Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Gaur POORVICTIMUSES 1993
Gaur POORVICTIMUSES 1993
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Journal of the Indian Law Institute
K.D. Gaur
I Introduction
THE INDIAN criminal law, being gift of British, is based cm the colonial concept
of jurisprudence. It is establishment oriented and pro elitist. It appears to be a
little hostile to the poor and weaker sections of the society, such as women,
children, physically, economically and mentally handicapped groups, prisoners,
religious and political dissenters, inhabitants of geographically remote regions,
victims of crime and the like. It operates oppressively on them despite consti-
tutional guarantees to the contrary.
from them and not as a positive and constructive social device for ch
socio- economic order and improving their lot.2
This article in brief discusses as to how the law and legal process
instead of safeguarding the rights and privileges of the poor and to
interests have often been used and abused by the state functiona
powerful sections of the society against the poor, the weak, the
downtrodden and the like. An endeavour has been made to provi
and suggestions for appropriate preventive and curative measures so t
becomes meaningful for whom it is meant.
2. Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1369.
3. The substantive criminal law is codified in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Code was
drafted by the Second Law Commission of India with Lord Macaulay as its President and Macleod,
Anderson and Millet as members. It has been adopted in most of the countries of the
commonwealth in South East Asia and Africa (former British subjects), such as Malaysia, Brunei,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ceylone, Myanmar (Burma) West- Africa, Nigeria, Somali, Sudan, Kenya,
Tanzania, Zanizibar, etc.
4. The earlier Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 (drafted by the British) has been replaced
by the new Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 on the recommendation of the Law Commission of
India. See, Law Commission of India, Forty-first Report (1969).
5. Cr. P.C., 1973, s. 2(c) says "cognizable offence" means an offence for which, and
"cognizable case" means a case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the First
Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant". S. 2(1 ) says
"non-cognizable offence" means an offence for which and "non-cognizable case" means a case in
which a police officer has no authority to arrest without warrant".
6. In I.P.C. three ch. viz., V-A, IX-A and XX-A and a number of ss. have been added and a
few deleted. Abbreviation I.P.C. has been used for Indian Penal Code and Cr. P.C. for Criminal
Procedure Code in the article.
In Re M aragaîham, 1 5 the two accused, husband and wife starving for about
1 0 days could find neither work nor anyone to give them food. They ultimately
determined to put an end to their lives and to their female infant, aged
and a half months (probably feeling that none could look after the ch
them). They tied themselves together with a rope and jumped in
carrying the female infant. The child slipped and was drowned when t
accused had jumped into the well. But they were rescued by a passerby
Conceding the right of private defence of the appellant, the court observed
that the entire case had been conducted sluggishly. Poor quality of justice
dispensed to the poor is a common feature of the judicial administration. Justice
Lahiri of Gauhati High Court emphasised that the stance of prosecution in a
welfare state must be within the parameters set out in the Constitution, viz.,
preamble, directive principles of state policy and articles 14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution,17 wherein lies the mandate of being fair, just and reasonable
as laid down by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
1 8. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597. The petitioner's passport was impounded by the government under
s. 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act 1976 by an order dated July 2, 1977, because her presence was
likely to be required in connection with the proceedings before a commission of inquiry. The
government declined in public interest to furnish reasons forits decision. Thereupon the petitioner
filed a writ petition under art. 32 of the constitution challenging the action of the passport
authorities being violative of art. 21 of the Constitution which guarantees personal liberty to
individuals. Rejecting the petition, the court held the right to go abroad in the circumstances of
this case was not a fundamental right. But it observed that the reasons for such deprivation must
be communicated to the petitioner so as make the action fair, just and reasonable. Mere procedure
wül not be sufficient to deprive a person of his right under ait. 21. It must satisfy the test of
reasonableness, which, inter alia, incorporate the rule of natural justice, i.e., audi alteram partem
- no one will be condemned unheard.
19. M.H. Hoskot w.State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1548; Raman v. Francis, (1988)
Cr. L.J. 1359 (Ker.).
20. Moti Ram v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1594.
21. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 S.C.C. 81, 91, 93, 98, 108, 115
respectively. These six cases are numbered serially. See also, Sanjay Suri v. Delhi
Administration, (1988) Cr. LJ. 705 (S.C.).
22. S unii B atra v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1579; Hazari Choubey v. State
of Bihar, (1988) Cr. L.J. 1390 (Pat).
23. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 378; Sheela Borse v. Union of
India, (1986) Cr. L.J. 1736.
24. Charles S obraj v. Superintendent, Central Jail, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1514.
25. O. Chinnappa Reddy, "Judicial Process and Social Change", 25 J.I.L.I. 149-157 (1983).
26. Supra note 19. The accused aged 30 years a Reader in Saurashtra University
Ph.D. cf Karnataka University approached Dabhoikar, a block maker of Bombay, pla
to prepare an embossing seal in the name of the Karnataka University, Dharwar and for
of authority purporting to have been signed by the personal assistant to the Vice Chanc
said university authorising him to get the seals made. In the meantime the concerned bl
of Bombay suspecting about the authority of the deal informed to the police le
unearthing in time of the criminal design. The petitioner was held guilty of attempt
(under s. 417 read with s. 51 1, 1.P.C.) and forging a valuable security for the purpose
and using as genuine a forged document (under ss. 467, 468 and 471 I.P.C.). The s
took a lenient and soft view and sentenced the accused to imprisonment till the rising o
But in appeal by the state government, the High Court enhanced the sentence to thr
rigorous imprisonment in view of the seriousness of the offence. The petition for sp
appeal against the heavy sentence was of course, rejected by the Supreme Court.
27. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1369. A writ petition was filed by an advocate before the Supr
under art. 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of habeus corpus for release of
prisoners on the basis of a news item written by K.F. Rustamji, former member of
commission which appeared in tnc Indian Express, 8, 9 Jan. 1979. The article reveal
and alarming revelation about the plight of undertrial prisoners in jails in the state of B
28. id at 1374.
29. Ait. 39-A of the Constitution provides that, "The State shall secure that the operation of
the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide
for legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities
for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities".
30. See, supra note 17.
31. See, supra note 27 at 1375.
32. The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is a small Act consisting of 30 ss. divided into
7 ch. Ch. 1 is preliminary (ss. 1 - 2); ch. II and III deal with the constitution of national legal service
authority (ss. 3-5) and state legal service authority (ss. 6-11) respectively; ch. IV prescribes the
criteria for the entitlement of legal aid and legal services (ss. 12-13); ch. V deals with finances,
accounts and audit (s. 14-18); ch. VI provides for the constitution, organization and powers of lok
adalats (ss. 19-22) and eh. VII deals with miscellaneous provisions (ss. 23-30).
33. "Legal Aid Farce", Blitz, 22 Oct. 1983.
34. V .R. Krishna Iyer, Law versus Justice 1 69 ( 1 98 1 ).
35. See, supra note 32, ss. 19-22.
36. M s. 20(1).
tions. The securities asked for loans by the creditors are disproportionately
high and are always to the disadvantage of the debtors. The gain received by
the money lenders are basically unproductive idle gains which pampers the
social parasites to impoverish the poor men further. The exorbitant rate of
interest multiply the lenders capital in inverse ratio at the same time multiplying
the misery of the poor borrowers. The tentacles of these money lenders are quite
sharp. The debtors remain in their deep clutches for long.
Though several slates have sought to provide protection against the eco-
nomic exploitation of debtors at the hands of creditors, by enacting the debt relief
laws, the menancing effect of money lending remains uncurbed. The Bombay
Money Lenders Act 1946 is an example of such a measure. However, inspite
of the restrictions imposed of money lending by law the money lenders manage
to graze in the green pastures outside the legal limits, particularly when the rate
of interest is as high as 100 per cent per annum.
Perhaps the courts have not visualised the magnitude of the problems and
hardships caused to the poor debtors as a result of exploitation by the money
lenders. The decision in Bhavarlal Pruthvirai Jain, illustrates that the courts
insist on technical compliance of the law instead of interpreting the provisions
37. Civil Procedure Code, 1908, order 23 rule 3 provides for compromise of suit. Rule 3 reads:
"Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part
by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties ... the court shall
order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in
accordance therewith
in the light of its objective. In the impugned case the accused money-lend
to visit a village named Ambet in the State of Maharashtra (which was o
the area for which he was granted a licence to transact business) w
complainant Abdul Shakur lived. He gave a loan of Rs. 3,200.00
complainant at the rate of 36 per cent, interest per annum m pled
ornaments of his wife. The courts below convicted the accused under section
540read with section 3441 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act 1946 for carrying
on business in the village Ambet, without the requisite licence in that behalf.
The debt relief laws should be drafted in such a way that the unscrupulous
traders might not escape from the clutches of the law. At the same time the
courts should take a liberal and pragmatic attitude in interpreting the provisions
of the statute and look into the object and policy of the law instead of sticking
to the compliance of the letters of the law.
40. S. S of the Act postulates that the money lender should hold a licence for money lending
business for a particular area.
41. S. 34 prescribes punishment for carrying on business without a licence.
42. See, D. C. Pandey, "Criminal Law", XVIII A.S.I.L. 461 at 463 (1982); see also, M.P.
Jain, "Law and the Poor: Some Recent Developments in India", 13 J.M.C.L. 23 -103 (1986).
water, breathing heavily dust laden polluted air and breaking and bl
all their life, may one day be able to realise that freedom was
monopoly of a few but belongs to all and that they are equally
participate in the fruits of freedom and development.
The court further said that every form of forced labour, begg
without wages) or otherwise is within the inhibition of article 23 a
no difference whether the person who is forced to give his labour
another is remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is paid labour
a person would be hit by article 23, if it is forced labour, that
supplied is not voluntary (willingly) but as a result of force or com
46. People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of Indią A.l.R. 1982 S.C.
of the People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) carried out a survey of diff
ASIAD - 1982 from July 30 to August 10, 1982 and found that contractors em
government to build the stadia, flyovers, hotels, village complex, etc. were viol
the laws with impunity, the toiling workers were being denied the rights guaran
important laws as the Minimum Wages Act. Accordingly, PUDR filed a writ i
Court under art. 32 of the Constitution by way of public interest litigation to ensur
of the constitutional mandate under art. 23 and provisions of various labour laws.
47. Constitution of India, ait. 23 states that "Traffic in human beings and begg
similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this prov
offence punishable in accordance with law".
48. S. Shankar, "Life and Death in Indebtedness", The Statesman 16 Jan. 198
49. S. 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 states that "dowry" mean
security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly -
to the other party to the marriage, or (b) by the parents of either part
person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person at or b
consideration for the marriage of the said parties
50. The governments of Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, Haryana, H
have under art. 247(2) read with art. 254(2) of the Constitution of In
Prohibition Act of 1961.
51. See, K.D. Gaur, Law and Society in Modern India 274- 82 (1989).
52. India Today, 15 April 1984, p. 39.
53
husband. It is obvious that there is a conflict of interest in such matters.
Pressure from any quarter should not weigh in the matter and come in the process
of law and procedure. It is callous on the part of the administration to take into
account extraneous considerations in such grave matters.
Of late, the legislature, taking note of the seriousness and gravity of the
problem of dowry and its cancerous growth on an unprecedented scale, took
various legislative measures to plug the loopholes in the law so as to make the
provisions of law pragmatic and effective.
In 1984 in pursuant of the recommendations of the joint select committee
of the House,54 the Parliament drastically amended the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961 vide the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984. Offences under the
Act have now been made cognizable and a police officer can arrest the accused
of dowry without a warrant and initiate criminal proceedings against the culprit.
The penalty for demanding dowry has been made more stringent besides many
other significant changes, such as the establishment of family court, etc., have
been provided in the Act.55
Besides the above amendments in the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 , two
important amendments of significance have been made in the Indian Penal Code
in 1983 and 1986 respectively to deal effectively with the crimes relating to
dowry. These are stated below.
53. Ibid. Another study of burn cases based on information collected at the Loknayak Jay
Prakash Hospital, Delhi revealed that women are burnt 10 times more severely than men. More
women die of bums compared to men. Women who died formed 62 per cent of the sample as
opposed to 24 per cent who were men and giving the lie the belief that women wearing nylon
fabrics were more burn prone than others, 58 per cent of the women who were burnt were wearing
cotton, silk and other natural fibres.
54. Parliament appointed a joint select committee of the House in December 1 980 to examine
and suggest various measures to streamline the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961. The committee
submitted its report to Parliament in August 1982 and suggested inter alia a number of important
changes of consequential significance that were accepted and incorporated in the Act.
55. Some of the important amendments made in the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 are as stated
below: ( i ) Punishment will be given only to the taker of dowry, whereas it was applicable in case
of both the giver and taker of dowry earlier (s.3); ( ii) complaints about dowry can be made within
10 years of marriage as against one year before (s. 6); (iii) the clause 'as consideration for the
marriage' is deleted from the definition of dowry under s. 2 of the Act of 1961 ; (iv) setting up of
family court and special court for trial of bride burning cases have been provided as against the
earlier provision of trial by the general criminal courts; (v) permissible wedding expenses is linked
to the income of the bride's parents; and (vi) penalty for demanding dowry has been made nïore
stringent. A minimum of 6 months of imprisonment with a maximum of 2 years of imprisonment
and fine of Rs. 10,000 has been provided as against 6 months of imprisonment and Rs. 5,000 fine
earlier (s. 4).
In 1986 vide Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1986, a new section 304-5
was added in the Indian Penal Code for punishment in case of dowry death.
Section 304-5, IPC reads as follows:
56. I. P.C. s. 498 -A reads: "Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to
cruelty: Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation: For the purposes of this section "cruelty"
means: (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, (whether mental or physical) of
the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing
her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security
is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand".
57. See, K.D. Gaur, A Text Book on the Indian Penal Code 447-50 and 662-5 (1992).
58. Inder Raj Malik, v. S imita Malik, (1986) Cr. L.J. 1510; WazirChand v. State of H ary ana,
A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 378.
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal and rejecting the
of the High Court, that since the demand of Rs. 50,000.00 was
waived aside and the marriage was allowed to continue, the dem
"dowry" amounting to an offence under section 4 of the Dowry Pr
1961 , observed that the dominant object of the Act is to stamp out
of demanding dowry in any shape or form either before or after
The court held that the precise time when the demand for dowry is
the sole deciding factor. The offence is complete when the dem
Consent for meeting the demand is not necessary. This is a welcom
A little about 9 p.m. on December 1, 1980 a shout was heard from flat no.
9-B of crying "bachao-bachao" (save-o-save). On hearing the cry neighbours
rushed to the flat and found Sudha in a standing position but aflame. The
neighbours extinguished the fire. She was taken to a hospital where she died in
the early hours of 2, December 1980. Sudha made a categorical statement, soon
after the neighbours gathered near the flat and while on her way to the hospital
in the taxi, pointing to her mother-in-law - Shakuntala as the killer and that she
had set her on fire after pouring kerosene on her body, Sudha also indicated
Laxman to have actually set fire and that Subhash assisted him in the act.
The trial judge on the basis of the evidence put forward by the prosecution
and the defence came to the conclusion that the relationship of Sudha with her
husband Laxman and members of his family had become strained on account of
demands for more dowry and on Sudha's refusal to oblige them, the accused had
decided to do away with her before the child was born. Accordingly, kerosene
had been sprinkled on Sudha's body with a view of killing her and fire was set
to her clothes at the time alleged. The trial court being convinced of the charge
of murder convicted all the three accused under section 302 read with section
34 IPC. Considering the murder of Sudha to be one of the atrocious dowry
deaths, the court sentenced each of them to death and referred the matter to the
Delhi High Court for confirmation of the sentence in accordance with section
366 of the CrPC.
The High Court of Delhi diferred from the trial judge and acquitted all the
accused of the murder charge accepting the defence plea that it was purely a case
of an accident. The defence pleaded that when the brother-in-law of the
deceased returned to the house a few minutes before 9 p.m. at night, the deceased
wanted to warm up the cooked food for being served to him. At that point of
time, the child of the brother-in-law cried for milk. The mother-in-law of the
deceased wanted the milk to be heated up for the child and asked the deceased
to give the milk first for the crying child and then attend to the brother-in-law.
It is at that point of time, it was alleged that the deceased lighted the kerosene
stove, which was in the open space that caught fire and the deceased succumbed
to injuries.
Rejecting the High Courts' theory of accident, the Supreme Court held that
the defence plea in the instant case that the brides' clothes caught fire due to
kerosene stove resulting in her death due to burn injuries was not maintainable.
The court held that since the deceased did not have any warm clothing on her
person and as the evidence shows, she had only a nylon saree, it was not likely
that she would have ventured going up in cold in the month of December to
operate the kerosene stove placed in an open space near the kitchen as she was
expected to keep properly robed to avert getting ill from exposure to cold in an
fire but on account of a designed move on the part of the members of the family
of the accused persons to put an end to her life.
The court accordingly, held Shakuntala and Laxman responsible for killing
of Sudha by setting her on fire. To Subhash, the court gave a benefit of doubt
and he was acquitted. As regards sentence the court opined that normally in a
bride burning case death sentence would be an appropriate sentence but in view
of the acquittal of the accused by the High Court, life imprisonment to the mother
and son respectively was awarded for murder of Sudha.
I Cf)
In Lichham
scolded by th
dowry to sati
harassments
washing the u
and later th
"bachao"). Wh
outside with
immediately
serious. She
Ironically th
refused to ta
While in ho
mother-in-la
before two w
Jaipur acquit
state appeal r
in-law under
In appeal the
murder as a
62. Lichhamad
relationship with his 22 years old niece, a medical student, whom he nominated
as beneficiary on the death of the insured in a life insurance policy of Rs.
50,000/-. It was also alleged that he had illicit incestuous relationship with his
sister Meera. The death of Veena occurred in the kitchen of the two bed room
flat occupied by the husband in the campus of Bañaras Hindu University ol
which he with his wife and sister Meera was the occupant. When Ram Prasad,
the milkman came to the house of the accused for supplying milk in the morning
of 12 September 1984 at about 7.00 a.m., he knocked the door. The door was
opened by the sister of the husband. Ram Prasad saw that smoke was coming
out from inside the house and when he peeped inside he noticed that the dead
body of Veena was burning in the kitchen. Surprisingly, the husband and the
co-accused sister-in-law did not try to extinguish the fire. The milkman shouted
for help and the neighbours rushed and extinguished the fire and took the
deceased to the hospital.
On the basis of the above facts, the husband and the sister- in-law (Narendra
and Meera) were convicted by the session judge, Varanasi for the murder ol
Veena under section 302 read with section 34 of IPC and sentenced to death
and life imprisonment respectively. The High Court of Allahabad acquitted both
the accused holding ita case of "suicide". Against the decision of the High Court
the father of the deceased and the State of Uttar-Pradesh went in appeal to the
Supreme Court.
The main issue in the case was as to whether Veena (deceased) committed
suicide because her matrimonial life was disturbed or whether she was physically
eliminated by her husband who was not happy with the matrimonial tie.
After examining the facts and the evidence, the Supreme Court came to the
conclusion that the short period the deceased had lived with her husband, she
had realised that the could not continue with the marriage. She was, accordingly,
planning to start a new life by pursuing an academic career and taking up a job
as a lecturer. She wrote to this effect to her father. Under these circumstances.
Thakkar J., speaking for the court said:
The court underlined the callousness of both brother and sister who did
nothing to save the girl and did not even go any where near the kitchen where
Veena was brining; and pointed that the accused "did not show as much concern
as the milkman, a stranger who shouted for help and tried to extinguish the fire".
Having analysed every point raised, the judge rightly concluded that "accident
and suicide are excluded beyond a reasonable doubt and that the death of Veena
is established to be homicidal". Accordingly, the court allowed the appeal and
convicted the accused Narendra for murder and sentenced him to life imprison-
ment. However, the court did not interfere with Meera's acquittal.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Wazir Chand.,61 acquitted the
appellant and his son Kanwar Singh who were convicted under section 306 of
IPC68 by the session judge and the Punjab and Haryana High Court for abetting
the newly married woman to commit suicide.
The facts are of common day occurence in Indian set up nowadays. The
deceased, Veena was married to Kanwar Singh on 16 October, 1993. Within
less than a year of her marriage, Veena died after having sustained burn injuries
at the residence of her husband Kanwar Singh who was living with his father
Wazir Chand. She sustained burn injuries on June 10, 1984 in the morning al
about 6.30 a.m. and was taken to the Geeta Nursing Home where she died next
morning at about 1 1 .00 a.m.
Relying on the defence version that Veena did not commit suicide but her
clothes accidentally caught fire, when she was preparing tea for the family over
a stove, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the courts below and
acquitted the accused of the charge under section 306 IPC. The court held that
there was not sufficient evidence on the basis of which a conclusion could be
reached with any reasonable certainty that Veena committed suicide. For
instance, there was no suicide note left by the deceased. It was not clear from
the evidence whether she set herself on fire or her clothes accidentally caught
fire. It could not also be certainty said that there was a deliberate delay on the
part of the husband and the father-in-law in taking her to the hospita
better treatment available to her.
Wife burning tragedies are becoming too frequent for the coun
be compi acement. Police sensitization mechanisms which w
vent the commission of such crimes must be set up if these hor
crimes are to be avoided. Likewise, special provisions facili
easier proof of such special class of murders on establishing ce
basic facts must be provided for by appropriate legislation.
69. Lotika Sarkar, "Women and the Law", XXIV A.S.I.L. 372 at 373 (1988
70. A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1271.
71. ¡bid. See also Kashi Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1980) BBCJ (HC) 612; Inder Sain v. The
State, (1981) Cr. L.J. 1 1 16 (Delhi); P.M. Bakshi, "The Dowry Deaths", The Statesmen 1 July
1983 p. 8; Vijai Rat na v. State of U.P., (1988) Cr. L.J. 1581 (All.).
72. (1 871 ) 3 N.W.P. 316; see, supra note 68 for text, IPC, s. 306.
73. (1913) I.L.R. 36 All. 26; Tejsingh, AIR. (1958) Raj. 169.
74. In reV idyasagar Pande, (1928) l.L.R. Pat. 74.
The Act provides for first appeal against the order of the trial court within
30 days of the judgment. The onus of providing innocence on a charge under
the Act of 1987 lies on the accused. The district magistrate has been empowered
to prevent construction of sali temples and to seize funds collected for the
purpose of glorification of sati under sections 7 and 8 of the Act. The magistrate
can also issue a ban order as a prevention measure and get sati temples under
construction demolished.
82
It is found that even in case of a bailable offence, where th
entitled to secure bail as a matter of right, bail is not granted by th
the accused is able to secure a surety. As a result the poor man
possess sufficient means to furnish bail and who is not able to arr
83
has to suffer incarceration silently even in summons cases, till the
In certain cases one has to be in detention for even longer peri
maximum term of imprisonment provided for the offence charge
concerned penal provisions without the trial having commenced.84
82. The offences under IPC have been classified into bailable and non- bailable offences
according to the nature and gravity of the offence. Cr. P.C., 1973, s. 2(2)(0) says: "Bailable
offence" means an offence which is shown as bailable in the first schedule or which is made
bailable by any other law for the time being in force, and non- bailable offence means any other
offence".
83. Cr. P.C., 1973, s. 2 (w) says "summons-case" means a case relating to an offence, and not
being a warrant-case.; s.2(x) "warrant-case" means a case relating to an offence punishable with
death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years.
84. Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary , State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1369.
85. Supra note 20. The Haryana High Court in Gursewak Singh v. State of Punjab, (1988)
Cr. L.J. 1605 (P & H), and Gauhati High Court in A. Loso v. State of Manipur, (1988) Cr. L.J.
1458 (Gau.) have adopted a positive approach in granting of bail.
86. Hussainara Khatoon, v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar , A.I.R. 1979 s.c. 1360; see also,
Gursewak Singh, ibid.
87. Id. at 1362.
It is therefore high time that the courts must abandon the antiquated
under which pretrial release is ordered - only against bail with suretie
concept is outdated and perhaps it has done more harm than good. If t
is satisfied, after taking into consideration all the facts available befo
the accused has his roots in the community and is not likely to abscond,
should release the accused on personal bond.
88. See, Sunil Batra, supra note 22. Some of the instances reported in Sunil Batra case are
given below: "Dharma Teja, the Shipping magnate who served his sentence in Tihar Jail, Delhi
had thousands of rupees in Jail and all the comforts. He had an air cooler in his cell, a radio cum
record player set and even the phone; Haridas Mundhara, a businessman, not only did he had all
• the facilities in jail but he could also go out of jail whenever he liked. At times he could be out
for several days and travel beyond Delhi; Ram Kishnan Dalmia, a business magnate spent most
of his jail term in hospital. Smugglers imprisoned in Tihar Jail get their food from posh hotels
and whisky from Connaught Place in Delhi..."
89. An interesting example of different attitude of courts applying different yardsticks in
sentencing a rich and a poor man is found in two Malaysian cases, Le ., Wickrasooriya v. Public
Prosecutor , (1964) 30 M.L.J. 281 and Public Prosecutor v. Mohammad Abdullah A ng Swee Kang,
(1987) 2 M.L.J. 368. In the former case the accused- an accountant was convicted under s. 408
Malaysian Penal Code for misappropriating two sums of money - $39.70 and $12.00 Malaysian
dollars for three years* of imprisonment on each count: whereas in the latter case the accused -
managing director of a big company - charged for misapproriating sterling pounds 338,808.00
was sentenced to only four years' of imprisonment under s. 408 of the Penal Code. (Note: one
Sterling pound is almost five times more in value than one Malaysian dollar).
92. See, supra note 78. Undertrial prisoners include all those persons who are in judic
custody on remand during investigation.
93. Supra note 2.
94. Surendra Yadav, "Under Trials Need Bail Reforms", (1982) Cr. L.J. 25-6 (1982).
In 1978 the Supreme Court was seized with the question of pri
the conceptualisation of freedom behind bars and the role of judic
constitutional sentinel in a prison in the case of Sunil Beam?6 The
ers, Batra, an Indian and Sobhraj, a French national, the forme
sentence and the latter under-trial facing grave charges challenged
treatment in jail as illegal. The former questioned solitary confine
legal sanction pending his appeal against the sentence of death
Delhi High Court, and the latter questioned the distressing disable
fetters of under-trials for unlimited duration of time in the prison
Allowing the writ petition, the court said basic prison decency
of criminal justice. By isolating criminals and confining them
place in jail from the rest of the society mainly two objectives are
criminals as well as other people are deterred from committing cr
it serves protective function by quarantining criminal offenders f
period of time. Also it is hoped that after their release from jail t
rehabilitated properly. The latter objective is the central theme of a
facilities.
95. "S.C. Concern at Delay in Trials in Bihar", The Times of India, 5 Feb
also, Prisoners, Human Rights, Directive Principles of Jurisprudence, vol. II,
96. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1675.
Forms were forsaken since freedom was at stake and the letter was
metamorphosed into a habeas corpus proceeding and was judicially charged
with eclectic creativity. Being convinced of the allegations, the court issued the
writ directing the authorities that "the prisoner Prem Chand shall not be subjected
to physical manhandling by any jail official, that the shameful and painful
torture to which he had been subjected, a blot on Government's claim to protect
human rights, shall be ended and that he shall be given proper medical care and
treatment". Justice Krishna Iyer speaking through the court said:
It is gratifying to note that the Supreme Court has shown concern for
prisoners' right to fair treatment in jail in earlier cases as well and given relief
103. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v. State of A. P., A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2092.
104. Id. at 2094.
105. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra supra note 23. Sheela Barse, a journalist from
Bombay wrote aletter to the Supreme Court complaining of custodial violence to women prisoners
whilst confined in the police lock-up in the city of Bombay. The petitioner stated in her letter that
she interviewed 15 women prisoners in Bombay Central jail between 11th and 17th May, 1982
and 5 out of them told her that they had been assaulted by police in the police lock up. She
particularly mentioned the case of Devamma and Pushpa Baeen.
106. Supra note 22 at 1587.
107. Ibid.
108. Sanjay Suri v. Delhi Administration, (1988) Cr. L.J. 705 (S.C.).
109. See, supra note 2.
1 10. A number of constitutional protections are available to an accused under arts. 20, 21 and
22 of the Constitution, viz., protection in respect of conviction for offences, protection of life and
personal liberty and protection against arrest and detention in certain cases and art. 39 A provides
for legal aid to the indigent.
or relief. For instance, the poor, the young, the old, the mentally d
intoxicated, the persons belonging to scheduled castes, scheduled tr
ward classes, and the women, etc. prefer to suffer the agony silently
fate. 1 1 1 In fact, how many people suffer irreparable harm as a resu
assault each year and what is the extent and magnitrade of that harm
to assess. There is no proper machinery to record even the extent o
harm caused to the victims, of damage to the property, stolen, destr
as a result of carnage, riots and caste struggles, etc. Indisputably suc
enormous and irreparable. By harm is meant, "damage to lhe person
liberty, honour, etc., not caused by the victim's, own action but by t
accused and their associates as well as apathy on the part of the pro
take appropriate action in time". No one thinks of the misery and
the victims of crime and the authorities are indifferent towards t
they do not exist and matter to the establishment.
ļļO
The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 in a few cases under sections
357 to 359 have empowered the criminal courts to order for the payment of
compensation to the victims of crime out of the fine imposed by the court in a
case. The amount of compensation is limited to the amount of fine imposed and
can be ordered only, if the accused is convicted.114 The provisions are hardly
satisfactory.
Perhaps, it would be appropriate and practicable to do away with short term
sentences ranging upto six months of imprisonment or atleast reduce it to limited
cases. This is because punishment through incarceration especially short term
sentences serves none. The offender is hardly rehabilitated. In fact, the chances
of his rehabilitation are reduced, after release. The tax payer is burdened with
increased prison costs and the victim is forced to bear the cost alone. The total
cost of prison to the public exchequer in India accounts to Rs. 21 million. A
minimum of Rs. 300 to Rs. 400 per month is spent over one prisoner.1 15 It is
estimated that approximately 85 per cent of the male convicts and 95 per cent
of the female convicts, mostly poor undergo prison sentences for periods less
than six months. In such cases fine may be imposed and the accused may be
released either on admonition, or on probation with or without supervision, or
sentence may be suspended. This will reduce the high cost of prison as well as
reduce congestion and overcrowding in jails. The amount so saved may be
utilised for compensating the victims of crime.
1 13. Criminal Procedure Code 1973, s. 357 lays down that when a court imposes a sentence of
fine or a sentence of which fine forms a paît, the court may, when passing judgment, order the
whole or any part of the fine recovered to be used (a) for defraying expenses property incurred in
the prosecution, (b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused
by the offence when substantial compensation is recoverable by such person in a civil court, (c)
when any person is convicted for an offence of murder or for abetment of murder in paying
compensation to the person who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, entitled to recover
compensation; s. 358 provides for compensation to the persons groundlessly arrested; s. 359
empowers the court in case of non cognizable offences to order the accused of conviction to pay
to the complainant in whole or in part the cost incurred by him in the prosecution in addition to
the penalty imposed upon him. See, Haň Singh v. Sukhbir Singh, (1988) 4 S.C.C. 551. The
Supreme Court awarded Rs. 50,000 as compensation to the victim.
114. The Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill 1971 had suggested for a comprehensive
provision for compensation to victims of crime as a specific measure in certain offences, but it
was not approved by the legislature. Some of the special statutes have provided for the award of
compensation to the victims of crime. For instance, s. 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958
provides for compensation in case of release of the accused on probation and s. 1 10-Z? of the Motor
Vehicles Act 1939 for the award of compensation to the injured and to the deceased's legal heir.
The Workmen's Compensation Act 1 923 prescribes a scale of compensation for injury by accident.
The Law Commission of India has recommended to the government for awarding compensation
to the victims in hit and run category and automobile accidents.
115. See, Mahmood bin Mohammad, The Victim of Criminal Justice, Social Defence, 5-15
(1982). The figures relate to 1980- 1981. It must have gone up substantially during 1991-92 due
to rise in prices and high cost of living.
Chapter VIII of CrPC in sections 106 to 124 provides for security proceed-
ings and empower the magistrate to obtain security from a person whose conduct
causes or is likely to cause a reasonable apprehension of breach of the peace or
disturbances of public tranquility. This is an instance of preventive justice which
1 11
the courts are intended to administer. For this purpose magistrates are vested
with wide judicial discretionary powers to nip in the bud conduct subversive of
the peace and public tranquillity.
But it is found that many a time the law is abused by the police in the name
of security and maintenance of public peace and order on flimsy grounds. On
times the poor and innocent persons are picked up by the police, not because
they have committed any crime, but because they are poorly dressed, illiterate
unemployed and are victim of extrme poverty. They are brought before the
magistrate, and before they could know of it, they are remanded to the police
custody where they remain indefinitely as the investigations are never com-
pleted.123
The case of Jagannathan, 1 24 from the State of Tamil Nadu is a classic
example of hardship and humiliation suffered by a poor villager. Jagannathan
aged 40, a small farmer of Perambur village in Tamil Nadu, entered that
nightmare world in March 1981 when his involvement in a village quarrel
entangled him in a police case. For Naidu, life before that was an endless
struggle for survival. The two acres of land he owned was barely enough to
support his wife and three children. To make ends meet, he was forced to sell
121. Ch. VIII provides for security measures for keeping the peace and for good behaviour (ss.
1 06 to 124); ch. X deals with maintenance of public order and tranquility (ss. 1 29 - 148) and ch.Xl
deals with preventive action of the police (ss. 1 49 - 1 53).
122. Madhii Limaya v. S.D.M. Munghey, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2486 at 2501. Held, since the ■
object of the chapter is prevention of crime, maintenance of public order and disturbance of public
transquility and breaches of the peace, the provisions are saved vide ci. (2), (3), (4) and (5) of art.
19 of the Constitution of India and are not ultra vires.
123. Jagannathon v. State, (1983) Cr. L.J. 1748; see, India Today, 30 Sept., 1983 p. 140. It is
reported that in the State of Tamil Nadu police often use Tamil Nadu Prevention of Begging Act
1945 in order to put innocent persons in beggar rehabilitation homes indiscriminately.
124. Ibid. See also, S.H. Venkataraman, India Today 31 Oct. 1983, p. 147.
125. Cr.P.C., 1973, s. 167(5) reads: "If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case,
the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused
was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence...."
126. Supra note 123.
127. (1988) Cr. L.J. 1803 (S.C.).
128. A.l.R. 1982 S.C. 1463, State of Kemla v. Kuttan Mohanan, (1988) Cr. L.J. 453 (Kerala);
Hiralal Gopilal Ralnare v. State of M. P., (1988) Cr. L.J. 457 (M.P.).
129. A.l.R. 1983 S.C. 339.
130. Ibid..
131. Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, s. 6 says: (i) No Court shall take cognizance of an
offence punishable under s. 1 51 or s. 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under sub- section (2) of s.5
of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction.
(a) ... (b) ... (c) ... of the authority competent to remove him from his office. Criminal Procedure
Code 1973, s. 197 also provides for a prior sanction of superior authority as a pre requisite for
prosecution of judges, magistrates, and public servants.
132
tions fearlessly, efficiently and effectively without any fear
Instances are not unknown in India (this is equally true in other c
as Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Phillipines, etc. ) whe
and bureaucrates have used the sanction clause to delay and
i il
132. Lákshmi Shankar Srivastava v. State ( Delhi A dtn inist raion), (1979) Cr. L.J. 207. See, D
D Basu, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Prentice Hall of India, Delhi 1979) p. 524; see, Law
Commission of India, Forty-first Report, p. 1 16, paras 15-115 (1969).
133. Shah Commission, (headed by Justice Shah of the Supreme Court of India) which was
appointed by the Government of India during 1 977-78 to investigate into the various allegations
of abuse of power by the politicians and bureaucrates during the Emergency decleared by the then
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, have gone at length on this issue and pointed out a number of
instances of excesses committed and abuse of authority by politicians and bureaucrates. Inquiry
commissions appointed by the Federal as well as the state governments from time to time to
investigate into the charges of corruption, favouratism, nepotism, etc. of politicians, bureaucrates
have also indicated about various instances of misuse and abuse of authority by the persons in
power against the poor and the weak.
134. R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 684.
135. Indian Penal Code 1860, s. 161 deals with the offence of taking gratification other than
legal remuneration in respect of an official act by public servant, and s. 1 65 deals with the offence
of obtaining valuable thing, without consideration from persons concerned in proceeding or
business transacted by such public servant.
136. S. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 deals with offence of criminal misconduct
by a public servant.
137. State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1249.
138. Supra note 134. Held, that a member of legislative assembly (M.L.A.) is not a public
servant within the meaning of clause (3) or clause (7) of s. 21 IPC, since M.L.A. is not in the pay
role of the state government. An M.L.A. discharges the constitutional junctions.
139. A shok v. Pralhad and Sons, (1988) Cr. L.J. 78 (Bom.). The police officers were found
guilty of beating and were convicted accordingly.
140. A bani Ch. Biswal v. State of Orissa, (1988) Cr. L.J. 1038 (Orissa).
141. Dadanchand v. R.S. Rathode, (1988) Cr. L.J. 1506 (M.P.); Shrilal v. Manmath Kumar,
A.I.R. 1960 Raj. 173.
way in discouraging the police from using third degree methods in inve
of crimes by physically and mentally torturing persons.
In the meantime the Ninth Lok Sabha was dissolved and the Union
took the stand that the notice of the motion as well as the decision of th
of the Ninth Lok Sabha to admit the motion and to constitute the com
investigation and proof of grounds had lapsed with the dissolution of
Lok Sabha On that basis the Union of India refused to act in aid of the d
146. The majority view was taken by Justices B.C. Ray, M.N. Ve
S.C. Agarwal and minority view by Justice L.M. Sharma, who
government.
147. State of Bihar v. Ran Naresh Pandey , A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 389.
148. Balwatit Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2265; State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh ,
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. '2'4; Gokaraju v. State of A. P., A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1473.
149
In R.K. Jain, the petitioner, challenged the withdrawal of t
Dynamite case against George Fernandes, a minister and of others b
Janata Party Government and of four cases against former defence
Bansi Lai by the Cogress I Government after it returned to power i
Supreme Court had upheld the withdrawal of the Dynamite cases on
that the offences allegedly committed by Fernandes and others were
character. The court held that since during the emergency proclaim
country by the Congress I Government (1975 to 1977) democratic ri
unavailable, the opponents of the regime resisted to unconstitutiona
to change the government. Hence prosecution could not continu
government changed. In Bansi Lai, the argument of paucity of e
justified and in one of the four cases, the complainant had been
profitably compensated.
Sheo N andan Paswan}^ is perhaps one of the recent cases in
power of withdrawal has been grossly abused by the executive in fa
then Chief Minister of the State of Bihar, Jagannath Mishra. The o
took place in 1970. The accused no. 2, J agannath Mishra, former Ch
of the State of Bihar was charged along with other three accused pe
sections 420, 466, 471, 109, 120-.8,. Indian Penal Code and under
5(1 )(a), 5(1 )(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for using
his official position as a minister or chief minister of the State of Bi
servant in conspiracy with other accused and to protect Naval K
(accused no. 3) in particular. After obtaining necessary sanction by
nor of the State of Bihar, trial began in the court of the Special Jud
After a protracted hearing on 20 June 1981 the learned judge al
withdrawal of the case after the special public prosecutor argue
withdrawal was necessary on four counts viz., lack of prospect o
prosecution in the light of the evidence, implication of the accused a
political and personal vendetta, inexpediency of the prosecution for
of state and public policy and adverse effects that the continu
prosecution would bring on public interest in the light of the change
In appeal Patna High Court approved of the withdrawal and rejected
filed against the order of withdrawal.
151. ¡bid. The majority view was taken by Justice Behnil Isla
the minority view by Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar, who held with
152. See, Chaitany Kalbag, India Today, 15 Jan. 1983, pp. 1
It may be noted that both the courts and the public prosecutor have a solemn
duty to protect and preserve the administration of criminal justice against the
possible misuse and abuse of authority by the executive by resorting to the
withdrawal clause to achieve the ulterior motive of circumventing the process
of law.154 In other words, the ultimate guiding principle for withdrawal of any
criminal proceeding must always be to uphold justice and not to subvert the
process of law.155 It must be exercised with great care and caution to avoid
possible abuse of authority.
XIV Conclusion
The study made in the foregoing pages reveals that the criminal judicial
system is indifferent and perhaps unconcerned and little hostile to the poor and
the weak, such as women, children, physically, economically and mentall
handicapped groups, prisoners and the like. It may be because even after four
and half decades of independence no serious efforts have been made to redraft
penal norms, radicalise punitive processes, humanise prison houses and ma
anti-social and anti-national elements, such as hoarders, smugglers, tax-evader
black marketeers incapable of escaping the legal coils. On the other han
whatever legislations, piecemeal amendments, substitutions and deletions have
taken place to ameliorate the conditions of downtrodden masses do not appear
to have achieved their purposes.156
The study further discloses as stated earlier that the criminal judicia
system, being drafted by the British is pro- establishment oriented and operate
to the disadvantage of the poor and the weak. The disadvantaged and the weak
do not feel adequately protected. Very often the weak, the deprived and
underprivileged groups in the society are over-represented in the prison popu
lation, whereas rich and powerful manage to escape the process of law, because
of the money and muscle power.
The persons in authority and responsible for the enforcement of law and
setting legal machinery in motion to safeguard the interest and well being of the
people should not use and misuse the law for their personal gain and advantage
157. V.R. Krishna Iyer, Perspectives in Criminology , Law and Social Change 2-3 (1989) and
Judicial Justice 5-48 (1985).
158. A.K. Das, "Judiciary's New Role" The Statesman, 22 June 1983, Santosh Hegde, "Public
Interest Litigation and Control of Government", Ind. B. Rev. vol. 15, pp. 1-7 (1988).