
4. Examination of witnesses; Suppletory application of the rules on deposition in criminal cases
a. Mr. A, a Filipino was arrested and jailed in Indonesia for trafficking of dangerous drugs.
He was sentenced to die. Hours before his execution, the Philippine Government requested
the Indonesian Government to suspend his execution, because his testimony is vital in the
prosecution of his recruiters and traffickers who are now detained in the Philippines.
Hence, pursuant to its obligations under the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, the
 Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of Mr. A to afford him an
opportunity to present his case against his alleged recruiters and traffickers who were
allegedly responsible for recruiting and exploiting him to engage in drug trafficking. The
Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to the taking of
Mary Jane's testimony, viz.: (a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia; (b) No cameras shall be allowed; (c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be
present; and (d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.
Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of
Complainant Mr. A by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories" with the Regional Trial
Court. The State averred that the taking of Mr. A’s testimony through the use of deposition
upon written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court
because he is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court
due to his imprisonment. The prosecution also pointed out that Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court applies suppletorily in criminal proceedings and the use of deposition upon written
interrogatories in criminal cases is not expressly prohibited under the Rules of Court.
Further, it pointed out that the Supreme Court has allowed dispensation of direct
testimony in open court under the Rules of Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit
Rule. Lastly, the OSG averred that Cristina and Julius will still have an opportunity to
examine Mary Jane by propounding their own set of written interrogatories through the
designated consular officer who will be taking the deposition; Moreover, they were not
precluded from objecting to the questions and answers. Should the motion be granted?
i. Yes, the motion should be granted.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, when it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of
the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending.
Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable
notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the
same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. Meanwhile, a party
desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall
serve them upon every other party with a notice stating the name and address of
the person who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and address of
the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken.
iii. Here, the motion should be granted, because the examination of witness for the
prosecution does not apply because Mr. A is not sick, not infirm, and did not have
to leave the Philippines without definite date of return. However, in light of the
unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the provisions on deposition
shall apply suppletorily in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence,
the taking of testimony of Mr. A through a deposition by written interrogatories
is in order. ||| (People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, [October 9, 2019])
5. Appeals in criminal cases
a. Mr. A was charged before the MTCC with violation of Article 91(B)(3) of PD 1067. The
MTC rendered its decision convicting Mr. A. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s decision. The
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Thus, Mr. A filed a notice of appeal with the CA, in order
to review the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s decision. Did Mr. A avail of the correct
remedy?
i. No, Mr. A availed of the wrong remedy.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, an appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken only by
a petition for review on certiorari, except in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Further, except as
provided in Section 3, Rule 122 regarding appeals in criminal cases where the
 penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal
taken to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal shall be dismissed.
iii. Here, Mr. A availed of the wrong remedy, because he should have filed a petition
for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, and not a notice of appeal to the
CA. ||| (People v. Constantino, G.R. No. 251636, [February 14, 2022])
b. Mr. A and Mr. B were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No.
9165. The RTC ruled that they are guilty for the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision. Mr. A and Mr. B filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Mr. A failed to sign the verification portion of the petition. The Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that Mr. B must be acquitted of the crime
charged. Should Mr. A be acquitted of the crime charged?
i. Yes, Mr. A should also be acquitted of the crime charged.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Further, case law dictates that by
operation of [Section] 11 (a) of Rule 122, a favorable judgment — such as the
acquittal— may benefit a co-accused who did not appeal, even if the conviction of
the latter had already become final and executory."
iii. Here, Mr. A should be acquitted of the crime charged, because he must benefit
from the favorable outcome of the instant petition even if he did not sign its
verification portion.||| (CICL XXX v. People, G.R. No. 230964, [March 2, 2022])
6. Search and Seizure
a. The RTC issued a search warrant which read, in part, as follows: “It appearing to the
satisfaction of the undersigned that after examining under oath by searching questions and
answers PO2 A, there exists a probable cause for Violation of RA 9165 which has been
committed and there is a good sufficient reason to believe that Mr. B has possession and
control of undetermined amount of Metham[pheta]mine Hydrochloride commonly
known as shabu which [he] is keeping and concealing in [his] house at Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab,
San Pedro[,] Laguna. The search was conducted by the police and shabu was found in the
said house. Later, Mr. B filed a motion to quash the search warrant based on the
following grounds: (a) house number 972 did not appear in her home address as stated
in the search warrant; and (b) the search warrant failed to distinguish petitioner's unit,
which was the place intended to be searched, from the other units or rooms representing
the four other households inside the house located in Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro,
Laguna. Did the RTC issue a valid search warrant?
i. Yes, the RTC issued a valid search warrant.
ii. Case law dictates that the test of whether the requirement of definiteness or
particularity has been met is whether the description of the place to be searched
under the warrant is sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a search of
other premises located within the surrounding area or community. Further, the
requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized does not require technical
accuracy in the description of the place to be searched.
iii. Here, the RTC issued a valid search warrant, because the phrase “in his house at
Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna” sufficiently described the place to be
searched to the exclusion of the other two structures or buildings similarly located
along the street of Gitna. The house number of his house is not necessary. Further,
the interior description of the house of Mr. A does not have to be alleged in the
search warrant, since technical accuracy is not required. To require PO2 A to
describe the interior set-up or floor plan of Mr. A’s house would be unreasonable.
(Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 213875, [July 15, 2020])
b. The Executive Judge of RTC Las Piñas issued a search warrant against Emily and Miguel
at their three-storey residence located at No. 12, Pusoy St., Masambong, Quezon City. On
July 15, 1999, at around 9:30 in the morning, PCI Tambungan formed a team and conducted
 the search upon the house located at No. 12, Pusoy St., Masambong, Quezon City. At the
third floor of the house, they found in the shared cabinet of Emily and Miguel sachets of
shabu. The search of the cabinet was conducted in the presence of Miguel and Emily. Are
the seized sachets of shabu admissible in evidence?
i. Yes, the sachets of shabu are admissible in evidence.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall
be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. Further, case law dictates that the Rules of
Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose
presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, a search under the
strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed by the lawful occupant of the
premises sought to be searched. Only upon their absence may two (2) persons of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality be made to stand as their
replacements. This provision of the Rules of Court enforces and protects Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which speaks of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
iii. Here, the sachets of shabu are admissible in evidence, because the police officers
searched the third floor of the house, where they found the sachets of shabu, in the
presence of the lawful occupants of the house.||| (Estores y Pecardal v. People,
G.R. No. 192332, [January 11, 2021])
c. On April 6, 2004, at about 5:45 p.m., members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of
San Fernando, Bukidnon, set up a mobile check point at Purok 4, Sitio Paso, Barangay
Mabuhay, San Fernando, Bukidnon, pursuant to the implementation of COMELEC 8
Resolution No. 6446, 9 imposing the COMELEC gun ban. While conducting the routine
inspection in the check point, the police officers flagged down Mr. A. They asked him for
the Certificate of Registration (CR) and Official Receipt (OR) of his motorcycle. M. A,
however, failed to produce these documents. The law enforcers then became suspicious
and, thus, asked him to open the tools compartment of his motor vehicle. From the tools
compartment, the police officers found five bundles of marijuana placed and wrapped in
a cellophane. The police officers further asked Mr. A to open the compartment under the
driver's seat. Petitioner initially refused but he eventually relented. The search of the
compartment under the driver's seat further yielded several bundles of marijuana. Was
there a valid warrantless search?
i. Yes, there was a valid warrantless search.
ii. Case law dictates that setups of the military or police checkpoints are considered
a variant of searching moving vehicles which are not illegal per se, for as long as
its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way
least intrusive to motorists. Inspections at checkpoints are not violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable searches if limited to the following: (a) the
officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds; (b) simply looks into a vehicle; (c) flashes a light therein
without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a
physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a
visual search or visual inspection; and (e) n where the routine check is conducted
in a fixed area. Thus, checkpoint searches are considered valid as long as it is
limited to a mere routine inspection. However, when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search instead of a mere routine inspection, such search
remains valid as long as the officers who conducted the search have a reasonable
or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In
other words, vehicles may also be stopped to allow authorized personnel to
conduct an extensive search when there is probable cause which justifies a
 reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that either the motorist is a
law offender, or that the contents of the vehicle are, or have been, instruments
of some offense.
iii. Here, there was a valid warrantless search. It is true that the root of the encounter
of the police officers and Mr. A was due to the mobile check point. Thus, the police
officers should have only conducted a visual search. However, the arrest was not
made by reason of the COMELEC gun ban or any traffic violation. Instead, it was
in light of Mr. A's failure to present his OR/CR, which raised suspicions on the
part of the police officers, prompting them to inquire further and look into the
motor vehicle, on the theory that Mr. A might be committing a crime or the motor
vehicle itself is the subject of the crime already committed. Thus, the consequent
search conducted by the police officers, which led to the confiscation of marijuana,
shall be considered valid. ||| (Uy y Sayan v. People, G.R. No. 217097, [February
23, 2022])
EVIDENCE
1. Equipoise rule
a. What is the equipoise rule?
i. Under this rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there
is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden
of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to
produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the
accused of the crime charged is found lacking. ||| (Arriola v. People, G.R. No.
199975, [February 24, 2020])
2. Original document rule
a. In a case for Estafa, the prosecution offered the photocopy of the acknowledgment receipt
signed by the accused showing personal receipt of the sum of money from the private
complainant to prove the amount of damage. Accused objected to the offer of the
photocopy on the sole ground that it is a mere reproduction of the original in violation of
the original document rule. The court overruled the accused’s objection and admitted in
evidence the photocopy of the acknowledgment receipt. Did the court err in admitting the
photocopy? Explain briefly. (2022 Bar Examination)
i. No, the court did not err in admitting the photocopy.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, writing, recording, photograph or other record, no evidence is
admissible other than the original document itself. Further, a "duplicate" is a
counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same
matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or
by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original. Lastly, a duplicate
is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is
raised as to the authenticity of the original, or (2) in the circumstances, it is unjust
or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.
iii. Here, the court did not err in admitting the photocopy, because the photocopy of
the acknowledgement receipt is a counterpart produced by the same impression
as the original or by chemical reproduction which accurately reproduced the
original.
3. Offer of compromise
a. Mr. A sold a property to Mr. B for P10Million. Mr. B paid Mr. A in full. Mr. A did not
deliver the property to Mr. B, and Mr. B later discovered that Mr. A had no authority to
sell the property. Thus, Mr. B filed a complaint for estafa against Mr. A with the office of
the prosecutor. Mr. A was later charged by the prosecutor with the crime of estafa. If Mr.
A will return the full amount of P10Million to Mr. B, will that be considered as an implied
admission of guilt?
i. Yes, it would be considered as an implied admission of guilt.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses
or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission
of guilt.
iii. Here, it would be considered as an implied admission of guilt, because the return
of the money is tantamount to an offer of compromise by the accused in a criminal
case for estafa.||| (Arriola v. People, G.R. No. 199975, [February 24, 2020])
4. Hearsay/Independently relevant statements
a. Mr. A sold a property to Mr. B for P10Million. Mr. A did not deliver the property to Mr. B,
and Mr. B later discovered that Mr. A had no authority to sell the property. Thus, Mr. B
 filed a complaint for estafa against Mr. A with the office of the prosecutor. Later, Mr. A
was charged with estafa. During trial, Mr. C testified for the prosecution. He testified that
he was told by Mr. B that Mr. A had no authority to sell the property. The purpose of the
testimony is to prove that Mr. B made the statement or utterance to Mr. C. Mr. A objected
on the ground that the testimony was hearsay. Is the testimony admissible in evidence?
i. Yes, it is admissible in evidence.
ii. Case law dictates that while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made
by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact
asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose
of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or
falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such statement has
been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown.
This is also called as an independently relevant statement.
iii. Here, it is admissible in evidence, because the purpose of Mr. C’s testimony was
not to prove Mr. A actually had no authority to sell the property, but only to prove
that Mr. B made the statement or utterance. Thus, it was an independently relevant
statement. ||| (Arriola v. People, G.R. No. 199975, [February 24, 2020])
5. Dying declaration v. Part of res gestae
a. Immediately before he died of gunshot wounds to his chest, Venancio told the attending
physician, in a very feeble voice, that it was Arnulfo, his co-worker, who had shot him.
Venancio added that it was also Arnulfo who had shot Vicente, the man whose cadaver
was lying on the bed beside him. In the prosecution of Arnulfo for the criminal killing of
Venancio and Vicente, are all the statements of Venancio admissible as dying declarations?
Explain your answer. (2017 Bar Examination)
i. No, all of the statements of Venacio shall not be admissible as dying declarations.
ii. Under the Rules of Court, the declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death. Further, statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto,
under the stress of excitement caused by the occurrence with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae.
iii. Here, all of the statements of Venacio shall not be admissible as dying declarations.
Venacio’s statement that Arnulfo shot him shall be admissible as a dying
declaration, because (1) he was a dying person, (2) he made it under the
consciousness that he was about to die, (3) it was received in a criminal case
involving his death, and (4) the declaration was about the circumstances of his
death. However, Venacio’s statement that Arnulfo shot Vicente is not a dying
declaration because the declaration was about the circumstances of the death of
Vicente and not him. Instead, it shall be admissible as part of res gestae, because
Venacio made the statement subsequent to the shooting incident, a startling
occurrence, while Venacio was still under the stress of excitement caused by the
said incident.