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NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

PAKISTAN

STATECRAFT AND STRATEGY

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DETAILED OUTLINE

STATECRAFT AND STRATEGY

CHAPTER-6
NATIONAL PURPOSE, INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES
 General 147

 National Security Policy (NSP) Basic Flow Chart 148

 International Environment 149

 Threats and Opportunities – Linkage with Interests 151

 Summing Up 152

 Objectives of Chapter 6 152

 Reference for Study 152

SECTION-I : NATIONAL INTERESTS – MEANINGS, HISTORY, USAGES AND

CLASSIFICATIONS
 Meanings and the Concept 153

 History and Usages 154

 National Interests – Conceptual Ambiguity 154

 Levels of National Interests 155

 Classifying the National Interests as per the Intensity 157

 Criteria to Determine National Interests 157

SECTION-II : NATIONAL INTERESTS – THEORIES AND DIMENSIONS

 General 160

 Theories of International System 160

 Balance of Power 161

 The Balance of Terror 161

 Collective Security 161

 Other General Theories 162

 Dimensions of National Interest 162

 Salience of National Interest 162

 Determining the Scope of National Interests 164

 Broad Dimensions of National Interests 164

SECTION-III : NATIONAL OBJECTIVES – THE ENDS

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 General 167

 The Concept of National Objectives 168

 Competitive and Absolute Objectives 168

 Power as a National Objective 169

 Wealth as a National Objective 169

 Cultural Objectives 170

 Peace as a National Objective 170

 Motivation for National Objectives 171

 Unified vs Divergent Objectives 171

 National vs Humanitarian Objectives 172

 Long-Range vs Immediate Objectives 172

 General vs Specific Objectives 173

 Stated vs Actual Objectives 173

 Status quo vs Change in Objectives 173

 Determinants of National Objectives 174

 Pakistan’s National Purpose, Interests and Objectives 174

SECTION – IV : NATIONAL PURPOSE, INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES –ONE OF

THE SUGGESTED MATRICES FOR PAKISTAN
 National Purpose 175
 National Interests 175
 National Objectives 175
CHAPTER - 7
NATIONAL POWER
 General 177
 The Anatomy and Rule of Power in World Politics 177
 Elements of National Power 178
 Geography 178
 Natural Resources 179
 Demography 180
 Economic Capacity 180
 Technological Base Including Nuclear Capability 181
 National Leadership 182
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 National Morale or Psycho - Social Element 183
 National Character 183
 Military Power 184
 War Potential 184
 Iman / Faith 184
 Information 184
 Reference for Study 185
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SECTION-I : POWER AND INFLUENCE

 General 186

 Coercion, Non-coercive Influence, and Non-coercive Uses of Power186

 The Forms of Power and Non-coercive Influence 187

 Power : Putative and Actualised 191

 Other Characteristics of Power and Non-coercive Influence 194

 International Power and Influence Structures 196

SECTION-II :THE ESSENCE OF NATIONAL POWER

 What is National Power? 199
 Roots of Modern Nationalism and Impact on National Power 201
 Retreat from Nationalism: Apparent and Real 201
 Personal Insecurity and Social Disintegration 203
 The Task of Evaluation of National Power 205
 Typical Errors of Evaluation 207
 The Absolute Character of Power 208
 The Permanent Character of Power 209
 The Fallacy of the Single Factor 211
SECTION-III : DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL POWER
 General 214
 The Context of National Power 215
 Categorizing the Elements of National Power 217
 Natural Determinants of Power 217
 Social Determinants of Power 220
 Method of Evaluation 225
 Thinking Out of Box 227
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CHAPTER-8
INSTRUMENTS OF STATECRAFT
 General 229
 The Use of Instruments of power 229
 Persuasive Instruments 230
 Cooperative Instruments 230
 Coercive Instruments 230
 Economic Inducements 231
 Covert Actions 232
 Force and Diplomacy 232
 Power and Influence: Choice of Instruments 233
 Instruments as the Means 233
 Objectives of Chapter-8 234
 Reference for Study 235
SECTION-I : PROPAGANDA: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT
 General 236
 Relevance of Psychological Instrument 236
 Nature and Scope of the Psychological Instrument 237
 Distinguishing the Psychological Instrument 238
 Methods of Influencing State Behaviour 238
 Types of Psychological Operations 239
 Techniques of Psychological Operations 240
 Propaganda - Areas of Difficulty 241
SECTION-II : DIPLOMACY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT
 General 242
 Basic Assumptions 243
 Foreign Policy Process and Role of Modern Day Diplomacy 243
 Major Functions of the Diplomatic Instrument 244
 Relation between Diplomacy and other State Instruments 245
 Trends in Diplomacy : Developing World 246
 Diplomatic Instrument: Limitations of Developing World 247
 Importance of Diplomacy as a Major Instrument 248
 Key Conclusions 248
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SECTION- III :ECONOMICS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT
 General 249
 Basic Components of Economic Statecraft 249
 Foreign Economic Policy 250
 International Economic Policy 250
 Economic Diplomacy 251
 Economic Leverage 251
 Economic Sanctions 251
 Economic Warfare 251
 Economic Coercion 252
 Forms of Economic Statecraft 252
 Significance of Economic Statecraft 253
SECTION –IV :MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT
 General 255
 Relationship between Policy and Military 255
 War as a Political Instrument 255
 The Essence of State and the Role of Military 256
 Military Force as an Indispensable Instrument of Statecraft 257
 Use of Force: Does the Ends Justify the Means? 258
 Use of Force : The Perfectionist Approach 258
 Use of Force : The Nonperfectionist Approach 260
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CHAPTER-6
NATIONAL PURPOSE, INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

General

1. Nations specifically identify their reason to exist. Vital core values, once grouped
to form a consensus will or desire of the people of a nation, become the purpose of their
lives. Once related to a state or nation state, it is called National Purpose - Raison
d’etre. Since National Purpose determines the roadmap of a nation, not only of today
but of future as well, a National Purpose Statement should carry national consensus
and constitutional support in precise and unambiguous words. National Purpose is
then manifested into National Interests, which in turn are split into detailed National
Objectives, generally called the ‘ends’. Therefore, spirit of the National Purpose must be
upheld in all circumstances and reflected in the National Interests. It is like a tree; core
values are roots, main steam is the National Purpose, shoots are the National Interests
while braches are the National Objectives. Relative significance of each Interest and
Objective is determined by its relative capacity to serve the National Purpose.

Ends – Linkage with National Security Policy Flow Chart

2. The basic elements of National Security Policy (NSP) are:-

a. National interests and objectives (The Ends).
b. Challenges or threats to the National Interests. (The Environment).
c. Power (or the instruments/resources required) for implementing the
National Security Policies and Strategies (The Means).
d. National Policies and Strategies (The Ways).

3. At the highest level of abstraction, national interests are the “wellspring” from
which national objectives, policy and strategy flow. National interests are the most
important wants and needs of a nation. The overriding national interests are normally
stated in terms of national survival, national identity and well being. Preservation of
territorial integrity, freedom, independence, socio-political institutions and honour are
fundamental to the survival of a nation.
4. Whereas national interests define the fundamental needs of a nation, national
objectives spell out what a country is trying to do to maintain those national interests.
National objectives are the specific Ends that a nation seeks in order to advance,
support or defend its national interests. Though National Objectives are generally
described in three broad categories-political, economic, and security, some other
categories such as social, ideological, technological or military are also used to ensure
specific emphasis.
5. Policy is a broad course of action to achieve specific objective and it provides
guide lines to formulate the strategy. At the highest level it is called National Security
Policy. At the lower levels respective ministerial policies are known as National Policies.
The dominating policy remains to be the National Security Policy. Strategy (The Way) is
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another term often used but little understood. It has taken on so many meanings in
different publications; therefore, it is important to set the context for its use here. Andre
Beaufre defines strategy as: The art of applying force so that it makes the most
effective contribution toward achieving the Ends set by political policy. The aim of
strategy is to achieve the defined objectives by making best use of the available
resources. The art of strategy consists in choosing the most suitable means from those
available and so orchestrating their results that they combine to produce a
psychological pressure sufficient to achieve the moral effect required. On the other hand
John Collins states that National strategy fuses all the powers of a nation, during peace
as well as war, to attain national interests and objectives. Within the context, there is an
overall political strategy, which addresses both external and internal issues; an
economic strategy, both foreign and domestic; a military strategy; and so on. Each
component influences national security immediately or tangentially. In short policy is
‘What to do’ (part) and strategy is (the) ‘How to do’ part of the National Security planning
process.

NSP - Basic Flow Chart

6. National Security Policy (NSP) flow chart in its simplest form is outlined as under:-

National Purpose

National Interests

National Objectives

National Security Policy

Supporting National Policies

National Strategies to implement each National Policy

7. Linkages and Brief Explanation

a. National Purpose

(1) Known as Raison d’etre.

(2) Desire/will of the people to lead their lives according to their
shared/common beliefs and values.
(3) Non verbal consensus of core values of people.

b. National Interests

(1) General and continuing ends for which a state acts.

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(2) Interpretation of National Purpose, in prevailing environment.
(3) Assessment of future prospects.
c. National Objectives

(1) Are based on certain principles and designed to support

national interests.
(2) Used to define broad goals or targets or phases whose
accomplishment leads to progressive attainment of national
interests.
d. National Policy

(1) Broad course of action at national level, designed to achieve

National Objectives.
(2) Means to accomplish Ends.
(3) Sometimes, policies are also called as the Ways.
(4) Provide guide lines to the national policies at lower level.

e. National Policies

(1) Policy prepared by each of the major instruments or ministries.

(2) Aimed at setting their respective specific course of action to
support the National Security Policy to achieve the national
interests and objectives.

f. National Strategies

(1) National strategies are prepared in detail to implement the

respective national policies.
(2) Strategy consists of both development and employment of the
respective instrument of power to achieve an objective.

International Environment

7. Theorists generally think international environment is under pinned by

international system. In simple words, the interaction of its entities (which creates the
environment) is according to some regularized process. So, the utility of any model of
international system lies in its ability to explain the dynamics with which a policy maker
must deal. But the world being very complex, does not lend itself to the grasp of any
strategist so easily. Therefore, an accurate assessment of international political
environment is usually mind-boggling and oversimplification in its assessment may lead
to wrong conclusions. This is so, because beneath the veneer of international system is
a functioning anarchy i.e. anarchy that works; amply explained in Chapter 2 of this Basic
Book.
8. In the post cold war era, the international political environment has become more
complex. This is primarily due to the decline of traditional political community like the
nation state and the ascendance of non-state actors. So, policies and strategies in their
traditional form are no longer able to deal with the new international environment
successfully. For that reason the meaning of international relations has also changed. It
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is no longer purely inter state relations. These political theories will be further explained
in the context of statecraft in Chapter 8.
9. In the post cold war (period) political literature, several divergent theories have
emerged to explain this situation and prescribe the strategies for dealing with the
changed international environment. Generally these theories perceive the world
demarcated and divided but not according to the state boundaries, but, on the basis of
technology, military power, economics, cultural & religious affinities and civilizations.
10. Interestingly western political theorists and strategists are increasingly targeting the
nation state and suggest that communication revolution and global economy will
eventually reduce nation state to “flag state” or even end of state sovereignty. It even
raises question on the very efficacy and purpose of a nation state. Besides this, forces
of regionalism and ethno-religious parochialism are also undermining the institution of
nation state. The decomposition of states in Africa offers a glaring example in this
respect. Similar forces are at work in Asia as well. The challenges are aggravating,
especially for the developing world.
11. However, for the developed world changed international environment is creating
new opportunities to regain control over the natural and human resources of the Third
World bypassing nationalism that historically has been the linchpin of a nation state to
protect itself against foreign influence and control Second, the developed world has
acquired that degree of economic prosperity and control over technology that even if
formally the role of state declines or diminishes, its polity will still stay intact. But in the
Third World, the story may have a different end. The weakening of state structure could
lead to break up of its polity. Prosperity is a uniting factor while poverty and
backwardness, unless alleviated, may turn into a disintegrating force So, the Third
World countries will have to carefully examine the notions and theories suggesting
diminishing role of state, identify challenges and their impact on the national interests
and objectives.
12. In the second half of the twentieth century (between the Second World War and
end of the Cold War) the international economy was conceptualized as per the following
subsystems:-
a. The developed (and industrialized) world corresponding roughly to OECD
countries.
b. The developing world is further subdivided into oil producing countries and
newly industrialized countries such as ASEAN. The bulk of Third World
countries and around 30 poorest states sometimes labeled as the fourth
world.
c. The socialist economic block.
13. At the end of the Cold War the biggest challenge for the developed world was
how to integrate the erstwhile socialist economies (of Russia and Eastern Europe) with
the developed world (the first world) or minimally bring them at the same level with the
newly industrialized countries (the second world).
14. Sensing that the existing geo-economic systems would persist as their economic
problems are there to perpetuate without a major redistribution of resources and
transfer of technology, the United States and the rest of the developed world came up
with a new solution. This new solution was based on the fact that at functional level
international trading and financial system was cutting across these geo-economic
subsystems. So, international free trade in this new order is given the primacy under the
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rhetoric of “global economy”. Actually it should be termed as free global trade since that
is the substance of this new order.
15. The global economy in its conceptual essence and practical implications is no
different from Mercantilist and colonialist economic order as it also presents a
relationship of an economic centre and the periphery where it is the economic centre
that dictates what to sell and what to buy and on what terms and the periphery is to
comply with. Moreover, like that order, it envisages that the centre (the developed
world) will avail the cheap labour and raw material of the periphery (the developing and
the under developed world). This order is likely to impact national interests and
objectives of all nation states around the world, thus, comes the conflict of interests.
16. Karl Marx said, “Capital has no motherland”. However in this case “the
motherless capital “will flow from undeveloped to the developed lands hence those are
the hub of international finance. Second the flow of technology in this new economic
dispensation is not likely to be as free as promised. Western transfers of technology,
regimes are getting more rigid than relaxed. Thirdly, labour is not given access across
borders. While the developed world controls capital and technology, under developed
world has some residual control over its labour and natural resources. In the global
economy they are likely to lose that also. So, there are enormous challenges to the
national interests of developing countries like Pakistan.

Threats and Opportunities – Linkage with Interests

18. There exists a close relationship between threats, opportunities and national
interests. Threats and opportunities essentially emanate from international environment.
In other words these are created by other players. The international environment can be
broadly put in two inter related but separate fields i.e. political and economic.. Similarly
identification of threats and opportunities for promoting national interests is equally
important for formulation of strategy. Here it may be pointed out that while in the case
of superpower or big powers it is usually a threat to their regional or global interests,
but, in the case of smaller or weaker states it can be a threat to their national security or
even survival. So, the threat definition and appreciation assume greater importance in
the case of weaker states. When it comes to opportunities, weaker states have lesser
capacity then big powers to create opportunities. Therefore, they have to wait for them
and avail them, if and when these arise. For this reason, the leaders/strategists of
smaller states need to show greater astuteness than their counterparts in the big
powers. The most difficult task for the leader of a medium/small power is to appreciate
that what is vital for his country is most often not vital for the super powers and that it is
them who set the rules of the game which a small power or country like Pakistan cannot
violate in the pursuit of its national interests and objectives. Then, in the last analysis
the medium/smaller power has to adjust its objectives to the world order established by
the big powers and it cannot aspire for vice versa. Even, the domestic environments are
also subjected to the pulls and pressures of the international environment and the
interests of the great powers.
19. For this reason, a Pakistani strategist should be very clear about what is feasible
and what not while setting the foreign policy objectives, and, he/she should define the
national interests accordingly. In other words, “he/she has to cut the coat according to
the cloth.” But, it is often more difficult to do than to suggest that nation’s interests
should be defined clearly. It requires not only the ability to interrelate and synthesize
clashing perceptions and opposing versions of facts and conclusions but also the
appreciation of national aspirations and core values. But having said so, the clear
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definition of national interests is an essential pre-requisite to an effective and sound
national strategy. However, the concept of national interests is as simple as it may look
like. It requires intensive study and effort to comprehend its dimensions and linkages
with the environment and policies and strategies.
Summing Up
20. To sum up, big powers can afford to make mistakes in the definition and
identification of national interests, threats and opportunities. By the sheer weight of their
power they can escape out of a crooked situation. Second, their capacity to absorb
setbacks is much greater. But weaker states can hardly afford to make big mistakes in
their strategic calculation, since they can barely live with “small mistakes”. This highlights
the significance of this Chapter. The National Defence Course will revolve around the
discussion of national interests and objectives. Almost, all syndicate/central discussions
and National Security exercises will refer to the national interests and objectives of
Pakistan. Therefore, it is of almost importance to understand the concept in its all
dimensions, levels and classifications.
Objectives of Chapter - 6
21. Following objectives are intended to be achieved:-
a. To understand the meanings, usages and classifications of national
interests.
b. To study basic theories of international system impacting the concept of
national interest.
c. To comprehend the concept of national objectives (as Ends) and their
linkages with the national interests.
d. To identify National Purpose, Interests and Objectives of Pakistan.
Reference for Study
22. Following references are suggested for further study:-
a. Strategy and Force Planning Naval War College, Newport, RI, USA.
b. National Interest by Joseph Frankel.
c. National Interest, International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.
d. National Interests, Political Parties, Mass Media, Religion and Foreign
Policy by Attar Chand.
e. The Origins of National Interests edited by Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas
and B.Frankel
f. National Interests by Trable, Josephy.
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SECTION-I
NATIONAL INTERESTS – MEANINGS, HISTORY, USAGES AND CLASSIFICATIONS

Meanings and the Concept

1. ‘National interest’ is a singularly vague concept. It assumes a variety of meanings
in the various contexts in which it is used and, despite its fundamental importance,
these meanings often cannot be reconciled; hence no agreement can be reached about
its ultimate meaning. The admittedly limited literature specifically dealing with it
suggests no precise classification of its various uses. It is characteristic that no entry
under the heading can be found in the Oxford Dictionaries, in the first edition of The
International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.
2. Though fundamental but relatively unimportant is the semantic ambiguity
stemming from the fact that the adjective ‘national’ refers both to the nation which is a
social group and to the state which denotes its political organization. In most cases
reference is made to the state and it is usually clear from the context when this is not
the case, e.g. when the argument is about nationalism, or a nation devoid of a state, or
when the nation is juxtaposed to the state, etc. Ambiguities can, however, occur and
can be of great importance, when a nation is not coterminous with its national state, as
in the case of the interwar Germans or of the contemporary Chinese.
3. To start with, as an analytic tool, the term national interest was employed to
describe, explain, or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation’s foreign policy.
As an instrument of political action, it serves as a means (rather than ends) of justifying,
denouncing or proposing policies. Both usages, in other words, refer to what is best for
a national society. They also share a tendency to confine the intended meaning to what
is best for a national society. Beyond these general considerations, however, the two
uses of the concept have little in common.
4. Two fundamentally different approaches to the analyses of the concept are
represented by the ‘objectivists’ and the ‘subjectivists’. The former assume that national
interest can be objectively defined. Or, at least, can be examined with the help of some
objectively definable yardsticks and criteria. The latter interpret it as a constantly
changing pluralistic set of subjective preferences; the most important recent work in this
direction has been through the study of decision-making. It is impossible to reconcile the
two approaches and frequently even the individual contributions within one of the
schools.
5. The definition of national interest further depends upon the position a person
holds between several pairs of extremes, such as altruistic egoistic (ideals vs self-
interest, idealists vs realists), short- and long term concerns, activist and reactive,
radical and conservative, hard and tender minded, traditional and innovating, collectivist
and individualist, etc. In all cases it is more profitable to think not of a dichotomy but of
a spectrum within which the attitudes of individuals can be ranked after they have been
measured by some empirical indices. Finally, increasingly blurred boundary between
the domestic and the international activities of the state adds to the confusion, since
core values pursued within these two areas of activities are not necessarily identical and
often receive quite different priorities.
6. The substantive definition in each case must be arrived at through confronting
the aspirations of the state with its image of the international environment and all the
ensuing uncertainties can be subsumed under three major headings:-
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a. Vagueness of the aspirations and lack of clear priorities;
b. Incomplete knowledge of the international environment;
c. Uncertainties about the behaviour of other states and the evolution of the
nation state system.
7. National interests are often expected to be permanent or extremely durable. In
our generation, Hans Morgenthau has matched Lord Palmerston’s assertions on the
subject. The national interest of great powers and in good measure the methods by
which it is to be secured are impervious to ideological and institutional changes. Their
permanence is, however, only relative. They are subject to reinterpretation, especially in
the light of changes in power relations. Since the last war, for example, Britain has
abandoned her traditional oceanic priorities and the principle of avoiding military
commitment to the Continent in peace time, the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine,
reinterpreted several times since its announcement in 1826, has again changed.
History and Usages
8. The history of the concept of ‘national interest’ goes back to the earliest stages of
the evolution of the modern state, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, first in
Italy and then in England. After the advent of nationalism, the older terms like the ‘will of
the prince’, ‘dynastic interests’ or raison d’etre were gradually replaced by reference to
the nation. The term ‘national interest’ has been extensively used by American
statesmen ever since the establishment of the Constitution. Similar terms were
concurrently employed, such as ‘national honour’ ‘public interest’, ‘general will’; often
the imperative nature of the concept was stressed by reference to ‘vital interests’.
9. In the West today the ‘nation’ and ‘national interest’ are losing their supreme
place in politics. On the one hand a unitary national interest strikes us as inappropriate
for our pluralist societies, on the other; it clashes with global ideals and integration
within regions. The clarity of the concept of ‘national interest’ is closely connected with
that of political boundaries and hence the generally perceived crisis of the national state
inevitably leads to a crisis of national interest. Its popular appeal is waning.
10. The concept of ‘national interest’ is particularly useful for purposes of
comparison. Such comparison used to be simple in the nineteenth century when the
Concert of Europe consisted of a few, fairly homogeneous states. It has now become
increasingly complex owing to the combination of several developments. First, the
multiplication of states limits the uses of detailed historical inquiry since all the 140 or
more states are obviously beyond anybody’s scope. Second, a parallel multiplication of
cultures and of value-systems obstructs understanding. Instead of being, as in the past,
a major tool of analysis in the circumscribed western word, historical analogy has
become less useful and even misleading when we try to understand the foreign policies
of a Communist, or Asian or African state. Third, the constantly growing volume and
scope of international transactions has broadened the field of enquiry. Fourth, the
integration of international politics has greatly reduced the value of limited comparisons.
National Interests – Conceptual Ambiguity
11. Throughout the history of the evolution of the state, states have recognized no
higher authority than themselves. Obviously, then, the state is the entity that defines its
own interests and that determines how it will attempt to achieve them. A state's interests
are called the national interest, and the methods and actions it employs to attempt to
achieve its national interests are called national policy.
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12. Unfortunately, however, the concept of national interest is extremely ambiguous,
as even the most cursory examination shows prevailing ambiguity.
a. Who within a state defines the national interest?
b. Do national interests change when governments change either peacefully
or by force?
c. Which group or groups within a state define who the friends and enemies
of a state are? When serious internal disagreements exist concerning
national interests and national policy, which view of interest and policy is
truly national?
d. Does a state in fact have long term interests determined by geography,
resource base, population, cultural ties, and other factors that transcend
short term or mid term definitions of national interest that are influenced by
the politics of the day?
13. The ambiguities are many. These questions are much more than academic
inquiries relevant only to the classroom. Throughout history individuals and groups
have appealed to the national interest to justify the policies that they preferred.
a. What then is national interest and who is to define it? What factors should
be considered when an attempt is made to define it?
b. What roughly 170 states in the world today follow? These and other
related questions are of great importance. Perhaps the most significant
question, however, is what should count when national interest is being
defined. Inevitably, different individuals give different answers.

Levels of National Interests

14. The term ‘national interest’ can be classified into aspirational, operational and
explanatory and polemical. The logic of this classification is highly imperfect since the
third category overlaps with the first two; moreover, the suggested categories do not
escape the nature of ‘ideal types’. Nevertheless, the classification is operationally
convenient since every single use of ‘national interest’ falls predominantly, though
seldom completely, within one of the proposed categories.

15. Aspirational Level. On the aspirational level, national interests refers to the
vision of the good life, to some ideal set of goals which the state would like to realize if
these were possible. If interest is professed on the aspirational level alone, this means
that it is not actively pursued but it does not mean that it is politically irrelevant. It still
indicates the general direction desired and, given an opportunity through favourable
changes in the environment or in capabilities, it may become operational. Thus, while
we would be mistaken in attributing an immediate operational significance to the
professed ex Soviet desire to communize the world. We would be likewise mistaken in
considering this desire as meaningless and as incapable of becoming operational in
some favourable circumstances. Their characteristics are as under:-
a. They are normally long term interests ;
b. They are generally rooted in history and/or ideology;
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c. They command more attention from an opposition free of the restraints
than preoccupation with, that of actual government. Within political realm
they are the major concern of extremist factions which are concerned with
ideological purity;
d. Even when they do not directly influence actual policy , they can provide
purpose or direction, or at the least, a sense of hope (e.g, pan-Arabism or
pan Africanism or the messianic ideas in Polish history);
e. They need not be fully articulated and coordinated and they can be
contradictory;
f. They do not require a ‘feasibility study’ and are rarely if ever costed;
g. They are determined by political will rather than by capabilities-ideology is
a strong determinant. The influence of power is ambivalent: while an
ambition may be due to the people’s awareness of the power of their
state, it can be likewise due to their awareness of their powerlessness and
their escape into day dreams.

16. Operational Level. On the operational level, national interest refers to the sum
total of interests and policies actually pursued. Operational interests tend to differ from
aspirational ones in respect of the following characteristics:-
a. They are usually short, capable of achievement within the foreseeable
future;
b. They often, but not exclusively, stem from considerations of expediency;
c. They are the predominant concern of the government and/or party in
power;
d. They are used in a descriptive rather than a normative form;
e. Owing to the practical problems of implementation, contradictions among
these are less easily tolerated than among aspirations;
f. They are generally translated into policies which are based upon the
assessment of their prospects of success and which can be at least
approximately costed;
g. The crucial variable in their determination is found in capabilities rather
than in political will. Hence the hypothesis can be advanced that
classification of states by power is here more relevant than that by
ideology. It is likely that all small states, whatever their ideology, merely
react to overwhelming international stimuli;
h. They can be systematically arranged into maximum and minimum
programmes, the former approximating aspirational interests. Such
arrangement, however, depends upon systematic planning of foreign
policy and rarely, if ever, actually takes place.
17. Explanatory and Polemical Level. On the explanatory and polemical level,
in political argument, the concept of ‘national interest’ is used to explain, evaluate,
rationalize or criticize foreign policy. Its main role is to ‘prove’ oneself right and one’s
opponents wrong and the arguments are used for this purpose rather than for
describing. The most important sources are official documents published (white and
coloured papers) and statements by heads of government and foreign minister made in
 18
parliament, at press conferences and on other occasions. A special category of these
are made for international consumption, diplomatic notes, statements made during
foreign visits and in the United Nations. The non official sources such as parliamentary
debates, discussion in the mass media, are also relevant examples.

Classifying the National Interests as per the Intensity

18. Vital Interests. These are directly connected to the survival, safety and
vitality of a nation. If these are unfulfilled, it will have immediate consequence for
preservation of the core values. To preserve vital interests, there can be no compromise
or hesitation about going to war. Vital national interests are relatively easy to define. If a
certain interest is declared as vital, it must be backed up by military power; otherwise
the opponent may consider it as a bluff. The vital interest transcends to the shade of
survival interest where the very existence of the nation is in peril. This condition arises,
when there is an imminent credible threat of massive destruction to the homeland if the
aggressor state’s demands are not met. Therefore, the nation must be ready to fight a
war in case the vital interests are threatened.
19. Most Important or Very Important Interests. These include interests which if
unfulfilled will result in damage that will eventually affect vital national interests. These
include issues, which become so important to the nation’s well being that its leadership
will refuse to compromise beyond the point that it considers to be tolerable. Potentially
these interests can grow in the minds of the citizens until they seem to be vital. For the
third world countries such interests may include the economic prosperity, communal
harmony, national integration and resolution of a dispute with neighbour states.
20. Important Interests. These include those national interests, which affect
national well being of a nation or the world as a whole. If these are unfulfilled, it will
result in damage that is unlikely to affect vital national interests. These will generally
include issues that a country considers important but not crucial to its well being and
can be negotiated with an adversary and mutually advantageous deals worked out
provided the adversary is not engaged in hegemony. If the opponent is hegemon,
compromises on important interests will not calm matters and may even be read as
appeasement.
21. Peripheral Interests. These include interests, which are harder to define
and one may seek to compromise. Typically they may be somewhat removed from our
borders and represent no threat to our sovereignty. These are issues that are of lower
order of political, economic or ideological magnitude and do not pose any threat to our
sovereignty. If these are unfulfilled, it will result in damage that is unlikely to affect vital
national interests.
Criteria to Determine National Interests
To some economic criteria is the answer. Any policy that enhances a states economic
position is seen to be in the national interest. Improving a country's balance of trade,
strengthening a country's industrial base, or guaranteeing a country's access to oil,
natural gas or other energy or non fuel mineral resources may all be considered to be in
a country’s national interest. Often, however, economic criteria may conflict with other
criteria.

22. Ideological criteria are sometimes used as the predominant determinant of

national interest. Most counties either formally or informally use an ideology to justify
both their legitimacy and policy. Ideological criteria influence the states to adopt certain
 19
ways of looking at the world and of defining their national interests; ideology may at
times be overcome by other criteria for defining national interests.

23. The augmentation of power is another method of defining national interest. Any
policy that enhances state’s power is therefore in its national interest. Power of course
may be augmented in a variety of ways, such as by improving economic strength, by
using ideological persuasion, or by enhancing military capabilities; power permits a
state to survive, and therefore it is in the interest of all nations to acquire power.

24. Military security and/or advantage is another prominent criterion to determine

national interest. With force playing such a prominent role in international relations,
states perhaps look to military security as a minimum determinant of their national
interest. Proponents of military security argue that chief responsibility of any state is to
provide safety for its inhabitants; proponents of military advantage argue that the best
way to achieve that safety is through military advantage. Arguments about nuclear
parity, versus ‘nuclear superiority’ are at least in part the result of such differing opinions
as to military dimensions of national interest.

25. Morality and legality are similarly contentious issues when attempts are made to
determine the national interest. Although in many instances the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ of an
issue may be at first apparent, closer examination often clouds what at first glance may
have been a clear moral or legal conclusion. Morality and legality as determinants of
national interest raise even more question when they are addressed in the context of
military capabilities. In both moral and legal senses might may not make the right, but it
does influence the outcomes.
26. Numerous other criteria also exist for determining the national interest. Some
people argue that national interest should be determined by cultural affinity, that is, by
defining a states interest to coincide with the interests of other states whose language
or traditions may be the same as one’s own. Others argue that ethnic or race issues
should play a large role in determining the national interests. Still other individuals see
national interest as any action or set of actions that allow a country to make all its
decisions for itself, regardless of what the economic, military or other implications of that
total independence would be.
27. What then ‘counts’ when national interest is being defined? The answer,
obviously, depends on who is doing the defining. In the minds of some, so called
objective factors such as economic strength, military capabilities or the size of the
resource base may prove dominant when national interest is being defined. Other may
view subjective factors such as morality, legality or ideology as more important.

28. National interest must therefore be viewed less as a constant set of national
objectives than as changing approximation of what the leaders of a country or other
significant individuals or groups within a country view as important. Even this general
observation must be qualified, however, for the rate of change of these approximations
of national interest may differ considerably from a country to a country.
 20

29. Even the type of government that a state has may play a major role in
determining how a state's national interests are defined. Governments of Western style
democracies, for example, often take into account the wishes and desires of various
interest groups that wield domestic power, more autocratic or dictatorial governments
define their national interests with less concern for inputs from domestic interest groups.
30. National interest, then, is a difficult term with which to come to grips. Within a
single state different individuals and different groups define the national interests in
different ways, even at the same time. It has a concept that has no universal meaning.
Even with those shortcomings, however, national interest is a useful concept, for it
provides us with a tool with which we can understand, in general terms, the objectives
states seek in international affairs.

SECTION-II
NATIONAL INTERESTS – THEORIES AND DIMENSIONS

General

1. Generally, national interest is interpreted in a mixed way. Interpretation depends

upon several sets of contradictory considerations. First, decisions at the operational
level tend to be conceived within a narrow context in which only a few dimensions are
considered, whereas decisions at the aspirational level refer to national interest as a
whole and to the broad principles involved in it. Second, on the operational level the
processes of reasoning tend to be inductive; at the other two levels they tend to be
more deductive. Thirdly, people with a theoretical, philosophical basis take more
interest in the aggregate, whereas those with an empirical, scientific basis put more
emphasis upon the single dimensions of the concept. This is an example of the general
tendency of contemporary social sciences to break down in tractable social problems
and concepts into more manageable elements.

2. Fourth, social roles play a differentiating part. Top level decision makers
(statesmen, prominent politicians and senior civil servants, especially planners) as well
as people not directly involved in government (academics or publicists) generally take
more interest in the aggregate. Lower-ranking politicians and civil servants (the
executants of policies determined by others) tend to take a narrower interest in the
single elements of national interest. Fifth, powerful ideological beliefs stimulate interest
in the aggregate, as shown in the patriotic appeals by the nationalists or in the
expositions of the Communist millennium by the Marxists. Finally, the effect of the
power position of the state is ambivalent. A state with limited capabilities is governed
mainly by contingencies, is more closely tied to the operational level and is less capable
of developing its aspirational interests. Simultaneously, however, the scope of its
national interest is much more circumscribed, making it easier for its rulers to
comprehend and to pursue this interest as a whole.
 21
Theories of International System
3. The analysis of the state and its government is the most important and
impressive field of political thought but it is not directly concerned with national interest.
Traditionally, scholars have been concentrating upon domestic affairs (the structure of
government), the relations between the individual and authority, etc. Such early models
as those of a pyramid or a balance, or the more complex ones of mechanism or an
organism, gradually adopted from the natural sciences from the end of the Middle Ages,
allowed the scholars to analyse the state in isolation from the international
environment. Moreover, all these models and theories were concerned with the
discovery of certain immutable laws and left no room for the elements of purpose,
choice and decision. The latter were introduced only by the historians.
4. The basic purpose of foreign policy postulated until recently were found in two
interconnected complexes of goals: one centering upon survival, defence, preservation
of independence and maintenance of geographical boundaries and another one
centering upon diplomacy. These arise from the very fact of existence within the
international society. The basic purpose of foreign policy in the past could be summed
up as the maintenance of state sovereignty, a concept which became the foundation of
international relations and was inflated into a powerful myth. Undoubtedly, under the
impact of the recent changes in the international environment, this sovereignty, never
complete in the past too, has been eroded and has been to a large and growing extent
replaced by the interdependence of states.
5. Theories of the international system have a different focus from the theories of
the state and philosophies of statecraft. They are, nevertheless, intimately connected
with them as the state has to maintain its sovereignty within the international system
and hence is directly affected by the nature of the nation state system. The major
theories are: Balance of Power, Balance of Terror and Collective Security.
Balance of Power
6. The most important school of thought in the field is concerned with the ‘balance
of power’ to which many writers attribute a fundamental role in politics. Although many
variants have been proposed, the essentials of the approach are simple. Its proponents
claim that the international behaviour of states is governed predominantly by power
considerations and hence that the operation of the international system imposes as the
supreme goal of national interest a power position sufficiently strong to counteract any
possible dangers. This can be achieved by improving the capabilities of the state as by
securing allies, mainly on the principle of the bad neighbour policy. The underlying
theory is that clashes of opposing national interest are likely to arise with neighbours,
and therefore neighbours are destined to be enemies; hence it is a sound principle to
form ‘natural’ alliances with states not sharing a common boundary but being
contiguous to a neighbour and likewise hostile to it.
The Balance of Terror
7. Since 1945 the advent of nuclear power has brought into question the traditional
balance of power theory. On the one hand the theory is still operated in the modern
form of ‘the balance of terror’ which applies only to nuclear powers. This theory
prescribes as an imperative goal of national interest the maintenance of a sufficient
second strike nuclear force to deter an attack by the adversary. At the same time, in
order to avoid the dangers of escalation, it indicates also an interest in the operation of
an international order within which violent conflicts would be circumscribed, going far
beyond the concern of the states in the nineteenth century. It tended to create greater
harmony between the interests of varying and diversified nations.
 22
Collective Security
8. A further important theory of the international system is that of collective security.
It was incorporated into the Covenant of the League of Nations largely on the basis of
President Wilson’s ideas, and it was based upon revulsion against power politics and
the ineffectiveness of the balance of power, for which it was supposed to act as a
substitute. The basic objective of the new approach was to pit the collective power; of
all ‘peace-loving’ states against any aggression, by whomever and wherever it might be
perpetrated.
Other General Theories
9. Other general theories of domestic and of international politics are only indirectly
relevant. This applies even to theories of nationalism. It does of course make a great
difference to the moral and metaphysical foundations of national interest whether we
postulate the nation as the supreme good or refuse to do so. Writers on nationalism do
not, however, shed much light upon these problems as they are primarily concerned
with the analysis of the concepts like ‘the nation’ and of ‘nationalism’ and about their
relevance in history and politics. By the nature of things, most analysis of politics refers
to the concept of national interest. They tend, however, to postulate it or to classical
concept of ‘sovereignty’, writers about it assume that state conceive their national
interest primarily in the terms of the maintenance of sovereignty. The fashionable social
communication approach assumes in its own terms a similar national interest of
autonomy in social communication. Neither explains whether the postulated contents of
‘national interest’ lie in the very nature of our political system or whether they are
defined with some degree of freedom, and if so, in what way.
Dimensions of National Interest
10. The most frequently employed divisions are: strategic, political and economic
dimensions. This distinction, which corresponds with the customary division of
governmental tasks between separate ministries, has been frequently and rightly
attached for its tendency to lead to three distinctly conceived policies. These separate
policies being formulated and pursued in their individual contexts and insufficiently
coordinated, do not serve and often damage the national interest conceived; as a
whole. Nevertheless, regardless of departmental divisions and coordination,
governmental activities in foreign policy fall within the three fairly well defined categories
of strategic/military, political/diplomatic, and economic; each of which requires a
different expertise. Hence, the administrative division and the distinction of three
corresponding dimensions within the national interest are both fully warranted. The
different administrative problems of coordinating separate agencies so well documented
in the United States’ foreign policy are fully matched by the intellectual problems of
coordinating the corresponding three dimensions of national interest which starkly
appear in the recurrent debates about defence and economics. Subsequent paragraphs
merely outline the intractable problems of this intellectual coordination, without trying to
resolve them.
11. Although no clear models of a rational foreign policy to be aspired to have been
proposed either by statesmen or by their analysts and critics, the basic pattern implied
in most statements and writings on the subject is reasonably similar and national goals
are politically determined, the strategic goals should serve them, the country’s economy
has to supply the wherewithal and hence economic considerations serve as a source of
means as a well as a constraint. The balance between the three dimensions has
always been delicate, political goals can readily impose strategic ones which are
beyond the military potential and/or economic resources of the state; strategic goals
 23
through their own momentum may pervert political goals as well as impose unbearable
economic burdens; economic goals competing with the costs of strategy can cripple the
state’s military arm and upset its foreign policy. History abounds in examples for each
category of problems.
Salience of National Interest
12. ‘Salience’ is a term which has not been fully assimilated in common usage. It is
used here because it serves best to convey the joint qualities of importance,
prominence, urgency and intensity while, as explained later, it does not fully coincide
with any of them. Since the concept has a general bearing upon the formulation of
national interest, it is discussed here both in relation to elements and in general terms.
Salience is a compound notion. It can be regarded as roughly equivalent to the
immediate importance attributed to an issue or element and possible future changes in
importance are often so heavily discounted that we must think of salience as
characteristic of a short term view, and hence as potentially clashing with long range
considerations.
13. Salience can be equated with the prominence of the issue, which may coincide
with its intrinsic importance but also merely with its sensational news value. As it
coincides with prominence, it sometimes deviates from urgency because not all urgent
things become prominent and not all prominent things are urgent. Finally, owing to all
these considerations, it cannot fully coincide with the intensity of a person’s attitude
although the latter is one of its most important ingredients. It is harder to agree about
the salience of any elements of national interest than about their relevance or any other
of their qualities. This fact is generally acknowledged as being of utmost political
importance because salience largely determines the choice of priorities. It is not a
constant, objectively assessable quality. Its assessment fluctuates so much from
person to person and from occasion to occasion that many despair of the possibility of a
rational decision about national interest. The problems of comparison are further
bedeviled by the uncertainties of simultaneously assessing several states in which
calculations must be added up or multiplied by some co-efficient.

14. Ultimately, salience is determined by the general approach to foreign policy

which is governed by a combination of many factors. Specifically one may hypothesize
that its assessment depends upon:-
a. The scope of the national interest which, in turn, largely depends upon the
power status. Small states justifiably complain that what appears to them
as salient (and vital) is often deemed much less so by the great powers to
whom they are allied. Thus the Poles were most unhappy about
Churchill’s wartime refusal to press Stalin to agree to the restoration of the
pre-1939 Soviet-Polish frontier as were the Israelis about the United
States and Britain not sharing their view of the Egyptian occupation of the
Straits of Tiran in 1967.
b. The stress laid either upon domestic or upon international elements. This
is the foundation of the most articulate debate on national interest ever
held, that between the ‘realists’ and the ‘idealists’ in the United States. It
is also a major, though seldom fully recognized reason for Britain’s failure
to exercise her opportunities for leadership in Western Europe after 1945.
She was preoccupied with domestic issues such as the establishment of
the welfare state and nationalization, and with imperial matters which lie in
 24
between the domestic and the foreign fields. The situation in many new
states is reversed.
c. Assessment of relevance which is frequently governed by ideology and
considerations of principle rather than by rational calculation of interests.
Western observers repeatedly comment on Communist and new states
neglecting their ‘true interests’ i.e. mainly economic and political interests,
for ideological reasons.
d. Although the qualities of importance and urgency can be and sometimes
are assessed on the basis of a rational evaluation, tradition often prevails,
especially when the situation is unclear and/or time is pressing. Thus while
unemployment is the major economic trauma in
Britain, money inflation is more in Germany; All these play a significant
part in decisions concerning the salience of individual issues.
15. In small states, national interest is frequently reduced to the central question of
survival. Hence there is less controversy over salience and priorities, especially if the
state adjoins a powerful and expansionist neighbour.

Determining the Scope of National Interest

16. As with most aspects of national interest, its scope is determined by
environmental influences, or by volitional acts; as a rule by a combination of the two.
Thus the Himalayan states have been forced by international events to abandon
isolationism and to enlarge the scope of their national interest, but it was Castro’s act of
will to enlarge the scope of Cuba’s national interest. Franklin Roosevelt’s abandonment
of isolationism and involvement of the United States in the Second World War is
generally interpreted as due to circumstantial influences, i.e. to the rise of totalitarianism
and to Japanese expansionism; some American historians, however, attribute it to his
deliberate and voluntary act of will. The rise of the United States and Soviet interest in
the Third World can be regarded as a mixed case. It was partly due to the
establishment of weak independent states which created a potentially dangerous power
vacuum, and partly from deliberately conceived designs to intervene in them for
ideological, economic, and also humanitarian reasons.
17. A discrepancy between the capabilities and the power status of a state generally
leads to a redefinition of the scope of its national interest but, as a rule with some time
lag. An example can be found in the contrasting post-war developments in Britain and
in Germany or Japan. While Britain started as one of the Big Three but gradually lost
her power status and eventually, by 1967, decided to withdraw from east of Suez and to
adopt a predominantly regional, Western European orientation. The two defeated
powers gradually built up their status on the foundations of powerful economies and
enlarged the scope of their national interests which, as a result of their defeat, had been
at first severely restricted.
18. Small states tend to limit the scope of their national interest to their more
immediate environment, and their foreign policy is concerned with a much narrower
range of problems and topics. The rapidly growing extent and volume of the activities of
all states inevitably broaden the scope of their national interests but the dynamics of the
situation may now be changing its direction. At whichever level a state may be, it is no
longer interested merely in preserving the status quo but aspires to constant growth of
economic production, of standards of living, of social welfare. Much of this expansion
can be satisfied only internationally and this cannot fail to broaden the scope of its
national interests.
 25
Broad Dimensions of National Interests
19. The Vitality Dimension
a. Though states usually regard certain interests centering upon national
survival, no generally accepted criterion exists for defining an interest as
vital Of these, the preservation of the ‘vital core’ or the ‘nerve centre’ of
the country is most important; interests tend to lose importance with their
distance and their lack of connection with this center.
b. The traditional hallmark of an interest which is deemed vital is that the
state is unwilling to make concessions on it and that it is prepared, if
necessary, to go war over it.

c. To enhance the status of interests which are considered vital, they are
often represented as being also permanent. In fact their life span is rarely
very long as they cannot remain in existence without major alterations
once the value system and/or the net achievement capability has
undergone serious changes.
d. Dramatic changes occur in the imperial interests of states which are
deemed vital in one generation but soon go into oblivion. Thus in the
sixteenth century Britain gave up her three centuries-long designs to
dominate the continent and since 1945 she has given up her empire.
Even attachment to the integrity of the state’s territory is not sacrosanct.
The Germans have now apparently become fully reconciled to the loss of
Alsace-Lorraine.
e. The adjective ‘vital’ added to an interest has an emotional appeal and, as
it lacks clear legal or political definition, it is open to abuse in political
argument similar to that to which ‘national interest’ in general is subjected.
This happened in the protracted debate about the American involvement
in Vietnam.
f. Estimates of the ‘vital’ nature of an interest change under the impact of
one of the following factors, or of their combination. First, a change in the
values held by the leadership or by the people, or by both; both an interest
of no great intrinsic importance may become ‘vital’ when it assumes a
symbolic value and/or when it involves national prestige, e.g. redress for a
trivial violation of the frontier, or for insult to the national flag. Second, in
the definition of interests as ‘vital’, the capabilities required securing them,
and the estimated cost and risk, must be taken into account.
g. In the contemporary nation state system, the state’s most vital interest in
preserving its territorial integrity and political independence is in most
cases ensured by the stability of the international system but the costs of
pursuing interests which are deemed ‘vital’ and require intervention, are
rapidly escalating.
h. Capability extends vital interests by a process which is inherently self
destructive: each successive extension can be promoted only by further
extension, and the cost of each successive extension is higher than the
previous one. At some point the cost exhausts capability, and the process
 26
of extension is necessarily halted, and the widespread structure begins to
crumble (ex USSR).
j. When an interest is infringed by another state, the judgement as to how
vital this interest is partly depends upon the identity and nature of the
infringing state. One crucial variable is the power status of the offending
state.
k. Traditionally interests are defined as vital mainly in the strategic/political
sphere and are connected with the notion of the power deemed necessary
for national survival and for the attainment of many national goals. Since
the Second World War not only economic but also psychological and
ideological elements have been steadily gaining in importance but the
center of gravity has not decisively shifted in their direction.

20. The Spatial Dimension. Space, as Kant has convincingly argued, is

fundamental to all thinking which relates to human experience. Any discussion of
foreign policy and national interest inevitably includes some analysis of space:-
a. It is a geographical dimension of international politics; one of the main
elements of the state, especially the area it occupies and its boundaries;
an element of power; a traditional objective of foreign policy, in its relation
to warfare, etc. It is understandable that, being so fundamental as well as
so familiar in relation to the various aspects of foreign policy, the spatial
dimension has not attracted much attention in its general bearing upon the
definition of the national interest.
b. In the first instance, three basic spatial aspects of the state itself must be
briefly mentioned. These are its territorial character, its boundaries, and its
‘vital core’ or ‘nerve centre’. Territory, along with the people and
government, is indisputably an essential ingredient of the state.
c. It is clear that people fight much more determinedly in defence of their
territory and that its security forms the central core of all conceptions of
national interest.
21. The Time Dimension
a. Time, as much as space, is such a fundamental category of thinking that it
defies clear conceptualization; no human actions or thoughts can be
conceived outside its context and yet they rarely have fixed points of
reference to it. Foreign policy is involved whether we are dealing with
current problems or with plans for the future, or with the evaluation of the
past.
b. There is little hope that we shall ever achieve a general agreement about
the ranking of interests in their relation to time but there are fair prospects
of partial success, provided we limit the exercise to a specific aspect or
issue of the national interest.
c. Another quality of interests which is related to time is their duration, the
two extremes here being permanent and ephemeral interests.
d. At the other extreme, short range, tactical aspects of foreign policy
invariably include interests so ephemeral that nobody, or very few would
 27
include them in the notion of the national interest at all, except in the heat
of the contemporary political argument.
e. The formulation of the national interest is not a matter of a continuous
assessment, each phase of which can be dated. The salience of its
various elements constantly changes but reformulation takes place only
sporadically, when a major decision has to be made.
f. The difference in the time dimension between the operational and the
aspirational levels of definition of the national interest does not lie in their
reference to the past or the future; each is concerned with both. The major
discrepancy lies in the time span taken into account. At the operational
level it tends to be shorter; at the aspirational level decision makers are
less concerned with the contingencies of the present and hence look both
further back into the past and further forward into the future.

SECTION-III
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES – THE ENDS
General

1. To understand how nations act in their relations with each other one must know
in case (respect) of each nation as to what it wants to achieve (National interests and
objectives) and what it is capable of doing (Power Potential); as these are the basic
determinants of the policies and actions of nations within the state and with respect to
each other. Since, the aspect of Power Potential of nations needs more elaborate and
detailed discussion, therefore, it is dealt within the next chapter separately. The
objectives of nations are discussed in the following paragraphs.
2. The national interests are the starting point. The aims / objectives / goals are a
function of the national interests. Each state has its own security perceptions and
imperatives. To safeguard its national interests and for the pursuit of the overall
national objectives it formulates its National Security Policies. Nations seek security
and peace but not peace at the cost of national security. Total security has, however,
rarely been possible even for the most powerful nations. States, therefore, evolve
security policies in keeping with their national interests. In broad terms a nation is said
to have security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate vital interests to avoid
war.
3. Apart from their inability to ensure total security owing to external factors, a
nation may not be able to spare unlimited resources for their security because the effort
is so diverted it may detract from national progress and well being of its people. So a
national policy has to be first evolved to provide guidelines to the strategy.
4. In order to identify the hierarchy of various elements of National Security Policy,
following flow chart may be useful; -

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FLOW CHART

National Purpose
 28

National Interests

National Objectives

National Security Policy

Supporting National Policies and Strategies

Diplomatic Policy Economic Policy Defence Policy Media Policy

Diplomatic Strategy Economic Strategy Military Strategy Media Strategy

The Concept of National Objectives

5. Nations may have a variety of objectives. Some members of the “realist” school
of international relations assume that for the process of study, all national objectives can
be reduced to one: the objective of national power. According to them, power is the
immediate goal of every nation that engages in politics, no matter what its ultimate
objectives may be. This seems, however, to be an over simplification. Power is surely
one of the most important objectives that nations pursue, but it is not the only objective
and always the principal one. If we are to understand the actions of nations in their
dealings with each other, we must understand not only the objectives they share, but
also the differences in their hopes and aspirations. Power is also considered as the
means to attain the end. National objectives and goals have been used
interchangeably. These are more specific.
6. As a start, we can divide all national objectives into four broad categories of
power, wealth, cultural welfare and peace. Having goals of one kind does not exclude
the others, for it is possible for a nation to pursue goals in all thee categories at one and
the same time. Indeed one goal may be necessary to achieve another, and the same
action may be a means to several different ends. Wealth may bring power, and power
may bring peace, and peace may be necessary to preserve the cultural heritage of the
nation.
Competitive and Absolute Objectives
7. An important distinction can be made between objectives which are competitive
and those which are absolute. Some may be desirable in themselves, quite apart from
what other nations do; for example a higher standard of living or the preservation of the
national culture. Such we shall call absolute. Others have a meaning only in relation to
other nations; for example, a desire to be as rich as others or to be the most powerful in
the world. Such objectives are competitive.
8. The nation with competitive objectives can never rest, even though it may be
winning for the moment. Regardless of whether it is competing with an other nation or
with the whole world, regardless of whether it wants to be better than the nation just
ahead of it or whether it wants to be the best, success will always be precarious. The
chances of success always rest in some part in another nation’s hands.
 29
9. If the national objective is absolute, the nation may make a great effort to achieve
its aim, but once it is reached, the nation can relax. It does not matter that others are
outstripping it or that those who were behind are catching up. Instances of absolute
objectives are hard to find, partly because they have been reported less thoroughly than
the others and are not as rare as reading of current headlines would lead one to
believe. Japan, until it was forced to establish contact with the West, pursued absolute
objectives. Many of the smaller countries still do. It is not always easy to tell whether a
nation is competing with others or not. For instance in the case of India and her efforts
to industrialize, the standard of living is so very low that it would be natural for any
Indian Government to seek to raise it. However, it is very difficult to say at this time
whether India’s attempt to increase productivity are aimed simply at improving living
standards regardless of what other nations do or whether they are part of an effort on
India’s part to become a major world power. The same action serves both ends.
10. If a nation’s leaders constantly say that it is competing with others and if its
behaviour supports these assertions, no such problem exists. It is not hard to find
cases of this sort. Hitler made it quite clear that Germany’s cultural objectives were an
assertion of German superiority over others, and German behaviour towards the Jews
and the Poles in particular made it all too clear that Hitler was telling the truth. The
same is true of the United States. It is the richest and most powerful nation on earth but
is not content. It is very much concerned with keeping its lead over the rest of the
world, and is anxious not to allow others to close the gap. Its objectives too, are largely
competing.
11. In spite of the fact that such knowledge is not always easy to come by, it is often
crucial for a nation to know whether other nations are competing with it or not, for if the
objectives of a nation are determinedly competitive, those with whom it competes must
not make the mistake of granting it concessions unless they are ready to concede
supremacy in the area of competition. Concessions will not satisfy a competitor; they
will merely bring it nearer to victory.
12. National objectives or goals do not remain competitive or absolute forever. For
the time being, Germany seems to have forsaken any of her competitive objectives.
Certainly, other nations have changed the nature of their goals in the past. For much of
its history, the United States had absolute objectives in the field of power, seeking only
enough power to assure her own independence. However towards the end of the
nineteenth century, her objectives began to fluctuate. Between the two world wars, the
United States turned back to absolute objectives, but sine the end of the 1930’s these
have been clearly competitive. The assumption of world leadership allows no other
choice. The reverse is true of Sweden, which no longer competes in the field of power.
In this area its objectives are as absolute as those related to power can ever be.
Power as a National Objective
13. It is sometimes claimed that the drive for power is inherent in human nature and
that this drive makes nations intrigue and fight against each other. However, such
reasoning seems dubious. On the national scale, power is a conspicuous objective of
some nations but by no means of all, and the emphasis that different nations place upon
it varies greatly. Every nation, however, seeks to be master in its own house and to be
free of external control. To this extent, it can be said that all nations seek to maintain at
least a minimum of power; if only to survive as political entities, for if a nation does not
control even its own domestic affairs, then nation-hood is an illusion. In addition, power
over other nations can be extremely useful in achieving other desired aims, such as
wealth or colonies or peace and security. Power, in other words, is an important means
to other objectives. Indeed, it is valued primarily for this reason, and only rarely is it
 30
sought as an end in itself. Finally it must be noted that nations occupy positions in an
international power system, that is to say, they have a certain amount of power relative
to that of other nations. It could be related to all elements of national power.
Wealth as a National Objective
14. Wealth is another objective that is sought to some extent by all nations. It is
comparatively more specific. Every nation seeks adequate resources, and production to
maintain at least subsistence for its population with enough surpluses to provide the
ruling group with whatever standard of luxury it is accustomed to. Indeed, national
existence demands a certain minimum of national wealth. Above and beyond this
minimum many nations, the United States among them, pursue wealth as a major
objective. It might however, be thought that the poorest “have –not” nations would be
those most interested in increasing their wealth, while the wealthy nations would be less
anxious to accumulate further riches, but in reality this is not the case. Most rich nations
view their high living standards as an indication of their general superiority over their
less wealthy neighbours, but again it is possible to distinguish between nations such as
Russia and United State, which seek wealth in order to prove their primacy, and those
like the Scandinavian Countries, which seem to value better living for its own sake. In
modern times it is called economics.
15. Wealth in the form of increased national production can be converted into
military or civilian goods. In the first case, wealth is clearly being used to increase
national power and not to improve living standards, but even if the emphasis is on
civilian goods, it may be that power is a major consideration. For example, great effort
may be made to secure capital investment to develop heavy industry, which can be
used to turn out tractors one day and tanks the next, airliners today and bombers
tomorrow.
16. Wealth is not only a major source of power, power may also be a major source of
wealth. As concepts however, wealth and power are quite separate. Confusion is
caused by the fact that these two goals are so often pursued jointly, but it should be
clear that they may also conflict with each other. Often a nation must choose between
guns and butter and the choice it makes will shed great light upon its national
objectives.
17. For less wealthy nations however, the choice is more pressing. England made
her choice not so long ago, when she gave up many of her international responsibilities
because of the tremendous economic cost to the British taxpayer. Nazi Germany and
Communist Russia on the other hand chose in the past to increase their power. Even at
the expense of living standards.
Cultural Objectives
18. Apart from power and wealth, a nation may have cultural objectives. In fact, the
preservation of national culture is an objective of every nation. As we have seen
profound sentiments grow up around national way of life and most of the people of the
world have a deep preference for their own language, their own ways of dressing,
eating and building houses, their own political, economic and religious institutions.
19. National governments often encourage such nationalistic sentiments as a means
of unifying the nation and increasing the power and effectiveness of the government in
its dealings with other nations. Most nations today are not simply political units, they
are also cultural units.
20. Nations seek to preserve their cultural values in many different ways. A major
reason for desiring national independence or for opposing foreign conquest is that
 31
independence allows the assertion of the national culture, whereas foreign conquest
may threaten to submerge it or change it drastically.
21. Much of the resistance underdeveloped nations offer to technological change,
stems from a fear that modernization will destroy the old culture, as in fact it will. Such
resistance may be extremely damaging in terms of wealth and power, but if cultural
objectives are primary, who can say that the resistance is mistaken? Actually, many of
the leaders of underdeveloped countries seem to be ambivalent about modernization in
general and foreign aid in particular. There are contradictions. On the one hand they
want very much to possess the higher standard of living and increased power that
modernization would bring, but on the other they do not want the changes in the local
culture that modernization would require. Caught in conflict between cultural and other
goals they want some how to wish away the conflict and achieve both sets of objectives
at once.
Peace as a National Objective
22. In the twentieth century and more so now, peace has become a more important
national goal than ever before. The destructiveness of World War I, the first major
conflict between fully industrialized nations, came as a shock to the world. It was felt at
the time that another war of this sort would destroy humanity. We now know that the
First World War was but a beginning. Although humanity has survived a Second World
War and will perhaps survive a third, the invention of weapons such as the hydrogen
bomb, guided missiles, and bacteriological weapons has greatly intensified the search
for peace. The nature of warfare has therefore changed drastically since the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries and so has the importance of peace as a national objective in
the 21 century.
23. Even now, peace is only one of many objectives and although it is not
necessarily supreme. Sometimes peace is complementary to other objectives;
sometimes it is even a pre-requisite for the achievement of others. Generally, when a
nation is declining in power, peace is necessary if it is to preserve whatever power and
wealth it possesses.
24. On the other hand, it is possible to find instances where peace is an obstacle to
the achievement of other objectives. This is particularly the case for powerful nations
that desire changes in the status quo, which other nations are not willing to make
peacefully. Wars, after all, are waged because at least one side believes it has
something to gain from victory. That is to say, what is a common means by which
nations attempt to achieve objectives of wealth or power or cultural preservation? In
cases where war is not terribly destructive or where victory is certain and the destruction
is likely to be almost exclusively at the enemy’s expense, a nation may well weigh the
advantages of peace against other objectives. India, for example, found it to her
advantage to seize Kashmir by force.
Motivation for National Objectives
25. It is not enough to determine whether a nation’s objectives are competitive or
absolute and whether it is seeking power, wealth, cultural objectives, peace, or some
combination of them all. Other questions must be answered if one is to understand the
objectives that motivate international action. Following questions can provide answers
related to the motivation for National Objectives.
a. Specifically we will want to know: Who is it that holds the objective? Is this
so-called national objective truly one of the entire nation or is it only that of
some special group within the nation? Or to put it another way, are the
 32
national objectives of various groups within the nation the same or do they
differ i.e. unified or divergent?
b. Next we will want to know who is expected to benefit from the
achievement of the objectives the nation itself, a whole group of nations or
humanity at large. That is, is the objective strictly national or is it
humanitarian?
c. Another important question concerns the time at which the objective is
expected to be reached. Is it an immediate or a long-range objective?
d. Then there is the question of how well defined the objective is? Is it
specific or is it general and perhaps ambiguous?
e. Finally, we will want to know whether the future state desired is a
continuation of the present state of affairs or whether it must be brought
into existence i.e. does achievement of the objective involve maintaining
the status quo or does it require change?
26. Answers to these questions will be provided in the succeeding paragraphs.
Unified Vs Divergent Objectives
27. It relates to the consensus or otherwise. It is difficult to find a nation where
national objectives are formed by the entire population. In any nation, democratic or
totalitarian, there is a power structure, headed by a relatively small group of people who
make the major decisions, although in a democracy (and even, to a limited extent, in a
totalitarian system) the public must ultimately approve these decisions or at least accept
them.
28. Under the circumstances, it is not to be expected that a nation’s national
objectives need always be in accord with the best interests of the entire population.
Indeed, the entire population may not even have the same interests, so that a single
objective to suit them all would be impossible. It seems safe to say that national
objectives are always the goals of those who hold the most power in the national
government. Whether the goals of this group are shared by the entire population or
even the majority varies from situation to situation.
National Vs Humanitarian Objectives
29. In analyzing and identifying national objectives, few important questions to be
asked are: Who will profit from the future state of affairs that a nation desires? Is the
achievement of the national objectives to be of advantage solely to that nation, or will
other nations also benefit? Important consequences depend upon whether the objective
is strictly national or humanitarian, for if the nation that holds the objective is to be the
sole beneficiary, it cannot really expect other nations to support its aims, whereas if
other nations are to benefit as well, their cooperation can be expected. We are not
asking here whether other nations will be affected by the achievement of the objective,
but whether they will benefit. If other nations were not affected, the objective would not
be international and would not concern us here.
30. Great advantages accrue to the nation that has objectives believed by its own
people and by others, aimed (to be steps) towards universal good. The nation that
wants to persuade other nations to do as it wishes must have these nations believe that
it is working for their interests as well as its own. Humanitarian objectives, therefore, are
essential for dominant nations wishing to hold together their allies and followers. A
major source of power of such nations is their ability to generate humanitarian goals and
 33
when these cease to be put forward or cease to be believed, disastrous consequences
follow.
31. Even when a nation says that its objectives benefit mankind and other believe
this to be so, it does not necessarily follow that this is true. Usually the assertion that a
nation is the welfare of humanity is not an outright lie but a half-truth. A major task in
the realistic analysis of national goals is to differentiate between the interests of one’s
own nation and interests of other nations (or the general good). The fact of the mater is
that national objectives truly in the general interest are extremely rare, if they exist at all.
Nations of little power are almost compelled to have national objectives that appear, at
least, to be humanitarian, whereas powerful nations have more of a choice in the kind of
goals they hold.
Long-Range Vs Immediate Objectives
32. Another important consideration concerns the amount of time that is expected to
elapse before a national objective is realized. Long-range objectives/goals are in a
sense “safer” for a national government, since it is harder to tell whether they are
achieved. On the other hand, it is difficult to whip up great enthusiasm for extremely
distant objectives, since people seem most easily motivated to work for benefits that
they themselves or at least their children will receive. It is hard to work for posterity
without some intermediate reward along the way.
33. Ideally, immediate and Long-Range objective should be in accord with each
other, the Long-Range ones determining what the immediate ones will be and the
immediate ones being steps toward the Long-Range ones. In fact, there is often conflict
between the two. In such cases, the short-term objectives more often win out, first
because they are often more concrete and second, because there is more pressure
from the population to receive immediate rewards. Long term objective are usually
related to the strategic vision.
34. On the whole, countries with popularly controlled governments are under much
more pressure to pursue immediate objectives. Autocratic governments, on the other
hand, are much freer to make Long-Range plans since their government structure
facilitates resistance to immediate popular demands.
General Vs Specific Objectives
35. Still another distinction can be made between objectives that are specific and
those that are general or vague. Vague or general objectives, useful to cover
disagreement within the nation, are also useful to keep one’s rivals guessing. Perhaps
the ideal national situation for a nation is to have complete internal unity behind both
general and specific objectives but to confine public statements in the realm of general
objectives. This provides the government with freedom of action and with maximum
bargaining power on any specific occasion.
36. Finally, it should be noted that general objectives can also serve the purpose of
hypocrisy. Specific objectives may be narrowly nationalistic and highly offensive to other
nations, and to state them outright would arouse opposition from other nations. In such
a case, vague, general ones which are often humanitarian in nature can be extremely
useful. Disguised in this way, putting down a colonial revolt becomes “restoring order”,
subverting a rival government is “opposing tyranny”, and preparing for conquest is
“assuring peace”. The danger in relying heavily upon the use of general objectives is
that the nation may forget that for effective action it must know, at least privately, what
its specific objectives are? It is possible to talk in generalities, but action is always
 34
specific. To act without definite objectives is to run the risk of producing consequences
quite other than those intended.
Stated Vs Actual Objectives
37. The point that national objectives are not always what they are claimed to be or
what they appear to be leads us to the next distinction to be made between them. Are
the statements made in error with the intent to deceive? This is crucial information for
those who must deal with that nation. Indeed, a major function the intelligence services
of any country is to find out the true national objectives of other nations. Mistakes in this
area can be extremely costly, even fatal. Germany lost two world wars because she did
not understand that American objectives ruled out the possibility of allowing Germany to
defeat England and France. England for her part almost lost World War II because she
did not understand that Germany’s objectives were war and world supremacy. The
British naively thought that Hitler’s objectives were more limited and that he could be
satisfied through concessions.
Status quo Vs Change in Objectives
38. We have spoken of objectives as desirable future states to be achieved, but
there are many nations that are quite content with many aspects of the present world.
For them, the achievement of many national objectives merely means continuing the
status quo. It is important to know whether this is the case or whether realization of
national objectives requires change. Those whose goal is to upset the status quo are
often viewed as trouble makers as spoilers of peace who pursue narrow nationalistic
goals at the expense of the common good, while those who seek the status quo are the
defenders of peace. The so-called troublemakers counter charge that status quo lovers
are against justice and freedom, and really interested only in preserving their own
positions of privilege.
39. There is some truth in both these charges. Those who defend the status quo are
certainly those who are most contented with it, that is, those whose power and privilege
are greatest. On the other hand, those who are discontented and seek to change the
status quo often find that they cannot do so within the existing set of rules or without
disturbing the peace. Neither side can claim a monopoly of morality or of humanitarian
goals.
Determinants of National Objectives
40. Among the major determinants of national objectives are the interests of the most
influential groups within the nation, the personalities of the most important leaders, the
power position of the nation, and the general climate of the times. Other factors that
seem to have an influence on objectives are whether the national government is
democratic or autocratic and whether the ruling elite are divided or otherwise. National
character as it is currently defined does not appear to be a major factor. At least, its
influence has not yet been clearly identified. Although it is not possible to specify all the
determinants of each of the kinds of national objectives, some generalizations may be
suggested.
41. Wealth including capture of resources is most often sought by wealthy nations,
just as power is a more important national objective for strong nations than for weak
ones. Peace is a more important objective for declining nations or for nations at the
peak of their power than for nations that are rising in power. However, the industrial
revolution has greatly increased the importance of wealth and particularly of higher
living standards as an objective for every nation. Similarly, the increased
 35
destructiveness of weapons of war has increased the importance of peace as a national
objective.
42. Powerful, expanding nations are most often competitive in their national
objectives, whereas weak nations and nations that are declining in power are more apt
to pursue absolute ones. Expanding nations, particularly those that have recently risen
in power, are most likely to have objectives that involve changing the status quo,
whereas declining nations and nations near the peak of their power are most concerned
to preserve the existing order.
43. Powerful nations may have objectives that are either humanitarian or
nationalistic; weak nations, however, cannot afford to have those objectives which
cannot be justified as national Nationalistic objectives are also more likely when a high
degree of sacrifice is required of the national population.
44. Nations with totalitarian governments are more apt to have unified objectives
than democratic nations. Autocratic governments also find it easier to work toward
long-range objectives since they are under less pressure than democracies to produce
immediate rewards for the public. Finally, national objectives are most likely to be
specific when the nation is unified, for vague objectives may be needed to cover up
fundamental disagreement among important groups within the nation.
Pakistan’s National Purpose, Interests and Objectives
45. Having gone through this chapter, you may now be in a position to identify the
National Purpose, Interests and Objectives for Pakistan. Before you take a step in that
direction you are advised to carefully read the basis of the creation of Pakistan and its
constitution, contained in the Lahore Resolution of 1940 and the Objectives Resolution
of 1949 given in Chapter 4. As a guideline, one of the suggested matrices is given in the
next section.
 36

Section-IV
National Purpose, Interest & Objectives-One of the Suggested
Matrices for Pakistan

National Purpose
1. Sovereignty, democracy, prosperity, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated
by Islam.
2. National Interests
a. Vital Interests
(1) Territorial Integrity Including AJK & NA.
(2) Socio-economic development.
(3) Minimum credible nuclear deterrence.
b. Most Important Interests
(1) Energy and water security.
(2) Promote democracy.
(3) Root out extremism.
(4) Peaceful resolution of Kashmir.
c. Important Interests
(1) Improve Pakistan’s image.
(2) Promote Islamic values of moderation.
3. National Objectives
a. Maintain conventional and nuclear forces including safety and security of
the later to safeguard territorial integrity.
b. Conserve and develop water and energy resources.
c. Promote tolerance, brotherhood and respect for humanity as
enshrined in Islam.
d. Sustain economic growth through stability of macro economic indicators.
e. Remove distortions in education system due to parallel streams and re-
orientate the system towards development of skills.
f. Achieve millennium development goals for socio economic uplift of
masses.
g. Strengthen democratic institutions and organs of the state.
h. Ensure rule of law, transparency and good governance.
j. Implement provincial autonomy as per constitution.
 37
k. Bring FATA and NAs into main stream.
l. Harness media to achieve national integration and image building.
m. Keep Kashmir issue alive at international forum while engaging India
for a peaceful resolution of all issues.
n. Further strengthen strategic partnership with China through geo economic
linkage.
o. Broaden base of relations with USA, open up with Russia and achieve
greater interaction with EU.
p. Engage all stakeholders for a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan.

q. Promote relations with Muslim and SAARC countries.

 38

CHAPTER - 7
NATIONAL POWER
General

1. This Chapter is about National Power: its influence, essence and determinants.
The objectives of this Chapter are to make participants understand:
a. The concept of power and national power.
b. The essence of national power.
c. And be able to evaluate the elements of national power as the means to
an end.
2. One of the most important characteristics of a nation is its 'power', which is a
major determinant of the part a nation plays on the international scene. The language of
international politics bristles with the word 'power' because of the simple fact that politics
and power are inseparable. Though this word is used constantly, the concept of power
for which the word stands varies widely from one context to another. Sometimes the
word is used in the narrow sense of physical coercion or the ability to apply such
coercion and nothing more. The measure of a state's power, it has been argued, is its
ability to wage war. More often power should be thought of in its widest sense to include
all forms of action, though in the ultimate analysis resort to arms may be the final
measure. Power is thus the ability to influence the behaviour of others in accordance
with one’s own ends.
The Anatomy and Rule of Power in World Politics
3. Power is not an object but a part of the relationship between individuals or
groups of individuals. The very existence of power presupposes at least two parties
having some kind of relations with each other, and it further presupposes that in some
matter where they disagree, one has the ability to make the other do what it wishes.
4. The means employed by states to influence the actions of other states to gain
their own desired ends vary over the entire spectrum of negotiation, bargaining,
persuasion, inducement, barter, bribery, pressure, intimidation and coercion. The last
two are definitely naked use of power but in all the other forms, an undercurrent of the
influence of strength must manifest itself if these forms are to be effective. In fact any
foreign policy divorced from strength is likely to be impotent. The term “National Power"
thus means the total capability of a state to gain desired ends (National Interests and
Objectives) vis-à-vis other states. It, therefore, envisages the use of all the tools and
techniques of statecraft with the maximum intensity of effort that can be brought to bear
while bearing in mind that all political power is relative.
5. The tools of statecraft are the physical instruments used to attain national
interests and objectives, whereas techniques are the forms of action employed to attain
these ends. For example, armed forces are tools while military display and war are
techniques of statecraft.
6. The major techniques of statecraft can be grouped as follows:
a. Diplomacy and related techniques.
b. Propaganda and other means of psychological/mass persuasion.
 39
c. Economic inducements and pressures/coercion.
d. Subversion and sabotage.
e. Military pressures and coercion.
f. Use of force.
7. The various techniques of statecraft rarely function separately in practice. Rather
they are combined in endless patterns and permutations, depending upon conditions
and upon the ingenuity of statesmen. Mass propaganda, subversion, economic
inducements or coercion and display of military force, when applied singly or in
combination may set the stage for diplomatic negotiations. Even full scale war does not
completely halt the process of diplomacy. Diplomacy, therefore, need not be associated
only with a prevailing condition of peace. All the techniques of statecraft get their energy
from the National Power.
8. The power of any state, which can be described in the functional terms of tools,
techniques, and intensities of effort, is never absolute. Every action in politics produces
effects that are relative not only with respect to the form and the intensity of the act but
also with respect to the forces arrayed in opposition. The analysis of world politics
involves, therefore, complex calculations of interacting factors and forces. In order to
understand the power of a single state, one must evaluate not only its objectives,
resources, opportunities and intensities; but must also estimate these same qualities as
they are presented by other states. In addition, an estimate of the relationships of
neutrality, alliance or hostility, which determine the directions and intensities of pressure
and resistance, must also be made. Thus, the tools, techniques, instruments and
relationships constitute in the aggregate, the anatomy of power in world politics.
Elements of National Power
9. The quality and measurement of national power involves many intangibles.
Nevertheless there are certain basic elements that contribute towards it. Political
scientists differ in detail, when drawing up a list of those elements, but by and large the
elements listed below encompass all the aspects:
a. Geography.
b. Natural Resources.
c. Demography.
d. Economic Capacity.
e. Technological Base including Nuclear Capability.
f. Political Structure.
g. Cultural Cohesion.
h. National Morale or Psycho-Social Conditions.
i. Military Strength.
j. Iman/Faith.
k. Information.
Geography
10. Napoleon said "The foreign policy of a country is determined by its geography".
The following aspects of geography contribute towards national power:-
a. The size of the land area, territorial sea, continental shelf and
conservation zone.
b. The climate and oceanography.
c. The topography.
 40
d. The location.
11. Size or Area. The size or area of the country (depending on how large or small
it is) makes possible the support of a large population and possibly the possession of
large resources, which are important elements of national power. The size or the area
also has a direct effect upon the ability of the nation to use force in self defence, and it
helps give a nation those powers of persuasion which flow from the ability to defend
itself. The size and shape of a country also determines the type of strategy it should
follow.
12. Climate. Climate does not have any direct effect upon the ability of a nation to
persuade, reward, punish or use force on other nations though it does influence its
defence capabilities. Its effect is wholly indirect, ruling out in certain cases, the
possibilities of a large population or a large modern industry. It may in some cases
(though this point is very controversial) have an effect on the quality of manpower, e.g.
in the highly tropical and hot climates of Asia and Africa. However, many analysts
believe that the low quality of manpower in these regions is as a result of colonial rule
and the environment it fostered rather than because of the climatic effect.
13. Topography and Oceanography contribute towards national power by:
a. Influencing and possibly determining the population that a region can
support.
b. Influencing the communication and transportation system.
c. Influencing the defensive capabilities of a nation by the presence of
natural barriers along its frontiers or in depth.
14. Location
d. The location of a country by itself may not contribute to its inherent power,
but it certainly influences the relations and attitudes of other countries
towards it and vice versa depending on:-
(1) The strategic importance of the area it occupies.
(2) The size and power of its neighbors.
b. Location determines the countries with which a nation must compete most
actively and also influences its policies. It also contributes to national
power in as much as it may influence or aid certain techniques of
statecraft in furthering national policies. In this context, a study of
Pakistan's geopolitical problems because of her location would be very
instructive. The influence of geography in the political actions of a country
has been theorized by many authors, of which Mackinder, Mahan and
Spykman are notable. The compulsions caused by geographic constraints
on the national policies and strategies must therefore, be analyzed very
carefully. Pakistan ignored these and lost half of the country in 1971.
Natural Resources
15. The importance of natural resources as a determinant of national power is
obvious in the provision of resources for the use of force be it economic or military. The
possession of resources alone however does not by themselves make a nation strong.
It is their exploitation that contributes to national power. A weak nation rich in resources
is liable to lose not only its resources but its freedom as well, as it invites aggression as
exemplified by the fate suffered by weak Asian and African states in the colonial era.
 41

Demography
16. The population of nation and its quality is an important source of national power.
It provides the means for the exploitation and development of natural resources and all
national efforts and activities. The aspects which should be analyzed when studying this
element are:
a. Size. The contribution, which a large population makes to national
power, is obvious but size without quality can be a handicap as shown by
the teeming millions of underdeveloped countries. A large population does
not guarantee a strong armed forces or a productive economy, but it is a
pre-requisite for economic and military strength. All great powers have
large populations.
b. Composition. From the point of view of work, all the people of a nation
are not equally important in the contribution they can make to its strength.
The segment that contributes most, is the manpower normally required for
the armed forces (between 18 to 40 years) and for the labour force
(between 15 and 60 years). It is therefore essential, when assessing the
strength this element provides, to ascertain the available manpower
reserves, as this greatly influences the potential that can be generated in
an emergency.
c. Demographic Transition. It is also necessary to assess the
demographic transition pattern, so that the manpower resources that may
be available in the future can be visualized and their impact on power
potential analyzed. Export of skilled and unskilled manpower must be
studied and analyzed thoroughly to make best use of manpower in
boosting and recovery of own economy in a planned manner. Failure to
do this may allow uncontrolled flow of large sums of foreign exchange in
the form of remittances whose use in non-productive sectors can create
unprecedented inflation which can do untold damage to the economy as is
happening these days to Pakistan.
d. Quality. Population can contribute to national power only if it is skilled,
educated, healthy and correctly motivated. An ignorant population can be
a millstone, consuming the available natural resources without producing
the tangible forms of national power. A skilled and highly motivated
population on the other hand can compensate for lack of natural resources
to a great extent e.g. Japan and South Korea.
Economic Capacity
17. The exploitation of natural resources results in the formation of an industrial
economy producing capital goods and services, which contribute to the visible
manifestations of national power. Goods may be consumer, capital or warlike in nature
and when produced in excess of the nation’s domestic requirements contribute to
national power by giving the state the capability of persuasion and influencing other
countries by supplying or denying them these goods, thereby affecting their policies.
Warlike goods contribute to the muscle of the armed forces, without which no matter
how large the size, they are ineffective. For example, oil and technology have emerged
as the most potent weapons of diplomacy since Nov 73.
18. In the appraisal of relative power, a nation's economic potential is defined as the
maximum output of goods and services during a specified period of time - in other
 42
words, the gross national product. Against the base of the population, it provides the per
capita income. Based on this appraisal, the six richest nations are Kuwait ($13000),
Switzerland ($9870), Sweden ($9530) Saudi Arabia ($9210), Germany ($8400) and
USA ($7860). It is interesting to note that of these only USA is a major power, while the
others play a much lesser role in international affairs than their wealth indicates.
Economic wealth or strength by itself is, therefore, no absolute indication of national
power - it must be considered in relation to other elements. Nevertheless, economic
strength has and will always be an important instrument of political power, if only
because of its association with the instrument of military power. (The larger the GNP of
a country, the greater capacity it has to set aside large chunk of its budget for defence
expenditure).
19. When assessing and evaluating the contribution that the economic capacity of a
nation makes towards the use of armed strength, one must consider:
a. The economic capacity vis-à-vis strategic industries and not its capacity in
general.
b. Essential civilian production as strategic production and not as diversion of
resources from the war making capacity.
c. The importance of the time element in the form of readiness for rapid
convertibility from a peace oriented to a war oriented economy.
Technological Base Including Nuclear Capability
20. A sound and modern technological base is important for rapid, cost effective and
qualitative economic and military growth. A country using outdated technology spends
enormous amounts in production, yet the outcome is not of high quality. Nuclear
capability can provide much needed power resources at less cost than conventional
means. In addition, its capability as a deterrent in the military field is well established.
21. The effectiveness with which various elements of power can be exploited and
marshaled will obviously affect the generation of national power. This effectiveness
cannot be easily measured, but may be reasonably evaluated as to the capability of the
government to harness and comprehensively direct the potential power of a nation in:
a. The type and form of government and its organizational structure.
b. National leadership and the response of the people to it.
c. Diplomatic skills.
22. Type and Form of Government
a. The type and form of government plays an important role in assessing its
capability to marshal national power, if only because this determines its
ability to form cohesive policies and response to changing environments.
In practice, however, it may not be easy to determine this ability merely by
studying the constitution and the organizational structure a state claims to
have. The effectiveness of a government depends on how well its
machinery actually functions.
b. The form of government e.g. monarchy, republic, dictatorship etc are
deceptive in assessing this competence. Hitler's Germany, did benefit in
the initial stages of the third Reich because of the centralization of all
authority in the person, but the system broke down under the stress of
total war; whereas the United States, where the system of checks and
balances is designed to put curbs on the executive, reacted by providing
almost dictatorial powers to the government without destroying the
 43
constitutional fabric.

c. The competence of the agencies and departments of government

responsible for implementing and giving practical shape to government
policies is also an important factor, and must be assessed irrespective of
the type of government.
23. National Leadership. National leadership derives its power from the
response it gets from the people. In this, the historical, psychological and sociological
aspects play an important role. The quality of the government and how it operates
reflects the experience of the people and their expectation and attitude towards what it
should do. The quality of leadership will determine to a large extent the attitude of the
people towards the government’s policies and the confidence placed in them.
24. Diplomatic Skills
a. The power a nation is influenced not only by the means that it possesses
but also by the presence or absence of a coherent, definite and feasible
foreign policy. Here, it is best to be clear what foreign policy means. "The
foreign policy of a nation is more than the sum total of its foreign policies,
for it also includes the commitments of a state, the current form of its
interests and objectives and the principles that it professes". With the
increasing influence of domestic policies on foreign policy and vice versa,
the conduct of this policy assumes great importance in contributing to
national power.

b. Diplomacy is the art of directing the different elements of power to bear with
maximum effect upon those points in the international field which concern
the national interest most directly. If this art is lacking, the advantages
accruing from the elements of power may be dissipated.

c. Regional and international economic/political/military alliances and

associations are becoming more and more assertive and relevant in
global power politics. Similarly, international bodies like UNO and its
subsidiaries are exercising their own influence. A nation’s power potential
is considerably improved if it is strongly bonded in an alliance and it
maintains more clout and weightage in UNO.
Cultural Cohesion
25. Culture is another determinant of power. Culture is the component of
accumulated resources and materials, which the people inherit, employ, transmute, add
to and transmit; it is all learned behaviour which has been socially acquired. Common
cultural heritage and commonly held ideas, values and beliefs bring about cohesion and
homogeneity in the community and give it a sense of direction; this is a source of
national power.
26. However, when there is contradiction between the ideas, values and beliefs on
the one hand, and external environment on the other hand, the cultural framework
cracks; this weakens the moral fibre of the nation and releases the forces of
disintegration from within. We observe this situation in modern times, in the developing
countries which have imported Western modern science, technology and methods of
business enterprise, but their own cultural traditions have remained unaffected and
unchanged. These countries face the problem of refashioning their whole social
 44
structure, taking into account different structural and cultural conditions prevailing in
each country.

National Morale or Psycho - Social Element

27. This element is difficult to define, as it is a state of the mind resulting from the
historical, psychological and sociological background and environment. Basically, it is
willingness by a large percentage of the individuals in a nation's population to put the
nation's welfare above their own personal welfare. The basis for a high national morale
is thus based on motivation to place the nation above the individual. As former US
President Kennedy said, "It is not what the country can do for you, but what you can do
for the country that is important". Morgenthau has defined national morale as "the
degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its
government in peace or war".

28. This element because of its very nature does not lend itself to an accurate
quantitative analysis. Nevertheless certain indicators do assist in determining its quality.
These indicators are:
a. The Degree of Identification. Individuals feel with the Nation. An
individual may identify himself with other parochial affiliations in
preference to the nation e.g. regional, religious, and clannish. If these
affiliations are stronger, national morale will be adversely affected and
more so in a crisis. This aspect can be assessed by an analysis of the
political structure, the social environment and past behaviour of the
populace.
b. Confidence in the National Government. An individual may identify
himself with the nation, but if he lacks confidence in the national
government, his response at a time of crisis is bound to be less
spontaneous, thus affecting national morale.
c. Faith in an Ideology. Faith in an ideology which transcends the above
factor may arouse the spirit of sacrifice and cause an individual to
completely identify himself with the nation and the government at the time
of a crisis. On the same basis, hatred for an enemy may also add to the
determination of the people and thus result in high national morale. For
Muslim nations the strength of "Iman" and the concept of "Shahadat" are
the biggest force multipliers. The above are at best, means of assessing
national morale and can not be considered conclusive by themselves as
nations may react quite unexpectedly to similar situations at different
times. Indian response in Kargil is a case in mind.
National Character
29. As a result of historical experiences and sociological environment, the people of
a nation develop certain distinct and peculiar traits, characteristics and attitudes e.g. the
common sense of the British, the individualism of the French and the tenacity of the
Russian. These obviously influence national reaction in a situation and thereby
influence national morale. Morale makes a very important contribution to national
power. Francis Bacon, while discussing this aspect in his essay, the “True Greatness of
Kingdoms and Estates” says, "Walled towns, stored arsenals and armouries, goodly
races of horse, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery and the like; all this is but
a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and
 45
warlike. Nay, number itself in armies importeth not much, where the people are of weak
courage, for as Virgil sayeth; it never troubles a wolf how many the sheep be".
30. As mentioned earlier, the assessment and evaluation of this element is difficult
because its manifestations are not always easily obvious. History may provide a guide,
but it is very difficult to predict the actual state of morale under any one set of
conditions. Overestimating or underestimating this, in one's own nation or the enemy's
can have serious repercussions.
Military Power
31. Military power is the visible manifestation of a nation’s capability to resort to use
of force in support of its policies. The supreme importance of the military instrument lies
in the fact that the ultimate ratio of power in international relations is determined by war
or capacity to wage war. Every act of the state, in asserting its power, is directed
towards war, which may be the only course in the last resort.

32. The size of the armed forces, their professional standard, the quality of
leadership, weapons and equipment, logistic capability, morale and motivation are
factors which are to be assessed and evaluated so as to determine military power. The
general standard of education and technical know-how of the population, industrial
capacity and the response of industry to the needs of war and the extent of dependence
on external sources assist in this evaluation.
33. The ability to mobilize additional resources of men and material in a given time is
also an important factor. Many countries do not have large standing armies but can
mobilise and sustain a much larger force. When evaluating military power one must,
therefore, distinguish between the existing forces and those that can be mobilised.
34. Military power provides backing and insurance for a country's foreign policies. If
power to underwrite a country's policy is limited, it restrains the extent to which a policy
can be pursued.
War Potential
35. Every element has its own significance vis-à-vis its contribution to national
power. As war is the ultimate expression of a nation’s determination to pursue its
policies, it is essential that a study of the various elements is carried out specifically to
evaluate their contribution to the nation's capability of waging war. This capability is
termed as "War Potential". This study is necessary because it is does not follow that a
nation, which is economically very powerful will also have great ability to wage war. War
potential is thus simply an evaluation of the elements of national power with respect to
their contribution to military strength, and indicates the nation’s capability to wage war.
Iman / Faith
36. Iman or faith is a force multiplier, which can profoundly influence/alter the
behaviour and psychological make-up of the people. A handful of Afghans driving out
USSR, Vietcong’s souring the ambitions of USA, Buddhist monks walking over red hot
charcoal etc; are acts of faith. For the Muslims, the concept of Iman/faith attributable to
their belief in the concept of ‘Shahadat’ and destiny has a special meaning; it makes
them fearless fighters in war and resilient beings in peace.
Information
37. The communications blitz has taken a new momentum in recent years.
Developments in communication satellites and computer linkages (especially the e-mail
and internet etc) have enabled nations to influence the hearts and minds of target
 46
states. It is, therefore, no longer possible for any nation to shield its citizen from the
information warfare of its adversaries, except by superior motivation, faith and national
ideology duly backed up by stable socio-economic environment. It manifests itself as
propaganda, an instrument of statecraft. Information warfare cuts across all the social
determinants of national power as follows:
a. Due to the global economic interdependence, feeding of incorrect
information can lead to initiating of certain sequence of actions which may
seriously affect the target nation’s economy; case in point is the crash of
the Far Eastern economies in Jan 1998.
b. Information has the harmful potential of altering in a matter of years the
basic values and cultural beliefs that takes generations to create, thus
affecting national will.
c. Countries which control the information means can now launch a well
planned campaign to significantly change the general public/global opinion
in much the same manner as CNN did during the Gulf War and more
recently during the Bosnian crisis and Iraq War.
38. In the present era, it is imperative for nations to harness the information means,
not only to ward off negative information onslaught from hostile states, but also to
consolidate all the other elements of National Power Potential. For Pakistan, aspects
related to psychological Warfare are of special significance in view of the domination of
informational means by India in our part of the World.
Reference for Study
39. Following reference may be useful for detailed study:-
a. Age of Power by Friedrich, Carl J.
b. The political Economy of International Power by Klaus Knorr.
c. Politics among Nations by Morganthau.
d. Determinants of National Power by David Jablonsky.
e. Foundation of National Power by Harold; Sprout Margret.
f. National Power Potential of Pakistan by Ashraf Qureshi.

SECTION-I
POWER AND INFLUENCE
(BY KLAUS KNORR)

General
1. Since interstate relations involve the distribution, creation, and destruction of
such common values as security and wealth, governments are often eager to exercise
power and influence and are, in turn, subject to the power and influence of other
governments. The academic literature on “power” and “influence” is in a deplorable
state of confusion and disagreement, yet the usefulness of these terms is measured by
a clear conception of what power and influence mean, of the conditions under which
they will be wielded, and of the consequences of their employment. To promote such
clarity is the purpose of this section.
 47
Coercion, Non-coercive Influence, and Non-coercive Uses of Power
2. Although this study concerns all uses of power, it will focus mainly on coercive
power, partly because this use is less easily understood than the alternative uses, but
chiefly because the coercive employment of power is more frequent than its non-
coercive use. Power can be used either to establish influence by means of coercion or,
without coercive intent to defend or change the status quo between actors. An actor B is
influenced if he adapts his behaviour in compliance with, or in anticipation of, actor A’s
demands, wishes or proposals. B’s conduct is then affected by something A does or by
something he expects A may do. In consequence, B will modify his behavior if he would
not have done so otherwise, or he will not change his behavior if he would have altered
it in the absence of external influence.
3. Influence can be non-coercive as well as coercive. It is coercive when B’s
conduct is affected by his fear of sanctions of one kind or another; that is, some threat,
actual or implied, to his goal achievement. B’s choice of behavior is consequently
restricted by A’s influence. On the other hand, influence is non-coercive, if B’s choices
are enriched rather than limited by A’s influence, for example if A persuades B that a
proposed co-operative venture is mutually beneficial. In the event of coercion, B loses,
or expects to lose something of value while A gains, or expects to gain something of
value. When influence is non-coercive, both A and B gain, or expect to gain something
valuable. Some writers use the term ‘power to designate all influence, whether coercive
or non-coercive. In this study, we will designate only coercive as power.
4. Coercion, however, is not the only purpose for exercising power. It can also be
used directly to modify the status quo between actors without an attempt to secure
compliance. Coercion is effected by a threat of punishment; for example, the threat of
war, yet, the military capability on which such a threat is based can also be used simply
to take something (e.g. a piece of territory) from an opponent or, conversely, to keep an
opponent by sheer resistance from taking it. There may be no attempt to coerce the
opponent to give up territory or to make him desist from attempting to seize it. In any
particular situation of conflict, military force may be used for both of these purposes at
once but the two purposes are distinct. A coercive purpose would be to destroy part of
potential opponent’s military capacity. On the other hand, after China had been testing
nuclear explosives in 1968 and 1969, there was considerable speculation whether the
Soviet Union might not simply wipe out the Chinese nuclear establishment by
bombardment. Reducing a potential opponent’s military capability may of course, set
him up for coercion, but this may not be the actual purpose. The object might be simply
to render a state too weak to attack others. Similarly, the capacity to withhold economic
advantages may be used for other than coercive purposes. Thus, after World War II, the
United States placed an embargo on the export of a wide range of strategic goods to
the Soviet Union. The object then was not to coerce Russia to do something or other,
but to obstruct the growth of her military strength. A state may also infiltrate another
politically by means of propaganda, bribery, conspiratorial support of revolutionaries,
etc. Again, the purpose may be coercive, but it may also be only to politically weaken
the other state or its government by fostering domestic disunity.
5. In domestic law enforcement, the purpose of punishment is either to coerce (i.e.
deter) or to curtail the ability of the criminal to pursue crime. In other social relationships,
another purpose of punishment is to afford emotional satisfaction. Similarly in inter state
relationships, power may be used not only to coerce or to affect an actor’s capabilities,
but also to simply hurt another, to inflict vengeance, or to symbolize displeasure or
antagonism. For example, Peking’s refusal in the 1960s to recognize and exchange
diplomatic representation with countries eager to reciprocate did not serve a coercive
 48
purpose, and the same can be said about the non-recognition of China by the United
States. Also, by the late 1960’s it had become clear that most goods which the United
States government did not permit to be exported to the Soviet Union did not in fact
obstruct that country’s military development. The effect was that of an economic
pinprick which has come to serve a symbolic purpose.
The Forms of Power and of Non-coercive Influence
6. Power and non-coercive influence appear in forms that are specified with
reference to the particular base from which influence is generated. Thus, we have just
distinguished between military power, economic power, and political penetrative power.
Military power turns on threats, which can take various forms e.g. an increase in the
military budget, the mobilization of military reserves, redeployment of naval forces, and
even war itself if it expresses a threat to continue or escalate existing hostilities.
Economic power turns on the withholding of economic advantages e.g. trade,
investment, currency support, development aid. Political penetrative power, which is
less well understood, turns on a variety of overt or clandestine activities e.g.
propaganda, the stirring up of political unrest and strikes, the support of opposition
parties or revolutionary groups, the bribing of officials or political leaders. Nazi Germany
employed such means in order to soften Austria’s and Czechoslovakia’s resistance. A
favourite technique of Soviet propagandists has been the establishment of “front
organizations” e.g. the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of
Democratic Youth, and the World Peace Movement in non- Communist countries.
Propaganda is the planned dissemination of information, arguments and appeals
designed to influence the beliefs, thoughts and actions of specific foreign target groups.
Control achieved by such intervention can be used for making threats, that is, for
attempting coercion. This has rightly been called “psychic coercion”. More often it is
employed to limit another state’s capacity for international action, for example, by
creating disunity in the target country. Alternatively, it can also be used to enlarge a
state’s capacity for international action, for instance, by strengthening the domestic
support of a foreign government.
7. Non-coercive influence involves interaction, which is fruitful and enriching rather
than restricting the choices of the actors concerned. Like power, it turns on a large
range of values important to these actors. In fact, any value, which is a power base,
may also provide a base for non-coercive influence. For instance, while the withholding
of diplomatic recognition of states and the rupture of diplomatic relations constitute
power plays, the extension of recognition and the assumption of diplomatic relations are
also capable of being used coercively to provide a base for influence. Even propaganda
can be supportive rather than subversive. The essential difference is that A has
something of value to B and gives it to B without condition, or without any condition that
limits B’s choice of behavior. For instance, A may give economic assistance to B in
order to enable the latter to increase his capacity for economic production. In this case,
wealth is the influence base. Similarly, military power may figure as an influence base
when it supplies security for another state; expertise is the base when technical
assistance is extended. However, as we shall see below, it is questionable whether
non-coercive influence is involved whenever any of these values are extended on the
basis of something for something.
8. The extension of information, persuasion, and advice are important bases of non-
coercive influence. It may be that B misunderstands what A is after but then, A supplies
information in order to dispel the misunderstanding. Thus, some inter-state conflicts of
interest decrease or vanish, once the governments involved are fully informed.
Persuasion and advice are related bases of influence. B may have adequate
 49
information but may misinterpret it. By means of persuasion, A may help B to redefine
their relationship and to evaluate properly the consequences of either’s policy. Advice is
to suggest a course of action conducive to B’s as well as A’s goal achievement. It is
quite different from a demand, which is to serve exclusively the ends of the demanding
actor. Information, persuasion and advice clarify or enlarge the recipient’s choice of
policy. A frequent object of persuasion and advice is to propose some co-operative
enterprise such as an alliance or a cultural exchange program, from which both actors
can secure value. The play of non-coercive influence and co-operation are facilitated
when the value preferences of actors converge rather than diverge as when they share
an interest in free trade or economic integration, or in some sort of ideological utopia,
but a similar structure of value preferences proves integrative rather than divisive only if
it is marked by priorities that are susceptible to co-operative solution, rather than conflict
and competition. Against this background, benevolent influence also thrives on the
mutual respect and esteem of elites and communities’ feelings which, in the modern
age, are rooted in the domestic as well as international performance of countries and
often also in dedication to the same ideology. Still more favourable of course are special
relationships of friendship and trust established as a result of a satisfactory shared past
experience. Such relationships impede the exercise of coercion and encourage non-
coercive influence, whereas settled relations of animosity have the opposite effect. Trust
refers to expectations of benevolent behavior in contrast to suspicion, which feeds on
the expectation of malevolence. Although attitudes of respect and friendship may be
unrelated to the immediate issues confronting governments, they create an environment
facilitating cooperation.
9. All these factors may play a role when international leadership is not based on
hegemony or domination and hence is not derived from compulsion or from a forcible
change or maintenance of the status quo, either of which, in turn, may be based on
military or economic superiority or superiority in some other value. In international
interaction, a state may lead by proposing, initiating and organizing co-operative
arrangements contributing to the benefit of all voluntary participants. Thus, the leader
may provide and/or organize military security against aggression or more generally, the
preservation of the established order, or the leading nation may prove innovating in
designing new solutions to pressing problems, for instance by proposing regional
federation or other modifications of the status quo. The point is that, in the absence of
any compulsion, these capacities for organizing co-operation and multinational problem
solving and for increasing the supply of protection and other values furnishes the bases
for benevolent leadership. This leader does not command, control, and manipulate. He
serves his function by information, persuasion, advice, and example, and once a state
has displayed these qualities over some time, it enjoys a corresponding prestige that
tends to facilitate the future exercise of non-coercive leadership. To conclude, whether
leadership is based on military or economic superiority, or superiority in some other
value base, it can be either or both coercive and non coercive in practice.
Positive Sanctions
10. We have not yet mentioned a mode of power or influence, which occurs
frequently in international affairs and is especially important in a study of the political
economy of power and influence. This is what is sometimes called “reward power” or
“positive sanctions.” It is the influence based on A’s promise of some sort of goal
gratification to B on condition that B will supply something of value to A. It occurs in a
transaction that can be looked at as an exchange. For example, one state provides
another with an air base in exchange for economic aid. A bribe is in the same category,
since it is a prepaid reward.
 50
11. Whether or not reward power is coercive is a key question in our context. Many
writers hold that the promise of reward gives rise to clearly non-coercive influence. This
is no doubt correct under many circumstances. After all, B is presumably free to agree
on any exchange of benefits - A sold and B bought economic aid. The something for
something trade implies that B will be no worse off, and presumably will be better off, if
he responds to A’s promise. The promise in such a proposed exchange is really a bid.
However, if subjected to coercion, B would be definitely worse off than before.
12. If calling the relationship non-coercive seems satisfactory in many conceivable
situations, is it satisfactory in all? In some cases positive sanctions are used along with
negative ones. Actor A is threatening B but offers a reward as well with the expectation
that, by reducing the latter’s costs of compliance, he is more likely to get his way. For
example, the reward may act as a “sweetener” or as a face-saving symbol. If the offer
and acceptance of a reward is not a once for all or very occasional, but rather a regular
event, the recipient becomes dependent on the reward, and the rewarding actor is
setting up, or at any rate is presented with, a base for subsequent coercion. Actor A can
threaten to cut off the reward, and what if the promised reward is the suspension of a
punishment? “The carrot or the stick” is a phrase suggesting a situation quite different
from normal commercial exchanges. It suggests that the dispensing actor (the lord or
boss) is manipulating the “donkey” (the peasant or lowly worker or slave). The choice of
either coercion or reward is strictly a matter of expedience, even if the carrot is chosen,
the recipient is aware of the alternative of the stick. This kind of situation may come
about even in the case of commercial exchanges. In the eyes of the economist, such
exchange will be concluded only when they are perceived to be advantageous by the
parties to the prospective trade. Neither the supplying nor the demanding party imposes
his will on the other. Traders are neither malevolent nor benevolent. They simply look
out for themselves. Thus, the economist ordinarily abstracts power or coercion from any
realities. In certain areas, to be sure, he has felt obliged to take cognizance of the
intrusion of power and coercion. He realizes that in other than perfectly competitive
markets i.e. where neither the individual seller nor the individual buyer has influence on
price, there is apt to be conflict over the exchange ratio. He understands that the
monopolist has market power and that, in the case of bilateral monopoly, bargaining
outcomes hinge in the economic “power” of the parties e.g. employers versus organized
labor. He is also aware that many transactions in the real world are not exactly like the
exchange of two commodities as in labor contract, and that certain inequalities
produced by some unregulated markets lead to “unjust” results that call for regulation
(e.g. child labor). Socialists have pointed to other peculiarities of free markets. They
observed that although the consumer is sovereign in a free market, the rich speak with
greater authority of purse than the poor and that inequalities in the distribution of
purchasing power are not just the result of differential contributions to the productive
process.
13. There is no doubt that parties to exchange transactions may feel exploited.
However, the subjective feeling of being exploited does not necessarily indicate the
presence of coercion. Obviously, many traders would prefer a greater reward for what
they sell or indeed a reward without any something for something whatsoever, yet they
have to come to terms with the perennial fact of scarcity. Most valued things are more
or less scarce, and there must be some sort of allocation mechanism for rationing them
out. The market and bargaining are such distributive mechanisms.
14. Nevertheless, some situations of exchange do suggest exploitation by the
normative standards of many communities. There are well known cases of people who,
under conditions of exceptional distress, have urgent and basic wants that can be used
 51
as leverage by others. There is the speculator, who in a backward country hoards grain
in anticipation of crop failure and famine and then sells food at prices requiring the
starving poor to mortgage their property and future products, and there is the usurer
who lends money to the unfortunate at exorbitant rates. There is the famous Biblical
story of the famished Esau selling his birthright to Jacob for a mess of pottage, and
there is also the historical fact of wide spread debt slavery. These situations are quite
different from ordinary market transactions. They suggest that the possessor of a
temporary advantage (which is not due to his productive effort) can convert it into a
permanent one. This sort of situation is by no means unknown in the modern world. B
may hate to give an air base to A but is in desperate (ultimately political) need of
economic aid. In fact, ordinary social intercourse suggests that even a gift may have
similar consequences. Often the benefactor is not a peer but a superior, and the
recipient may feel constrained to show gratitude in various ways. Gifts may be a way of
establishing superiority, and the recipient of a reward may feel degraded. One with
abundant supply of resources enabling him to serve the urgent needs of others is in a
position to capitalize on this and acquire power over them.
15. The conclusion is inescapable that some “power” to reward is susceptible to
coercive exploitation. This is not the case in markets in which normal recognized
“exchangeable” suitably change hands on the basis of reciprocal intensity of demand,
and which are characterized by a considerable number of competing buyers and sellers.
(Competition always curtails power.)
16. Coercive potential is generated in exchange transactions if one or more of the
following asymmetries characterize the relative bargaining positions of the actors. First,
A has a substantial degree of monopoly power so that B cannot turn to alternative
suppliers if he finds A’s terms unacceptable. Second, A can bring into play coercive
power, whether derived from military or economic power or some other power base, and
thus reduces B’s freedom to take or leave A’s offer. (Western business enterprise
dealing with authorities and landowners in undeveloped countries often enjoyed this
advantage.) Third, A has superior market knowledge and is able to deceive B or to take
advantage of his ignorance. Fourth, B’s demand is inordinately intensive and inelastic
because he has very little economic staying power when hit by an emergency beyond
his control, such as war or a slump in his export markets. (This is the case of the
famished peasant at a time of crop failure who sells his land for food to a usurious
merchant).
17. The concept of exploitation suggests that the outcome of a relationship or
exchange is “unfair” or “unjust”. That there is a lack of equivalence in the value of the
things exchanged. It should be noted however, that whether or not the outcome
constitutes exploitation becomes a question of fact, capable of empirical verification only
with reference to a normative standard previously established. Moreover, the types of
asymmetries between actors identified above do not produce exploitation automatically.
There is no law of nature that makes A grasping or malevolent, but history reveals that
the temptation of the strong, rich, and cunning to exploit the weak, poor, and ignorant is
not easily resisted, within and between societies, The record also shows that, even
when the temptation is resisted, the weak and destitute often suspect and allege
exploitation. For these reasons, many societies lay down rules for curbing unequal
power, even that of governments, and subject its use to legal and informal norms, but
such laws and norms are largely absent from interstate relations, and those restraints
that have recently evolved lack impartial enforceability.
18. The use of positive sanctions nevertheless differs from that of negative sanctions
in important respects. Promises are taken as a less unfriendly way of managing
 52
relationships than are threats. B feels less put upon and is less likely to defy the
influence attempt. He receives something even if he also loses something of value. B’s
relations with A are therefore less likely in this case, to inhibit simultaneous co-operation
on other matters or to leave a “scar effect” which limits or rules out friendly relations in
the future than when he is subjected to a threat of deprivation of one kind or another.
On the other side the use of rewards not only requires “reward power” the capability to
promise worthwhile economic, diplomatic, or military benefits to B but a successful
attempt to influence the latter also results in corresponding costs to A. As we will
examine in more detail below, the use of threats also involves costs, but the cost
structure is different. Upon B’s compliance with a positive sanction, the reward is due,
while nothing is due upon B’s compliance with a threat.
Power: Putative and Actualized
19. The phenomenon of power lends itself to two sharply different conceptions. The
inability to grasp this difference leads to inevitable misunderstanding and confusion.
Since coercive influence limits the conduct of an actor subjected to it, power can be
seen to reside in the capabilities that permit the power wielder to make effective threats,
but it can also be seen as identical with, and limited to the influence on the actually
achieved behaviour of the threatened actor. On the first view, power is something that
powerful states have and can accumulate; power is a means. On the second view,
power is an effect, the influence that is actually enjoyed. It is generated in an interaction,
which is an encounter. On the one hand, power is something that an actor can hope to
bring into play in a range of future situations. On the other hand still, as power comes
into being it is shaped and enjoyed only in a specific situation. Its measure is the
amount of influence actually achieved.
20. Today, most theorists conceive of power as actually achieved influence, whereas
most laymen see it as reposing in the capabilities that permit strong threats to be made.
Both concepts catch a part of reality, but it is critically important that we know which one
we have in mind when we speak of “power”. In the following, we will call the one
putative power and the other actualized power. When we refer simply to ‘power”, it is
the context that makes it clear whether the issue is putative or actualized power. The
distinction is extremely important. Many people believe that armies and navies are
military power, or that great national wealth is economic power, and they are inevitably
puzzled when, in real life, superior national power so defined fails to coerce a weaker
state, or when the superior power gets tested by an inferior one.
21. Having defined what actualized power is, we must now clarify what putative
power consists of; and how it is converted into actualized power. We will do this in detail
for military power and then more briefly for other types of coercive power and also for
non-coercive influence.
22. Putative military power has three components. Military forces i.e. military
strength, military potential i.e. capacity to expand or improve military forces, and
military reputation, i.e. the expectation of other national actors, derived from past
experience, that the state concerned has a greater or lesser disposition to resort to
military threats when its vital interests are crossed.
23. There are three mechanisms through which military strength, or more broadly,
putative military power can become effective, that is, actualized. One is through war, the
second is by way of military threats, and the third is through the anticipation and anxiety
that the other state may resort to its military force if a serious conflict of interest arises.
This third mechanism is extremely important, even though it is the least noticeable, and
is often expressed only in the councils of the influenced state but not always even there.
 53
For example, such councils may not consider certain courses of action at all because it
is obvious to everyone that they are likely to incur the displeasure of a militarily very
superior state, yet power has nonetheless become effective. Casting a quick glance at
historical record, it may appear to us that wars occur all too often, but it also tells us that
they are the least frequent mechanism through which actualized power is achieved.
Certainly, that the use of threats is far more frequent follows logically from the fact that
effective military threats do not lead to war and that not all ineffective threats do.
Although the usually unobserved and often unobservable operation of the third
mechanism denies us statistical evidence, it seems very likely that it is through this
silent mechanism that putative military power is most often converted into actualized
power. Governments do not like to incur coercive threats. The third mechanism of
conversion has the further peculiarity that military power becomes effective without any
encounter. If the “exercise” of power requires “manifest intention”, then this mechanism
leads the strong state to enjoy the fruits of power without deliberately wielding it. In
many in stances, the powerful state may not even be aware of its power having become
actualized.
24. How exactly does putative military power become effective and what
circumstances affect the transformation? Crisis conditions often degrade rationality to
some extent as a result of time, pressure, fatigue, anxiety, etc. (thus leading to
deviations from perfect rationality. There is of course the further and normal problem
that, even though disposed to act rationally, governments may lack adequate
information for making the estimates that underlie their decisions. Unquestionably,
governments make errors, and some decisions to comply or to defy are apt to be
mistaken. However, we have also assumed that governments know that their
information is inadequate and will prudently take uncertainty into account.
25. It is possible and often useful to design similar models identifying the variables
that will make A decide whether or not to make a threat (or whether to execute the
threat when he has been defied). Regarding the initial decision, we may postulate that it
depends mainly upon three factors. First is A’s estimate of the value to him of B’s
compliance, in terms of the values at stake in the original conflict but possibly also in
terms of the benefits of a successful threat, its effect on other states and for future
power plays and in terms of the government’s position at home. Second is A’s
estimate of the diverse costs of making the threat, including any adverse reaction of
opinion both domestic and of other states, the various costs of being defied and the
costs involved in executing a defied threat. Third is A’s tendency to act rationally and to
assume risks. The model can accommodate all possible decisions of this kind. For
instance, it helps to explain why the United States, though overwhelmingly more
powerful militarily, did not react with a forceful and explicit threat against North Korea
when that small power seized the pueblo in 1968. With so much of its military strength
tied up in the Vietnamese war, the American public increasingly tired of that conflict,
opinion elsewhere critical of United States military intervention abroad, and North Korea
likely to receive Soviet and Chinese backing, the estimated costs of any specific threat
loomed presumably very large in relation to any conceivable gain. It is important to
realize that attempts at achieving coercive influence involve costs. The extent to which
power be employed clearly depends on the sensitivity of the power holder to the costs
of its use. J. Harsanyi has suggested that a complete measure of A’s actualized power
depends upon the ratio of the cost of the power play to A and the costs of defiance to B.
Accordingly, the more power A has, the less his costs and the higher the costs of
resistance to B, and power is more efficient as the value of the stakes at issue exceeds
the costs incurred in wielding it. The transformation of putative into actualized power is
obviously least costly. If costly at all, it is when the third conversion mechanism is
 54
operating. There is then no test of power which may fail and end up by diminishing A’s
putative power. Conversion is much less costly when a threat is effective than when the
threat has to be made good. This cost is less or absent when the threat is inferential
rather than substantive. If A’s threat does not suffice to extract B’s compliance, B is
presumably testing A’s putative power. There is a considerable loss in having one’s
power disputed, and perhaps revealed as pretended power.
26. The need for excessive reliance on violence can be regarded as an index of
weakness rather than of strength. (Certainly, in domestic situations, violence tends to
appear when power is in jeopardy), and there is the additional cost that, once violence
has begun, B’s resistance may grow and a settlement by reconciliation and compromise
is made more difficult. For these reasons, it is unwise for the threatening power to
proceed automatically to violence when a military threat has been repudiated. There is
usually ample cause for re-estimating the situation. Meeting a test of power may have
harmful side effects when if occurs under circumstances so costly for instance, as a
consequence of domestic disunity that its repetition will be doubted. On the other hand,
A’s coercive threat tends to be more effective, as B is surer that it will be executed in the
event of non-compliance, and though power tests are costly, the avoidance of such
tests may be interpreted as signifying fear and irresolution and may thus cause putative
military power to suffer decline. Finally, even though the making and execution of
threats is costly, the rewards may be high, not necessarily in terms of the issue at stake,
but in terms of maintaining or enhancing a reputation for power which may lead to ready
actualization in future conflicts or, hopefully, through the third mechanism. To set an
example and to display military resolve is why governments have sometimes resorted to
threats or to their execution, even though the precipitating cause of conflict seemed
relatively unimportant.
The Effectiveness of Economics and Other Non-military Power and Influence
27. Non-military coercion and non-coercive influence are subject to the same kind of
analysis we applied to military power and so is the use of non-military power in
changing the status quo without influencing actors. Since much of this would be
repetitive, we will examine these other forms of influence more briefly as far as the
conversion process is concerned. Economic power with reference to coercive threats is
used to deny some sort of economic advantage to another state, but by no means
necessarily always for the purpose of gaining some economic benefit. For instance, A
may place an embargo on imports from B in order to compel B to change its political or
economic behaviour. The ability to shut off valuable markets, to pre-empt sources of
supply, to stop investments, or reduce economic aid would constitute elements of
national economic strength equivalent to military strength. The ability to increase such
international economic control constitutes potential economic strength, and the known
disposition to have recourse to economic pressures would be the remaining constituent
of putative economic power. Clearly, the three conversion mechanisms will be operating
with this form of power. A variety of factors intervene to permit or deny, more or less,
the transformation of economic power into effective influence over another actor’s
behavior. The expected costs to A of the economic threat or of executing it, and the
expected vulnerability of B to the threat, will figure eminently in A’s decision.
Expectations regarding domestic and foreign support will affect decisions and again, the
achievement of coercive influence will depend on B’s calculations of the comparative
costs of compliance or defiance and the degree of his disposition to act rationally and to
take risks. In this area, too, the evaluation of threats and noncompliance are subject to
misperception, and their effect is subject to change (e.g. a disastrous crop or prolonged
major strikes in the threatened country), and the value of the stakes involved in the
 55
conflict affect B’s decision to make or execute an economic threat and B’s decision to
cope with the threat or its execution. It is also clear that effective influence is achieved
only in concrete situations.
28. If we turn to the promise of reward (whatever it might be, e.g. military, economic,
or diplomatic), the structure of factors involved in other coercive threats will be operative
in those cases in which, for the reasons indicated in the foregoing, the carrot carries the
suggestion of being a substitute for the stick. In other cases of a promise of goal
gratification conditional on something for something, we have non-coercive influence
aiming at the exchange of some sort of benefits. We have then a bargaining process
free of coercion. Whether or not a reward will be offered or accepted depends on each
party’s estimate of whether the exchange is advantageous and also on the actor’s
estimate of whether the expected benefit will actually be forthcoming. The eventual
settlement will reflect the bargaining power of the two parties which tactical skills aside,
favours the party that has the lesser perceived interest in reaching agreement.
Other Characteristics of Power and Non-coercive Influence
29. In order to complete our analysis, we will set forth briefly a number of
characteristics that all forms of influence more or less share.
30. The international power and non-coercive influence of states differ in amount or
strength that is to say in weight, scope, and domain. Weight reflects the degree to which
the policy of the influenced state is affected. Scope refers to the range of values in
regard to which its behavior is influenced (e.g. may be more open to influence in
economic than military matters). Domain refers to the number of states that are being
influenced. A state may succeed in coercing several others by the same threat or may
persuade a number of them to co-operate with the same proposal. The influence
relationship can be multilateral as well as bilateral. Indeed it can, and very often is,
multilateral not only with reference to a single actor attempting to influence several
others by means of the same threat, reward, or proposal, but also in terms of several
actors attempting simultaneously to influence the same state or states. Whether
coercive or not, the attempt at influence occurs frequently in a competitive situation.
When actors attempt to exercise influence competitively, the actualization of their
putative influence, whether coercive or not tends to be diminished. Rivalry for influence
is especially important in coercive situations, for it tends to limit the weight, scope, and
domain of power. B may be able to play off one state against another. His will (and
ability) to resist A may be abetted by C’s offer of backing (or, of course, by C’s threat
against A, in which case power is directly limited by power). The influence relationship is
modified further if several strong states combine to influence a weak one or if several
weak states combine to defy, or perhaps even threaten, a strong one.
31. In our foregoing analysis we assumed that influence is one sided and that only
one kind and means of influence is employed in any particular situation. We must now
relax these and other simplifying assumptions. Coercive power, if it comes about, is of
course inherently asymmetrical, but this does not mean that B, who is subjected to A’s
attempt to coerce, may not be able to exert counter influence in the process. If he is
being threatened militarily, he may mobilize to suggest that he has the resolution to
resist, or he may negotiate for the support of other states. Indeed, as Boulding and
Schelling have pointed out the apparently weaker party may sometimes win because of
superior determination, in turn resulting from the fact that its range of choice is more
limited, or because choice has been limited by irrevocable commitment. If power
becomes actualized, it does so as a result of A’s net ability to coerce. B may be able in
various ways to raise A’s costs in trying to actualize putative power. Indeed,
actualization of power will proceed only and precisely as far as B’s resistance permits.
 56
32. To lift another simplifying assumption, an attempt at coercion may not only flatly
fail or succeed. It may succeed (or fail) in part, namely to the extent set by B’s will and
ability to resist. Indeed, if we conceive of the value X that A wants to extract from B as
something divisible (which it may or may not be), we can hypothesize A’s resistance to
further losses will grow progressively with each unit of x given up, while A’s will to pay
the costs and assume the risks of power conversion will decline with each unit of x
gained. (In real life, the problem may not, of course, be a linear one). The outcome will
then represent a compromise.
33. The bargaining involved in attempts at coercion is frequently protracted. B’s skill
may make it so. This means that the variable conditions determining the conversion of
putative into actualized power may change during the time of the bargaining process. A
may suddenly find a part of his putative power claimed by conflicts with other states. B
may come to enjoy increasing domestic or foreign support etc. On the other hand, there
may be changes to B’s disadvantage. Such changes will induce the actors to reconsider
and perhaps revise earlier decisions to inflict or resist coercion. As a result, B’s
resistance may crumble or mount, or A’s position may be strengthened or weakened.
34. In our simple model, we also assumed that only one base or means of influence
was operating at any one time. In the real world, A may resort to several different
threats (i.e. a threat package) and B to several different counter threats. Thus, A may
threaten B with economic reprisals and promise to reward B with certain economic
advantages, while B may counter with a propaganda campaign directed at A’s public.
Since states may find it to their mutual advantage to engage in limited cooperation even
in the midst of a serious crisis or war, non-coercive influence may be intermixed with
attempts at coercion. The ability to act as an international leader may likewise rest on a
blending of coercive and non-coercive influence. Or in the complete absence of
coercion, a state may lead on the basis of several shared values, e.g. information,
expertise, and trust. If a particular encounter allows a rational leader to choose from
several, available means of influence, he will compare their expected costs and
effectiveness and then combine them in such a way as to achieve a particular effect at
minimum cost and risk.
35. The choice of means, however, depends not only on their availability to
government and on the expected cost and efficacy of their employment. It depends also
on the character of past relationships between states. Previous relationships and hence
predisposition’s may be of long-standing friendship or hatred, trust or suspicion,
confidence or fear, and these attitudes condition both the generation and resolution of
conflict and the scope for non-coercive influence. Prior friendship will tend to minimize
the very generation of conflict, at least serious conflict (though by no means prevent it),
since governments and publics are disposed to be accommodating. When conflicts do
arise, attempts at pacific settlement have priority. Resort to coercion is shunned as
inappropriate, and will be considered only when the stakes are extremely high. An
established friendly relationship obviously facilitates co-operation and the mutual flow of
non-coercive influence. Conversely, conflicts are apt to arise more easily and attempts
at coercion are considered more readily within a relationship of antagonism.
36. Special relationships may be based on a long history of cooperation and alliance,
or on a common culture and language, or less solidly on close economic ties. They
produce a context which affecting the choice of influence attempts, is expressed in the
very tone of diplomacy, in a distinct atmosphere. During the 1960;s for example, the
tone of American diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia and China was suspicious, cool, and
sometimes frosty, while that exhibited in American relations with England and Japan
was more often confident and friendly.
 57
International Power and Influence Structures
37. Viewing international systems as a whole whether global as now or regionally
confined as before the overseas eruption of European power, the distribution of putative
power and influence and the foundations on which they rest have shown various
patterns, the only uniform property being the inequality of the units. Depending on the
base value from which international power and influence are derived, one could identify
a number of not wholly overlapping patterns at any one time. The dominant pattern has
thus far always been founded on military and economic strength. Since non-coercive as
well as coercive influence can turn on these very same assets, and since some other
assets are usually associated with economic power (e.g. wide-ranging expertise), the
international pattern of non-coercive influence has tended to gravitate toward the
pattern of coercive power. There are however, influence bases which need not be
associated with military and economic strength, such as certain bargaining skills, the
image of a successful mastery of domestic problems, cultural affinity, and ethnic
identity.
38. Looked at from the viewpoint of the majority of small and weak states, the
international system looks immensely different from the viewpoint of Manila, San
Salvador, or Copenhagen than from that of Washington, Moscow, or Beijing. To the
weak states, the system is one of limited international freedom of action and decidedly
little security from aggression. To them, goal achievement requires external power, they
have fewer feasible options than the strong states, and their usually narrow margin of
safety is highly demanding of vigilant prudence. (Only the strong can hope somehow to
“muddle through”). According to their experience as a group, the international balance
of power and the bipolar systems are designed primarily to promote the interests of the
great or of the superpowers respectively. Faced with these prospects, some small
states have embraced neutralism or nonalignment; others tried appeasement of the
most threatening power. Alternatively, the weak state may seek protection in alliance
with a strong power. This is a time - honoured practice or, more recently, in systems of
collective security. Yet whatever alternative they turn to, they depend for their security
ultimately on external assistance or luck. They cannot assure it from their own
resources. There are, as we shall see, some changes in the contemporary world that
have somewhat eroded the military foundation of power, but essentially the international
system is still one of basic insecurity for the weak.
39. Looked at from the viewpoint of the strong state, the systems have actually been
only relatively more secure for them than for the weak, when (and this is the rule) there
was one other power, or more powers, of comparable strength. Anarchy, though it gives
predatory opportunities to the strong is a risk and a burden to all members. Yet, despite
this inescapable fundamental insecurity, strong states of course enjoyed opportunities
(while they lasted) for pushing their goal achievement at the expense of the small fry
(and hence have been far less stimulated than lesser states to revolutionize the
interrelation system in the direction of viable collective security.
40. Unequal putative power facilitates the establishment of empires, including
colonial empire in which the colonial population, with lesser rights than the imperial
population, is subject to exploitation. Unequal power also facilitates the establishment
and preservation of a range of national privileges, diplomatic and economic, which are
not expressed in territorial control. Furthermore, unequal power, favours hegemony,
which without formal institutionalization of authority, means supremacy in an area that
the hegemonic state controls fundamentally by coercive power. (Non-coercive influence,
no matter how one sided, can be about leadership but not hegemonic supremacy.) The
lesser states within the sphere of influence of the hegemonic state, a sphere often
 58
tacitly recognized by other strong states, usually on the expectations that other powerful
states will reciprocate by similarly acknowledging their sphere of interest are essentially
satellites. Unlike colonial dependencies or protectorates, they retain formal sovereignty
but in important foreign policy respects they lack autonomy not only on the essentially
ad hoc basis on which weak states see their self determination episodically restricted by
more powerful states, but on a regular basis. There can be little doubt about the Soviet
Union’s hegemonic power over the Communist states in Eastern Europe, except
Yugoslavia and Albania, even though there have been attempts from time to time by the
smaller Communist states to contest and reduce the scope of Soviet hegemony.
Rumania’s strivings in the middle and late 1960’s are a case in point.
41. Another relationship resting on inequality of power and influence is paternal
leadership. Paternal leadership is based on a mixture of coercive and non-coercive
influence. In this case, non-coercive influence and non-coercive bargaining is not just an
incidental or marginal admixture, but a very important and often an equal or a
predominant foundation of the relationship. The paternal leader occupies internationally,
a position similar to ruling elites within relatively non-autocratic states. Such elites
organize and finance, by means of taxes and other extractions from the rest of the
populations (e.g. military conscription) the production of public goods and services (e.g.
domestic order and school systems), which would not be produced or paid for
voluntarily. These elites enjoy their position by a varying combination of coercion and
consent. Internationally, the paternal leader organizes the achievement of some sort of
net benefits to himself and his client state or client states. (The “public” benefits may
involve military protection by means of alliance, the support of friendly foreign
governments challenged by revolutionaries or the formation of a customs union (as did
Prussia in the 1830’s), or the benefits may be directed to a range of common problems,
as is the case with the Organization of American States, for which the United States
acts as paternal leader. Paternal leadership may also be multilateral for instance, the
leadership of the Big Four in the establishment of the United Nations at the end of World
War II and the United States and Great Britain in the creation of the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank) . On the other hand, when the United States proposed and financed the Marshall
Plan for the economic reconstruction of war torn Europe, it acted as a single patron.
42. Domestic elites may use their authority to extract resources for the provision of
public goods in order to exploit the rest of the population by means of excessive
taxation or by defining as “public goods” those in which only they are primarily
interested (e.g. an ambitious build-up of military strength). Similarly, the paternal leader
may exploit his international clients by extracting advantages contributing only or mainly
to his interests. Thus an alliance leader may use military bases supplied by smaller
allies for operations that have nothing to do with alliance business and which these
allies may sense as disadvantageous to themselves. However, the examples we have
given do not indicate that paternal leaders will often be in a position to exploit their
clients on a net basis. What happens in this respect depends primarily on whether the
leader enjoys appreciable net coercive power or whether he leads on the basis of non-
coercive influence and the exchange of something for something. It is quite possible for
a client to exploit the paternal leader if he has adequate bargaining power. For instance,
he may threaten to switch to a rival leader or collapse against the pressure of domestic
revolutionary forces under circumstances which make his survival and that of the client
relationship very desirable to the paternal leader. Thus, it is quite likely that some post-
war clients of the United States e.g. the Republic of China (Taiwan) or South Korea
have exploited the United States. Indeed, there has been speculation on whether the
United States has not been exploited by some of its NATO allies who supplied far
 59
smaller inputs for alliance purposes than the United States had requested or suggested
or even than they had agreed to provide and it is quite possible that Communist China
exploited the Soviet Union before the rift between the two states opened and expanded
sharply in 1963.

SECTION-II
THE ESSENCE OF NATIONAL POWER
(BY MORGANTHAU – WANS – J. MOVGEN THAN)
What is National Power?
1. We have said that by power we mean the power of man over the minds and
actions of other men, a phenomenon to be found whenever human beings live in social
contact with one another. We have spoken of the "power of a nation" or of "national
power" as though the concept was self-evident and sufficiently explained by what we
have said about power in general. While, it can be easily understood that individuals
seek power, but how do we explain the aspirations for power in the entities called
nations? What is a nation? What do we mean when we attribute to a nation aspirations
and actions?
2. A nation as such is obviously not an empirical thing. A nation as such cannot be
seen. What can be empirically observed are only the individuals who belong to a nation.
Hence, a nation is an abstraction from a number of individuals who have certain
characteristics in common, and it is these characteristics that make them members of
the same nation. Besides being a member of a nation and thinking, feeling, and acting
in that capacity, the individual may belong to a church, a social or economic class, a
political party, a family, and may think, feel, and act in these capacities. Apart from
being a member of all these social groups, he is also a human being pure and simple,
and thinks, feels and acts in that capacity. Therefore, when we speak in empirical terms
of the power or of the foreign policy of a certain nation, we can only mean the power or
the foreign policy of certain individuals who belong to the same nation. As Marcel Proust
put it: "The life of nations merely repeats, on a larger scale, the lives of their component
cells; and he who is incapable of understanding the mystery, the reactions, the laws that
determine the movements of the individual, can never hope to say anything worth
listening to about the struggles of nations."
3. Yet this poses another difficulty. The power or the foreign policy of the United
States is obviously not the power or the foreign policy of all the individuals who belong
to the nation called the United States of America. The fact that the United States
emerged from the Second World War as the most powerful nation on earth has not
affected the power of the great mass of individual Americans. It has, however, affected
the power of all those individuals who administer the foreign affairs of the United States
and more particularly, those who speak for and represent the United States on the
international scene. For a nation pursues foreign policies as a legal organization called
a state, whose agents act as the representatives of the nation in international affairs.
They speak for it, negotiate treaties in its name, define its objectives, choose the means
for achieving them, and try to maintain, increase, and demonstrate its power. They are
the individuals who, when they appear as representatives of their nation on the
international scene, wield the power and pursue the policies of their nation. It is to them
that we refer when we speak in empirical terms of the power and of the foreign policy of
a nation.
 60
4. How, then, does it come about that the great mass of the individual members of a
nation, whose individual power is not affected by changes in nature of national power,
identify themselves with the power and the foreign policies of their nation, experience
this power and these policies as their own, and do so with an emotional intensity often
surpassing the emotional attachment to their individual aspirations for power? By asking
this question, we are posing the problem of modern nationalism. In preceding periods of
history, the collective whose power and aspirations for power the individual identified
himself with was determined by ties of blood, of religion, or of common loyalty to a
feudal lord or prince. In our time the identification with the power and policies of the
nation has largely superseded or, in any case, overshadows those older identifications.
How is this phenomenon of modern nationalism in relation to power to be explained?
5. We have learned from our discussion of the ideologies of foreign policies that in
the mind of the individual, the power aspirations of others bear the stigma of immorality.
While this attitude has one of its roots in the desire of the prospective victim of the
power of others to defend his freedom against this threat, the other root grows from the
attempt of society as a whole to suppress and keep in bounds individual aspirations for
power. Society has established a network of rules of conduct and institutional devices
for controlling individual power drives. These rules and devices either divert individual
power drives into channels where they cannot endanger society, or else they weaken
them or suppress them altogether. Laws, ethics, and mores, innumerable social
institutions and arrangements, such as competitive examinations, election contests,
sports, social clubs, and fraternal organizations serve that purpose.
6. In consequence, most people are unable to satisfy their desire for power within
the national community. Within that community, only a relatively small group
permanently wields power over great numbers of people without being subject to
extensive limitations by others. The great mass of the population is to a much greater
extent the object of power than the wielder. Not being able to find full satisfaction of their
desire for power within the national boundaries, the people project those unsatisfied
aspirations onto the international scene. There they find vicarious satisfaction in
identification with the power drives of the nation. When the citizen of the United States
thinks of the power of his country, he experiences the same kind of exaltation the citizen
of Rome must have felt when identifying himself with Rome and its power and by the
same token contrasting himself with the stranger, he would say: “Civis Romanus sum,”
which means “I am a Roman citizen”. When we are conscious of being members of a
very powerful nation, the nation whose industrial capacity and material wealth are
unsurpassed, we flatter ourselves and feel a great pride. It is as though all of us, not as
individuals but collectively, as members of the same nation, owned and controlled so
magnificent a power. The power our representatives wield on the international scene
becomes our own, and the frustrations we experience within the national community are
compensated for by the vicarious enjoyment of the power of the nation.
7. These psychological trends, operating within the individual members of a nation,
find support in the rules of conduct and in the institutions of society. Society restrains
aspirations for individual power within the national community and puts the mark of
dishonour upon certain power drives pointing toward individual elevation, but it
encourages and glorifies the tendencies of the great mass of the population, frustrated
in its individual power drives, to identify itself with the nation's struggle for power on the
international scene. Power pursued by the individual for his own sake is considered an
evil to be tolerated only within certain bounds and in certain manifestations. Power
disguised by ideologies and pursued in the name and for the sake of the nation
becomes a good for which all citizens must strive. The national symbols, especially in
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so far as they have reference to the armed forces and relations with other nations, are
instruments of identification of the individual with the power of the nation. The ethics and
mores of society tend to make that identification attractive by holding out rewards and
threatening punishments.
8. Thus it is not by accident that certain groups of the population are either the most
militant supporters of the national aspirations for power in the international field, or else
refuse to have anything to do with them at all. These are the groups, which are primarily
the object of the power of others and are most thoroughly deprived of outlets for their
own power drives or are most insecure in the possession of whatever power they may
have within the national community. The lower middle classes such as the white-collar
workers, and the main bulk of the labouring masses, identify themselves completely
with the national aspirations for power. The main example is the revolution of Marxism;
particularly as shown by the common men in Europe. While the bulk of the labouring
masses pose small concern for the foreign policies of the United States, the lower
middle classes are taken an ever increasing importance.
9. It is here, then, that one must seek the roots of modern nationalism and the
explanation for the increasing ferocity with which foreign policies are pursued in modern
times. The growing insecurity of the individual in Western societies, especially in the
lower strata, and the atomisation of Western society in general has magnified
enormously the frustration of individual power drives. This, in turn, has given rise to an
increased desire for compensatory identification with the collective national aspirations
for power. These increases have been quantitative as well as qualitative.
Roots of Modern Nationalism and Impact on National Power
10. Until the time of the Napoleonic Wars, only very small groups of the population
identified themselves with the foreign policies of their nation. Foreign policies were truly
not national but dynastic policies, and the identification was with the power and the
policies of the individual monarch rather than with the power and the policies of an
entity, such as the nation. As Goethe put it in a significant passage of his
autobiography: "We all felt for Frederick [the Great], but what did we care for Prussia?"
On February 19, 1809, Thomas Jefferson wrote to John Hollins that "These [scientific]
societies, are always at peace; however their nations may be at war. Like the republic of
letters, they form a great fraternity spreading over the whole earth, and their
correspondence is never interrupted by any civilized nation."
11. With the Napoleonic Wars began the period of national foreign policies and wars;
that is, the identification of the great masses of the citizens of a nation with national
power and national policies, replacing identification with dynastic interests. Talleyrand
pointed to that change when he said to Czar Alexander in 1808: "The Rhine, the Alps,
and the Pyrenees are the conquests of France; the test of the Emperor; they mean
nothing to France." Up to the First World War, it was doubtful to what degree the
members of the European socialist parties identified themselves with the power and
policies of their respective nations. Yet the full participation in that war of the main bulk
of the workers in all belligerent countries demonstrated the identification of practically
the whole population with the power and policies of their respective nations.
Retreat from Nationalism: Apparent and Real
12. The Second World War, however, brought about certain retrogression from that
maximum identification which the First World War witnessed. That retrogression took
place at the top and at the base of the social pyramid. On the one hand, small yet
powerful pro-fascist groups of intellectual, political, and military leaders in Great Britain
and France either refused to identify themselves with their countries or even preferred
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to identify themselves with the national enemy. The leaders who felt this way were
insecure in their power positions, especially in view of the initial political and military
weakness of their countries, and the enemy alone seemed to be able to assure them
their positions on top of the social pyramid. On the other hand, the French Communists,
owing allegiance to both France and the Soviet Union, were able to identify themselves
fully with their nation only after the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 had
brought both allegiances into play. The German attack on France alone was unable to
rouse them to active opposition to the invader, but the German attack on the Soviet
Union made France and the Soviet Union allies in a common cause and allowed the
French Communists to oppose the German invaders of France, the common enemy of
France and the Soviet Union alike. The identification of the French Communists with
French national policies was predicated upon the identity of those policies with Russian
interests and policies. This Communist allegiance to foreign interests and policies, to
take precedence over national ones, was a universal phenomenon that, as such, was a
challenge to the cohesion of the nation state and to its very existence.
13. This disintegration of national solidarity can hardly be called a retreat from
nationalism, for it exchanges loyalty to a foreign nation for loyalty to one's own. The
Communist Frenchman, as it were, transformed himself into a Russian nationalist who
supports the policies of the Soviet Union. What is new in this nationalism is its
inconsistency in demanding identification with one-foreign-nation while denying the
claims of other nations to the loyalty of their citizens.
14. It testifies to the strength of national solidarity that this transfer of loyalty from
one's own nation to another, which is the fountainhead of a worldwide political
movement, has proven to be a short lived interlude. Revival of national solidarity began
in differing degrees with communist governments and movements putting their
respective national interests ahead of those of the Soviet Union. Thus, the monolithic
world-Communist movement, directed by, and at the service of the Soviet Union, has
been replaced by "polycentrism” in which national loyalties and interests take
precedence over the affinities of political philosophy.
15. However, the aftermath of the Second World War has brought into being a
genuine retrogression from nationalism in the form of a movement toward the unification
of Western Europe. This movement has thus far to its credit three concrete
achievements in terms of working supranational organizations: the European Coal and
Steel Community, the Common Market (European Economic Community), and Euratum
(European Atomic Energy Community). Two experiences gave birth to the movement
toward European unification: the destructiveness of the Second World War and the
political, military, and economic decline of Europe in its aftermath. The supporters of this
movement could not help but conclude from these experiences that, in Western Europe
at least, the nation state is an obsolescent principle of political organization, which far
from assuring the security and power of its members, condemns them to impotence and
ultimate extinction either by each other or by their more powerful neighbours. Only the
future will show whether this acute sense of insecurity, not only of the individuals but
also of the national societies to which they belong, will lead to political creativity in the
form of the political, military, and economic unification of Europe, or to political
impotence in the form of a retreat into "neutralism"- that is, the renunciation of an active
foreign policy altogether, or to political desperation in the form of a more intense
identification with the individual nations.
16. A force that runs counter to the revival of nationalism is the growing recognition
by statesmen, intellectuals, and technical experts that the solution to certain
fundamental problems posed by the modern technologies of transportation,
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communications, and warfare transcend the interests and the ability of any single
nation, however powerful. The control of nuclear energy, the protection and restoration
of the natural environment, the supply of food and raw materials are problems of this
kind. They cannot be solved by an individual nation competing with other nations for
national advantage. All nations, or a considerable number of them, have a common
interest in the solution of these problems, which interest ought to be reflected in
common policies transcending particular national interests. While some small elites
have become aware of this novel element in world politics and are trying to come
intellectually to terms with it, the actual conduct of national foreign policies has hardly
been affected by it. On the contrary, it testifies to the undiminished strength of
nationalism that organizations such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies,
which were created for the purpose of realizing the common interests of the nations of
the world, have been seized by competing nationalisms for the purpose of serving
competing national interests.
Personal Insecurity and Social Disintegration
17. Qualitatively, the emotional intensity of the identification of the individual with his
nation stands in inverse proportion to the stability of the particular society as reflected in
the sense of security of its members. The greater the stability of society and the sense
of security of its members, the smaller are the chances for collective emotions to seek
an outlet in aggressive nationalism, and vice versa. The revolutionary wars of France in
the last decade of the eighteenth century and the wars of liberation against Napoleon
from 1812-15 are the first examples in modern times of mass insecurity, induced by the
instability of domestic societies and leading to emotional outbursts in the form of fervent
mass identifications with aggressive foreign policies and wars. Social instability became
acute in Western civilization during the nineteenth century. It became permanent in the
twentieth century as a result of the emancipation of the individual from the ties of
tradition, especially in the form of religion, of the increased rationalization of life and
work, and of cyclical economic crises. The insecurity of the groups affected by these
factors found an emotional outlet in fixed and emotionally accentuated nationalistic
identifications. As Western society became ever more unstable, the sense of insecurity
deepened and the emotional attachment to the nation as the symbolic substitute for the
individual became ever stronger. It reached the fervour of a secular religion under the
impact of the world wars, revolutions, concentration of economic, political, and military
power, and the economic crises of the twentieth century. Contests for power now took
on the ideological aspects of struggles between good and evil. Foreign policies
transformed themselves into sacred missions. Wars were fought as crusades, for the
purpose of bringing the true political religion to the rest of the world.
18. This relation between social disintegration, personal insecurity, and the ferocity of
modern nationalistic power drives can be studied to particular advantage in German
fascism, where these three elements were more highly developed than anywhere else.
The general tendencies of the modern age toward social disintegration were driven to
extremes in Germany by a conjunction of certain elements in the national character
favouring the extremes rather than mediating and compromising positions, and by three
events that weakened the social fabric of Germany to such an extent as to make it an
easy prey for the consuming fire of National Socialism.
19. The first of these events was the defeat in the First World War, coinciding with a
revolution that was held responsible not only for the destruction of traditional political
values and institutions, but for the loss of the war itself. The revolution naturally brought
loss of power and insecurity in social status to those who had been at or near the top of
the social hierarchy under the monarchy. Yet the social situation of large masses of the
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population was similarly affected by the impact of the idea that defeat and revolution
were both the result of treacherous machinations of domestic and foreign enemies
working for the destruction of Germany. Thus it was widely held that Germany was not
only "encircled" by foreign enemies, but that its own body politic was shot through with
invisible hostile organisms, sapping its strength and bent upon destroying it.
20. The second event was the inflation of the early twenties, which turned large
segments of the middle classes into commoners economically. Among the people at
large, this economic downturn at least weakened (if it did not destroy) the traditional
moral principles of honesty and fair dealing. The middle classes, in protest against their
economic pauperization, embraced the most anti-proletarian and nationalistic ideologies
available. The lower strata of the middle classes especially had always derived at least
a limited satisfaction from their superiority to the commoners (proletariat). When they
viewed the social pyramid as a whole, they had always to look up much farther than
they were able to look down. Yet, while they were not actually at the bottom of the social
pyramid, they were uncomfortably close to it. Hence their frustrations and insecurity and
their predisposition for the nationalistic identification. Inflation pushed them down to the
bottom, and in the desperate struggle to escape social and political identification with
the amorphous mass of the proletariat they found relief in the theory and practice of
National Socialism. National Socialism offered them lower races to look down upon and
foreign enemies to feel superior to and conquer.
21. Finally, the economic crisis of 1929 brought all the different groups of the
German people in different ways face to face with the actual or threatened loss of social
status and intellectual, moral, and economic insecurity. The workers were faced with
actual or threatened permanent unemployment. Those groups of the middle classes
who had recovered from the economic devastation of inflation were losing what they
had regained. The industrialists had to cope with increased social obligations and were
haunted by the fear of revolution. National Socialism focused all those fears,
insecurities, and frustrations upon two foreign enemies: the Treaty of Versailles and
bolshevism, and their alleged domestic supporters. It channelled all those thwarted
emotions into one mighty stream of nationalistic fanaticism. Thus National Socialism
was able to identify in a truly totalitarian fashion the aspirations of the individual German
with the power objectives of the German nation. Nowhere in modern history has that
identification been more complete, and has that sphere in which the individual pursues
his aspirations for power for their own sake been smaller or has the force of the
emotional impetus with which that identification transformed itself-into aggressiveness
on the international scene been equalled in modern civilization.
22. While the transformation of individual frustrations into collective identification with
the nation has never in modern history been more comprehensive and intensive than it
was in National Socialist Germany, nevertheless the German variety of modern
nationalism differs in degree rather than in kind from the nationalism of other great
powers such as that of the Soviet Union or of the United States. In the Soviet Union the
great mass of the population has no opportunity to satisfy its power drives within the
domestic society. The average Russian worker and peasant has nobody to look down
upon, and his insecurity is intensified by the practices of the police state as well as by a
low standard of living. Here, too, a totalitarian regime projects these frustrations,
insecurities, and fears onto the international scene where the individual Russian finds in
the identification with "the most progressive country in the world”, "the fatherland of
socialism" vicarious satisfaction for his aspirations for power. The conviction, seemingly
supported by historic experience, that the nation with which he identifies himself is
constantly menaced by capitalist enemies serves to elevate his personal fears and
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insecurities onto the collective plane. His personal fears are thus transformed into
anxiety for the nation. Identification with the nation thus serves the dual function of
satisfying individual power drives and alleviating individual fears by projecting both onto
the international scene.
23. In the United States, the process by which national power is appropriated by the
individual and experienced as his own resembles by and large the typical pattern as it
developed in Western civilization during the nineteenth century. This is to say, the
identification of the individual with the power and the foreign policies of the nation
proceeds largely in terms of the typical frustrations and insecurities of the middle class.
Yet American society is to a much greater extent a middle-class society than any other
society in Western civilization. More importantly, whatever class distinction there may
be tend to be mitigated, if not resolved in American society by the common denominator
of middle-class values and aspirations. The identification of the individual with the nation
in terms of middle-class frustrations and aspirations is, therefore, almost as
predominant and typical in American society as the proletarian identification is in the,
Soviet Union. On the other hand, the relatively great mobility of American society opens
to the great masses of the population avenues for social and economic improvement.
These opportunities have in the past, at least in normal times, tended to keep rather low
the emotional intensity of that identification as compared with the corresponding
situations in the Soviet Union and in National Socialist Germany.
24. However, new factors have arisen in recent times with the increasing atomisation
of society, the threat of world revolution as symbolized by international Communism, the
relative disappearance of geographical isolation, and the danger of nuclear war. Thus,
in the eighth decade of the twentieth century, intensified individual frustrations and
anxieties have called forth a more intensive identification on the part of the individual,
with the power and the foreign policies of the nation. If, therefore, the present trend
toward ever increasing dogmatic frustration and international instability is not reversed,
the United States is likely to partake to a growing extent in those tendencies in modern
culture, which have found their most extreme manifestations in Soviet Russia and
National Socialist Germany. These were the tendencies that made way for an ever
more complete and intensive identification of the individual with the nation. In such
complete and intensive identification, we have one of the roots of the ferocity and
ruthlessness of modern foreign policies where national aspirations for power clash with
each other, virtually supported by total populations with an unqualified dedication and
intensity of feeling, which in former periods of history only issues of religion could
command.
The Task of Evaluation of National Power
25. It is the task of those responsible for the foreign policy of a nation and of those
who mould public opinion with regard to international affairs to evaluate correctly the
bearing of these factors upon the power of their own nation and of other nations as well,
and this task must be performed for both the present and the future. What is the
influence of the unification of the armed services upon the quality of the military
establishment of the United States? What effect will the use of nuclear energy have
upon the industrial capacity of the United States and of other nations? How will the
industrial capacity, military strength, and national morale of China develop after Mao's
death? How has the hostility of China and Pakistan influenced the national morale of
India? What is the significance of the revival of a German army for the national power of
Germany? Has reduction changed the national character of Germany and Japan? How
has the national character of the people of Argentina reacted upon the political
philosophies, methods, and objectives of the Peron regime? In what ways does the
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advancement of the Russian sphere of influence to the Elbe River affect the
geographical position of the Soviet Union? Will this or that reorganization or change in
the personnel of the State Department strengthen or weaken the quality of American
diplomacy? These are some of the questions, which must be answered correctly if a
nation's foreign policy is to be successful.
26. Yet these questions referring to changes in one particular factor are not the most
difficult to answer. There are others, which concern the influence of changes in one
factor upon other factors, and here the difficulties increase and the pitfalls multiply.
What is, for instance, the import of modern technology of warfare for the geographical
position of the United States? How, in other words, do guided missiles and supersonic
planes affect the geographical isolation of the United States from other continents? To
what degree will the United States lose, and to what degree will it retain, its traditional
inviolability to overseas attack? What do the same technological developments mean in
view of the geography of Russian territory? To what extent have these factors reduced
the protective function of the wide expanses of the Russian plains? In this context, what
protection has the Channel afforded Great Britain since the beginning of British history?
What will the industrialization of Brazil, China, and India signify for the military strength
of these countries? What is the relative importance of the American army, navy, and air
force in view of changes in the technology of warfare? What does the anticipated rate of
increase of the American population in the next two decades and the more rapid
increase of the populations of Latin America, India, China, and the Soviet Union portend
for the industrial capacity and military strength of these nations? How will fluctuations in
industrial production affect the national morale of the United States, the Soviet Union,
Germany, Great Britain, and France? Will the British national character preserve its
traditional qualities under the impact of the fundamental changes, which the industrial
capacity, the economic organization, the military strength, and the geographical
isolation of Great Britain are undergoing?
27. The task of the analyst of national power does not however stop here. He must
yet try to answer another group of questions of a still higher order of difficulty. These
questions concern the comparison of one power factor in one nation with the same or
another power factor in another nation. In other words, they concern the relative weight
of changes in the individual components of the power of different nations for the over-all
power relations of these different nations. If one considers for instance, the relative
power of the United States and the Soviet Union at a particular moment, let us say in
1972, the question arises of how the different power factors on either side add up and to
which side, and in what respects, they give a superiority in power. To what extent does
the quantitatively and qualitatively superior industrial capacity of the United States
compensate for the probable inferiority of its land forces? What are the respective
strengths and weaknesses of the highly concentrated American industrial and
population centres, with their great vulnerability to air attack and their great ease of
communication, and of the dispersed Russian centres, partly secret in location and
character, yet faced with great difficulties in transportation? What power does the Soviet
Union derive from the exposure of Western Europe to ideological and military
penetration from the East? What weakness does it suffer from its exposure to air and
naval attack from the Pacific? What is the significance, in terms of the respective power
positions of the pluralistic operation in the United States, of groups subservient to Soviet
foreign policy, and of the enforced homogeneity of Soviet public opinion? What is the
impact upon the national power of the United States of a democratic form of
government and of a non totalitarian economic system in comparison with the
totalitarian political and economic organization of the ex Soviet Union?
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28. These and similar questions must be asked and answered with regard to all
nations that play an active role on the international scene. The relative influence of the
different factors upon national power must be determined with regard to all nations that
compete with each other in the field international politics. Thus one ought to know
whether France is stronger than Italy and in what respects. One ought to know what the
assets and liabilities in terms of the different power factors of India or China are, with
respect to the Soviet Union, of Japan with regard to the United States, of Argentina with
regard to Chile, and so on.
29. The task of power computation is still not completed. In order to gain at least an
approximately true picture of the distribution of power among several nations, the power
relations, as they seem to exist at a particular moment in history, must be projected into
the future. To achieve this, it is not enough to ask oneself: What are the power relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1978, and what are they likely to be
in 1980? Decisions on international matters based upon, and referring to the power
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have to be taken not only in
1978 and 1980, but every day and everyday changes, however small and imperceptible
at first, in the factors making for national power. One may add an ounce of strength to
this side and take a grain of might away from the other.
30. On the relatively stable foundation of geography, the pyramid of national power
rises through different gradations of instability to its peak in the fleeting element of
national morale. All the factors we have mentioned, with the exception of geography,
are in constant flux, influencing each other and influenced in turn by the unforeseeable
intervention of nature and man. Together they form the stream of national power, rising
slowly and then flowing on a high level for centuries, as in Great Britain, or rising steeply
and falling sharply from its crest, as was the case in Germany; or as in the United
States and the Soviet Union, rising steeply and facing the Uncertainties of the future. To
chart the course of the stream and of the different currents that compose it, and to
anticipate the changes in their direction and speed, is the ideal task of the observer of
international politics.
31. It is an ideal task hence, incapable of achievement. Even if those responsible for
the foreign policy of a nation were endowed with superior wisdom and unfailing
judgment, and could draw upon the most complete and reliable sources of information,
there would be unknown factors to spoil their calculations. They could not foresee such
natural catastrophe as famines and epidemics, such man-made catastrophes as wars
and revolutions as well as inventions and discoveries, the rise and disappearance of
intellectual, military, and political leaders, the thoughts and actions of such leaders, not
to speak of the imponderables of national morale. In short, even the wisest and best
informed of men would still have to face all the contingencies of history and of nature.
Actually however, the assumed perfection in intellect and information is never available.
Not all the men who inform those who make decisions in foreign affairs are well
informed, and not all the men who make decisions are wise. Thus the task of assessing
the relative power of nations for the present and for the future resolves itself into a
series of hunches, of which some will certainly turn out to be wrong while others may be
proved by subsequent events to have been correct. The success or failure of a foreign
policy, in so far as it depends upon such power calculations, is determined by the
relative importance of the right and wrong hunches made by those responsible for a
particular foreign policy of a particular nation, as well as by those who conduct the
foreign affairs of other nations. Sometimes the mistakes in the assessment of power
relations committed by one nation are compensated for by the mistakes committed by
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another. Thus the success of the foreign policy of a nation may not be due to the
accuracy of its own calculations but to the greater errors of the other side.
Typical Errors of Evaluation
32. Of all the errors that nations can commit in evaluating their own power and the
power of other nations, three types are so frequent and illustrate so well the intellectual
pitfalls and practical risks inherent in such evaluations that they deserve some further
discussion. The first disregards the relativity of power by erecting the power of one
particular nation into an absolute. The second takes for granted the permanency of a
certain factor that had in the past played a decisive role, thus overlooking the dynamic
change to which most power factors are subject. The third attributes to one single
factor, a decisive importance to the neglect of all the others. In other words, the first
error consists in not correlating the power of one nation to the power of other nations,
the second consists in not correlating actual power at one time to possible power at
some future time, and the third consists in not correlating one power factor to others of
the same nation.
The Absolute Character of Power
33. When we refer to the power of a nation by saying that this nation is very powerful
and that nation is weak, we imply a comparison. In other words, the concept of power is
always a relative one. When we say that the United States is at present one of the two
most powerful nations on earth, what we are actually saying is that if we compare the
power of the United States with the power of all other nations, as they exist at present,
we find that the United States is more powerful than all others.
34. It is one of the most elemental errors in international politics to neglect this
relative character of power and to deal instead with power of a nation as though it were
an absolute. The evaluation of the power of France in the period between the two world
wars is a case in point. At the conclusion of the First World War, France was the most
powerful nation on earth from a military point of view. France was so regarded up to the
very moment in 1940 when its actual military weakness became obvious in a crushing
defeat. The newspaper headlines from the beginning of the Second World War in
September 1939 to the defeat of France in the summer of 1940 tell most eloquently the
story of that misjudgement of French military power. During that period of the so-called
phoney war, the German armies were supposed not to dare to attack the French
because of the latter's superior strength, and on numerous occasions the French were
reported to have broken through the German lines. At the root of that misjudgement
there was the misconception that the military power of France was not relative to the
military power of other nations, but something absolute. French military strength, in
itself, was at least as great in 1939 as it was in 1919; France was therefore believed to
be as strong a nation in 1939 as it had been in 1919.
35. The fatal error of that evaluation lies in the unawareness of the fact that in 1919,
France was the strongest military power on earth only in comparison with other nations,
of which its closest competitor, Germany, was defeated and disarmed. The supremacy
of France as a military power was, in other words, not an intrinsic quality of the French
nation which might be ascertained in the same way in which one might detect the
national characteristics of the French people, their geographic location, and natural
resources. That supremacy was, on the contrary, the result of a peculiar power
configuration; that is, of the comparative superiority of France as a military power over
the other nations. The quality of the French army as such had indeed not decreased
between 1919 and 1939. Measured in numbers and quality of troops, artillery, airplanes,
and staff work, French military power had not deteriorated. Thus, even so keen an
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expert on international affairs as Sir Winston Churchill, comparing the French army of
the late thirties with the French army of 1919, could declare in 1937 that the French
army was the only guarantee of international peace.
36. He and most of his contemporaries compared the French army of 1937 with the
French army of 1919, which had gained its reputation from comparison with the German
army of the same year, instead of comparing the French army of 1937 with the German
army of the same year. Such a comparison would have shown that the power
configuration of 1919 was reversed in the late thirties. While the French military
establishment still was essentially as good as it had been in 1919, Germany's armed
forces were now vastly superior to the French. What exclusive concern with French
armed might (as if it were an absolute quality) could not reveal, a comparison of the
relative military strength of France and Germany might have indicated, and grave errors
in political and military judgment might thus have been avoided. A nation that at a
particular moment in history finds itself at the peak of its power is particularly exposed to
the temptation to forget that all power is relative. It is likely to believe that the superiority
it has achieved is an absolute quality to be lost only through stupidity or neglect of duty.
A foreign policy based on such assumptions runs grave risks, for it overlooks the fact
that the superior power of that nation is only in part the outgrowth of its own qualities,
while it is in part the result of the qualities of other nations compared with its own.
37. The predominance of Great Britain from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the
beginning of the Second World War was due mainly to its insular protection from attack
and its quasi-monopolistic control of the main sea-lanes of the world. In other words,
Great Britain during that period of history had in comparison with other nations, two
advantages no other nation possessed. Great Britain's insular location has not changed
and its navy is still one of the most powerful in the world. But other nations have
acquired weapons, such as nuclear bombs and guided missiles that obviate to a
considerable extent the two advantages from which the power of Great Britain grew.
This change in the power position of Great Britain sheds light upon the tragic dilemma
that confronted Neville Chamberlain in the years before the Second World War.
Chamberlain understood the relativity of Britain's power. He knew that not even victory
in war could stop its decline. It was Chamberlain's ironic fate that his attempts to avoid
war at any price made war inevitable, and that he was forced to declare the war he
dreaded as the destroyer of British power. It is, however, a testimony to the wisdom of
British statecraft that since the end of the Second World War, British foreign policy has
by and large been conscious of the decline of British power relative to the power of
other nations. British statesmen have been aware of the fact that while the British navy,
taken by itself, may be as strong as it was ten years ago and the channel is as broad
and unruly as it always was, other nations have increased their power to such an extent
as to deprive those two British assets of much of their effectiveness.
The Permanent Character of Power
38. The second typical error impairing the evaluation of national power is related to
the first one, but proceeds from a different intellectual operation. While it may be well
aware of the relativity of power, it singles out a particular power factor or power relation,
basing the estimate upon the assumption that this factor or relation is immune to
change.
39. We have already had occasion to refer to events up to 1940 that saw the
miscalculation in France, the first military power on earth. Those who held this view
erected French power as they had experienced it at the end of the First World War into
a permanent quality of France which seemed impervious to historic change, forgetting
that the eminence of that power in the twenties was the result of comparison and that it
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would have to be tested by comparison in order to ascertain its quality in 1940.
Conversely, when the actual weakness of France revealed itself in military defeat, there
developed a tendency in France and elsewhere to expect that weakness to endure.
France was treated with neglect and disdain as though it were bound to be weak
forever.
40. The evaluations of Russian power had followed a similar pattern, but in reverse
historical order. From 1917 to the battle of Stalingrad in 1943, the Soviet Union was
treated as if its weakness at the beginning of the twenties was bound to persist
whatever change might occur in other fields. Thus the British military mission that was
sent to Moscow in the summer of 1939 to conclude a military alliance with the Soviet
Union, in anticipation of the approaching war with Germany, conceived its task with a
view of Russian power which might have been justified ten or twenty years before. This
miscalculation was an important element in the mission's failure. On the other hand,
immediately after the victory of Stalingrad and under the impact of the Soviet Union's
aggressive foreign policy, the belief in the permanent invincibility of the Soviet Union
and in the permanency of its predominance in Europe was widely held as a dogma.
41. There is an apparent ineradicable inclination in our attitude toward the Latin-
American countries to assume that the unchallengeable superiority of the giant to the
North, which has existed since the nations of the Western Hemisphere won their
independence, was almost a law of nature which population trends, industrialization,
political and military developments might modify but could not basically alter. Similarly,
since for centuries the political history of the world has been determined by members of
the white races, while the colour races were in the main the objects of that history, it is
difficult for members of all races alike to visualize a situation where the political
supremacy of the white races might no longer exist; where indeed, the relation between
the races might even be reversed. It is especially the demonstration of seemingly
irresistible military power, which exerts a strange fascination over the minds of those
who are given to hasty prophecies rather than to cautious analysis. It makes them
believe that history has come to a standstill, as it were, and that today's holders of
unchallengeable power cannot fail to enjoy this power tomorrow and the day after.
Thus, when in 1940 and 1941 the power of Germany was at its peak, it was widely
believed that German domination of Europe was established forever. When the hidden
strength of the Soviet Union startled the world in 1943, Stalin was saluted as the future
master of Europe and Asia. In the post war years the American monopoly of the atomic
bomb gave rise to the conception of the American Century - world dominion based
upon unchallengeable American power.
42. The root of all those tendencies to believe in the absolute character of power or
to take the permanency of a particular power configuration for granted lies in the
contrast between the dynamic, ever changing character of the power relations between
nations, on the one hand, and the human intellect's thirst for certainty and security in the
form of definite answers, on the other. Confronted with the contingencies, ambiguities,
and uncertainties of the international situation, we search for a definite comprehension
of the power factors upon which our foreign policy is based. We all find ourselves in the
position of Queen Victoria, who after dismissing Palmerston, whose unpredictable
moves on the international scene had exasperated her, asked her new Prime Minister,
John Russell, for "a regular programme embracing these different relations with other
powers." The answers we receive are not always as wise as the one John Russell gave
Queen Victoria. "It is very difficult," he replied, "to lay down any principle from which
deviations may not frequently be made", yet a misguided public opinion is only too
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prone to blame statesmen for such deviations, deeming compliance with principles,
without regard for the distribution of power, to be a virtue rather than a vice.
43. What the observer of international politics needs in order to reduce to a minimum
the unavoidable errors in the calculations of power is a creative imagination, immune
from the fascination that the preponderant power of the moment so easily imparts, able
to detach itself from the superstition of an inevitable trend in history, open to the
possibilities for change which the dynamics of history entail. A creative imagination of
this kind would be capable of that supreme intellectual achievement of detecting under
the surface of present power relations the germinal developments of the future,
combining the knowledge of what is with the hunch as to what might be, and
condensing all these facts, symptoms, and unknowns into a chart of probable future
trends which is not too much at variance with what actually will happen.
The Fallacy of the Single Factor
44. The third typical error increase the power of different nations - attributing to a
single factor an overriding importance, to the detriment of all the others can best be
illustrated in three of its manifestations most consequential in modern times: geopolitics,
nationalism, and militarism.
45. Geopolitics. Geopolitics is a pseudo science erecting the factor of geography
into an absolute that is supposed to determine the power, and hence the fate of nations.
Its basic conception is space. Yet, while space is static, the peoples living within the
spaces of the earth are dynamic. According to geopolitics, it is a law of history that
peoples must expand by "conquering space," or perish, that the relative power of
nations is determined by the mutual relation of the conquered spaces. This basic
conception of geopolitics was first expressed in a paper by Sir Halford Mackinder, "The
Geographical Pivot of History," read before the Royal Geographical Society in London in
1904. "As we consider this rapid review of the broader currents of history, does not a
certain persistence of geographical relationship become evident? Is not the pivot region
of the world's politics that vast area of Euro-Asia, which is inaccessible to ships, but in
antiquity lay open to the horse-riding nomads, and is today to be covered with a network
of railways? This is the "Heartland" of the world, which stretches from the Volga to the
Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic Ocean. "Outside the pivot area, in a great
inner crescent, are Germany, Austria, Turkey , India and China, and in an outer
crescent, Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada and Japan." The
"World-Island" is composed of the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, around which
the lesser land areas of the world are grouped. From this geographical structure of the
world geopolitics draws the conclusion that "Who rules east Europe commands the
Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World-
Island commands the World."
46. Mackinder, on the basis of this analysis, foresaw the emergence of Russia, or
whatever nation would control the territory described above, as the dominating world
power. The German geo-politicians, under the leadership of General Haushofer, who
exerted an important influence upon the power calculations and foreign policies of the
Nazi regime, were more specific. They postulated an alliance with the Soviet Union or
else the conquest of Eastern Europe by Germany in order to make Germany the
predominant power on earth. It is obvious that this postulate cannot be directly inferred
from the geopolitical premise. Geopolitics only tells us what space is destined, because
of its location relative to other spaces, to harbour the master of the world. It does not tell
us to what particular nation that mastery will fall. Thus the German school of geopolitics,
eager to demonstrate that it was the mission of the German people to conquer the
"Heartland," the geographical seat of world dominion, combined the geopolitical doctrine
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with the argument of population pressure. The Germans were a "people without space,"
and the "living space" that they must have in order to live, beckoned to be conquered in
the empty plains of Eastern Europe.
47. Geopolitics, as presented in the writings of Mackinder and Fainieve, had given a
valid picture of one aspect of the reality of national power, a picture seen from the
exclusive, and therefore distorting, angle of geography. In the hands of Haushofer and
his disciples, geopolitics was transformed into a kind of political metaphysics to be used
as an ideological weapon in the service of the national aspirations of Germany.
48. Nationalism. Geopolitics is the attempt to understand the problem of national
power exclusively in terms of geography, and degenerates in the process into a political
metaphysics couched in a pseudoscientific jargon. Nationalism tries to explain national
power exclusively or at least predominantly in terms of national character, and
degenerates in the process into the political metaphysics of racism. As geographical
location is for geopolitics the one determinant of national power, so membership in a
nation is for nationalism a similar determinant. Membership in a nation may be defined
in terms of language, culture, common origin, race, or in the decision of the individual to
belong to the nation, but no matter how it is defined, the membership always entails as
its essence partaking in certain qualities, called the national character, which the
members of a particular nation have in common and by which they are differentiated
from the members of other nations. The preservation of the national character and,
more particularly, the development of its creative faculties is the supreme task of the
nation. In order to fulfil this task, the nation needs power that will protect it against other
nations and will stimulate its own development. In other words, the nation needs a state.
"One nation-one state" is thus the political postulate of nationalism; the nation state is its
ideal.
49. Though the nation needs the power of the state for the sake of its preservation
and development, the state needs the national community in order to maintain and
increase its power. Particularly in the nationalistic philosophy of Germany (in the
writings of Fichte and Hegel, for instance), the national character or spirit appears as
the soul, and the political organization of the state as the body of the national
community, which needs both in order to fulfil its mission among the other national
communities. The feeling of affinity, the participation in a common culture and tradition,
the awareness of a common destiny, which are of the essence of national sentiment
and patriotism, are transformed by nationalism into a political mysticism in which the
national community and the state become superhuman entities, apart from and superior
to their individual members, entitled to absolute loyalty and, like the idols of old,
deserving of the sacrifice of men and goods.
50. This mysticism reaches its highest point in the racist worship of the national
character. The nation is here identified with a biological entity, the race, which, so long
as it remains pure, produces the national character in all its strength and splendour. The
dilution of the race through the admixture of alien elements corrupts the character of the
nation and thus weakens the power of the state. The homogeneity of the nation and the
purity of the race thus appear as the very essence of national power, and for the latter's
sake national minorities must either be absorbed or ejected. In the end, the national
character of one's own nation comes to be regarded as the repository of all those
qualities: courage, loyalty, discipline, industry, endurance, intelligence, and faculty for
leadership the possession of which justifies the exercise of supreme power over other
nations and at the same time makes the exercise of such power possible. The
overestimation of the qualities of one's own nation, which is characteristic of all
nationalism, leads in the concept of the master race to the very idolatry of the national
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character. The master race is, by virtue of the superior quality of its national character,
destined to rule the world. It has by virtue of these qualities the potential power to
exercise world-wide dominion and it is the task of statesmanship and of military
conquest to transform those slumbering potentialities into the actualities of World
Empire.
51. The intellectual and political excesses of nationalism and of its degenerate
offspring, racism, have shocked and repelled the non-nationalistic mind to a much
greater degree than have the excesses of geopolitics. The latter have in the main been
limited to Germany, and were perpetrated in an esoteric language. The excesses of
nationalism, on the other hand, are the logical outgrowth of a secular religion that has
engulfed in the fanaticism of holy wars of extermination, enslavement, and world
conquest. Since nationalism has singled out the national character as the pivot of its
political philosophy, program, and action, critical observers have frequently tended to go
to the other extreme and have denied the existence of a national character altogether.
Intent upon demonstrating the mythical and subjective essence of nationalism, they
have been anxious to show that its alleged empirical basis, the national character, is
also nothing but a myth.
52. One can readily agree with the critics of nationalism and racism that the allegedly
inevitable determination of the national character by the "blood" that is, the common
biological characteristics of the members of a certain group is a political fabrication
without any basis in fact. One can also agree that the absolute constancy of the national
character, deriving from the immutability of the qualities of a pure race, belongs in the
realm of political mythology. The existence of the United States as a nation and its
assimilative powers offer convincing proof of the fallacy of both 'assertions. On the other
hand, to deny altogether the existence of the national character and its bearing upon
national power runs counter to the facts of experience of which we have given a few
samples above.
53. Militarism. Militarism commits the same type of error with respect to military
preparedness which geopolitics and nationalism commit with regard to geography and
national character. Militarism is the conception that the Power of a nation consists
primarily, if not exclusively, in its military strength, conceived especially in quantitative
terms. The largest army, the biggest navy, the biggest and fastest air force in the world
become the predominant if not the exclusive, symbols of national power.
54. Nations whose military strength lies in navies rather than in large standing armies
are keen to point with abhorrence to the militarism of Germany, France, or the Soviet
Union without recognizing that they have developed their peculiar brand of militarism.
Influenced by writers such as Mahan, they have emphasized out of all proportion the
importance of the size and quality of their navies for national power. In the United States
there is a widespread tendency to overemphasize the technological aspects of military
preparedness, such as the speed and the range of airplanes and the uniqueness of
weapons. The average German was misled by masses of Goose-stepping soldiers. The
average Russian experiences the supremacy of Soviet power, derived from space and
population, in the throngs filling the vastness of Red Square on May Day. The typical
Englishman used to lose his sense of proportion in the presence of the gigantic form of
a dreadnought. Many Americans succumbed to the fascination that emanated from the
"secret" of the atomic bomb. All these attitudes toward military preparedness have in
common the mistaken belief that all that counts, or at least what counts most for the
power of a nation, is the military factor conceived in terms of numbers and quality of
men and weapons.
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SECTION-III
DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL POWER
(BY DAVID JABLONSKY)

“I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of
power after power that ceaseth only in death.”
Thomas Hobbes
General
1. Thomas Hobbes personifies the realist approach to international relations in a
world of anarchy and self-help, in which individual man and men aggregated into states
seek to maintain or to increase power. In the modern era, this approach is reflected
quintessentially by Hans Morgenthau, who presents national power not only as an end
of the Hobbesian sense that “power is always the immediate aim, “but as a means to
that end. The study of strategy also deals with power primarily from the national
perspective, an acknowledgement that the nation-state is still the most important actor
in the international arena. This perspective is tempered, however, by recognition that
forces and trends in recent decades have produced a multi-centric world of
transnational actors that coexists with the traditional state-centric world. Both worlds
must be considered when examining the concept of national power. There is also the
acknowledgement of power as an end or objective in the sense of Morgenthau’s
description of national interests defined in terms of maintaining, balancing, or increasing
national power. But the emphasis here is primarily on national power as means or
resources to further national strategy, defined by the Department of Defence (DOD) as
the “art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological
powers of a nation-state, together with its armed forces during peace and war, to serve
national objectives.”
2. Most scholars, in fact, focus on power as a means, the strength or capacity that
provides the “ability to influence the behaviour of other actors in accordance with one’s
own objectives.” At the national level, this influence is based on relations between
nation-state A and another actor (B) with A seeking to influence B to act in A’s interest
by doing x, by continuing to do x, or by not doing x. Some governments or statesmen
may seek influence for its own sake. But for most, influence, like money, is instrumental,
to be used primarily for achieving or defending other goals, which could include
prestige, territory, raw material, or alliances. To achieve these ends, state A can use
various techniques of influencing, ranging from persuasion or the offering of rewards to
threats or the actual use of force.
3. From this standpoint, the use of a nation’s power is a simple relational exercise,
but in dealing with the concept of national power, as Clausewitz remarked of war,
“everything is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” To begin with, there are
subtle characteristics of power that render its use in the national strategic formulation
process more art than science. Moreover, relationships among the elements of national
power as well as the context in which they are to be used to further a nation’s interests
are seldom clear-cut propositions. All this means that in the end, national power defies
any attempts at rigorous, scientific assessment. The purpose of this article is to
demonstrate why this is so and, more important, why all the complexity notwithstanding;
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the concept of national power remains a key building block for understanding and
developing strategy.

The Context of National Power

4. National power is contextual in that it can be evaluated only in terms of all the
power elements and only in relation to another player or players and the situation in
which power is being exercised. A nation may appear powerful because it possesses
many military assets, but the assets may be inadequate against those of a potential
enemy or inappropriate to the nature of the conflict. The question should always be:
power over whom, and with respect to what?
5. Multidimensional Interrelationship. National power is historically linked with
military capacity, a natural relationship since war in the international arena is the
ultimate ratio of power. Nevertheless, one element of power alone cannot determine
national power. For instance, there is the huge size of Brazil, the large population of
Pakistan, the industrial makeup of Belgium, and the first-class army of Switzerland. Yet
none of these states is a first-rank power. Morgenthau calls the mistaken attempt to
define national power in terms of one element of that power the “Fallacy of the Single
Factor.” Another aspect of this fallacy is the failure to distinguish between potential and
actual Power. Part of the problem stems from the fact that the term “power has taken on
the meaning of both the capacity to do something and the actual exercise of the
capacity and yet a nation’s ability to convert potential power into operational power is
based on many considerations, not the least of which is the political and psychological
interrelationship of such factors as government effectiveness and national unity.
6. In this context, the elements of national power, no matter how defined, can be
separated only artificially. Together, they constitute the resources for the attainment of
national objectives and goals and while those goals may be judged as moral, immoral,
or amoral, the elements of power are simply means to national strategic ends and as
such are morally neutral. It is possible, in other words, to reject the cynic’s belief that
God is on the side of the largest number of battalions, as well as the assumption that
the side with the smallest number always fights for the right.
7. Relations and Dynamics. National power is relative, not absolute. A nation
does not have abstract power in and of itself, but only power in relation to another actor
or actors in the international arena. To say that the United States is the most powerful
nation on earth is to compare American power with that of all nations, as they currently
exist. Nevertheless, leaders of a nation at the peak of its power can come to believe that
such power has an absolute quality that can be lost only through stupidity or neglect. In
reality the superior power of a nation is derived not only from its own qualities, but from
that of other actors compared with its own. Many observers in the late 1930s, for
example, perceived France as more than a match for Nazi Germany, since the French
military of that era was superior in quality and quantity or troops and weaponry to the
victorious French forces of 1919. But the French military power of 1919 was supreme
only in the context of a defeated and disarmed Germany; that supremacy was not
intrinsic to the French nation in the manner of its geographic location and natural
resources. Thus, while the French military of 1939 was superior to that of 1919, a
comparison of 1939 French military power to that of Germany in the same year would
have shown a vastly different picture for many reasons, not the least of which was the
German adoption of the military doctrine of blitzkrieg.
8. Closely allied to all this is the fact that national power is dynamic, not permanent.
No particular power factor or relationship is immune to change. In this century, in
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particular, rapid changes in military technologies have accelerated this dynamism.
American’s explosion of a nuclear device instantly transformed its power position, the
nature of warfare, and the very conduct of international relations. A war or revolution
can have an equally sudden effect on power. The two world wars devastated Europe,
caused the rise of the flank powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and set the
developing world on a road to de-colonisation that in less than 50 years dismantled a
system that had been in existence for over three centuries. Economic growth can also
quickly change a nation’s power position, as was the case with Japan and Germany
after World War II. In addition, the discovery of new resources, or their depletion, can
alter the balance of power. Certainly OPEC’s control over a diminishing supply of oil,
coupled with its effectiveness as a cartel, caused a dramatic shift in power relations
after 1973.
9. Such shifts are not always so immediately discernible. Power, as Hobbes long
ago pointed out, is what people believe it is until it is exercised. Reputation for power, in
other words, confers power on a nation-state regardless of whether that power is real or
not. At the same time, there are examples throughout history of nations that continued
to trade on past reputations, only to see them shattered by a single event. For France,
the battles of Sedan produced just such effects in 1870 and again in 1940.
10. This subjective characteristic of power also plays a key role in deterrence, the
exercise of negative power as state A influences actor B not to do x. The influence is
effectively exercised because B perceives that A not only has the capability to prevent B
from doing x, but the willingness to use that capability as well. In other words, national
credibility must be a concomitant of national capability for deterrence to work. When the
combination doesn’t occur, as Britain and France discovered when Hitler discounted
their guarantee of Poland in the summer of 1939, the result can be war. “The men of
Munich will not take the risk,” the Nazi leader explained to his commanders on 14
August 1939.
11. Situational. Some elements of national power or combinations of power cannot
be applied to certain situations involving certain actors. The United States in 1979-88,
for instance, was powerless to rescue American citizens held hostage in Teheran, and
American nuclear power during the Cold Ward had little value in causing non-aligned
countries to modify their policies; neither did it deter North Korea nor North Vietnam in
their attempts to unify their countries.
12. The Vietnam War also illustrates another contextual aspect of national power -
that of cost-risk-benefit analysis, in which power can be exercised but the costs and
risks are perceived to be disproportionate to the benefit achieved. Power, in other
words, must be relevant in the existing circumstances for the particular situation. This
explains why, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States was not able to
persuade its European allies to allow American planes to use NATO bases for refueling
and maintenance. The overall economic and military strength of the United States as
well as the political bonds of alliance solidarity proved less influential on European
decision makers than the possible economic loss of their access to oil. This type of
American power was equally irrelevant in late 1994 when Britain and France, with
troops involved in peace operations on the ground in Bosnia, turned down a US plan for
NATO air strikes to support Muslims in the besieged town of Bihac.
13. This aspect of the contextual nature of national power introduces even more
complications when the diversity of actors in the international arena is taken into
account. In an increasingly multi-centric world, nation-states will increasingly deal with
transnational actors in the exercise of national power. The European Union is just one
example of international government organizations in which the confluence of political
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and economic trends has created a supra-national regional unit that transcends in many
ways both the legal territorial aspects of the state and the psychological unity of the
nation. This type of challenge is abetted by international nongovernmental actors
ranging from multinational corporations focused on self-interested profit and national
liberation movements seeking to establish new governments within existing states, to
organizations such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace, seeking to mobilize
international public opinion in order to bring pressure on national governments to alter
particular policies.
14. Some of these actors respond more willingly to one aspect of national power
than to another. Multinational corporations, for example, will generally react to economic
factors more rapidly than the United Nations or a national liberation movement.
Conversely, negotiations and appeals to human morality may prove to be more powerful
at the United Nations than in the corporate boardroom or in the field and the allegiance
of an uneducated people in a newly independent country may help create a powerful
national liberation movement, yet be meaningless for a multinational corporation or the
United Nations. National power, then, is contextual not only in its application to other
states, but to other global actors as well.
Categorizing the Elements of National Power
15. It is convenient to organize the study of national power by distinguishing between
natural and social determinants of power. The natural determinants (geography,
resources, and population) are concerned with the number of people in a nation and
with their physical environment. Social determinants (economic, political, military,
psychological, and, more recently, informational) concern the ways in which the people
of a nation organize themselves and the manner in which they alter their environment.
In practice, it is impossible to make a clear distinction between natural and social
elements. For instance, resources are a natural factor, but the degree to which they are
used is socially determined. Population factors, in particular, cut across the dividing line
between both categories. The number of people of working age in the population affects
the degree of industrialization of a nation, but the process of industrialization, in turn,
can greatly alter the composition of the population.
Natural Determinants of Power
16. Geography. Geographical factors, whether they are location and climate or size
and topography, influence a nation’s outlook and capacity. Location, in particular, is
closely tied to the foreign policy of a state. Vulnerable nations, like Poland caught
geographically between Russia and Germany, have even had to deal with the loss of
national existence. Conversely, large bodies of water throughout their histories have
protected Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. Each, in turn, used the
combination of a large navy and overseas trade to become a great power. With its
oceanic moats, the United States was able to follow George Washington’s advice to
avoid entangling alliances and expand peacefully for almost a century, free of external
interference. In addition, those expansions came about primarily without conquest,
through the purchase of huge land tracts from European powers that found the location
of the territories too remote to defend easily.
17. The connection between foreign policy and location is, in fact, so fundamental
that it gave rise in this century to geopolitics as a field of study. At its most extreme,
geopolitics can succumb to Morgenthau’s Fallacy of the Single Factor” or be distorted
as it was at the hands of Karl Haushofer and his disciples into a kind of political
metaphysics with a call for adequate national living space (Lebensraum) that was put
into ideological service for Nazi Germany. At its best, geopolitics has many insights to
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offer. Consider, for instance, the connection between the British and American
development of democracy and civil rights and the relatively secure strategic locations
of both countries, as opposed to the authoritarian regimes of Germany and Russia
direct neighbours for much of history, lying exposed on the North European plain, or
consider the continuing Russian drive for warm-water ports and the continuing value of
choke points, as was demonstrated when Egypt’s closure of the Straits of Tiran in May
1967 led to war. The persistence of this field of study was reflected in the Cold War by
Raymond Aaron, who described the forward deployment of US troops as analogous in
geographical terms to earlier British policy:-
a. In relation to the Eurasian land mass, the American continent occupied a
position comparable to that of the British Isles in relation to Europe: the
United States was continuing the tradition of the insular state by
attempting to bar the dominant continental state’s expansion in central
Germany and in Korea.
b. Location is also closely tied to climate, which in turn has a significant
effect on national power. The poorest and weakest states in modern times
have all been located outside the temperate climate zones in either the
tropics or in the Frigid Zone. Even Russia has chronic agricultural
problems because all but a small part of that country lies north of the
latitude of the US-Canadian border. Russia is also a good example of how
geographical factors such as size and topography can have advantages
and disadvantages for a nation. The Soviet Union, with its 11 time zones,
was able to use its vast size during World War II to repeat the historical
Russian military method of trading space for time when invaded. At the
same time, that immense size certainly played a role in the complex ethnic
and political centrifugal forces that eventually pulled apart the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. In a similar manner, the predominantly north-
south Russian rivers are great natural resources that would have been
economically and politically more valuable had they run in an east-west
direction. In the future, technology may mitigate some of these factors in
the same way that intercontinental missiles affected the importance of
insular locations. But here, as in other areas, there are many geographical
obstacles to the acquisition of power that are costly or impossible to
overcome.
18. Population. Demographics in the form of size, trends, and structure are an
important aspect of national power. A large population is a key prerequisite, but not an
automatic guarantee of strength. Thus, there is Canada, more powerful than the more
populous but less industrialized Mexico and Japan with a small population marked by
widespread technical skills, has been able to exercise national power far in excess of
China for all its masses. At the same time, trends in population growth and decline can
have significant effects on national power. The Prussian unification of the German-
speaking people in 1870, for example, instantly created a great power with a population
that grew by 27 million between then and 1940, even as that of France reflected the
shift in European power, increasing by only four million in the same period. In another
example, the historical increase in American power was partly due to the arrival of more
than 100 million immigrants between 1824 and 1924. During the same century, Canada
and Australia, comparable in territory and developmental level but with populations less
than a tenth of America’s, remained secondary power. That such trends could have
more complex causes dealing with other elements of power was illustrated by the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had a large and growing population during most of that
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period, but also remained a secondary power because it was divided ethnically, weak
politically, and at an extremely low level in terms of industrial development. In the
future, global trends also will affect the structure and balance of national populations,
particularly those of the poorest countries. In 1830, the global population reached one
billion for the first time; it required 100 years to double. It took only 45 more years
(1975) for the population to double again to four billion. In the next 21 years the
population increased almost two billion, reflecting a growth rate of about 90 million a
year. For the next several decades, 90 percent of this growth will occur in the lesser-
developed countries, many already burdened by extreme overpopulation for which there
is no remedy in the form of economic infrastructure, skills, and capital. Population
structure and balance are also significant for developed nations. Important here is the
percentage of the population in the most productive cohort, generally considered to be
somewhere between the ages of 18 and 45, that can best meet the needs of the
nation’s military and industry as well as create the following generation. Comparing the
numbers in this group to those in the younger cohort also provides a more accurate
picture of population trends and the interaction of demographics with all power
elements. Israel, for example, has to deal with its relatively small population and the fact
that the military siphons off a significant segment of the civilian workforce in the middle
cohort. One consequence is government emphasis on education across all age groups.
Another is the government’s military focus on sophisticated weaponry, mobility, air
power, and the pre-emptive strike in order to avoid drawn-out land warfare that could be
costly in manpower. Finally, a comparison of the middle population group to the older
will provide a picture of trends that can have significant consequences for a nation’s
power. For example, any nation with an increasing cohort of retired people coupled with
generous social welfare benefits will eventually have to face hard choices between guns
and butter on the one hand and possible limits to its national power as well as to its
investment and economic growth potential on the other. These choices already face the
United States as the “baby boomer” generation approaches retirement age against the
backdrop of a staggering explosion in social entitlements.
19. Natural Resources. Large amounts of natural resources are essential for
a modern nation to wage war, to operate an industrial base, and to reward other
international actors through trade and aid, either in modern industrial products or in the
raw materials themselves. But these resources, whether they are arable land and water
or coal and oil, are unevenly distributed around the world and are becoming increasingly
scarce. Moreover, as in the case of the geopolitical ownership of strategic places, the
physical possession of natural resources is not necessarily a source of power unless a
nation can also develop those resources and maintain political control over their
disposition. In their raw state, for example, minerals and energy sources are generally
useless. Thus, the Mesabi iron deposits had no value to the Indian tribes near Lake
Superior, and Arabian oil a century ago was a matter of indifference to the nomads who
roamed above it. Conversely, those nations with great industrial organizations and
manufacturing infrastructure have traditionally been able to convert the potential power
of natural resources into actual national power. Very few nations, however, are self-
sufficient. A country like the United States has a rich store of natural resources, and yet
may be dependent on imports because of its voracious consumption, Japan, on the
other hand, has few natural resources; it is dependent on imports for 100 percent of its
copper; and 70 percent of its timber and grain. Nations have traditionally made up for
such difficulties in several ways. One time-honoured method is to conquer the
resources, a principal motivation for the Japanese expansion that led to World War II
and the Iraqi invasion that led to the Gulf War. A second method is to develop resources
in another country by means of concessions, political manipulation, and even a
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judicious use of force all used earlier to considerable effect by the United States in Latin
America. In an age of increasing interdependence, this type of economic penetration
has long since lost its neo-colonial identity, particularly since both of America’s principal
World War II adversaries now regularly exercise such penetration in the United States.
The third and most common method for obtaining natural resources is to buy them. In
recent years, however, the combination of rapid industrial growth and decline of
resources has changed the global economy into a seller’s market, while providing
considerable economic leverage to nations in control of vital commodities. OPEC’s
control of oil, for example, provided its members influence out of proportion to their
economic and military power. A similar transformation may occur in the future with those
nations that are major food producers as the so-called “Green Revolution” faces to
prospect of more depleted lands and encroaching deserts. Finally, there is the short
supply of strategic and often esoteric minerals so necessary for high technology and
modern weapons. One consequence of this diminishment of raw materials has been the
emergence of the sea bed, with its oil and manganese reserves, as a new venue of
international competition, in which those nations with long coastlines and extensive
territorial waters have the advantage. Such shortages are a reminder of how closely
connected is the acquisition of natural resources to all the elements of power,
particularly for a truly dependent nation like Japan, which can neither feed its people nor
fuel its high technology economy without access to overseas markets. Without its
alliance with the United States as a means to ensure its access to such resources as
Persian Gulf oil, Japan would be forced to expand its “self-defence “ military force,
perhaps even becoming a declared nuclear power.
Social Determinants of Power
20. Economic. Economic capacity and development are key links to both natural
and social determinants of power. In terms of natural resources, as we have seen, a
nation may be well endowed but lack the ability to convert those resources into military
hardware, high-technology exports, and other manifestations of power. Ultimately,
however, economic development in a nation flows from the social determinants of
power, whether they are political modernization and widespread formal education, or
geographic and social mobility and the ready acceptance of innovation. All this, of
course, is worked out against the backdrop of balanced military investment. An excess
of military spending can erode the underlying basis for a nation’s power if it occurs at
the expense of a larger economy and reduces the national ability to invest in future
economic growth. For developing countries already short of economic investment
capital, military spending represents a serious allocation of resources, but even
advanced countries, especially since the end of the Cold War, have to make some
choices between guns and butter. Since a nation’s political stability as well as the
legitimacy of its government are increasingly linked to domestic economic performance,
excessive military spending can be dangerous for large and small countries alike, as the
former Soviet Union discovered to its peril.
21. Strong domestic economies also produce non-military national power in the
international arena. Leading industrial nations have available all the techniques for
exercising power, including rewards or punishment by means of foreign trade, foreign
aid, and investment and loans, as well as the consequences their domestic policies can
have on the global economy. This type of power can be weakened, however, if a nation
suffers from high inflation, a large foreign debt, or chronic balance-of-payment deficits.
In short, the strength of a nation’s economy has a direct effect on the variety, resiliency,
and credibility of its international economic options. The size of the US budget and trade
deficits, for example, means that the Federal Reserve must maintain interest rates high
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enough for deficit financing, which limits its ability to stimulate the economy with lower
rates and American foreign aid is becoming less influential as an economic instrument
of power as budgets decline. On the other hand, US trade policy has become
increasingly important to the US economy, with American exports, as an example,
expected to create 16 million jobs by the year 2000. That such economic considerations
are closely interrelated to other elements of power is demonstrated by the perennial
question of whether most-favoured-nation status, which is nothing more than normal
access to US markets, should be made conditional on progress in human rights by
countries such as China.
22. Finally, increasing interdependence has caused major changes in the economic
element of national power. National economies have become more dependent on
international trade and on financial markets that have become truly global in scope. This
in turn makes it more difficult for a nation to raise short-term interest rates or to
coordinate monetary policy with other international actors. In a similar manner, the
ability of nations to use exchange rates to further their national interests has declined as
governments deal more and more with international capital flows that dwarf the
resources available to any nation to defend its currency. From a security perspective,
this type of economic interpenetration is reflected in the mutual vulnerability of national
economies. Moreover, a nation’s economic policy is now influenced by myriad
international governmental organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), while multinational
corporations stand ready to manipulate the domestic politics of nation-states to further
their transactional interests.
23. Military. Military strength is historically the gauge for national power. While
defeat in war has normally signaled the decline if not the end of a nation’s power,
military victory has usually heralded the ascent of a new power, but military power is
more than just the aggregation of personnel, equipment and weaponry. Leadership,
morale, and discipline also remain vital factors of military power. Despite rough
quantitative parity between the Iraqi military and the allied coalition, the dismal Iraqi
performance in the Gulf War demonstrated the enduring relevance of those intangibles.
That performance also showed how political interference or the gradual infection of a
nation’s military by incompetence, waste, and corruption can weaken the nation’s armed
forces. By contrast, there is the example of the US military working over the years in
tandem with political authorities to move from the hollow force of the immediate post-
Vietnam period to the joint military machine of Desert Storm.
24. The Gulf War also highlights how important power projection and sustainability
are in the modern era for military effectiveness. For a global power like the United
States, the focus on these factors produced not only the unique air and sea lift capability
that provided transportation for a half million troops to the Persian Gulf in 1990-91, but
incredible resupply feats in an environment in which a single division during the 100-
hour ground offensive consumed 2.4 million gallons of fuel, brought forward in 475 x
5000-gallon tankers. Allied to these factors, of course, are readiness considerations
ranging from training and manoeuvre opportunities to the availability of fuel and repair
parts. In a similar manner, a nation’s potential for rapid mobilization may also play a key
role. Israel, for example, has a permanent force of only 164, 000 highly trained and
ready soldiers. But that force can be augmented within 24 hours by almost three times
that many combat-ready troops and Sweden also has the capability to mobilize a force
that can equal many European standing armies almost overnight.
25. The quality of arms technology also has become a vital military factor for all
nations in a period marked by rapid and important scientific breakthroughs. Timely
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inventions ranging from the crossbow to the airplane have often been decisive when
accompanied by appropriate changes in military organization and doctrine. When these
two components lag behind technological change, as they did in the American Civil War
and World War I, the results can be horrific diminishment and waste of military power. In
addition, new technologies in the hands of rouge states or non-state actors such as
terrorist groups will continue to be an important consideration for nations in the exercise
of military power. Weapons of mass destruction are and will probably continue to be of
primary concern in this regard, but even relatively cheap, recently developed
conventional weapons on the appropriate situation can be decisive, as was illustrated
by the American-built, shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles that enabled the
Afghan Mujahideen guerrillas to neutralize Soviet air power. Finally, technological
advances are a useful reminder once again that military power, like all elements of
national power, is contextual. Technology is not an automatic panacea for producing
quick victories and low casualties, particularly absent clear political direction and
coherent strategy. There comes a time, as Britain’s thin red line discovered under the
weight of the Zulu offensive at Hewana, when quantity has a quality of its own.
26. Political. This element of power addresses key questions, many of which are
related to the psychological element: What is the form of government, what is the
attitude of the population towards it, how strong do the people want it to be, and how
strong and efficient is it? These questions cannot be answered with simple statistics, yet
they may be paramount in any assessment of national power. If a government is
inadequate and cannot bring the nation’s potential power to bear upon an issue, that
power might as well not exist. Nor can an analysis turn upon the type of government a
state claims to have, for even the constitution of a state may be misleading. The 1936
Soviet Constitution, for example, was a democratic-sounding organic law that had little
in common with the actual operation of the Soviet regime. In the same vein, the German
Weimar Constitution, a model of democratic devices, did not prevent Hitler from
reaching power and from creating his own “constitutional law” as he proceeded.
27. What is clear is that the actual forms of government, each with its own strengths
and weaknesses, play a role in the application of national power. An authoritarian
system for instance, restricts in varying degree individual freedom and initiative, but
permits formulation of a highly organized state strategy. Democratic systems by
comparison, require policy formation by consensus building and persuasion in an open,
pluralistic society. Consequently, it is extremely difficult for democracies to develop and
implement a long-range state strategy or to change policy direction as abruptly as, for
example; Nazi Germany and the USSR did in the ideological policy reversal marked by
the August 1939 non-aggression treaty. In addition, the level of political development
within a state is also important. This development involves both the capability, and more
particularly the efficiency and effectiveness of a national government in using its human
and material resources in pursuit of national interests. Thus, administrative and
management skills are crucial if a nation is to realize its full power potential.
28. A government also takes the shape and operates the way it does for very
complex reasons, many of which reflect the experience of a people and their attitude
towards, and expectations of what the government is to do and how strong, as a
consequence, it should be. For example, a fear of too much state power caused the
Founding Fathers deliberately to make the United States government inefficient (in the
sense of a quick, smooth operation) by means of “checks and balance.” In a similar
manner, the French fear of a “man on horseback” in the wake of their second
experience with Bonapartism caused a curtailment of executive powers that resulted in
the weakness of the French governments after the Franco-Prussian War. Under both
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the Third and Fourth French Republics, as a result, the French strengthened the
legislative branch to a degree that made strong executive leadership almost impossible.
The French preferred to suffer the executive weakness rather than run the risks entailed
in a strong government. Consequently, while the United States had 14 administrations
between 1875 and 1940, and the British 20, France had 102. After World War II, the
Fourth French Republic averaged two regimes a year.
29. Psychological. The psychological element of power consists of national will
and morale, national character, and degree of national integration. It is this most
ephemeral of the social power determinants that has repeatedly caused nations with
superior economic and military power to be defeated or have their policies frustrated by
less capable actors. Thus, there was Mao’s defeat of Chiang Kai-shek when Chiang at
least initially possessed most of China’s wealth and military capability, the ability of
Gandhi to drive the British from India, and that of Khomeni to undermine the Shah. It is
almost a cliché that any measurement of US economic and military power vis-à-vis that
of the North Vietcong combination during the late 1960s would have led to the
conclusion that US superiority in these two categories would result in an American
victory. Harry Summers recounts a story in this regard, that was circulating during the
final days of the US retreat from Vietnam:-
a. When the Nixon Administration took over in 1969, all the data on North
Vietnam and on the United States was into a Pentagon computer-
population, gross national product, manufacturing capability, number of
tanks, ships, and aircraft, size of the armed forces, and the like.
b. The computer was then asked, “When will we win?”
c. It took only a moment to give the answer: “You won in 1964!”
30. National will and morale are defined as the degree of determination that any
actor manifests in the pursuit of its internal or external objectives. For a given
international actor, however, will and morale need not be identical at all levels of
society. During 1916 and early 1917, the Russian nobility continued to plan for new
offensive action even as Russian troops were abandoning their weapons and their
battle field positions. National character has an equally complex relation to national
power in as much as that character favours or prescribes certain policies and strategies.
Americans, for example like to justify their actions. Thus, the United States did not enter
World War I until Wilsonian idealism had to confront the loss of American ships and
American lives. The elevation of “moralism” in the conduct of foreign policy, in turn,
diminishes the ability of the United States to initiate a truly pre-emptive action. In the
Cuban missile crisis for example, the choice of a blockade over an air strike was based
in part on the argument that from the standpoint of both morality and tradition, the
United States could not perpetrate a “Pearl Harbour in reverse”. In all such cases, as
with will and morale, it is extremely difficult to identify the constituent parts of and
sources behind national character. Historical experiences and traditional values
undoubtedly are important, as are, such factors as geographic location and
environment. Russian mistrust of the external world, for instance, is historically verifiable
as part of the national character, whether it is because of the centuries of Tartar rule,
three invasions from Western Europe in little more than a century, or something else,
and Russian stoicism is a character trait, whether the cause is Russian Orthodox
Christianity, communism, or the long Russian winters.
31. Finally, there is the degree of integration, which refers simply to the sense of
belonging and identification of a nation’s people. In many ways, this contributes to
national will and morale as well as character. In most cases there is a direct correlation
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between the degrees of perceived integration and the extent of ethnic, religious,
linguistic, and cultural homogeneity, all of which contribute to a sense of belonging,
manifested in a sense of citizenship. On the other hand, despite examples to the
contrary (Belgium, Canada, and the states of the former Yugoslavia), a lack of
integration need not necessarily cause lack of identity. Swiss unity has continued across
the centuries despite low degrees of integration in ethnicity, language, and religion.
32. Informational. The communications revolution, which began over a century ago
with the advent of global transmission of information, has taken on new momentum in
recent decades with the development of fax machines, television satellites, and
computer linkages. As the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated in
the fall of 1989, a new fact of life in the international arena is that it is no longer possible
for any nation-state to deny its citizens knowledge of what is taking place elsewhere.
Ideas move more freely around the world now than at any other time in the past. This
has had particularly fortunate results for the United States. Even as some other aspects
of power have gone into relative decline. America’s influence as a source of ideas and
as a shaper of culture has increased. This “soft power,” in Joseph Nye’s words, has
been a major factor in formulating the US national security strategic objective of
“enlargement.” So in one sense, information has contributed to the concept of the world
as a global village.
33. This combination of enhanced communication and dissemination of information,
however, is a two-edged sword that cuts across all the social determinants of power in
national strategy. In the economic realm, for instance, global interdependence has been
enhanced by information-communication improvements. On the other hand, near
instantaneous downturns of major economies is always a possibility with the immediate
transmission of adverse economic news concerning any nation-state or transnational
economic actor. Politically, instantaneous and pervasive communication can enhance
the ability of government elites to lead the people in a democracy or to act as a national
consoler in times of tragedy, such as the Challenger explosion or the Oklahoma City
bombing. At the same time, these developments can also aid political leaders who seek
support by appealing to popular passions and prejudices, which are the great simplifiers
always waiting in the wings to stir fundamental discontents and the dark side of
nationalism. In terms of psychological power, Winston Churchill demonstrated
repeatedly that the pervasive distribution of targeted information can have widespread
effects on intangibles such as national will. Conversely, however, this sense of knowing
everything has the harmful potential of altering in a matter of years, the basic values
and cultural beliefs that take generations to create.
34. Nowhere is the effect of developments in communications and access to
information more far-reaching than on warfare. In the purely military realm, information
dominance can create operational synergies by allowing those systems that provide
battle space awareness, enhance command and control, and create precision force to
be integrated into the so-called “system of systems.” One result of all this is to compress
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, previously considered as separate
and distinct loci of command and functional responsibilities. The commander will be
faced in the future with the much more complex job of recognizing those events
occurring simultaneously at all three levels and integrating them into the calculation that
results from the traditional consideration at the operational level of which tactical battles
and engagements to join and which to avoid. Equally important, shorter time for
decisions – occasioned by both the compressed continuum of war and electronically
gathered information – means less time to discover ambiguities or to analyse those
ambiguities that are already apparent.
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35. At the higher level of cyber war, the two edged potential of communications and
information is even more evident. In the future, nations will wage offensive information
warfare on another state’s computer systems, targeting assets ranging from
telecommunications and power to safety and banking. Such an onslaught could
undermine the more advanced aspects of an adversary’s economy, interrupt its
mobilization of military power, and by affecting the integrity of highly visible services to
the population, create almost immediate pressure on government at all levels. As
activities rely increasingly on information systems rather than manual processes and
procedures, information infrastructures of the most developed nations, such as the
United States, become progressively more vulnerable to state and non-state actors.
Even as there are advances in information security technologies, hacker tools are
becoming more sophisticated and easier to obtain and use. One analyst concludes in
this regard that, for the United States, “the possibility of a digital pearl Harbour cannot
be dismissed out of hand.”
Method of Evaluation
36. Evaluation of national power is difficult. The basic problem, as we have seen, is
that all elements of power are interrelated. Where people live will influence what they
possess; how many they are will influence how much they possess; what their historical
experience has been will affect how they look at life; how they look at life will influence
how they organize and govern themselves: and all these elements weighed in relation
to the problem of national security will influence the nature, size and effectiveness of the
armed forces. As a consequence, not only must each separate element be analysed,
but the effects of those elements on one another must be considered. These
complexities are compounded because national power is both dynamic and relative.
Nation-states and other international actors change each day in potential and realized
power, although the rate of change may vary from one actor to another. As these
changes go on continually, an estimate of a states’ national power vis-à-vis the power of
another actor is obsolescent even as the estimate is made. The greater the rate of
change in the actors being compared the greater the obsolescence of the estimate.
37. In other words, like all strategic endeavours, more art than science is involved in
the evaluation of where one nation-state stands in relation to the power of other regional
and global actors. This has not deterred one former government official from creating a
formula to develop a rough estimate of “perceived” national power focused primarily on
a state’s capacity to wage war:

Pp = (C+E+M) x (S+W) in which,

Pp = Perceived power
C = Critical mass: population and territory
E = Economic capability
M = Military capability
S = Strategic purpose
W = Will to pursue national strategy

38. Regardless of its prospective contribution in calculating a Pp value, this formula

has some important lessons. The more tangible elements (C, E, M) that can be
objectively quantified also involve varying degrees of subjective qualifications: territory
that is vast but covered with mountain ranges and has few navigable rivers; a
population that is large but unskilled and uneducated; or cases in which, despite
qualitative military superiority in technology and weapons on one side, the opponent is
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able to prevail through superior intangibles ranging from leadership to morale. Most
importantly, by demonstrating that national power is a product rather than being a sum
of its components, the formula is a reminder of how important the relational and
contextual aspects are. The United States discovered in Vietnam that no matter how
large the sum of the more tangible economic and military capabilities in relation to an
adversary, their utility is determined by the intangibles of strategic purpose and national
will. Zero multiplied by any number, no matter how large, will still be zero.
39. These considerations are particularly important in evaluating what some might
consider as irrational acts by states that use force to alter the status quo. In fact, these
states may simply differ from others in the perception of low risks where others perceive
high ones, rather than in the willingness to take risks. There is growing evidence that
the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait falls into this category. In another era, many of Hitler’s
“Saturday surprises” in the 1930s were considered reckless by those who would
eventually have to redress their consequences. These incidents came about, however,
not because the Nazi leader willingly tolerated a high probability of conflict, but because
he was certain that the other side would back down. When the German military opposed
such policies as the Rhineland coup and the Anschluss on the basis that they were too
dangerous, Hitler did not argue that the risks were worth the prizes, but that instead,
taking the social determinants of power in Germany and the other countries into
consideration, the risks were negligible. In terms of the concept of gain and risk
assessment displayed in Figure 1 below, Hitler’s analysis of potential opposition came
to rest at the MAXIMIN approach Quadrant, not that of MAXIMAX in Quardrant1.

RISK
High (MAX)
1 Low2 (MIN)
High (MAXIMAX) (MAXIMIN)
Gain (MAX)
3 4
Low (MINIMIN)
(MINIMAX)
(MIN)
Figure 1. Gain and Risk Assessment.

40. In the Rhineland episode of 7 March 1936 for example, the military correlation of
forces was quantifiably against Germany, as Hitler was well aware. “We had no army
worth mentioning,” he reflected later; at that time it would not even have had the fighting
strength to maintain itself against the Poles”, but unlike his military advisors, who were
focused firmly on French military capabilities, the Nazi leader considered other elements
of power, particularly the lack of political integration and coherency in the French
Popular Front government and the connection to the psychological component of
French national will. As a result, he concluded that France had no intention of
responding militarily to the German military incursion. On 9 March, the Wehrmacht
commander received warning of impending French military countermoves and asked to
withdraw troops from major cities in the Rhineland. Hitler, however, was still taking an
essentially MAXIMIN (Quadrant 2) approach and correctly discounted the possibility of
intervention by a French government vacillating between two incorrect positions:
MAXIMAX (Quadrant 1) and MINIMAX (Quadrant 3).
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Thinking out of the Box

41. A great deal of lip service has been paid of late to the need for students of
strategy to “think outside the box.” The “box” in this case presumably contains the
traditional approaches to those issues that affect America’s national security. It is
natural of course, in a time of great change to search for a “Philosopher’s Stone,” or to
look for the sword that can, in one clean stroke, preclude the tedious unraveling of the
Gordian knot of post-Cold War strategy. Perhaps this will all be possible in an extra-box
environment of the future, but such explorations cannot and should not be made until
the student of national security has learned to think inside the box, and that begins with
an understanding of concepts like national power.
42. The concept of national power helps to provide an initial organizational focus as
students deal with the deceptively simple thought process that links strategic ends,
ways, and means. National elements of power, however they are described, provide
the conceptual foundation for this process at the national strategic level. An
understanding of the characteristics and the interrelationships of these elements allow
the student to expand the process to comprehend how derivative instruments of power
can be combined most effectively as policy options to achieve national strategic
objectives. This is a key step in strategic maturation that will pay an increasingly larger
role in the future for military and civilian professionals concerned with national security
strategy.
43. Military planners already deal with Flexible Deterrent Options, in which military
instruments of power are matched with instruments derived from other elements of
power. Military options in response to a challenge could include an increase in specific
reconnaissance activities, the exercise of certain propositioned equipment, or the
deployment of small units. Politically, this could mean consultation by executive branch
elites with congressional leaders or initiation of a specific diplomatic demarche. At the
same time, economic options might include, alone or in combination, the enactment of
trade sanctions, the freezing of assets, and the restriction of corporate transactions. In
all this, the effectiveness of small discrete response options depends upon how well the
instruments of power are wielded together and that will depend to a great deal on how
well military strategists and their civilian counterparts understand the elements of
national power from which those instruments are derived.
44. The focus on these elements of national power as means to national strategic
ends also serves as an organizational link to the overall strategic formulation process.
That process begins by demonstrating how national strategic objectives are derived
from national interests, which in turn owe their articulation and degree of intensity to
national values. This linkage is also a useful reminder that power, the “means” in the
strategic equation, ultimately takes its meaning from the values it serves. Without the
legitimacy provided by this connection to national values, national power may come to
be perceived as a resource or mean that invites suspicion and challenge; at worst it
could be associated with tyranny and aggrandizement. Without the bond of popular
support and the justification that comes from an overarching purpose, national power
can be quick to erode and ephemeral as a source of national security.
45. In the end, what takes place within the box in dealing with concepts like national
power is an educational process, a not inconsiderable achievement in an era
mesmerized by techno-chic innovations which tend to confuse training with that
process, and data collection with knowledge. The need to maintain such distinctions
was summarized by Michael Howard almost 30 years ago in his report on service
colleges to the British Ministry of Defence: There will always be a prime need for the
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fighting leader in the armed forces; but today the junior fighting leader often needs to
exercise a considerable degree of independent and informed judgment, while the
demands made on his seniors find little parallel in any civil profession. To fit officers for
so testing a career, it is as necessary to extend their intellectual powers as it is to
strengthen their moral powers and their capacity for physical endurance.
46. In the final analysis, the study of national power is a valuable educational
objective because it is so difficult. Aspiring strategists must grapple with concepts that
overlap, that are subjective in many cases, that are relative and situational, and that
defy scientific measurement. All this teaches flexible thinking – the sine qua non
(prerequisite) for a strategist. In short, it is this very complexity that causes students to
mature intellectually, to understand that within the box there is no such thing as a free
strategic lunch. Equally important, students learn that they cannot escape these
limitations by moving outside the box, a lesson that many futurists need to absorb.
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CHAPTER-8
INSTRUMENTS OF STATECRAFT
General
1. Instruments of statecraft are used to influence the behaviour of actors (state or
non state) in the international system. In making influence attempts foreign policy
makers may choose from among a wide variety of alternative ways to promote their
goals. Foreign policy “tools,” means,” “instruments,” “levers,” and “techniques” all refer
to the policy options available to decision makers in pursing a given set of objectives
(also called National Interests) and these terms are being used interchangeably.
2. Some scholars reduce all techniques of statecraft to two categories, that is, war
and diplomacy. Both Raymond Aron and Hans Moregenthau illustrate this tendency to
use “diplomacy” to refer to all the means of conducting relations with other states short
of war. However, it is simply not very helpful to present a policy maker with only two
sets of options. Even the busiest statesman is likely to regard such categorization as
overly simple and not especially useful. The trick is to give the policy maker a set of
alternatives that is simple enough to be readily understood yet complex enough to call
attention to alternatives that might otherwise be ignored.
3. Lasswell suggests that his “fourfold division of policy instruments is particularly
convenient when the external relations of a state are considered: information,
diplomacy, economics and force (words, deals, goods, and weapons). Lasswell’s
formulation provides the basis for the following taxonomy of instrument of statecraft
employed in this chapter:-
a. Propaganda refers to influence attempts relying primarily on the deliberate
manipulation of verbal and psychological symbols, also called as
psychological instrument.
b. Diplomacy refers to influence attempts relying primarily on negotiation,
including both persuasion and coercion.
c. Economic statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on
resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms
of money.
d. Military statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on coercion,
violence, weapons or force.
4. The study of instruments of statecraft is complicated and confused by the
tendency to treat the capabilities (power resources, power assets or power bases) of
states as if they were property rather than relational concepts. Thus, statesmen are
often described as “employing” or “using” their “capabilities” or “power bases” as if these
were possessions of a single state. And techniques of statecraft are often classified
according to the kind of “power base” employed” e.g, economics, military, propaganda,
or diplomatic instrument. Thus economic techniques are said to exercise economic
power, military techniques are said to exercise military power, and so on.

The Use of Instruments of Power

5. The use of instruments of power is to influence the behaviour of other
states/actors. The instruments of power or policy tools can be categorized differently
depending what generic strategy is being used in the bargaining process i.e, pure
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diplomatic persuasion, diplomatic persuasion with positive incentives (promises and
rewards), and third, threat or actual use of force. The instruments of power in the case
of super or big powers are substantial. In the case of smaller/weaker states these at
best are meager and therefore hardly appropriate for the achievement of their strategic
objectives. For this reason all by itself a smaller state can ill afford to indulge in gunboat
diplomacy “unless backed by a big or a super power.” Thus, the best available course
for a small state like Pakistan is to structure its strategy on established principles of
international behaviour and law, international public opinion and support of at least one
big power.
Persuasive Instruments
6. Diplomacy is the major persuasive instrument. Any treaty or agreement reached
under coercion is rarely lasting. Versailles Treaty of 1919 is case in point. So, an
agreement or treaty should represent or appear to represent the common interests of
both the sides. Hence, the role of diplomacy as the persuasive instrument of statecraft
becomes the most important. Also, on this count, persuasive diplomacy is different from
the one, which resorts to threats or promises much less actual punishments or rewards.
In the past bilateralism has been the main mechanism for conducting persuasive
diplomacy. However since the inception of the UN, multilateralism has provided a
useful mechanism for persuasive diplomacy. Both big and small states avail UN
mechanism for persuasive diplomacy. One reason for this is that UN mechanism
generally opts for persuasion than enforcement.
7. Lately many states particularly the big powers, who have the means to control
international media, try to reach out to the public opinion of the other state as a method
of persuasion. Similarly they use various devices to influence the ruling elite or policy
and opinion makers respectively to bring about the desired change in the policy of other
state/states. The telecommunication revolution and IT has made it possible for them to
achieve their objectives on this score more easily. However, the formal and tested
mechanism for persuasive diplomacy remains to be the UN,
intergovernmental/international organizations such as Arab league, OAS, OIC, OAO etc
and indeed bilateralism. More over, international agencies such as World Bank and
IMF etc are also used by the big powers for persuasive diplomacy, involving economics.
Cooperative Instruments
8. Co-operative instruments in simple terminology mean applying policy of “carrot”
to influence other governments. In practical terms it means extending economic,
military and technical assistance. Lately trade on favourable terms is also in vogue to
achieve the same purpose. The fundamental reality of this instrument is that it is
applied by the richer countries or militarily and technologically more advanced countries
vis-à-vis poorer and less advanced countries. So, for countries like Pakistan the scope
and option of applying this instrument is rather limited. On the other hand this has been
massively used by the developed world to influence the developing and undeveloped
countries. In exception to this rule the oil rich Arab countries have tried to use their
petrol dollars to influence the policies of the developed world but with a limited success.
Coercive Instruments
9. Coercion as an instrument of statecraft is as old as the interstate relations itself.
When persuasion and incentives or convincing and canvassing fail to achieve the
desired objectives, states resort to coercion as strategy to obtain their objectives.
Coercion does not mean bludgeoning an enemy or going to war with it. Second,
coercion is not only of military nature. Lately big powers are increasingly resorting to
economic coercion in the form of sanctions. Third, coercion is could be both overt and
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covert. The coercion of any kind is meant to raise the risks for the other party to the
extent that it is forced to desist from certain action or policy course. Hence, its strategic
significance in the statecraft can not be denied. But this instrument can be essentially
used by the more powerful than the less powerful player. Therefore, its efficacy for the
smaller/weaker states is not much. For the same reason the majority of states today
(who happen to be weaker) display aversion to it.
10. In simple language sanctions mean stopping of economic, military and
technological assistance to a country in order to bring about a change in its policy on a
particular subject / subjects. In its extreme form sanctions entail imposing on a country
total or almost total embargo in order to prevent or hamper its interaction with other
states with a view to bring about the collapse of its government and system. So,
sanctions can be mild or harsh depending upon the motive behind them i.e. whether a
change of policy or government / dispensation is desired. The United States more
than any other country or body including the UN has resorted to the use of this device to
achieve its objectives.
11. The fact that except for the Banana republics such as Panama or Haiti, the U.S.
sanctions have rarely produced the desired results suggests that sanctions in the last
analysis are an expression of anger and frustration than a cogent or efficacious policy.
Second, most often sanctions are initiated by the U.S. legislature rather than the
administration. Therefore, these are motivated by domestic political considerations
rather then strategic purposes. Third, the understanding of any legislature of the
international situation is normally sketchy and lacks depth. So, quite often sanctions
mess up U.S. interests instead of serving them. In some cases they produce just the
opposite results.
12. What about other powers and the UN’s policy on the question of sanctions? The
record shows that other powers including the Western Countries have not shown that
much wont for slapping sanctions as the U.S. When it comes to the UN, it can impose
sanctions only when there is consensus among the permanent members of the Security
Council on the question. So, during the Cold War UN sanctions against any country were
rare. However, since the end of the Cold War, and inception of unipolar world order,
where the U.S. calls the shots in the UN Security Council, the world body is also resorting
to imposition of sanctions on the behest of Washington.
Economic Inducements
13. Economic assistance has been invariably used by big and rich states to promote
their national interests, not with standing the fact that some humanitarian consideration
may have influenced their policy of offering and giving such assistance. In some cases it
may have helped the recipient state as well in the process. However, it goes without
saying that the recipient countries pay back in terms of adapting their political and
economic policies to the likings of donor powers. At times the recipient countries can ill
afford such adaptation of policies. Of late the argument in the donor countries is:
whether economic assistance be extended for overt political reasons; and whether it
should be short term bargaining ploy or long term policy objective etc. But this argument
does not question the political premise of economic assistance i.e. economic aid as an
instrument of political influence and in some cases control of policies in other state.
14. Since early eighties, economic assistance directly or indirectly through U.S.
controlled international agencies such as IMF, and the World Bank is also used to
reform “the economics of the Third World by bringing about structural changes in them
according to the free market (laissez fair) lines. A close examination of the economic
scenario of the Third World would suggest that barring in some cases such as ASEAN,
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in majority cases foreign aid has created dependency syndrome and not led to the
economic growth and developments. So, the recipient countries have been the losers at
the both ends; partly for their own fault but mostly as a result of “aid addiction”. This has
become a chronic disease in the developing economies.
15. The strategists of the Third World, therefore, need to re examine the whole
question of accepting foreign aid with economic or political strings attached. This kind of
close scrutiny is all the more essential in Pakistan, where foreign economic assistance
has led the country to debt trap. Trade policy, as an instrument of pursuing national
interests falls in the domain of foreign affairs and is part of the larger concept of
economic inducements. America, since its inception as an independent country has
been using trade as means to serve its foreign political objectives. This is partly due to
the fact that Americans opted for independence from Great Britain as a result of trade
disputes with London. Second and more important is the fact that the U.S. is
tremendously rich and has been of great commercial interest to the rest of the world,
both to her allies and adversaries. So, it can use trade as a weapon to promote its
diplomatic objectives.
Covert Actions
16. United States and other big powers including those in the past have invariably
resorted to covert action to promote their interests when other means or methods have
failed or appeared to be more costly and less effective. On occasions, covert action has
been an adjunct of the overt action. The covert action is normally carried out by the
intelligence agencies and its targets may include a country’s government, legislature,
political parties, labour unions, intelligentsia, religious parties, armed forces, internal
security apparatus etc to achieve desired results for the perpetrator of the covert action.
Generally the action becomes public knowledge if and when it fails. Otherwise it often
remains shrouded in secrecy.
17. Lately is the U.S. there has been some debate with regard to the moral
desirability of covert action as instrument of statecraft on the grounds that such actions
are against the Judeo Christian values. There are two interesting aspects of this
argument. It has been triggered by the cases where covert action has failed and not by
those where such operations have succeeded. Second, the argument refers to the
violation of religious values in a totally power oriented materialistic society. The smaller
states generally find it difficult to evolve effective defence mechanism against covert
operations of big powers. Therefore, the strategists in smaller countries should not just
focus on counter intelligence measures but supplement them by educating and arousing
public opinion against them.
Force and Diplomacy
18. It goes without saying that diplomacy hacked by force has greater chance of
success than the one not sufficiently backed by force. So, big powers off and on indulge
in flexing of military and economic muscle to back their diplomatic/political goals. Today
‘Force’ includes economics and media as well. So, do other states when feasible.
However in resorting to show of force or indulging in gunboat diplomacy correct
assessment of the ground situation including the evaluation of psycho-political
environment is critical to success. The fate of the American Marines in Lebanon in 1983,
Israel’s setback in South Lebanon, and US missile attack on Afghanistan, would suggest
that flawed evaluation could produce just the opposite results. A determined enemy ready
to put more on risk can always frustrate the practitioner of gunboat diplomacy. When it
comes to smaller/weaker states the better course is to avoid this method since this could
be easily taken for a bluff and called. Iran’s deployment of forces on border with
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Afghanistan (after the killing of some Iranians in Mazar-e-Sharif by Taliban) was a case in
instance. Another instance was the Indian Brass Tacks Exercise, which was deemed as a
bluff by Pakistan and called accordingly. Mobilization and massing of military by India
during 2001/02 is another example. However, the wiser course for smaller states or
states not very powerful and vulnerable militarily is to resort to principles instead of show
of force.
Power and Influence: Choice of Instruments
19. The question of means to implement strategy takes us to the nature of power
itself. Power, that is available or can be made available to implement a strategy. The
purpose of strategy being to influence another state or the ability to make another nation
do, what it would not do otherwise. Power consists of two tiers or layers, the latent or
potential power and that which is manifest and can be mobilized easily. It can be further
categorized into tangible and intangible power.
20. The strategist has to make critical decisions with regard to; (a) the proper
balance between the potential and mobilized power; (b) on which tools of statecraft the
state craft to rely; and (c) how to use these tools to achieve national objective
effectively, but most importantly he has to evaluate the power available to his state in
the light of the power available to other actors. Without such assessment of correlation
of forces in a given situation, adoption of a correct strategy will be simply impossible. In
plain words such assessment should go into the question of real and perceived power
of one’s own state and that of the other state/actor, and then decide on the choice of
instrument.
Instruments as the Means
21. Instruments are means to achieve the ends; the means by which statesmen make
influence attempts on other actors is to say that such activities are political acts. For most
political scientists political processes are defined in terms of power or influence, that is,
situations in which some people change the actions or predispositions of other people in
some way or the policies of other states in own favour. We now come to consider the
means by which states characteristically defend or advance their interests in the
international system, the answer to this is quite simply: international co-operation. It could
be willing or through pressure. International co-operation has always been the way in
which the states of the world have conducted their business. No state, especially in these
last decades of the twentieth century, is so remote and detached that it does not require
the goodwill and help of other states; none is so powerful that it can impose its will on all
other states. Governments quite often complain that other governments ‘will not co-
operate’ or ‘will not negotiate’, but that is contrary to commonsense. Every state will co-
operate with any state provided that that state co-operates on terms favourable to itself.
For co operation, all instruments become relevant.
22. Almost all the actions of governments, Ministers and diplomats in the field of
external affairs have some ‘mass-persuasive’ elements in them. They are intended,
among other things, to affect the opinions and emotions of people in other countries in a
manner which suits the purpose of the state doing the ‘mass persuading’. But mass
persuasion can also be, and in most parts of the world is in fact today, a specialized
activity carried on by specialized agencies, specialized agencies, staffed by skilled
manipulators of opinion under general government direction. In this case it is more
usually known as propaganda, that is, the professional dissemination abroad of biased
images, using suggestion for the most part, rather than rational persuasion, in order to
influence attitudes abroad and also, hopefully, the policies of relevant governments.
Propaganda may be purely verbal, in the form, for example, of the Voice of America,
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Radio Free Europe, the external services of the BBC and those of Moscow and Cairo,
or American leaflet raids on North Vietnam, but it may also take the form of ‘propaganda
of the deed’ that is, the taking of overt and visible action from which it is hoped that
appropriate inferences will be drawn abroad. It could be said as a general rule that
propaganda is probably most effective, not when it is self-consciously arguing an
arguable case, but when it is presenting incontrovertible facts and pointing out certain
implications which follow (or are supposed to follow) from them. The options to use this
instrument as a means are many in style and application.
23. Diplomatic pressures in international politics are perhaps the most normal,
continuous and regular. Certainly they are the most unspectacular and possibly the
most effective in the long run of all the repertoire of pressures. Included in this category
are what may be called unilateral representations, or reasoned arguments in favour of a
certain policy by the target state, which may be a change in policy desired by the
applicant state or the continuation of a desired policy, if a change is in contemplation,
mediated through the normal and established diplomatic channels. Some times, and
increasingly since the First World, such representations are publicized, possibly on a
world-wide scale, in order to win over public opinion in the target state and perhaps
elsewhere, too.
24. Next, as we proceed along the scale of pressures towards the compulsive end,
there is a long and complicated repertoire of economic, financial and commercial
pressures. These could be both persuasive and coercive. These are covered in detail in
the subsequent sections of this chapter. However, economic pressure as a means
could be manifested in following ways:
a. Mild retaliatory trading measures.
b. Economic and technical assistance.
c. Boycott or refusal to buy the goods.
d. Embargo, blockade or quarantine.
e. Economic sanctions.
25. Finally, there are many other violent acts which may, or may not, fall into the
categories described in the previous paragraphs, and which may, or may not, be legal.
There can be included under this heading such measures as: the forcible sequestration
of the property of another state or of its nationals; forceful acts in defiance of treaty
obligations and commitments; armed intervention in another state or the dispatching of
hostile forces into the territory of another state; putting the applicant state on a war
footing and intimating that as a last resort war could ensue unless the other state
complies with the applicant’s will; invasion and other armed actions levelled against the
political independence and territorial integrity of another state; finally, war itself and its
modern variants, such as ‘war by proxy’, that is, giving encouragement to the people of
a third state to use armed force against the target state, the will or policy of which it is
desired to change. Now we talk about the pre emptive and preventive wars as well.
Objectives of Chapter- 8
26. To comprehend the instruments of statecraft, with special focus on:-
b. Propaganda: psychological Instrument of Statecraft.
c. Diplomacy as an Instrument of Statecraft.
b. Economic as an Instrument of Statecraft.
d. Military as an Instrument of Statecraft.
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Reference for Study
27. Following references may be important for further studies:-
a. The Political Economy of International Power by Klaus Knorr.
b. Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy by Robert
T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde.
c. The Globalization of World Politics by John Baylis and Steve Smith.
d. Economy Statecraft by David A. Baldwin.
e. Theories of Peace and Security edited by John Garnett.
f. Understanding War by Peter Paret.
g. Force and Statecraft by Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George.
h. The Information War by Dale Minor.
j. Diplomacy of Power by Stephen S. Kaplan.
k. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy edited by Alexander L. George and
William E. Simons.
l. Systems, States Diplomacy and Rules by J. W Burton.
m. Instruments of Statecraft by Michael McClintock.

SECTION-I

PROPAGANDA: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT

General
1. Propaganda is the planned dissemination of information, arguments and appeals
designed to influence the beliefs, thoughts and actions of specific foreign target groups.
Control achieved by such intervention can be used for making threats, that is, for
attempting coercion. This has rightly been called “psychic coercion”. More often it is
employed to limit another state’s capacity for international action, for example, by
creating disunity in the target country. Alternatively, it can also be used to enlarge a
state’s capacity for international action, for instance, by strengthening the domestic
support of a foreign government. Even propaganda can be supportive rather than
subversive. The extension of information, persuasion, and advice are important bases
of non-coercive influence. B may misunderstand what A is after, and supplies
information in order to dispel misunderstanding. Thus, some interstate conflicts of
interest decrease or vanish, once the governments involved are fully informed.
Persuasion and advice are related bases of influence. B may have adequate
information but may misinterpret it. By means of persuasion, A may help B to redefine
their relationship and to evaluate properly the consequences of either’s policy. Advice is
to suggest a course of action conducive to Bs as well as A’s goal achievement. It is
quite different from a demand, which is to serve exclusively the ends of the demanding
actor. Information, persuasion and advice clarify or enlarge the recipient’s choice of
policy.
Relevance of Psychological Instrument
2. Traditionally, there have only been three major instruments of statecraft, each
with its own distinctive tools, techniques, and modes of operations. The military employs
the weapons of physical violence. The economic involves the manipulation of the
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production and distribution of goods and services in an attempt to achieve certain
foreign policy goals. The diplomatic is distinguished by the fact that it is primarily
concerned with direct negotiations between official decision-makers from various states.
For centuries these were the instruments of statecraft used by the statesmen of the
world. It is not that psychological operations were unknown. Indeed, Line barger has
traced their employment back to antiquity, but two developments which have culminated
in the twentieth century have made the psychological instrument one of the major
instruments of statecraft. First, the development of mass communications has made it
possible to spread information and ideas to great masses of people in countries that
have experienced even a small amount of modernization. In the twentieth century for
the first time in history, it has become possible for the leaders of one nation to
communicate directly with the peoples of another nation. Second, and equally
important, the twentieth century has seen the expansion of the potential or actual power
base of a society. This has been particularly true in democratic states with the continual
expansion of the franchise to a larger and larger segment of the population, but even
the most totalitarian of the modern dictatorships can be distinguished from its
authoritarian predecessor by the fact that the former is apparently forced to solicit the
active support of its subjects whereas the latter could exist with mere passive
acquiescence. The new-found power of the masses and the ability of a foreign power to
speak directly to these masses have now made the psychological instrument of
statecraft a major one.
3. It is a basic thesis of this section that there is a psychological instrument distinct
from the three more traditional instruments; that this instrument is as analytically sep-
arable, and as operationally inseparable, from those instruments as, say, the diplomatic
is from the military. Reporting and explaining government actions is one function of that
instrument; helping to coordinate and time "such actions so as to derive from them the
maximum advantages" is another of its functions, but to be fully exploited the
psychological instrument must also have a part in initiating policy and action. This is not
to claim any position of pre-eminence for the psychological instrument; it is to plead for
it a status of equality with the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments, each of
which will find its role constantly moving up or down a scale of relative importance,
reflecting the set of circumstances peculiar to any given world situation in response to
which the particular policy must be developed or the particular action taken. This is
more relevant to developing states, where there is comparatively less emphasis on
accepting this as a powerful instrument.
Nature and Scope of the Psychological Instrument
4. The activities involved in the use of the psychological instrument have been
variously named and described. "Political warfare" and "psychological warfare" have
been extensively used during and after the Second World War. The British leaned
toward the former, and the United States toward the latter. "Propaganda," "The
Campaign of Truth," and "war for men's minds," "communications weapon," and many
more represent other attempts to define and/or give an emotional stamp to the activities
related to the psychological instrument in question. Officially, the US operations in this
area have been labeled "information" and that word has appeared in almost every one
of the several titles which various national propaganda agencies and its ancestors have
borne. This superfluity of names indicates general lack of agreement on the exact
nature and role of the psychological instrument. One American scholar using the term
"psychological warfare" to apply to the use of the psychological instrument generally,
paraphrases Mark Twain in commenting", psychological warfare is neither psychology
nor war," while another, equally astute and experienced, has a more restricted point of
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view, defining psychological warfare essentially as the "application of parts of the
science called psychology to the conduct of war." Another feels that the distinctive
characteristic of psychological operations is that they attempt to influence the will to
conduct policy as distinguished from the capability to conduct national policy. A fourth
emphasizes the more strictly propaganda function of "talking" about the activities carried
on by the other instruments of statecraft.
5. Information Warfare is the latest notion used by the scholars and statesmen not
only have some of the words employed been distasteful, they also indicate that the
nature and scope of the activities involved have not fully been appreciated. The limits
imposed by the use of any term employing the word "warfare" have already been
pointed out, but the innocuous word "information," which has gained respectability, if
nothing else, also indicates severe limitations in the concept of the nature of the
psychological instrument of statecraft.
6. On July 8, 1953, the White House released a statement on a highly classified
report of the President’s Committee on International Activities. Judging from some of the
wording of this statement, the committee seemed to come close to understanding and
recommending the use of the psychological instrument. It said, "In reality, there is a
psychological aspect or implication to every diplomatic, economic or military policy or
strategy. This implication should receive more careful attention, both in the planning and
execution stage of policy, but not to the exclusion of other factors." But then the
statement goes on to say that "except for propaganda there are no 'psychological war-
fare' instruments distinct from traditional instruments of policy." One is tempted to
wonder if the committee did not find that the only ready "solution" to an admittedly
complex and trying problem was to deny the existence of facts which gave us the
problem in the first place. It did bow to the realities of international relations to the extent
of saying that the important thing was "to coordinate and time such [day-to-day gov-
ernmental] actions so as to derive from them the maximum advantages."
Distinguishing the Psychological Instrument
7. This discussion provides the basis for distinguishing the various instruments of
statecraft and establishing the unique characteristics of the psychological instrument.
The diplomatic instrument is identified by the fact that it involves direct contact between
the officials of one state with the officials of another. Many times these contacts are
negotiations that lead to changes in the material world. The economic and military
instruments of statecraft involve direct manipulation of the material world. The
psychological instrument involves manipulation of the apparent world.
8. The traditional methods for a state to influence the behavior of a foreign state
have been through the manipulation of material objects, usually in the external
environment of the state being acted upon. These traditional strategies involved military
and/or economic operations and diplomatic negotiations. The distinctive nature of
psychological operations derives from the fact that they do not attempt to manipulate
material objects, but rather try to influence the way in which material objects are
perceived and interpreted.
9. Propaganda broadcasts to a foreign population might cause many people to
change their attitudes toward their government's policy, which in turn might be
instrumental in the decision-makers' estimation of their domestic support, which in turn
could lead to a policy change. Psychological operations in a third country might
contribute to a change in leadership, which in turn requires the decision makers in other
states to redefine the external situation, but whenever the initial operation involves an
attempt to manipulate peoples' views of the world rather than material objects and
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events, one is dealing with the psychological instrument of statecraft also called
propaganda.
10. One further point should be made. Obviously diplomatic, economic, and military
operations do have psychological implications and in many cases it is most difficult to
label an operation as purely economic or purely psychological. It is more useful to think
of operations that are woven together in a national strategy to affect the behavior
pattern of foreign states as primarily economic, primarily psychological, etc.
Methods of Influencing State Behaviour
11. Analytically it is possible to establish four ways in which psychological operations
can influence the behaviour of foreign states. Two have to do with the situation external
to the foreign decision-maker, and two deals with the internal or domestic, situation.
Two are designed to affect directly, and two are intended to achieve their purpose
indirectly. A listing would appear as follows:-
a. External (or "foreign" to the foreign decision-maker).
(1) Affect directly the manner in which the leader perceives the ex-
ternal situation independently (or relatively independently) of any
actual changes that take place.
(1) Actually modify the external situation of the foreign decision-maker
by manipulating the apparent world of people outside his national
boundary.
b. Internal (or "domestic" to the foreign decision-maker):-
(1) Affect directly his perception of some aspect of his own nation
which has a bearing on his choice of foreign policy alternatives.
(2) Modify the attitudes or behavior of the populace, or that portion of it,
on which the decision-maker's power depends.
12. It may be helpful to a clearer understanding of these approaches if an example is
attempted for each. So far as one not privy to the whole story can tell, it would appear
that the "apparent world" view of their nations international situation, held by the French
and British leaders at the time of the Suez venture in 1956, was changed in mid-course
by a Soviet threat and/ or an American protest directed specifically at those leaders for
the very purpose of causing them to take the action they took in halting the military
operation. The Soviet "atomic blackmail" threat was unquestionably a psychological
tactic, whether or not they would have backed it by action had their public threat not
been heeded. The American protest, which was directed to the European leaders in
normal diplomatic channels, might have remained purely a manifestation of the
diplomatic instrument had it not been also publicly "released." When this was done, the
tactic became "psychological" in that the publicity itself was obviously intended to
influence the British and French leaders' thinking. (The fact that the "message" was also
intended for Russian minds does not change the intent in regard to the British and
French. Indeed, it was probably related to that intention.)
13. As an example of indirectly affecting the external view of a decision-maker, one
might cite any number of possibilities. For instance, if Soviet propaganda and agitation
in Iran was to help bring about the establishment of a pro-Soviet government in that
country, there would be a change in the material world, which would undoubtedly affect
U.S. policy-makers' view of the situation in the Near East. This would most likely
precipitate a change in American foreign policy. The initial phase, however, would
involve the Soviet use of psychological operations in Iran.
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14. It has been suggested by Speier that it would not have been difficult for British
psychological operators to change Hitler's view of the internal German situation if, after
Rudolf Hess's dramatic 1941 flight to England, they had suggested that there were other
high German officials contemplating similar escapes. It is conceivable, anyway, that this
might have set off a purge in top-level Nazi circles which would have had serious
implications for the German war effort. It is a common method of influencing in 21 st
century.
15. The fourth way in which psychological operations can effect policy change is by
affecting those on whom the decision-maker's authority depends. For example, there is
no doubt that Egyptian propaganda and agitation helped bring about the revolt within
Iraq in 1958, with consequent changes in official Iraq's attitude toward Egypt as well as
toward East and West. Psychological operations can help build up or destroy morale in
peace as well as in war. They can help create support for a particular group in a society
or for a particular course of action; they can equally well help to dissipate such support
as already exists. These changes in the internal situations should help bring about
changes in the behavior of the policy-makers. What US is doing in Iran to influence the
opposition and the pro west people is another example.
Types of Psychological Operations
16. Propaganda. There are almost as many definitions of propaganda as there are
writers on the subject. Doob calls propaganda "the attempt to affect the personalities
and control the behavior of individuals toward ends considered unscientific or of
doubtful value in a society at a particular time." Bartlett defines propaganda as an
"attempt to influence opinions and conduct-especially social opinions and conduct-in
such a manner that persons who adopt the opinions and behavior indicated do so
without themselves making any definite search for the reasons." In the well-known
Smith, Lasswell, and Casey volume on communication, propaganda is considered to be
"language aimed at large masses" for the purpose of influencing “mass attitudes on
controversial issues”.
17. Rumor. A second technique of communication used in psychological
operations is that of rumor. The definition of rumor used in this study is taken directly
from Allport and Postman. These men define rumor as a "specific (or topical)
proposition for belief, passed along from person to person, usually by word of mouth,
without secure standards of evidence being present”. It can be seen immediately that
rumor differs from propaganda. Initially anyway, it is limited in its audience. It is
disseminated by personal contact and thus by the time it has reached a large audience
it has been filtered through the minds of a great number of individuals. There is a certain
amount of disagreement over just how reliable rumor is as a form of communication.
Allport and Postman reported that typically some interesting changes take place in the
process of transmission. The source of the information is often lost or is changed. As
the rumor travels, it tends to become more concise. Details, sometimes important
details, are lost, but the substance that remains after repeated telling tends to be
sharpened and perhaps exaggerated.
18. Direct Person-to-Person Communication. The great upsurge in professional
and academic interest in communications came after the advent of mass
communication on a large scale and consequently a large amount of the work that has
been done in the field has been on the organization and impact of the mass media in
modern societies. This should not blind one to the fact, however, that the most effective
form of persuasive communication is face-to-face communication. The Soviets
recognize this fact and the great amount of effort they devote to oral agitators is
evidence of this recognition. This is being done almost by all the big powers.
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19. Symbolic Acts (or Propaganda of the Deed). Meaning, of course, can be
"transferred" through various types of action. Indeed, all foreign policy operations have
a symbolic impact over and above their physical impact, but we are not imperialist
enough to claim, therefore, that all foreign policy acts belong ultimately in the bag of
techniques to be used in psychological operations. There are, however, instances when
physical operations are important primarily for the meaning they convey rather than for
the change in the material world which they bring about.
Techniques of Psychological Operations
20. Deception - Enlightenment. These two tactics are best explained in
relationship to the distinction between the material and the apparent worlds. Tactics of
deception attempt to make the audience build up a psychological environment which dif-
fers from the material environment. In the terms of perceptual psychology, tactics of
deception try to provoke non-veridical percepts, and tactics of enlightenment are
attempts to bring a skewed perception in line with reality.
21. Terror and Reassurance. Terror has been used to control the behavior of men
since the beginning of history. The dictators of the twentieth century have added new
refinements. The effectiveness of their use of terror to achieve political goals both
domestic and foreign is a matter of historical record. The effective use of terror is
dependent on the use of coercion. Terror is essentially a threat, either implicit or explicit.
If the threat is to be effective, it must be supported by physical violence-usually the
more beastly, the more effective the terror. The coercion that is the most effective in
instilling widespread terror: is that which appears to its victims to be completely
capricious. There should be no pattern in its application. If victims are chosen at
random, all in the community may be terrorized; if the coercion follows a discernible pat-
tern, only those who seem destined to be next will be maximally affected.
Propaganda – Areas of Difficulty
22. The use propaganda in international politics is hedged about cuing with
difficulties; and it may, like many other of the types of to the pressures considered in this
chapter, have adverse ‘boomerang’, effects on the applicant state. It is certainly not
true, as Hitler claimed in Mein Kampf, that ‘by clever and persistent propaganda Heaven
can be made to look like Hell and Hell like Heaven’. In the first place, the population of a
totalitarian state may be effect forces timely insulated by the criminal law of the country
against the receipt of information or propaganda from abroad. It may be a yoked serious
criminal offence to listen to, or read foreign news or foreign opinions. Moreover, even if
there are no legal restrictions of the on the receipt of ideas from abroad, the people of a
country may be psychologically insulated against those ideas. This may be due to
inborn or cultivated suspicion of everything or anything that with the foreigner says on
the principle timeo Danaos et dona ferentes ( ‘I fear the Greeks, especially when they
are bringing gifts’) or to period purposeful indoctrination of the people of a target state in
a political direction contrary to that which the applicant state intends. So much is this so,
that under certain conditions propaganda offensives levelled against a country may
have counter productive effects in so far as the people of that country may feet that
there is an even greater need to rally round their country and its leaders if they are
under attack from outside, or the target government may conclude that they must do
even more to isolate their people from external influences if they are already being ‘got
at’ from the outside.
23. Due to these difficulties which face the practice of mass persuasion, in the
international system in the twentieth century, there has developed the Trojan Horse or
Fifth Column technique of attacking the target state from the inside. The attempt here is
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to penetrate what is sometimes called the ‘hard shell’ of the target state by arranging for
a friendly faction to be organized within it, which can agitate on behalf of the applicant
state, spread alarm or pessimism, cut communications, seize key points such as radio
and television stations, printing presses and telephone exchanges, possibly timed to
coincide with an armed attack by the applicant state from outside. Obviously, the
success of these penetrative techniques will depend on the morale and public spirit of
the people of the state under attack, their loyalty to the basic symbols representing the
state, and the presence or absence among them of groups alienated, for one reason or
another, against the existing order in the target state.

SECTION-II

DIPLOMACY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT

General
1. This section identifies diplomacy as a key process of communication and
negotiation in world politics and as an important foreign policy instrument used by global
actors. Diplomacy in world politics refers to a communication process between
international actors that seeks through negotiation to resolve conflict short of war. This
process has been refined, institutionalized and professional zed over many centuries.
Diplomacy in foreign policy refers to the use of diplomacy as a policy instrument
possibly in association with other instruments of statecraft such as economic and
military force to enable an international actor to achieve its policy objectives.
Diplomacy not only helps us to understand the nature of world politics as a whole but,
from a different perspective, it also reveals much about the behaviour of the nation
states actors in a global system of world politics.
2. Diplomacy originated within a limited world society of expanding feudal States. It
was an instrument fashioned and generally accepted amongst States on the commonly
held assumptions that each State then made regarding the nature of other States, their
propensity to expand, their aggressiveness, and their readiness to employ force either
to preserve an interest or to pursue one. Diplomacy was an instrument of power politics.
Morgenthau analysed it as an important element of national power; even diplomatic
ceremonial attracted his special attention. In his view, the task of diplomacy was
fourfold:
a. Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of the ‘power actually
or potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives.
b. Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the power
actually or potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives.
c. Diplomacy must determine to what extent these different objectives are
compatible with each other
d. Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives.
3. Traditional diplomacy was an instrument fashioned to meet the needs of States
in the context of the following propositions:
a. Man was by nature aggressive, at least when behaving in international
society;
b. The quest for power was universal and a fundamental drive;
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States, being led by and comprising men, were aggressive and sought
power.
c. Some States were more aggressive and more inclined to seek power than
others because of variations in needs, human qualities, social institutions
and Philosophies.
d. Each State was in these circumstances obliged to organize its defences
against the potential aggressive designs of others.
Basic Assumptions
4. These five propositions logically led to the assumption that conflict of ‘vital
interests’ between States could be contained only within a threat system, and, if not
contained, could be resolved only by violence. The device of power balances, and the
organization of collective security to which its failure gave rise, were the operative
means of containing violence. They were designed to preserve existing power
relationships. Any alterations that took place were those that these arrangements could
not contain; changed relationships could come about only by the exercise of force or the
threat of force.
5. Once these propositions and the operative assumption to which they gave rise
were accepted, once they formed the basis of State policy and practice, a sequence of
events was likely to occur:
a. Each State perceived the defence preparations of others as potential
defence against change it sought, or as potential aggression in the pursuit
of change it sought to avoid;
b. No state enjoyed security standing alone in conditions of greatly
differentiated power, and each tended, therefore, to seek alliances;
c. Even though these alliances were defensive and designed deliberately
merely to create power balances, they stimulated other alliances;
d. Power balances evolved into attempts at securing favorable balances,
and arms competition was established; breakdowns in the balance
system, due to the failure of States to give pride of place in policy to
maintaining balances, due to attempts by dissatisfied powers to alter
conditions, and due also to miscalculation of power balances, led to war;
e. War settlements led to wider, even universal collective, security; and
f. The collective security instituted after wars was a favourable power
balance under the cloak of’ international institutions, and this led to
subsequent challenges by dissatisfied Powers.
Foreign Policy Process and Role of Modern Day Diplomacy
6. We need first to locate diplomacy within the foreign policy process of states.
There are two major stages in that process- the making and the implementation (or the
carrying out) of policy. A simple view suggests that the making of foreign policy is the
exclusive business of government. So important is foreign policy to the achievement of
the national interests of the state that the most senior members of government will
oversee and control the policy process. Having made the key decisions, they then hand
them over to their foreign departments for implementation. Diplomacy is one of a set of
instruments through which decisions are implemented, policy activated, and policy
objectives achieved.
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7. This is a reassuring picture in that, while the difficulties of successful
implementation are underplayed, it does suggest that it is the politicians who establish
the policy objectives and make the important decisions. If they are elected, this
suggests the possibility of democratic control of foreign policy in principle at least. (It is
not the case in developing states)The foreign policy bureaucracy, not elected of course,
plays a subordinate, non political, essentially instrumental role. This picture, however, is
an idealized one, unlikely to match the realities of the process, particularly in developing
states with their highly bureaucratized system of government, where diplomacy as
policy instrument is not very well understood.
8. There is a specialized section of every government devoted to foreign policy
process. This usually takes the institutionalized form of a foreign department with a
dedicated staff. Every foreign department is linked to a network of embassies abroad
and this constitutes the diplomatic machinery of government. If we identify the main
functions performed by this machine, it will become apparent that they relate not only to
the implementation but also to the actual making of foreign policy. Diplomacy as a
government activity then refers not only to a particular policy instrument but also to the
whole process of policy making and implementation.
Major Functions of the Diplomatic Instrument
9. There are major functions performed by the diplomatic instrument. The first is to
collect information essential for policy. Information and data are the raw materials of
foreign policy and it is part of the job of diplomatic corps to gather information and report
back to the political leadership. Given the expanded agenda of modern foreign policy,
the scope and range of information required by government for policy making purposes
has increased dramatically. As much of this information is specialized, it is normal for
trained representatives called attaches to be attached (as their name suggests) to the
larger embassies. These may include commercial, military, scientific or cultural
attaches, or some relevant mix of experts depending upon the precise nature of the
relationship between the parties.
10. Second function relates to the advice to the government and policy formulation.
In that, it is difficult in practice to separate the function of information gathering and
political reporting from the expectation that diplomats will offer policy advice to
government. Part of the purpose of having permanent representatives abroad is that
they develop a familiarity with the country in which they are based and are able to use
this together with other skills and experience to interpret data and to put a gloss’ on their
reports. They make assessments about likely developments and also make reports on
the reception home government policies have received or are likely to receive. The
distinction between giving advice and making policy is often blurred. The information
and advice given by diplomats will certainly limit the perceived options available and
may effectively structure the choices of the political leadership to formulate viable policy.
11. Third relates to the implementation. If diplomats contribute to policy making by
providing information and advice, the diplomatic machinery also provides an important
policy instrument relevant to policy implementation through the functions of
representation, negotiation and consular service. Embassies not only represent the
government abroad, they also represent the wider interests of the home state which go
beyond the narrowly political realm. The ambassador and his/her staff will attempt to
maintain good relations with the host state, to network with local elites, to be present at
relevant ceremonial occasions and events where home interests are required to be
promoted- at trade fairs, for example. The status and size of the embassy provides a
symbolic representation of the importance attached to relations with the host country.
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Increasing or decreasing the number of diplomats can be used politically to signal the
current state of a relationship, or to indicate problems.
12. Negotiation is the fourth and perhaps the single most important function of the
diplomatic instrument. This covers a variety of activities from simple consultation known
as an ‘exchange of view’ to detailed negotiations on a specific issue. Professional
diplomats may take the lead on negotiations or they may play a supportive role if
political leaders themselves or other envoys are involved. Whenever states require the
agreement of other states or third parties, diplomacy is the technique used to secure
that agreement. The ability to persuade other parties is central to the art of diplomacy.
On some issues, persuasion itself may suffice. But not infrequently, some pressure may
be required and the parties involved may then agree to compromise and to adjust their
original positions. Pressure may take various forms including the imposition of time
limits on the negotiation, seeking to isolate the other party diplomatically or, in extreme
circumstances, threatening to break off diplomatic relations.
13. The final function of the diplomatic machine, the provision of consular services,
has two elements of which the second is more directly related to diplomacy as a policy
instrument. The first type of consular activity involves action to support and protect
home citizens abroad. This work, together with the processing of immigration
applications from host citizens may be handled separately from embassy work. The
second type of consular work is dedicated to commercial work, supporting trade
relations in concert with economic instrument with the host state. This type of work has
increased dramatically in recent years and embassies are often evaluated in part at
least in terms of their ability to boost home export promotion and trade activity generally.
Relation between Diplomacy and other State Instruments
14. We have established that diplomacy is an important policy instrument in its own
right. Persuasion or pure ‘diplomacy ‘may be sufficient to achieve a state’s policy
objectives abroad. Typically, however, diplomacy is linked to other policy instruments to
produce what is called ‘mixed diplomacy’ to create desired influence. Here diplomacy
becomes a communications channel through which the use or threatened use of other
instrument of statecraft is transmitted to other parties. States learned long ago that
persuasion is often more successful if ‘stick’ and/or carrots’ are attached. There are
three other types of policy instrument that may be used in various ways; either as
potential rewards or punishments in the attempt to secure compliant behaviour in
another party. These instruments and their linkage with diplomatic instrument are given
in the following paragraph.
15. First, military force may be threatened or deployed to give ‘muscle’ to a
negotiation. Diplomacy and military force in combination have been used by states for
so many centuries that they may be regarded as the traditional instruments of foreign
policy. The growing costs of warfare, however, have led developed states at least to
look for alternative instruments to strengthen their hand in negotiations. A second
instrument, economic measures, is not new-trade diplomacy also has a long history,
but trade and aid have been used increasingly since World War II to influence the
outcome of negotiations. Both trade and aid can be threatened or used as a stick or as
a carrot in the sense that wither can be offered or withheld. The third instrument used in
conjunction with diplomacy is the most recent in term of regular usage and can be
labeled subversion or psychological operations. Where the other instruments are
used to target governments directly, subversion is rather different in that it is focused on
particular groups within other states with the object of undermining or overthrowing the
government of that state. Subversion may include a variety of techniques including
propaganda, intelligence activities, and assisting rebel groups.
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16. The effectiveness of integrated diplomacy in achieving policy objectives depends
upon a variety of factors including the nature of the objective sought, the availability of
relevant instruments, of statecraft the nature of the ‘mix’ used the costs attached to the
use of particular instruments, and so on. In terms of selection, diplomacy continues to
occupy a favoured position because it has certain comparative advantages even though
it may need to be supplemented by other instruments to be effective. First, diplomatic
resources are readily available. All states and other actors have at least some capacity
to communicate with other parties. Second, diplomacy has relatively lower costs directly
associated with it. While the use of other instruments may be regarded as politically
unacceptable in certain circumstances- military force in particular- diplomacy is widely
as legitimate ‘because of its association with negotiation and conciliation, which are
valued as norms of international behaviour’.
Trends in Diplomacy in Developing World
17. Each age has regarded the issues of its time as unique, as embodying a sharp
break from the past. In 1920 the Royal Institute of International Affairs of UK held a
conference to discuss the New Diplomacy that had emerged after the Great War.
Today, it is fashionable to speak similarly of “Total”, “New’ or “Concorde’ diplomacy. The
content, method and style of diplomacy are evolving all the time. We live in an age of
accelerating change, which impacts on the lives of all. Diplomacy too evolves, but the
more things seem to change, the more they are also the same. The business of winning
friends abroad and influencing them remains the constant object of this instrument of
statecraft.
18. International contacts by virtually every agency of government are multiplying
relentlessly. From agriculture to aviation, arid from water resources to wildlife, different
branches of government deal directly with foreign counterparts and with specialized
international agencies in their domain. Foreign ministries long ceased to hold the
monopoly as exclusive external contact channels. There are a few hold-outs, such as
the Japanese, who centralize all international negotiations at the Gainiusho, and the
Germans, who insist that formal instructions to all personnel in their embassies must be
routed through the Auswartiges Amt-even when the majority of officials in large
embassies belong to other agencies. In India, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is
often a bystander, because it is sometimes marginalized by the other Ministries and
agencies on external issues. Battles for turf arise in all countries and are seldom won by
invoking right, or Government Rules of Business Allocation.
19. There is expanding technical complexity of issues in the global and bilateral
debate, be it in trade, the environment or international finance. In developing world this
has led to the argument that Foreign Service officials are not technically qualified as if
an official belonging to the Administrative Service, the former district magistrate, who
moves from one ministry to another, in the States and at the Center, has developed
such expertise! For the Foreign Service, this is linked with the development of what the
Duncan Report of 1969 in UK called the “professional generalists”. Such experts are
able to move with felicity from one technical diplomatic discussion to another, grasping
the essentials beyond the jargon, and keeping track of the underlying national interest.
Improved training at mid and top career levels is an urgent necessity.
20. Another kind of trend comes from the fact that heads of governments in
parliamentary systems (and heads of state in presidential systems) act autonomously
on external affairs issues, and deal directly with one another, bypassing their own
foreign ministers and the ministries. Elsewhere, the peregrinations of the heads to
foreign lands have also grown exponentially in the past three decades. Added to this is
the growth in “Summitry”, at the UN and at the other international and regional
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instances. With similar growth in the travel of foreign ministers and other ministers, and
the high officials, embassies become servicing facilities, handling the greeting and the
logistics for the visitors, but we see elsewhere that this does not really reduce the
substantive action arena for traditional diplomacy.
21. National sovereignty is under challenge and erosion, resulting in a significant
impact on diplomacy, by adding complex new elements. The European Union is the
best living instance of new political engineering, where nations have voluntarily,
sometimes reluctantly ceded legislative and oversight authority to supra-national
entities. It adds to the models of advanced cooperation and becomes an element in its
own regional partnership dialogue, setting out what today may seem a distant goal.
Economic interdependence also produces limitations. At the World Trade Organization
(WTO), tariff rates are “bound” at levels set in agreements, and represent commitments
on future policy. Another instance is the dispute settlement mechanism, whose decision
WTO members are legally bound to accept. The international finance institutions, such
as the World Bank, IMF, and the Asian Development Bank, have policy prescriptions
and loan conditions amounting to encroachment on legitimate areas for national
discretion. Then there is the change in international public law that sets in its on
sovereign action. International NGOs and business bodies, ranging from Amnesty
International to the World Economic Forum, exert persuasion on national policy or act
jointly with domestic counterparts and foreign governments.
22. The media are another new dominant presence in international affairs, with
global village”, TV images, and the simplified sound byte, shaping perceptions as never
before and forcing rapidity of reaction. The diplomat must possess a degree of media
savvy that the older generation of statesmen and diplomats would have considered
obscene. For a political personality on mission abroad, nothing hurts more than a
negative image projected back home by the Diplomacy and Foreign Policy print and
visual media. A corollary to that is that the visitor abroad, particularly developing world is
seldom much concerned with the local media, which falls into the category of issues that
the Mission Abroad has to contend with, without support of the visiting dignitary. Overall,
diplomacy has to confront, more than ever before, the potential for gains and distortions
that this particular external constituency offers.
23. Democracies also lace a special challenge in handling external affairs in an age
of media hype, instant analysis and excessive expectations - the impatience of public
opinion, the urge for instant gratification. In a noisy and unstable democracy, with
limited understanding of the nuances of foreign policy, public posture often locks
diplomacy into particular modes of negotiation. Compulsions of domestic politics lead
political parties, especially in the opposition, to postures on external issues that lack
consistency. This lack of consistency has become a significant constraint on diplomatic
initiative and on flexibility for maneuver. A particular requirement is for informed
dialogue with the public and education of opinion, not necessarily in favor of the policy
of the day, but in international affairs. Much more than a typical branch of government
dealing with steel or heavy industry, or with urban affairs, a foreign ministry needs a
section that deals with public affairs in a sustained way. This goes beyond public
relations in the narrow sense of PR, or media affairs as handled by foreign office.
Diplomatic Instrument: Limitations of Developing World
24. The discussion in the previous paragraphs has assumed that all states are
similar with respect to diplomacy and foreign policy. There are however, important
differences between developed and developing states which must qualify some of the
generalizations we have made about ‘states’. In particular, developing states are
handicapped as effective international actors by having relatively underdeveloped
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diplomatic machines and by a restricted range of other policy instruments. They tend to
have a patchy system of representation about and limited recourses available for policy
formulation and implementation. They also have a limited range of other policy
instruments for bargaining with various actors and for implementing decisions made.
For many developing states, the use of international organizations at both regional and
global levels is crucial to compensate for weaknesses in national capabilities. We
should note here the special role of the United Nations as a forum in which all
developing states are represented and where they can attempt to coordinate their
common interests and maximize their diplomatic impact on world politics
Importance of Diplomacy as a Major Instrument of Statecraft
25. We have focused on diplomacy as an instrument of state behaviour, whether we
are talking about developed or developing states. Indeed, to start with, diplomacy used to
be called ‘Statecraft’, in order to emphasize the traditional dominance of states as
international actors. However, even the most powerful states are no longer the only
significant international actors in the international state system. Bilateral state-to- state
diplomacy remains an important structural feature of that system but it has been
increasingly supplemented by multilateral forms of diplomacy with a mixture of state and
non-state actors involved. What forms does multilateral diplomacy take and how do
actors seek to manage these complex relationships? International organizations tend to
act diplomatically in very much the same way as states. They may not have the extensive
diplomatic apparatus performing a wide range of functions that are characteristic of
developed states, but all have at least a rudimentary diplomatic statecraft. They can
communicate their interests and deploy their recourses to influence the outcome of
negotiations. Indeed, many of these actors have a greater ability to influence the
diplomatic process at a global level than smaller states. At a regional level, complex
multilateral types of diplomacy have evolved which have reached their most developed
form in Europe and can be illustrated by looking at foreign or external policy making in the
European Union.
Key Conclusions
26. Important points from this section are summarized as under:-
a. Diplomacy plays a key role in the foreign policies of states and other
international actors. It has become an all encompassing instrument.
b. A diplomatic instrument (minimally a foreign department and overseas
representation) may be highly developed or rudimentary depending upon
the actor but it performs important functions in the making and the
implementation of foreign policy.
c. Diplomacy involves persuading other actors to do (or not do) what you
want (don’t want) them to do. To be effective, (‘pure’) diplomacy mostly
need to be supplemented by other instruments of statecraft, but
negotiating skills are central to the art of diplomacy.
d. Diplomacy combined with other instruments (military, economic,
propaganda) is called mixed integrated diplomacy. Here, diplomacy
becomes a communications channel through which the use or threatened
use of other instruments is transmitted to other parties.
e. Diplomacy usually has comparative advantages over other instruments in
terms of availability and cost. It is more prominent and active in day to day
functions of the nation state system.
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f. In complex, multilateral negotiations, diplomacy has become less an art
form and more a management process reflecting high levels of inter-
dependence between societies and states.

SECTION- III

ECONOMICS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT

General
1. Klaus Knorr for example, focuses his attention on explaining the concepts of
power and influence, while virtually ignoring economic concepts as compared to the
military instrument of statecraft. Thus when Knorr defines “economic power” in terms of
“economic policy” it is presumably all right since one has only to consult a “good
textbook” in order to ascertain criteria for distinguishing economic from non-economic
policy. The best known textbook available, however, is not very helpful in this respect.
Some of these are clearly unacceptable for differentiating economic from non-economic
statecraft. Similarly, to define economics as the “study of how to improve society” is too
broad to be helpful in defining economic statecraft. An equally broad definition favored
by some economists depicts economics as “a science responsible for the study of
human behavior as the relationship between ends and means, which have alternative
uses. So defined, it encompasses the whole field of means-ends analysis and is utterly
worthless for distinguishing economic techniques of statecraft from other techniques. In
defining economic statecraft or economic power, as in other areas of intellectual inquiry,
it is risky to take agreement on basic concepts for granted.
2. There are, as always, borderline cases that are hard to classify. For example,
should the sale or gift of military hardware be considered as economic or military
statecraft? In general, the relevant distinction is between firing ( or threatening to fire)
weapons and selling (or promising to sell) them. Insofar as a market price for such items
exists, these transactions could reasonably be labeled economic statecraft. A plausible
case could also be made for classifying them as military since items like e.g. nuclear
bombs, may have no “going market price”, also since providing weapons is so closely
related to military statecraft, some might want to treat it as such. Depending on the
particular research interest at hand, one might decide to classify them either way. The
existence of such borderline cases, however, does not do serious harm to the value of
the concept of economic statecraft for most purposes.
Basic Components of Economic Statecraft
3. The concept of economic statecraft has the following three basic components:
a. Type of policy instrument used in the influence attempt, i.e. economic
policy.
b. Domain of the influence attempt, i.e. other international actor (s).
c. Scope of the influence attempt, i.e. some dimensions (s) of the targets
behavior (including beliefs, attitude, opinions, expectations, emotions,
and/or propensities to act).
4. As with policy options, the value of a particular conceptualisation is best
measured by comparing it with available alternatives. Whereas economic statecraft is
defined in terms of means, alternative concepts are usually defined in terms of actual or
intended effects of a policy or in terms of the process by which the policy was made.
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Following alternate concepts related to economic statecraft will be briefly discussed in
the subsequent paragraphs :-
a. Foreign economic policy.
b. International economic policy.
c. Economic diplomacy.
d. Economic leverage.
e. Economic sanctions.
f. Economic warfare.
g. Economic coercion.
Foreign Economic Policy
5. The term "foreign economic policy" is sometimes used in much the same way as
"economic statecraft" is used here. Other uses, however, should be noted. Benjamin
Cohen and Robert Pastor define it in terms of governmental actions intended to affect
the international economic environment to attain national interests. An important
drawback to this conception is that it makes its definition impossible to consider foreign
economic policy as an option when a statesman wants to affect the no economic
aspects of the international environment. Rational adaptation of means to ends in
foreign policy making is not facilitated by defining some policy options in terms of
particular ends. Still another objection to this definition is that it says nothing about the
means to be used, thus leaving open the possibility that the use of non economic
techniques, such as threats of violence, could be considered foreign economic policy.
Such a possibility strays needlessly from common usage.
6. I. M. Destler offers a definition of "foreign economic policy" in terms of the actual
impact of state actions on foreign and economic concerns. This definition implies
nothing whatever about either the means used or the effects intended; instead it
focuses on the actual effects- intended or not. Thus, a nuclear war could be labelled as
"foreign economic policy" if it had important side effects on foreign economic matters.
Any conception of foreign economic policy that cannot differentiate between nuclear
attack and trade restrictions is hopelessly at odds with common usage. Any conception
of "policy" that ignores both means and ends is unlikely to be of much use in assessing
the rationality of a given policy.
International Economic Policy
7. ‘Stephen D. Cohen argues that the term ' 'international economic policy’, is
preferable to the more commonly used phrase, "foreign economic policy." He contends,
"International economic policy must be viewed as being a separate phenomenon, not a
tool for use by either foreign policy or domestic economic policy officials." The reasons
underlying Cohen's position can be summarized as follows: (1) "International economic
policy” is the "preferable term because...policy making in this area must take account of
too many questions of domestic policy to be considered “foreign.” (2) The term 'foreign
economic policy' usually connotes a subdivision of foreign policy as a whole and is
therefore an oversimplification. “And (3) acceptance of international economic policy as
a distinct policy area is the "best and quickest way" to improve understanding of the
"forces of economics in international economic policy" and of "the global political impact
of U.S. international economic policy." The following points, however, should be noted in
response to Cohen's position: (1)Foreign policy has traditionally been defined in terms
of attempts to influence foreigners, not in terms of the factors that should be taken into
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account in formulating the policy. The fact that making international economic policy
requires consideration of foreign and domestic political and economic factors in no way
distinguishes it from traditional conceptions of foreign economic policy. (2) It is not self -
evident that treating foreign economic policy as a subdivision of foreign policy as a
whole constitutes "oversimplification."
Economic Diplomacy
8. The term "economic diplomacy" is sometimes used in much the same sense that
“economic statecraft" is used here. The primary disadvantage of such a definition is that
it broadens the concept of "diplomacy" so much that it makes it difficult to think in terms
of diplomatic alternatives to economic techniques.
Economic Leverage
9. Klaus Knorr uses the term "economic leverage" to discuss how economic factors
can be used ''as means to achieving state policy." Such usage might appear similar to
the concept of "economic statecraft." There is a difference, however, between "levers"
and "leverage" a difference that is crucial to understanding the dynamics of influence
attempts. "Lever" is a property concept, while "leverage" is a relational concept. Some
levers permit the exercise of leverage; others do not. Lever is closer to element, while
leverage4 is synonymous to the exercise of statecraft.
Economic Sanctions
10. At least three common meanings of the term "economic sanctions" may be
identified. The first is a rather narrow concept referring to the use of economic
measures to enforce international law. The second refers to the types of values that are
intended to be reduced or augmented in the Target State and the third usage
corresponds to the concept of economic instruments of statecraft commonly used in the
international system.
11. The first is narrowly legalistic and therefore unsuitable for general foreign policy
analysis. The second emphasizes intended effects rather than the means for achieving
those effects. The difficulty is that any or all of the policy instruments discussed in
various sections in this chapter can be used to affect the economic values in a target
state. Diplomatic pressure on other states can be used to discourage trade with the
target; propaganda can be used to undermine confidence in the target state's currency;
and military instrument can be used to destroy factories. Thus, conceiving of economic
sanctions in terms of the intended effects on the receiving state is no help at all in
distinguishing economic from non economic tools of statecraft.
12. The term "economic sanctions" is used in so many different ways that there is
much to be said for avoiding it altogether. Unfortunately, the term is so deeply
embedded in the literature of economic statecraft that ignoring it is impossible. In fact it
has been linked with economic warfare, as well.
Economic Warfare
13. Some conceptions of "economic warfare" emphasize means, while others
emphasize effects. Thus, some writers portray the bombing of industrial targets during
World War II as economic warfare. While military analysts may indeed consider an
attack on industrial targets as economic warfare. The basic intuitive notion of most
people is that firing weapons and dropping bombs are military undertakings.
14. Yuan-li-Wu conceives of economic warfare in terms of "international economic
measures" that enhances the "strength" of a country relative to an actual or potential
"enemy". The context of Wu's discussion makes it clear that he conceives of "strength"
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as war-making potential. War- making potential, of course, may take various forms,
depending on the type of war to be fought. Since the utility of any technique of
statecraft varies from one policy contingency framework to another, no overall
assessment of the utility of a technique can be based on a single set of assumptions
about who is trying to influence whom, when, where, and how. Although the
"international economic measures" discussed by Wu are similar to the "economic
techniques of statecraft" discussed here, Wu's concentration on the utility of such
techniques for promoting a particular kind of war-making ability severely restricts the
applicability of his analysis to other kinds of situations.
15. The concept of "economic warfare" most closely related to the concept of
‘economic statecraft" is of Thomas Schelling's. He defines it in terms of "economic
means by which damage is imposed on other countries or the threat of damage used to
bring pressure on them." He specifically rules out the use of military means to inflict
economic damage, and he makes it clear that economic warfare can be used to pursue
a wide variety of foreign policy goals, not merely economic ones. Although superior to
most other concepts of "economic warfare," Schelling's concept includes only
techniques intended to impose negative sanctions and is therefore too narrow to serve
in place of "economic statecraft."
Economic Coercion
16. The concept of "economic coercion" is rarely defined by those who use it. Knorr's
work stands as an admirable exception to this rule. The concept of "coercion"
developed by Knorr, however, diverges substantially from conventional usage. The
basic intuitive notion of coercion refers to a high degree of constraint on the alternative
courses of action available to (i.e., perceived by) the target of an influence attempt. To
be more precise, coercion usually refers to a situation in which one actor (A) is able to
manipulate the cost/benefit ratios of the alternatives perceived by another actor (B), so
that the latter would be foolish to choose any alternative other than X; where X
represents either a single alternative or a category of alternatives. There are essentially
five ways for A to do this: (I) by threats of punishment; (2) by promised rewards; (3) by
actual punishment; (4) by actual rewards; and (5) by conveying correct or incorrect
information to B with respect to the cost/benefit ratios of his alternatives. Thus, the most
common examples of coercion include the following: "Your money or your life!"; "Sink or
swim!"; "Surrender or die!"; "An offer you can't refuse!"; and "Water for a person dying of
thirst." The most often overlooked ways for A to coerce B are actual rewards and
punishments.
Forms of Economic Statecraft
17. The concept of economic statecraft employed in this section is intentionally
broad, as it must be if it is to subsume ‘Means’ by which foreign policy makers might try
to influence other international actors. Some of the myriad specific forms of economic
techniques of statecraft are listed on the next page. These are intended to illustrate the
wide variety of economic techniques and do not purport to be exhaustive. It contains
examples of policy instruments usually associated with attempts to threaten or punish
while it also provides examples of tools of statecraft normally associated with attempts
to promise or provide rewards.
18. Depending on the particular situation, any of the policy instruments listed below
could be used for either positive or negative sanctions. Such techniques have been or
might be employed by statesmen to pursue a wide variety of foreign policy goals,
including the following: weakening or strengthening the leadership of another state,
changing the political system of another state, changing the domestic or foreign policies
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of another state, changing the capabilities of another state, promoting a particular
ideology, deterring war, acquiring or maintaining allies, weakening or strengthening
alliances of other states, stopping or reducing the level of violence of an ongoing war,
affecting the tariff policy of another state, the rate of economic growth in another state,
changing the economic system in another state, acquiring access to the goods or
services of another state, denying another state access to the goods or services of a
third state, changing the level of economic welfare in another state, speeding up or
slowing down the rate of economic recovery from war in another state, and so on. In
each case a political act is taking place insofar as a state is attempting to affect the
actual or potential behaviour of another international actor.

19. Examples of Economic Statecraft: Negative Sanctions

Trade Capital
a. Embargo a. Freezing assets
b. Boycott b. Controls on import or
export
c. Tariff increase c. Expropriation
d. Tariff discrimination (unfavourable) d. Taxation (unfavorable)
e. Withdrawal of “most-favored-nation e. Withholding dues to
treatment international organization
f. Blacklist f. Threats of the above
g. Quotas (import or export)
h. License denial (import or export)
j. Dumping
k. Preclusive buying
l. Threats of the above
20. Examples of Economic Statecraft: Positive Sanctions
Trade Capital
a. Tariff discrimination (favorable) a. Providing
b. Granting “most-favorable-nation” b. Investment guarantees
Treatment
c. Tariff reduction c. Encouragement of private
exports or imports
d. Direct purchase d. Taxation (favorable)
e. Subsidies to export or imports e. Promises of the above
f. Granting licenses (import or export)
g. Promises of the above

Significance of Economic Statecraft

21. Should tariffs, foreign aid, embargoes, preclusive buying investment guaranties,
direct purchase, and so on be treated in terms of a broad concept of economic
statecraft? Why bother to group them all together? Even if one grants the need for
increased attention to economic techniques, it would be possible to favor continued
separate treatment for each technique. What is to be gained after all, by conceptual
aggregation at such a high level of abstraction? It is one thing to show that such
aggregation is possible, but it is another to show that it is desirable.
22. There are at least three reasons for thinking in terms of a broad concept of
economic statecraft: (1) because others do; (2) because economic techniques are
peculiar; and (3) because other techniques of statecraft are treated at this level of
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generality. If the concepts of economic statecraft involved jumping together activities
that are not usually consider being members of a single category, some justification for
the departure from common usage would be called for. In the case of economic state
craft, however, no such obligation exists. Both in social science and in ordinary
language the economic dimension of social life-defined roughly the way it is here- is
often treated as an analytical category. Conventional usage includes frequent
references to “the economy,’ “the economic system,” “economic activities and economic
organizations”. There is nothing unusually broad about the term ‘economic” as used
here. Categorization at this level of generality occurs in daily newspapers, social
science textbooks, library catalogues, and every day conversation and in governmental
organizations at every level. Furthermore, the distinction corresponds with the
conventional division of academic disciplines. There are few departments of foreign aid,
international trade, foreign investment, or taxation; instead, such academic interests are
usually jumped together in a department of economics. The burden of proof lies with
those who would deny that a conceptual category employed so often in other spheres of
life should be applied to thinking about foreign policy techniques.
23. A second reason for thinking in terms of economic statecraft is that these
techniques share certain characteristics that differentiate them from non economic
techniques of statecraft. Both money and markets are unusual institutions. Thus, Gilpin
argues that “what is unique about the modern world is that the economic aspects of
social life have become more differentiated from other aspects because of the rise of a
market economy. And Alfred Marshall observes that “the problems, which are grouped
as economic, because they relate specially to a man’s conduct under the influence of
motives that are measurable by a money price, are found to make a fairly homogeneous
group. If money and markets are peculiar, those techniques of statecraft closely
associated with them are likely to share some peculiarities. One of the purposes of this
book is to identify some of these.
24. The most compelling argument, however, for treating economic techniques at a
high level of generality is that other techniques are so treated. Thus, Charles
F.Hermann identifies the following examples of “a single broad type of instruments”:
propaganda, military, diplomacy, and foreign assistance. The striking thing about this list
is that the first three are on a much higher level of generality than the fourth. Unlike
propaganda, military instruments, and diplomacy, foreign aid is not a broad category but
rather a relatively narrow one. It is simply not comparable to the level of generality of the
other three types of foreign policy tools.
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SECTION –IV

MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT

General
1. Armed Forces are employed not only for war and the threat of war, whether for
purpose of aggression or defense, throughout history they have had other political and
social functions as well. Military power expresses and implements the power of the state
in a variety of ways within and beyond the state’s borders, and is also one of the
instruments of statecraft with which political power is originally created and made
permanent. Holders of political power do not invariably wish to increase it. When they
do, the threat or use of force becomes an important element of their policy.
2. Putative military power has three components. Military forces (i.e. military
strength), military potential (i.e. capacity to expand or improve military forces), and
military reputation, (i.e. the expectation of other national actors), derived from past
experience, that the state concerned has a greater or lesser disposition to resort to
military threats when its vital interests are threatened. There are three mechanisms
through which military strength, or, more broadly, putative military power can become
effective or actualized. One is through war, the second is by way of military threats, and
the third is through the anticipation anxiety of other states that the nation involved may
resort to its military force if a serious conflict of interest arises with them. This third
mechanism is extremely important, even though is the least noticeable, and is often
expressed only in the councils of the influenced state but not always even there. For
example, such councils may not consider certain courses of action at all because it is
obvious to everyone that they are likely to incur the displeasure of a militarily very
superior state, yet power has nonetheless become effective. Casting a quick glance at
the historical record, it may appear to us that wars occur all too often and that there is
intense relation between policy and military instrument of statecraft.
Relationship between Policy and Military
3. The relationship between the holders of political and military power is central to all
societies and helps determine their character. Clausewitz had defined the relationship
between the two kinds of power by declaring that war is the continuation of politics by
other means. In his view, the political nature of war affected both actions of the armed
forces and the relationship between the political and military leadership. As wars were
fought to achieve a political purpose, every action in war should, if possible, accord with
this purpose. A purely military act did not exist.
4. Moltke took a more expansive view of military authority. He agreed that war was an
instrument of state policy and was therefore ultimately controlled by the head of
government. The armed forces must work only for the political purpose, but their actions
must be totally independent of politics. Once war was declared, the soldiers were
autonomous in their operations against the enemy until they presented the head of
government with the victory that would enable him to conclude an advantageous peace.
War as a Political Instrument
5. Clausewitz’s analysis of the political character of war is among his most significant
and potentially most fruitful achievements. When he identified the state’s political
intentions and energies as a basic element of war he did not, of course, reveal anything
that was unknown to soldiers and statesmen, even if they did not always fully understand
 115
the implications of this identification. Nor did earlier political or military theorists ignore the
links between policy and war and between military organization and economic, social and
political conditions. But Clausewitz was the first to place politics at the center of an
analysis of what he called the “total phenomenon” of war and to develop concepts and
methods that made possible the systematic study of the interaction of politics with other
basic components of organized violence.
6. War is not waged in a military vacuum. At every point it touches on political
interests or on elements that may quickly become political and strategic planning as well
as the operations themselves must be mindful of these links and consequences. War is
an expression of the state’s political will. In turn the government owes it to the state and to
use its military instrument sensibly and, whenever possible, to assign missions to the
armed forces that are not beyond their capacity. This demands true cooperation between
the political leadership, its military advisors, and the commanders in the field.
The Essence of State and the Role of Military
7. The essence of the state is power. As it guarantees the state’s existence, Power
in relation to other states is the ultimate standard by which the internal affairs of the state
must be measured. (At least that is the case with major states. Smaller entries must
safeguard their independence by ensuring pacific relations between social groups,
efficient administration, and sensible alliances.) Domestic policies must create the means
of political and military power, but at least in states that are surrounded by powerful
neighbors their particular character matters less than their efficiently. However, social
change is inevitable and should be reflected in the country’s political institutions. The
readiness to fight and the readiness to compromise lie at the core of politics.
8. Military power, (i.e. the capacity to use violence for the protection, enforcement or
extension of authority) remains an instrument with which no state has yet found it possible
completely to dispense. Indeed, it is not easy to see how international relations could be
conducted, and international order maintained, if military instrument was totally absent.
The capacity of states to defend themselves, and their evident willingness to do so,
provides the basic framework within which the business of international negotiation is
carried on. It is significant that nearly every one of the new states which has emerged
since the Second World War has considered it necessary to create at least a token
military force; even the strategic need has been as negligible as the financial capacity to
support it. Such a force is not purely symbolic. The ultimate test; of national
independence remains in the nuclear what it was in the pre-nuclear age: whether people
are prepared to risk their lives in order to secure and preserve it.
9. However, the thesis that military power is an intrinsic part of the structure of
international order is not one which will meet with unanimous approval. Attitude towards
the place of armed forces in international relations fall somewhere between two extremes.
On the one hand is the view that armed forces constitute a purely destabilising factor on
the international scene, and that their abolition would lead to greater stability among
nations. At the other extreme we have the belief that military power is not merely one
element of national and international order, but the basic instrument, and that no cheque
in international politics can be honoured unless there is a full supply of military power in
the bank meet it.
10. At the other extreme we have the belief that military power is not merely one
element of national power and international order, but the basic factor; and that not
cheque in international politics can be honoured unless there is a full supply of military
power in the bank to meet it, but such a view is really no more tenable than it’s opposite.
The role of military power in international order is in fact as difficult to define as is the role
 116
of gold in economic transactions; and the controversies in the economic sphere parallel
very closely those in the military. Those who believe in the primacy of military
considerations in international affairs have their parallel in those economists who insists
that a sound currency is the only basis for a healthy economy and who pursue policies of
sound finance at whatever short-term cost in social distress. Those who deny the need for
military power at all have much in common with the thinkers who would maintain that the
gold standard is a shibboleth contrived by financiers for their own profit, and that a
workable economic system, based perhaps on some form of Social Credit, if not on
simple inflation, can be devised without reference to it at all.
Military Force as an Indispensable Instrument of Statecraft
11. Military force, then, is an indispensable instrument of policy for independent
sovereign states. However, this simple proposition, the starting point for nearly all
strategic thinking, has been widely challenged, particularly in the second half of the
twentieth century Walter Millis, amongst others, has argued that ‘because of the nature of
contemporary international the capacity to wage war is the most dispensable of all
instruments of national survival and welfare’. And he goes on to say that ‘unless it is
somehow dispensed with, there is not much hope for either welfare or society’. Numerous
other writers have commented along similar lines. They have mounted a twin pronged
attack on the view that military power is a useful instrument of statecraft and in turn the
policy.
12. The second prong of the attack on the usefulness of military power takes the form
of an assertion that modern military weapons are so destructive of life and property that
they cannot reasonably be regarded as an instrument of policy. Almost the same point
can be made in a slightly different way. Those who query the value of massive military
power usually have a very narrow interpretation of its usefulness. They tend to think that
military power is only useful if it is exercised in war, where as in fact there are reasons for
thinking that military power is most useful when it is not used. Traditionally, states have
acquired military power with the aim of deterring others from waging war against them, at
least as frequently as they have acquired power with the intention of waging war
themselves. There is a sense, then, in which war may be regarded as a failure of military
power rather than an inevitable consequence of its acquisition. Military power does not
have to be used to be useful; it is sometimes most useful when it is not used, and the
hazards of modern war, far from changing the situation, have actually reinforced it.
13. The assumption that military force still has a role to play in world politics is not the
only assumption underlying contemporary strategic thought. Equally important are the
‘value’ assumption implicit in the goals that military policy is directed towards. Almost
without exception strategic thought assumes the desirability of one kind of world rather
than another. In particular it assumes the desirability of a peaceful world in which
individual states enjoy a high degree of security. It may seem strange to some that a
subject which is preoccupied with techniques of violence is none the less directed
towards the maintenance of peace and the promotion of national and international
security. On the face of it at least there is surely something a little odd about the idea that
those who are concerned with the most destructive weapons known to science are mainly
interested in bringing about conditions in which those weapons will never be used.
14. There is another angle to the use of Force as an instrument of statecraft. It relates
to the problems of ethical and moral constraints on the use of Force. Peace without use
of military instrument has been the dilemma of both the diplomats and statesmen. How to
find ways of restraining the use of Force has been a perennial problem in the theory and
practice of international relations. Since the ideal course of action of abolishing war
completely is evidently unattainable, statesmen, political philosophers, lawyers and
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soldiers have turned to other methods of limiting the use of Force as an instrument of
policy. This has become more relevant in the age of preventive and pre emptive wars.
Use of Force: Does the Ends Justify the Means?
15. Although the question of the role that moral and ethical principles can, or should,
play in the conduct of international affairs has engaged the attention of moral and political
philosophers for centuries; it has not been resolved even on the theoretical level. The
problem is often put in the form of a question: Does the end justify the means? This is the
way in which many people address such policy questions as: Was President Truman
morally justified in using atomic bomb against Japan? Was President Kennedy morally
justified in approving the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and, later, in risking a
thermonuclear war by attempting to coerce Khrushchev into removing the missiles from
Cub? Was Nixon justified in using covert methods to try to prevent the election the
election of a Socialist, Allende, in Chile and, afterward, to bring about the downfall of
Allende’s Socialist government? Similarly, was the Soviet Union justified in using its army
to put down the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and to intervene in Czechoslovakia in 1968
and Afghanistan in 1979. Was US justified to invade Iraq, and Afghanistan.
16. As noted earlier, there is a long history of controversy over the question whether
and how moral principles should apply in foreign policy. Three schools of thought may be
identified, each of which takes a different position on the issue “Does the end justify the
means??” There is, first the amoral point of view, a designation that can be given to all
those who believe that the question of morality applies only to the ends or goals of foreign
policy, not the selection of means to achieve those ends. This position is taken by
adherents of an extreme Realpoliitik approach to world politics as well as by a variety of
political activists whether ideological fanatics like Hitler and the old Bolsheviks or extreme
nationalists and terrorists. They argue in effect that since the objectives they pursue are
morally justified, that’s all that matters. Any means to an end is then justified, with one
caveat, to be sure and that is that the means chosen be effective. For the moralists, then,
the criterion to be applied in choosing methods is not their morality but rather their
efficiency. They are interested only in whether the means chosen will be effective in
promoting the moral objective.
17. It should be noted, however, that those who subscribe to the amoral position do
not always feel free to choose morally questionable means. Sometimes they feel obliged
to respect the moral standards of others, for they realize that to be completely ruthless
can create strong opposition and back their cause. A moralist, therefore, may restrain
themselves from taking actions, but they do so out of prudence and coldly calculated self,
not because they have moral scruples of their own.
Use of Force : The Perfectionist Approach
18. The perfectionist approach to the question “Does the end justify the means” is
another familiar position. The perfectionist argues that no matter how noble and virtuous
the end, it never justifies the use of means that violate moral/ethical standards. The
moral perfectionists and the amoralists, therefore, stand at opposite ends of the spectrum.
Perhaps the best example of a thoroughgoing moral perfectionist is the pacifist-one who
excludes the use military force and violence in all circumstances, even in self defence.
For the genuine, full blown pacifist not even circumstances in which the physical survival
of the nation is at stake can justify a resort to violence in self defence. However, we must
not assume that pacifists are cowards. Faced with aggression against his own country, a
pacifist may rely on nonviolent techniques of passive resistance to frustrate the
aggressor. A courageous pacifist may be willing to risk his own life in passive resistance
efforts.
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19. Similar to the pacifists in some respects are those persons in the United States
and elsewhere who some years ago used to criticize Cold War policies on the grounds
that they plunged the world into crises, such as the Berlin crises of 1948 and the Cuban
missile crises, which raised the danger of a thermonuclear war. These critics were not
procommunist or pro-Soviet; they did not favor the spread of communism throughout the
world. Rather, they felt that reliance on deterrence and military threats to defend against
the spread of communism was immoral and unacceptable because such policies
increased the risk of a thermonuclear holocaust. Many of them, like the pacifists, were
willing to pay a stiff price in order to avoid the danger of World War III. They recognized
that if American leaders followed their advice and did not use force and threats of force to
deter communism, then communism would inevitable spread, but they took the position
that such an outcome, however distasteful, was preferable to a thermonuclear holocaust,
and this position they expressed in the colorful phrase “Better Red than dead”. This
slogan was quite popular twenty years ago among some members of the peace
movement and those who favored unilateral disarmament by the United States.
20. Even if one disagrees with pacifists and those who argued “Better Red than dead”,
one can respect them for their willingness to face up to the logical and political
consequences of their beliefs. Of quite a different stripe, on the other hand, are other
perfectionists, often referred to as moralizers, who avoid dealing with the question of the
costs (to others as well as to themselves) if their moralistic views on foreign policy are
actually adopted. Moralists of this kind are often accused by their critics of wanting to
retain the comforts of a good conscience for themselves in matters of foreign policy
without being prepared to pay the price. Moralists often are more concerned with the
symbolic aspects of foreign policy than its actual substance. They frequently appear to
be less concerned with influencing foreign policy than with registering virtuous attitudes.
21. There are other interesting aspects of the perfectionist position which deserve
some attention. Some perfectionists have argued that states should behave in accord
with the same high standards of morality that apply to individual persons in a well ordered
community. They recognize that states and their rulers do not behave according to these
standards; but they believe that they ought to do so and that it is the task of enlightened
leaders to create an international system in which they will. A well known exponent of this
view was Woodrow Wilson. As Wilson phrased it in his message to Congress in 1917
declaring war on Germany; “We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted
that the same standards of conduct and responsibility for wrong done shall be observed
among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of
civilized states”.
22. Various objections have been raised against this kind of perfectionist view, not all
of which can be taken up here. One of the criticisms is that states are different from
individuals and that therefore moral standards that can be appropriately held up to guide
and judge the behavior of individual persons in a well-ordered community cannot apply
to states that are trying to provide for their security in an anarchic international system.
Elaborating on this, some writers (for example, E.Carr, in The Twenty Years’ Crisis) say
that moral standards can take precedence only in a well-developed, well-ordered
international community, one in which people agree that the good of the whole
community must take precedence over the good of the parts. Viewed from this
standpoint, it is obvious that loyalty and adherence to a world community are not yet
powerful enough to override what individual states consider to be their “vital national
interest.”
23. Another familiar criticism of the perfectionists is that their emphasis in on morality
easily leads to a self-righteous moralism in foreign policy. Such a criticism was leveled
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against John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s secretary of state. Dulles and moralists of his
kind, it was charged, are dangerous people to have in charge of foreign policy because
they tend to convert conflicts of interest among states into conflicts between “good” and
“evil.” This kind of moralization of foreign policy can have catastrophic consequences.
The more passionately a moralist leader believes he is right in a dispute with another
state, the more likely he is to reject compromise and accommodation and strive instead
to secure a complete victory over the opponent on behalf of his moral principles. Thus, it
is possible that amoralistic approach in foreign policy, if carried to an extreme, can end
up in fanaticism, which in turn can lead to catastrophic results. This type of concern was
registered by Hans Morgenthau, a leading proponent of the “realist” approach to
international affairs, when he wrote: “We cannot conclude [from the good intentions of a
statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally praises worthy or politically
successful. How often have statesmen been motivated by a desire to improve the world,
and ended by making it worse?”

Use of Force : The Non-perfectionist Approach

24. So much for the perfectionist answer to the question “Does the end justify the
means?” This formulation of the problem is rejected by a third school of thought, the non
perfectionists, for whom Arnold Wolfers was a leading spokesman. For the non-
perfectionists, there is no simple, unequivocal answer to the question as there is for the
anioralists and the perfectionists. Non-perfectionists insist that this question has to be re
formulated in a significantly different way, as follows: “Under what conditions do which
ends justify what means?” And as their reformulation of the question implies, the non-
perfectionists believe that whether morally questionable means are justified cannot be
answered abstractly but depends on the specific circumstances of the situation as well
as on the character of the objectives the policy maker pursues in that situation. Because
non-perfectionists stress the critical importance of the circum stances of each case, they
are often said to take a contextualist approach to the problem. That is to say, the non-
perfectionists employ situational ethics, not absolutist ethical standards.
25. Who, then, subscribes to the non-perfectionist view, a view that takes issue with
both the amoralists and the moral absolutists? It may come as a surprise to learn that
the original Realpolitik and “realist” approach to international politics subscribed not to
the amoral position but to this contextualist view of the role of moral principle’s in the
conduct of foreign policy. The realist approach, identified in modern times with the
writings of Hans Morgenthau, goes back at least as far as Machiavelli. It is important to
recall that the Florentine thinker, although he often sounded as if he adhered to the
amoral position, was in fact a contextualist of the non-perfectionist stripe. It is true that
many realists have misread Machiavelli’s The Prince as saying that “the end justifies the
means” and that international politics being what it is a kind of “dog-eat-dog” contest,
one has to take a cynical, amoral stance toward the problem of selecting means to
pursue foreign policy objectives. Those who oversimplify Machiavelli’s position in this
way may be referred to as the vulgar realists” vulgar”, because they have
misunderstood and distorted his realist approach to international politics. Actually, as
Kenneth Waltz and Michael Waizer have emphasized, Machiavelli attached important
qualifications to his advice to the ruler. Thus, Machiavelli says that not all ends, but only
some ends, justify morally dubious means; they must be constructive, beneficent ends.
26. An even more important qualification is Machiavelli’s additional caveat that
whether unsavory, morally questionable means are justified depends upon what he calls
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“the necessity of the case”—that is, whether in a given situation there are no alternative
modes of action that promise success in achieving the constructive end. The realist
position on this issue has been developed further by academic theorists such as
Morgenthau and Wolfers who defend the original realist position and distinguish it from
the oversimplified, distorted views of the vulgar realists.
27. Whatever the philosophical or political attractiveness of the non-perfectionist
approach, it is much more difficult to apply in practice than either of the two other
approaches. The amoralist and the perfectionist positions can be implemented much
more easily than the situational ethics which are supposed to guide the realists. Thus,
the perfectionist operates with a flat prohibition against using morally dubious methods
of even on behalf of the most virtuous ends. The amoralist’s rule of action is exactly the
opposite and almost as easy to apply: any means, however, immoral, is acceptable so
long as it promises success and is efficient. In contrast, it is impossible to convert the
non-perfectionist point is of view into simple rules of action that give explicit and clear-
cut guidance to the decision maker. Since so much depends on the specific
circumstances of the case, non-perfectionists can formulate only very general
guidelines for decision-making. Four such guidelines have been spelled out by Arnold
Wolfers, and in listing them now it will become obvious why they are best regarded as
general guidelines rather than in specific rules for correct behavior.
28. The first is that the objective of a foreign policy action must be genuinely
constructive and praiseworthy if the decision maker is even to consider choosing
morally dubious methods on its behalf. Some would say that, if this guideline is taken
seriously by the policy maker, then he would use force only to defend the truly “vital
interests” of the nation.
29. The second is that morally dubious means should not be employed when less
dubious means that may achieve the same objective are available. Third, a statesman
should choose that course of action which, in the given circumstances, promises to
cause the least destruction of things of value.
30. Finally, the statesman who attempts to apply situational ethics in making difficult
decisions of this kind should be constrained in the choice of means, particularly when
military force is employed by what theologians have referred to as the “principle of
proportionality”. This is an enjoinder to the effect that the dubious means employed
must at least have a rational relationship to the ends pursued. In practice, this re quires
the statesman to avoid profligate use of force that will inflict more loss of life and more
damage than is necessary or congruent with what is at stake. It will be recalled that
American war policies in Vietnam were severely criticized, even among those who were
not totally opposed to U.S. objectives, on the grounds that they grossly violated the
principle of proportionality. The military means employed by U.S. forces and the
enormous destruction they wrought were felt to be out of any conceivable proportion to
the American interests involved once seen in today’s world (with respect to Iraq and
Afghanistan), there seems to no change.