METAPHILOSOPHY

Vol. 15, No. 1, January 84

0026-1068 $2.00

A DEFINITION OF FOUNDATIONALISM
ERIC STIFFLER

Much recent work in epistemology concerns the viability of the approach

to the theory of knowledge that has come to be known as foundationalism.
My own view is that some version of foundationalism is probably correct but
I will not attempt to defend this claim here. Instead, I want to take a small
but necessary step toward resolving the many controversies that surround
foundationalism by offering a definition of what it is for a theory of knowl-
edge to be foundational. More specifically, my aim is to develop a simple
definition which readily distinguishes foundationalism from its principal
contemporary and historical rivals. The main way in which the definition I
offer differs from other proposals is that it takes foundationalists to be com-
mitted to various substantive claims about basic propositions in addition to
holding merely that there are basic propositions. In the course of the paper I
show that the definition satisfies the following criteria of adequacy: (1) it
identifies as foundational theories usually viewed as paradigm cases of the
foundational approach, (ii) it resolves borderline cases plausibly, and (iii) it is
not so restrictive as to exclude the possibility of significant disagreement
within the foundationalist camp. At the end 1 test the definition against
Roderick Firth’s suggestive remarks on self-warrant that have led to the
development of “modest” versions of foundationalism.

While most twentieth century Anglo-American philosophers have until

recently adopted the foundational approach to problems in epistemology, the
origins of the view can be traced back to Aristotle’s remarks on scientific
knowledge in the Posterior Analytics, 72a. For Aristotle, scientific knowledge
requires demonstration; but “the premises of demonstrated knowledge must
be primary . . . they must be the ‘appropriate’ basic truth”. A basic truth,
Aristotle goes on to say, is an “immediate proposition” or a proposition
“which has no other prior to it”. It was Descartes, however, who anticipated
foundationalism in its modern form. He argued that knowledge requires
acceptance of indubitable claims and offered a description of the content
of these claims. Descartes also approached epistemological problems from
the point of view of the knowing subject, a perspective that has retnained
characteristic of foundationalism down to the present day.
A number of analogies have been used to explain the main tenets of the
foundationalist program. We are asked to picture the totality of human
knowledge as an edifice, wall, or inverted pyramid. Knowledge can then be

16
 A DEFINITION OF FOUNDATIONALISM 17
seen to have two main parts. One part, comprising by far the greater share of
what we know, is analogous to all but the lowest levels of these structures.
Here we find a hierarchy of claims, each of which is supported by claims
more fundamental than itself. The well known argument from the regress of
epistemic justification suggests that a claim must have an established place in
the hierarchy to qualify as knowledge. Thus, claim A is known only if there is
some claim B which supports it; B in turn must be supported by some claim
C that is known; and so on. According to the argument, the regress is halted
when we arrive at the second ‘foundational’ part of knowledge. Here questions
of support are no longer relevant because, like the building’s foundation,
the bottom row of bricks in the wall, or the vertex of the pyramid, the claims
at the base of the hierarchy bear the burden of providing the ultimate meaI.1.
of support for all the rest.
Although there is agreement on its broad outlines, the details of the
foundational approach are the subject of much dispute. The thesis that
knowledge rests on a foundation can be applied to all or only a segment of
human knowledge. Conflicting views about the proper analysis of knowledge
are compatible with the thesis. Most importantly, a variety of positions is
possible concerning the nature of the foundational claims themselves and the
manner in which they must be related to nonfoundational claims to insure
knowledge. It will be helpful to introduce some simplifying assumptions and
a common terminology in arriving at a clearer understanding of the theory.
Foundationalism has been applied to questions concerning the structure of
both Q priori and Q posteriori knowledge. As a first simplification let us agree
to consider only its implications for the latter sort of knowledge here.
Secondly, let us assume, as most foundationalists have, that knowledge is a
species of true belief. The remaining differences between foundationalists and
their opponents are best appreciated by adopting the first-person perspective
mentioned earlier. To do this we focus attention on the knowledge available to
individual subjects, remembering that the ultimate goal of the theory is to
produce an account of the structure of empirical knowledge in general.
Since knowledge derives from belief, the structure of an individual’s
beliefs at a given time provides a natural starting point for the account. This
structure can be viewed as a system composed of the individual’s belief set at
the time, and the various evidential relations that obtain between the members
of the set. The belief set of any subject S at any time t can be defined as the
set of propositions that S believes or accepts as true at t . Foundationalists,
of course, are primarly interested in two sorts of propositions in this set,
those which are candidates for the foundational and nonfoundational parts
of knowledge. Let us term propositions of the former sort basic and those of
the latter nonbasic. One way, then, to arrive at a first approximation of how
foundationalists construe the foundational part of knowledge is to define the
notion of a basic proposition.
18 ERIC STIFFLER
I1

The first and most obvious requirement to be made of basic propositions

is that they provide evidence for one or more other propositions in the sub-
ject’s belief set. It would be pointless to regard a proposition as basic which
failed to support any other proposition. While such a claim might itself count
as knowledge it would not figure in the justification of other claims, and thus
be incapable of performing one of the essential functions of basic pro-
positions. The capacity to provide evidence is not sufficient to establish that a
proposition is basic, however, as nonbasic propositions must also be allowed
to provide evidence if the foundationalist is to generate his hierarchy of
rationally defensible claims.
It might be suggested that the notion of evidence can be used to attribute
a second feature to basic propositions which, together with the first, yields a
satisfactory definition. In addition to providing evidence for other pro-
positions, it could be maintained that a basic proposition is one for which no
other proposition in a belief set provides evidence,’ but a simple counter-
example refutes this suggestion. Suppose John’s belief set contains both the
proposition that it rained in Chicago yesterday and the proposition that it
rained somewhere in Illinois yesterday. It is reasonable to regard the first of
these claims as providing evidence for the second. Then if none of the other
propositions in John’s belief set provides evidence for the claim that it rained
in Chicago yesterday, this proposition must be basic for him, according to the
proposed definition. Yet, clearly, this proposition is not basic and no found-
ationalist would regard it as such. The fact that John has no evidence for be-
lieving that it rained in Chicago yesterday shows that his belief is unjustified,
not that it is basic.
Although this suggestion fails it is on the right track because few found-
ationalists have been willing to hold that nonbasic propositions ever provide
evidence for basic ones.* The reason usually given, however, is that basic
propositions do not stand in need of evidence from other propositions. Such
a contention is hardly surprising given foundationalism’s guiding assumption
that basic propositions form the absolute bedrock of all rationally acceptable
claims, and the feature which allows them this role can be described succinctly.
In a word, foundationalists demand that basic propositions not require
evidence from other propositions. A more satisfactory definition of basic
propositions can now be stated. A proposition p is basic for a subject S at a
time r if, and only if, (i) p is a member of S’s belief set at t , (ii) p provides

Many foundationalists require that no other propositions provide evidence for basic
ones. See, for example, G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York:
Humanities Press, 19531, pp. 122-24; and D.M. Armstrong, BelieL Truth and Knowl-
4dge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 77ff.
Proponents of modest foundationalsim, which is discussed in section IV, are the main
exception.
 A DEFINITION OF FOUNDATIONALISM 19
evidence for some other proposition q which is also a member of S’s belief set
at t , and (iii) p does not require evidence.
It is tempting to put the definition to work immediately. Why not simply
hold that foundational theories of knowledge, and foundational theories
alone, claim that there are basic proposition^?^ In favor of this proposal is
the fact that many prominent twentieth century foundationalists build their
theories around the notion of basic propositions. Such is the case with various
of the theories put forward by Russell, Moore, Carnap, Lewis, Price, and
Ayer, and more recently with those offered by Chisholm, Danto, and Pollock;
careful examination of these theories shows that all attribute t o basic pro-
positions the two main features employed in the d e f i n i t i ~ n .Moreover,
~ by
identifying foundationalism with the claim that there are basic propositions
in the sense defined we allow room for disagreement regarding their content.
Foundationalists have always debated the question of which propositions
actually are basic. The traditional view that they concern sense impressions
has given ground to adverbial theories which hold they are about certain of
the subject’s own mental states; still other foundationalists have argued that
observation sentences of various descriptions are basic. To further com-
plicate matters, each of these positions is open to a number ofinterpretations.
Many disputes of comparable importance occur within the foundationalist
camp and a definition which took sides on them would seriously misrepresent
the position.
An objection that can be raised against this characterization of found-
ationalism is that the definition of basic propositions it employs is less in-
formative than it might be; in addition to not taking a stand on the content
of basic propositions, it adopts two crucial notions as primitives, that of
evidence and that of a proposition not requiring evidence. However, it seems
these notions must be left unanalyzed in characterizing foundationahsm
A number of writers have defined foundationalism along these lines. See, for example,
James W. Cornman, “Foundational versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empirical
Justification”, in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, ed. by G.S.Pappas and M.
Swain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 229-52; and William P. Alston,
“Two Types of Foundationalism”, Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1976), pp. 165-85.
Critics of foundationalism in particular have tended to identify foundationalism with
acceptance of the doctrine of basic propositions. For example, see Nicholas Rescher,
“Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization”, Journal

of Philosophy, 71 (1974), pp. 695-708; and Laurence Bonjour, “Can Empirical Knowl-
edge Have a Foundation?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (1978), pp. 1-13.
The specific works in question include Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Phil-
osophy (New York: Humanities Press, 1953); C.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and
Valuation (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1946); Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure
of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1967); H.H. Price, Perception (London: Methuen, 1932); A.J. Ayer, The Problem
of Knowledge (Baltimore Penguin Books, 1956); Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowl-
edge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy
of Knowledge (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968; and John Pollock, Knowledge
and Justification (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
20 ERIC STIFFLER
because, again, both are the subject of disagreement among foundationalists.
Some foundationalists take a purely logical view of the evidence relation;
others offer normative accounts; still others seek an analysis in terms of the
theory of probability. Furthermore, different conclusions are possible regard-
ing the actual extent of our knowledge and the nature of the claims which
basic propositions warrant us in accepting. The demand that basic prop-
ositions not require evidence also gives rise to competing theories. Some
foundationalists argue that belief that such a proposition is true must be
infallible, indubitable, or sufficient to guarantee its own correctness while
proponents of weaker analyses contend that it need only be self-intimating,
immune to certain kinds of criticism, or self-warranting.’ As it stands the de-
finition has the virtue of embracing all these different positions.
Critics sometimes fail to recognize the diversity of opinion possible even
on such central issues as the evidential status of basic propositions. The most
frequent objections to foundationalism, e.g., that it is committed to some
form of the Myth of the Given or is unrealistic in holding that any of our
beliefs are absolutely certain, overlook these differences and as a result succeed
in engaging only those versions of the doctrine which adopt strong inter-
pretations of the claim that basic propositions do not require evidence.6 In
his important recent book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard
Rorty occasionally falls into this trap by identifying foundationalism with the
view that basic propositions are incorrigible in the sense that persons who
believe them cannot be mistaken in doing so. One of the reasons Rorty
objects to foundationalism, understood in this way, is that it leads us to
conceive of the processes by which we come to believe basic propositions “on
a causal, para-mechanical model, as a special relation between certain objects
and the human mind which enables knowledge to take place more easily or
naturally or q ~ i c k l y . ” But,
~ of course, a foundationalist need not adopt
this model; nor need he hold that basic propositions are incorrigible since
weaker accounts of why basic propositions do not require evidence are
compatible with the theory. In fairness to Rorty it should be added that the
picture he presents of foundationalism’s general commitments is largely
accurate. Foundationalists do assume that the aim of epistemology “is
to find the maximum amount of common ground with others” and think
that this aim is best achieved by showing how the contributions to a given
discourse can “be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational
’ For an excellent discussion of the different views foundationalists have defended
regarding the evidential status of basic propositions see William P. Alston, “Varieties of
Privileged Access” in Empirical Knowledge. Readings from Contemporary Sources,
ed. by R.M. Chisholm and R.J. Swart2 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973),
gp. 376-410.
In William P. Alston, “Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?”, Philosophical Studies
29 (1976), pp. 287-305, the main objections Will and Lehrer bring against found-
ationalism are shown to fail for this reason.
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979), pp. 95-96.
 A DEFINITION OF FOUNDATIONALISM 21
agreement can be reached”; however, only very ambitious foundationalists
would contend that these rules are fine-grained enough t o decide “what
would settle the issue on every point where statements seem t o conflict.””

The suggestion that every theory of knowledge which adopts basic pro-
positions is foundational goes some way toward providing an adequate under-
standing of foundationalism but, in the end, it is not as illuminating as it
should be. The problem is that various theories satisfying this condition are
almost universally rejected by foundationalists. To exclude these theories
it is necessary to take notice of certain further substantive assumptions
foundationalists characteristically make about basic propositions. In particular,
three assumptions are important: (1) that only a proper subset of all pro-
positions can qualify as basic, (2) that some basic propositions must provide
evidence for propositions which entail that physical objects exist, and (3) that
a proposition does not require evidence only if a subject who lacks evidence
for it could nonetheless be justified in believing it. Let us examine these new
requirements in turn, explaining why each is needed and showing how each
rules out alternatives to foundationalism.
Foundationalists have always denied that just any proposition can be
basic. For example, none would allow that general propositions such as that
all ravens are black are ever basic. They would further deny that a great many
singular propositions, e.g., that this raven is black, are basic. This restriction
derives in part from the interpretation usually placed on assumptions (2) and
(3), but it merits statement as a separate principle as a reminder that a major
aim of foundationalism is the construction of a general theory of knowledge;
if it proved impossible to isolate a set of propositions that could in principle
serve as basic for any individual subject, the theory’s generality would be
seriously compromised. Of course, the fact that a proposition is a member of
the class of basic propositions does not mean that it will be basic for every
person. An individual must believe that the proposition is true in order for it
to be basic for him on a given occasion and, in addition, it must provide
evidence for other propositions in his belief set.
The assumption that not all propositions qualify as basic excludes certain
contextual theories of knowledge. One philosopher who defends an extreme
version of contectualism is J.L. Austin. According to Austin, the propositions
which are basic for a person at a time can only be determined by examining
the context in which the person is called upon to defend his beliefs. Austin
argues that “in general, any kind of statement could state evidence for any
other kind, if the circumstances were appropriate”: and suggests that general
propositions sometimes serve as the sole means of support for singular pro-

’ Ibid., p. 316.
J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 116.
 22 ERIC STIFFLER
positions. Foundationalists have strong reasons for rejecting such a view.
While it is certainly true that on some occasions general propositions support
singular ones, this does not show that the former can be basic. It may be in-
appropriate or unimportant at the time to as) what propositions provide
evidence for a general claim, but a subject who has no reason whatsoever
for believing a general proposition also lacks support from the claims that follow
from it. The obstacle is that general propositions require evidence, and the
fact that they are accepted in certain contexts without question does not
show that the person accepting them is necessarily entitled to d o so.
Assumption ( 2 ) offers a partial interpretation of the demand that basic
propositions provide evidence for other propositions. For the simple reason
that a great many of the things we claim to know concern physical objects,
foundationalists hold that a theory of knowledge must show how we come
to have evidence for physicalistic propositions, i.e., propositions which entail
that physical objects exist. This is necessary if a theory is to avoid skepticism
about the extent of human knowledge. In addition, physicalistic propositions
have long been regarded by foundationalists as prime examples of the sort of
proposition standing in need of evidence. Since Descartes many philosophers
have thought it part of the purpose of a theory of empirical knowledge to
offer justification for belief in the existence of an external world. Even some
opponents of foundationalism, such as W.V. Quine, view physicalistic claims
as primitive theoretical posits and deny that they can be taken at face value
from an evidential point of view.”
One consequence of ( 2 ) for most foundational theories is that basic pro-
positions themselves cannot entail that physical objects exist. This restriction
is sufficient to prevent theories such as naive realism from being classed as
foundational. Usually pictured as the common man’s theory of perception,
naive realism holds that we directly perceive physical objects or their sensible
qualities. Foundationalists reject naive realism because it fails to explain how
we come to have evidence for physicalistic claims. In Ayer’s words, naive
realism is “not philosophically enlightening , . . it offers no account of the
way in which things are known”.” Positivistic epistemologies which recognize
observation statements as basic, and take these to describe physical objects
in various ways, are open to the same objection.
Assumption (3) would appear to be noncontroversial and is already
implicit in a number of the points made up to now. Nevertheless, it is import-
ant to notice that the principle that basic propositions do not require evidence
concerns the conditions beliefs must satisfy in order to be justified. Ordinarily
we hold that S is justified in believing that p only on the condition that there
is some further proposition, q , such that q provides evidence for p , and S
believes that q. What is meant in saying that a proposition does not require
evidence is that this prerequisite does not apply in its case. According to

lo W.V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960), 96.
l1 A.J. Aycr, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 8 2 .
 A DEFINITION OF FOUNDATIONALISM 23
foundationalists a person does not need to have evidence for a basic pro-
position because, simply from the fact that he believes it, it follows that the
belief is justified. It is clear why foundationalists maintain that it is un-
necessary to look to other beliefs to justify acceptance of basic propositions.
If a person is justified in holding a belief only when he holds others which
support it, questions regarding any beliefs justification will have to be
answered by reference to that of others, and so the regress of epistemic
justification begins. The major issue foundational theories speak to is how
justified beliefs differ from unjustified ones, and the whole foundationalist
account of justification collapses unless it is assumed that even without
evidence acceptance of basic propositions is justified.
Some theories which in other respects closely resemble foundationalism
deny (3). The requirement is rejected, for example, in certain theories
proposed by Neurath, Goodman, and the later Carnap.12 The aim of epistem-
ology according to these philosophers is to provide a rational reconstruction
of knowledge and each adopts a principle of tolerance which allows for the
possibility of various alternative methods of reconstruction. On this view
it is a mistake to restrict basic propositions to those which are justified.
As many different kinds of propositions can be basic as there are different
possible reconstructions; each reconstruction shows, in effect, that the pro-
positions it begins with do no require evidence. The objection foundationalists
bring against such relativistic theories is that they ignore the requirement
Aristotle imposed in defining a basic truth as one “which has n o other prior
to it”. When the question of a proposition’s need for evidence is relativized
to a particular reconstructive framework, the issue of epistemic priority
disappears and one can no longer be certain that belief in the proposition is
justified regardless of the evidence for it. Foundationalists, in contrast, intro-
duce the notion of basic propositions precisely for the purpose of distinguish-
ing justified from unjustified beliefs.

It should be clear at this point how I propose to define foundationalism. A

foundational theory of knowledge is one which accepts the doctrine of basic
propositions sketched above and, in addition, adopts assumptions (1)-(3)
discussed in the previous section. The two main formal features of found-
ational theories are that they take basic propositions to provide evidence for
other propositions but do not regard basic propositions as requiring evidence
themselves. The substantive principles (1)-(3) offer a partial interpretation of
these features, and so have the effect of restricting the content of basic prop-
’’ See Otto Neurath, “Protocol Sentences”, in Logical Positivism, ed. by A.J. Ayer
(New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 199-208; Nelson Goodman, The Structure of
Appearance (Cambridse: Harvard University Press, 1951); and Rudolf Carnap, “Uber
Protokollsa’tze”, Erkenntnis, 3 (1932-33), pp. 215-28, and The Logical Syntax of
Language (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1937).
24 ERIC STIFFLER
ositions without fully determining it. By steering a middle course between
formal and substantive conditions, the definition allows for great diversity of
opinion within the broad outlines of the theory.
Aside from its simplicity, a further advantage of the definition is that it
succeeds in distinguishing foundational theories from several close cousins,
among them contextualism, naive realism, certain positivistic accounts of
observation, and relativistic reconstructive theories. It goes without saying
that the definition also draws a clear boundary between foundationalism and
two radical alternatives that have lately gained currency, naturalistic epistem-
ology and the coherence theory. Naturalistic epistemologists have no use for
the notion of basic propositions because they argue that human knowledge
should be studied as a natural phenomenon, using the most suggestive theories
and results of the natural sciences, and approach questions of evidence from
the point of view of the mechanism of acceptance and its reliability as a
means of acquiring information about the world. Coherence theories offer a
more traditional account of evidence but also deny the need for basic pro-
positions inasmuch as they hold that evidence for a claim consists in its
cohering with a maximally comprehensive set of claims, the members of
which are not limited to basic propositions.
It has recently been suggested that some of the disputes between found-
ationalists and their opponents, especially advocates of the coherence theory,
might be resolved if we recognize weaker and stronger strains within the
foundationalsit t r a d i t i ~ n . ’While
~ it is beyond the scope of the present paper
to determine how far reconciliation is possible, the notion that there may be
two distinct versions of foundationalism provides an interesting test case for
our definition. According to the suggestion, foundationalists part company
over the issue of the kind of justification or warrant attaching to acceptance
of basic propositions. One school of thought, which leads to a modest version
of foundationalism, endorses the view that basic propositions need only be
self-warranted; other, more radical foundationalists reject self-warrant and
claim that basic propositions need a stronger form of justification, e.g., one
which involves certainty or is sufficient to guarantee their truth. Our de-
finition clearly counts the stronger theories as foundational. The question is
whether it can also recognize the weaker variant.
How we answer this question depends, of course, on our understanding
of self-warrant. Here it is helpful to consider three alternative accounts dis-
tinguished by Roderick Firth.14 The first maintains that the justification of
a basic proposition may be increased when it receives support from other

‘ 3 This suggestion is made by Mark Pastin, a leading proponent of modest found-

a ionalism and Self-warrant”, in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, pp. 279-88.
Much of the recent interest in modest foundationism stems from Firth’s influential
“Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority”, in Empirical Knowledge. Readings from
Contemporary Sources, pp. 459-70. The three accounts I sketch are presented by Firth
as progressively weaker positions regarding the warrant of expressive judgments on pp.
466-67.
 A DEFINITION OF FOUNDATIONALISM 25
propositions, e g , by cohering with them, and decreased when it fails to
receive support, but in no case is its warrant ever diminished to the point
where a person would be more justified in disbelieving the proposition than
in believing it. Second, it might be assumed that a basic proposition has some
initial justification which is not defeasible through failure to receive support
from other propositions; nevertheless, the degree of initial justification is
not great enough to insure that a person who accepts the proposition is
always more justified in believing it than in disbelieving it. Or, thirdly, one
could adopt the second view with the exception that even the initial justific-
ation of basic propositions is held to be defeasible. While each of these altern-
atives provides a plausible account of the notion of noninferential warrant,
only the first is compatible with the proposed definition of foundationalism.
This is due to the definition’s demand that basic propositions not require
evidence in a sense relevant to a person’s being justified in accepting them.
Presumably a proposition does not require evidence for the purpose of justi-
fying belief only if a person would at least be more justified in believing the
proposition than in disbelieving it, even in the absence of supporting evidence.
As the other two accounts explicitly reject this restriction, theories which
take these views of self-warrant as definitive of basic propositions do not
qualify as foundational according to the definition.
Although I cannot argue convincingly for it here, it seems to me that the
definition’s handling of modest theories is in keeping with the main tenets
of foundationalism. In particular, foundationalism’s insistence that the regress
of epistemic justication ends at the level of basic propositions argues against
reducing too drastically the degree of noninferential support ascribed to basic
propositions. Stronger, more traditional foundationalist theories, of course,
hold that this support cannot be reduced at all. For them a person who
accepts a basic proposition is always completely justified in doing so. The
fact that the definition permits disagreement on this matter, and thereby
recognizes a range of weaker theories which allow other propositions to
influence somewhat the justification of basic propositions, is a further point
in its favor.

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