Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 45, No.

3, 2011

Kant’s Philosophy of Education: Between

Relational and Systemic Approaches

ANA MARTA GONZÁLEZ

The purpose of this paper is to view Kant’s approach to

education in the broader context of Kant’s philosophy of
culture and history as a process whose direction should be
reflectively assumed by human freedom, in the light of man’s
moral vocation. In this context, some characteristic tensions of
his enlightened approach to education appear. Thus, while
Kant takes the educational process to be a radically moral
enterprise all the way through—and hence, placed in a
relational context—he also aspires to constitute education as
a science, to be improved through experiments, thereby paving
the way for a systemic approach to education; in spite of its
moral inspiration, his systemic approach not only could enter
into conflict with the moral demand of taking each individual
subject as an end, but is also marked by an intrinsic paradox,
already involved in the ambiguity of the term ‘humanity’,
which might mean a) humanity as a moral disposition present
in each individual human being or b) humanity as a whole, as
the ‘human species’.

INTRODUCTION
‘Man is the only being who needs education’ (Kant, ED., 9:441; (1)).1
This is hardly an original thesis. However, Kant’s understanding of the
process of education—which includes ‘nurture, discipline, and teaching,
together with culture’2—constitutes one of the first systematic attempts to
gain a full understanding of the social and political implications of this
process, which, for him, can have only a moral goal. Accordingly, the
purpose of this paper is to look at Kant’s approach to education in the
broader context of Kant’s philosophy of culture and history,3 as a process
whose direction should be reflectively assumed by human freedom, in the
light of man’s moral vocation.
This broader context has been suggested by Moran’s recent approach to
the topic—insofar as she points at framing Kant’s theory of education
within his theory of the highest good.4 However, my interest here is not so
much to argue for the consistency between Kant’s theory of moral agency

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434 A. M. González

and his account of education, as to underline the social and historical

responsibility deriving from his views. This places Kant’s approach to
education within a philosophy of history marked by what Pauline
Kleingeld has described as the ‘self-transformation of society into a moral
community’ (Kleingeld, 1999, p. 61).
As soon as we approach education from this historical perspective,
however, the traditional objection to the compatibility of Kant’s moral
philosophy and his philosophy of history appears sharply under a new
light, as the tension between adopting the promotion of the human race as
our own moral end and taking the humanity of the individual human being
as an end in itself.
As I expect to show, Kant takes educational process to be a radically
moral enterprise all the way through: in no way does he attempts the
instrumentalisation of the individual human being for the good of the
species. This is not only clear from his texts; it is also implied in the fact
that he places education in the context of human relationships, although
acknowledging also that its success largely depends on society cooperat-
ing to this end, under the guidance of enlightened experts. However,
insofar as he aspires to constitute education in a science, to be developed
according to a (moral) concept, and to be improved through experiments,
he also paves the way for a systemic approach to education, which, in spite
of its moral inspiration, not only could enter into conflict with the moral
demand of taking each individual subject as an end, but is also marked by
an intrinsic paradox: this paradox/conflict is present in the ambiguity
involved in the very notion of ‘humanity’, which might be taken to mean
a) a moral disposition present in each individual human being or b) the
human species as a whole. While these two meanings of ‘humanity’
are to a certain extent a matter of ordinary language, the very fact
that Kant explicitly purports a planned self-education of ‘humanity as a
whole’ directly unveils this tension and hence the need for balancing
relational and systemic approaches to education. In this regard, while
nobody denies Kant’s moral approach to education, it could also be argued
that he favours the systemic approach, because he thinks of education
mainly in terms of ‘cultivation of human potentialities’, which, apart from
the moral disposition, can be developed to a certain extent through
pragmatic reason.

I THE GOAL OF EDUCATION

According to Kant, the ultimate goal of education is to attain man’s
destiny, which is no other than achieving full humanity. While in this
context humanity can be taken almost as synonymous with ‘personality’,
we should be aware of the variety of meanings which Kant ascribes to the
term. Thus, sometimes he contrasts humanity and personality, taking the
first in a more pragmatic way; other times, however, he takes humanity in
a clear moral sense, as a synonym of ‘dignity’,5 or personality.6 Yet, even
when he takes the term in this moral sense, sometimes he uses it to mean

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the moral dimension existing in every individual human being, while at

other times he takes it to mean the human race as a whole.

IA Moral and Pragmatic Conceptions of Humanity

While the pragmatic meaning of humanity is fully at work in Kant’s
8
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Kant, 2006), the clearest
example of the distinction between the pragmatic and the moral7meaning
of the term is to be found in the following passage of the Religion:

The predisposition to humanity can be brought under the general title of a

self-love which is physical and yet involves comparison (for which reason
is required); that is, only in comparison with others does one judge oneself
happy or unhappy. Out of this self-love originates the inclination to gain
worth in the opinion of others, [. . .] nature itself wanted to use the idea of
such a competitiveness (which in itself does not exclude reciprocal love)
as only an incentive to culture. Hence the vices that are grafted upon this
inclination can also be named vices of culture [. . .] (REL., 6: 27).

On the other hand,

The predisposition to personality is the susceptibility to respect for the

moral law as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of choice. This
susceptibility to simple respect for the moral law within us would thus be
the moral feeling, which by itself does not yet constitute an end of the
natural predisposition but only insofar as it is an incentive of the power of
choice . . . (REL., 6: 27).

According to these texts from the Religion, then, there would be a

difference between humanity and personality: while humanity accounts
for our social dimension, and moves within the realm of pragmatic reason,
personality accounts for our moral dimension. Important, at any rate, is
that Kant also takes this meaning of personality to be equivalent to
humanity when considered from an intellectual point of view:

The idea of the moral law alone, together with the respect that is
inseparable from it, cannot be properly called a predisposition to
personality; it is personality itself (the idea of humanity considered
wholly intellectually . . . (REL., 6: 28).

Accordingly, we are presented with two considerations of humanity: the

empirical one, which characterises humanity as self-love involving
comparison, and the intellectual one, which characterises humanity as
susceptible to the moral law, even if such susceptibility is not followed by
actual lawful behaviour. For Kant it is this second ‘intellectual’
consideration of humanity that makes every human being worthy of
respect:

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I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a human being; I cannot
withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a human
being, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it (MM., 6:
464).

Against this background, we understand that, in saying that humanity is

the goal of education, Kant is claiming that the educational process must
be guided by the moral law, and should lead to the full flourishing of each
personality. Yet that guidance can have different meanings, depending on
whether we take humanity to mean the original predisposition to the good
in every individual human being—a predisposition which belongs ‘to the
very possibility of human nature’ (REL., 6: 28)—or the idea that
lawgiving reason is attributed to the whole species.

IB Humanity as the Disposition to the Good in the Individual Human Being;

Humanity as a Moral Idea Attributed to Every Individual of the Species
Indeed, as I pointed out above, while in some texts Kant distinguishes
between humanity and human beings, suggesting that humanity is
something in each human being—namely that which makes each human
being worthy of respect, as we have just said, his/her predisposition to the
good7—in other texts ‘humanity’ is not understood as something existing
in every particular human beings, but rather as an idea which lawgiving
reason attributes to the whole species, and only therefore, to every
particular human being. This is the case, for instance, when in the
Metaphysics of Morals he speaks of lawgiving reason as including ‘the
whole species (and so myself as well) in its idea of humanity as such’
(MM., 6: 451).
Now, taken in this second sense—as the idea that lawgiving reason is
attributed to the whole human species—humanity is not necessarily
something we can empirically recognise, but something we should
attribute to every individual human being. This, of course, has immediate
application in the realm of education: lawgiving reason commands us to
treat children as endowed with humanity, i.e. endowed with a
predisposition to the good, even if such predisposition is not empirically
apparent.
Now, humanity as the condition in which lawgiving reason encom-
passes every single human being cannot be confined within a particular
class of human beings, or within a particular political community. Among
the many consequences we could draw from this realisation is the
characteristic cosmopolitan drive of Kantian ethics, which is also a
characteristic of his Theory of Education. Accordingly, the moral goal of
education, as expressed in the ideal of humanity, will include, but will not
be limited to, the upbringing of good citizens.8 Along these lines, one
important part of education is to teach us how to rise above historical
particularities and recognise our common humanity. In Kant’s view, this
requires that education be placed under the guidance of enlightened

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experts. In a text that already anticipates the connection between

education and the philosophy of history, he argues:

Parents care for the home, rulers for the state. Neither have as their aim
the universal good and the perfection to which man is destined, and for
which he has also a natural disposition [. . .] The management of schools
ought, then, to depend entirely upon the judgment of the most enlightened
experts [. . .] It is only through the efforts of people of broader views, who
take an interest in the universal good, and who are capable of entertaining
the idea of a better condition of things in the future, that the gradual
progress of human nature towards its goal is possible (ED., 9: 448; 449;
(16), (17)).

As we can see from this text, Kant regards education as a crucial moment
in the development of humanity, that is, in the development of all of man’s
capacities towards a ‘moral culture’. He holds that enlightened experts
should be in charge of leading the educational process because they are
people of broader views, able to build the educational process for the
improvement of humanity as a whole. Both things are related, because
Kant takes the purpose of education to be the development of man’s
capacities, and this is a work of the whole human race, which involves all
generations and can only be improved if people with authority are ready to
invest in it.9
Yet the fact that individual education could improve insofar as
education of society at large improves—for we would then have better
knowledge of man’s real capacities—does not mean that both ends are the
same; and much less are the actions aimed at those ends the same. The
action aimed at educating a child is obviously different from the action
aimed at gaining experimental knowledge for best educating a child; even
if the experimental knowledge gained through the process of education is
good for improving the educational process, and ultimately society at
large, the goal of improving education and society is different from the
goal of educating one child. While improving education may become the
object of a systemic action, education is always the object of a moral
relationship.
It is at this point that the problem that we stated above appears: can we
assume both ends at the same time, without colliding with the Humanity
Principle, which prescribes that we never use humanity merely as a means,
but always as an end?10
A possible way out of this objection would be to observe that, in
promoting the good of the human race, we are not necessarily taking the
individual human being merely as a means, for this individual can still be
treated simultaneously as an end, and also because, as a rational being, she
should also learn to take an interest in the good of the human race as a
whole. While the latter does not authorise us to bypass the reason and will
of the individual subject we are dealing with, we should remember that in
education we are dealing with human beings who are not yet autonomous
themselves, proper subjects of the Kingdom of Ends.11 In fact, as pointed

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out above, the whole process of education aims at making them

autonomous human agents.
Still, this does not authorise us to drop the difference between education
and experimentation, for, as we saw above,12 legislative reason
encourages us to include every individual human being under the idea
of humanity. Thus, educating one child, as a relational activity, is still
something different from the experimental-scientific activity aiming at
identifying the methods and practices which might possibly improve the
general process of education and raise the cultural level of society at large.
Specifically, while educational techniques, learned through observation
and experimentation, can surely improve the particular aspects of
education linked to pragmatic reason, both at the individual and the
social level, moral education, as something directly linked to personality,
is always beyond the reach of those techniques, and dependent on a
relational approach to education.

II. THE IMPROVEMENT OF HUMAN NATURE THROUGH

EDUCATION
In order to understand the personal nature of moral education, and its
impossible replacement through educational techniques, we have to
understand the way in which Kant envisions the relationship between
nature and education. Generally speaking, Kant envisions the work of
education within a broader plan of improvement of human nature. He
thinks that in this realm, as in many others, the times are ripe for man to
take up the responsibility for his own development towards his own
destiny. Through unexpected ways, Nature—or Providence—has brought
mankind to a point in which reflective and scientific education can replace
tentative and imitative education. The duty of culture—included by Kant
among the duties towards oneself—represents at the individual level what
educational policies should represent at the social level. Humanity
enlightens itself. Yet, in order to do so, first man has to be rescued from
his animal state, and brought up to become an autonomous human being.
The process whereby the human being reaches his maturity is marked by
two key words: ‘discipline’ and ‘culture’.

IIA Discipline and Culture

Kant’s use of the term ‘culture’ is not always consistent: sometimes he
takes it as an equivalent to instruction, at other times he equates it with
technical ability—culture of skill—and still at other times culture
embraces both discipline and instruction, thereby becoming almost a
synonym for ‘education’. However, he usually distinguishes between
‘discipline’ and ‘culture’: while ‘discipline’ implies a negative task,
directed to the correction of faults (hence it is sometimes called ‘negative
culture’), ‘culture’ has a positive meaning: it provides us with information,
instruction, and brings about abilities and skills.13

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It should be noted that this distinction plays a crucial role not only in
Kant’s theory of education, but more generally in the shaping of Kant’s
own system of thought: for while he equates his Critique of Pure Reason
with a discipline of reason, aimed at preventing reason from a transcendent
use, he also speaks of the System of Metaphysics as the culmination of
every ‘Culture of Reason’. In the specific realm of education, however,
discipline can be basically defined by its effect on man’s sensible nature;
thus, according to Kant, ‘discipline changes animal nature into human
nature’ (ED., 9: 441; (3)). By ‘human nature’ he means in this context a
nature able to follow the moral law. Thus, while discipline helps us keep in
check our ‘natural love of freedom’ (ED., 9: 442; (5)), lack of discipline
would lead to unruliness, or ‘independence of law’ (ED., 9: 442; (4)). The
same point is clearly made in the Critique of Judgment:

Culture of training (discipline), is negative, and consists in the liberation

of the will from the despotism of desires, by which we are made, attached
as we are to certain things of nature, incapable of choosing for ourselves,
while we turn into fetters the drives that nature has given us merely for
guidance in order not to neglect or even injure the determination of the
animality in us, while yet we are free enough to tighten or loosen them, to
lengthen or shorten them, as the ends of reason require (KU., 5: 432).

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant speaks of culture as the ‘ultimate end’ of

nature, but takes ‘culture’ mostly in the negative sense, as ‘discipline’,
because in this work he is focused on the disciplining role of nature.14 In
the Education, he differentiates more clearly between both concepts. He
then considers lack of discipline ‘a greater evil than neglect of culture, for
the latter can be remedied later in life, but unruliness cannot be done away
with and a mistake in discipline can never be repaired’ (ED., 9: 443; (7)).
Echoing Rousseau, Kant thinks that ‘In man there are only germs of good’
(ED., 9: 448; (16)); yet, he is also aware of the radical evil in us, consisting
in the propensity to subordinate the moral law to one’s own happiness
(REL., 6: 36); accordingly, he shows more readiness to admit that, in order
to develop those germs, some discipline is required: the role of discipline,
indeed, is to educate inclinations, in order to make them receptive to
higher—that is, moral—ends.15 Otherwise, human nature can easily
deteriorate into something evil: Kant even characterises evil as ‘the result
of nature not being brought under control’ (ED., 9: 448; (16)). Only after
man has been disciplined, can we can think of the perfection of his nature
in a positive way, which is culture. Kant is rather optimistic in this regard:

. . . it is delightful to realize that through education human nature will be

continually improved, and brought to such a condition as is worthy of the
nature of man. This opens out to us the prospect of a happier human race
in the future (ED., 9: 444; (7)).

Now, as we noted above, Kant understands that this perfection is

equivalent to the development of man’s natural gifts ‘in their due

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proportion’ (ED., 9: 445; (10)), according to ‘a conception as to the object

of his existence’ (ED., 9: 445; (10)). In the absence of such a concept, it is
impossible to improve education in a way that can be followed by each
generation. Kant complains about the present educational system, and longs
for a ‘scheme of education better suited to further its objects, and hand
down to posterity directions as to how this scheme may be carried into
practice, so that they might be able to realize it gradually’ (ED., 9: 445; (9)).

IIB The Development of Human Capacities According to a Plan

Indeed: for Kant education is mainly an activity directed towards the
development of human capacities; this is why his approach to education
can easily shift from the consideration of individual education to the
improvement of society at large and back: an increase in the ‘cultural
capital of society’—to put it in contemporary words—will positively
influence the development of capacities of the individual. Yet, there is one
capacity that cannot be expected to develop in this rather natural way
because it is beyond the reach of the causality of nature and the dynamics
of pragmatic reason; this capacity is precisely the moral disposition in us,
which should then become the object of specific education.
For sure, Kant takes the cultivation of both natural and moral capacities
to be something required by the dignity of human nature,16 and thinks also
that ‘under the present educational system, man does not fully attain to the
object of his being’ (ED., 9: 445; (9)). Part of the reason he gives is that
‘education is an art which can only become perfect through the practice of
many generations’ (ED., 9: 446; (11)), and past generations did not have a
clear ‘conception of the perfection which human nature might attain—
even now we have not a very clear idea of the matter’ (ED., 9: 445; (10)).
In his view, this inconvenience can only be overcome as long as we ‘work
out a scheme of education better suited to further its objects, and hand
down to posterity directions as to how this scheme may be carried into
practice, so that they might be able to realize it gradually’ (ED., 9: 445;
(9)). Indeed, for Kant,

. . . each generation, provided with the knowledge of the foregoing one, is

able more and more to bring about an education which shall develop
man’s natural gifts in their due proportion and in relation to their end, and
thus advance the whole human race towards its destiny (ED., 9: 446;
(11)).

Thus, Kant’s reference to the development of ‘man’s natural gifts in their

due proportion and in relation to their end’ has to do with the harmonic
development of every particular human faculty. Yet the same text clearly
shows that Kant does not have in mind solely the development of an
individual human being’s faculties, but that of the whole human race; in
other words: education is viewed in the light of the progress of humanity
as a whole, for which the development of every human potentiality is
requisite. Because he sees education mostly in terms of developing human

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potentialities, Kant suggests the specialisation of the concept of culture

according to the different faculties. Thus, he distinguishes among the
culture of imagination,17 the culture of memory,18 or the culture of
reason19—theoretical as well as practical—implying that each natural
capacity has a possible perfection. At the same time, in light of the moral
ideal, Kant also speaks of a ‘culture of reason’, which involves not only
the development of technical and pragmatic reason, but also specifically
the cultivation of moral reason. This becomes for Kant the end of
education. In other words: education should not merely aim at developing
a culture of skill, or a culture of good manners, but most importantly, a
moral culture. How is this moral culture to come about?

IIC The Constitution of a Moral Culture

The constitution of a moral culture has to be considered from two different
perspectives: from the perspective of proper education—which we are
considering now—and from the perspective of educational policies. In the
Education, Kant is obviously concerned with education in the strict sense,
although, as we have already pointed out, he gives important hints as to
the relevance of educational policies. By this I mean basically his
preference for public over private education,20 as well as his idea that
education should respond to a rational plan21 inspired by a moral ideal.22
In other writings he is even more explicit. Thus, in his essay, An Old
Question Raised Again, he notes:

To expect not simply to train good citizens but good men who can
improve and take care of themselves; to expect that this will eventually
happen by means of education of youth in the home, then in schools on
both the lowest and highest level, in intellectual and moral culture
fortified by religious doctrine—that is desirable, but its success is hardly
to be hoped for [. . .] The whole mechanism of this education has no
coherence if it is not designed in agreement with a well-weighed plan of
the sovereign power, put into play according to the purpose of this plan,
and steadily maintained therein (QQ., 7: 93).

Leaving aside the mechanism of education to focus on its relational

dimension, the attainment of a moral culture depends on teaching children
to act upon principles, and hence autonomously. At this point, however,
we have to consider the practical side of the problem pointed out above: in
order to educate autonomous human agents, we have to engage in a
process marked by heteronomy. The sequence of this process has already
been sketched: the first step in education, after nurturing the infant, is to
subject children’s animal nature to discipline, so that it becomes receptive
to the moral law; then we can start its positive education, which includes
instruction and ability—entrusted to teachers, who train for school only
(ED., 9: 452; (21))—as well as discretion and refinement—entrusted to
tutors, guidance for life (ED., 9: 452; (21))—always with a view to the
development of a moral culture.23

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What interests us here is to stress the fact that moral training must form
part of education, as well as the underlying idea that all preceding
education has to be inspired by the moral ideal included in the idea of
Humanity. Kant thinks that his own times are still far from being inspired
by this ideal: ‘We live in an age of discipline, culture, and refinement, but
we are still a long way off from the age of moral training.’24 And yet, it is
the reference to reason, and hence to the moral ideal, that differentiates
between simply being broken in, or trained, being mechanically taught
and, on the other hand, being enlightened:

Horses and dogs are broken in; and man, too, may be broken in. It is,
however, not enough that children should be merely broken in; for it is of
greater importance that they shall learn to think. By learning to think, man
comes to act according to principles and not at random. Thus we see that a
real education implies a great deal (ED., 9: 450; (19)).

Such an education would entail teaching students how to think, how to act
according to principles, and not merely because of fear or interest, and
how to respect the rules while, at the same time, developing a sense of
one’s freedom and value. Those are just some of the challenges that any
educator, who aims at building up autonomous characters, faces. They led
Kant to insist in the moral dimension of education, as well as in the need
for enlightenment, without thereby forgetting that all education entails
also a mechanical part:

Education and instruction must not be merely mechanical; they must be

founded upon fixed principles: although at the same time education must
not merely proceed by way of reasoning, but must be, in a certain sense,
mechanical (ED., 9: 451; (20)).

III THE EDUCATION OF CHARACTER: BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND

MORAL CULTURE
Kant distinguishes between physical and practical education; while one
part of physical education is that ‘which man has in common with
animals, namely, feeding and tending’,

‘Practical’ or moral training is that which teaches a man how to live as a

free being. (We call anything ‘practical’ which has reference to freedom.)
This is the education of a personal character, of a free being, who is able
to maintain himself, and to take his proper place in society, keeping at the
same time a proper sense of his own individuality.25

For Kant, the goal of education is the cultivation of character, which is

specifically a matter of what Kant calls ‘moral culture’ (ED., 9: 486; (93)),
although it also entails physical education. Moral culture is the most
important part of what he calls ‘practical education’, and it comes last in
order of time, because it is based upon fundamental principles. Nevertheless,

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. . . it must be taken into account from the beginning, at the same time
with physical training; for if moral training be omitted, many faults will
take root in the child, against which all influences of education at a later
stage will be powerless (ED., 9: 455; (33)).

In these words, we can see Kant’s attempt of going beyond that somewhat
rigid distinction between ‘animal nature’ and ‘human nature’ which he
drew in the first place. Obviously, Kant is aware that character involves a
certain discipline of our animal nature so that it becomes docile to the
command of reason. In practice, both dimensions overlap. The way the
child is nurtured and disciplined, the way she is trained to develop certain
skills, while not determinate of her moral condition, can nevertheless
hinder or foster the development of her character. As it becomes apparent
in the next passage, Kant thinks that the child has to be attracted to the
morally good first by a view to his own advantage; immediately after this
motivational path has been somehow taken, the moral motive has to
become the leading one. Kant refers to this complex process, which helps
bring the child from her natural path to a moral path, by the general term
‘machinery’:

It certainly cannot be denied that in order to bring either a mind that is still
uncultivated or one that is degraded onto the track of the morally good in
the first place, some preparatory guidance is needed to attract it by means
of its own advantage or to alarm it by fear of harm; but as soon as this
machinery, these leading strings have had even some effect, the pure
moral motive must be brought to bear on the soul.26

In other words: physical culture—which operates with a view to our own

advantage, for instance, through punishments and prizes—must play a part
in the training of character; the educator has to take it into account, in the
process of education, but always with a view to the development of a
moral character.27 This means that, at some point, the ‘pure moral motive
must be brought to mind’; physical culture is no longer useful for this
purpose, because ‘moral culture must be based upon ‘‘maxims,’’ not upon
discipline’.28
This is—as Kant himself acknowledges—one of the greatest problems
of education:

[H]ow to unite submission to the necessary restraint with the child’s

capability of exercising his freewill . . . How am I to develop the sense of
freedom in spite of the restraint? I am to accustom my pupil to endure a
restraint of his freedom, and at the same time I am to guide him to use his
freedom aright. Without this all education is merely mechanical, and the
child, when his education is over, will never be able to make a proper use
of his freedom (ED., 9: 453; (29)).

Indeed, in order to acquire personality it is not enough for me to act

according to the law, do the right thing; in addition, I must do it for the
right reason, act on principle. Thus, if my lawful behaviour were simply

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forced from the outside, through prizes or punishments, I would be lacking

proper moral worth. In order to act morally well, I need to act from respect
for the law, which is the most adequate moral disposition. Education
should aim at awakening ‘this receptivity to a pure moral interest’, which
Kant considers to be ‘the most powerful incentive to the good’.29 From
this perspective, a moral culture would be that in which moral principles
would become a sort of ‘second nature’ for men (ED., 9: 445; (9)). In his
book on Religion, Kant writes that man’s moral culture should begin,

. . . not with an improvement of his mores, but with the transformation of

his attitude of mind and the establishing of a character, although it is
customary to proceed otherwise and to fight vices individually, while
leaving their universal root undisturbed (REL., 6: 48).

Kant thinks that every human being has a predisposition to the good which
can become a steady attitude of mind if only he is presented with the
example of dutiful actions done out of pure respect for the law.30 This is
why he thinks that morality should be taught in such a way that people
appreciate ordinary duty, instead of being enkindled by heroic deeds.31 He
had expressed the same idea in the Methodology of Pure Practical Reason.
After suggesting that the human propensity to discuss the moral value of
ordinary actions constitutes a good starting point for moral education,32 he
noted,

I do wish that educators would spare their pupils examples of so-called

noble (supermeritorious) actions, with which our sentimental writings so
abound, and would expose them all only to duty and to the worth that a
human being can and must give himself in his own eyes by consciousness
of not having transgressed it; for, whatever runs up into empty wishes and
longings for inaccessible perfection produces mere heroes of romance
who, while they pride themselves on their feeling for extravagant
greatness, release themselves in return from the observance of common
and everyday obligation, which then seems to them insignificant and
petty.33

The fact that Kant prevents against teaching morals by showing

extraordinary examples34 instead of by instilling respect for one’s
ordinary duty, does not mean that he is against all kinds of admiration,
for he thinks that ‘there is one thing in our soul which, if we duly fix our
eye on it, we cannot cease viewing with the highest wonder, and for which
admiration is legitimate and uplifting as well’ (REL., 6: 49). With those
words he refers to the ‘original moral predisposition in us’ (REL., 6: 49);
this sublime vocation—as Kant holds—fills us with wonder, and the
feeling it provokes is a means of awakening our moral dispositions, and
restoring the order among incentives; that is, restoring the purity of the
human heart.35
Nevertheless, Kant contrasts the sublimity involved in the sober
experience of duty’s own ‘sober’ method with the ‘sentimental’

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approaches to education ‘which make the heart languid instead of

strengthening it’. In his view,

. . . it is altogether contrapurposive to set before children, as a model,

actions as noble, magnanimous, meritorious, thinking that one can
captivate them by inspiring enthusiasm for such actions. For, since they
are still so backward in observance of the commonest duty and even in
correct estimation of it, this is tantamount to soon making them
fantasizers (KpV., 5: 157).

For Kant, mere feelings, which stimulate the heart but are fleeting and
leave no trace, are not a good ground for an education in morals;
principles based on concepts are a more solid basis to this end.36 As he
writes in the Metaphysics of Morals:

It is not comparison with any other man whatsoever (with man as he is),
but with the Idea (of humanity), with man as he ought to be, and so
comparison with the law, that must serve as the constant standard of a
teacher’s instruction (MM., 6: 480).

IV IMITATIVE VERSUS SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION

Now, in order to get a true moral education, Kant considers it necessary
that the whole process of education be perfected. As we noted above, Kant
thinks that education is a work of the whole human race, which should be
particularly entrusted to ‘enlightened experts’. Indeed, according to Kant,
no individual human being, no matter how cultivated he is, can ensure that
his pupils attain their destiny. For this to happen, education has to follow a
scheme designed with a view toward furthering humanity.
Kant’s insistence on the need for a scheme, a plan of education, has to
be understood against the background of what he considers the imitative
method characteristic of traditional education.37 On his part, he is ready to
break with the imitative method in educational matters:

The question arises, should we in the education of the individual imitate

the course followed by the education of the human race through its
successive generations? [. . .] Since the development of man’s natural gifts
does not take place of itself, all education is an art. Nature has placed no
instinct in him for that purpose (ED., 9: 446–7(12); (14)).

Kant’s mistrust of traditional ways of education has to do with its

unsystematic style, which he attributes to a lack of reflective judgment,
and ultimately to its explicit lack of grounding in the moral law. For him,
the art of education ‘is only mechanical when we learn by experience
whether anything is useful or harmful to man . . . if education is to develop
human nature so that it may attain the object of its being, it must involve
the exercise of judgment’ (ED., 9: 447; (14)). In his view, the transition

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from mechanic education to education based on judgment constitutes

education as a science:

. . . if . . . the children are to progress beyond their parents, education must

become a study, otherwise we can hope for nothing from it, and one man
whose education has been spoilt will only repeat his own mistakes in
trying to educate others. The mechanism of education must be changed
into a science (ED., 9: 447; (14)).

One of the most basic principles of this science, which enlightened experts
in charge of developing educational schemes should take into account, is
to impart ‘to man a value with regard to the whole human race’:38

Children ought to be educated, not for the present, but for a possibly
improved condition of man in the future; that is, in a manner which is
adapted to the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of man (ED., 9:
447; (15)).

Along these lines, he literally says that ‘education must be cosmopolitan’

(ED., 9: 448; (16)). The cosmopolitan principle is implicit in Kant’s
suggestions for educational policies. One of the reasons he gives for
entrusting the management of schools to ‘enlightened experts’ (ED., 9:
449; (17)) rather than to parents or rulers is that both parents and rulers are
focused on a narrower end than that which is required. In contrast, the
‘enlightened experts’ are supposed to ‘take an interest in the universal
good’, and ‘are capable of entertaining the idea of a better condition of
things in the future,’ so that ‘the gradual progress of human nature towards
its goal is possible’ (ED., 9: 449; (17)).
Likewise, he is of the mind that public education is a better option than
private education, although he does not interpret this division merely in
terms of publicly funded versus privately funded education.39 For him,
public education is concerned with instruction, whereas private education
is in charge of carrying out what is learned in public education (ED., 9:
452; (22)), although Kant also considers the case of a ‘complete public
education’—by which he means ‘one which unites instruction and moral
culture’ (ED., 9: 452; (22)), in the sense we have sketched above—as an
education which nourishes regard for humanity, beyond all particularities.
The sort of institution which combines instruction and moral culture he
calls an ‘educational institute’, whose object—so Kant believes— ‘is the
improvement of home education’ (ED., 9: 452; (23)) by way of
experimentation, ‘and [the education of] individuals, so that in time a
good private education may arise out of these public institutions’ (ED., 9:
452; (23)). Concerned with the economic expenses of public education, he
thinks that ‘if only parents—or those who are their fellow helpers in the
work of education—were well educated themselves, the expense of public
institutions might be avoided’ (ED., 9: 452; (23)).
The idea that the improvement of education involves experimentation is
something that goes hand in hand with Kant’s purpose of making a science

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of this art. Consequently, one of the aspects he admired in the Dessau

Institute was the freedom experienced by its teachers, to develop their own
methods and plans, as well as the communication among them and with
other learned men of Germany. In a way, it was Enlightenment at work;
that is, reason taking up the role nature had played to date, in the education
of mankind:

People imagine, indeed, that experiments in education are unnecessary,

and that we can judge from our reason whether anything is good or not.
This is a great mistake, and experience teaches us that the results of an
experiment are often entirely different from what we expected. Thus we
see that, since we must be guided by experiments, no one generation can
set forth a complete scheme of education. The only experimental school
which had in a measure made a beginning to clear the way was the Dessau
Institute. This must be said in its praise, in spite of the many mistakes with
which we might reproach it—mistakes which attend all conclusions made
from experiments—namely, that still more experiments are required (ED.,
9: 451; (20)).

V EDUCATION WITHIN KANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Kant envisions the whole process of education in the context of a
Philosophy of History typically his own, which counts on the civilising
work of Nature upon humanity, but aims at the development of moral
agency.40 For him, History makes sense insofar as it is viewed as directed
toward the realisation of man’s moral vocation.41 Nature helps the
historical realisation of man’s moral vocation by forcing the development
of sound legal institutions, both at a state and at international level, to
grant perpetual peace.
Indeed, in Kant’s view—as expressed in An Old Question Raised Again:
‘Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?’—humanity will advance
morally, ‘not by the movement of things from bottom to top, but from top
to bottom’ (QQ., 7: 92), that is, by introducing reforms at the higher—
national and cosmopolitan—level, which will then affect the individual
level. As we mentioned above, Kant thinks that,

. . . to expect not simply to train good citizens but good men who can
improve and take care of themselves; to expect that this will eventually
happen by means of education of youth in the home, then in schools on
both the lowest and highest level, in intellectual and moral culture
fortified by religious doctrine—that is desirable, but its success is hardly
to be hoped for (QQ., 7: 93).

He then went on to recommend a plan of education drawn in agreement

with the sovereign power (QQ., 7: 93). The system, however, cannot
conjure up all the problems. Particularly, it cannot conjure up the most
basic problem which has to be faced by every educational theory: man
educates man. Human beings are to be educated and enlightened by other

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human beings, who, in turn, are also in need of education. This makes
education a difficult task, whose difficulty Kant parallels to that of
government:

There are two human inventions which may be considered more difficult
than any others—the art of government, and the art of education: and
people still contend as to their very meaning (ED., 9: 448; (12)).

Indeed, in his Idea for a Universal History Kant raised an analogous

problem, which he called ‘the hardest problem and the last to be solved by
the human species’ (IDEA., 8: 23): Men are to be ruled by men, but the
man who rules is himself in need of a ruler. In An Old Question Raised
Again, he also notes that this would be a hopeless task were it not because
of our hope in a Providence who makes use of the natural rivalry among
men, as shown in historical events, to advance sound legal institutions,
under whose umbrella a moral culture can first develop (see QQ., 7: 93).
That said, a similar problem is raised in the Education:

It is noticeable that man is only educated by man—that is, by men who

have themselves been educated. Hence with some people it is want of
discipline and instruction on their own part which makes them in turn
unfit educators of their pupils. Were some being of higher nature than man
to undertake our education, we should then be able to see what man might
become. It is, however, difficult for us accurately to estimate man’s
natural capabilities, since some things are imparted to man by education,
while other things are only developed by education . . . (ED., 9: 443–4;
(7)).

In this case, however, man cannot simply expect that sound educational
institutions—that is, institutions prepared to educate the moral disposi-
tion—will emerge from the natural rivalry of men, out of a combination of
natural mechanism and pragmatic reason: ‘Providence has willed that man
shall bring forth for himself the good that lies hidden in his nature’ (ED.,
9: 446; (11)). Indeed,

Providence has not placed goodness ready formed in him, but merely as a
tendency and without the distinction of moral law. Man’s duty is to
improve himself; to cultivate his mind; and, when he finds himself going
astray, to bring the moral law to bear upon himself (ED., 9: 446; (12)).

Kant himself recognises that,

. . . upon reflection we shall find this very difficult. Hence the greatest and
most difficult problem to which man can devote himself is the problem of
education. For insight depends on education, and education in its turn
depends on insight (ED., 9: 446; (12)).

This means that, in contrast to the circularity detected in the problem of

government—whose solution through sound legal institutions could be

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expected to a certain extent from a combination of nature and pragmatic

reason—the solution to this new circularity cannot follow the same path.
Since education is a moral enterprise, its advancement cannot be expected
from merely pragmatic reason: it has to come from other human beings.
However, Kant does think that some progress can be made as long as we
apply scientific reason to the whole process, so that, instead of starting
anew in each generation, simply imitating the steps taken by previous
ones, we introduce an adequate scheme of education, which can be
enriched and improved by each generation and transmitted to the next:

Education can only advance by slow degrees, and a true conception of the
method of education can only arise when one generation transmits to the
next its stores of experience and knowledge, each generation adding
something of its own before transmitting them to the following. What vast
culture and experience does not this conception presuppose? It could only
be arrived at a late stage, and we ourselves have not fully realized this
conception (ED., 9: 446; (12)).

In a way, the science of education is assumed to take the role previously

played by Nature or Providence, as to the progress of mankind towards the
moral ideal. The fact that Kant considers this ideal will be better realised
in future generations than in his own does not mean that he takes future
generations to be morally superior to previous ones, unless we take the
phenomenological aspects of human agency as determinant of moral
superiority. As he had noted in An Old Question Raised Again, the profit
humanity gains from progress towards the better is ‘not an ever-growing
quantity of morality with regard to intention, but an increase of the
products of legality in dutiful actions whatever their motives’ (QQ., 7: 91).
The goal of education is to bring the human being from the state of
immaturity to a mature use of his freedom. To this end, education cannot
be merely mechanical and imitative, but rather has to teach humans how to
think and act according to principles. Yet, as he stated in the Groundwork,
there is no empirical way to know whether any given individual, any given
society, has ever fully learned that lesson, that is, has ever acted in a truly
autonomous way.42 Insofar as education is a moral task, its real success is
beyond measure.

VI CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
It is time to take up the problem we advanced above: while Kant considers
the educational process to be a radically moral enterprise, he also aims at
constituting education as a science to be improved through experimenta-
tion, whose results should be accumulated and passed on from one
generation to another. In this way, he introduces a twofold perspective into
the educational process: on the one hand, the proper educational
perspective focuses on the advancement of a particular child, whose
discipline, ability, and discretion is fostered in the light of a moral ideal;
on the other hand, the scientific perspective is interested in enriching our

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knowledge about education, through experiments and reflection, also in

light of the moral ideal, but with a view towards the improvement of
humanity as a whole.
Although the moral ideal provides us with a reference to see the
connection between both processes, it does not cancel the two
perspectives. Indeed, while the educational process can ultimately benefit
from the science of education, they remain at two different levels: the
pragmatic and the moral levels. Something similar could be said of
educational policies, which, according to Kant, should be implemented
under the guidance of enlightened experts; while these policies may be
responsible for increasing the educational level of general population—
which can only have a positive effect on the subsequent education of
individuals—they should not be mistaken for the proper educational
process.
The alliance of educational science and educational policies is not to be
mistaken for the educational process as such. Even if Kant himself paves
the transition from the latter to the former, insofar as he defines education
in terms of ‘developing potentialities’, he still considers the educational
process at the level of personal relationships. In contrast, educational
sciences and policies introduce a systemic consideration of education
whose end is no longer the advancement of an individual human being, but
the progress of the human species.
While Kant is interested in the education of individual human beings,
and holds that only human beings can educate human beings, he is also
interested in advancing the progress of humanity as a whole; on his view,
the progress of humanity has been prepared by nature, and should now be
entrusted to moral reason. However, the fact that Kant thinks of education
mainly in terms of ‘cultivating human potentialities’, and most
potentialities—with the notorious exception of the moral disposition—
can be fostered by pragmatic reason, means that he makes room for
scientific and technical approaches to education, whose end is not so much
the advancement of individual human beings as the improvement of the
average education.
In spite of the moral inspiration of this latter effort, confusing its end
with the end of the educational process would risk a collision with the
moral demand to take each individual subject as an end. The fact that
human beings have to be educated so as to appreciate the value of
humanity and the progress of mankind does not authorise us to experiment
upon them, and hence impose upon them, against their own judgment, the
requirements of educational science or policies. Here, as always, we
should take care not to mix up the perspective of moral agency and that of
the philosopher of history.
Now, given that the subject of education is not an autonomous being
yet, should we draw the conclusion that no system of education can be
ever implemented? Not necessarily. The systematic approach to education
is all right as long as it does not endanger the relational approach, which is
focused on the advancement of an individual human being. Indeed, things
are different when the path towards autonomy is prepared in the context of

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personal relationships, interested not so much in the cold development of

potentialities as in the real good of the person.43

Correspondence: Ana Marta González, Departamento de Filosofı́a,

Edificio de Bibliotecas, Universidad de Navarra E-31080 Pamplona,
Despacho 2331, Spain.
Email: agonzalez@unav.es

NOTES
1. Citations of Kant’s works, even when English translations are used, will follow the usual
standards: Title of the work, volume and page of the Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften,
herausgegeben von der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. However,
citations of the Education will also include the reference to the paragraph in the English
translation by Annette Churton.
The following abbreviations and translations will be used:
ED. Education, A. Churton, trans. (Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1960).
Checked with the ‘Lectures on Pedagogy’, R. B. Louden, trans., in: P. Guyer and A. W. Wood
(eds), ‘Anthropology, History, and Education’, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel
Kant in Translation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 434–485.
GG. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, M. Gregor, trans.; C. M. Korsgaard, intro.
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997).
IDEA. Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, E. Humphrey, trans.
(Indianapolis, IN, Hackett Publishing Company, 1983).
KpV. Critique of Practical Reason, M. Gregor, trans. and ed.; A. Reath, intro. (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
KU. Critique of the Power of Judgment, P. Guyer, and E. Matthews, trans.; P. Guyer, ed.
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000).
MM. Metaphysics of Morals, M. Gregor, trans. and ed.; R. J. Sullivan, intro. (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
QQ. An Old Question Raised Again: ‘Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing’?, L. Beck, R.
Anchor and E. Fackenheim, trans. Originally published by The Liberal Arts Press, 1957;
Reprinted in The Conflict of the Faculties, (New York, Abaris Books, 1979).
REL. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, A. Wood and G. di Giovanni, ed. and
trans.; R. M. Adams, intro. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).
2. ‘According to this, man is in succession infant (requiring nursing), child (requiring discipline)
and scholar (requiring teaching)’ (ED., 9: 441; (1)).
3. See González, 2004, 2009, 2010.
4. Moran, 2009.
5. See Sensen, 2009.
6. Humanity is clearly equated with dignity and personality in MM., 6: 462.
7. ‘It is only through the noble predisposition to the good in us, which makes the human being
worthy of respect, that one can find one who acts contrary to it contemptible (the human being
himself, but not the humanity in him)’ (MM., 6:441).
8. ‘Men need the training of school-teaching or instruction to develop the ability necessary to
success in the various vocations of life. School-teaching bestows upon each member an
individual value of his own. Next, by learning the lesson of discretion in the practical matters of
life, he is educated as a citizen, and becomes of value to his fellow-citizens, learning both how to
accommodate himself to their society and also how to profit by it. Lastly, moral training imparts
to man a value with regard to the whole human race’ (ED., 9: 455; (32)).
9. See ED., 9:443; (7).
10. ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always
at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ (GG., 429). See also GG., 4: 428.

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11. ‘Every rational being, as an end in itself, must be able to regard himself as also giving universal
laws with respect to any law whatsoever to which he may be subject; for it is just this fitness of
his maxims for giving universal law that marks him out as an end itself’ (GG., 4: 438).
12. MM., 6: 451: Lawgiving reason encourages us to include ‘the whole species . . . in its idea of
humanity as such’. Hence, children are also included.
13. See also Kate Moran’s account of negative and positive culture in Moran, 2009.
14. See KU., 5: 431–2.
15. See also KU., 5: 433; 534.
16. ‘Through education human nature will be continually improved, and brought to such a condition
as is worthy of the nature of man’ (ED., 9:444; (7)).
17. ‘As to the culture of the imagination, the following is to be noted. Children generally have a very
lively imagination, which does not need to be expanded or made more intense by the reading of
fairy tales. It needs rather to be curbed and brought under rule, but at the same time should not be
left quite unoccupied’ (ED., 9: 475; (73)).
18. ‘The memory is cultivated 1) by learning the names which are met with in tales, 2) by reading
and writing . . . 3) by languages, which children should first learn by hearing, before they read
anything . . .’ (ED., 9: 474; (70)).
19. ‘As regards the cultivation of the superior mental faculties, this includes the cultivation of the
understanding, judgment, and reason . . .’ (ED., 9: 476; (74)).
20. See ED., 9: 452–3. In those paragraphs, Kant shows preference for public over private education,
but suspects of the compromises derived from public money (ED., 9: 449).
21. On educational terms, he admired the model provided by Dessau Philanthropinum, founded by
Johann Vernhard Basedow (1724–90) in 1774. ‘The present Basedowian institutes are the first
that have come about according to the perfect plan of education. This is the greatest phenomenon
which has appeared in this century for the improvement of the perfection of humanity, through it
all schools in the world will receive another form, and the human race will thereby be freed from
the constraints of the prevailing schools. Akk, 25:722–3.’ Quoted by Robert B. Louden in the
introduction to ‘Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum’ (Louden, 2007, p. 98).
22. ‘Building on Rousseau’s appeal for educational methods that would work with rather than
against nature, the Philanthropinum institutes introduced a variety of pedagogical techniques and
priorities that have since earned a place in the educational mainstream—e.g. conversation-based
approaches to foreign language teaching (including Latin), gymnastics and physical education,
and less stress on memorization. But above all, it was the non-sectarian and cosmopolitan
emphases of Basedow’s curriculum that appealed to Kant’ (Louden, 2007, p. 98).
23. ‘Through education, then, man must be made—First, subject to discipline [. . .] Secondly,
education must also supply men with culture [. . .]; Thirdly, education must also supply a person
with discretion (Klugheit), so that he may be able to conduct himself in society, that he may be
liked, and that he may gain influence. For this a kind of culture is necessary which we call
refinement (Civilisierung) [. . .] Fourthly, moral training must form a part of education. It is not
enough that a man shall be fitted for any end, but his disposition must be so trained that he shall
choose none but good ends—good ends being those which are necessarily approved by everyone,
and which may at the same time be the aim of everyone’ (ED., 9: 449–50; (18)).
24. ED., 9: 451; (19). See also, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View:
‘We are, to a high degree, cultivated beyond bearing by all manner of social convention and
propriety. But we are a long way from being able to regard ourselves as moral’ (IDEA., 8: 26).
25. ED., 9: 455; (31).
26. See KpV., 5: 152. Kant regards man’s respect for the Moral Law as a powerful incentive for
action, and as a disposition which should be carefully cultivated, because it represents the proper
moral ground of our actions.
27. ‘In the first period of childhood the child must learn submission and positive obedience. In the
next stage he should be allowed to think for himself, and to enjoy a certain amount of freedom,
although still obliged to follow certain rules. In the first period, there is a mechanical, in the
second, a moral constraint’ (ED., 9: 453; (27)).
28. ED., 9: 480; (77). ‘Man’s moral capacity would not be virtue were it not produced by the strength
of his resolution in conflict with powerful opposing inclinations. Virtue is the product of pure
practical reason insofar as it gains ascendancy over such inclinations with consciousness of its
supremacy (based on freedom)’ (MM., 6: 477).

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29. See KpV., 5: 152–153.

30. See REL.,6: 48.
31. See also REL.,6: 49.
32. See KpV., 5: 154.
33. KpV., 5: 155. And he explains further, in a note: ‘It is quite advisable to praise actions in which a
great, unselfish, sympathetic disposition or humanity is manifested. But in this case one must call
attention not so much to the elevation of soul, which is very fleeting and transitory, as to the
subjection of the heart to duty, from which a more lasting impression can be expected, because
this brings principles with it (but the former, only ebullitions)’ (KpV., 5: 156, footnote).
34. ‘For, a maxim of virtue consists precisely in the subjective autonomy of each human being’s
practical reason and so implies that the law itself, not the conduct of other human beings, must
serve as our incentive. Accordingly, a teacher will not tell his naughty pupil: take an example
from that good (orderly, diligent) boy! For this would only cause him to hate that boy, who puts
him in an unfavourable light. A good example (exemplary conduct) should not serve as a model
but only as a proof that it is really possible to act in conformity with duty. So it is not comparison
with any other human being whatsoever (as he is), but with the idea (of humanity), as he ought to
be, and so comparison with the law, that must serve as the constant standard of a teacher’s
instruction’ (MM., 6: 480).
35. See REL., 6: 50.
36. See KpV., 5: 157.
37. ‘Let us suppose the first parents to have been fully developed, and see how they educate their
children. These first parents set their children an example, which the children imitate and in this
way develop some of their own natural gifts. All their gifts cannot, however, be developed in this
way, for it all depends on occasional circumstances what examples children see’ (ED., 9: 445;
(10)).
38. ED., 9: 455; (32). See also ED., 9: 499; (113): ‘There exists something in our minds which causes
us to take an interest (a) in ourselves, (b) in those with whom we have been brought up, and (c)
there should also be an interest in the progress of the world. Children should be made acquainted
with this interest, so that it may give warmth to their hearts. They should learn to rejoice at the
world’s progress, although it may not be to their own advantage or to that of their country’.
39. Shortly before this paragraph, when referring to the Austrian experiment with normal schools,
Kant had criticized some governmental interventions in education: ‘This is an example of how
government might interfere in the education of subjects, and how much evil might arise from
compulsion’ (ED., 9: 451; (20)).
40. See ANTH., 7: 328.
41. Unlike Kleingeld, I think that Kant’s philosophy of history does not depend neither solely nor
mainly on his doctrinal views on nature, but is rather a critical means to provide human agency
with meaning and hope.
42. ‘In fact, it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out with complete certainty a
single case in which the maxim of an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested simple on
moral grounds and on the representation of one’s duty’ (GG., 4: 407).
43. This paper is part of a project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, ‘Moral
Philosophy and Social Sciences’ (FFI2009-09265/FISO). I am thankful to the anonymous
referees of the journal for comments made on the original version of this paper.

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