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D/HQT/18/28/140 Army Code No. 71615

Infantry Tactical Doctrine

Volume 2
The Tactical Employment of
Infantry Weapons and Systems

Pamphlet No. 3
Infantry Anti-Armour Weapons
Medium Range Anti-Tank Guided Weapon — MILAN
Rocket System 94 mm HEAT — LAW

2000
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COPYRIGHT
This work is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publication
belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information con-
tained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmit-
ted in any form outside MOD establishments except as authorized by both the sponsor
and the MOD where appropriate.

SECURITY
This document is issued for the information of such persons who need to know its con-
tents in the course of their official duties. Any person finding this document should hand
it into a British Forces unit or to a British police station for its safe return to the MINISTRY
OF DEFENCE, D MOD SY, LONDON SW1A 2HB, with particulars of how and where
found. THE UNAUTHORIZED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT
COULD BE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS OF 1911–1989.

AUTHORITY
This publication is issued under the overall direction of the CGS. It is an MOD Approved
Code of Practice (ACOP). Where issues of health and safety are concerned it takes into
account the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.

STATUS
The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experi-
ence and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations
and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved
that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you
criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of
health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a per-
son criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary
action under the provisions of the Army Act.

AMENDMENTS
Amdt No. Date Amdt No. Date Amdt No. Date

DISTRIBUTION
(See page vi)
FOR THE ATTENTION OF ALL SCALE HOLDERS
Units requiring an increase or decrease to their scale should apply to DGD&D,
Publications who will arrange for a revised distribution. Any request to exceed the scale
must be supported by a written justification which is to be referred by DGD&D to HQ
Infantry for approval.

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RESTRICTED Army Code No. 71615
D/HQT/18/28/140

Infantry Tactical Doctrine Volume 2

The Tactical Employment of Infantry Weapons
and Systems
Pamphlet No. 3
Infantry Anti-Armour Weapons
Medium Range Anti-Tank Guided
Weapon — MILAN
Rocket System 94 mm HEAT
— LAW
Prepared under the direction

of the Chief of the General Staff

Ministry of Defence

MAY 2000

Crown Copyright Reserved

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The Infantry Mission is —

‘to close with and engage the enemy in concert with

other arms, in all operational theatres and environments,
in order to bring about his defeat’.

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FOREWORD

1. The development of doctrine is a continuous process and the information con-

tained in the series of Infantry Doctrine Publications will naturally be subject to
change. This change will either be driven from higher level developments or from
field experience. Any person wishing to propose amendments to the pamphlets in
Volumes 1 and 2 is strongly encouraged to write to SO2 TD, Force Development
Branch, Headquarters Infantry, Warminster Training Centre, Warminster, Wiltshire,
BA12 0DJ. All proposals will be considered for submission to the Infantry Doctrine
Working Group. Other queries should be made to Infantry Publications (same
address), ATN Warminster Mil ext 2325/2452.

2. Infantry Doctrine forms part of a coherent hierarchy of doctrine publications.

Associated publications are: British Defence Doctrine; The British Military Doctrine;
ADP Volume 1 — Operations; ADP Volume 2 — Command; AFM Volume 1 Part 2 —
Battlegroup Tactics; Army Unit SOPs, and the Tactical Aide Memoire. British Army
Review, Army Training and Doctrine News and The Infantryman provide current
thought and discussion on doctrine matters.

3. Individuals should first read the Introduction on page xi which explains the aim,
layout and scope of this pamphlet as well as the structure and breakdown of Infantry
Tactical Doctrine Publications.

4. This is a new pamphlet and should be issued with its own binder.

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DISTRIBUTION
(Also see note below)

HQs Commands, Divisions, Brigades and Directorates

(less HQ Infantry) — 2 copies each
Infantry
HQ Infantry/Infantry Reps and LOs — 10 copies
Regular Infantry Battalions — 17 copies each
TA Infantry Battalions equipped with MILAN — 14 copies each
Remainder TA Infantry Battalions — 5 copies each
Independent/Detached Infantry Companies — 2 copies each
AITAT (G) — 5 copies
SAS Regiments — 5 copies each
HQ SASC and TAGs — 2 copies each
Training Centres/Schools
HQ School of Infantry — 2 copies
ITC Wales — 70 copies
ITC Warminster — 120 copies
ITC Catterick — 10 copies
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst — 5 copies
CATC (for distr to CAS CACTG as required) — 20 copies
DGD&D — LW1 — 2 copies
JSCSC — 10 copies
AJD (JSCSC) — 10 copies
BATUS — 5 copies
Other Arms and Services
RAC Regiments — 1 copy each
RM Commandos — 17 copies each
RM Reserve — 2 copies each
CTC RM — 25 copies each
RAF Regt Sqns (incl RAF Honington) — 2 copies each

Note:
The previous system of A to F scaling is being phased out for GSTPs. Units will in
future receive a specific initial entitlement as decided by the sponsor.

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CONTENTS

Page

Foreword ..................................................................................................... v
Distribution .................................................................................................. vi
Contents ...................................................................................................... vii
List of Illustrations ....................................................................................... ix
Introduction ................................................................................................. xi

CHAPTER 1. — THE FUNDAMENTALS

Section 1. — The Principles .................................................................... 1-1

Section 2. — Operational Guidelines ...................................................... 1-5
Section 3. — Command .......................................................................... 1-9
Section 4. — Combat Service Support ................................................... 1-11
Annex A. — Anti-Armour Ambushes ..................................................... 1A–1

CHAPTER 2. — ANTI-ARMOUR PLANNING ................................... 2-1

Annex A. — Killing Area Guidelines ...................................................... 2A-1

Annex B. — Anti-Armour Overlay and Attached Notes ......................... 2B-1
Annex C. — Atk Platoon Commander’s Briefing Notes ......................... 2C-1
Annex D. — MILAN Visibility Overlay .................................................... 2D-1

CHAPTER 3. — MRATGW — THE BASICS

Section 1. — The Weapon System ......................................................... 3–1

Section 2. — The Atk Platoon ................................................................. 3–2
Section 3. — Deployment Guidelines ..................................................... 3-5
Section 4. — Generic Battle Procedure .................................................. 3-7
Annex A. — Technical Details — MILAN and MILAN Infra Red
Adaptor (MIRA) .................................................................. 3A-1
Annex B. — Generic Deliberate Battle Procedure ................................. 3B-1
Annex C. — Generic Hasty Battle Procedure ........................................ 3C-1
Annex D. — Duties and Brief Formats for the Atk Platoon .................... 3D-1

CHAPTER 4. — MRATGW — SITING AND COORDINATION

Section 1. — Siting .................................................................................. 4-1

Section 2. — Coordination ...................................................................... 4-6

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Page

CHAPTER 5. — MRATGW — FIRE CONTROL ............................... 5–1

CHAPTER 6. — MRATGW — OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ........... 6–1

CHAPTER 7. — MRATGW — DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS .......... 7–1

Annex A. — MILAN Battle Trench Including Provision for OHP
Using SHS Sheets and Chatham Arch .............................. 7A-1
Appendix 1. — MILAN Battle Trench — Stores (Inc OHP) and
Components of Chatham Arch .................................. 7A1-1
Appendix 2. — Other Options ............................................................ 7A2-1

CHAPTER 8. — MRATGW — DELAYING OPERATIONS ............ 8-1

CHAPTER 9. — MRATGW — TRANSITIONAL PHASES

Section 1. — Advance to Contact ........................................................... 9-1
Section 2. — Meeting Engagement ........................................................ 9-5
Section 3. — Withdrawal ......................................................................... 9-5

CHAPTER 10. — MRATGW — OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC

ENVIRONMENTS
Section 1. — Crossing and Breaching Obstacles ................................... 10-1
Section 2. — OBUA/FIBUA ..................................................................... 10-2
Section 3. — Operations in Woods and Forests (OIWF) ........................ 10-4
Section 4. — Operations in Conditions of Limited Visibility .................... 10-4
Section 5. — Operations in an NBC Environment .................................. 10-5

CHAPTER 11. — THE ARMOURED INFANTRY ANTI-TANK

PLATOON ....................................................................................... 11-1

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Page

CHAPTER 12. — SHORT RANGE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS —

94 mm LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPON

Section 1. — The Weapon ...................................................................... 12-1

Section 2. — Organization ...................................................................... 12-2
Section 3. — Deployment Guidelines ..................................................... 12-3
Section 4. — Offensive Operations ......................................................... 12-7
Section 5 — Defensive Operations ........................................................ 12-10
Section 6. — Operations in Specific Environments ................................. 12-18

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure No

1 Lead Vehicle Method .............................................................. 5-4

2 Key Point Method .................................................................... 5-4
3 Delaying with Armour — Fixing .............................................. 8-3
4 Delaying with Armour — Deception ........................................ 8-3
5 Leap-Frogging ......................................................................... 8-4
6 Caterpillar ................................................................................ 8-6
7 Suggested Advance Guard Drills ............................................ 9-3
7a. During the Advance ......................................................... 9-3
7b. On Contact ....................................................................... 9-3
8 LAW Sited for Maximum Effect ............................................... 12-4
9 A Defilade Position .................................................................. 12-5
10 Layout of a LAW Anti-Armour Matrix ...................................... 12-12
11 Possible Section Anti-Armour Ambush ................................... 12-16
12 Withdrawal Sequence for Section Anti-Armour Ambush ........ 12-19

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INFANTRY TACTICAL DOCTRINE

VOLUME 2
THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY WEAPONS
AND SYSTEMS

Pamphlet No. 3

ANTI-TANK GUIDED WEAPONS MILAN

INTRODUCTION

Aim Contents

1. The aim of this pamphlet is to provide a CHAPTER 1. — THE FUNDAMENTALS

guide to the planning and conduct of CHAPTER 2. — ANTI-ARMOUR PLANNING
infantry anti-armour operations. It links the CHAPTER 3. — MRATGW — THE BASICS
planning of operations at battlegroup and CHAPTER 4. — MRATGW — SITING AND
sub-unit levels and lays down the generic COORDINATION

guidelines for the tactical employment of CHAPTER 5. — MRATGW — FIRE CONTROL

MRATGW MILAN and the Rocket System CHAPTER 6. — MRATGW — OFFENSIVE

94 mm HEAT — LAW.
2. The pamphlet is based on AFM Volume
1 Combined Arms Operations, Part 2,
Battlegroup Tactics and Infantry Tactical
Doctrine, Volume 1, The Infantry Company
Group, Pamphlet Nos. 1, 2 and 3. It also
subsumes all Infantry Anti-Armour (MILAN
and 94 mm — LAW) TD Notes and various
precis issued by the Anti-Tank Division, ITC
Warminster.
OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 7. — MRATGW — DEFENSIVE
OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 8. — MRATGW — DELAYING
OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 9. — MRATGW — TRANSITIONAL
PHASES
CHAPTER 10. — MRATGW — OPERATIONS IN
SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS
CHAPTER 11. — THE ARMOURED INFANTRY ANTI-
TANK PLATOON
CHAPTER 12. — SHORT RANGE ANTI-TANK
WEAPONS — 94 mm LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPON

Usage

3. The pamphlet is designed for use at three levels: the first part (Chapters 1 and 2)
provides sufficient knowledge for battlegroup and sub-unit staff to plan and conduct
infantry anti-armour operations. The middle part (Chapters 3 to 11) contains
information that an anti-tank platoon needs to conduct operations in support of either
a battlegroup or sub-unit. The final part (Chapter 12) gives the information needed by
those persons required to plan and/or conduct anti-armour operations using the LAW.

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4. The principles, procedures and tactics outlined in this pamphlet are necessarily
generic. Units should use them as a baseline from which to develop tactics relevant to
their particular role and theatre of operations.

5. The weapon drills and technical details for MILAN and the 94 mm LAW are to be
found in Infantry Training, Volume VI, Pamphlet No. 27 for MILAN and Volume III,
Pamphlet No. 14 for the 94 mm HEAT — LAW.

Structure of Infantry Tactical Doctrine Publications

6. The Doctrine Hierarchy. The Doctrine Hierarchy ensures that Army doctrine
cascades from policy and principles to practical applications and procedures. There
are three elements to the hierarchy:

a. Principles. Principles are the guiding doctrine that is concerned with

operational art and the British outlook on operations is contained in British
Defence Doctrine (JWP 0–01). From this overarching publication is derived
British Military Doctrine (BMD), Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs) and various
Joint publications. Allied publications, such as ATP–35(B), also describe prin-
ciples.

b. Practices. The practical application of tactical doctrine for field comman-

ders at formation and battlegroup level are contained in Army Field Manuals
(AFMs). The Infantry tactical doctrine contained in this new series of pamphlets
lies between practices and procedures.

c. Procedures. Procedures are the mechanics that ensure the success of

operations. At Army level procedures are detailed in publications such as
AFSOPs, AUSOPs and TAM. Infantry procedures are detailed in a new range
of pamphlets called Infantry Tactical Publications.

7. Infantry Doctrine Development. The Director of Infantry is charged by the

Chief of the General Staff with the development of Infantry tactical doctrine at com-
pany level and below. Development of this doctrine is the responsibility of the Infantry
Force Development Committee (IFDC) whose aim is to integrate the five functional
areas of Infantry Fighting Power: doctrine, equipment, structures, training and man-
power and logistics. Each of these functional areas is represented by a Working
Group whose aim is to provide advice and guidance to the IFDC in their area, in con-
junction with the Force Development branch of Headquarters Infantry.

8. Infantry Tactical Doctrine. Infantry tactical doctrine has been defined as ‘tac-
tical doctrine to provide guidance to company commanders by detailing Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) appropriate to their level of tactical command’.

9. Publications. The structure of Infantry tactical doctrine and training publica-

tions has been rationalized and will now be broken down into two parts — Infantry

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Tactical Doctrine and Infantry Training — each divided into a number of volumes fur-
ther sub-divided into pamphlets.

a. Infantry Tactical Doctrine. Infantry tactical doctrine consists of two vol-

umes: Volume 1 — The Infantry Company Group; Volume 2 — The Tactical
Employment of Infantry Weapons and Systems.

b. Infantry Training Publications. Infantry training publications consists of a

number of volumes concerning skill at arms, ranges, support weapons, signals
training and vehicles and vehicle mounted weapon systems.

Breakdown of Infantry Tactical Doctrine Publications

10. Infantry tactical doctrine is contained in two volumes:

a. Volume 1 — The Infantry Company Group.

b. Volume 2 — The Tactical Employment of Infantry Weapons and Systems.

11. The detailed breakdown of the pamphlets is as follows:

a. Volume 1 — The Infantry Company Group.

Pamphlet
Title
No

1 The Infantry Company Group — The Fundamentals

2 Infantry Company Group Tactics

3 Infantry Platoon Tactics

4 Armoured Infantry Company Group Tactics

5 Infantry Company Group Jungle Tactics

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b. Volume 2 — The Tactical Employment of Infantry Weapons and Systems.

Pamphlet
Title
No

1 Infantry Tactical Doctrine Notes

2 The Medium Mortar — 81 mm L16

3 Infantry Anti-Armour Weapons:

Medium Range Anti-Tank Guided Weapon — MILAN

and Rocket System 94 mm HEAT — LAW

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Chapter 1

THE FUNDAMENTALS

SECTION 1. — THE PRINCIPLES

0101. Despite the end of the Cold War and Contents

the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Page
number of MBTs continues to increase and it SECTION 1. — THE PRINCIPLES 1-1
is assessed that by 2010 there will be in SECTION 2. — OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES 1-5
excess of 150,000 MBTs worldwide. At the SECTION 3. — COMMAND 1-9
same time UK’s deployable armour has SECTION 4. — COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1-11
been decreasing. Therefore, it can be
concluded that not only should the Infantry Annex:
expect to fight armour during most A. Anti-Armour Ambushes
operational deployments, but also that
infantry anti-armour weapons will increase in importance as the Army moves towards
greater strategic mobility.

0102. Anti-Armour Operations (AAO). AAO are designed specifically for the
destruction of enemy armour by a combined arms battlegroup and are applicable to all
operations of war, including Peace Support Operations. AAO may be the main effort
of a battlegroup operation (e.g., the destruction of a specific enemy force) or they may
be carried out to protect the force to enable it to complete its mission (e.g., flank
protection). AAO are always subordinate to battlegroup operations and should be
conducted within the framework of Combined Arms Operations — Battlegroup
Tactics.

0103. Infantry Anti-Armour Weapons. The Infantry possess their own anti-
armour weapons which can be used offensively to cause maximum attrition or
defensively for force protection. These are:

a. MILAN. The infantry battalion's anti-tank (Atk) platoon provides its

integrated Medium Range Anti-Tank Guided Weapon (MRATGW). MILAN has a
range of between 400 – 1950 metres with an ideal battle range of 800 – 1800
metres. The system is remarkably accurate out to maximum range. The K115
warhead will penetrate up to 750 mm Rolled Homogeneous Armour (RHA); its
penetration is severely reduced by Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA). Its visual
and thermal signatures are small and it is almost undetectable when well sited.
The rate of fire is slow, an average of three missiles per minute, and the operator
must be exposed throughout the engagement which can be up to twelve
seconds. The system is manportable but at 70 kgs for a ‘fighting post’ (MILAN
firing post, MIRA sight, 2 x missiles and 2 x LAWs) it is a heavy load; the system
relies on a weapons carrier to sustain it in battle.

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b. LAW. All troops in the battlegroup should have access to LAW. It has a
range of between 25 – 500 metres. However, its accuracy reduces with range
and a realistic maximum range for use against moving targets is 300 metres.
LAW will penetrate up to 700 mm RHA but its effect is severely reduced by ERA.
It weights 10.4 kg, which restricts the movement and agility of the firer. The
launch signature is prominent and can be slow to disperse.

0104. Principles for the Employment of Infantry Anti-Armour Weapons. Important

considerations in the tactical employment of anti-armour weapons are:

a. Selection of the Task. Battlegroup planning staff must consider all the
characteristics of the weapons when assigning fire units to tasks. In general
each fire unit can only fulfil one task at a time. The following are likely tasks for
anti-armour weapons, which could be carried out, at either battlegroup or sub-
unit level:

(1) Fixing Operations. Infantry anti-armour weapons are ideally suited

to fixing the enemy, providing armour and aviation with manoeuvre space.
This will normally be achieved through the destruction of the enemy's
reconnaissance, leading element or forces attempting to pivot from a
flank.

(2) Strike Operations. In certain circumstances infantry anti-armour

weapons will have to be used for strike operations. They will require
MILAN in open country and LAW in close or built up terrain. Strike tasks
are carried out as ambushes or offensive patrols combining aviation (if
available) ATGW, LAW and indirect fire.

(3) Surveillance Operations. MILAN has an effective thermal sight and

should be incorporated into the STAP. If the armoured threat is high,
MILAN must be sited for that role carrying out surveillance as appropriate.
However, when the armoured threat is low MILAN should be fully utilized
for observation.

(4) Force Protection. Concurrent with all operations is the requirement

to use anti-armour weapons for force protection. This type of operation will
be carried out by all troops throughout the depth of the battlefield. The
primary weapon used for force protection will be LAW.

b. Concentration of Fire. Concentrated firepower will result from a

combination of the number of rounds fired per minute, the number of hits on
target and the hit/kill probability. Due to MILAN's slow rate of fire, LAW's limited
accuracy and the limited mobility of both systems, sufficient fire units must be
allocated to Killing Areas (KAs) in advance of the engagement to achieve the
planned effect.

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c. Siting. The characteristics of anti-armour weapons mean that they must

be carefully sited to ensure they can engage the vulnerable flanks and rear of
modern MBTs, thereby significantly improving the chances of a kill. They must
also remain concealed to ensure that they are not detected and destroyed by
MBTs or indirect fire before opening fire. It is therefore critical that anti-armour
weapons are sited in defilade to achieve maximum effect. Siting is a time
consuming business but in general the more time allocated to siting positions
the more effective they will be and the greater their survivability.

d. Coordination. AAO do not stand alone and must be coordinated with

other battlegroup activities to achieve maximum effect. The following areas are
critical:

(1) Information. In general anti-armour weapons will not be observing

forward of their KAs. It is therefore essential that they are made aware of
the movements of both friendly and enemy forces close to their KAs. This
should ensure speedy engagements and reduce the risk of fratricide.

(2) Armour. The movement and engagements of armour must be

coordinated to ensure maximum destruction of the enemy and to prevent
fratricide. If friendly armour is planning to move through KAs then anti-
armour fire must be tightly controlled.

(3) Obstacles. Maximum use should be made of obstacles to channel

the enemy into selected KAs. Obstacles should also be used to slow and
disrupt enemy movement through KAs in order to allow sufficient
engagement time for anti-armour weapons.

(4) Indirect Fire. Enemy forces will be slowed and disrupted by indirect
fire making easier targets for anti-armour weapons. Indirect fire will also
be invaluable for supporting movement, particularly the extraction of
forces, providing mutual support and the destruction of the enemy once
the anti-armour engagement is complete. However, indirect fire must be
tightly controlled to prevent it obscuring the enemy during an anti-armour
engagement.

(5) Direct Fire. Direct fire from GPMG (SF), HMG and infantry
company positions should be used to provide a protective envelope for Atk
weapons. Infantry companies should also be used to complete the
destruction of immobilised armour through aggressive patrolling.

e. Engagement Priorities. In order to achieve maximum shock and attrition

with minimum ammunition expenditure, priorities of engagement must be
allocated across battlegroups and sub-units. Engagement priorities must be
based on the threat, the battlegroup/sub-unit capability, concept of operations
and the manoeuvrist approach.

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f. Responsibilities for AAO. The responsibilities for planning and

conducting AAO within battlegroups and sub-units are shown below:

(1) Battlegroup Commander. The battlegroup commander is

responsible for the outline anti-armour plan, which should be articulated in
his concept of operations. Ultimately, he is also responsible for ensuring
that sub-units comply with the anti-armour plan.

(2) Battlegroup Staff. The battlegroup chief of staff is responsible for

the overall coordination of the anti-armour plan.

(3) Atk Platoon Commander. The Atk platoon commander, or his 2IC,
is the battlegroup commander's anti-armour adviser who will conduct the
detailed planning and coordination for battlegroup infantry anti-armour
weapons. He is also responsible for the control of battlegroup Atk sections
during battle and the command of the Atk platoon when deployed as a
formed group.

(4) Sub-Unit Commanders. The responsibility for planning and

conducting AAO to meet a sub-unit mission are the responsibilities of the
sub-unit commander. Sub-unit commanders must also be able to advise
battlegroup commanders of their own anti-armour capability when
required.

(5) Atk Section Commanders. The detailed siting, coordination and

command of the Atk sections is carried out by the Atk section
commanders. They are also responsible for assisting sub-unit
commanders plan AAO and for providing advice on the deployment of
MILAN and LAW.

(6) Rifle Platoon Commander. The detailed siting, coordination and

command of LAW within the rifle platoons are the responsibility of the rifle
platoon commander.

0105 – 0106. Reserved.

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SECTION 2. — OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

0107. MILAN. Every infantry battalion of the Regular Army is currently

established with an Atk platoon whose purpose is to provide a dedicated medium
range capability. The Atk platoon establishment varies according to the battalion's
role. The current ORBATs are summarized below:

Other Major
Role Size Distribution Remarks
Equipment
Armoured 12 MILAN 1 x Atk Pl 8 x Warrior
1 + 47 2 x Spartan
2 x Atk sects of 3
dets
Mechanized 12 MILAN 1 x Atk Pl 8 x Saxon
1 + 41 2 x TUH
2 x Atk sects of 3
dets
Air Assault 24 MILAN Rifle Coys Orbat is still
1 sect of 3 MILAN being developed
Man Sp Pls (x3)
1 sect of 3 MILAN
2 MILAN in Pl HQ
Light Role 12 MILAN 1 x Atk Pl 2 x TUL
1 + 41 6 x TUM
2 x Atk sects of 3 2 x TUH
dets
RM 24 MILAN 1 x Atk Tp 12 x BV 206
Commando 1 + 86 7 x Pinzgauer
4 x Atk sects of 6
MILAN

0108. LAW. LAW is an all arms weapon and should therefore be deployed with all
groups operating in the close battlefield. The first line scales of LAW vary depending
on the role and operation. However, it should be deployed with all rifle platoons and
the Atk platoon for offensive action and to other elements of the battlegroup, including
the attached CSS elements, for self defence.

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0109. Outline Operational Tasks. An overview of tasks for anti-armour weapons

is shown in the following tables:
a. Offensive Operations.

Task Comment
Security of FUP MILAN and LAW should be deployed to protect the FUP prior
and firebase to an attack. If MILAN is not required for fire support it can be
used to protect armour in the firebase.
Fire support MILAN can be used to fix or strike vehicles and strongpoints.
It must be sited to achieve best effect on the objective. LAW
can be used to provide fire support during the fight through.
MILAN can be used to vector the assaulting force on to the
objective.
Cutoffs To prevent either a withdrawal or reinforcement of the objec-
tive, MILAN should make use of its range to dominate ground
while LAW is deployed in short term ambushes.
Flank protection MILAN should be used to secure open flanks and likely
enemy counterattack routes.
Hasty defence LAW provides immediate local anti-armour defence. MILAN
follows up assault to provide battlegroup defence.

b. Defensive Operations.

Task Comment
Anti-armour frame- In positional defence MILAN and LAW are sited to provide a
work matrix of mutually supporting KAs. In mobile defence MILAN will
be targeted against specific TAIs. All anti-armour assets can be
used to channel the enemy into the main battlegroup KA.
Protection of sub- LAW is the primary weapon used for this purpose. MILAN can
units. be used to provide depth to a position.
Protection of key MILAN should be sited to cover the main approaches while
points LAW provides point defence.
Flank protection MILAN will cover battlegroup flanks while LAW protects sub-
unit.
Covering force MILAN can provide observation and anti-armour overwatch to a
screen. MILAN and LAW can conduct anti-armour operations
as part of a guard force providing it is triggered by the recon-
naissance element.
Counterdesant In the presence of a desant threat MILAN can be tasked to
cover potential HLS. However, this is not an ideal role and other
battlegroup assets should be considered first.

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c. Delaying Operations.

Task Comment
Screen force MILAN should provide anti-armour overwatch and observa-
tion.

False front or delay-

ing force MILAN may operate either as sections, platoons or with sub-
units in the delaying action. Consideration should be given to
grouping MILAN, GPMG (SF) and/or HMG together to pro-
vide additional manoeuvre sub-units. LAW must be deployed
in ambush to dominate close country.

Flank protection MILAN will cover battlegroup flanks while LAW protects sub-
unit.

Break clean MILAN, in conjunction with GPMG (SF)/HMG and indirect fire
support, assist the break clean of another force, making use
of maximum range.

d. Transitional Phases.

Task Comment
Advance MILAN can be employed to provide overwatch for the screen
or an anti-armour capability for the advance or flank guard.
LAW provides immediate anti-armour defence for the sub-
units.

Meeting engage- MILAN and LAW should be deployed early to fix the enemy
ment either frontally or on the flanks.

Withdrawal MILAN should be deployed with the security element when it

is planned for armour to withdraw early. Consideration should
be given to grouping MILAN, GPMG (SF) and/or HMG
together to provide additional manoeuvre sub-units to secure
intermediate positions. LAW must be deployed in ambush to
dominate close country.

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0110. Anti-Armour Ambushes. An anti-armour ambush is a strike operation

against a predicted enemy force aimed at causing maximum attrition. Each ambush is
conducted against a single Target Area of Interest (TAI) defined by the battlegroup
IPB, to disrupt or dislocate the enemy’s operations. They may be conducted in any
operation of war, either as deliberate or hasty tasks, at battlegroup, sub-unit, platoon
or section level. Anti-armour ambushes are covered in detail in Annex A to this
chapter.
0111. Integration with STAP. MILAN and LAW will be deployed to observe TAIs
and will therefore be an important part of the battlegroup STAP. Integration of these
systems with the STAP is the responsibility of battlegroup HQ and will usually take
place once anti-armour coordination is complete. The Atk platoon commander is
responsible for producing the visibility overlay for MILAN.
0112. Deployment Guidelines. Infantry anti-armour systems are less flexible in
their deployment than armoured systems. The following are the essential steps in
their deployment:
a. Production of an Anti-Armour Plan. The anti-armour planning process
runs in parallel with battlegroup planning. The production of an initial anti-
armour plan can take up to two hours, although this may have to be curtailed
during hasty operations. Anti-armour planning is covered in detail in Chapter 2.
b. Siting and Coordination. In order to produce the most effective anti-
armour plan the weapons must be correctly sited and coordinated. This process
will take place after the initial plan has been produced and can take up to two
hours depending on the terrain.
c. Transit Time. An honest assessment must be made of the time taken to
move from one firing position to another. Movement may be conducted using
tracks, wheels, helicopters or on foot. Where possible transit routes should be
reconnoitred and rehearsed. The transit time must be recorded at the relevant
headquarters where it will be incorporated into the Decision Support Overlay
(DSO).
d. Action Time. The time taken to get the weapon from its transit position to
its fighting position, ready to fire or vice versa, is known as action time:
(1) MILAN. The time taken to get MILAN detachments into and out of
action is a combination of the time required to unload the vehicle and time
to move on foot to the firing position. A MILAN post with the basic fighting
load of two missiles should be in action within ten minutes, although a
further three minutes should be allowed for additional multiples of four
missiles (i.e., in action with basic load ten minutes, in action with fourteen
missiles per detachment — twenty-one minutes).
(2) LAW. The same principles apply for LAW, although the time is
generally considerably shorter.

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e. Protection. MILAN and LAW positions are likely to be subjected to both

indirect and small arms fire. They will require time to dig shell scrapes and battle
trenches to enhance their protection. The following are useful guidelines:

Field Defence Time Comment

Shell scrape 30 minutes

Battle trench 3 men 2–5 hours using Excavation by LWT takes approxi-
Stage 1 explosives and hand mately 20 minutes
excavation

Battle trench 3 men 12–14 hours using Includes revetted ammunition and
Stage 2 explosives and hand shelter bays
excavation

Battle trench 3 men 18–20 hours using Construction of Chatham Arch 4

Stage 3 with explosives and hand men 2 hours using sandbags or 1
Chatham Arch excavation hour using Geoweb

0113 – 0114. Reserved.

SECTION 3. — COMMAND

0115. Ownership. In order to create the required tempo of operations, anti-

armour weapons must be commanded and applied at the level at which they are
expected to influence the battle. In general the following apply:

a. MRATGW. Currently MILAN is the Infantry's longest range anti-armour

weapon and it is therefore usually employed on the battlegroup anti-armour
mission. In these circumstances the Atk sections are owned by the battlegroup
commander and commanded by the Atk platoon commander. At times Atk sec-
tions may be allocated to sub-unit commanders to allow them to complete their
missions. In these circumstances the sub-unit commander owns the sections
and commands them through the Atk section commander.

b. LAW. As a short range weapon LAW is normally deployed on the sub-

unit anti-armour mission. In these circumstances the LAW teams are owned by
the sub-unit commander and commanded by his subordinates. At times LAW
teams may be employed on the battlegroup anti-armour mission. In these cir-
cumstances the battlegroup commander owns the teams. If they remain
deployed in a sub-unit's area of operations (AOR) they should be commanded
by that sub-unit; if they are deployed outside a sub-unit AOR they should be
commanded by the Atk platoon commander.

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0116. Communications. Good communications to the correct level of command

are essential to ensure the efficient passage of critical information, battle space
awareness and rapid response. As a guide the following should apply:

a. MRATGW. The Atk platoon should operate its own command net at all
times. This ensures that orders and information can be passed quickly between
the detachments and platoon headquarters. The section commanders should
operate on the battlegroup command net when employed on a battlegroup task
and the sub-unit command net when allocated to a sub-unit.

b. LAW. LAW teams should operate on the net that gives them best
communications to their sub-unit. If LAW is deployed in support of the
battlegroup mission the teams should utilize the Atk platoon command net and
link to the nearest Atk section.

0117. The Mission. Every anti-armour group must have an unambiguous anti-
armour mission stating what it is to achieve, where it is to achieve it and why it is to
achieve it.

0118. Orders for Opening Fire. Fire control is vital, to avoid jeopardising security,
to cause the maximum impact on the enemy and to avoid the engagement of our own
forces. Responsibility for the order to open fire must be clearly defined; in principle it
should be held at the highest level commensurate with the threat and the need to
maintain operational flexibility. Every soldier manning an anti-armour weapon must
know the following:

a. Where to Fire. Each weapon system must know precisely within which
area it can fire. This is defined by a left and right of arc, a near and far limit and
any restricted areas. In general this will be shown on a range or battle card but
during mobile operations may be passed over the radio or by face to face
briefings.

b. When to Fire. All engagements fall into three categories:

(1) Self Defence. Fire may only be opened in self defence.

(2) Weapons Tight. Fire may only be opened when the vehicles are
positively identified as enemy. It allows freedom to engage the enemy as
early as possible but is only applicable to those troops with a high standard
of AFV recognition.

(3) Weapons Free. Any vehicle that is not positively identified as

friendly may be engaged. This allows massive freedom of action but can
lead to fratricide. This level of fire control should only be used when battle
space awareness is good or engagement ranges are likely to be short. All
friendly troops must be aware of weapons free areas and avoid them.

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(4) Countersurveillance Control Measures (CSCM). In order to

maintain OPSEC additional fire control measures will be issued by
battlegroup headquarters as CSCMs. These override tactical fire control
measures.

c. What to Engage. Each system must understand its engagement

priorities.

0119 – 0120. Reserved.

SECTION 4. — COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

0121. Integrating CSS. The anti-armour plan will not succeed without fully
integrated CSS and the battlegroup commander must ensure that the plan is
sustainable at every stage of its execution. The Battlegroup Logistic Officer (BGLogO)
is responsible for conducting the battlegroup CSS estimate, which should include the
requirements to support the anti-armour plan. There is no dedicated CSS support for
the Atk platoons so all assets must be drawn from either the sub-units or battlegroup
echelon.

0122. Combat Supplies. Stocks of both MILAN and LAW ammunition are likely to
be limited and careful consideration must be given to their distribution. Decisions will
need to be taken concerning the distribution of anti-armour ammunition across the
battlegroup to ensure that the conduct of operations remains as flexible as possible
while husbanding valuable ammunition natures. The split of ammunition carried in the
F, A1 and A2 echelons needs to be defined and will depend on the threat and the
tactical plan. Ground dumping should be considered and balanced against the
potential loss of any predumped ammunition. The policy for the abandonment/
destruction of ammunition must be clear.

0123. Replenishment. Anti-armour assets are moved to meet the threat and are
therefore liable to be regrouped at relatively short notice. This may put them inside the
battlegroup's CSS decision cycle. It is important that the Atk platoon 2IC, sub-unit
headquarters and the supporting echelon keeps track of any regrouping or movement
on the battlefield to ensure that replenishment can take place. The responsibility for
the replenishment of anti-armour groups depends on the task organization and must
be clearly defined prior to operations.

0124. Equipment Support (ES). Mobility is critical to maintain responsiveness

during all operations. The importance of the anti-armour plan in achieving the
battlegroup mission will govern the priority for ES for anti-armour weapons and
vehicles. The responsibility for the support of anti-armour groups depends on the task
organization and must be clearly defined prior to operations.

0125. Medical Support. Anti-armour groups are responsible for evacuating their
casualties to the nearest CAP or RAP.

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ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 1

ANTI-ARMOUR AMBUSHES

General

1. An anti-armour ambush is a strike operation against a predicted enemy force in

order to cause maximum attrition. Each ambush is conducted against a single Target
Area of Interest (TAI), defined by the battlegroup IPB, to disrupt or dislocate the
enemy's operations. They may be conducted in any operation of war either as delib-
erate or hasty tasks. Anti-armour ambushes require careful planning and skilful exe-
cution to achieve the necessary shock action for success.

Principles

2. The basic principles are:

a. Intelligence. Anti-armour ambushes must be based on sound intelligence

underpinned by a thorough understanding of the enemy's forces and tactical
techniques. Ambushes must be targeted against predicted enemy routes,
based on IPB, and the movement of enemy forces should be tracked using for-
mation or battlegroup ISTAR assets.

b. Surprise. Surprise is essential if the ambush is to achieve the shock

action necessary to fulfil its mission. Careful planning, reconnaissance, the
application of good CSCM and sound fieldcraft are all essential if the ambush
is to avoid compromise.

c. Coordinated Fire Plan. The coordination of all arms is essential to ensure

that maximum firepower is concentrated into KAs at the appropriate time. The
use of aviation, MILAN, LAW, RGGS, GPMG (SF), obstacles, demolitions and
mines, indirect fire and small arms needs to be carefully planned. The charac-
teristics of each weapon must to be considered, however the principles of sit-
ing remain extant. This will lead to the development of a coordinated fire plan,
for example: engineer support to canalise the enemy into KAs, MRATGW ini-
tiating the attrition of enemy vehicles while short range weapons provide local
protection, GPMG (SF) to destroy the dismounted infantry, aviation to continue
the anti-armour attrition followed by indirect fire to cover the withdrawal.This
can be more clearly shown in the form of a synchronisation matrix:

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H – 30 H HOUR H + 10 H + 15 H + 20
Obstacle plan
MRATGW
SR ATk
GPMG (SF)
AVIATION
FIRE PLAN

d. Control. Anti-armour ambushes require effective command, control and

communications. The level of command and ownership will depend upon the
size and importance of the task. The anti-armour ambush could be conducted
at battlegroup level and be commanded by the Atk platoon commander, at sub-
unit level with Atk elements attached, or at rifle platoon level using LAW.
Communications must be effective between all the elements of the operation.
Troops taking part must be fully briefed and key stages of the operation should
be rehearsed. The ambush commander needs to be located where he can best
influence the battle.

e. Simplicity. A simple plan based on a clear concept of operations needs

to be developed. It must be briefed to all commanders and if possible to all
those taking part. Everyone must have a clear understanding of his role and
task within the anti-armour ambush. Sufficient consideration needs to be given
to the conduct of the ambush and, in particular, the method of initiation and fire
control.

Layout and Grouping

3. The type of ambush will depend on the mission, the task organization, the enemy
tactics and the ground. A basic linear ambush might be used to cover an MSR, but
would be the exception rather than the rule. More likely would be the use of the area
ambush, especially when there is more than one route through the TAI.

4. An anti-armour ambush has four components:

a. An ISTAR group to provide early warning of the approach of the enemy

and to enable the ambush to be triggered. OPs can be provided by the recon-
naissance platoon, Atk platoon and rifle platoons while FOOs can provide
MSTAR overwatch.

b. A killing group (or more than one for area ambushes) to cover the KAs and
spring the ambush.

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c. Cutoffs to deny enemy escape routes and defeat enemy flanking counter-
attacks.

d. A local protection group to provide flank protection to the killing group and
destroy enemy dismounted infantry.

Planning and Preparation

5. Initial planning for an anti-armour ambush will be carried out by battlegroup

headquarters staff, which should include the Atk platoon commander, to identify
potential TAIs. This should include a thorough mission analysis and combat estimate
to identify the key tasks, force required to achieve the mission and the best ambush
site. The principles and sequence of anti-armour planning are extant and should
include reconnaissance if the tactical situation and time permits.

6. During the detailed planning of anti-armour ambushes the following additional

factors should be considered:

a. Ground. The TAI should be broken down into specific KAs for groups of
weapons. The terrain analysis must, therefore, consider the use of all weapons
to ensure that KAs are selected to suit weapon characteristics. Each route
through the area should be covered by at least one KA. Some route denial may
be necessary, however, obstacles should be concealed or surprise may be lost.

b. Enemy. Consideration must to be given to the types and numbers of

vehicles, (including High Value Targets and High Payoff Targets) and enemy
routes to ensure that sufficient force is targeted against the predicted target.
Enemy courses must be assessed to ensure the best coverage of the TAI and
to identify any need for reserves.

c. Friendly Forces. The composition and size of the force required to com-
plete the mission will have to be decided and this will have to be balanced
against the resources available. The requirement for mutual support within the
ambush area must be considered.

d. Weather. Bad weather has a degrading effect on many of the weapons

likely to be employed in an anti-armour ambush. Poor visibility must be taken
into account during the planning stage.

Conduct of the Ambush

7. An anti-armour ambush is a patrol task and in general the orders should follow
the format laid down in TAM Part One, patrol orders. All battle procedure and
rehearsals should take place in a secure area. Those troops moving by vehicle and
helicopter will require DOPs which should be sited to ensure they do not compromise
the ambush. As the groups are likely to be spread over a wide geographical area, the

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different teams may have to move autonomously, by foot or vehicle to their own
FRVs, from which they can conduct final battle procedure. Routes must be coordi-
nated to minimize the risk of blue on blue engagements. The following points require
particular consideration:

a. Anti-armour coordination must be carried out. The physical dispersion may

make it difficult to carry out coordination in the usual manner but it may be
achieved by using the following techniques:

(1) Coordination by exception.

(2) By radio using compass bearings.

(3) By radio using thermal reference points and BATCO Card 005.

b. There must be a clearly understood order for initiating the ambush. This
must cover the contingency for springing the ambush when the enemy appears
from both the expected direction and the least advantageous direction. There
must also be a fail safe system which allows individual weapons to engage the
enemy on their own initiative in the event of failure of communications. Methods
which can be used for fail safes are as follows:

(1) Specified number of vehicles in a KA.

(2) Movement of vehicles across a geographical feature or specified

line.

c. Fire control method to be used, including a priority of engagement and

contingencies for a number of target arrays.

Combat Service Support

8. A logistic plan must be made to ensure that the ambush can sustain itself for the
duration of the operation. The ammunition requirement must be carefully analysed
and the policy for the abandonment/destruction of unused missiles and LAW must be
clearly stated. In certain circumstances ammunition should be predumped to allow
replenishment during the withdrawal.

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Chapter 2

ANTI-ARMOUR PLANNING

Introduction Contents

0201. The production of the detailed Annexes:

anti-armour plan is the responsibility of the A. Killing Area Guidelines

Atk platoon commander. The anti-armour B. Anti-Armour Overlay and Attached Notes
plan must incorporate all available anti- C. Atk Platoon Commander’s Briefing Notes
armour weapons and not simply those D MILAN Visibility Overlay
found in the Atk platoon. The coordination
and integration of all such available weapons and units result in threats to which the
enemy is increasingly unable to react, thereby slowing his own decision making
process and forcing him to submit to our tempo of operations.

Principles
0202. The principles of anti-armour planning are:
a. The anti-armour plan must conform to the battlegroup commander's con-
cept of operations.
b. Killing areas must be sited to cover the anticipated enemy threat, as pre-
dicted by IPB.
c. All available weapon systems must be coordinated to optimize their char-
acteristics in order to produce the greatest effect on the enemy.

Stages
0203. Planning of AAO is conducted in three key stages:
a. Anti-Armour Estimate.
b. Confirmation.
c. Coordination.

Anti-Armour Estimate (AAE)

0204. The AAE is designed to allow the Atk platoon and section commanders to
identify possible enemy routes, suitable killing areas and firing positions for anti-
armour weapons. It is a systematic approach which starts with mission analysis and
requires the production of overlays depicting data on terrain and enemy. In effect, it
is a concise form of IPB. The AAE is conducted in the following sequence:

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a. Mission Analysis.

b. Terrain Analysis.

c. Threat Analysis.

d. Initial Plan.

0205. Mission Analysis. The mission analysis will be triggered by the

battlegroup warning order and follows the standard format. The Atk platoon
commander must examine his role in the operation to define the following:

a. Time Estimate. The correct division of the available time for the
completion of the anti-armour plan.

b. Likely Tasks. Identify the most suitable tasks and employment for the
anti-armour weapons, consistent with the constraints, and advise the
battlegroup commander accordingly.

c. Clarification. Identify the critical information required for the completion of

the anti-armour plan.

d. Warning Order. On completion of his mission analysis he must issue a

warning order to his subordinates.

0206. Terrain Analysis. The terrain analysis is a comprehensive ground

appreciation. It is of primary importance because it not only assists in the prediction of
the likely enemy routes, but also allows the accurate siting of anti-armour weapons to
ensure that they cover the optimum KAs while achieving defilade. It consists of two
graphical overlays:

a. Intervisibility Study. This overlay highlights, as accurately as possible, the

shape of the ground within the area of operations.

b. Difficult Ground Study. This overlay is the key to predicting likely enemy
routes. It shows the areas that are either SLOW GO or NO GO to armoured
movement. Some examples of such areas are:

Built-up areas Steep gradient Rivers

Marshland Dense Forestry

0207. Threat Analysis. This is the production of an overlay showing the most
likely enemy routes into, through and out of the area of operations. It is derived from
the information culled from the terrain analysis combined with the current assessment
of the enemy's strength, intentions and objectives.

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0208. Selection of Killing Areas. On completion of the threat analysis potential

KAs for infantry anti-armour weapons should be selected. They must meet the
following criteria:

a. They must provide good coverage of the KA, optimising the weapons
characteristics.

b. They must have a reasonable degree of defilade to ensure survivability and

minimize attrition.

Note. The detailed requirements for MILAN and LAW KAs are at Annex A.

0209. Initial Plan. The initial plan is based on the best KAs that conform to the
battlegroup commander's concept of operations. Fighting units (Atk sections/rifle
platoons) will be tasked to cover groups of KAs ensuring that the correct firepower is
concentrated to achieve the desired effect. The initial plan may have a number of
options, each with relative strengths and weaknesses. The initial plan must be
produced as an overlay (see Annex B) showing:

a. Primary. Those KAs which are critical to the anti-armour operation. Anti-
armour assets must be dedicated to these KAs. Primary KAs must be the Atk
platoon's main effort.

b. Secondary. Those KAs that cover secondary or less important routes.

Weapons positions will be sited, reconnoitred and where possible prepared.
Weapons systems will only be tasked to cover these KAs when a threat is seen
to be developing. The deployment of these weapons will be tied in with the
battlegroup Decision Support Overlay (DSO).

c. Mobile. Certain KAs may have a number of good firing positions, which
might make them suitable for mobile operations. Mobile KAs denote a
movement box within which anti-armour systems are free to manoeuvre to
engage the enemy. They should be kept clear of any other friendly forces to
reduce the instance of fratricide.

Confirmation

0210. Once the Atk platoon commander has produced his initial plan, based on his
AAE, he must confirm it as quickly as possible by conducting the following:

a. Reconnaissance of the area of operations.

b. Brief the battlegroup commander on the plan.

c. Issue the anti-armour plan at the battlegroup O Gp.

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0211. Reconnaissance. The conduct of the reconnaissance will depend upon

the time and resources available to the Atk platoon commander and on the tactical
situation. The essential requirement is to obtain a feel for the terrain in general. The
Atk platoon commander must prioritize his reconnaissance plan and should visit the
least satisfactory KAs first. If a helicopter is available, it is an ideal means for covering
the ground quickly and confirming the viability of the plan.

0212. Briefing the BG Comd. The Atk platoon commander must brief the
battlegroup commander on the anti-armour plan prior to the battlegroup O Gp; the
time and place should be agreed before he departs on his reconnaissance. The aim of
the briefing is to familiarize the battlegroup commander with all aspects of the anti-
armour plan. The plan may have a number of options and the Atk platoon commander
must make an honest appraisal of their strengths and weaknesses. He should present
his preferred option and make recommendations for improving the plan. The detailed
format is at Annex C. On completion of the brief the battlegroup commander will make
suggestions and amendments and then give his approval of the plan. The anti-armour
plan is now part of the overall battlegroup concept of operations and as such may not
be altered without the battlegroup commander's authority.

0213. Battlegroup Orders. The Atk platoon commander must attend the
battlegroup O Gp to give a summary of the anti-armour plan. On completion of the O
Gp he will distribute copies of the anti-armour trace and attached notes, to sub-unit
commanders and to his own section commanders. An example of a overlay and a set
of attached notes is shown at Annex B.

Coordination

0214. Coordination of the anti-armour plan must take place at both battlegroup and
sub-unit level to ensure that all available assets are employed to the optimum effect.
The requirements and responsibilities for coordination are summarized below:

Level Battlegroup Sub-Unit

Responsibility Atk Platoon Commander
Direct Fire Confirm coverage and integra-
tion of long and medium range
Atk weapons with Atk section
commanders and armoured
squadron commanders.
Atk Section Commander
Confirm coverage and integration
of short and medium range anti-
tank weapons with sub-unit com-
manders. Confirm mutual support
for anti-armour teams provided by
direct fire weapons.

Indirect Fire Coordination of anti-armour Liaise with FOO/MFC to coordi-

plan and indirect fire plan/target nate use of DFs in and around
list with BC/FPC. KAs.

(cont)

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Level Battlegroup Sub-Unit

Responsibility Atk Platoon Commander. Atk Section Commander.
Protection Ensure coverage of obstacle Confirm locations of weapon posi-
plan with BGE. tions and priority of work.

STAP Ensure MILAN/MIRA coverage Confirm anti-armour coverage and

integrated into BG STAP with observation.
OC Fire Support Coy.

Movement Coordinate movement of anti- Confirm track plan and redeploy-

armour assets, redeployments ment options with sub-unit com-
and contingency plans with BG mander.
Ops Offr.

Flanks Liaise with flanking units and Liaise with neighbouring sub-units
formations to ensure coverage to integrate anti-armour fire.
of boundaries and flanks

Coordinated Plan

0215. During coordination it may be necessary to adjust some KAs to make the plan
work on the ground. Once coordination is complete the final, coordinated plan must be
disseminated using either an overlay, as shown at Annex B, or radio briefing so that
the key commanders within the battlegroup are aware of the finalized KAs. Once the
plan is coordinated the Atk platoon commander must produce the MILAN Visibility
Overlay, as shown at Annex D, which will be added to the battlegroup STAP. The
finalised plan must be back-briefed to the battlegroup commander.

Sub-Unit Anti-Armour Planning

0216. Sub-unit commanders must plan their own anti-armour operations. In most
instances they will start the process after the initial plan has been issued. Sub-unit
commanders should follow the same process as laid out for battlegroup planning. In
many cases the experienced commander will be able to apply his military judgement,
knowledge of the situation and eye for the ground to compress the process. Sub-unit
commanders will be assisted by the Atk section commanders of any Atk sections that
are placed under their command.

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ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 2

KILLING AREA GUIDELINES

The ideal dimensions of a MILAN killing area are:

1400 m 400 m

FIRING
600 –
POSTS
1000 m

The ideal dimensions for a LAW killing area are:

500 m

150 m LAW

Note. The actual shape and size of the KA will be dictated by the shape of the
ground and so straight edged KAs are exceptional.

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 ANTI-ARMOUR OVERLAY AND ATTACHED NOTES

CAPT J SMITH
ANTI-ARMOUR OVERLAY
18 0730Z Jan 00

32
3A 3B 05

M1 3A 3B 2A
M2 3 2A
M1A
3
2
M3 M2A 1B

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00 1
2
21
1 1A 1B
M3A
1A
Key: (not included on real time overlays)
97
M Mobile Occupied 28
94 mm Unoccupied
CHAPTER 2
ANNEX B TO

2B-1
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ANTI-ARMOUR PLAN ATTACHED NOTES

CO’s Mission — DENY ENEMY PENETRATION OF LINE Authority to Open Fire

‘POACHERS SNARE’ FOR 24 HRS TO ALLOW COMPLE- MOB — D3, REMAIN-
TION OF BDE OBSTACLE PLAN. DER D2 — SUB-UNIT
COMMANDERS

Atk Concept Tasks Priority of Engagement

MOB SECT FWD FOR MOB-ATTRIT EN RECCE. 1 RECCE
EARLY ATTRITION, C/S 31 COVER NW APPROACHES 2 COMD
TO A COY TO PROVIDE TO B COY AREA 3 AD
AN ANTI-ARMOUR 31-DESTR EN ARMOUR 4 ENGR
FRAMEWORK. WITHIN BDYS, COVER NW 5 MBT
APPROACHES TO A COY 6 IFV
AREA.

Vehicle Plan — VEHICLES TO BE HARBOURED AND ADMINISTERED UNDER

SEC ARRANGEMENTS. ANY REPLEN TO BE REQUESTED TO PL 2IC OVER ATK
PL NET.

C/S GR/AREA POSN KA COY COORD RV MAIN EFFORT/

No. No. AND TIME REMARKS
298989 1 1 A GR 298989, PRIMARY KA,
1300 HRS COVER W
APPROACH TO
COY AREA.
306002 2 2 A TFO FROM PRIMARY, 94 MM
KA 1 KA, DEAD
31 GROUND N OF
A COY.
301030 3 3 A TFO FROM PRIMARY KA
KA 3A COVERS NW
APPROACH TO
COY AREA.
(Cont)

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POSN KA COORD RV MAIN EFFORT/

C/S GR/AREA COY
No. No. AND TIME REMARKS
310989 1A 1A TFO FROM SECONDARY
KA 2 KA, OCCUPY ON
MY ORDERS.
326004 1B 1B TFO FROM AS FOR 1A.
KA 1A
31 318033 2A 2A TFO FROM AS FOR 1A.
Cont KA 1B
301034 3A 3A TFO FROM AS FOR 1A.
KA 3B
308035 3B 3B TFO FROM AS FOR 1A.
KA 2A

234015 M1 M1 B 234015, 1515 SECONDARY

HRS KA, FOR EARLY
ATTRITION.
222016 M2 M2 TFO FROM AS FOR M1.
K1 M1
223988 M3 M3 B TFO FROM PRIMARY KA,
KA M2 COVERING W
APPROACH TO
B COY AREA.
264004 M1A M1A B TFO FROM PRIMARY KA,
KA M2A COVER N OF B
MOB
COY AREA.
258991 M2A M2A B TFO FROM PRIMARY KA,
KA M3A COVER NW OF B
COY AREA.
236997 M3A M3A B TFO FROM SECONDARY
KA M3 KA, COVER SW
APPROACH TO
B COY AREA,
OCCUPY ON MY
ORDERS.

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 RESTRICTED

2B-4 RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

ANNEX C TO
CHAPTER 2

ATK PLATOON COMMANDER'S BRIEFING NOTES

Briefing to Battlegroup Commander

a. Determine time available for the brief.

b. Orientate to map (if required).

c. Describe likely enemy routes.

d. Describe anti-armour plan in logical sequence highlighting coverage and

weaknesses.

e. Suggest priority of engagement for anti-armour weapons.

f. Suggest fire control and OPSEC measures for anti-armour weapons (to be
included in CSCM).

g. Summary.

Briefing to Battlegroup O Gp

a. Groupings (if required).

b. Outline of plan.

c. Any key KAs that may be covering friendly force wdr routes, armour routes
into blocking positions, etc.

d. Decision Points, important to the plan, especially concerning counterattack

options, redeployment and/or the use of reserves.

e. Routes to be used by the Atk sections through friendly c/s AORs if moving
independently.

f. Key administration points such as administrative responsibility for attached

Atk sections.

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 MILAN VISIBILITY OVERLAY

00 CAPT J SMITH
VISIBILITY OVERLAY
53 18 0730Z Jan 00

91
50

3 6

2 7
5
8

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4 9 45
04
CHAPTER 2
ANNEX D TO

2D-1
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2D-2 RESTRICTED
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Chapter 3

MRATGW — THE BASICS

SECTION 1. — THE WEAPON SYSTEM

0301. General. MILAN has a maximum Contents

range of 1950 metres with missile flight time Page
of 12.5 seconds. At medium to maximum SECTION 1. — THE WEAPON SYSTEM 3-1
engagement ranges a well sited MILAN has SECTION 2. — THE ANTI-TANK PLATOON 3-2
a small firing signature which makes SECTION 3. — DEPLOYMENT GUIDELINES 3-5
detection of the firing post difficult.It is SECTION 4. — GENERIC BATTLE
comparatively light and, with integral thermal PROCEDURE 3-7
image (TI) sights, offers a 24 hour capability Annexes:
in most weather conditions. A. Technical Details — MILAN and MILAN Infra Red
Adaptor (MIRA)
0302. Limitations. The main limitations B. Generic Deliberate Battle Procedure
of MILAN are: C. Generic Hasty Battle Procedure
D. Duties and Brief Formats for the ATk Platoon
a. A minimum range of 400 metres
for planning purposes.

b. A long time of flight and a slow rate of fire.

c. Vulnerability to both direct and indirect fire.

d. Effectiveness against MBTs is limited during head-on engagements.

e. Limited ammunition holdings.

f. Limited visibility in certain conditions such as heavy rain, mist, heavy

particle smoke (such as grass fire) and snow.

g. Mobility is dependent upon a weapons carrier.

h. Its vulnerability to directed energy weapons (DEW), i.e., lasers.

0303. Technical Details. Further technical details of MILAN and MIRA are to be
found at Annex A to this chapter.

0304 – 0305. Reserved.

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SECTION 2. — THE ANTI-TANK PLATOON

0306. The Orbat. Under the Infantry’s plan to rationalize its orbats by 2010 all
battalions, less those in 16 Air Assault Brigade, will move towards a generic orbat (by
April 2000) of a platoon headquarters and 12 posts; AI and Mechanized Atk platoons
have two sections each of six posts whereas the Light Role battalions have three
sections each of four posts. Battalions in 16 Air Assault Brigade have 16 posts; one
section of four posts in the Man Support Platoon and one section in each of the rifle
companies.

0307. Atk Platoon Headquarters. This contains the platoon commander, platoon
2IC and their drivers and operators. It consists of two command vehicles each with
identical radio fits and is capable of splitting between Main HQ and one other. If a
platoon has its sections deployed to reinforce another battlegroup the platoon
headquarters is likely to be deployed to an armoured battlegroup.

0308. Atk Section. A section is the basic fighting unit and consists of two or three
detachments. The section commander is a SNCO who is responsible for both fighting
and administering his command. He requires his own vehicle in order to site,
coordinate and administer his detachments. If he is deployed under command of a
sub-unit he becomes that sub-unit commander’s anti-armour adviser.

0309. Atk Detachment. The detachment is the basic fire unit of the Atk section
and consists of two firing posts which are always deployed on a common mission. The
detachment commander is a corporal who is responsible for fighting and
administering his detachment. Each detachment is mounted in a single vehicle with a
dedicated driver. Each post is manned by a minimum of two men, a number one and
number two, who should be assisted by the detachment commander and driver.

0310. Individual Roles. There are seven key roles within the Atk platoon which
are:

a. Platoon Commander. In addition to his normal command functions the

Atk platoon commander is the battlegroup commander’s anti-armour adviser
who will conduct the detailed planning and coordination of battlegroup infantry
anti-armour weapons. He is also responsible for the control of battlegroup Atk
sections during battle and the command of the Atk platoon when deployed as a
formed group. He is also responsible for overseeing and advising on all aspects
of anti-armour training.

b. Platoon 2IC. In barracks the platoon 2IC is responsible for the routine
administration of the platoon including the maintenance and serviceability of all
vehicles and equipment. He is also to assist in planning training and must
ensure that training standards are maintained. On operations he is responsible
primarily for developing and implementing the platoon’s logistic plan. He must
also be prepared to take over the planning and command function from the

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platoon commander either within his own battlegroup or when detached to

another.
c. Section Commander. The section commander commands the basic
fighting unit of the Atk platoon:
(1) In barracks the section commander is responsible for:
(a) The discipline and welfare of his section.
(b) The training of his detachments to meet the operational
requirement.
(c) The personal development of the individuals in his section.
(d) The serviceability of all weapons, equipment, vehicles and
radios issued to his section.
(2) On operations he is responsible for implementing the battlegroup
anti-armour plan during all operations of war. This involves the detailed
siting and coordination of MILAN and the direct command of his Atk
section. The section commander is also responsible for assisting sub-unit
commanders plan anti-armour operations and for providing advice on the
deployment of MILAN and LAW.
(3) The role of the Atk section commander is extremely demanding, in
that he is a commander who must be able to operate effectively at both
battlegroup and sub-unit level and make critical tactical decisions in an
isolated environment without the direct support of a platoon commander or
CSM. He needs to be a strong, competent individual who can act
confidently and intelligently using his own initiative.
d. Detachment Commander. The detachment commander commands the
basic fire unit of the Atk section:
(1) In barracks he is responsible for the administration of his detachment
and the training of his MILAN teams within the framework of the section.
He is also responsible for the serviceability and maintenance of his
weapons, vehicle, stores and equipment.
(2) On operations he is responsible for fighting his MILAN teams in
accordance with the section commander’s plan. This includes the
immediate command and control of his firing posts, implementing the fire
control plan, applying specified fire control measures and coordinating the
local defence of his positions.
(3) The detachment commander is responsible for fighting his
detachment and must therefore be a leader as well as an anti-armour
specialist.

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e. Number One. The primary task of the Number One is to crew and fire the
MILAN post. His main responsibilities are:
(1) Maintaining the serviceability of his firing post.
(2) Maintaining the correct level of operating skills in conjunction with the
Number Two.
(3) Carrying, deploying and conducting engagement drills with the post
(including the MIRA).
(4) Conducting misfire drills in conjunction with the Number Two.
f. Number Two. The primary task of the Number Two is to assist the
Number One to operate the MILAN post. His main responsibilities are:
(1) Maintaining the serviceability of his firing post.
(2) Maintaining the correct level of operating skills in conjunction with the
Number One.
(3) Target selection and indication for the Number One.
(4) Loading, unloading and clearing of ammunition onto and away from
the firing post.
(5) Conducting misfire drills in conjunction with the Number One.
(6) Carriage of the immediate supply of missiles for the firing post.
(7) Sending appropriate reports and returns to the detachment or
section commander.
g. Driver. The primary task of the driver is to maintain and drive the
detachment’s vehicle. His main responsibilities are:
(1) Driving the detachment’s vehicle as directed by the detachment
commander.
(2) The serviceability of his vehicle and associated equipment.
(3) Maintaining an operating skill level equal to the other MILAN
operators.
(4) Camouflaging, concealing and maintaining the vehicle.
(5) Immediate resupply of his detachment from the vehicle.
(6) Taking over as an operator when required.
0311 – 0312. Reserved.

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SECTION 3. — DEPLOYMENT GUIDELINES

0313. Firepower. In battle, the Atk platoon must be able to concentrate ATGW fire
against the enemy at the correct time and place causing the desired level of attrition.
In order to achieve good firepower the detachments must be able to maintain a high
rate of fire, good accuracy and a high hit/kill probability.

a. Rates of Fire. MILAN’s rate of fire depends on the target acquisition time,
time of flight and the time taken to reload the firing post. A well trained MILAN
team should be able to achieve three rounds per minute at maximum range; if
the majority of engagements take place at shorter ranges they should achieve
four rounds per minute. High rates of fire can only be achieved if detachments
have the following:

(1) A clear understanding of their mission, including any constraints on

their action, and good situational awareness.

(2) Good detection, recognition, identification and location skills.

(3) Efficient weapon drills.

b. Accuracy. MILAN is extremely accurate. However, it relies on the

operator to engage and track the target. In order to achieve a high level of hits
the operator must:

(1) Harmonize the firing post.

(2) Carry out pre-aiming drills and track the target for the duration of its
flight under battle conditions.

(3) Apply the 75 mil Rule.

(4) Carry out decoy drills.

c. Hit/Kill Probability. The hit/kill probability is the theoretical number of

rounds required to kill a target and is governed by the effect of the missile on the
target. When MILAN is fired against IFVs the hit/kill probability will be high and
they can be engaged from any aspect. However, when MILAN is fired against
MBTs the hit/kill probability in the frontal arc is lower than on the sides or rear.
Therefore it is important that MILAN is sited to engage MBTs from the side or
rear if it is to cause the highest levels of attrition.

0314. Movement. Atk sections must be able to move to positions from which they
can concentrate fire. Movement requires the ability to navigate accurately across
whatever terrain has to be crossed, making best use of ground. Movement is
controlled by drills and procedures which culminate when the section is declared ‘In
Action’. Finally all movement must be underpinned by good situational awareness,
sound fieldcraft and timely decision making.

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0315. Protection. MILAN detachments must survive to cause attrition. Their

survival will depend on the following aspects:

a. Siting. MILAN must always strive to engage the enemy from defilade
positions. This is generally achieved using cover, hard or soft, but at times
defilade can be achieved through range. The vulnerability of firing posts will
increase as defilade decreases. Siting is covered in detail in Chapter 4.

b. Fieldcraft. All elements of the Atk platoon must employ a high standard of
fieldcraft to prevent them being detected by the enemy. Maximum use must be
made of dead ground when moving round the battlefield. Positions should not
be compromised during the occupation phase and vehicles must be concealed
to prevent them attracting unnecessary attention.

c. Firing Positions. The MILAN firing post should, except in exceptional

circumstances, be fired in the ground role. This gives it the best concealment,
because of its low silhouette, and provides greater protection for the weapon,
ammunition and crew from small arms fire and shrapnel.

d. Local Defence. Once ATGW crews are identified by the enemy they are
highly likely to be attacked by dismounted infantry. Therefore all MILAN
detachments must have a local defence plan using their own resources which is
coordinated with the nearest friendly troops.

0316. Target Guidelines. There are a finite number of engagements that can be
carried out by an element of the Atk platoon. These can be used to produce planning
guidelines which are shown below:

a. An Atk detachment should aim to engage a force no larger than a platoon or

a platoon (+), such as a combat recce patrol.

b. An Atk section should aim to engage company sized tank forces or

company (+) MR force.

c. An Atk platoon should aim to engage a force no larger than a Motor Rifle
battalion.

0317. It should be noted that anti-armour operations do not stand alone and must be
coordinated within the combined arms battle, as outlined in Chapter 1.

0318 – 0319. Reserved.

3-6 RESTRICTED
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SECTION 4. — GENERIC BATTLE PROCEDURE

0320. Battle Procedure. The aim of battle procedure is to ensure that a soldier is
sent into battle without wasting time and with the minimum fuss, knowing exactly what
he has to do, how he is going to do it and what support he is going to be given. Good
battle procedure ensures that a commander commits his force to battle with the
maximum preparation having taken place in the minimum time and is achieved by
observing the following principles:

a. Anticipation.

b. Efficient drills.

c. Concurrent activity.

d. A thorough knowledge of the grouping system.

0321. Generic Battle Procedure Guides. Although each battlegroup will adapt
battle procedure and create SOPs, there is a basic and generic series of steps that
should be followed for the Atk platoon at all levels and for all operations. For deliberate
operations, these steps are shown in the table outlined at Annex B. Where time does
not allow, or the tactical situation requires quick action, hasty battle procedure will be
adopted. This condensed version will allow the platoon to go into action with sufficient
information but with less steps taken and so less time committed to battle procedure.
As such, for hasty operations, battle procedure for the Atk platoon can be modified as
shown in Annex C.

0322. Functional Groupings. In preparation for operations, functional groupings

are established to assist battle procedure. For the Atk platoon, these functional
groupings will involve the following personalities:

a. Battlegroup R and O Gp — Atk platoon commander. Upon completion of

the R Gp and prior to the O Gp, he will produce his plan and brief the battlegroup
commander as outlined in Chapter 2.

b. Sub-Unit R and O Gp — Atk section commander.

c. Harbour and Rear Recce Parties — The senior detachment commander

within the section and a Number One from the other detachment deploy with a
harbour party. The section commander and two Number Twos deploy as a rear
recce party.

d. Main Body — The remainder of the section under command of the

remaining detachment commander.

0323. There are five stages to Atk platoon battle procedure:

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a. Preparation. Preparation is triggered by the warning order produced by

the Atk platoon commander. It will normally take place in a concentration area
and consists of the following:

(1) Preparation of all weapons and equipment, including testing and

harmonization of firing posts and MIRAs.

(2) Rehearsals for impending operations.

(3) Continuation training on key skills (such as simulator firing and AFV
recognition).

b. Siting. The section commander carries out the detailed siting of the KAs
guided by the trace issued to him by the platoon commander. He will decide the
exact locations of the KAs and the positions of each firing post within his section.
The sequence for siting is set out in Chapter 4.

c. Movement. Movement takes place as follows using the functional

groupings:

(1) The harbour party recces any moves forward from concentration
areas to assembly areas, prior to occupation by the main body.

(2) A rear recce party carries out the same function for a rearward move.

(3) Upon occupation by the harbour or rear recce party, the detachment
commander is responsible for the duties as laid down in Annex B.

d. Occupation. The occupation routine is as follows:

(1) Having completed the detailed siting, the section commander briefs
his detachment commanders prior to any occupation of the positions, as
shown at Annex D.

(2) This brief is repeated in the same format by the detachment

commander to the detachment prior to carrying out the ‘In Action’ routine,
as shown in Annex D.

(3) Once the positions are occupied, the section commander will brief
the closest sub-unit commander following the format as shown in Annex
D.

e. Coordination. Coordination is carried out at all levels within the platoon

and is covered in Chapter 5.

3-8 RESTRICTED

TECHNICAL DETAILS — MILAN AND MILAN INFRA RED ADAPTOR
(MIRA)
MILAN
Performance
Range
Velocity
Time of Flight
Tracking Rate
Elevation Range
Azimuth Range
Dimensions and Weight
Firing Post and Tripod
Firing Post and Tripod
in Logistic Container
Missile, Fins Folded
Ammunition Tube
Four Ammunition Tubes
in Logistic Container
Miscellaneous
Tracker Field of View
Goniometre Sensing Field
Magnification
Tripod Height (maximum)
(minimum)
Warhead Weight
Explosive Weight
Warhead, Stand Off Distance
RESTRICTED
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 3
Warhead Armed, 20 metres.
Minimum Planning Range, 400 metres.
Maximum Range, 1950 metres.
75–210 metres per second, according to
distance travelled.
Approximately 12.5 seconds at maximum range.
20 mils per second, maximum.
± 189 mils from horizontal.
640 mils.
0.90 x 0.42 x 0.65 metres.
17.68 kilogrammes.
1.00 x 0.60 x 0.50 metres.
60 or 65 kilogrammes, depending on country
of manufacture.
Length, 0.77 metres. Diameter of Warhead,
0.103 metres. 6.65 kilogrammes.
Length, 1.20 metres, Diameter, 0.133 metres.
12.25 kilogrammes.
1.30 x 0.54 x 0.50 metres. 82 kilogrammes.
150 mils.
80/20 mils.
x7.
0.50 metres.
0.30 metres.
2.70 kilogrammes.
1.45 kilogrammes.
371.4 millimetres.
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MIRA

Performance

Detection Range AFVs Good Conditions — 3000 metres.

100% probability at 2000
metres.
Bad Conditions — 84% probability at 2000
metres.
Recognition Range AFVs Good Conditions — 90% probability at 1500
metres.
Bad Conditions — 71% probability at 1500
metres.
Identification Range AFVs Good Conditions — 72% probability at 1200
metres.
Bad Conditions — 61% probability at 1200
metres.
Continuous running time — 2 hours approxi-
mately
Batteries 3 cell Lithium battery — 2 hours.
6 cell Lithium battery — 4 hours.
Operating Temperature
Limitations MIRA — –40°C to +52°C.
Bottles — –40°C to +40°C.
Lithium batteries — –40°C to +40°C.

Data — MIRA

Operating Wavelengths 8–13 microns.

Field of View 50 x 100 mils.
Angular Resolution 0.175 milliradians.
Thermal Resolution 0.16°C.
Image Frequency 20 Hz.
Magnification x1.
Display Red light emitting diodes.
Start Up Time 30 seconds.
Harmonization of Axes 1.0 milliradian.
Power Consumption 7.5 volts DC — 4 ampere/hours.

Data — Cooler

Type High pressure pure air at nominal maximum

pressure at 414 bar approximately at 20°C.
Cooler Joule Thompson mini cooler.
Cool Down Temperature –196°C approximately.

3A-2 RESTRICTED
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ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 3

GENERIC DELIBERATE BATTLE PROCEDURE

STAGE PL COMD SECT COMDS DET COMDS MAIN BODY

1 BG R GROUP In CONC AREA with Main Body In CONC AREA.
Anti-Armour 2IC Comd Main Body:
Estimate UTE
Recce Harmonization
Brief Ammo Inspection
Orders and
Rehearsals
Sim and cont trg
Admin
2 BG O GP BG O GP or Junior DC to
Issue trace and COY RV remain in comd
attached notes Receive trace of Sect in CONC
and notes AREA Senior DC
to HARBOUR
PTY
3 Troubleshoot Site Positions ASSY AREA CONC AREA
and Killing Areas Senior DC with Prep to move in Sect
harbour pty: packets to Assy Area.
Site (hasty Def) Junior DC IC packet.
Recce and mark
Coordinate on POSITION routes ASSY AREA
Prepare brief Sect packets arr in
Battle cards assy area.
Spitlock Met and briefed by
Veh positions DC.
4 BG HQ On POSITION ASSY AREA
Back brief final Prep brief Sect Sect packets
plan Brief the closest prep to move to
Coord Conf OC positions
5 On POSITION
Sections arrive at
positions, met
and briefed by
Sect Comd.
In Action
Prep Positions

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3B-2 RESTRICTED
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ANNEX C TO
CHAPTER 3

GENERIC HASTY BATTLE PROCEDURE

STAGE PL COMD SECT COMDS DET COMDS MAIN BODY

1 BG R GROUP In CONC AREA with Main Body. In CONC AREA.

Anti-Armour 2IC Comd Main Body:
Estimate UTE
Recce Harmonization
Brief Ammo Inspection
Orders and
Rehearsals
Sim and cont trg
Admin

2 BG O GP BG O GP or COY Junior DC to CONC AREA

Issue trace and RV remain in comd of Prep to move in Sect
attached notes Receive trace Sect in CONC packets to Assy Area.
and notes AREA Junior DC IC packet.
Senior DC to
HARBOUR PTY

3 Troubleshoot Site Positions ASSY AREA ASSY AREA

and Killing Areas Senior DC with Sect packets arr in
Prep brief Sect harbour pty: assy area.
Site (hasty Def) Met and briefed by DC.
Recce and mark Prep to mov to
routes positions.
Prepare brief
Battle cards
Spitlock
Veh positions

4 Deploy to comd On POSITION

location Sections arrive at positions, met and briefed by Sect Comd.
In Action
Prep Positions

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3C-2 RESTRICTED
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ANNEX D TO
CHAPTER 3

DUTIES AND BRIEF FORMATS FOR THE ATK PLATOON

1. Duties of the DC moving forward with a Harbour Party or rearwards on a

Rear Recce Party.

a. Site initial MILAN positions.

b. Recce and mark routes in and out.

c. Find and mark vehicle positions.

d. Prepare battlecards.

e. Prepare DC brief.

f. Spitlock trenches and start digging if time permits.

2. Sect Comd Brief to DC/DC Brief to the Det.

a. Grid of position.

b. Direction of main tank threat (MTT).

c. ETA of enemy.

d. Priority of engagement.

e. Authority to open fire and CSCMs.

f. Location of temporary, unoccupied and neighbouring positions.

g. Arcs.

h. Near and far limits.

i. Neighbouring sub-unit locations.

j. Where to lay line.

k. Vehicle position.

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3. In Action Routine.

a. Dismount from vehicle and adopt all round defence.

b. Section commander gives brief to DCs.

c. DCs brief Dets.

d. DC report to Sect Comd or respective sub-unit when Det is in action in

temporary position.

e. Det prepares primary position and position to be initially occupied. Line is

laid if required and a FP must remain in action at all times.

f. On completion of both the occupied and primary positions, the Det moves
into the positions to be initially occupied, is fully prepared and in action.

4. Sect Comd Brief to Closest Sub-Unit Commander.

a. Explain and confirmed and coordinated MILAN positions and KAs.

b. Advise on any weaknesses in plan and changes from original plan.

c. Advise on best location for 94 mm KAs.

d. Advise on location for obstacles and GPMG (SF).

e. Highlight any problems with occupation.

f. Hand over a 1:50,000 scale trace of MILAN KAs and positions.

5. Sect Comd Coordination Brief to Platoon Commander.

a. How long is available for the brief.

b. Highlight any problems in siting and changes to KAs and firing positions.

c. Copy KAs from coord template to Pl Comd’s coord board.

d. Explain weaknesses in plan.

e. Highlight any 94 mm KAs and positions.

f. Request RV for UTE and harmonization timings from Pl 2IC.

3D-2 RESTRICTED
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Chapter 4

MRATGW — SITING AND COORDINATION

SECTION 1. — SITING

Introduction Contents

Page
0401. When producing the anti-armour
plan, the platoon commander will adhere to SECTION 1. — SITING 4–1

the principles of anti-armour planning and SECTION 2. — COORDINATION 4–6

the siting considerations. He must ensure

that his plan is workable and that the section commanders are given siting tasks that
are achievable. Failure to do this will result in an anti-armour plan which lacks coher-
ence and is poorly coordinated.

0402. The Atk section commander is trained to give detailed advice to the sub-unit
commander on the siting of MILAN. He must ensure that the precise location and
alignment of each MILAN position is marked out and indicated to each MILAN team.
If this is not done there is a chance that the team will not cover the allotted KA and
thus the mission may not be achieved.

0403. His start point is the KA and the appropriate location from which to cover it, as
given in the sub-unit commander’s orders or the Atk platoon commander’s trace.

0404. The Atk detachment commander must also be aware of these considerations
so that he can deputise for the section commander when necessary. In assembly
areas, detachment commanders are required to carry out siting by themselves. Due
to the confined nature of assembly areas it is likely that they will not be able to take
full account of all the considerations listed below.

Defilade

0405. A defilade position is one which the enemy cannot engage with direct fire or
observed indirect fire without himself being within the weapon’s KA. The aim is to pro-
tect and conceal the weapon from the enemy’s main axis of advance. Defilade can
be achieved by siting behind hard or soft cover.

0406. Advantages. A defilade position provides:

a. Cover from view, and therefore observed indirect fire.

b. Protection from direct fire until the crew is capable of retaliation.

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c. Concealment of the weapon signature.

d. An ambush and surprise effect against enemy vehicles.

e. A larger target to aim at.

f. Thinner side armour against which to effect a kill.

0407. Disadvantages. The disadvantages are that:

a. The enemy vehicles may be well into the battlegroup area before they are
engaged. Therefore depth and mutual support are essential.

b. The targets move quickly and open fields of fire are necessary.

0408. Developments in armour protection, together with the current limitations of

MILAN, all combine to determine that defilade is vital.

Depth

0409. Depth will allow increasing numbers of anti-armour assets to engage

decreasing numbers of enemy vehicles and is vital to the achievement of the mission.

0410. Depth is achieved by deploying the available assets throughout the battle-
group area. A section may be deployed with the Covering Force and move back at
the appropriate moment to provide additional strength to depth positions. Anti-armour
weapons, principally MILAN, will be deployed throughout the battlegroup area to
cover the Main Tank Threat (MTT) and likely enemy routes. Secondary routes and
tasks can be covered by secondary KAs.

Mutual Support

0411. Mutual support is necessary to overcome the relatively slow rate of fire of
MILAN and to allow for casualties and obscuration. Thus each KA should be covered
by a minimum of two MILAN firing posts. Detachment KAs should be sited so that
they complement each other and hence provide mutual support.

0412. MILAN teams must also be mutually supported by short range anti-armour
weapons to cover the near limit and any dead ground in their KAs.

All Round Defence

0413. MILAN must be deployed to cover the MTT on the routes through the posi-
tion. However, the threat of enemy outflanking and encircling tactics must not be for-
gotten. All round defence can be achieved by using short range weapons, secondary
tasks and mobile assets.

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Concealment

0414. Survivability on the battlefield will depend to a great extent on concealment.

Once MILAN opens fire from its permanent position the defensive position will be, to
a large extent, compromised. It is therefore important that weapons remain con-
cealed and hold their fire until the last possible moment, creating surprise and an
ambush effect. Clear orders for opening fire must be given prior to deployment for a
particular operation.

0415. Concealment presupposes good fieldcraft. Commanders should:

a. Use available cover to conceal the weapon position.

b. Look at potential fire positions from the enemy point of view.

c. Practise the preparation of overhead protection. This includes deturfing,

camouflage of spoil, the use of nets to eliminate shadow and deception.

Protection

0416. Atk crews need protection from suppressive fire, e.g., artillery, CAS, heli-
copter gunships, enemy lasers and also against infantry attack.

0417. One of the major tasks of enemy artillery is likely to be the detection and
destruction of ATGW. If they are unable to destroy the weapon system they will
attempt to neutralise it by means of HE and smoke. Chemical weapons may be used
prior to the assault. Obvious positions, whether on a map or to observers, should be
avoided.

0418 Hard defilade will help to protect ATGW but cannot replace the protection
afforded by digging in with good overhead protection. A well trained enemy will
attempt to have tanks on the objective one minute after his artillery has lifted. The
implication is that Atk detachments must be able to fire during the bombardment.

0419. Atk crews will often be sited away from rifle company positions in order to
negate some of the enemy artillery effects and to get the necessary fields of fire.
Infantry approaches to Atk positions must be covered by small arms fire. GPMG(SF),
DFs, mortar defensive fire tasks and command detonated Claymore-type mines may
also be employed. By night or in bad visibility, ideally, infantry should be collocated
to provide local protection. The section commander must ensure that he coordinates
this with the rifle company commander.

0420. Deception through the use of false or dummy positions can also be used to
deceive the enemy over the location of Atk positions.

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Fields of Fire and Killing Areas

0421. MILAN must have relatively open fields of fire to overcome the time of flight
limitation and avoid engagement of fleeting targets.

0422. MILAN should be sited to cover a realistically sized KA. The ideal width is
600 – 1000 metres. Any wider than this will result in a dug-in firing post being unable
to cover the KA because of its overhead protection.

0423. The effects of dead ground must be considered. Section commanders must
be able to plot dead ground accurately to identify the problems so that contingency
plans can be made.

0424. In the past, power lines have caused a worry as several areas of NW Europe
were criss-crossed by high tension cables and pylons. This led to fears that if the
guidance wire touched a power line, then the operator could be at risk or, worse, that
the missile and firing post could be affected. Tests have proved that the MILAN guid-
ance wire will not conduct electricity due to the plasticised covering. In very wet con-
ditions, the only possible danger is that some electricity might pass along moisture
actually on the guidance wire, but this is unlikely to form a complete circuit from the
power line to the firing post. An extra reassurance comes from the fact that most
MILAN shoots tend to be low on the ground and thus most missiles will pass below
power lines anyway.

Temporary and Alternate Positions

0425. Temporary positions must be occupied whilst the main position is being pre-
pared. MILAN must be ‘in action’, camouflaged and covering the same task as the
main position. The rear blast area must be clear and a battle card must be produced.

0426. An alternative position is a position where the detachment covers the same
main task, but from a different position.

Rear Danger Area

0427. The operational rear blast area (see Pamphlet 27, The MILAN Weapon
System, Army Code No. 71284) must be applied, particularly if sited near woods,
buildings or troops.

Launch Dispersion

0428. On firing, the missile is ballistically launched and so its flight path is set.
There is a danger that the missile could ground if it is a low launch and there is an
obstacle just in front of the position or if it is an uphill shoot. If the missile launches
high, problems could occur with overhanging trees and branches. If the position is

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tucked back into a wood, then there is a need for a reasonably wide gap in front of
the position in case the missile deviates to the side on launch.

Distance Between Posts

0429. The distance between firing posts depends on the ground being covered but
both posts need to be able to cover the same KA. Within a detachment, as a guide-
line, posts should be 100 – 150 metres apart. This lessens the effect of artillery sup-
pression on the detachment as a whole and eliminates the possibility of decoy. Within
a section (again as a guideline) detachments should be sited at least 300 – 500
metres apart. The reason for this is so that one detachment is not suppressed by
artillery fire aimed at the other detachment. Command and control of both the sec-
tion and the detachment must be taken into account when siting.

Vehicle Positions

0430. Vehicles should be sited in dead ground and camouflaged as protection

against enemy thermal imaging devices and air reconnaissance and, if possible,
sited behind hard cover for protection against suppressive fire. Depending on the tac-
tical situation, vehicles should be reasonably close to firing post positions to help
withdrawal or redeployment. Vehicle routes must be thoroughly reconnoitred by day
and night. Potentially, AFV/WR may be used in a support role. In such cases vehicle
routes to and from possible deployment positions will also need to be reconnoitred.

Snow Conditions

0431. In snow conditions, the following need to be considered:

a. On launch, the blast produces a significant black mark behind the firing
position and in soft snow quite a lot of snow dispersion. Siting in defilade will
overcome most of the problems caused.

b. Firing posts and ammunition should be painted white and use must be
made of white camouflage nets.

c. To prevent the firing post sinking, snow should be packed hard and white
camouflage material spread under the tripod legs to distribute the weight.

d. The problems of coordination are more difficult because it takes longer to

complete as movement is difficult, particularly in areas inaccessible to vehicles.

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Overpressure

0432. In OBUA operations, the over pressure caused by ignition of the gas gener-
ator combined with rear blast creates a significant hazard in small, enclosed spaces.
Fire positions must therefore be chosen with care. Furthermore:

a. Section commanders must be careful not to site MILAN in buildings in

which the overpressure on missile launch could endanger the crew from falling
masonry. In any kind of building overpressure blast will raise considerable
amounts of dust and this could limit MILAN to being a one shot weapon.

b. It is operationally safe to fire from beneath overhead protection on trenches,

subject to observing the critical measurements and methods of construction
which are given at Annex A to Chapter 7.

Tasking/Survival

0433. When all the considerations listed above have been taken into account, two
crucial questions remain to be answered:

a. Can I do my task?

b. Can I survive?

0434 – 0435. Reserved.

SECTION 2. — COORDINATION

Introduction

0436. The Atk section commander sites the MILAN firing posts, working from the
trace that the Atk platoon commander has produced. Once the siting is completed
the plan must then be coordinated.

0437. Coordination is important in order to ensure that an accurate picture of anti-

armour coverage within the battlegroup is presented to the battlegroup commander.

The Reasons Why

0438. There are several reasons for coordination:

a. To identify weaknesses within the defence.

b. To provide a basis for contingency planning.

c. To tie up details between mutually supporting weapons.

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Sequence

0439. The Atk platoon commander should carry out a time appreciation and issue
coordination RVs and times for each Atk section commander on the attached notes,
working backwards from the time of the coordination conference and allowing for
time to brief the commanding officer well before the conference; at least 30 minutes.

0440. The Atk platoon commander should allow at least 90 minutes from the arrival
of the Atk section commander on the company positions, before arriving at the first
coordination RV. If more time is available then this should be given to the Atk section
commanders.

0441. The RV should, whenever possible, be at one of the detachment positions.

This is so that the Atk platoon commander can see the ground for himself and if any
problems arise they can be resolved as quickly as possible. The other reason is that
if either is late then the time can be used constructively.

0442. When the Atk section commander is siting, the Atk platoon commander has
a period of time, at least 90 minutes, when he can ‘trouble shoot’. He should visit the
KAs and weapon positions most likely to cause problems, or those with which he was
least happy. He can then make decisions on adjusting or slipping KAs, or reversing
shoots before any digging takes place. He should also see the relevant company
commander to see if he has any problems or suggestions.

0443. After ‘trouble shooting’, the Atk platoon commander will then go around the
section positions in turn, meeting the Atk section commanders at the RVs and times
given earlier. He should bear in mind the travel time between positions, and should
work from the forward companies backwards, or at least in some form of priority
order.

Method

0444. Coordination starts with the Atk section commander’s 1:25,000 scale coordi-
nation template. The template should be completed as soon as possible after the
weapon positions have been sited. It is used to brief the company commander and
for coordination with the Atk platoon commander.

0445. The platoon commander’s coordination board should be large enough to

encompass the whole battlegroup area with room for flanks and boundaries. The
map detail should be put on earlier, possibly by the platoon 2IC and/or radio opera-
tor during the planning and trouble shooting phase.

0446. The coordination template is slipped under the coordination board and dead
ground and KA coverage, including extensions and slippages, are transcribed onto
the overlay. Any other problems, not resolved during ‘trouble shooting’, can also be
rectified. It is also another opportunity for the platoon commander to visit each com-
pany commander. The procedure at the coordination RV should be as follows:

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a. The Atk platoon commander starts the coordination process by stating how
much time is available and any other vital information.

b. Detail from the Atk section commander’s template is copied onto the pla-
toon commander’s coordination template. The section commander, who can
describe each KA as he copies it onto the platoon commander’s board, should
do the actual transcription.

c. The section commander continues to follow his briefing sequence, giving

the platoon commander as much detail and information as possible. As far as
possible, the section commander should relate what he is describing on the
map, to what can be seen of the ground around him, i.e., the KA.

d. The platoon commander should listen to the section commander’s brief

and once the section commander has finished (in 5 – 10 minutes) the platoon
commander can then raise any questions or points he has (remaining five min-
utes).

Mobile Assets

0447. In addition to the ground role the mobile plan, where appropriate, should also
be considered. One section may be forward as a mobile section and the mobile com-
mander needs to have a coordination board similar in size to that of the platoon com-
mander’s. This is because the mobile assets are likely to be widely dispersed and are
generally required to redeploy to depth positions during a battle.

0448. The mobile commander should attend the coordination conference whenever
possible and aim to arrive 30 minutes early in order to brief the platoon commander.
Should the tactical situation prevent this, then the platoon commander must liaise
with him at some other stage to coordinate the complete plan.

0449. The mobile commander must look at his depth positions as well as carrying
out a reconnaissance of his withdrawal routes. He should also liaise with the com-
panies whose areas he intends to move through.

Coordination Conference

0450. Once all the KAs have been transcribed onto the platoon commander’s coor-
dination board, he should take time to consider any weaknesses that have been
revealed. He should then try to find a couple of sensible options to solve each weak-
ness. During his pre-coordination conference brief to the commanding officer he
should highlight every weakness in his plan, but then offer these possible solutions
to the commanding officer for his consideration.

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0451. At the coordination conference the platoon commander would be expected

to speak about the anti-armour plan. He should not state the obvious, but should
highlight changes to the original plan and any major considerations.

0452. The platoon commander should make an amended 1:50,000 overlay of the
coordinated plan. If possible this overlay can be made and copied before the coordi-
nation conference by the platoon 2IC. Copies of this amended overlay should be
issued to the following:

a. Battlegroup Commander.

b. Operations Officer.

c. Fire Planning Cell.

d. Company/Squadron Group Commanders.

e. Brigade HQ (via the Ops Officer).

f. Flanking Units (if applicable).

0453. Coordination is equally important at both sub-unit and battlegroup level. The
following table is a check list of other areas that must be coordinated. It is not an
exhaustive list and it will depend on what is available.

Area Section Commander Platoon Commander

Protection Liaise with coy gp comd with Liaise with battlegroup Engr
regard to location of MILAN Offr to ensure coverage of BG
trenches and priority for obstacle plan.
digging.
STAP Liaise with coy gp comd with Coordinate MIRA’s coverage in
regard to the requirement for the battlegroup STAP.
patrols to cover dead ground.
Fire Support Liaise with coy gp comd to
ensure short range hand held
anti-armour weapons are
employed to maximum effect.
Movement Liaise with coy gp (or other Coordinate movement of all
sub-unit) comd to avoid fratri- MILAN assets, particularly
cide within coy area of respon- mobile assets.
sibility.

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Chapter 5

MRATGW — FIRE CONTROL

Introduction

0501. If MILAN is to be successful against enemy AFVs, and missiles are not to be
wasted, there must be an effective system of fire control. Such a system must be
easily understood in order that it may be implemented without hesitation and also
flexible enough to allow junior commanders to use their initiative.

0502. MILAN crews will almost always engage designated specialist vehicles first.
In a situation where our tanks are not committed to the battle at the same time as
MILAN, infantry may have to use MILAN against tanks. The considerations for siting
MILAN to enable them to do this effectively are covered in Chapter 4.

Factors

0503. There are four factors which make up the fire control system for MILAN.
These are:

a. Killing Areas.

b. Priority of engagement.

c. Authority to open fire.

d. Method to be employed.

0504. Killing Areas.

a. All anti-armour weapons must be allocated KAs. These can be designated

as primary or secondary.

b. Where KAs overlap or are covered by several weapons, reference points

must be mutual. If there is a considerable overlap of KAs it will be necessary to
modify the priority of engagement of one or more of the detachments to prevent
the engagement of the same target by different detachments.

c. Targets in KAs must be divided, or allocated a priority to suit the different

weapon systems covering that KA.

d. All weapons must have battle cards showing the detail explained in
Chapter 4, Section 2. This detail must be known by all commanders of the dif-
ferent weapon systems.

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0505. Priority of Engagement. Because MILAN crews have relatively few mis-
siles and a slow rate of fire, particularly at longer range targets, each missile must
inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible. Thus, a battalion command vehi-
cle will be a more lucrative target than an infantry section APC. All weapons cover-
ing KAs must be allocated a priority of engagement appropriate to their characteris-
tics. The priority of engagement will be detailed in orders, or attached notes, once the
anti-armour plan has been sanctioned by the commanding officer. An example prior-
ity of engagement for an Atk detachment deployed in defence behind an obstacle belt
is shown below. This might change as the battle progresses, and as different factors
influence the battle.

a. Priority 1 — Reconnaissance vehicles.

b. Priority 2 — Command vehicles.

c. Priority 3 — Air defence vehicles.

d. Priority 4 — Specialist engineer vehicles.

e. Priority 5 — Tanks with mine clearing devices.

f. Priority 6 — Tanks.

g. Priority 7 — APCs.

0506. Authority to Open Fire.

a. Normally, to preserve security, MILAN will be concealed and protected until

required, at which point as many firing posts as possible will start engaging the
enemy to achieve concentration of firepower and an overwhelming shock
effect. The authority for MILAN crews to open fire must be detailed in orders in
accordance with the battlegroup fire control measures and CSCMs.

b. It is vital that MILAN crews have an established and common FAILSAFE

to employ in the event of the link with the ‘imposing commander’ breaking
down. This will allow the detachment commander to use his initiative to engage
the enemy within the framework of a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
known by all the platoon and sanctioned by the commanding officer.

0507. The Method of Fire Control. With two MILAN firing posts firing into the
same KA it is necessary to avoid both firing posts engaging the same target, thus
wasting missiles. The method of fire control employed within each detachment (and
preferably the whole platoon) must be common and easily understood and imple-
mented. There are two methods of fire control currently in general usage across the
Infantry: the Lead Vehicle Method and the Key Point Method.

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a. The Lead Vehicle Method (see Fig 1). The firing post furthest away from
the enemy point of entry into the KA engages what he estimates to be the lead
vehicle of the enemy formation within the KA. The firing post nearest the point
of entry then selects the highest priority target within the formation according to
the priority of engagement he has received in orders. If the farthest away firing
post is unable to identify the lead vehicle he should bring his reticle pattern
across his KA towards the MTT. The first vehicle that cuts his vertical line is the
lead vehicle. If two vehicles are on the same line he should engage the farthest
away from him.

b. The Key Point Method (see Fig 2). The enemy formation within the KA is
split into two equal sectors with an imaginary line running through the ‘Key
Point’ either vertically or horizontally, depending on the direction of enemy
approach. The ‘Key Point’ is adjusted as the enemy formation centre of mass
shifts and each firing post engages targets in accordance with the priority of
engagement within his sector of the KA. It is important to remember that it is
the enemy formation not the KA that is split.

Conclusion

0508. The methods of fire control outlined above will not cover all circumstances
due to the possibility of fleeting targets, decoy sources and a multi-directional enemy
approach to the KA. However, they provide the foundations of a simple, easy to
understand and implement method of ensuring that each missile finds a separate tar-
get and that the rate of fire is not hampered unnecessarily.

0509. To overcome difficulties of electronic countermeasures, as much of the fire

control system as possible should be pre-planned. Field telephones will provide facil-
ities for secure communications but even these could be disrupted by artillery fire.
Once deployed, MILAN teams must have sufficient information to engage the
enemy effectively even if they receive no further orders. It is then the detachment
commander’s and No 1’s responsibility to implement the fire control plan to the best
of their ability.

Fire Control Plans

0510. Each battalion should adopt workable fire control plans adaptable to any sit-
uation. These should be incorporated in SOIs (see Annex B) and be practised fre-
quently by all members of the Atk platoon. Both of the above methods can be adjusted
to fit with battalion SOPs/SOIs.

Fire Control Training

0511. Fire control training is the responsibility of the NCOs within the MILAN pla-
toon. It can be conducted easily without extensive preparation and with imagination

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2.3
1.2
Comd
1.1
MTT 1.3 2.4
2.1
1.4

2.2

KEY
2.2 indicates the
second target that
FP 2 will engage.
FP 1 FP 2

Fig 1. — Lead Vehicle Method

KEY
POINT

1.4
1.1 2.4
1.3 2.2
KEY
2.1 POINT
MTT
1.2
2.3

KEY
2.2 indicates the
second target that
FP 2 will engage.
FP 1 FP 2

Fig 2. — Key Point Method

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it can be both realistic and challenging. In order to make fire control training pro-
gressive there are a number of aids to conducting this type of training:

a. Static Model Board. A simple model board with vehicles laid out in a sta-
tic display to represent an enemy formation within a KA can be used for basic
fire control instruction. More detail can be found in Infantry Training Volume VI,
Infantry Heavy Weapons (Anti-Armour), Pamphlet No. 27 The MILAN Weapon
System.

b. Live Formations. By employing a series of live target vehicles to move

into a real KA fire control training can be conducted using the MILAN simulator
and a priority of engagement can be tested if different vehicle types are avail-
able. Control by a series of umpires with radios is simple to execute. The use
of Tactical Engagement Simulation (TES) equipment for this type of training is
ideal.

c. O’Keefe Trainer. Made of Lego, this is a simple motor which pulls mod-
els on string over a model board to represent a moving enemy formation. When
a vehicle is hit the flywheel is thrown and that vehicle stops whilst the others
continue to move. Several O’Keefe trainers can be used on the same ‘battle-
field landscape’ to provide different enemy profiles. It is all-weather and can be
used in and out of doors. More detail can be found in Infantry Training Volume
VI, Infantry Heavy Weapons (Anti-Armour), Pamphlet No. 27 The MILAN
Weapon System.

d. Unit Fire Control Trainer (UFCT). This system is primarily used for indi-
rect fire training. It projects a pre-programmed moving formation of up to ten
generic armoured vehicles which can be engaged using the MILAN simulator.
It provides no recognition training but is useful for practising fire control against
real terrain.

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Chapter 6

MRATGW — OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

0601. Tasks. The Atk platoon and its sections contribute to the success of offen-
sive operations by providing accurate, medium range, direct fire. Although Atk pla-
toons, with the exception of the AI battalions, suffer from limited mobility, effective
and imaginative planning can, to a degree, overcome this shortfall. The principal
tasks for MRATGW are to:

a. Form Part of the Fire Support Group (FSG). Elements of the Atk platoon
can be used to either reinforce the FSG or to replace armour deployed in the
FSG. It is important that MRATGW is deployed to achieve the best effect on the
target without bunching in the FSG. During night operations MRATGW can be
used to vector assaulting troops on to the objective.

b. Form Cutoff Parties. MRATGW can use its reach to interdict attempts by
the enemy to either withdrawal from or reinforce its forces on the objective.

c. Security of FUP and FSG. Both the FUP and FSG are vulnerable to
offensive enemy action. MRATGW can use its range to provide protective
envelopes around these areas. While they are unlikely to provide total protec-
tion they should ensure that the battlegroup is given time to react by causing
sufficient attrition to fix the enemy. The Atk platoon should not become involved
in marking the FUP and LD, which are primary tasks for the Recce platoon.

d. Flank Protection. MRATGW can be used to protect an open flank. These

flank protection tasks may be against predicted enemy secondary routes or
they may be in response to cross boundary activity. Flank protection tasks can
be carried out by a single section when the threat is low or when conducted at
sub-unit level. If the threat from the flanks is high then it must be covered by a
minimum of two sections commanded by the Atk platoon commander.

e. Hasty Defence. The Atk platoon must provide the anti-armour defence,
in conjunction with armour, following offensive action.

f. Bunker Busting. In certain circumstances, MRATGW could be used to

destroy bunkers and strong points. This is more likely when the threat from
armour is low.

0602. Planning. During offensive operations the anti-armour plan will almost
invariably fall into two parts; the initial plan covering activities up to the assault force
reaching the objective and the subsequent hasty defence plan. During deliberate
operations the Atk platoon commander should carry out his estimate and issue
orders for both phases at the battlegroup O Gp. During hasty operations the Atk pla-

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toon commander must carry out a quick estimate for the initial plan and issue orders
for the deployment of his sections in accordance with battlegroup SOPs. He must
then conduct quick anti-armour planning and issue his hasty defence plan before H
Hour.

0603. Main Effort. There will be conflicting demands for resources and greater
attrition among Atk detachments during offensive operations. The Atk platoon com-
mander must understand his main effort and husband resources accordingly to
ensure he meets his mission.

0604. Coordination. The activities of MRATGW, armour and indirect fire must be
coordinated to ensure that maximum attrition is achieved on the target. Where pos-
sible MRATGW should engage first to avoid obscuration; when this is not possible
engagements should be carried out on the periphery of the dust cloud. Arcs of fire
must be allocated to individual fire units with the objective being clearly divided up
between them. Normal fire control procedures should be used when armour and
MRATGW are engaging the same area. In certain circumstances, such as when
attacking the forward edge of a village or wood line it may be more effective if armour
engages moving targets while MRATGW engages static targets.

0605. Concealment. Atk sections deployed into a FSG must be dismounted.

They must therefore make good use of ground to occupy their positions and select
the best possible fire positions in the time available. The principles of siting still apply.
They should avoid operating close to armour, who will draw enemy indirect fire.

0606. Protection. Once the enemy has identified Atk positions he will attempt to
neutralise them with indirect fire, small arms and his own ATGW. Therefore, detach-
ments must apply good field craft and make effective use of the natural cover. Where
possible they should dig shell scrapes.

0607. Command. Once offensive operations have commenced it is likely that

direct control of Atk sections will devolve to the Atk platoon commander. He must
understand the battlegroup commander's plan and ensure that his platoon play their
allotted role. The Atk section commander is responsible for the detailed siting and
control of his section. When deployed in the FSG he should man both the Atk pla-
toon command radio net and the FSG command radio net. Unless the Atk platoon
commander/2IC is deployed in the FSG, the Atk section commander must carry out
the all coordination with OC FSG.

0608. Sub-Unit MRATGW. If MRATGW is allocated to the sub-units the Atk sec-
tion commander must liaise directly with the sub-unit commander, ensuring that he
informs the Atk platoon commander of developments.

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Chapter 7

MRATGW — DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Roles Contents

Annex:
0701. During defensive operations the Atk
A. MILAN Battle Trench Including Provision for OHP
platoon can deploy its sections to provide Using SHS Sheets and Chatham Arch
medium range anti-armour support to the Appendix 1. MILAN Battle Trench — Stores (Inc
covering force, main defensive forces, and OHP) and Components of Chatham Arch
the reserve or counterattack forces as fol- Appendix 2. Other Options
lows:
a. Anti-Armour Framework. The main task of MRATGW in defence is to pro-
vide the anti-armour framework for both area and mobile defence. The aim of
the framework is to fix the enemy so that the battlegroup manoeuvre forces can
strike.
b. Covering Force. MRATGW can assist in observation and provide an anti-
armour overwatch to the ISTAR screen. It can also conduct anti-armour opera-
tions as part of the guard force.
c. Flank Protection. MRATGW can be used to protect an open flank. These
flank protection tasks may be against predicted enemy secondary routes or
they may be in response to cross boundary activity. Flank protection tasks can
be carried out by a single section when the threat is low or when conducted at
sub-unit level. If the threat from the flanks is high then it must be covered by a
minimum of two sections commanded by the Atk platoon commander.
d. Support to Sub-Units. MRATGW sections may be placed under direct
command of sub-units to enable them to complete their mission. The tasks allo-
cated to MRATGW sections will include destruction of the enemy in sub-unit
KAs or the protection of vulnerable sub-units.
e. Protection of Key Points. MRATGW sections may be deployed to provide
point defence around key points, such as reserve demolitions.
f. Surveillance. If the armoured threat is low, Atk detachments can be
deployed as OPs maximizing the MIRA TI sight.

Considerations
0702. The principal considerations for the employment of MRATGW in defence are:
a. The main anti-armour effect must be coordinated to destroy enemy vehi-
cles penetrating a defended position.

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b. KAs must be allocated to anti-armour weapons to cover the main tank

threat (MTT).

c. Atk obstacles, the approaches to key terrain and important ground must be
covered by fire.

d. Minor tank threats must be dealt with using secondary KAs and/or with
short range weapons.

e. In ground holding operations, dug-in MILAN must be sited first to conform

with the battlegroup commander's concept of operations and in accordance
with the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). All other assets are
then superimposed on and around this framework of dug-in MILAN. Thus
MBTs, IFVs, protective minefields and short range weapons are all comple-
mentary to this basic framework.

Area Defence

0703. Purpose. Area defence focuses on the retention of terrain or its denial to
the enemy for a period of time. It does this by absorbing the enemy into a framework
of mainly static defences from which he can be destroyed by fire. MRATGW provides
the anti-armour matrix which should dominate all the major approaches to the area.
The key to area defence is the coordination of the anti-armour plan and its integra-
tion into the battlegroup plan. This should reveal any weaknesses and allow contin-
gency plans to be made to cover them.

0704. Deployment. During area defence MRATGW will normally be deployed at

battlegroup level on the battlegroup anti-armour plan. As a rule sections will cover a
single avenue of approach while detachments cover individual KAs. All detachments
will be given primary KAs to cover and should fight from prepared positions with good
overhead cover. At times the Atk platoon commander may need to redeploy detach-
ments to secondary KAs to defeat a secondary threat. This needs to be carefully con-
sidered to ensure that the detachments have the combat power to move and that the
redeployment of unengaged framework MILAN from their primary tasks does not
leave a gap in the defence, which the enemy could exploit later.

0705. Conduct. Area defence relies on well sited positions that will cause maxi-
mum attrition while sustaining minimum casualties. All MRATGW positions must be
sited in defilade to engage the enemy in the 800 – 1800 metres range. In order to
avoid artillery concentrations, MILAN should be well dispersed and deployed away
from those areas that are likely to attract indirect fire. The location, in relation to com-
pany positions, must be balanced by the requirement for security and protection from
dismounted infantry. The psychological factors of isolated positions and radio silence
should not be under-estimated. When MRATGW is deployed in a sub-unit area the
sub-unit commander is responsible for providing logistic support, local protection and
moral support.

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Mobile Defence

0706. Purpose. A mobile defence is used to cover broad frontages and/or to

defend against an enemy with greater combat power but less mobility. It may be used
when a unit is defending a large AO with well defined avenues of approach, such as
flat open terrain. Mobile defence defeats the attacking force by permitting it to
advance to a position which exposes it to counterattack by a strike force. The pre-
requisite for successful mobile defence is that the defending force must have greater
relative mobility than the attacking force.

0707. Deployment. During mobile defence MRATGW will be employed primarily

with the fixing force, although it may also be included in the strike force. The aim is
to concentrate sufficient force in the correct area to achieve the mission. During
mobile defence it is likely that the anti-armour cover will be less comprehensive, than
in area defence, but the firepower concentrated in each TAI will be greater. Depth will
be achieved by moving sections to occupy selected KAs, normally moving rearwards
through the battlegroup area.

0708. Conduct. Mobile defence is a highly demanding form of operation requir-

ing careful planning, rehearsals, good battle drills and initiative at the lowest levels.
The following should be considered:

a. All commanders must understand the higher commander's plan so that

they can make maximum use of their own initiative. Section commanders, in
particular, should be clear in their own minds about the priority of their tasks
within the overall battlegroup concept of operations; above all they must under-
stand their main effort.

b. Normal battle procedure must be carried out to produce a well sited and
coordinated plan. Positions covering primary KAs must be prepared and pre-
stocked with ammunition. Positions covering secondary KAs must be clearly
marked, if unoccupied, and where time allows prepared. Section commanders
must be prepared to take on responsibility for any KA if the situation requires it.

c. Routes between KAs must be carefully selected making best use of dead
ground. They must be reconnoitred and when time allows the occupation of
positions should be rehearsed at detachment level. Routes must also be coor-
dinated at battlegroup level to ensure that they are deconflicted with the obsta-
cle plan and other friendly forces.

0709. Command. During the course of the battle the Atk platoon commander
must ensure that his sections are given sufficient support to achieve their mission.
This involves the redeployment of sections in accordance with the battlegroup DSO
and the provision of fire support. At times the Atk platoon commander should deploy
forward where he can read the battle more effectively. Atk section commanders have
to be allowed to fight their sections and should have clear guidance on movement
once they have completed their mission.

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Covering Force Operations

0710. Purpose. Covering Forces will be given either a screen or guard mission.
Their task is to observe, engage, intercept, disorganize and deceive the enemy dur-
ing his advance to the FEBA. MRATGW can provide anti-armour overwatch for the
screen force and concentrated anti-armour fire for the guard force.

0711. Screen Overwatch.

a. Deployment. MRATGW can be deployed forward to provide protection

for the reconnaissance screen. In this role the Atk detachments must site them-
selves to conform to the screen’s surveillance plan. While the normal siting con-
siderations will apply, it is highly unlikely that they will always be met. Therefore
maximum use should be made of MRATGW's range to ensure that the great-
est possible distance is maintained between the firing posts and the target. On
completion of the overwatch task sections need to regroup and reorganize
before deploying to a subsequent task. Therefore, they should be initially
employed covering a secondary KA rather than on the battlegroup main effort.

b. Conduct. During screen overwatch tasks it is essential that firing posts

remain concealed until they are required to fire so that they maintain the secu-
rity of the screen. Tight fire control must be maintained, although individual
posts may need to fire on their own initiative to counter an enemy threat. Atk
detachments should always remain on the friendly side of the screen moving
backwards either by caterpillaring or leap frogging firing posts. Successful con-
duct of an overwatch task will depend on all elements involved understanding
the task and each others capabilities.

c. Command. An Atk section deployed on screen force tasks will be com-

manded by the Atk section commander who will liaise directly with the screen
force commander. When two or more sections are deployed the Atk platoon
commander or 2IC should coordinate their movement.

0712. Guard Force.

a. Deployment. The guard force is expected to conduct aggressive opera-

tions and MRATGW should be deployed to provide concentrated fire on select-
ed areas. Deployment and siting are conducted as normal with great emphasis
being placed on anti-armour ambushes.

b. Conduct. During guard force actions MRATGW should be fought at sec-

tion level using sequential KAs. Ambushes should be integrated into the over-
all fireplan to ensure that maximum attrition is inflicted on the enemy in the
shortest possible time. Atk sections must avoid close quarter battle so that they
can disengage quickly and fall back to their next positions. Atk section com-
manders should be clear in their own minds about the priority of their tasks
within the overall covering force concept of operations; above all they must
understand their main effort.

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c. Command. An Atk section deployed on guard force tasks will be com-

manded by the Atk section commander who will liaise directly with the guard
force commander. When two or more sections are deployed the Atk platoon
commander or 2IC should coordinate their movement.

0713. Key Point Defence. MRATGW should be used to provide ATGW fire on to
the approaches of key points. It can also be used to provide depth to a defended
locality. When deployed in this manner the firing posts should be sited away from the
defended locality to prevent them being neutralized by indirect fire.

0714. Support to sub-Units. In certain circumstances one or more Atk sections

may be placed under command of an infantry company group to support it in its mis-
sion. Normal battle procedure, siting and coordination are carried out, with the excep-
tion that the TAIs are allocated by the sub-unit commander in consultation with either
the Atk platoon or section commander. When a single section is allocated to a com-
pany group, the Atk section commander will advise on the allocation of KAs and con-
duct the detailed siting and coordination at sub-unit level. If more than one section is
allocated to a sub-unit, the Atk platoon commander or 2IC should deploy to control
both sections.

0715. Field Defences. MRATGW must survive to fight. Key to its survival is good
siting using defilade which needs to be reinforced by solid field defences. During
defensive operations all primary positions must be fully prepared with the MILAN bat-
tle trench and Chatham Arch, which are detailed at Annex A. When allocating plant
and resources to prepare field defences the priority must go to those positions cov-
ering primary KAs. All subsequent allocation should be made from front to rear. The
Atk platoon 2IC must supervise the use distribution of plant and resources during the
preparation phase to ensure that it conforms to the anti-armour plan.

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ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 7

MILAN BATTLE TRENCH INCLUDING PROVISION FOR

OHP USING SHS SHEETS AND CHATHAM ARCH

Trench Construction Notes

1. The following diagram shows the dimensions and different sections of a MILAN
battle trench:
0.7 m 2.3 m 2.4 m 2.3 m
0.8 m

Shelter Bay Ammo Bay

Entrance Fire Bay with Wpn Sp

7.7 m

The MILAN Battle Trench

2. Stores. A list of stores required to construct the trench is at Appendix 1.

3. Excavating the Trench. Spitlock and deturf an area 7.7 metres long and 0.80
metres wide. Place the turfs to one side for subsequent use as camouflage.

Excavate the area to a depth of 1.5 metres (unless otherwise ordered).

4. Excavate the firing platform 2.8 metres long, 0.4 metres wide and 0.2 metres
deep then excavate cleared zone. Dig an anchor wire channel 0.3 metres deep and 3
metres long as shown:
2.8 m
3.0 m 0.4 m

Shelter Bay Ammo Bay

0.4 m

5.0 m

500
Ejection Areas mils

Excavating the Trench

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Note: Clear to a height of 0.5 metres above axis of ammunition tube. Taper depth
from 0.2 metres to nil over distance of 5 metres.

5. Constructing the Ammunition Bay. Place one 1.8 metre and one 0.6 metre
pickets to act as bearers along each side of the trench with the two pickets just
overlapping each other. Each picket is secured in place by 0.6 metre pickets.

Ammunition Bay

2.3 m

Constructing the Ammunition Bay (1)

Cut one 1.8 metre CGI sheet in half to revet the end of the ammunition bay. Only one
half sheet will be required if 1.2 metre wide sheets are used.

Connect four SHS sheets in pairs to support the OHP. Revet the end wall with the half
sheets of CGI, placing one half sheet above the other and overlapping by at least one
corrugation (only one half of a 1.2 metre wide sheet is used), then place the first pair of
SHS sheets against the revetment sheets to hold them in place. the SHS sheets must
rest on the horizontal pickets. Place the second pair of SHS sheets over the top of the
first pair of sheets so that the length of the bay is 2.3 metres, ensuring that it overlaps
the first pair by at least one corrugation.

2.1 m

Ammunition Bay

2.3 m

Constructing the Ammunition Bay (2)

Note: It may be easier if the whole trench is revetted prior to placing on any OHP.

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6. Constructing the Shelter Bay. The shelter bay is constructed in the same way
as for the ammunition bay, using two pairs of SHS sheets, ensuring that the length of
the shelter bay is 2.3 metres and that the gap between the shelter bay and
ammunition bay is 2.4 metres.

Shelter Bay

Fire Bay

2.3 m 2.4 m

Constructing the Shelter Bay

7. Constructing the Firing Bay. Revet the fire bay wall by placing two 1.8 metre
x 1.2 metre sheets, or four 1.8 metre x 0.6 metre sheets, one above the other and
overlapped by at least one corrugation with their ends tucked behind the vertical walls
of the shelter bay or the ammunition bay and then overlapped behind the weapon
support. Ram earth behind the revetment sheets to ensure a tight fit.

8. Constructing the Weapon Support. Place one 1.8 metre A/I picket along
each side of the fire bay in a central position to act as bearers for the weapon support.
Each 1.8 metres picket is secured in place by two 0.6 metre pickets driven vertically
0.3 metres from the ends. Connect the 0.8 metre SHS sheets, to support the weapon,
and rest them on the bearer pickets, so that the fire bay is divided into equal bays 0.8
metres long.

Weapon Support

Shelter Bay Ammo Bay

0.8 m 0.8 m 0.8 m

Constructing the Firing Bay and Weapon Support

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9. Constructing the Entrance. Connect one pair of SHS sheets for revetment
and place them behind the revetment pickets, and tuck their ends behind the shelter
wall. Tie the revetment pickets to the anchor pickets using six to eight turns of 14
gauge wire, windlass it in two places and backfill the anchor wire channels.

0.7 m

Shelter Bay

Constructing the Entrance

10. Completing the Battle Trench. Construct a sandbag retaining wall over the
open end of the ammunition bay and both ends of the shelter bay.

Place 0.45 metres of soil on both bays and compact it thoroughly. Remove the
remaining soil to another place or save for OHP if the Chatham Arch is to be used.
Replace the turfs over the shelter bays and camouflage the whole position.

Place a single layer of sandbags on the weapon support and adjust to suit firing posts.

Replaced Turfs

0.45 m

1.5 m
Sandbag
Retaining
Wall

Completing the Battle Trench

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OHP for MILAN — The Chatham Arch

11. Basis. The basis of the Chatham Arch is a standard three piece section
commercial steel arch culvert. The arch has a similar profile to, but is smaller than, the
Anderson shelter used in WWII. When disassembled and stacked the components
measure 1.6 x 1.5 x 0.3 metres and will fit inside a ¾ ton trailer.

12. Trench Description. The only modification to the existing MILAN trench was
to extend and place a central weapon support in the firebay. The weapon support is a
800 mm length of SHS with sandbags. Hence the MILAN weapon has been moved
rearward; this has reduced back blast overpressure and improved the arc of fire as the
missile is flush with the rear of the arch. One aspect of the new weapon location is that
the trench needs to be constructed slightly askew to the centre of the arch of fire. This
is because the left of arc is limited as the sight moves away from the firer. Even if the
trench is dug incorrectly, or the assigned arc is changed, within reason, the Chatham
Arch can be adjusted to suit before sandbagging.

13. Construction Details. The Chatham Arch can be easily constructed by two
men in 30 minutes to provide immediate overhead protection. Full OHP requires 160
sandbags giving a total completion time of eight man hours. This is five times faster
than the existing design and can be further reduced by the use of sandgrid or
Geoweb. This design is suitable where mechanical digging support is not available.
Full trench construction should follow as time permits. The normal trench construction
is as follows:

a. Stage 1. The fire bay is excavated 1.5 m deep x 2.4 m long x 0.80 m wide.

b. Stage 2. Excavate shelter bay and ammunition bay. Construct SHS and
fire bay with weapon support. Note: The weapon support aids revetment,
therefore no picket and wire revetting is required for the fire trench. Complete
excavation of firing platform.

c. Stage 3. Construct Chatham Arch over the fire bay and complete with
sandbagging or Geoweb.

Note: Camouflage of the Chatham Arch is an ongoing process which commences

at the start of excavation and continues until the trench is abandoned.

14. Carriage. The arch can be assembled in advance and carried as follows:

a. AFV. By removing part of the exhaust stack and rear aerials the arch can
be carried on the top rear of a 432. Provided the front tie back tensioning sling is
removed one man can tip the arch off the rear of the vehicle. The fall will not
damage the arch as any bend can be hammered out. The system would be
aided by welding fixing brackets to the 432. FEW have demonstrated this
procedure and found it provides rapid OHC. It should be noted that no
discussions have taken place with local road authorities.

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b. Manually. The arch can be carried manually; four is the minimum,

however, the optimum is six men.

c. Air Drop. Air drop, by helicopter or parachute, has been considered but
not trialled through a lack of resources. Air mobile forces may like to take this
option further.

15. Sandgrid/Geoweb. Sandgrid or Geoweb is a commercially available

polythene honey-combed material that can be filled with earth or stone to provide
OHP. It is simpler and faster to use than sandbags. FEW trialled sandgrid on the
Chatham Arch and found that two layers with a separation sheet of FRM could replace
160 sandbags. Concern was expressed that the sandgrid could be blasted sideways.
However, this could be prevented if the arch sheets have steel pins (similar to shear
connectors) that can be swung upright to engage the gaps in the sandgrid.

16. Other options for the use of Chatham Arch are detailed at Appendix 2.

17. Preparation — Connection of Seating Channel to Edge Sheets. Prior to

the deployment of the arch the seating channels can be bolted to the edge sheets.
The steps are as follows:

a. Place the edge sheets, concave upwards, together double bolting seam to
double bolting seam with the corrugations running in the same direction. Ensure
that the sides running parallel to the corrugations are common, i.e., holed or not
holed. If not, rotate one sheet by 3200 mils.

b. Place the seating channels on the outermost sides of the edge sheets,
running at right angles to the corrugations. Ensure that the large side of the
seating channel is on the bottom side of the edge sheet.

c. Line up the seating channels so that there are clear holes on the second
valley in from each end (to allow later connection of the tensioning tie back
slings) and at least one other clear hole. Using this hole bolt the seating channel
to the edge sheet.

d. The seating channel can remain permanently bolted to the edge sheet for
the life of the arch.

18. Installation of the Arch. The arch can be installed by two men as follows:

a. Lay the centre sheet, concave upwards with corrugations parallel to the
axis of the trench, in the ejection area approximately 1.5 metres from the closest
side of the trench.

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Platform

Shelter Bay Wpn Ammo Bay

Sp

1.5 m

Centre Sheet

Installation of the Arch (1)

b. Lay the edge sheets, concave upwards, either side of the centre sheet to
form a semi-circular shape as shown in the sketch. Ensure that the sides
running parallel to the corrugations are common, i.e., holed or not holed. If not,
rotate the centre sheet by 3200 mils.

1.5 m

Ejection Areas

Installation of the Arch (2)

c. Position soldier No. 1 with a spanner, spike and nuts on the outside of the
sheets. Position soldier No. 2, with a spike and bolts, between the sheets and
trench.

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d. No. 1 lifts an edge sheet to a vertical position so that it can be held by No. 2.

e. No. 1 then lifts the centre sheet so that it meets the edge sheet ensuring that
there is an overlap so that the holes can be lined up for bolting. Both soldiers can
use their spikes to assist in the line up. Bolting can then commence, noting that
the bolt heads are on the inside of the arch. At this stage six bolts spread over
the seam will be sufficient to hold the two sheets together.

f. Lift the last edge sheet and join to the centre sheet.

g. Complete the remainder of the bolting on both seams. There must be a

minimum of 22 bolts per seam although all available holes should be bolted. The
bolts have a lug that engages in the seam to prevent rotation and the head also
has a slot which fits the spike. Check that all bolts are tight.

h. If necessary adjust the position of the arch so that the seating channel is
lined up with the excavated platform.

i. Both soldiers move to the outside of the arch and lift under each bolting
seam. After a small lift the arch will fall under its own weight onto the platform.
Then adjust the arch so that the arc of fire is correct and the position is central to
the trench. Adjust the sandbags on the split hairpin shelter so that the seating
channel is supported.

j. Drive the 600 mm angle pickets as shown so that the grooves engage the
seating channel. The pickets are driven in pairs at each end of the seating
channel.

Chatham Arch

Shelter Bay Ammo Bay

Pickets driven in at
same angles as
corrugations

Installation of the Arch (3)

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k. Connect the steel wire rope tie back tensioning slings to the holes left spare
in the seating channels (second ridge in when viewed on the outside of the arch)
and tighten. Do not over tighten, just ensure that the tie back sling is not slack.

Tie Back Tensioning

Slings running parallel
and either side of
Fire Bay Trench

Shelter Bay Wpn Ammo Bay

Sp

Installation of the Arch (4)

l. Place three layers of sandbags on the top of the arch interlocking them to
prevent slippage. If soil is placed between sandbag walls ensure that the bolt
threads are covered with empty sandbags.

m. Camouflage as necessary.

19. Removal of the Arch. The arch can be removed by two soldiers using the
reverse procedure for installation. Do not remove the seating channel from the edge
sheets.

20. Stores. The stores requirements for the Chatham Arch are listed at Appendix 1.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 7

MILAN BATTLE TRENCH — STORES (INC OHP)

CGI sheets, 1.8 m x 1.2 m 5

(or CGI sheets, 1.8 m x 0.6 m) 9

SHS Sheets 1.2 m 10

SHS Sheets 0.8 m 2

1.8 m Pickets 33

0.6 m Pickets 24

Sandbags 200

14 Gauge Wire 1 kg

COMPONENTS OF CHATHAM ARCH

Corrugated centre sheet 1.5 m x 1.5 m 1

Corrugated edge sheet 1.5 m x 1.0 m 2

Seating Channel 1.5 m 2

20 mm nuts and bolts 45 (min)

Wire rope tie back tension slings 2

0.6 m Pickets 8

Sandbags 160

Spanner spike 1

Screwdriver spike 2

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 7

OTHER OPTIONS

Chatham Arch — Alternative Uses

1. During the development stage of the Chatham Arch, it became apparent that
there could be other field fortification uses for the equipment besides MILAN OHP.
The versatility of the equipment relates to the high structural strength to weight ratio of
the components because of the corrugated shape and arch profile. Possible other
options for the Chatham Arch are as follows:

a. OHP for GPMG (SF).

b. OHP for mortars.

c. OHP for observation posts.

d. Command post and field shelter.

e. FIBUA fortification.

2. OHP for GPMG (SF). The standard design of OHP for GPMG (SF) is very
similar to the existing design for MILAN OHP formed from pickets, CGI and sandbags.
The structural stability of this design has already been commented on. The Chatham
Arch meets all the dimension requirements for the GPMG (SF) fire bay; the profile can
be reduced by digging the seating channel foundations deeper so the arch almost
rests on the SHS shelter bays.

3. OHP for Observation Posts. FEW are not aware of a requirement for OHP
over observation posts (OP). However, interest was expressed by a GOC designate
during an RSME demonstration. If the edge sheets are joined together, a low profile
structure is produced that may also be suitable for stay behind parties. Alternatively,
the centre sheet can be used by itself to form an OP, hence each Chatham Arch will
provide two separate OPs.

4. Command Post/Field Shelter. As the Chatham Arch can be jointed together,

lengthways, by either bolting or overlapping the edges, it is feasible to construct a
command post/field shelter, using two arches.

5. Dimensions. The dimensions are as follows:

a. Span : 2.5 metres.

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b. Rise : 0.92 metres.

c. Length : 1.5 metres.

d. Thickness : 2.75 millimetres.

e. Weight (assembled) : 170 kilogrammes.

6. Components.

a. 2 edge sheets 1.5 m x 1.05 m.

b. 1 centre sheet 1.5 m x 1.5 m.

c. 2 seating channels 1.5 m long.

d. 60 M20 bolts and nuts (galvanised) (includes 10 spare).

e. Spiking tool and spanner.

The edge and centre sheets are corrugated on a 200 mm pitch by 55 mm depth, and
have 15 bolts per metre along the seams.

7. Material. The culvert material is mild steel, cold formed into corrugations,
galvanised, with a minimum yield strength of 227 N/mm2.

8. Tensioning Tie Back Sling. Steel wire rope tie backs (two per arch).

9. Weapon Support. The weapon support uses 800 mm long split hairpin shelter
(SHS). This item was the forerunner of the current 1.2 m SHS and was obtained from
FEW stock. 1.2 m SHS cannot be used.

10. Hold Down System. The need for a hold down system to prevent uplift was
identified for nuclear blast, and soil nails may solve this problem. A similar
requirement exists for artillery ground burst — 8 x 600 mm long steel pickets similar to
the type used with PSP would be suitable.

Summary

11. There are many uses for the Chatham Arch as a field fortification equipment.
The arch could be used as the standard design for OHP over weapon systems and
also below ground for shelters. It is stronger, quicker and more simple to construct
than the existing designs.

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Chapter 8

MRATGW — DELAYING OPERATIONS

Roles

0801. During delaying operations the Atk platoon can deploy its sections to provide
accurate medium range ATGW fire to support the delaying force. The principal tasks
for MRATGW are:

a. Support to the Screen Force. MRATGW should provide anti-armour

overwatch and observation as outlined in Chapter 7 — Defensive Operations.

b. Delaying Force. Maximum use should be made of MILAN's range to sup-

port both the false front and the delay force. Atk sections can be used either to
support a rifle company, in conjunction with armour or grouped with GPMG(SF)
or HMGs to provide maximum firepower into selected KAs.

c. Flank Protection. MRATGW can be used to cover an exposed flank or to

fill gaps created between adjacent units. Flank protection tasks can be carried
out by a single section when the threat is low or when conducted at sub-unit
level. If the threat from the flanks is high then it must be covered by a minimum
of two sections commanded by the Atk platoon commander.

d. Support the Disengagement of Forward Elements. MILAN can be used

by the in-place forces to provide MRATGW fire across the handover line to sup-
port the disengagement of the delaying force.

Delaying Force

0802. Purpose. Delay is an operation in which a force under pressure trades

space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum, without becoming decisively
engaged. Delay is arguably the most complicated operation to conduct. It does not
fit neatly into a series of stages. Rather it comprises a series of coordinated subordi-
nate actions of defence or offence, which are broken off when the enemy presses too
close to the point where the delaying force are at risk of being irretrievably embroiled.
Simplicity is thus a pre-requisite of planning for and executing a delay operation.

0803. Deployment. During delaying operations MRATGW should fight from well
sited and prepared positions making maximum use of anti-armour ambushes.
Sections can be deployed to operate either in direct support of a rifle company group,
in conjunction with armour or as a separate manoeuvre element.

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a. Support to Rifle Company Groups. An Atk section may be allocated to a

rifle company group to support it in its task. During the planning stage all ele-
ments of the company group must be synchronised by the company comman-
der to achieve the mission. The Atk section commander will provide detailed
advice about the deployment and siting of anti-armour weapons and conduct
the detailed coordination. MILAN is likely to be deployed to cover the main KA,
protect the front and flanks of the company position or provide depth to the
company position. High priority tasks must be covered by primary KAs while
other tasks will be covered by secondary KAs.

b. In Conjunction with Armour. Atk sections may be tasked to operate in

conjunction with armour either as part of the delay force or specifically as part
of a deception plan. In order to cause delay, the ATGW force should be
deployed to fix the enemy while the armour operates in a mobile role to strike
(see Fig 3). During deception operations it may be possible for ATGW and
armour to operate alongside each other to create the illusion of an inter-unit
boundary (see Fig 4). Both operations require careful coordination.

c. Manoeuvre Element. During some delay operations, particularly by light

forces, it may be necessary to establish alternative delay positions to give the
manoeuvre sub-units time to occupy their rear positions. MILAN, GPMG (SF),
HMG and indirect fire can all be group together to form an effective ad hoc
manoeuvre element capable of causing delay. Such a force has limited ground
holding capability and must therefore be sited to cause attrition at maximum
range.

0804. Conduct. Atk sections will fight the delay battle from a series of ambush
positions making it hard to identify primary and secondary positions. Section com-
manders must understand the higher commander's intention and priorities so that
they can implement the plan effectively. The overall conduct of operations is similar
that outlined for mobile defence in Chapter 7 — Defensive Operations. During the
course of the delay battle MRATGW may be used to plug gaps caused by the attri-
tion of other anti-armour systems. This should be achieved by redeploying sections
that are out of contact.

0805. Movement. In order to occupy delaying positions sequentially, Atk sec-

tions must move rearwards either by leap-frogging, caterpillar or a combination of
both.

a. Leap-frogging. If Atk sections are deployed in depth they can conduct

delay by leap-frogging. As the first section engages the enemy, the second
occupies the next position in depth and prepares to assume responsibility for
the operation. The first section disengages and passes around the second (see
Fig 5). It then prepares to re-engage the enemy from a position in greater
depth. Leap-frogging allows a high concentration of force on each KA and cre-
ates time for good battle procedure. However, it requires more forces. Leap-
frogging is recommended for a main axis.

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x6
x6

Fig 3. — Delaying with Armour — Fixing

Illusory
Boundary

x3 x6

Fig 4. — Delaying with Armour — Deception

RESTRICTED 8-3
8-4
x2
x2 x2
RL
John
Wdr
Route Wdr
Route

x2
x2 x2

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

RL
Peter

RL
Dave

Fig 5. — Leap-Frogging
 RESTRICTED

b. Caterpillar. If the delay battle is being fought over a wide area Atk sec-
tions may have to use the caterpillar technique. In this case an Atk section
delays continuously on and between positions throughout its area of responsi-
bility (see Fig 6). The priority of the KAs will determine the number of detach-
ments that are tasked to it and Atk detachments will be responsible for moving
rearwards on the orders of the section commander. The caterpillar technique
provides good coverage with less resources but is more likely to be penetrat-
ed. Caterpillar is recommended for use during the reconnaissance battle and
on secondary axes.

0806. Disengagement. Atk sections and detachments must understand when

they are to disengage from the enemy. This should relate to attrition, delay imposed
(time lines) or a defined point on the ground (disengagement lines). At times Atk sec-
tions may need indirect fire to assist them with disengaging from the enemy; such
tasks should be preplanned and held on call. Drills for disengaging must be practised
before the start of an operation.

0807. Coordination. The anti-armour plan must continue to be coordinated by

the Atk platoon commander. In particular he must ensure that gaps created by attri-
tion are filled by anti-armour assets in accordance with the battlegroup commander's
intent. The Atk section commander must coordinate the movement of his detach-
ments with each other as well as with other assets deployed on the same task.

0808. Command. It is essential that simple command procedures are main-

tained during delay operations. The chain of command for a particular operation must
be clearly defined so that the section and detachment commanders are in no doubt
concerning their missions. Regrouping must be carefully monitored by Atk platoon
HQ to ensure that the section commanders are fully briefed on a change of mission.
Atk section commanders must position themselves to cover their primary KAs as
specified in the attached notes. If they are unable to define their main effort they
should locate themselves with the bulk of their firepower. The rearmost Atk detach-
ment commander should command the subsequent positions until the Atk section
commander is in a position to assume control.

Support the Disengagement of Forward Elements

0809. Purpose. The withdrawal of a delaying force into the area where an in-
place force takes over the battle can be a critical operation, especially if the delay
force has been unable to disengage. A handover line must be given; the in-place
forces may have to deploy forward of this line to take over the battle and assist in the
rearward passage of lines.

0810. Deployment. MRATGW can be deployed to provide ATGW fire across the
handover line to support the disengagement. There are two general options for
deployment, either a broad but shallow line across the battlegroup frontage or con-
centrated fire in fewer specified TAIs. The detailed siting will fall out of the IPB and
anti-armour planning.

RESTRICTED 8-5
8-6
x2
x2 x2
RL
John
Wdr
Wdr Route
Route

x2 x2
x2
x2 x2

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

Wdr
Route

x2
x2 x2 x2 Wdr
Route

Fig 6. — Caterpillar
 RESTRICTED

0811. Conduct. The enemy should be given as little indication of the handover
line as possible, therefore support on the handover line will be characterised by tight
fire control and efficient CSCMs. The action may be conducted either as an anti-
armour ambush, to cause maximum attrition in as short a time as possible, or it may
be conducted as a series of sniping ‘shoot and scoot’ actions. Anti-armour ambushes
need more combat power but provide a greater concentration of fire and stand a bet-
ter chance of stopping a larger force. Sniping actions provide more coverage across
the battlegroup frontage but are likely to be penetrated more easily. They will be more
effective against reconnaissance elements.

0812. Command. It is possible that the withdrawing force and the enemy may
approach the handover line in close proximity with each other. It is recommended that
the Atk platoon commander deploys forward as a liaison officer to provide the nec-
essary information to the battlegroup commander and his own troops. The Atk pla-
toon 2IC should remain in Main HQ to coordinate his own platoon and provide advice
to the battlegroup commander. Atk section commanders should locate themselves
with their lead detachment commanders to ensure tight fire control.

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8-8 RESTRICTED
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Chapter 9

MRATGW — TRANSITIONAL PHASES

SECTION 1. — ADVANCE TO CONTACT

0901. Purpose. The purpose of an Contents

advance to contact is to enable a force to Page
seize and maintain the initiative by seeking
SECTION 1. — ADVANCE TO CONTACT 9-1
to gain or re-establish contact, under
SECTION 2. — MEETING ENGAGEMENT 9-5
favourable conditions, with the enemy. By
SECTION 3. — WITHDRAWAL 9-5
seeking contact it differs from the meeting
engagement where contact is made unex-
pectedly.

0902. Roles. During an advance to contact MRATGW can be employed on the

following tasks:

a. As anti-armour overwatch for the recce force.

b. An anti-armour capability with the advance guard.

c. An anti-armour capability with the flank guard.

d. Close protection for battalion headquarters, sub-units and the echelon.

0903. Recce Overwatch.

a. Deployment. MRATGW can be deployed forward to provide protection

for the recce screen. In this role the Atk detachments must site themselves to
conform to the screen’s surveillance plan. While the normal siting considera-
tions will apply, it is highly unlikely that they will always be met. Therefore, the
Atk section should move as close behind the recce sections as possible to
ensure that the greatest possible distance is maintained between the firing
posts and the target.

b. Conduct. During screen overwatch tasks it is essential that detachments

move stealthily so that they do not compromise the recce screen. Individual
posts must be able to fire on their own initiative to counter an enemy threat and
it is therefore critical that movement across the screen is coordinated. Atk
detachments should always remain on the friendly side of the screen moving
forward either by caterpillaring or leap frogging firing posts. Successful conduct
of an overwatch task will depend on all elements involved understanding the
task and each other’s capabilities.

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 RESTRICTED

c. Command. An Atk section deployed on screen force tasks will be com-

manded by the Atk section commander who will liaise directly with the recce
force commander. When two or more sections are deployed the Atk platoon
commander or 2IC should coordinate their movement.

0904. Advance Guard. The advance guard will normally be based on a single
sub-unit and ATGW will be placed directly under command of that sub-unit com-
mander. Its role is to fix enemy forces once they have been identified by the recce.
During normal movement ATGW will be used to provide overwatch or flank protec-
tion. Once in contact ATGW will be deployed either offensively or defensively. It is
important that ATGW deployment is carried out as a drill, while trying to apply normal
siting considerations, to maintain the tempo of operations. A suggested drill is shown
at Figs 7a and b.

0905. Flank Protection. Flank guards will be deployed during most operations,
although their composition will depend on the enemy threat.

a. Deployment. A flank guard may be deployed at both sub-unit and battle-

group level and will operate within the battlegroup STA plan. The battlegroup
flank guard may include one or more MRATGW sections along with other ele-
ments. At sub-unit level an Atk section may be deployed on its own to conduct
flank protection.

b. Planning. MRATGW cannot match the speed of engagement of MBTs;

therefore the deployment of MRATGW must be planned before the advance
starts. The Atk platoon commander will conduct his anti-armour planning and
select KAs and the anti-armour plan may have to be updated or amended as
the threat develops.

c. Conduct. All flank protection tasks will have to balance the need to
counter an enemy threat from a flank and provide anti-armour overwatch with-
in the flank guard while moving forward in parallel with the battlegroup. The Atk
section will move purposefully, deploying detachments as appropriate; MILAN
post should normally be fought dismounted. Forward movement of the sections
will be coordinated by the Atk platoon commander and must be conducted with
the highest standards of fieldcraft to avoid detection.

d. Siting. During the course of the advance the section commander should
site detachments to the best of his ability given the time available. The detach-
ment commanders must conduct their own detailed siting, based on the infor-
mation passed to them by the section commander. Detachment commanders
must also select potential emergency firing positions while their detachments
are on the move.

e. Emergency Action. A MRATGW section should always aim to engage

enemy armour from well sited positions. If the section is surprised by the enemy
it will have to carry out an emergency action drill. The detachments must deploy

9-2 RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

(Vulnerable
Flank) (mounted)

(mounted) (mounted)

a. — During the Advance

En

x2
(Vulnerable
Flank) x2

x2
(mounted)

b. — On Contact

Fig 7. — Suggested Advance Guard Drills

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 RESTRICTED

immediately to the best cover available, conduct a ground action and engage
the enemy as quickly as possible. The vehicle must be moved away from the
firing positions and concealed in dead ground.

f. Formation. The Atk section will normally use a loose box formation to
provide all round observation and defence. The vehicles must avoid bunching
but should be close enough to provide overwatch.

g. Movement. There are three movement techniques:

(1) Travelling. The flank guard uses a travelling technique when

speed is necessary and contact with the enemy forces is not likely. All
vehicles of the section move together, usually in column.

(2) Travelling Overwatch. The travelling overwatch movement tech-

nique is used when contact with the enemy forces is possible, but speed
is important. The section commander and the lead detachment will move
forward supported by the two rear vehicles, one of which will provide
overwatch while the other covers to a flank.

(3) Bounding Overwatch. The Atk platoon commander orders bound-

ing overwatch when contact with the enemy is expected. The section
commander will move forward with the lead elements as in travelling
overwatch until he reaches the first of his KAs he then sites his lead
detachment. One of the rear detachments then takes on the overwatch
task and the advance continues to the second KA when the second
detachment is sited. The advance continues in this manner until all
detachments are sited at which point the second section must either pass
through or the section commander must lift his rearmost detachment and
pass them forward to take over the advance.

h. Command. Commanders at all levels must understand their missions

and be prepared to act off their own initiative so that they can influence the bat-
tle quickly. Platoon commanders are responsible for forward planning and con-
trolling the movement of their sections to ensure that they conform to battle-
group manoeuvre. Section commanders are responsible for the tactical deci-
sions and the implementation of the anti-armour plan. Detachment comman-
ders are responsible for the deployment of their posts and the conduct of
engagements.

0906 – 0907. Reserved.

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SECTION 2. — MEETING ENGAGEMENT

0908. Purpose. The meeting engagement is a combat action that occurs when a
moving force, incompletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy at an unexpect-
ed time and place. This will usually occur during an advance to contact and can eas-
ily lead to a hasty attack and possible exploitation. Initiative and delegation will be of
the essence.

0909. Role. During a meeting engagement the Atk platoon could be used in
either an offensive or defensive role. The three most likely tasks are to:

a. Fix the enemy to prevent him deploying or withdrawing to more favourable

terrain through offensive action.

b. Conduct defensive operations to guard a flank to counter an enemy strike.

c. Conduct anti-armour ambushes to strike the enemy once the conditions

are favourable.

0910. Planning. A meeting engagement is characterised by a lack of informa-

tion, lack of time and confusion. It is therefore not possible to plan in detail for this
kind of operation. The platoon commander must understand the battlegroup com-
mander’s contingency plans for dealing with a meeting engagement. He must be
constantly selecting suitable KAs and should regularly brief section commanders on
his own contingency plans and priorities.

0911. Conduct. Due to the nature of a meeting engagement the Atk platoon
commander may have to deploy his sections to counter an enemy threat on his own
initiative. In doing so he must ensure that he does not add to the confusion.
Detachments should not be left to sit idle and should be brought into action where
they can make some contribution until a firm decision is made about their deploy-
ment.

0912 – 0913. Reserved.

SECTION 3. — WITHDRAWAL

0914. Purpose. A withdrawal occurs when a force disengages from the enemy
in accordance with the will of the commander. It seeks to disengage its combat force
from the enemy although contact may be maintained through other means. Success
will depend on tight control, security, balance and maintenance of morale.

0915. Role. During a withdrawal the Atk platoon can provide MRATGW for:

a. The security element, particularly when tanks are withdrawn early.

b. The flank and rear guards of the main body.

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 RESTRICTED

c. A new or intermediate defensive position.

0916. Planning. During the planning for a withdrawal the Atk planning team will
have to consider two separate operations, planning the withdrawal and planning for
the subsequent operation. If the withdrawal is likely to be out of contact the planning
for the subsequent operation should be the priority. However, if the withdrawal is
expected to be in contact then the subsequent operation will take a lower priority.

0917. A withdrawal in contact will be conducted along the same lines as a delay-
ing operation.

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Chapter 10

MRATGW — OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

SECTION 1. — CROSSING AND BREACHING OBSTACLES

1001. General. MRATGW can be Contents

deployed to support obstacle crossing or Page
breaching operations. The use of MRATGW SECTION 1. — CROSSING AND
during hasty and assault operations will be BREACHING OBSTACLES 10-1
limited by the need for careful siting and the SECTION 2. — OBUA/FIBUA 10-2
lack of armoured protection for the MILAN SECTION 3. — OPERATIONS IN WOODS
teams. However, MRATGW would be partic- AND FORESTS (OIWF) 10-4

ularly useful during deliberate and covert SECTION 4. — OPERATIONS IN

CONDITIONS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY 10-4
operations. In general the employment of SECTION 5. — OPERATIONS IN AN NBC
MRATGW will be similar to that outlined in ENVIRONMENT 10-5
Chapter 6 — Offensive Operations with the
following considerations:

a. In-Place Force. MRATGW can be used to support the in-place force by

providing overwatch, fire support or security. Maximum use should be made of
its range either to fire across the obstacle, from areas that are less likely to be
subject to enemy counter fire, or to interdict the enemy beyond the immediate
scope of the assault echelon.

b. Bridgehead Force.

(1) Assault Echelon. MRATGW can be carried with the assault eche-
lon to support the immediate assault. However, it will have a restricted
ammunition load and therefore be of limited use.

(2) Main Body. MRATGW should be deployed with the main body to
establish a hasty anti-armour defence for the bridgehead area.

c. Breakout Force. MRATGW could be used to support the advance as laid

down in Chapter 9 — Transitional Phases.

d. Water Obstacles. Both the MILAN firing post and the missiles are highly
susceptible to water damage following total immersion. If the risk of immersion
is high, MILAN firing posts and missiles should be stowed in logistic containers.

1002 – 1003. Reserved.

RESTRICTED 10-1
 RESTRICTED

SECTION 2. — OBUA/FIBUA

1004. General. MILAN is a weapon which, if it is to be used to best effect, should

be employed to destroy enemy armour in open countryside since this is what it was
designed for. Because of this, it is not a weapon well suited to FIBUA, since in that
environment targets are likely to be fleeting, or head on. Short range Atk weapons
are more suited to such tasks. Given these limitations, MILAN teams will be better
employed fighting from an urban area or an area of close country, engaging enemy
armour in the open countryside around villages or woods.

1005. Considerations. If MILAN is to be employed in FIBUA, the important con-

siderations must be borne in mind by commanders:

a. MILAN can be used to fire along streets at armour. However, the streets
may be cluttered with obstacles and the tanks may be either static or head-on
to the MILAN. The shoots involved would be difficult and dangerous.

b. MILAN in FIBUA can, by virtue of its accuracy, be used against enemy

strong points with great effect, and from considerable range.

c. The firing of MILAN from buildings poses many difficulties, and planned
defence incorporating their use must take these into account.

1006. Firing MILAN from Buildings. The following factors should be borne in
mind, and are presented as a form of SOP. This SOP is based on American para-
meters developed for other weapons. All dimensions must be confirmed by trial and
analysis for application to MILAN.

a. MILAN, like all backblast weapons, cannot be fired from a completely

enclosed or unvented room. However, MILAN can be sited and fired safely from
a building providing the following conditions are met:

(1) The building must be of sturdy construction and structurally sound.

(2) The room/ceiling must be at least 2.1 metres high.

(3) The floor size of the room must be at least 7 x 7 metres.

(4) There must be at least 2 square metres of ventilation (room open-

ing) to the rear of the weapon. (An open 2 x 1 metre doorway will be ade-
quate.)

(5) All glass, fixtures and small loose objects must be removed from the
room.

(6) All combustible material must be removed from behind the weapon,
but curtains and overstuffed furniture should be left in place (out of the
backblast area) to help absorb sound.

10-2 RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

(7) There must be an adequate clearance between the bottom of the

launch tube and the firing aperture. If possible a depression stop should
be used.

(8) Everyone in the room must be forward of the rear of the MILAN and
must wear ear defenders.

b. The crew must take precautions to minimise the effects of:

(1) Dust being raised on firing. Damping down will normally be neces-
sary.

(2) Poisonous fumes. Thorough ventilation is essential.

1007. Advantages and Disadvantages. As mentioned above, MILAN is more

likely to be used to fire from an urban area into the surrounding countryside. The fol-
lowing list of advantages and disadvantages of using MILAN in this way may be of
assistance to officers and NCOs when tasking or siting MILAN.

a. Advantages.

(1) Ammunition can be stockpiled in buildings or cellars.

(2) There will probably be better routes to alternative or secondary posi-

tions for MILAN teams.

(3) Track plan possibly unnecessary.

(4) Better concealment than in open fields.

(5) Good protection against small arms fire.

(6) Crews may find protection from artillery fire in cellars.

(7) More local resources will be available for construction of positions.

(8) The enemy may be forced to dismount his infantry to clear the urban
area, thereby slowing his advance.

(9) More fire positions, requiring less preparation, will be available.

(10) Thermal signatures will be better hidden.

(11) The range of MILAN may allow the linking of village defences.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) MILAN teams may be in obvious positions and will attract artillery
fire and FGA.

RESTRICTED 10-3
 RESTRICTED

(2) The urban area can be by-passed or encircled.

(3) Posts may be more difficult to site.

(4) Withdrawal from a village once in contact will be difficult.

(5) To gain defilade, the enemy must almost be allowed to drive past
the position before being engaged.

(6) Comparatively few MILAN may be in positions to engage the enemy.

(7) Minimum range of the weapon could require the collocation of 94

mm LAW.

(8) Fire positions must have sufficient overhead clearance to allow for
missile climb on launch.

(9) MILAN sited within buildings may become one shot weapons
because of the dust created and possible identification of the position.

1008 – 1009. Reserved.

SECTION 3. — OPERATIONS IN WOODS AND FORESTS (OIWF)

1010. Operations in Woods and Forests (OIWF). Reduced fields of fire make
MRATGW unsuitable for operations in woods and forests. During offensive opera-
tions MRATGW should be used to isolate objectives by interdicting enemy withdraw-
al or reinforcements routes. During defensive operations MRATGW should be
deployed forward of the forest, to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main
position, and on the flanks to destroy any enemy attempting to bypass the defended
localities within the forest.

1011 – 1012. Reserved.

SECTION 4. — OPERATIONS IN CONDITIONS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY

1013. Operations in Conditions of Limited Visibility. MILAN with its MIRA

sight will provide a 24 hour surveillance capability, although it will be downgraded by
mist and rain. If visibility is limited the following should be considered:

a. MILAN positions will have to be adjusted to cover the priority KAs.

Battlegroup HQ must be informed of any changes to the STAP. If time allows
poor visibility positions should be sited and coordinated.

b. Additional LAW patrols may have to be tasked to cover the gaps.

10-4 RESTRICTED
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c. Positions that are sited during poor visibility must be adjusted at the earli-
est opportunity.

d. MILAN OPs can be used to vector manoeuvre forces onto specific objec-
tives.

1014 – 1015. Reserved.

SECTION 5. — OPERATIONS IN AN NBC ENVIRONMENT

1016. Operations in an NBC Environment. The weapon system is designed to

be able to operate in an NBC environment, although prolonged periods in respirators
will degrade the firer. Most No. 1s will experience difficulty in acquiring a sight pattern
when firing in respirators and must practise the technique frequently during training.

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Chapter 11

THE ARMOURED INFANTRY ANTI-TANK PLATOON

Introduction

1101. The introduction of WR has significantly enhanced the combat effectiveness

of AI Atk platoons, and allows greater flexibility in their tactical employment. Currently
the AI Atk platoon is established for 12 MILAN posts (two sections each of six posts),
eight WR, two Spartan and 48 personnel.

1102. Firepower. An AI Atk detachment of two MILAN posts is mounted in a WR,

which has a turret-mounted 30 mm RARDEN main armament and 7.62 mm co-axial
MG. These turret weapons are a significant enhancement of the detachment’s
firepower. The co-axial MG is effective against dismounted infantry and soft skinned
vehicles. The 30 mm cannon is effective against most light AFVs, but not against
MBTs or the most modern generation of IFV. Therefore, MILAN is the primary anti-
armour system of the Atk detachment and the WR turret weapons are of secondary
importance.

1103. Turret Manning. There is no dedicated turret crew within the Atk
detachment. The detachment commander is the vehicle commander and the vehicle
gunner is the Number One from one of the MILAN teams. When the detachment is
mounted in the vehicle the turret should be fully manned by the detachment
commander and the vehicle gunner. During ground actions all members of the
detachment are likely to be dismounted, leaving only the driver with the vehicle. In
certain circumstances the detachment commander may wish to keep his vehicle
ready to move and should use either himself or his gunner as a skeleton vehicle crew,
ensuring that the remainder of the detachment man both posts.

1104. Tactical Use of WR Turret Weapons. If the turret is fully manned its
weapons may be employed in the following way:

a. Static Protection. Atk detachments are vulnerable to attack from the rear
or flanks by enemy vehicles or infantry while they are dismounted to cover a KA.
During these tasks WR should be deployed to over watch positions from which it
can cover and protect the dismounted detachment.

b. Mobile Protection. When the detachment is mounted in WR, the turret

weapons, combined with the vehicle’s speed, agility and protection, result in a
greater degree of survivability.

c. Enhance Anti-Armour Firepower. WR may be deployed to cover the

same KA as the dismounted posts. This has the advantage of supplementing
the ATGW fire with the turret weapons, so that as the MILAN engages MBTs the

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 RESTRICTED

WR may engage soft skin vehicles and dismounted infantry. However, this
leaves the flanks and rear of the dismounted detachment unprotected. It also
renders the WR more liable to destruction and should only be implemented
when the need for firepower overrides mobility.

d. Hides. For some tasks it may be appropriate to group the WRs in a Bravo
Muster or short-term hide while the detachments are dismounted. In this case
the WRs should be held ready for the extraction and redeployment of the
detachments.

1105. Separate Tasking. MILAN is dependent on its WR for mobility and

essential support. It also has no separate vehicle crew, so that the dismounted posts
and WR should always be employed as a single fire unit. In certain circumstances it
may be possible to task the two elements separately but the following limitations must
be considered:

a. Command. When Atk detachments are dismounted, the detachment

commander should dismount with them. Similarly, when an Atk section is at
ground action, the Atk section commander must remain in a location where he
can exercise effective command and control over his dismounted sections.
Therefore, if the WRs are to be employed on a separate task, the only
commanders available for this will be the vehicle gunners. The loss of the WR
will also reduce the range and effectiveness of both the section’s and
detachment’s communications.

b. Administration. When the detachment dismounts from the vehicle, they

must always assume that they may be separated from their vehicle for up to 12
hours and carry sufficient CSups, air bottles and batteries to sustain their
operations. Clear orders must be issued for the ground dumping of missiles and
subsequent abandonment/destruction if the Atk detachment is required to
exfiltrate on foot.

c. Routine. It is unlikely that the six man detachment will be able to sustain
the operation of both the posts and the vehicle over a 24 hour period.

1106. WR Location. When the detachment dismounts to cover a KA, WR will

move to a separate location in order to fulfil one of the above tasks. The following
factors will dictate the siting of WR:

a. Concealment. MILAN has a small silhouette and negligible thermal firing

signature. It is therefore hard to detect and capable of achieving great surprise.
WR, with its large visual profile and thermal signature, must be located in a
position that does not compromise the dismounted MILAN positions. This must
be the primary consideration when siting WR.

b. Time. The length of time that the detachment is to be dismounted should

be considered when siting WR. During a hasty deployment (5 – 10 minutes
during a mobile flank protection task) there may not be time to site and conceal

11-2 RESTRICTED
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the WR effectively. In this case, the WR must remain close enough to allow the
detachment to remount rapidly, but must be in a position that does not
compromise the concealment of the posts. For a deliberate deployment, more
time can be taken to site the WR effectively. This should involve the use of
camouflage and the digging of a scrape.

c. Communications. The dismounted detachment will use either a PRC 351

or lay line to the vehicle. When operating over a large area, the man pack radio
may not have sufficient range to communicate with the rest of the Atk section,
Atk platoon or sub-unit HQ. In this case the detachment will rely on the longer
range of its vehicle-mounted radio, and so the distance between the vehicle and
detachment must not be so large as to degrade the detachment’s ability to
communicate effectively.

1107. MILAN Firing Options. An AI Atk detachment can fire its MILAN from the
following positions:

a. Ground Role. MILAN is usually deployed in the ground role. This provides
the most stable firing position and lowest silhouette.

b. From the Rear Deck. This is not a recommended normal option, however,
during certain circumstances it may be necessary to fire off the rear decks of WR
in order to utilize the maximum range of the weapon. The drills for firing off the
back decks may be practised using DFWES equipment but are never to be
carried out during peacetime or TTW live firing. The following points must be
considered:

(1) Launch Dispersion. The configuration of the hatches in the open

position mean that there is a high probability of either the rear ejection of
the tube or the forward launch of the missile striking an obstruction on the
vehicle. This and the possibility of the missile’s overpressure being forced
into the rear of the vehicle mean that this method of live firing is strictly
prohibited in peacetime.

(2) Time into Action. The small size of the hatch and the limited space
inside the vehicle mean that getting the operator, post and missile tube
into position is a cumbersome and slow process. The constrained space
also means that only one operator can man the post resulting in a slower
rate of fire.

(3) Survivability. The visual and thermal signature of WR is hard to

conceal and will almost certainly draw fire onto the MILAN post. Both the
firer and MILAN post are unarmoured and liable to damage and injury.

(4) Turret and Vehicle Alignment. MILAN can only engage a target
from the rear deck if both the vehicle and the turret are aligned at ninety
degrees to the target. This is a slow process and hard to achieve in a
tactical environment.

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c. Pintle Mounted. There is currently no provision for a MILAN pintle mount

on WR.

Mobility and Protection

1108. The mobility and protection of WR has enhanced the tactical employability of
the AI Atk platoon. It can operate effectively in a mobile combined arms environment.
However, it must be remembered that when MILAN engages it must dismount its
teams from the vehicle and so loses the mobility and protection of the WR.

1109. Tasks. The operational tasks to which WR mounted MILAN is suited are
similar to Atk platoons in other infantry roles. Some of the areas in which WR has
significantly enhanced the Atk detachment’s effectiveness are listed below:

a. Flank Protection. An Atk section mounted in WR can effectively provide

mobile flank protection during such operations as an advance, delay or
withdrawal. The section may be under command of a sub-unit or the Atk platoon
commander.

b. Screen Force/Reconnaissance Group. An Atk section may be grouped

with a screen or reconnaissance group to provide over-watch and anti-armour
protection thus freeing up armour for other tasks.

c. Fire Support Group. MILAN can be effectively employed in a fire base.

The drill for a hasty attack would have MILAN deploying to occupy a firebase in
order to either reinforce assets already in place, or to release such assets
(principally armour) for other tasks. If armour is to be used in the FSG then
MILAN is best employed in the protection of the FSG rather than providing fire
support onto the objective.

d. Guard Force. WR mounted MILAN can be used as part of a guard force to

augment the battlegroup’s armour. It can be used to dominate an area, fixing the
enemy, while tanks manoeuvre.

e. Ambush/Delay. The firepower, protection and mobility of WR mounted

MILAN make it ideally suited to carrying out ‘shoot and scoot’ type ambushes as
a means of imposing delay and attrition. This can be done at section or platoon
strength and will generally require other battlegroup assets in support. Similarly
it is well suited to assisting other elements to achieve a ‘break clean’ from
contact.

f. Deception. The eight WRs of the AI Atk platoon make it similar in size to an
AI rifle company (14 WRs). MILAN’s ability to engage enemy armour almost two
kilometres away means that the Atk platoon is well suited to deception and ‘false
fronting’ during delaying operations.

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1110. Many of the tasks mentioned above involve an Atk section operating under
command of a sub-unit or as part of ad ad hoc grouping. If they are to operate
successfully (e.g., as part of the reconnaissance group) time must be allocated to
training these groups so that effective drills and SOPs can be developed and
employed.

Combat Service Support

1111. There are a number of administrative problems inherent in the current

establishment of the AI Atk platoon. The main areas of concern are listed below and
can be largely overcome by the application of effective SOPs and sufficient practice.

1112. Vehicle Storage. As with any AFV, there is limited stowage space inside
WR. The standard load carried in the rear of a Atk WR is:

Two Pax
Two Posts (including MIRA and all accessories)
12 Missiles
Two LAW
Personal kit
Vehicle CES

An effective and well-practised SOP for the storage of kit and equipment will ensure
the best use of the limited space available.

1113. Missile Resupply. Each Atk detachment will carry 12 missiles and two
LAW, which is sufficient for one standard engagement. Each Atk section commander
will carry 12 missiles and six LAW for immediate resupply in his Spartan. A further 24
missiles will be held at battlegroup HQ split between the Atk platoon HQ vehicles.
Remaining ammunition is carried by the A Echelon. The Atk platoon 2IC is
responsible for the coordination of resupply by sub-unit CQMS. Each platoon must
have a simple but effective SOP for resupply which is understood by the A Echelon.

1114. Ammunition Stowage. Vibration, lateral pressures or enemy action can

damage MILAN missiles. It is therefore imperative that they are stored in the left
sponsor using either the cruciform from the logistic container or the issued appliqué
kits. Two LAW must be stowed to cover the immediate short range anti-armour
capability.

1115. Vehicle Repair and Recovery. When sections are grouped with
companies, equipment support is provided by the company’s fitter section. When
operating with an ad hoc sub-unit or as a platoon group, provision should be made for
vehicle repair and recovery. Ideally, this should consist of a WR 512 and a WR 513
provided by Manoeuvre Support Company (Sp Coy) or drawn from a reserve sub-unit.

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1116. UTE and Harmonization. All posts must be tested and harmonized on a
daily basis during operations. Therefore, it is essential that the UTE and
harmonization equipment be carried in the Atk section commander’s Spartan.

1117. Simulator. Simulator training must be carried out as often as possible to

maintain operator skills. It must, therefore, be deployed on operations and used when
the Atk sections are static in forward mounting bases and concentration areas. The
simulator equipment is large and bulky and it should, therefore, be carried by CQMS
Sp Coy.

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Chapter 12

SHORT RANGE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS —

94 mm LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPON

SECTION 1. — THE WEAPON

1201. General. The 94 mm Light Anti- Contents

Tank Weapon (LAW) is the Army’s short Page
range anti-armour weapon. It will form the SECTION 1. — THE WEAPON 12-1
backbone of infantry companies’ anti- SECTION 2. — ORGANIZATION 12-2
armour operations and provide all elements SECTION 3. — DEPLOYMENT GUIDELINES 12-3
deployed in the close battle with an anti- SECTION 4. — OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 12-7
armour capability. LAW is a single shot SECTION 5. — DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 12-10
modular weapon which comprises a 9 mm SECTION 6. — OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC
spotting rifle, pre-loaded with five rounds, ENVIRONMENTS 12-18
and a rocket propelled HEAT round. It has
an effective range of 20 – 500 metres and
can penetrate up to 700 mm of RHA. A well trained LAW team should be able to
achieve a hit against a moving target at 300 metres and a hit against a static target out
to 500 metres. The complete system weighs 9.5 kgs.

1202. Limitations. The main limitations of LAW are:

a. It is a relatively delicate weapon and care needs to be taken over stowage

in trenches and when carried in AFVs or helicopters. During helicopter moves
LAW should be stowed between the legs, in the vertical position with end caps
on.

b. The weapon generates considerable overpressures when fired. Therefore,

it cannot be fired from confined spaces.

c. Its weight restricts the mobility and agility of the carrier during fire and
movement in the assault. It is also cumbersome and difficult to arm.

d. It has insufficient penetration to destroy modern MBTs in the frontal arc. It is

also degraded by Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA).

e. The launch signature is prominent and can be slow to disperse, particularly

in moist and airless conditions.

1203 – 1204. Reserved.

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SECTION 2. — ORGANIZATION

1205. Responsibilities Within the Rifle Company.

a. Platoon Commander. The platoon commander is responsible for

deploying and fighting his LAW teams in accordance with the company
commander’s anti-armour plan.

(1) He should give each section its KAs with a clearly identified left and
right of arc.

(2) He should show the section commander the general area in which he
is to site his teams, lay down the appropriate fire control measures and
priority of engagement.

(3) He must coordinate the platoon’s anti-armour plan using an AF

B9922.

b. Section Commander. The section commander is responsible for fighting

his LAW teams in accordance with the platoon commander’s plan.

(1) He should site his LAWs in detail to ensure that they can achieve the
mission and survive.

(2) He must ensure that both teams are aware of the Main Tank Threat
(MTT) and that they understand the fire control measures and priorities of
engagement that apply to them.

(3) He must ensure that arcs and reference points are shown on range
cards.

(4) He must ensure the serviceability of the section’s LAW.

1206. Allocation Across the Battlegroup. LAW must be allocated to ensure that
it can be used offensively by the rifle companies, Atk sections and reconnaissance
platoon. It must also be allocated to other stand alone groups such as battlegroup
headquarters, mortar line, echelons, Z musters and engineer groups. The exact
allocation of LAWs will depend on the threat, role in the operation and support from
other anti-armour weapons.

1207. Allocation Within Rifle Companies. The first line scale for each rifle
company is 72 LAW. This is distributed within the company in accordance with the
anti-armour plan but in principle each section should have an anti-armour capability.
Two LAW teams are usually incorporated into each section, one per fire team. During
dismounted operations no more than four LAW should be carried per section. The
remaining LAW will need to be moved forward using either dedicated bearer parties or
integral vehicles.

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1208. LAW Team. Although LAW can be carried and fired by a single soldier it is
more efficient when used by a two man team as follows:

a. The Number One carries, aims and fires the LAW.

b. The Number Two carries and prepares the second LAW, spots for the
Number One and provides close protection.

1209. Allocation Within the Atk Sections. LAW must be carried by all Atk
sections to cover the gap between the firing posts and the minimum range of the
weapon. All Atk detachments should deploy two LAW, one per post, with a further two
carried by the section commander.

1210 – 1211. Reserved.

SECTION 3. — DEPLOYMENT GUIDELINES

1212. Firepower. In battle, rifle platoons must be able to cause sufficient attrition
of the enemy to achieve their mission. Sections must be able to conduct rapid and
accurate engagements with LAW against the vulnerable areas of enemy AFVs.

a. Rate of Fire. LAW’s rate of fire depends on the time taken to acquire the
target, condition the weapon, confirm the lead and complete the engagement. A
well trained LAW team must be able to complete an engagement against a
moving target within 20 seconds. A high rate of fire can only be achieved if LAW
teams:

(1) Understand their mission, including any constraints on their action,

i.e., arcs and fire control measures.

(2) Recognize friendly AFVs at 500 metres.

(3) Have efficient weapon drills.

b. Accuracy. LAW’s design makes it impossible to apply the fourth

marksmanship principle. However, 80% and 45% hit rates can be achieved
against static and moving targets respectively. Acceptable levels of accuracy
will only be achieved if the LAW teams are practised in range estimation and
efficient at engaging moving targets. Range cards and reference points are
invaluable during defensive operations.

c. Hit/Kill Probability.

(1) The hit/kill probability is the theoretical number of rounds required to

kill a target and is governed by the effect of the warhead on the target.
When LAW is fired against IFVs the hit/kill probability will be high and they
can be engaged from any aspect; when LAW is fired against MBTs the

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hit/kill probability in the frontal arc is very low. Therefore, it is essential that
LAW is sited to engage MBTs from the side or rear if it is to cause the
highest levels of attrition.

(2) Experience has shown that enemy armour manoeuvres to present its
frontal armour to a LAW threat, making it hard to guarantee a flank shoot
from a single static position. Therefore, two mutually supporting LAW
teams should be sited to cover the predicted enemy approach route. The
primary team should cover the main KA while the secondary team will
cover the worst case route, usually the head on approach, as shown in Fig
8.

Primary
Team

Secondary
Team

Predicted
Enemy
Route

Worse Case
Enemy Route

Fig 8. — LAW Sited for Maximum Effect

1213. Movement. During movement to and from firing positions LAW teams
should move as part of a fire team. Once a firing position has been identified the
commander and LSW gunner should provide fire support while the LAW team moves
forward to occupy the firing point. Whenever possible the weapon is to be carried in
the closed position with the end covers fitted to prevent the ingress of sand and dirt
into the launch tube. The weapon should not be extended for firing until it is essential
to do so, which would normally be in cover near to the firing position.

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1214. Protection. LAW has a prominent firing signature and the survival of LAW
teams will depend on the following:

a. Siting. LAW must be sited so that the team are able to accomplish the
mission and survive. In order to achieve this LAW must be sited to engage the
side or rear armour of MBTs from positions that provide concealment and
protection. Therefore LAW must be sited in defilade to the expected enemy axis.
A defilade position is one that the enemy cannot engage with direct fire or
observed indirect fire from outside the LAW arcs. Defilade is achieved by siting
behind either hard or soft cover, as shown in Fig 9.

Fig 9. — A Defilade Position

b. Fieldcraft. All LAW teams must employ a high standard of fieldcraft to

prevent them being detected by the enemy. Maximum use must be made of
dead ground when moving around the battlefield and positions should not be
compromised during the occupation phase by vehicles.

c. Local Defence. During LAW engagements the fire team commander and
the LSW gunner should provide covering fire for the LAW team. This is
particularly important when engaging IFVs.

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1215. Employment. During combat, LAW will be deployed to provide either anti-
armour defence for a force, to allow it to complete its mission, or to conduct offensive
action to fix or strike the enemy. In both instances the key element is to cause
maximum attrition with as few losses as possible through careful siting. There are two
basic types of action using LAW:

a. Stalk. LAW is manoeuvred to engage either static or slow moving armour.

Stalks can be carried out during any operation of war but are covered in detail in
Section 4. — Offensive Operations.

b. Ambush. LAW is sited in a well concealed position, with maximum

defilade, covering a KA, into which it is predicted the enemy will drive.
Ambushes can be carried out during any operation of war but are covered in
detail in Section 5. — Defensive Operations.

1216. Target Guidelines. Target guidelines for the deployment of LAW are:

a. An individual LAW team should be targeted against:

(1) One static MBT.

(2) One moving IFV.

b. A section should be targeted against:

(1) One moving MBT or two static MBTs.

(2) Two moving IFVs.

1217. Readiness. LAW is a bulky and cumbersome weapon when extended for
firing. Therefore company commanders should relate the readiness of LAW to the
anticipated level of AFV threat. Thus, when the AFV threat is low all LAW should be
closed and under overhead cover. Conversely, when the armoured threat is high
company or platoon commanders could order the extension of a number of LAW
ready for quick and easy action. The decision to deploy LAW needs to be balanced
against the damage that could be done to the system by indirect fire that might
precede an enemy attack. Therefore the readiness state ordered should be the lowest
possible commensurate with the threat in order to maintain the integrity of this delicate
weapons system. Orders for LAW should be given within the coordinating instructions
paragraph, based on the guidelines shown in the following table:

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Readiness Guidelines

Threat Readiness State In Defence In Attack

Low 1 LAW closed with end Required for bunker

caps on. Placed under busting only.
cover.

Medium 2 Primary (1) LAW Small numbers carried

extended throughout as ordered by coy
stand-to (2). Sentries comd. Reserves car-
armed with LAW. ried forward in Z/B
vehicle or Rover.

High 3 All primary LAW Maximum number car-

extended for use by No ried or given to fire
1. Weapon to be held support group.
ready for immediate
use.

Imminent 4 As above with addition- Primary LAWs extend-

al reloads extended ed.
and ready in storage
bay.

Notes:

1. Primary LAWs are those weapons required for the first engagement.
2. Care should be taken to ensure that dirt does not ingress into the system as this
may hinder subsequent closing and re-extension of the launcher.

1218 – 1219. Reserved.

SECTION 4. — OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1220. Tasks. During offensive operations LAW can be used for the following
tasks:

a. Form part of the Fire Support Group (FSG). LAW teams can be integrated
with other elements in the FSG. LAW should only be used once the enemy
infantry have been suppressed by small arms fire or indirect fire. It is important
that LAW teams are deployed to achieve the best effect on the target without
bunching.

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b. Security of the FUP and FSG. Both the FUP and FSG are vulnerable to
offensive enemy action. LAW should be deployed to provide point defence
around both these locations.

c. Cutoffs. In close country, LAW teams can be infiltrated forward to lay

short term anti-armour ambushes.

d. Hasty Defence. LAW teams will provide the immediate anti-armour

defence for companies and rifle platoons.

e. Point Target Destruction. LAW teams will provide direct fire support to
assaulting platoons and sections. During the break-in battle LAW should be
targeted against strong points,bunkers and AFVs; as the battle becomes more
fluid it may be used to stalk AFVs or engage opportunity targets. LAW firings
should be integrated into platoon and section fire plans.

1221. Distribution. The number of LAW carried by platoons and sections during
offensive operations will depend on the threat and the specific type of operation being
conducted. It is recommended that the assaulting troops carry the minimum number
of LAW commensurate with the threat using the following groupings:

a. Section LAW Teams. Each section deploys with two LAW teams, each
carrying 2 x LAW. This gives maximum anti-armour capability but will reduce the
effectiveness of the assaulting troops and should only be considered for specific
anti-armour operations.

b. Platoon LAW Teams. Each platoon deploys with two fully equipped LAW
teams (one section) usually grouped together under the platoon sergeant. This
reduces the anti-armour capability but increases the flexibility of the assaulting
platoons. Teams are used at the discretion of the platoon commander.

c. Company LAW Teams. Each company deploys with six fully equipped
LAW teams. These are either the reserve platoon or a section detached from
each platoon under the control of the CSM or a nominated SNCO.

1222. Stalking. During offensive operations LAW teams may need to stalk both
slow moving and static targets so that they can be successfully engaged. Stalking is
generally carried out at section level, but may be incorporated into higher level
offensive patrols. The basic unit for a stalk is a section with two LAW teams.

a. Preparation. Before starting a stalk the section commander must identify

the general area of the objective. During quick battle orders the LAW teams
should be divided into primary and supporting teams.

b. Confirm the Objective. The patrol should move forward using scouts until
the commander can confirm the objective. The commander must make a quick
estimate to determine the best firing position for his LAW teams and issue quick
orders. The following should be considered:

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(1) The type of target to be attacked. MBTs must be attacked from the
flank, they can rotate their turrets and may move. IFVs can be attacked
from any direction but may be supported by dismounted infantry. Bunkers
may be supported by other positions.

(2) Ground to identify the primary LAW firing positions, firing positions
for the supporting team, routes to and from firing positions and a RV for the
withdrawal.

c. Execution of the Stalk.

(1) The supporting team occupies its position as quickly as possible and
is prepared to:

(a) Engage the target with small arms or RGGS to close down the
crew, if required.

(b) Engage the target with LAW if an opportunity presents itself.

(c) Cover the movement of the primary team.

(d) Suppress any supporting positions.

(2) The primary team should move to a position from which it can
engage the target, prepare its LAWs and engage the enemy firing no more
than two LAW.

(3) Once the primary team has engaged the objective it should withdraw
from the area. If the target has not been destroyed then the primary team
should take up a supporting position, once clear of the firing point, while
the secondary team manoeuvres to engage the target. If all LAW are
expended without destroying the target at least one of the stalking teams
should endeavour to keep observing the target while the other team
rearms for further offensive action.

1223. Fire Control. During offensive operations LAW teams will usually deploy at
‘weapons free’ enabling them to engage any armour that they do not positively identify
as friendly. If the probability of fratricide is high then ‘weapons tight’ should be
imposed as outlined in Chapter 1. In principle the primary LAW team should always
engage first to reduce ammunition wastage, while the secondary team ‘ghosts’ the
target ready to engage if the primary team misses. However, if targets are fleeting
then the LAW team with the best target aspect should claim the target and engage it. If
targets are hull down volley fire may have to be utilised.

1224 – 1225. Reserved.

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SECTION 5. — DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1226. Tasks. During defensive operations LAW may be used for the following
tasks:

a. Anti-Armour Matrix. During positional defence LAW will be sited to create

anti-armour matrices as part of either the sub-unit or battlegroup anti-armour
plan.

b. Point Defence of Sub-Units and Key Points (KPs). LAW will be deployed
to cover the approaches to company positions and KPs to complement the
battlegroup anti-armour plan.

c. Anti-Armour Ambushes. LAW teams can conduct anti-armour ambushes

as part of a covering force.

d. Manoeuvre Support. LAW teams will provide direct fire support to

platoons and sections during counterattacks with emphasis laid on stalking.

1227. Anti-Armour Matrix. An anti-armour matrix is a series of mutually

supporting LAW ambushes, normally mounted at company level designed to destroy
enemy armour within a selected KA. In order to be successful an anti-armour matrix
must sit astride predicted enemy routes and allow the enemy to penetrate it before
being initiated. An anti-armour matrix requires careful planning and skilful execution to
achieve the necessary shock effect for success.

1228. Composition of an Anti-Armour Matrix. There are four basic

components:

a. Early Warning. Some form of early warning must be placed on the enemy
side of the matrix. In certain circumstances this may be an element of the
battlegroup STAP but in most cases the company or platoon will have to provide
its own OPs.

b. Killer Group. This is the force covering the KAs that will engage the
enemy. It should consist of LAW teams, WR, mines, small arms and RGGS.

c. Cutoffs.

d. Reserves. Reserves should be held at platoon and company level which

can be used to plug gaps, reinforce positions or stalk armour that has broken
away from the main body.

1229. Conduct of an Anti-Armour Matrix. A matrix operation is conducted in

three stages:

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a. Occupation. The matrix should be occupied as stealthily as possible to

avoid compromise. Occupation should be carried out following either verbal or
radio orders using well practised drills. Once troops are on the ground they must
start to prepare obstacles and demolitions to channel the enemy into KAs.
Trenches and field defences must be prepared and ammunition, including LAW
must be stockpiled at critical points. Secondary positions must be sited, marked
and stockpiled with ammunition. Withdrawal or counterattack routes should be
reconnoitred and where possible rehearsed.

b. Engagement. As the enemy is about to enter the KAs fire control

measures should be reduced to allow the ambushes to be initiated. Once the
ambushes are sprung commanders should be prepared to mount stalks and
local counterattacks to exploit any success. Indirect fire should be used with
care but could be targeted against the enemy’s second echelon to disrupt their
reaction. Depth can be added to the matrix by using sequential KAs, as shown in
Fig 10.

c. Subsequent Operations. On completion of the matrix operation

commanders must either:

(1) Remain in their positions to defeat the next attack.

(2) Redeploy to prepared depth positions to defeat the next attack.

(3) Withdraw to start a subsequent task.

1230. Fire Control. Tight fire control must be enforced if the matrix is to succeed.
Initially all weapons should be kept at ‘self-defence’ until the enemy is within the
matrix. Once the enemy moves into the KAs ‘weapons free’ should be declared. All
commanders should ensure that they have a fail-safe method of initiation as set out in
Annex A to Chapter 1.

1231. Key Point Defence. The limitations of LAW make it a hard weapon to
deploy for KP defence. In order to make the most of the weapon, LAW positions
should be sited on reverse slopes along the likely approaches to the KP.

1232. Anti-Armour Ambush. LAW teams can be highly effective when used in
ambush from well concealed positions, with maximum defilade, covering a KA into
which it is predicted the enemy will drive. Anti-armour ambushes can be conducted at
section and platoon level in accordance with either the company or battlegroup anti-
armour plan.

1233. Principles. The following principles will apply:

a. Surprise. Surprise can be achieved by:

(1) Obtaining reliable information rapidly.

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(1)

(2)
(+)

(2) (+) (+)

(+)
(+)

(3)
(1a)

(2)

(+)

(3) (+)

Key: Notes:
OPs
(1.) OPs pull back to rejoin the depth pl.
Occupied (1a.) One secondary OP manned as required.
(2.) Fwd Sects fall back to unoccupied posns.
Unoccupied (3.) Reserves provide local counterattacks
or blocking positions.
Predicted
Enemy
Routes

Fig 10. — Layout of a LAW Anti-Armour Matrix

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(2) Careful planning.

(3) Detailed preparation.

(4) Good knowledge of tactics and techniques of enemy tanks and

AFVs.

b. Coordinated Fire Plan. Weapons, which may include mines and

demolitions, must be sited to achieve:

(1) Temporary isolation of the killing area.

(2) Restriction in crew vision by forcing tanks to close down.

(3) Separation of tanks and supporting infantry.

(4) Surprise delivery of accurate fire.

(5) Protection and concealment by siting in defilade positions.

c. Control. Effective control is essential for any patrol or ambush party and
must include:

(1) Early warning of the approach of a target or the location of a target.

(2) Positive identification of the target as enemy.

(3) Clearly understood fire control measures and orders for opening fire.

(4) Well defined arcs of fire and a priority of engagement.

(5) Immediate action drill if enemy cannot be engaged, or if the ambush

has been detected.

(6) A simple plan of withdrawal from the ambush positions.

(7) Radio communications.

d. Quick Reaction. Quick reaction and speed will be essential to:

(1) Deal with unexpected developments.

(2) Break contact effectively as a complete sub-unit. This may only be

achieved by simple, pre-rehearsed drills carried out quickly but under
control.

e. Simplicity. Ambush plans need to be kept simple so that:

(1) Each soldier has a clear understanding of his task in the ambush.

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(2) A quick and clean break with the enemy can be made once the
withdrawal is ordered.

1234. Factors in Planning Anti-Armour Ambushes. The following should be

considered when planning an anti-armour ambush:

a. Enemy Vehicles. IFVs can be attacked from any direction but may be
supported by dismounted infantry. Reconnaissance vehicles will invariably
move using stealth, avoiding obvious routes; they may also be supported by
MBTs. MBTs must be attacked from the flank and their weaknesses should be
exploited:

(1) Restricted vision when closed down.

(2) Limited depression of main armament. A tank is particularly

vulnerable when crossing a ridge.

(3) The lightly armoured areas of the tank hull. The sides, rear and top
are less well protected than the front.

(4) Difficulties in protecting themselves when replenishing or at rest.

b. Weather. Poor visibility will degrade sophisticated TI sights and give the
infantryman an opportunity to get in close for a kill. Poor weather will also affect
cross-country movement and assist in channelling armour along predicted
routes.

c. Darkness. With the introduction of thermal imagery and image

intensification devices, the advantages of darkness to the ambush are
considerably reduced; skilful use of ground and cover will offset this
disadvantage.

d. Available Weapons and Mines. The ambush plan must take into account
the weapons and mines to be used, and the characteristics and siting
requirements of each. In particular, attention should be paid to:

(1) LAW. The backblast area; arming distance of the projectile; fields
of fire.

(2) Red Phosphorus (RP) Grenades. These are most effective in

creating confusion, degrading enemy night vision devices and causing
burn injuries to dismounting troops.

(3) Mines. The availability of anti-tank mines and command detonated

mines; methods of initiation; danger to own troops.

(4) GPMG (Lt Role)/LSW. Ammunition available; use against tank

vision blocks, against dismounted troops; maximum use of beaten zone to
cover the withdrawal.

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(5) IEDs. Prepared by Assault Pioneers or RE and their use taught to

own troops.

e. Obstacles. The ambush should be sited to make maximum use of

obstacles to channel the enemy into the KA. Obstacles could include a
combination of the following:

(1) Minefields.

(2) Low wire entanglements or farm fencing.

(3) Booby traps.

(4) Cratering.

(5) Tree felling.

(6) Natural features.

1235. Composition of Anti-Armour Ambush Parties. The composition of anti-

armour ambush parties will depend upon the number of weapons to be used for the
particular task. Only rarely will the ambush group be less than section strength (eight
men). An eight man section ambush might form four groups as follows:

a. Command Team.

(1) Commander. Plans, sites, prepares, initiates and commands

ambush. He should also be prepared to fire RGGS during the withdrawal
phase.

(2) Smoke Man. Throws RP grenade on commander’s order and

covers the withdrawal. Acts as protection for the commander during
reconnaissance phases. He should also be prepared to fire RGGS during
the withdrawal phase.

b. LAW. Two teams of two. One LAW per team, both men work in pairs, one
man firing, the other as assistant and protection. At least two LAWs should be
kept in reserve (to counter any enemy armoured follow up), if necessary by
prepositioning extra LAW on the planned withdrawal route.

c. LSW Team. Two LSW gunners. Covers the occupation, provides early
warning and is responsible for engaging dismounting AFV crews.

d. GPMG Team. The platoon commander may allocate one of his GPMG
teams to support the ambush. This team is responsible for protecting the front of
the ambush and covering the withdrawal.

1236. Layout. A possible section anti-armour ambush is shown at Fig 11.

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Track
Sect Comd Smokeman
LAW Team Command
Detonated Mines Route in
LSW Team Bar Mine
GPMG Team En IFV
Sect RV

RV RV
RV

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Ambush Area
200 m x 200 m
Enemy
Road

Fig 11. — Possible Section Anti-Armour Ambush

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1237. Execution of an Anti-Armour Ambush. An anti-armour ambush follows

the normal patrol orders with particular emphasis on:

a. Action at FRV. On arrival at the FRV, normal patrol procedures will be

followed, but with the emphasis placed on the preparation of anti-tank weapons,
mines and illumination devices. Once this preparation has been completed the
commander, LSW team commander, GPMG team commander and smokeman
will make a reconnaissance of the ambush site to confirm:

(1) The exact killing area.

(2) Siting of Atk mines and command detonated mines.

(3) Siting of the LAW teams.

(4) GPMG/LSW positions.

b. Occupation. The sequence of events for the occupation of the ambush

position will normally be:

(1) The LSW team is positioned first to cover the move in of the
remainder of the ambush group.

(2) The Atk teams are then placed in position by the section commander.

(3) Mines are sited followed by wire and lights. Command detonated
mines should be sited on likely enemy counterattack routes, as flank
protection and along the withdrawal route.

(4) The GPMG team is sited.

(5) All groups prepare shell scrapes and clear fields of fire. If time
permits trenches should be prepared to Stage 3 and wire entanglements
laid.

(6) Withdrawal plans are rehearsed.

(7) The commander will usually visit each group in turn, before giving the
signal for ‘ambush set’, to confirm that all know their withdrawal routes to
the RV (unmanned), and to ensure that all weapons and defences are
correctly sited. Once the ambush is set all Atk weapons should be at
‘weapons free’ awaiting initiation.

c. Initiation. The ambush will usually, but not always, be initiated on the
leading enemy vehicle. The commander will let the chosen target vehicle reach
the killing area, then spring the ambush by initiating the primary Atk mine. This
will be the signal for the LAW teams to engage the AFV designated in the
commander’s orders. Smoke may be used to disorientate the AFVs which have

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been brought to a halt. The LSW team will engage dismounting AFV crews and
infantry. The GPMG should engage any enemy attempting to counterattack the
ambush site.

d. Withdrawal. On a pre-arranged signal, or when a group’s position

becomes untenable, a controlled, well rehearsed withdrawal should occur. The
sections should withdraw through RVs to the platoon RV. The withdrawal should
then continue along a clearly defined (and, if possible, marked) route to a point
at which it is possible to leave it at 90º via a concealed exit point, as shown in Fig
12. The GPMG team should cover the withdrawal from their flank positions for
as long as possible. Fire support positions should be pre-dug at each RV to
provide covering fire if needed. Indirect fire should be used to delay the enemy
and disrupt counterattacks.

1238 – 1239. Reserved.

SECTION 6. — OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

Crossing and Breaching Obstacles

1240. LAW is an extremely effective weapon system, which can be employed during
both deliberate and assault breaches or crossings. The tactical siting of the weapon
system is dependent on the depth of the obstacle and the enemy disposition. Within a
sub-unit LAW could be employed as follows:

a. In-Place Force. LAW can be deployed to support the in-place force by

providing overwatch for any reconnaissance force, fire support to the
bridgehead force or security to the bulk of the in-place force, including the
crossing headquarters. LAW should be sited to engage targets beyond the
crossing site on the far bank, cover reconnaissance probing for crossing sites
and to the flanks offering protection to the sub-unit.

b. Bridgehead Force. LAW must be carried by the assault force to provide

both immediate direct fire support and an anti-armour capability. Both the
assault echelon and main body will deploy LAW on the far bank to protect the
crossing and the build up of the breakout force.

OBUA/FIBUA

1241. LAW may be employed very effectively in urban areas. It is suitable for short
range engagements and the relative ease with which it can be moved enhances its
value to dismounted forces. When fired the weapon creates considerable
overpressure and this becomes a consideration when siting in built-up areas. It should
not be fired from small buildings or narrow alleyways. In extremes it can be fired from
large buildings such as multi-storey car parks.

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 Key:
Sect Comd Smokeman Concealed
Command Exit Point
LAW Team
Detonated Mines
LSW Team Bar Mine Wdr Route
GPMG Team En IFV
Sect RV

RV RV
RV

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ke
Smo

Enemy
Road

Fig 12. — Withdrawal Sequence for Section Anti-Armour Ambush

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1242. Offensive Operations. During offensive operations the use of LAW differs
as the attack develops:

a. During the investment phase the commander attempts to isolate the built-
up area from enemy withdrawal and reinforcement. LAW will mainly be utilized
by the reconnaissance force and must be sited to ensure an enfilade shot. The
main KAs will be covering enemy routes to and from the towns.

b. The break-in force can utilize LAW for shock action. The shaped charge is
unlikely to create a significant breach in a wall or cause casualties to those
inside the building. However, the blast and shock may be sufficient to neutralize
a defensive position in a room for a short period. Against structures, shaped
charge weapons should be aimed about six inches below or to the side of the
firing aperture. This enhances the probability of killing the enemy behind the
wall.

c. Securing the objectives and the clearance will be both time consuming and
ammunition intensive. LAW should be utilized to ensure that:

(1) The three dimensional nature of the battlefield is used to engage the
weakest parts of enemy armour, whilst enhancing the LAW team’s
survivability.

(2) HQs and echelons are properly defended. Due to the nature of the
operation HQs and echelons will probably move closer to the built-up
area. This increases their vulnerability to direct attack by enemy forces
and as such they require LAWs and a coherent defensive framework.

d. The reorganization phase will utilize LAW in a defensive framework and the
weapon system should be pushed out to the flanks and conform to the
considerations for defensive operations.

1243. Defensive Operations. During the defence of a built-up area LAW has a
varied tasking dependent on the stage of the battle:

a. The perimeter force will be made up of numerous groupings and within this
LAW can be utilized to cause early attrition of the enemy. Destruction of
reconnaissance and command vehicles will disrupt the enemy’s preparation for
the break-in. A clear plan of action and withdrawal route is required to ensure
the force is not cut off from the main defensive area.

b. The disruption force attempts to disrupt the attack by causing attrition and
channelling the enemy towards selected KAs. LAW should be utilized as
follows:

(1) In ambush positions firing from well concealed positions away from
buildings. Maximum use should be made of rubble or vehicles to provide

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concealment and protection. LAW teams should prepare two or three

such positions to increase depth and survivability.

(2) Against an armoured threat or from the line of march the utilization
of elevated positions is advantageous to the firer. Firing from elevated
positions protects the firer from tank main armaments and coaxial
machine guns. Utilizing flank and rear shots also enhances survivability
but care must be taken to choose well ventilated or open firing positions.
Against a convoy destroying the front and rear vehicles will trap the rest
of the enemy in the KA. An ambush position like this should be planned
in conjunction with snipers, infantry sections and GPMGs.

c. The main defended area comprises of a number of defended localities and

LAW would be particularly useful if sited in defilade to cover the approaches to
and between the defended localities. Pre-dumping will aid the rapid redeploy-
ment of LAW teams withdrawing from earlier phases of the battle.

d. The central reserve needs to consist of mobile forces with an anti-armour

capability. A thorough knowledge of the built-up area is required and the ability
to move to pre-reconnoitred positions would be beneficial.

Operations in Woods and Forests (OIWF)

1244. LAW is an ideal weapon system for OIWF and enhances section and platoon
fire power significantly. Due to limited distances involved in OIWF the use of spotting
rounds will give away any element of surprise and only the main armament should
be used. In all deployments the backblast area must be factored into siting.

1245. Offensive Operations. In offensive operations LAW should be located

with:

a. The assault groups, which enable the sweeps to move through the vege-
tation unencumbered by LAW. The assault group has the time and ability for
rapid deployment for anti-armour tasks.

b. The stop groups acting as cutoffs to destroy reinforcements or the enemy

withdrawal routes, utilizing the full range of LAW.

1246. Defensive and Delaying Operations. In defensive and delaying opera-

tions LAW can be used in conjunction with obstacles:

a. To channel the enemy into selected ambush areas, blocking routes with
disabled vehicles and causing maximum attrition before withdrawing to the
MDP.

b. Cover for pre-reconnoitred withdrawal routes.

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c. Designated KAs within the MDP.

Operations in Limited Visibility

1247. Uncontrollable factors such as fog and rain affect the whole battlefield but
light level smoke and dust can be used by both us and the enemy to act as a screen
or deception plan during operations. The deployment of LAW in operations in limited
visibility is dependent on the IPB and should be fully integrated with the STAP poor
visibility overlay. Due to the conditions there will be little warning of the enemy’s
arrival and as a result LAW should be ready and prepared for action. When LAW is
used at night, the following points should be considered:

a. LAW can be fitted with CWS.

b. Flares should be sited or fired to silhouette the target. A careful calculation

from the probable wind drift is necessary to avoid patrols being illuminated by
their own flares.

c. It will seldom be possible to fire flares and anti-armour weapons from the
same area. Ideally, radio communications should be used between those firing
flares and those firing Atk weapons to ensure coordination.

Operations in an NBC Environment

1248. The weapon system is designed to be able to operate in an NBC environ-

ment, although prolonged periods in respirators will degrade the firer. Most No. 1s will
experience difficulty in acquiring a sight pattern when firing in respirators and must
practise the technique frequently during training.

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