Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein, State Building in Scandinavia, Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jan., 1994), Pp. 203-220

State Building in Scandinavia
Author(s): Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein

Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jan., 1994), pp. 203-220
Published by: Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of
New York
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State Building in Scandinavia
Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein
The New State Theory and the Scandinavian Model
Interest has grown in recent years in the comparative history of state formation and state
destruction. Most studies of state-building processes have proceeded from a "realist"
analysis. Such a perspective is state-centered and involves a focus on each state's
international standing. It portrays the state not as an eternal being, but as a specifically
European creation. It sees modernity itself, and most especially the modem nation-state, as
the product of a specifically European combination of political diversity and religiou
commonality (in the form of Christianity).' Moreover, Europe holds the record when i
comes to the frequency of wars between states sharing a common culture. The states o
Europe were born in a systemic process uniquely combining a system of states linked by
treaties, embassies, marriages, and communications, on the one hand, with a regular
conduct of formally declared (and concluded) wars fought by large, disciplined military
forces, on the other.2
The modem state, as an institutional complex, may be compared to a coral reef. Much a
coral reefs are shaped by deposits over a long period, so states are shaped by their
institutions. Nobody envisaged the national states of Europe in the form we see them today
No one designed their principal components - treasuries, courts, central administrations
Such institutions typically arose as the more or less inadvertent by-product of efforts t
accomplish more immediate tasks, such as, classically, the creation and maintenance of
armed forces. Yet once come into the world, these institutions lived on, adding layer upon
layer to the coral reef. In addition, states share some basic traits with each other, just a
coral reefs do, and these similarities are not less striking for being the unintended
consequence of human action and even the result of sheer coincidence. These commo
features emerged partly on account of imitation and partly because the countries of Europe
faced certain shared general conditions. A comparative historical approach is therefore i
order, not only to specify these states' similarities and differences, but also to understand
them in depth.
A "dizzying relativism" presently characterizes state theory, in contrast to the situation
prevailing during the 1970s when Marxian "grand theories" of the state dominated the field
We realize-and must here acknowledge our debt to Marxists like Perry Anderson an
Nicos Poulantzas-that there have been many historical paths to modernity. In sum, modem
states differ from each other, and so the abstract term "state" can refer only to an
ideal-type.3 Since no general patterns of state development can be discerned, we must give
due attention to the variety among states. Scholars in this field have rather recently becom
aware of the "burden of history" and of divergent national political styles and traditions.4 In
a way, each state is unique. Colin Crouch has describe the working of history in th
decision-making processes we are interested in here.
203
Comparative Politics January 1994
When the active groups in a particular society tackle the latest conflict that has occurred in
relations between them, they do not work out how, in some abstract way, a problem of that kind
should ideally be solved. No one has the kind of knowledge needed to answer such questions in
complex matters, and in any case only a few component variables are loosened from the
historical package for manipulation at any one time. Usually, therefore, a solution will be sought
that involves as little disturbance as possible to known and understood principles of organization
and which facilitates the utilization of past experience. This does not imply that striking
innovations never occur. To move from having trade union leaders put in prison to inviting them
to ministerial talks, or vice versa, to cite a particularly common case of policy shift, is
dramatically innovative. But perhaps precisely because such moves involve a step into the
unknown, there will usually be attempts to carry them out in a manner that is in as many respects
as possible tried and familiar.5
The specific, historically inherited institutions of each country thus form a unique context in
which problems are viewed and interpreted. Almost identical problems may therefore be
treated very differently in two countries with divergent histories. We propose to examine
this question further in the context of an area often missing in "European" history: the
Nordic or Scandinavian region, with its five states, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland,
and Finland.6 Scandinavia is often either missing from European overviews or represented
by a single country, usually Sweden. It appears that non-Scandinavians widely assume the
other Nordic states to be no more than insignificant variations on the Swedish theme.7 But
is this a sound assumption? Since the Nordic nations are among the most stable, uncorrupt,
prosperous, and homogeneous welfare states in the world and have a number of remarkable
institutional inventions to their credit (the "ombudsman" being perhaps the most famous and
widely exported example), they would seem to deserve a closer look. What are these states'
common characteristics, their shared differentia specifica as compared to the rest of the
world? And how great is the variety among them? In this article, we shall compare the
Danish experience with that of its better-known Nordic neighbor, Sweden. We shall try to
locate both similarities and differences between these two countries. Our main purpose is to
present a "state-centered" explanation of why, from the turn of the century, liberal
tendencies in politics and society have been so much stronger in Denmark than in Sweden.
Denmark may, along with Sweden, be considered the most important Nordic case, for
Norway, Finland, and Iceland have for many centuries been subordinated to either the
Swedish or Danish state-building process. Iceland was a part of the Danish kingdom until
1944, as was Norway between 1375 and 1814. From 1814 to 1905, Norway was subject to
the Swedish crown (although it had its own constitution). Until 1809, finally, Finland was an
integral part of the Swedish realm. Finland is to a high degree "a receiver-country," with
patterns imported not only from Sweden, but from Russia and Germany as well.8 Among the
countries of Scandinavia, then, only Sweden and Denmark have undergone an independent
state-building process for many centuries. They are therefore the two best cases to examine
when seeking to ascertain whether a distinct Scandinavian model exists, or whether, to the
contrary, the Nordic countries diverge too greatly for such a concept to be of much use.
The Histories of Sweden and Denmark Compared

As a rule, the making of states has been driven by the making of war. Denmark and Sweden
are no exceptions. During the fifteenth century, the Nordic countries were joined in the
204
unstable Scandinavian Union under Danish leadership; this union was primarily a means of
asserting royal power against the commercial dominance of German merchants and the
Hanseatic League. Upon the union's dissolution, Sweden and Denmark fought ten bloody
wars (between 1520 and 1720) in their quest to dominate the Nordic and Baltic regions. The
balance of power gradually changed during the course of this rivalry. In the beginning,
Sweden was virtually surrounded and fought for its very existence. During the Thirty Years'
War from 1618 to 1648, however, Sweden emerged as the stronger of the two, and even
became a great European power. At this point it was Denmark's turn to be surrounded and
reduced to fighting for survival. This rivalry did not change merely the balance of power in
the north of Europe. It also furthered the process of state formation in both countries, a
process marked by many similarities, the most obvious being that both nations underwent a
marked militarization.
There were differences as well. Denmark took the road to absolutism, to a princely state.
Sweden, by contrast, retained a system of governance based on estates, notwithstanding the
various attempts to introduce absolutism. The two monarchies thus came to very different
solutions to the same problem: how to create loyal and obedient state servants in the face of
the fact that, in both polities, the nobles were a very small (though rich and powerful) part
of the population. In Sweden, both military and civil administrations were dominated by the
nobility; the main solution was therefore to create loyalty by means of mass ennoblement
and the establishment of close relations between the nobility and the other estates. In
Denmark, the opposite strategy was employed; a system of strong and stable absolutism was
established in 1660. The role of the nobility in the state apparatus was deliberately restricted.
Neither the military profession nor the civil administration was reserved for the nobility. The
majority of the officers were nonnobles. How can these differences be explained?
The utility of distinguishing between "eastern" and "western" paths to the modern state
has been widely agreed on. This distinction seizes upon the divergent economic bases of
state building. In the terminology of Barrington Moore, we find "bourgeois," urban-based
bureaucracies in the maritime west of Europe. In the east, we find agrarian bureaucracies,
rooted in the agrarian and military aristocracy, ruling over enormous expanses of land.9 In
the west, state building was based on capitalistic and monetized economies. In the sparsely
populated east, it was founded first and foremost on the exploitation of peasants. This
difference explains a large part of the variation in state-building processes and in the forms
of the modern state. The divergent economic bases helped to produce variations in the
character of absolutism, which led in turn to the development of democratic or autocratic
institutions. According to Perry Anderson, the eastern absolutist state was a device for the
consolidation of serfdom in a setting devoid of autonomous urban communities and urban
resistance. The dose of violence injected into social relations was far greater than in the
west.1' The eastern path to modernity was, in Tilly's words, the coercion-intensive
trajectory."I Eastern absolutism was a reaction to stress induced from outside. Among these
exogenous pressures was, surprisingly enough, Sweden, despite her small population, weak
towns, and thereby rudimentary economic force. The severity of the strain may be seen in
the fact that Warsaw, Berlin, Dresden, and Prague were all forced to submit to victorious
Swedish cavalry. Anderson has called this pressure the formative shock of eastern
absolutism. Prussia's militaristic absolutism arose in response to it.12 Russia was a similar
case, although it faced threats from the east and south as well as from Sweden.
205
Eastern absolutism entailed the suppression of urban independence and the end of any
prospect for politically liberal development, and it enshrined the political supremacy of the
nobility over the weak and undeveloped towns. It also involved a complex machinery of
repression directed against the peasantry. The prime objective of the landlord class was less
to fix the level of dues paid by the peasants, as in the west, than to hinder their mobility and
to chain them to the estates.
Eastern absolutism had two important, interrelated characteristics. First, the influence of
war on its structure was even more critical than in the west. The Prussian state reflected the
impact of militarization in perhaps the highest possible degree. Second, no urban
bourgeoisie strong enough to influence the character of the absolutist state existed in the
east. The device of a "service nobility" was in many respects the eastern equivalent of the
sale of offices in the west. The nobility was directly incorporated into the military machine.
Aristocratic dominance was less complete in the civilian bureaucracies, although
nonaristocrats were normally ennobled when they reached the top positions.13 In the west,
modem state building took several paths, but the general tendency was towards monetization
of the economy, growing capitalism, urbanization, and a strong bourgeoisie; the impact was
to diminish the authoritarianism of the state. According to Charles Tilly, the western
trajectories were capitalist, although in some cases a pattern of capitalized coercion
developed, wherein concentrations both of coercion and of capital emerged and indeed
developed in tandem. Such a path was taken in the British Isles.'4 There were significant
differences in the situation of the peasantry, but the general tendency was for agriculture to
evolve towards more capitalistic forms. According to Anderson, the monarchies of the west
relied on a skilled stratum of jurists to staff the administration.15 Yet, paradoxically enough,
the sale of offices simultaneously grew, as one of the more striking by-products of increased
monetization. As a result, parts of the bourgeoisie and nobility were integrated into the state
apparatus, while at the same time the efficacy of the state was threatened. In the more
densely populated west, with its autonomous towns, "civil society" was enriched by the
emergence of liberal institutions and organizations. In the words of Antonio Gramsci, the
difference between east and west was that, "in the East, the state was everything, civil
society was primitive and unmoulded; in the West, there was a balanced relationship
between the state and civil society and when the state trembled the robust structure of civil
society was visible."'16
The most problematic aspect of this distinction between western and eastern paths is that
it links the standing of the cities with the concentration of landholding in a specific way. Yet
a certain Scandinavian country did not exhibit this linkage, as Rokkan noted in his study of
Anderson's The Lineages of the Absolutist State. Sweden was in fact a "hybrid." According
to Perry Anderson, "eastern" and "western" patterns coexisted there: the weak towns
represented the "eastern" antiliberal element, while the free peasantry constituted the
"western" component. "Swedish Absolutism, by contrast, was built on a base that was
unique, because ... it combined free peasants and nugatory towns: in other words, a set of
two 'contradictory' variables running across the master-division of the continent.'"'7 Or, in
the words of Charles Tilly: "Twin facts . . strongly affected the path of the Swedish state
formation: first, the overwhelming presence of a peasantry that held plenty of land well into
the eighteenth century; second, the relative inability of landlords either to form great estates
or to coerce peasant labour on their lands.'"'" Castles also emphasizes that "the existence of
206
a Fourth Estate, consisting of the 'free' tax peasants, was unique in Europe."19 Sweden's
comparatively short-lived and immature absolutism was always based on popular opposition
to the aristocracy, but when victorious this "popular" power always handed the victory to
the king.20 Lawrence and Spybey emphasize the far-reaching importance of the Swedish
peasantry's relation to the state: "It is difficult to avoid the impression that this was a solid
foundation for the high level of involvement in and enthusiasm for government, engendering
an ingrained respect for the law for which Sweden has become so renowned.""' Castles
stresses the importance of the balance between estates in the Swedish model, a balance due
not least to the unusual role of the peasantry.
In this way, a balance was preserved over the centuries. Although at times the balance was
threatened--during the first forty years of the Vasa dynasty and by the noble acquisition of a
virtual hegemony of property ownership in the early part of the "Great Power" period-no
century passed in which either aristocratic constitutionalism or royal absolutism could have been
said to have entirely its own way.
The deviating case of Sweden was not difficult to grasp; indeed, it might even be the
evidence needed to avoid overgeneralization. In general theories of this kind, something is
probably wrong if deviations can not be found.
Anderson did not consider the other Nordic cases, but a Norwegian political scientist,
Oyvind Osterrud, later pointed out that Denmark was yet another hybrid case, with
characteristics exactly opposite to those of Sweden. At an early stage, extensive trade and
prosperous towns developed in Denmark, as did a peasantry subject to "eastern"
feudalism.23 In the early 1970s, Osterrud wrote a dissertation on agrarian structure and
peasant politics in Scandinavia and was therefore well acquainted with the current Danish
literature on the subject.24 It therefore seemed only natural to Stein Rokkan to sum up the
debate in the manner illustrated in Table 1.25 The matrix presents the two most important
Nordic states, Sweden and Denmark, as hybrids between two general types of European
"absolutism." It also presents them as two contrasting types. This might surprise those
inclined to view the Nordic states as variations on the same theme. It is correct to say,
however, that Sweden and Denmark have followed different paths to modernity. Swedish
"absolutism" was never stable and was early abandoned. The landed nobility was never
strong in relation to the peasantry, yet was influential in affairs of state and in urban
economic life. As in the English case, this influence was based on participation in
commercial affairs, which in turn paved the way for an evolutionary development towards
democracy. Noble participation strengthened commerce, which strengthened civil society
against the state. Moreover, Sweden was the only unified European state in which peasants
were represented in parliament; moreover, the independent peasantry manned the
conscript-based army and helped make Sweden a strong military power.
Sweden and Denmark Compared: The Military
Sweden's great power aspirations came to an end in the early eighteenth century. So did
Swedish absolutism. Until this time, Sweden had been in the avant-garde of Europe,
207
Table 1 The Relation between the Political Position of Towns and Peasants in Early Modern Europe
Strong free Weak dependent

towns towns
Free peasants Western Sweden

Europe
Peasants in Denmark Eastern
serfdom Europe
administratively and militarily. The

by the economy's low degree of mo
helped Sweden surmount its inheren
one based on part-time soldiers to w
of subsistence, these soldiers owed
system required a strong and penetr
intervention. By 1708, Sweden-Finlan
of about two million, a remarkabl
monarchy was constantly short of
bankruptcy by exporting copper and
country's rich
and mineral resources,
The tribute system worked well en
collapsed during periods of defeat a
Sweden's period as a great Europ
Liberty, during which Sweden's gove
The professionalization of the Swe
Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, each
while imitating the others in such ar
In all three states, the dominant segm
both expenses and personnel.27 Th
militaries differed,
su however. In its
the military elite and the economic a
the strongest armed state in Europe
more distinct from the rest of socie
208
monarch. Denmark could compete with Prussia in the mobilization of land forces, and the
monetary expenses incurred were undoubtedly higher than in Sweden.28 Moreover,
Denmark boasted a larger navy than either Prussia or Sweden. A considerable force of arms
was needed to keep the scattered, vulnerable state--which in addition to Denmark and
Norway included Schleswig-Holstein, the Faeroe Islands, and Iceland-in one piece.
One of the most striking aspects of the Danish military was its social composition, which
reflected the class basis of the Danish state. Only 20-25 percent of the officers were nobles
(the share was somewhat higher in Denmark than in Norway). By contrast, the nobility held
a solid majority in every other officer corps in Europe. The Danish deviation was rooted in
the circumstances surrounding the introduction of absolutism. Indeed, for some years
following the establishment of absolute royal rule, the nobility was excluded from high
military posts. There were no incentives or specific advantages for noblemen. Danish
officers were isolated from landed and other interests and were dependent on royal
prerogative. The Danish military was also a much more demarcated entity within the state,
compared to its Prussian and Swedish counterparts. This demarcation helped pave the way
for meritocratic and liberal egalitarian norms. The subordination of the military within the
kingdom of Denmark-Norway was in advance of its time, as measured by the fact that in
most European states the military-which had earlier been a dominant and partly
autonomous segment of the state structure -was placed under the control of a predominantly
civilian administration first after about 1850. (In most cases the military nevertheless
continued to be the largest of several differentiated departments.) As a consequence of this
unusual position, the military in Denmark was less subject than elsewhere to reactionary
politicization. Civilian control of government was irresistible. The number of officers in the
king's council during the whole period of absolutism between 1660 and 1848 can be counted
on one hand.29 The representatives of the military generally were not partners in
policymaking. At the close of the absolutist era in 1848, some army officers were actually
active in the liberal movement. Danish officers were not en masse a reactionary force. In
this they differed from their counterparts in those German states affected by the events of
1848. As a result, Copenhagen was the only European capital in 1848 where no shots were
fired to quell revolt. The strong emphasis in Danish public administration on meritocratic
and nonpolitical appointment and the correspondingly small extent of sinecure officeholding
may also be regarded as a liberal feature inherited from the distinctive variant of absolutism
in Denmark.
In Sweden, by contrast, the military and civilian elites were much more highly integrated,
and both the military and aristocracy exerted great influence over policymaking and
administration. Commoners without money or social connections had small prospects of a
military career.30 The military was very active in Swedish politics. The demilitarization of
Swedish society and state was a slow process and was not, according to Arteus, completed
before 1920.~' Military norms and aristocratic values remained strong, while modem
bureaucratic norms and democratic values took a long time to emerge and become dominant.
Sweden and Denmark Compared: Civil Administration
The differences between Sweden and Denmark in the role and organization of the military
were matched by divergent practices in the field of civil administration. Sweden's
209
development towards a modem bureaucratic state slowed during the Age of Liberty
(1720-1772). In a polity dominated by rival factions of the nobility, it was difficult to
establish and uphold meritocratic recruitment to the state apparatus. The militarized
character of the Swedish state also resulted in low prestige for civil servants. In practice, the
highest posts in the civilian bureaucracy were occupied by nobles. Even when the formal
privileges of the nobility were abolished in 1865, it took most of the nineteenth century to
eradicate this monopoly. The sale of offices was also much more prevalent in Sweden than
in Denmark during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The sale of offices in Sweden
was somewhat different from its counterpart in France, as the proceeds of sale did not in
most cases go directly into the state treasury but rather went to the former possessor of the
office. The former officeholder could in turn use this money for a new office or an old-age
pension. This practice undoubtedly reduced the wage cost for the state, but it also reinforced
the idea that offices were personal possessions. Loyalty and technical skills -were not
rewarded.32 In Denmark, by contrast, the sale of offices was exceptional.33
Important changes took place during the era of Danish absolutism in the relation among
monarch, administration, and nation. During absolutism's early stages, the person of the
king stood above the countries comprising his realm, and the king took personal charge of
many routine matters. Nonetheless, bureaucratization gradually proceeded, and personalist
absolutism had largely given way to bureaucratic absolutism by around 1730. Nor was the
monarch considered, by the latter date, to stand above his countries, but rather he stood on
their level. In addition, absolutism had been viewed at the beginning as irrevocable, but the
developing theories of the state came more and more to express the view that absolutism was
founded on the king's willingness to listen to the people and his ability to look after their
interests.34
In the Swedish civil administration, merit did not matter much. A veritable chaos reigned
at the law faculties of Swedish universities beginning in the mid eighteenth century. The
examinations for bestowing degrees required for employment in the state administration
were reduced to pure formalities. Since seniority was the decisive factor in the competition
for specific jobs, moreover, the nobility matriculated their children at far too young an age
for them to benefit from the instruction.35
Denmark, in contrast, developed a faculty of law at the University of Copenhagen with

traditions reflecting a strong German influence. Jurists dominated the state machinery at the
end of the eighteenth century. In the first part of the nineteenth century they were "the ruling
estate of Denmark," in the words of a Danish legal historian.36 The literature on
jurisprudence grew and paved the way for a more independent and liberal Danish legal
tradition (though one still heavily influenced by Germany). Denmark was, together with
Prussia, the most modem state in Europe at the time, if one interprets modernity in
Weberian terms. The Danish administration differed in important aspects from that of
Prussia, however. Recruits to the state administration were not drawn primarily from the
nobility, but rather in equal measure from the nobility and bourgeoisie. This recruitment
pattern undoubtedly restricted the political power of the landowners. It also helped open the
state apparatus to liberal economic and political reforms. Danish administration in the early
nineteenth century was dominated by the legal profession to an unusual degree, and civil
servants enjoyed high social status and played a leading political role. The Danish state was
absolutist, but it was at the same time constitutional, with strong liberal tendencies.37
210
The story was not the same in Sweden, despite a number of measures introduced in 1766
to strengthen bureaucratic control over the administration. A less efficient system of taxation
and the continued dominance of the nobility ensured that the aristocratic ethos was not
replaced by a bureaucratic one before the 1860s.38 Even as late as the early twentieth
century, a very considerable number of upper-level state bureaucrats were drawn from the
ranks of the aristocracy.39 The differences between Sweden and Denmark are hardly
explicable unless one takes into account the fact that the class base of the Danish state
differed from that of the Swedish state and that the former faced much more serious external
threats than did the latter. Both its class base-with the important bourgeois element-and
outside pressure produced a Danish state more autonomous from, but also more distant
from, society than its Swedish counterpart.
The Road to Mass Politics and the Character of State Intervention: Sweden
Stein Rokkan has suggested that we interpret the movement of each country from an an
regime of elite politics towards open and competitive mass mobilization in light of
timing and interaction of the nineteenth century's two great revolutions: the natio
revolution triggered by the Americans and the French and the industrial revolution laun
by the British. The national evolution affected Scandinavia well before the indu
revolution, but there were important differences in timing among the countries of the regi
All the Nordic countries save Sweden were heavily affected by the upsurge of nation
claims for territorial independence.40
Alone among the nations of Scandinavia, Sweden entered the era of mass politics
clearly consolidated boundaries (the territories taken from Denmark in the sevente
century had been thoroughly integrated into the nation-state and were unaffected by et
protest). In this case we can abstract from the dynastic union Sweden had with Norw
precisely because it was only dynastic: the two countries remained two distinct polities u
the same crown with different political institutions and independence in home aff
Swedish history has been marked by a remarkable continuity, which has enabled the cou
to democratize in a very gradual manner; this circumstance has inspired comparisons
the history of Britain. Such claims might be fair with respect to the pace of democratiz
Rokkan has summed up these historical experiences in the following formula: "A st
tradition of representative rule makes for a slow extension of political rights by stages,
protracted absolutism is more likely to lead to the sudden extension of political righ
most adult men."41
We may find an explanation of Sweden's seemingly anomalous development in the very

gradualness of change. Sweden's rigid class structure and long-surviving organicist
medieval political forms would seem to invite comparison with Germany; we might
therefore expect sudden changes to have characterized Swedish political history.42 Formal,
functional Stdindestaat representation lasted until 1865. The old system based on the
representation of estates (including the peasantry) formed the foundation of a slow,
step-by-step democratization (1866, 1907, 1917). The decisive change did not come until
1907, when suffrage was extended to all men; this reform too was incomplete, however, as
marked inequalities produced by the tax-weighting of votes were not abolished until 1917.43
211
How, then, could the rigid Swedish state evolve gradually and peacefully into a modern
western democracy (albeit one still marked by strong corporatist features)? Strikingly, the
changes in Sweden did not involve, despite their highly gradual nature, a strong adherence
to economic and political liberalism. The system of interest representation along rigid lines
of class had a deeply nonliberal character. Surprisingly enough, moreover, there were no
deep tensions between the dominant classes. The landed aristocracy was in decline, yet it
had in many respects become, in part because of its long-standing role in administration, as
much an urban as a rural elite. The reforms laid the foundations, furthermore, for an alliance
among bureaucracy, landed wealth, and industry. Here, then, was a putative "marriage of
iron and rye," in Barrington Moore's felicitous formulation, which he argues was the
historical precondition for the rise of the authoritarian variant of capitalism and eventually
fascism.44
Sweden diverged from this pattern, however, on account of the position achieved by the
independent peasantry. Here again we find the basis for Sweden's specific history. For while
1866 marked the victory of aristocracy in the first chamber of parliament, it represented the
political triumph of the independent farmers in the second chamber due to the construction
of the franchise, which favored property-owning citizens.45 The possession of political
power by the independent peasantry--prior to the emergence of industrialism proper--was a
quite anomalous state of affairs. The crucial point is that the estates reformed themselves.
The preconditions for a strong antistatist liberal tradition were lacking, despite the abolition
of both guilds and estates in the late 1860s. There was room, even so, for a brief interlude
of free trade between the mid 1850s and mid 1880s (the same policy lasted until 1914 in
Denmark, however) and for such economic measures as the liberalization of agricultural
trade against the will of the peasant estate (1856). The initial party-forming conflict in
parliament took place between free traders and protectionists.46 The old rural party
disintegrated, and a conservative party which found support in both rural areas and in the
cities emerged gradually after 1900. It was protectionist and markedly militarist in ideology.
The Swedish right retained a rural wing of some size for the next couple of decades and was
much more nationalist-conservative than the corresponding party in Denmark.47
Organized capitalism soon replaced the society of estates. In a very high degree this was
done, however, in the spirit of the society of estates. It seemed only natural to develop some
kind of administrative corporatism. The first proposal for a corporatist organization of the
state appeared in 1888 in the field of social administration--more specifically, in the area of
old-age pensions and occupational accident insurance. This proposal was not backed by
parliament, however, although a new public commission of inquiry was appointed in 1891
to solve the increasingly problematic "social question." 48 The accelerating industrialization
of Sweden brought a rapid increase in the size of the working class. At the same time, the
patriarchal responsibility earlier assumed by employers for their employees was disappearing
on account of the special character of the industrial labor process. The prevalent philosophy
favored coercive state intervention if the results of unrestricted freedom of contract were
considered harmful to both individual and society. In 1902, the conservative government
established the first public social insurance system in Sweden, accident insurance for
workers. The government also proposed a corporatively structured workers' insurance
council to administer this system, but the first chamber rejected the motion on technical
grounds. The first corporatist institutions were instead established at the local level in 1903,
212
when it was decided that the governing boards of the new public labor exchanges were to
consist half of employers and half of workers, under the chairmanship of a public official.
Such corporatively structured, publicly operated labor exchanges were operating in all major
cities by 1907. This development diverged markedly from the norm in the rest of
Scandinavia and Europe, where either trade unions or employers' organizations established
labor exchanges and the ensuing struggle for control over these agencies--which had a
critical impact on industrial relations--caused bitterness between the two sides of industry.
In Sweden, however, the background of the estate tradition made a joint corporatist system
seem only natural.49
From 1906 on, the National Board of Trade called together a number of labor exchange
conferences. An antiliberal, corporatist philosophy was soon firmly established in Swedish
politics. A corporatist organization of social welfare administration was introduced from
1912 on. By 1920, a number of corporatist agencies, including the National Pensions Board,
the National Industrial Injuries Insurance Court, and the Labor Council, had been
institutionalized, all without occasioning real conflict. Each of these agencies addressed the
labor market or the social dimension of "the working class question." The unique character
and strength of Swedish labor market policy and administration after the second world war
can be explained in part by the specific institutional features attending its beginnings. Three
different types of corporatist institutions had been formed: advisory committees, true
decision-making boards, and court-like agencies.50
It is important to note that this antiliberal corporatism predated the Social Democrats' rise
to dominance in Swedish politics. Working class representation in public administration was
considered only natural decades before universal suffrage was adopted. Perhaps surprisingly,
it was not least the jurists employed in the state administration who favored working class
participation.5' The strong liberal advocates prominent in Danish political history have never
really had a Swedish counterpart. It seemed much more natural in Sweden to embark on a
"statist" path. The development of the Swedish state and society became a corporate
project. In the period between the two world wars, Swedish mass democracy and in
conjunction with this development the Swedish Social Democratic Party achieved their
definitive breakthrough. The Swedish trade unions are strong in terms of both membership
and degree of centralization in part because the state has granted them the authority to
implement many policies in the field of labor and industrial relations. The Swedish farmers'
movement, moreover, first grew to strength after the state granted it the right to collect fees
from all producers of dairy and meat products, whether or not they were members of the
farmers' organizations. This forced collectivization of Swedish farmers was introduced in
1932 in response to the economic crisis in agriculture by a liberal government, with support
from the conservatives and the agrarian party.52
The Road to Mass Politics and the Character of State Intervention: Denmark
The shrinking kingdom of Denmark traveled a rockier road to mass politics tha
Sweden. Complexities arose from the shrinking process itself and from growing Da
nationalism. The absolutist constitution meant, furthermore, that gradual changes
difficult; rather, a sudden shift was necessary. In most European countries, it is importa
213
note, sudden shifts were also violent shifts, with lasting consequences for national political
culture. How did Denmark manage these stages of transition peacefully? Although a
relatively homogeneous nation, Denmark encompassed parts of today's northern Germany.
In keeping with the nationalist temper of the nineteenth century, independence movements in
Schleswig-Holstein appeared, and a rising Prussia saw an opportunity to expand. The
Danish road to mass politics became interwoven with armed conflicts ending with a
traumatic defeat in Schleswig-Holstein 1864. It led to the loss of Schleswig-Holstein, and
the remnants of the Danish monarchy formed one of the smallest states in Europe. The
defeat scarcely inspired faith in the capacity of the state, yet many of the popular initiatives
taken in this small country benefited from the organizational experience of those then and
formerly active in the military.
The absolutist constitution in Denmark clearly required extensive modernizing changes.
And, indeed, Denmark became a representative democracy rather suddenly in 1848-49.
This change, while formally dramatic, should not be likened to an upheaval of the French
type. (Surprisingly enough, Rokkan makes such a comparison.)5" The change was peaceful,
in fact, and had been presaged to some degree by the reintroduction during the 1830s, on "a
consultative basis," of the assemblies of estates. Furthermore, many state employees,
including members of the military, were involved in the changes. In contrast to the situation
in many other countries, no single estate held the majority in the Danish state assemblies.
The debates in these assemblies, including those conducted by employees of the absolutist
state, encouraged and stimulated liberal attitudes. Constitutional changes then came
gradually under consideration.
These drastic changes in the forms of legitimation nevertheless required a great deal of
flexibility on the part of the state elite. This elite of course contained a few opposed to any
change; the majority was doubtless moderate; yet royal servants-not only civil servants but
officers as well-were also a very large and prominent element among those actively
seeking change. Many factors contributed to the widespread sympathy among royal servants
for the "national liberal" party, which was the leading force in the modernizing efforts.
These factors include social contacts with the bourgeoisie, the established ideology which
stressed patriotism, professionalism, and individual merit as the true basis for status and
promotion, and hostility towards inherited privilege. The absolute monarchy bestowed much
on its servants, but in principle as a matter of grace rather than of right. A modern
constitutional state was thus the logical means to the establishment--for royal servants as
well-of rights and liberties. The royal servants' loyalty had been very gradually displaced
from the person of the monarch to the impersonal idea of the state.54 Since the clashes with
the many royal servants of German origin in the late eighteenth century, furthermore, Danish
royal servants had also been bearers of liberal nationalism and anti-German feeling. Such
anti-German feelings had gained ground, moreover, due to the unrest in Schleswig-Holstein.
Denmark was also influenced by the revolutionary outbreak in 1848. But unlike all other
European capitals where revolutionary outbursts took place, Copenhagen did not experience
any firing of arms. The result was the adoption in 1849 of what was, by nineteenth century
standards, a highly democratic constitution. Conscription was also extended at this time to
all classes. A number of other reforms then followed upon this democratic breakthrough, for
instance in the area of administration.
The Danish farmers joined in an alliance with the urban bourgeoisie to overthrow
214
absolutism. Their opponents could be found among landed proprietors and among the more
conservative jurists employed by the state. The political strength of the farmers gradually
grew in the decades following the overthrow of absolutism. They consolidated themselves as
a class by joining in insurance associations, savings banks, cooperative dairies, slaughter
houses, and other organizations. They did so, moreover, on a much greater scale than in
other countries. They also participated in local government and national politics, in this way
gaining political experience.55 Academies and local book clubs helped to spread knowledge
and culture.
The left in the Danish constitutional struggle was unusual, seen from a general European
point of view, for it was based above all on farmers, who more commonly act as the rank
and file of conservatism. The agrarian parties of Scandinavia have played an unusual role,
however. In terms of voter strength and durability, they remain unsurpassed among parties
of their type. Though nonsocialist, they have on the whole helped to shift the political center
of gravity in Scandinavia to the left in comparison to countries like Britain. The modest size
of the average landholding has furthermore inclined Scandinavian farmers to sympathize
with low income groups and with blue collar workers (viewed as individuals rather than as
members of a class). An instinctive tendency towards egalitarianism may be found among
farmers in both Sweden and Denmark, which in Denmark, however, is combined with
antistatism and economic liberalism since Danish farmers, unlike their Swedish
counterparts, have not required protection from foreign competition.56 The harder struggle
fought by Danish farmers for political rights has also reinforced such attitudes.
The greater reluctance of Danes to allow the state to intervene in economic life, as well as
their greater respect for individual liberty, should be viewed in the context of the farmers'
historical struggle with the state elite for political rights. The Danish farmers, who organized
themselves without the benefit of any direct state assistance, were an important influence in
the building of Danish democracy. Even compared to their Swedish counterparts, they
played an unusually significant role. The Swedish farmers' movement, by contrast, was
much more a child of the organized society of the twentieth century than of the popular
movements of the nineteenth.57 Furthermore, Swedish agriculture was in no position, unlike
its Danish counterpart, to become a leading export sector. Swedish farmers were also more
dependent on the state, not least because of their need for protection from foreign
competition. The state obliged this need with customs duties in the 1880s (followed in 1892
by industrial customs on the German model). In sum, while Danish farmers protected their
interests mainly by means of independent initiatives, their Swedish brethren sought
protectionism and organization by the state.
The early industrialization of Denmark started from a comparatively strong urban base,
transforming the conditions of the working class gradually. As a result, the labor movement
became integrated into the overall fabric of the society without much drama. As could be
expected, the Danish Social Democratic party was formed before its Swedish sister party
(1878 and 1889, respectively). During the constitutional struggle the Danish state was
relatively tolerant of trade unions, partly due to an interpretation of them as the urban
counterpart to the popular movements in the rural districts. Contrary to Sweden, where
industrialization came later, more rapidly, and to a very large extent in small rural towns, the
Danish unions were influenced by the guild tradition. As in Britain, the union movement
evolved from the former guilds, imparting a craft-based character to Danish unionism that
215
continues to differentiate it from its Scandinavian neighbors.58 Centralized negotiations

between unions and employers were already institutionalized in 1899. The state supported
the project with the establishment of, among other things, a permanent industrial court in
1910. In this respect, Sweden followed the Danish example in 1928. Despite its early
beginning, Danish corporatism remained in a relatively underdeveloped form with craft and
general unions surviving until the present day.59 Thus, the Danish labor movement has faced
a sharper division between the political realm and trade union struggle than its Swedish
comrades have. Within the Danish trade union movement, it has been harder to obtain
centralism and consensus, mostly because of its organization along craft instead of industrial
lines.60
Is There a Scandinavian Model?
One effect of these differences in state formation was that the popular movements o
Danish countryside were much more opposed to the ruling elites than were their S
counterparts. The Swedish ideological climate was much less influenced by a l
decentralized farmers' movement, and much more by a state-oriented labor move
While the Swedish state intervened heavily against the socialist movement's agitati
strikes, it was also inclined towards social policies of a paternalist and corporatist
Another effect of these different patterns of state building in Denmark and Sweden h
the stronger position of liberalism in Danish politics, which has continued all the way
the mid nineteenth century to the present. One area in which one might expec
differences to find expression is in social welfare policy. In the comparative literat
welfare states, Sweden and Denmark are both said to conform to the institutional typ
countries are top spenders on welfare, and both provide generous benefits in a wide r
areas to a majority of the population. Yet they vary considerably in just how
"institutionalist" they are.62 One difference between them lies in their approach to private
participation in the administration of welfare services. Both countries rely heavily on public
responsibility and financing. But Sweden makes much greater use of public bureaucracies in
the administration of benefits, the degree of social control is greater, and the use of
compulsory measures is more frequent.63 Nonpublic intervention, in the form of private
charity, is almost wholly absent in Sweden. An examination of 115 voluntary national
organizations in Denmark, by contrast, indicated that private charity still plays a major role
in social welfare in Denmark. In recent years, moreover, new private initiatives have been
taken.64 In addition, while there are many private schools in Denmark (which depend to a
high degree on public financing), there are hardly any in Sweden. The Danish tradition dates
back to the liberal movements of the nineteenth century, which were based on both farmers
and the urban bourgeoisie; these classes insisted on alternatives to the public schools and
demanded as well that such alternatives be supported financially by the public sector.
Perhaps the best example of the difference between Danish liberalism and Swedish statism
is the way temperance policy has been implemented. To control drinking habits, Sweden
enforced a highly bureaucratic and intrusive system of individual rationing between 1917
and 1955. Local bureaucrats were given the right to decide exactly how much alcohol each
individual had the right to buy. To make such a decision, the bureaucrats could make home
216
visits and collect information about the individual's social behavior from the local
temperance organization. In Denmark, no such system of social control was
established; the only measure taken was to increase the alcohol tax. While the case-b
system of rationing was lifted in 1954, Sweden still has far stricter regulations conce
the right to buy and serve alcohol than does Denmark.65
One of the Swedish welfare state's most striking features has been its active labor m
policy. Swedish labor market policy and administration have been the flagship of the
democratic welfare state. The ability of the Swedish state to move the majority of the
from the countryside into industrial centers has been viewed in other countries with
Other countries have not been able to employ the Swedish model for combatin
unemployment. The flexibility--both geographical and commercial-of the Swedish
force has been unparalleled. Strikingly, this flexibility has not been achieved again
opposition of the trade unions but rather with their cooperation (and with that of the stat
capital as well). In the late 1980s, 67-80 percent of Swedish expenses on labor m
policy were devoted to education and job training, while all but a fifth of D
expenditures went to cash benefits for the unemployed. In Sweden, the labor exchang
11,000 employees, that is, one per nine persons unemployed. The corresponding D
figures were 2,000 and one per 115 unemployed.66 In Denmark, the right of the indiv
not to move-even if the consequence is unemployment-is much more pronounced.
labor market policies are rudimentary in comparison to those in Sweden.67
A unique advantage enjoyed by the Swedish labor market administration lies
willingness of Swedes to accept the corporatist state as legitimate and to accept wh
labor market authorities tell them to do. Swedish labor market policy can be viewe
kind of paternalistic corporatism. It is paternalistic in the sense that it supervises and
it is most benevolent, moreover, as long as one stays within the established norms. Sw
has also been more successful than Denmark-and most other OECD countries as we
combating unemployment since the mid 1970s. More active employment measures h
times been attempted in Denmark, especially between 1979 and 1983-84, but with
limited success, and they have since been abolished. Swedish labor market policy is str
oriented to maintaining the saleability of labor power, while in Denmark cash benefit
the primary role.68
It is obvious that in Denmark unemployment benefits have been the basis for hundr
theatrical, musical, and other cultural groups. Much the same occurs in Sweden, wi
difference that the Swedish groups are partly state-organized, while the Danish group
independent of any state intervention. Unemployed artists in Sweden are provided
work in these groups, with the consequence that the artists do not freely choose each
but must more or less accept the colleagues assigned them by the labor market
administration. In Denmark, by contrast, labor market and social policy are "passive," in
the sense that they enable people to sustain a life outside the normal work society, and they
lack the active element designed to reintegrate people into "society," that is, the labor
market.69
From a wider perspective, both Denmark and Sweden must be reckoned universalistic in
their welfare ambitions. They share a number of important features, which together
comprise what might be called "the Scandinavian model" of state and society. This model is
marked by homogeneity, continuity, and a high level of organization. Its political features
217
include a state that is both strong and closely integrated with society by means of strong
local governments and popular organizations, a tradition of consensual democracy,
multiparty systems with strong social democratic and agrarian parties, high welfare
ambitions expressed in institutional rights linked to citizenship, a public sector administered
by universal bureaucracies in the Weberian sense, a state administration with a low level of
corruption, and a comparatively high level of efficiency.
Despite these similarities, however, a number of significant differences between
"'East-Nordic" and "West-Nordic" traditions can be discerned. Denmark's variant of
institutionalist welfare-statism is clearly different from Sweden's; we may call the form
"liberal welfare" variant. In short, the difference between Sweden and Denmark seems to
that, while in both countries attempts have been made to unify or even identify "s
"society," and "people," only the paternalistic corporatism of Sweden has succeed
imposing a "social construction of reality," whereas Denmark's pragmatic we
liberalism expresses a duality stemming from two very different heritages, on the one
a tradition of centralism dating from the absolutist era, and on the other, a herit
individualism and popular self-reliance drawn from struggle against the strong state.
NOTES
We would like to thank Peter Mayers for help with checking language and style.
I. Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University
1975): cf. John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The State (Milton Keynes: The Open University Press, 1
1-40.
2. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 26.
3. Pierre Birnbaum, States and Collective Action.: The European Erperience (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), p. 6.
4. See, for example, Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: False Leads and Promising Starts in Current
Theories and Research," in Peter B. Evans, Theda Skocpol, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Bringing the State Back
In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-37; Colin Crouch, "Sharing Public Space: States and
Organized Interest in Western Europe," in John A. Hall, ed., States in History (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986).
5. Crouch, pp. 178ff.
6. The terms "Nordic" and "Scandinavian" are interchangeable for all practical purposes; it would be pedantic to
restrict the coverage of the latter term to the geographical core area (Denmark, Norway, Sweden).
7. Cf. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: NLB, 1974).
8. Lars Westerlund, Statsbygge och distriktsfiirvaltning (Abo: Abo Academy Press, 1989).
9. Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (London: Penguin, 1968).
10. Anderson, p. 195.
11. Cf. Tilly, p. 30.
13. Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1680-1815 (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958).
14. Tilly, p. 153.
16. Kenneth Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), p. 105.
17. Anderson, pp. 179ff.
18. Tilly, p. 27.
19. Francis G. Castles, "Barrington Moore's Thesis and Swedish Political Development," Government and
Opposition, 8 (1973), 318.
218
20. Cf. Kurt Samuellson, From Great Power to Welfare State: 300 years of Swedish Social Development (London:
Allen George, 1968).
21. Peter Lawrence and Tony Spybey, Management and Society in Sweden (London: RKP, 1986), p. 2.
22. Castles, p. 317.
23. Oyvind Osterrud, "Configurations of Scandinavian Absolutism," in Per Torsvik, ed., Mobilization,
Center-periphery Structures and Nation-building (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1981), pp. 127-153.
24. 0yvind Osterrud, Agrarian Structure and Peasant Politics in Scandinavia (Bergen: Troms0 University Press,
1978). Later research into the history of the Danish peasantry has shown, however, how simplistic and formalistic it
is to describe the Danish peasantry as having been subject to "eastern" feudalism. The history of the Danish peasantry
has exhibited many "western" features. Cf. Ole Feldbaek, Dansk identitetshistorie I (Copenhagen: C. A. Rietzels
forlag, 1991).
25. Stein Rokkan, Stat, nasjon, klasse (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987).
26. Tilly, p. 136. Cf. Sven A. Nilsson, "Militirstaten i funktion," in Gustav II Adolf: 350 dr efter Liitzen
(Stockholm: Livrustkammaren, 1982), pp. 31-46; Sven A. Nilsson, "Den Karolinska Militirstaten," in Tre Karlar
(Stockholm: Livrustkammaren, 1984), pp. 29-51.
27. Gunnar Arteus, Krigsmakt och Samhille i Frihetstidens Sverige (Stockholm: Militarhistoriska forlaget, 1982), p.
95; cf. Nilsson, "Militarstaten i funktion," p. 45.
28. Gunner Lind, "Den dansk-norske h!er i det 18. arhundrede: Optimering, modernisering og professionalisering,"
Historisk Tidsskrift (1986), 29.
29. Gunner Lind, "Military and Absolutism: The Army Officers of Denmark-Norway as a Social Group and Political
Factor, 1660-1848," Scandinavian Journal of History, 12 (1987), 237.
30. Arteus, p. 313; cf. Nilsson, "Den karolinska militdrstaten," pp. 36ff.
31. Arteus, pp. 310ff.
32. Bo Rothstein, "Den svenska byrikratins uppging och fall," Haften fir kritiska studier (1982), 26-44.
33. Birgit Bjerre-Jensen, Udnaevnelsesretten i enevaldens magtpolitiske system, 1660-1730 (Copenhagen: G. E. C.
Gads forlag, 1987), p. 304.
34. Feldbaek, pp. 126 and 160.
35. Rothstein, p. 33.
36. Kai Hammerich, "Juristerna og embedslivet: En historisk oversigt," in E. Reitzel Nielsen and C. Popp-Madsen,
eds., Festskrift i anledning af tohundredes adrs dagen for indforelsen av juridisk eksamen ved Kopenhavns Universitet
(Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk forlag, 1936), p. 260.
37. Tim Knudsen, "Det danske bureaukrati," research paper, Institute of Political Studies, University of
Copenhagen, 1989.
38. Rothstein, p. 43.
39. Castles, p. 325.
40. Rokkan, p. 245.
41. Ibid., p. 247.
42. Crouch, p. 197.
43. Leif Lewin, Ideology and Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), ch. 3.
44. Moore, p. 69.
45. Sten Carlsson, "Standsriksdagens slutskede (1809-1866)," in Nils Stjernquist, ed., Riksdagen genom tiderna
(Stockholm: Sveriges Riksdag och Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, 1992), pp. 223ff, English edition, The Riksdag: A
History of the Swedish Parliament (Stockholm: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, 1987).
46. Lewin, ch. 2.
47. Rokkan, p. 256.
48. Bo Rothstein, "State Structure and Variation in Corporatism: The Swedish Case," Scandinavian Political
Studies, 14 (1991), 149-171.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., pp. 161-164.

51. Ibid., p. 169.
52. Bo Rothstein, "Explaining Swedish Corporatism: The Formative Moment," Scandinavian Political Studies,
(1992), 173-191.
53. Rokkan, p. 282.
219
54. Gunner Lind, "Noblemen, Officers, and Democracy in Denmark," in Bo Strith, ed., Languages and the
Construction of Class Identities (Gothenburg: Gothenburg University Press, 1990), pp. 157-180.
55. Peter Bogason, "Statsintervention i landbruget i demokratiseringen 1849," in Peter Bogason, ed., Nvere
tendenser i politologien: Stat og forvaltning (Copenhagen: Politiske Studier, 1990).
56. Niel A. Elder, Alastair Thomas, and David Arter. The Consensual Democracies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1988).
57. Rothstein, "State Structure and Variations in Corporatism," pp. 169-171; cf. Sten Carlsson, Svensk Historia,
vol. 2 (Lund: Gleerup, 1980), p. 404.
58. Nils Elvander, Skandinavisk arbetarrirelse (Stockholm: Liber, 1980).
59. Crouch, p. 196.
60. Goosta Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 59-70.
61. Gregory W. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism and Social Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),
pp. 125-138.
62. If the different state-building processes among the Scandinavian countries are not taken into consideration, the
liberalism of the Danish welfare state becomes inexplicable, as the following quote from Esping-Andersen's work on
Scandinavian social democracy shows. "In Denmark, social democratic ambitions have been heavily constrained by
liberal, petit-bourgeois interests. Little in the way of direct conflict ever erupted over individual reforms, but this does
not necessarily imply consensus. One might say that Danish social democracy was allowed to expand public social
welfare, but not without adhering to liberal notions of how to expand it. As a consequence, the Danish welfare state
has become somewhat of an outlier with respect to the celebrated 'Scandinavian model.' " Esping-Anderson, p. 156.
63. Arthur Gould, Conflict and Control in Welfare Policy: The Swedish Experience (London: Longman, 1988).
64. Kirsten Jeppesen and Dorte Hoeg, Private hjtelpeor-ganisationer pd det sociale omrcade (Copenhagen: The
Danish Institute for Social Research, 1987); Ulla Salonen-Souli6 Velfterdsstatens socialserviceunder frandring (Abo:
Abo Academy Press, 1991); Ulla Salonen-Souli6, "Alternatives for Organizing the Social Service: Reorganizing the
Field of Rehabilitation," in Tim Knudsen, ed., Welfare Administration in Denmark (Copenhagen: Ministry of Finance
1991), pp. 271-291: Ulla Haberman and Ingrid Parsby, Myter og realiteter i det frivillige sociale arbejde
(Coopenhagen: Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, 1987).
65. Bo Rothstein, Den korporativa staten: Intresseorganisationer och statsfirvaltning i svensk politik (Stockholm:
Norstedts, 1992), ch. 7; Gould, pp. 119-127.
66. OECD, Employment Outlook 1989 (Paris: OECD, 1989); cf. Per Kongshoj-Madsen, "Orienten begynner i
Malmb! Beskaeftigelsepolitik i Sverige, Finland og Norge," CASA research report no. 3 (Copenhagen: CASA, 1989).
67. OECD, Employment Outlook 1989; cf. Henning Jorgensen, "The Administration of Labour Market Policy in
Denmark in the 1980s," in Knudsen, ed., Welfare Administration in Denmark, pp. 181-205.
68. Jorgen Elm Larsen, The Welfare State and Unemployment Policies in Denmark and Other European Countries,
Research Report no. 1, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 1991.
69. Peter Abrahamson, "The Interplay between Social Policy and Labour Market Policy: Administrating Poverty
Risks in Denmark," in Knudsen, ed., Welfare Administration in Denmark, pp. 205-243.
220

Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein, State Building in Scandinavia, Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jan., 1994), Pp. 203-220

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Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein, State Building in Scandinavia, Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jan., 1994), Pp. 203-220

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State Building in Scandinavia

Author(s): Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein

Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of New

The New State Theory and the Scandinavian Model

The Histories of Sweden and Denmark Compared

Sweden and Denmark Compared: The Military

Strong free Weak dependent

Free peasants Western Sweden

Peasants in Denmark Eastern

administratively and militarily. The

Sweden and Denmark Compared: Civil Administration

Denmark, in contrast, developed a faculty of law at the University of Copenhagen with

We may find an explanation of Sweden's seemingly anomalous development in the very

continues to differentiate it from its Scandinavian neighbors.58 Centralized negotiations

Is There a Scandinavian Model?

50. Ibid., pp. 161-164.

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