Of Balloons and Bicycles; or, The Relationship between Ethical Theory and Practical Judgment

Author(s): Albert R. Jonsen

Source: The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 21, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1991), pp. 14-16
Published by: Hastings Center
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3562885
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 HastingsCenterReport,September-October
Of Balloons
and Bicycles
-or-
TheRelationshipbetweenEthicalTheory
and PracticalJudgment
byAlbertR. Jonsen
What has moral theory to do with practicaljudgment?The
practicalethicistcan move by analogyfromcase to case, saying
of most new cases, "Oh,I thinkI'vebeen here before."Theory,
ascendingto a broaderview, can providedirectionswhen the
ethicistfindsherselfinunfamiliar
territory.
he relationshipbetweenethical
theory and practicaljudgment is
not a happy or a stableone; while
the two live together in some fashion,
the terms of the cohabitation are not
clear to most interested observers. I
have to wonderwhat it is thatmost of us
see as the signs of instability.As I reflect
on this I direct your attention to the
photo (opposite) of a wire sculpture
presented to me by one of my students
some yearsago. It depicts a hot-airbal-
loon, made from a toilet float, and a
small tricycle sitting on the ground
beneath the balloon.Letus suppose the
tricycleis a proper, cross-countrycon-
veyance-a bicycle, in fact-and the
image willserve nicelyas a similefor the
relationshipbetween theory and prac-
ticaljudgment:the bicycleis like practi-
caljudgment, the hot-airballoon is like
ethical theory.
By theory, I mean any collection of
meaningful assertions, descriptions,
and explanationsthatattemptto give "a
big picture" about moral beliefs, at-
Albert R. Jonsen is professorof medical
history and ethics, School of Medicine,
University Seattle.
of Washington,
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1991
titudes, and behavior, a picture big
enough that by looking intently at it,
one can answerall the tough questions
that seem important to the proponent
of the theory. I refer to the grand
theories contrivedby thinkersfrom an-
cient times to today: Plato's Ideas,
Aristotle's Telos, Augustine's Two
Cities, St. Thomas's Natural Law,
Luther's Two Kingdoms, Hobbes's
State of Nature, Spinoza'sEthicaMore
Geometrico, Locke's Contract, Kant's
CategoricalImperative,Bentham and
Mill'sUtility,Rawls'sOriginal Position,
and so forth and so on. Obviously,each
of these is radicallydifferent from the
others; yet all are attempts to paint a
picture with a set of ideas that is big
enough and profound enough to make
intellectual sense of the moral life, at
least to the proponents and (because
the proponents wrote these ideas in
books) to those everywhere and
anywherewho read their books.
I want this simile of balloon and
bicycle to make four points. The first
point is that the philosophicalproblem
of the relationshipbetween theory and
practiceis much older than hot-airbal-
loons and bicycles, one of which was
invented in the eighteenth centuryand
the other in the nineteenth. Plato wor-
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ried about the problem and he elegant-
ly describes it in the sixth book of the
Republicwhere he depicts those who
have "the perfect vision [the word is
theoriathe 'vision thing' disdained by
presidents and delighting philo-
sophers] of the other world that orders
the laws about beauty, goodness and
justice in this world" (6.484). Aristotle
struggled with the problem: the sixth
book of the Nichomachean Ethicsdistin-
guishes theoretical wisdom (sophia)
from practical wisdom (phronesis)by
noting that the philosophers Anaxa-
gorasand Thaleshad sophia"ofextraor-
dinary,wonderful, difficult and super-
human things, but such knowledge is
useless because the good they are seek-
ing is not human. Phmnesis, on the other
hand, is concerned with human affairs
and with mattersaboutwhich delibera-
tion is possible"(6.11411b). As he was
about to embark on his great study of
moral behavior, St. Thomas slyly
remarked, "Sermonesmorales univer-
sales sunt minus utiles, eo cquod ac-
tiones sunt in particularibus"(Summa
Theologica2-2ae). His teaching about
the relation between moral scientiaof
principles and the practicaljudgment
of prudence was debated by his fol-
lowers for severalcenturies. Thus, the
problem is not at all new, not at all
simple:who am I to writeanythingnew
or simple about it in the next few lines?
The second point is this: from the
balloon one gets a wide view of the
landscape,and the horizonsarefarand
on all sides. From the bicycle,one sees
only the bumpy road ahead, the fallen
tree limbs, and the dogs in the bushes.
Theory, in this view, is a speculative
fashioning of the scope of human life
or action. It is very loosely tethered to
the ground and can float quite free. It
knows very little about the trials and
dangers, thrills and fun of riding the
bicycle, because it sees the details of
human life only from a great distance,
and often not at all. This distinction
findsitsconcrete realizationin the form
that each of these two kinds of
knowledge takes: theory can be dis-
cussed and argued in serene and un-
specific terms:read Sidgwickor Rawls,
where five hundred pages can go by
*Theoreticalethical discussionsare less
useful, since actions are particular.
 Hastings Center Report, September-October1991

without a detail of the casuists' '"who, of a constellation of ideas, arguments, speak of the weight of principles), nor
what,when, where,why,and how?"The and facts about the case, seen as a are theybalancedagainsteach other (as
point here is obvious: practicaljudg- whole. Justification of any particular we often say). These are, I think, falla-
ment is surrounded, beset by cir- moral claim comes rarelyfrom a single cious metaphors. The weight of any
cumstances; theory is free of them. principle, as many theories would like, ethical consideration comes, not from
Thus the relationship question is, in but usually from the convergence of the principles or maxims invoked, but
part, a question about how the general many considerations, each partially from the more fact-likeconsiderations
statements of theory are linked to the persuasive but together convincing that are piled onto practicaljudgment.
particular and variable statements of with plausible probability.The bike of Note how often, in ethical argument,
practicaljudgment. practicaljudgment pumps and steers we find resolution in quasi-quantifiable
All theory resultsfrom the desire to towardthat probability.The bikerlooks features: how close to death is the
escape from the crowding details of up from time to time at the pennants patient? how great is her pain? how
human business and to enjoy,for a bit, flying from the top of the balloon. On competent is this other patient?in what
the clear,free air and sparklinglight in each, a principle can be emblazoned trimesteris the pregnancy?The weight
which one can see all things together and the biker can recite one or several of principlescomes less from them-
and with etched clarity. Some bal- as he or she steers towarda resolution selves than from the factsthey carryin
loonists, like Plato, thought that this of a case. Practicaljudgment does not any particularcase.
ascent to a wider vision would unite all hang from one clinching argumentbut The fifth point is this: the balloon is
balloonists in one truth; others, like from the hooks of many partiallyper- above the bicycle and they are not con-
Kant,hoped that the higher viewpoint suasiveones. This is why practicaljudg- nected, except by shouting. How does
of the rationalballoonistwould elevate ment is alwaysprobabilistic. the broad view from above get com-
to moral certitude the dusty, muddy The fourth point is this: the balloon municated to the bicyclistbelow?And,
unreliability of earthbound impres- seems weightless. It ascends by throw- if it can be communicated, of what
sions and inclinations.In that clear air, ing out the sandbagsthat press it down relevance is the balloonist'sview to the
lowlymaxims are transmutedinto lofty to the earth. It floats ever upward.The bicyclist?It is probablybest communi-
laws.All theorists,I believe, feel that the bike is firmly on the ground, pressing cated after the balloonist has come
higher you fly the more certainyou are down on it as heavilyas its frame, the down:he or she can tell the earthbound
of where you are. avoirdupois of the rider, and the much about the general topography,
The third point follows from the amplitude of the lunch and other gear informing the bicyclistto look for cer-
second: the balloon floats free on the the rider is hauling. This suggests that tain landmarksin the earthlybike trip,
wind;the bicyclehas to be pumped and the principlesthat fly from the balloon warning that over the next hill is an
steered. Theory can be created by the are not themselves weighty (we often unpassable river, indicating that the
intelligent imagination:Hobbes's State
of Nature or Rawls'sOriginal Position
comes into existence as the imagination
moves in lines of geometrical and logi-
cal clarity. Practical judgment en-
counters many variables,and the path
of reasoning cannot be navigated
withouttakingthem into account.They
cannot be fitted, in any way, into the
process of deductive reasoning that
works well for theory. Those variables
are not even algebraic--that is, having
only quantity.They are of every quality
known to the human condition. They
are not only qualitative,they are multi-
ple and heterogeneous. Theory can-
indeed, must-overlook most of them
and adopt but one as significant, as
Rawls'sdoes self-interestor Kant'sduty;
practical judgment cannot overlook
anyof them. Thuswe sidewithAristotle,
who affirmed that "phronesis deals with
the ultimate particularand this is done
by perception (aisthesis)rather than
science (episteme)" (6.1142a). The per-
ception or aisthesisof which he speaks,
in my reading of the text, is not an
insight or intuition into the essence of
the problem, but the appreciativesight

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 Hastings Center Report, September-October1991
bike is moving in a circle and going
nowhere. These are the "principles"to
keep in mind as one wandersalong the
path. They tell where to turn or to stop.
They tell us how to keep going straight.
They tell us whether we are getting
anywhere. They do not, however, tell
much about actually navigating the
rough road. They may tell us the fron-
tiers between various human enter-
prises: where ethics ends and law
begins, where personal freedom
prevailsagainst social constraints,and
so forth. They do not tell us how this
conflict of personal freedom versusso-
cial constraint is to be resolved. That
depends on the condition of the road.
An occasional shout from the bal-
loon can be important to the bicyclist:
he or she might be pedaling off a cliff.
The balloonist's view can warn that a
particularresolution of a problem has
implications that the bicyclist would
want to avoid.We see this,for instance,
in the contemporarycritiqueof simple
consequentialism:the critics,by doing
some high-altitude calculations about
practical reasoning, see impassable
problemsin the distanceand can shout
to the pragmaticbicyclistthat he needs
a better map.
The lesson of this point is that the
communication between balloon and
bicycle may be important,but it need
be only occasional and sporadic. The
bicyclist can generally navigate pretty
wellwith the help of the immediatedata
of path conditions, road signs, and
familiarlandmarks.Certainveryspecial
ethical enterprises,as when the ethicist
is asked to consider a problem without
precedent-for example, reproductive
technology or genome mapping--
might require a more intense com-
munication between balloon and bike.
Even the biker who is generally com-
petent to get along on his or her own
may appreciate directions from the
higher viewpoint when engaged in a
long-distance race over unknown ter-
ritory.It is, I think, misleading to speak
of "applicationof theory to practical
judgment," for that gives the impres-
sion that the balloon of theory must
constantly direct the biker, like radar
directsthe pilot in a fog.
The finalpoint is this:byshowingyou
the balloon and the bicycle,I haveused
one form of the rhetorical device of
analogy:theory is like a balloon in some
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respectsand not alike in others;practi-
caljudgmentissomethinglike abicycle.
It is analogy that makes practicaljudg-
ment move; the comparison to similar,
but somewhat different cases is the
compelling reasoningthatpowersprac-
ticaljudgment.Analogyisrarelycentral
to theory, although certain images,
such as Plato'sCave and Locke's Con-
tract can serve to start off theoretical
construction. Theory likes to be a
whole, uniform, original construction,
laying its foundations on fresh soil and
building its own conceptual rooms in
Palladian symmetry. (Pardon the
momentary shiftof metaphor.)In prac-
tical judgment, however, reasoning
moves by analogy from case to case,
sorting out what is similar and what
different and how those differences
demand different resolution. Practical
judgment is a bike ride through partial-
ly remembered terrain. The practical
ethicist can sayof most new cases, "Oh,
I think I've been here before, even
though it looks a bit different now."
Theory may sometimes provide the
valuable warnings of which I spoke
above; it does so particularlywhen the
going gets rough and analogical
reasoning reaches dead ends, that is,
mustseek for ajustificationof the entire
line of analogical reasoning. Stephen
Toulmin and I give an example of this
in Abuse of Casuistry.the ethics of
sexuality, most of whose traditional
problems-adultery, fornication,
homosexuality-have been thought
about analogically, has always de-
pended on the permanence of dual
gender. Sex-changeoperationsradical-
ly undermine the line of analogical
reasoning and require recourse to
some new theory of sexuality. Many
other examples can be offered, but for
the run of practical judgment, the
bicyclist need never, or hardly ever,
glance up at the balloon of theory.
I wish to conclude my remarks by
quoting one of the high theorists of
modern moralphilosophy,C. D. Broad.
The last paragraph of his Five Typesof
Ethical Theory(1930), which gave a
strong impetus to interest in theory,
reads:
Rightaction [can be compared] to
playing a ball rightly at tennis or
cricket,and the theory of right ac-
tion [can be compared] to the
mechanical and hydrodynamical
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theoryofaction of the racketor bat
and the flight of the ball.The good
player responds, without explicit
analysisor calculation, to a highly
complex situationbyactionswhich
an observer possessed of super-
human powers of analysiswould
deduce as the solution of his equa-
tions. We can no more learn to act
rightlyby appealing to the theory
ofright action thanwe can playgolf
well by appealing to the mathe-
matical theory of the flight of the
golf ball. And yet it might have a
certain slightpracticalapplication.
It may lead us to look out for cer-
tain systematic faults which we
should not otherwise have
suspected ... But in the main the
old sayingis true:non in dialectica
complacuit Deo salvum facere
populum suum [a saying at-
tributed, I think, to Anselm and
meaning, "God does not save the
worldbylogic"].Not thatthisis any
objection to dialectic.For salvation
is not everything;and to try to un-
derstandin outline whatone solves
ambulandoin detail is quite good
fun for those people who like that
sort of thing.
I conclude this fancifuljourney on
twovehiclesby noting that all of us who
work in bioethics must enjoy that good
fun from time to time. We need to take
the balloon ride, or at least, see the
balloons in the air. The balloon of
theory can give us orientation of mind
and exhilarationof moral imagination.
However, we are not tethered to the
balloon;we do not need it for moment-
to moment directions through practi-
cal ethical problems.The balloon is an
occasional extravagance.The bicycleis
dailytransportationand exercise.