Received 16 July 2022, accepted 29 August 2022, date of publication 6 September 2022, date of current version 15 September 2022.

Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3204793

Authenticated Secure Quantum-Based

Communication Scheme in
Internet-of-Drones Deployment
HUSSEIN ABULKASIM 1,2 , (Member, IEEE), BRIAN GONCALVES 1,

ATEFEH MASHATAN 1 , AND SHOHINI GHOSE3,4

1 Cybersecurity Research Laboratory, Ted Rogers School of Information Technology Management, Toronto Metropolitan University, Toronto, ON M5B 2K3,
Canada
2 Faculty of Science, New Valley University, El-Kharga 71511, Egypt
3 Department of Physics and Computer Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, Canada
4 Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada

Corresponding author: Hussein Abulkasim (abulkasim@ryerson.ca)

This work was supported in part by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and in part by NXM Labs Inc.

1 ABSTRACT The rapid advance of manufacturing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, aka drones) has led
2 to a rise in the use of their civilian and commercial applications. The access of these drones to controlled
3 airspace can be efficiently coordinated through particular layered network architecture, often referred to
4 as the Internet-of-Drones (IoD). The nature of IoD, which is deployed in an open-access environment,
5 brings significant safety and security concerns. Classical cryptosystems such as elliptic curve cryptography,
6 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, and Diffie-Hellman are essential building blocks to secure communication in the
7 IoD. However, with the rapid development of quantum computing, it will be easy to break public-key
8 cryptosystems using efficient quantum algorithms like Shor’s algorithm. Thus, building quantum-safe
9 solutions to enhance IoD security has become imperative. Fortunately, quantum technologies can provide
10 unconditional security solutions to protect data and communications in the IoD environment. This paper
11 proposes a quantum-based scheme to prevent unauthorized drones from accessing a specific flight zone
12 and authenticates the identities and shared secret messages of involved entities. To do so, we used a quantum
13 channel to encode the private information based on a pre-shared key and a random key generated in a session.
14 The involved entities also perform mutual authentication and share a secret key. We also provide the security
15 proofs and analysis of the proposed scheme that indicates its resistance to well-known attacks.

16 INDEX TERMS Authentication, internet-of-drones, quantum-based communication, quantum

17 cryptography.

18 I. INTRODUCTION of drones for Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) applica- 25

19 Recently, the IoD has received a lot of attention from both tions. Ongoing developments in communication and wire- 26

20 research and industry thanks to the fact that the IoD can less networked systems make drones attractive systems to be 27

21 provide direct or indirect access to drones. In this scenario, the employed in a wide range of applications and services ranging 28

22 drones may only operate as mobile routers to forward infor- from military to civilian applications. Also, rapid technologi- 29

23 mation to distant nodes or be a part of the operations them- cal advancements in manufacturing high-quality and low-cost 30

24 selves, establishing autonomous swarms or mesh networks commercial drones have opened up a slew of new business 31

opportunities for consumer services like rescue operations, 32

The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and goods delivery, aerial photography and videography, live 33

approving it for publication was Rahim Rahmani . streaming, firefighting, disaster relief, crop spraying, crop 34

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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35 monitoring, etc. By 2025, the potential economic impact of and is significant for scenarios where the communicated data 91

36 integrated UAS is expected to reach $82 billion and generate is of high value to the attackers. 92

37 employment of up to 100,000 individuals, thanks to increased In 2020, Liu et al. [7] experimentally developed an air- 93

38 government initiatives to simplify the regulatory environ- borne mobile quantum communication network using a 94

39 ment [43], [44]. Aerial technology can provide services at a quantum-based drone. They used the quantum-based drones 95

40 lower cost and higher efficiency not easy to provide by tradi- as nodes capable of generating and measuring quantum bits 96

41 tional methods, making giants such as Amazon and Walmart (qubits); hence the drones can build a secure quantum chan- 97

42 praise it as the future of e-commerce. UAS involve critical nel among communicators. Liu et al.’s mobile quantum net- 98

43 strategic and financial information, making them vulnerable work could be used for multiple functions: 1) to interconnect 99

44 to attacks by unauthorized users that target communication, quantum satellites with quantum fiber ground networks; 2) to 100

45 transmitted data, or even physical elements. Without robust connect two quantum ground nodes or servers; 3) to con- 101

46 security and privacy communication systems, drones can be nect quantum drones with other quantum ground nodes or 102

47 used for illegal acts ranging from simple surveillance to seri- users and so on. Their work opens the door for a new era of 103

48 ous crimes like terrorist attacks and targeted assassinations. quantum-based drone development that could be used in real 104

49 In the beginning, researchers and engineers were focused on life. In this paper, we propose an authentication scheme based 105

50 the development of drone architecture and their functional on quantum cryptography for authenticating the involved 106

51 effectiveness without giving much attention to protecting the entities and securing the transmitted data in the IoD deploy- 107

52 integrity or confidentiality of drones’ communications and ment. The network model of the proposed scheme contains 108

53 data. Therefore, several recent papers have been published to various drones deployed in many zones that send their data to 109

54 address the problems of security and privacy based on classi- a ground station. We will prove the security of communica- 110

55 cal cryptography [1], [2], [3], [4], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], tion between entities against related common attacks such as 111

56 [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38]. impersonation attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. 112

57 However, none of these recent papers considered the threat of

58 quantum computing and only focused on the classical sense A. MOTIVATION 113

59 of security. In such works, public-key cryptosystems like Previous works have indicated that there are many challenges 114

60 elliptic curve cryptography, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), threatening the expansion of the use of drones for civilian and 115

61 and Diffie-Hellman are essential building blocks to secure military purposes [8]. Among these threats and challenges are 116

62 communication. All these classical cryptosystems have one the authentication of drones and the other involved entities, 117

63 thing in common: they are all based on the difficulty of controlling and hacking of the drones, jamming of the broad- 118

64 solving some complex mathematical problems. To assure the cast communication, and others. Recently, several drone inci- 119

65 security of such cryptosystems, it must be shown that crack- dents have occurred due to a lack of drone authentication. For 120

66 ing them is as difficult as solving an intractable mathematical example, many heavy-traffic airports in different countries 121

67 problem without possessing a secret piece of information. were closed and incurred huge financial losses due to unau- 122

68 The security of such a cryptosystem is guaranteed by the thorized access from suspicious drones (a recent relevant sur- 123

69 hardness of adopted mathematical problems like the discrete vey on this topic can be found in [9]). Therefore, it is crucial 124

70 logarithm problem and the integer factorization problem. to achieve authentication between ground stations and drones 125

71 If an advanced cryptanalysis algorithm defeats the hardness, to check whether a drone is authorized to access a certain 126

72 such a cryptosystem is deemed compromised. In 1994, Shor zone or not. Also, in some special cases, authentication is 127

73 developed a quantum cryptanalysis algorithm that could find needed between a drone and another drone for sharing some 128

74 discrete logarithms and factor integers exponentially faster information as well as authenticating the sensitive transmitted 129

75 than classical algorithms [39]. Shor’s algorithm theoretically messages among participants. The importance of authenti- 130

76 enables quantum computers to crack the majority of public- cation and such incidents motivate the need to propose and 131

77 key cryptosystems currently in use. Quantum computers exist design secure authentication schemes for drones. As a result, 132

78 presently, but they need significant technical improvement to several schemes employed classical cryptosystems to ensure 133

79 be widely utilized. It is believed that a quantum computer with the security and privacy of communications in the IoD envi- 134

80 around 20 million quantum bits (qubits) is required to break ronment [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], 135

81 an RSA-2048 algorithm [40]. Once scaled, quantum comput- [34], [35], [36], [37], [38]. However, Quantum computing 136

82 ers will catastrophically break most of our commonly used can efficiently break those classical cryptosystems that rely 137

83 standardized mechanisms for ensuring the integrity and con- on the complexity of these problems [39]. In 2016, NIST 138

84 fidentiality of the data [5], [6]. Fortunately, quantum cryptog- (National Institute of Standards and Technology) published a 139

85 raphy is able to provide unconditional security for the stored report on post-quantum cryptography, anticipating that a uni- 140

86 and communicated data (i.e., a protocol remains secure even versal quantum computer capable of breaking 2000-bit RSA 141

87 if an attacker has unlimited computing power or a powerful in a few hours will be available by 2030, making the exist- 142

88 quantum computer) [41], [42]. Therefore, securing the com- ing public-key infrastructure (PKI) insecure [45]. Therefore, 143

89 munication of drones based on quantum cryptography could quantum-safe schemes based on quantum cryptography or 144

90 resist the potential threat of a powerful quantum computer post-quantum cryptography to secure the IoD is imperative. 145

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FIGURE 1. Proposed model.

146 B. RELATED WORK based on classical cryptosystems, which are vulnerable to the 181

147 In 2018, Wazid et al. [10] provided a comparative study on massive power of a quantum computer or classical computing 182

148 some previous authentication protocols for the IoD in terms resources [5], [6]. As a response to those problems, quantum 183

149 of communication overheads and the features of functionality cryptography, as one of the most mature quantum computing 184

150 and security. They also introduced a generalized taxonomy of applications, has been adopted to provide unconditionally 185

151 the authentication protocols in the IoD environment. More- secure solutions in various communication systems that seek 186

152 over, the authors provided a list of practical challenges for optimal security of sensitive data and communication against 187

153 designing secure authenticated protocols in the IoD deploy- attackers [16]. In 2019, Liu et al. demonstrated a drone-based 188

154 ment. In 2019, Srinivas et al. [11] presented an authenticated mobile communication system for multi-node construction 189

155 lightweight method for users in the IoD environment with and real-time all-location coverage. The designed system has 190

156 temporal credentials. The authors employed the techniques of been proven robust against all-weather conditions and can be 191

157 hash function and fuzzy extractor. Also, they provided a com- scaled to multi-node structures. In 2021, Yu et al. designed 192

158 parative analysis of their proposed mechanisms with other an airborne quantum key distribution model that connects 193

159 existing schemes, demonstrated that their scheme is better in terrestrial networks with satellite networks to establish a real- 194

160 both security and functionality, and has lower computation time on-demand quantum network. These works focused on 195

161 and communication costs. In 2020, Alladi et al. [12] provided the ability to build quantum communication through drones 196

162 a lightweight authentication scheme to secure the communi- and its efficiency in the IoD deployment and did not con- 197

163 cation between drones and their ground stations based on the sider significant security features such as authentication, key 198

164 technique of Physical Unclonable Function. Pu and Li [31] sharing, and key management. Inspired by Liu et al. [7] and 199

165 presented a lightweight authentication scheme to provide other related works [17], [18], [19], this work introduces a 200

166 secure communications between ground stations and drones. robust and lightweight authentication scheme to secure the 201

167 The basic idea behind their scheme is that the ground station communication and data in the IoD deployment. 202

168 and drone employ the chaotic maps’ seed value to randomly
169 rearrange genuine messages according to the created chaotic C. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 203

170 sequence. Also, Pu et al. [22] proposed a lightweight mutual •We propose a mutual identity and message authentica- 204

171 authentication and key agreement scheme with protecting pri- tion scheme between the drones and the ground stations. 205

172 vacy for the IoD. A chaotic system and physical unclonable • A pre-shared secret key can be reused without informa- 206

173 function are used to provide mutual authentication and create tion leaks. 207

174 a session key between IoD system communication parties. • Sharing a secure random key among authenticated enti- 208

175 However, drones are vulnerable to device capturing and cer- ties for securing transmitted data. 209

176 tain types of attacks because of remote environments and • The proposed model is secure against well-known 210

177 limited resources. This raises the possibility of attackers steal- attacks. 211

178 ing drone data. In the same context, several authentication The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 212

179 protocols have been presented [3], [4], [13], [14], [15]. How- In Section II, we introduce the model considered for the 213

180 ever, securing communication channels in such schemes are main result of this paper, provide a table of notation, then 214

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FIGURE 2. Database server pre-shares Kd g with both the drone and the ground station and preloads the drone data into the drone before taking off. The
dashed line refers to a quantum channel.

215 describe our new protocol. Section III introduces system has the ability to intercept the communication channels 255

216 models. In Section IV, we prove the security of our protocol and can also forge or modify the exchanged message. 256

217 against an adversary attempting to become authenticated and • It is possible that an adversary has unlimited computing 257

218 access a secret session key. We then provide a description power and can use it to apply powerful computational 258

219 of other possible attacks that an adversary may attempt and attacks. However, the server and ground stations are 259

220 argue security against such attacks. considered secure entities in this work. Thus, the adver- 260

sary cannot extract useful information from the quan- 261

221 II. SYSTEM MODELS
tum channels that are information-theoretically-secure 262
222 We consider two models in designing the proposed work as
thanks to the principles of quantum physics. 263
223 follows.
224 A. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS III. THE PROPOSED WORK 264

225 Fig. 1 depicts the network model for remote mutual authenti- In this paper, we consider the following model of drones, 265

226 cation. The airspace includes multiple fly zones, and each fly ground stations, and a central control room with a database 266

227 zone may contain several drones in order to monitor a certain server. The database server is able to communicate with each 267

228 environment according to the network concept. A deployed ground station and each pre-take off drone through secure 268

229 drone in a certain fly zone collects targeted data from the sur- private channels. Each ground station is also able to commu- 269

230 rounding environment and transmits it to a database server in nicate with the drones within a known fly zone but cannot 270

231 a control room through a ground station. The database server communicate with other ground stations. The drones are able 271

232 stores sensitive information related to all involved entities to communicate with other drones within and beyond their 272

233 and the airspace. It also stores the data collected by legit- current fly zone. 273

234 imate drones. An internal trusted user in the control room

235 can access the control room’s database server to monitor the A. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION BETWEEN THE DRONE 274

236 IoD system. Quantum technologies are used to provide secure AND GROUND STATIONS 275

237 wired/wireless connectivity in the IoD environment. Private Before a drone d takes off, the database server pre-shares 276

238 keys are pre-shared between the server and the involved enti- a secret Kdg with both a drone (d) and a ground station (g) 277

239 ties (i.e., drones and ground station) through a secure private through a secure private channel (see also Fig. 2). Addition- 278

240 channel. Generally, a drone in a specific fly zone and a ground ally, the database server preloads IDg and FPd into the d, 279

241 station must authenticate each other before establishing a and sends IDd and FPd to g through a secure private channel. 280

242 secure session key to secure their future communications. Throughout this work, we assume that quantum channels are 281

243 This work assumes that the server, drones, and ground sta- optimal, i.e., quantum channels are noiseless and lossless. 282

244 tion are equipped with quantum capabilities to generate and Also, we assume that all involved entities agree on the four 283

245 measure quantum photons. We also assume that quantum Bell states {|φ00 i , |φ01 i , |φ10 i , |φ11 i}, indicated in (1), and 284

246 channels are optimal, i.e., quantum channels are noiseless the four unitary operations {σ00 , σ01 , σ10 , σ11 }, indicated in 285

247 and lossless. Each drone has a GPS, inertial measurement (2), to represent the four two-bits classical information {00, 286

248 units, and inertial navigation system to determine its present 01, 10, 11}, respectively. 287

249 geographical location and mobility. √ √

|φ00 i = (|00i + |11i)/ 2 = (|++i + |−−i)/ 2, 288
√ √
250 B. THREAT MODEL |φ01 i = (|00i − |11i)/ 2 = (|++i − |−−i)/ 2, 289
√ √
251 Our threat model is based on the following principles: |φ10 i = (|01i + |10i)/ 2 = (|+−i + |+−i)/ 2, 290
√ √
252 • Drones are usually deployed in unattended or hostile |φ11 i = (|01i − |10i)/ 2 = (|+−i − |+−i)/ 2. (1) 291
 
253 environments. Thus, involved entities can use public 1 0
σ00 = |0i h0| + |1i h1| = , 292
254 channels and endpoint nodes are honest. An adversary 0 1

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TABLE 1. List of notifications. bk1 represents the selected measurement bases based on k1 . 324

Similarly, d determines the initial basis for each qubit in the 325

sequence S1 k S2 based on the pre-shared key k2 producing 326

Sd = bk2 (S1 k S2 ) according to the same rule, i.e., if k2,i = 327

0 the drone d selects the Z − basis to transfer the correspond- 328

ing qubit in the sequence S1 k S2 ; otherwise, the drone d 329

selects the X − basis to transfer the corresponding qubit in 330

the sequence S1 k S2 , where bk2 represents the selected mea- 331

surement bases based on k2 . Here, k1 = k1,1 , k1,2 , . . . , k1,3n , 332

k2 = k2,1 , k2,2 , . . . , k2,3n and i = 1, 2, . . . , 3n. 333

Step 5: The drone d generates a sufficient number of 334

decoy-qubits, where every decoy-qubit is randomly selected 335

from the quantum states {|0i , |1i , |+i = √1 (|0i + |1i), 336
2
or |−i = √1 (|0i−|1i}. Then, d randomly inserts these decoy- 337
2
qubits re , and S .
into the sequences S0 , S34 338
d
Step 6: Through a quantum channel, d sends the sequences 339
re and S to the ground station g.
S0 , S34 340
d
Step 7: Upon g receiving S0 , S34 re and S , the drone d 341
d
announces the positions of each decoy-qubits and its cor- 342

responding initial bases to g. Subsequently, based on the 343

  received information, g measures these decoy-qubits to com- 344

0 1 pute the error value. If the error rate is lower than a preset 345
293 σ01 = |0i h1| + |1i h0| = ,
1 0 value, d and g continue to the next process. Otherwise, they 346

1 0
 must terminate the protocol. 347
294 σ10 = |0i h0| − |1i h1| = , Step 8: Upon confirming that the quantum channel 348
0 −1
  between d and g is secure, d sends the hashing value of the 349
0 1
295 σ11 = |0i h1| − |1i h0| = . (2) random key rd , i.e., h(rd ), to g through a quantum channel. d 350
−1 0 and g also employs the decoy-qubits technique used in Step 5 351

296 The detailed steps of the proposed model are as follows: and Step 7 to ensure the security of transmitting h(rd ). 352

297 Step 1: The drone d prepares the sequence S0 = h(IDd ⊕ Step 9: The ground station g checks whether S0 = h(IDdj ⊕ 353

298 IDg ), where IDd and IDg represent the destination identity of IDg ) is identical with its corresponding data (i.e., S00 = 354

299 the drone d and the ground station g, respectively. h(IDd ⊕ IDg )0 ) or not. If S0 = S00 ; g partially authenticates 355

300 Step 2: The drone d randomly generates 3n Bell quan- the identity of d and continues to the next step. Otherwise, g 356

301 tum states selected from the agreed four Bell states in (2). revokes d’s request and ends the protocol. 357

302 Then, d divides the 3n Bell states into four sequences: Step 10: Upon confirming that S0 is valid, g uses the pre- 358

303 S1 = d1 , d2 , . . . , dn , S2 = dn+1 , dn+2 , . . . , d3n , S3 = shared key (k2 ) and the rules indicated in Step 4 to measure 359

304 g1 , g2 , . . . , gn , and S4 = gn+1 , gn+2 , . . . , g3n . Here, di and gi (S1 kS2 ) getting (S30 kS40 ) ; note, if g has the identical pre-shared 360

305 (i = 1, 2, . . . , 3n) represent the first and the second photons key (k2 ), (S10 k S20 ) is identical to (S1 k S2 ). Also, g uses the 361

306 of the ith Bell state, respectively. pre-shared key k1 and the rules indicated in Step 4 to measure 362
re = b (S 0 | S 0 ) getting (S 00 k S 00 ); note, if g has the identical
S34
307 Step 3: d creates an n − bit random number (rd ) and gets k1 3 4 3 4 363

308 (rd ⊕ md ) k (h(rd ) ⊕ h(md )) by using the XOR operation pre-shared key (k1 ), (S30 kS40 ) is identical to (S300 kS400 ). Based on 364

309 and then the one-way hash function. Using the four unitary (mg kh(mg )), g applies unitary operations selected from the set 365

310 operations {σ00 , σ01 , σ10 , σ11 }, d encodes rd and (rd ⊕ md ) k {σ00 , σ01 , σ10 , σ11 } to S400 getting a new evolved sequence S4000 . 366

311 (h(rd ) ⊕ h(md )) on S3 and S4 , respectively, obtaining S30 = Step 11: Using Bell measurement, g measures every corre- 367

312 er (S3 ) and S40 = e(rd ⊕md )k(h(rd )⊕h(md )) S4 , where e represents sponding pair (di and gi ) in (S30 k S40 ) and (S300 k S4000 ) getting the 368

313 the encoding process based on the four unitary operations. result rd0 kM ; note, rd is identical to rd0 if the quantum channels 369

314 For example, when n = 2, if rd = 00 d applies the unitary are secure and g has the matching pre-shared key (Kdg ). The 370

315 operation σ00 on S3 , and if (rd ⊕md )k(h(rd )⊕h(md )) = 0111, ground station g then computes (rd0 kh(rd0 ))⊕M ⊕(mg kh(mg )) 371

316 d applies the unitary operations σ01 and σ11 on S4 . getting a computation result representing m0d k h(md )0 . After 372

317 Step 4: d determines the initial basis for each qubit in the that, g performs two comparisons: 1) g computes h(m0d ) and 373

318 sequence S30 k S40 based on the pre-shared key k1 produc- checks whether h(m0d ) is identical to h(md )0 or not; 2) g com- 374

319 ing S34re = b (S 0 k S 0 ) according to the following rule: if

k1 3 4
putes h(rd0 ) and checks whether h(rd0 ) is identical to h(rd ) 375

320 k1,i = 0 the drone d selects the Z − basis = {|0i , |1i} or not. If so, g knows with certainty that the message is 376

321 to transfer the corresponding qubit in the sequence S30 k S40 ; genuine and fully authenticates the identity of d. Otherwise, 377

322 otherwise, d selects the X − basis = {|+i , |−i} to trans- g and d end the protocol and restart the protocol from the 378

323 fer the corresponding qubit in the sequence S30 k S40 , where beginning. 379

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380 Step 12: g sends M to d through a quantum channel and to be detected, the two parties would restart the session with 435

381 checks the security of transmission with d as in Steps 6 & 7. new random values to be generated. The only information E 436

382 Step 13: Upon confirming the secure transmission of M , g could obtain without the risk of being detected would be the 437

383 also sends h(rd ⊕ Kg ) to d through a quantum channel and announcement of the information of decoy photons, which 438

384 checks the security of transmission with d as in Steps 6 & 7. does not cause leakage of any private information used to 439

385 Step 14: d computes (rd ⊕h(rd ))⊕M ⊕(md ⊕h(md )) getting generate any of the messages in the protocol. Additionally, 440

386 the computation result m0g kh(mg )0 . Subsequently, d computes E is unable to intercept any messages sent between d and g 441

387 h(m0g ) and checks whether h(m0g ) is identical to h(mg )0 or not. without being detected with high probability. This prevents E 442

388 If so, d deduces the shared secret key Kg0 , where m0g = mg = from attempting to recover or inject information needed to be 443

389 IDg k Kg0 . Finally, d checks whether h(rd ⊕ Kg0 ) is identical authenticated and/or get the shared key. Thus, E must attempt 444

390 to h(rd0 ⊕ Kg ) or not. If so, d believes that Kg0 is genuine and to guess the information necessary to be authenticated and get 445

391 authenticates the identity of g. Otherwise, d and g end the the shared key. 446

392 protocol and restart the protocol from the beginning. In Step1, d uses the XOR function to encrypt the IDd and 447

IDg and uses a one-way hash function to produce S0 . Then, 448

393 IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PROOFS based on a randomly generated key rd , the secret data md = 449

394 In this section of the paper, we perform our security anal- IDd kFPd , and the two shared sub-keys k1 and k2 , d creates the 450

sequences S34re and S and sends them to g in Step 6. To get K ,

395 ysis of our proposed protocol beginning with its provable d g 451

396 security against an adversary attempting to be authenticated E needs to 1) successfully guess the generated 3n Bell states; 452

397 and acquire the shared secret key. Following that, we provide 2) get the transmitted sequences S¯0 , S¯34re , S¯ , and h(r¯ ) that
d d 453
re
are sent by d correctly (i.e., S0 , S34 , Sd , and h(rd )); 3) then
398 heuristic arguments for security against additional quantum- 454

399 based attacks. successfully pass the eavesdropping check process in Steps 7 455

& 8. So, the probability (P) of getting Kg is as follows: 456

400 A. THE PROVABLE SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 1) In Step1, d randomly generates 3n Bell states from the 457

401 Definition 1: In [20], Wootters-Zurek introduced the four states in (1). So, the probability (P1) of E correctly 458

402 no-cloning theorem, which proved that it is impossible to guessing the Bell states is as follows: 459

403 duplicate an unknown quantum state without knowing the

1 1
404 polarization basis of that quantum state. Due to the no-cloning P1 = = 6n (3) 460

405 theorem, eavesdroppers cannot infer useful information from 43n 2

406 a quantum channel without being detected. Eavesdroppers 2) To successfully know S0 , S34 re , S , and h(r ), E must cor- 461
d d
407 must know all required information, e.g., the initial bases, rectly guess r¯d , m¯d , k¯1 , and k¯2 . So, the probability (P2) 462

408 to correctly measure the transmitted qubits from one legit- of guessing the correct sequences for E is as follows: 463

409 imate user to another. Without knowing this information

410 before transferring qubits, there is a high probability eaves- P2 = Pr[rd = r¯d ]Pr[md = m¯d ] 464

411 droppers will be caught when they try to intercept them. Pr[k1 = k¯1 ]Pr[k2 = k¯2 ] 465

412 Definition 2: Assume MB ∈ {Z − basis, X − basis} is 1 1 1 1

the qubit-creation algorithm [21]. An observer O has two = n × n × 3n × 3n 466
413 2 2 2 2
414 polarization bases Z − basis, X − basis and receives an arbi- 1
trary single qubit q. O can know q that was generated by = 8n . (4) 467
415
2
416 the algorithm MB with probability ξ . Here, we can define
3) In Steps 7 & 8, d and g employ l decoy photons to detect 468
417 the advantage adv(O) of the observer O to predict the polar-
E. To successfully pass this check, E must correctly
ization bases as adv(O) = ξ − ( 21 ). So, we can say that the
469
418
guess the measurement basis of the targeted photon and 470
419 qubit-creation algorithm (MB) is secure against predicting the
must also guess the initial basis to resend it to g. The 471
420 correct polarization basis when adv(O) is close to Zero or
probability of deciding the correct measurement basis 472
421 negligible.
(z-basis) is 50%, and the probability of deciding the 473
422 Theorem 1: Assume there is an eavesdropper E trying to
initial basis is also 50%. Therefore, the probability (P3) 474
423 authenticate himself and get the shared secret key (Kg ) from
of passing the eavesdropping check is as follows: 475
424 g. The highest probability for the attacker (E) succeeding is
1
425 equal to 22(7n+l) , where l is the length of the decoy-photons 1 1 1
and n is a security parameter. P3 = ( × )l = 2l (5) 476
426 2 2 2
427 Proof of Theorem 1: To prove Theorem 1, we first
Finally, the overall probability of getting Kg is as 477
428 explain why other methods of attack for E cannot be success-
follows: 478
429 ful; thus, the highest probability for E is to guess the informa-
430 tion necessary to authenticate themselves and get the shared P = P1 × P2 × P3 479
431 key. In the next session, we discuss various attacks in more 1 1 1
432 detail. During communications between d and g, E is unable = 6n × 8n × 2l 480
2 2 2
433 to obtain copies of the private messages sent between the two 1
434 parties without a high probability of being detected. If E were = 2(7n+l) . (6) 481
2
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 H. Abulkasim et al.: Authenticated Secure Quantum-Based Communication Scheme in IoD Deployment

FIGURE 3. Steps of the proposed method. The dashed arrow represents a quantum channel.

482 B. FURTHER SECURITY DISCUSSIONS proposed protocol can prevent the information leakage issue. 491

In the proposed protocol, the drone transfers S0 , S34 re , and

483 We now discuss additional security notions that an adversary 492

484 may try to exploit to gain information or access to private Sd to the ground station through a quantum channel. These 493

485 information. sequences are encoded based on the Kdg = k1 kk2 , md , and rd . 494

As indicated in Theorem 1, any attackers who try to recover 495

486 1) INFORMATION LEAKAGE secret information will be caught with high probability. More- 496

487 Preventing information leakage is crucial for some quantum over, the decoy-photon protocol [46] that is used for detecting 497

488 authentication protocols that enable attackers to deduce the eavesdroppers in Step 7 just uses the inserted decoy-photons 498

489 secret message or extract useful information from the clas- to check the security of transmission and does not expose any 499

490 sical public channels. In this subsection, we show that the other photons used for encoding secret data. 500

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 H. Abulkasim et al.: Authenticated Secure Quantum-Based Communication Scheme in IoD Deployment

501 In addition, if legitimate users detect an intruder in any

502 step through the protocol, they start the protocol from the
503 beginning. d will select different random Bell states and gen-
504 erate a new rd for encoding the secret information. Hence,
505 the newly transmitted data will be completely different and
506 will be carrying the same secret data as well as the pre-shared
507 keys that can be reused safely. Thus, the proposed protocol is
508 secure against information leakage.
509 2) INTERCEPT-AND-RESEND ATTACK
510 In Steps 6 & 8, before the drone d sends the quantum
511 sequences (S0 , S34re , and S ) to g, it must randomly insert
d
512 decoy-qubits in the states {|0i, |1i, |+i, or |−i} into the FIGURE 4. Probability of detecting intercept-and-resend attacks.
513
re and S . d stores a recording of decoy-qubits
sequences S0 , S34 d
514 positions and sends the quantum sequences to g and asks it to
errors only if |Ei and the targeted states are product states. 551
515 measure these qubits in the two bases Z − basis, X − basis
Therefore, E cannot perform the entangled-and-measure- 552
516 according to their initial bases. Then, d and g check the
attack without being caught. 553
517 measurement results. Since E does not know the positions
518 and the states of the decoy qubits, they will possibly measure
519 them with incorrect bases. Therefore, E will be detected with 4) IMPERSONATION ATTACK 554

520 probability 1 − ( 43 )l , where l is the number of decoy-qubits. In the Case of Impersonating the Drone (d): If the attacker 555

521 Hence, the probability is close to 1 when l is large enough tries to impersonate the drone (d) by sending forged 556
re and S to the ground station, they will
sequences S0a , S34a 557
522 (see also Fig. 4). da
be detected in Step 9 because the attacker does not know IDd 558
523 3) ENTANGLE-AND-MEASURE ATTACK and IDd that are required to produce h(IDd ⊕ IDg ). 559
524 An attacker (E) may steal partial information about secret In Case of Impersonating the Ground Station (g): If the 560
525 messages by using ancillary photons to entangle the qubits attacker tries to impersonate g, they will send to d an invalid 561
526 sent to the ground station and measuring the ancillary pho- data (i.e., M in Step 12 and h(rd0 ⊕ kg ) in Step 13) because the 562
527 tons. E may use a unitary operation UE to entangle a random attacker does not know the pre-shared key (Kdg ) that was used 563
528 qubit on the decoy-qubits and measure the random qubit in to reorder the transmitted sequences. Hence, the attacker can 564
529 the Z − basis or X − basis to steal the secret. In the follow- be detected in Step 14 when d checks whether: 1) h(mg )0 is 565
530 ing, E performs a unitary operation UE to entangle a qubit identical to h(m0g ) or not; 2) h(rd ⊕ Kg0 ) is identical to h(rd0 ⊕ 566
531 |Ei, on the decoy-qubits in the quantum states (|0i, |1i, |+i, Kg ) or not. 567
532 or |−i).
5) MODIFICATION ATTACK 568

533 UE |0i |Ei = a1 |0i |E00 i + a2 |1i |E01 i , In this attack, the attacker tries to modify the contents of 569

534 UE |1i |Ei = a3 |0i |E10 i + a4 |1i |E11 i , (7) the transmitted photons (in Step 2 or Step 6) to make the 570

communicants obtain different secret messages without being 571

535 where |a1 |2 + |a2 |2 = |a3 |2 + |a4 |2 = 1. Since the caught. Then, in the first case, the attacker tries to modify 572
536 decoy-qubits involved in the proposed protocol, the unitary re and S in Step 6 and send the modified quantum
S0 , S34 573
d
537 operation UE must meet the following conditions: re and S to the ground station. But, the
sequences, S0a , S34a 574
da
538 UE |0i |Ei = a1 |0i |E00 i , attacker may also modify the decoy-photons since they can- 575

not distinguish between the decoy-photons and secret pho-

UE |1i |Ei = a4 |1i |E11 i ,
576
539
tons. Thus, the attacker could be detected in Steps 7 & 8 when 577
1
540 UE |+i |Ei = [|+i (a1 |E00 i + a2 |E01 i d and g check the security of the quantum channel. Also, 578
2 even if a single photon has been modified; the ground station 579
541 +a3 |E10 i + a4 |E11 i)],
will detect the modification when checking the hash values of 580
1
542 UE |−i |Ei = [|−i (a1 |E00 i − a2 |E01 i h(IDdj ⊕ IDg ) in Step 9. Also, the attacker may try to modify 581
2 the sequences M transmitted in Step 9. However, both the 582
543 −a3 |E10 i + a4 |E11 i)]. (8)
drone and ground station perform a security check using the 583

544 When the operation of E introduces no error, UE must meet decoy-photon protocol as in Step 7. Thus, the attacker will be 584

545 the following conditions: detected with high probability. 585

546 a1 |E00 i + a2 |E01 i = a3 |E10 i + a4 |E11 i , 6) PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY 586

547 a1 |E00 i − a2 |E01 i = −a3 |E10 i + a4 |E11 i . (9) A proposed scheme supports perfect forward secrecy when 587

an attacker cannot deduce the shared secret key using a com- 588

548 We can easily obtain a1 + a4 = 1 and a2 + a3 = 0, and promised pre-shared secret key of any node. In this work, 589

549 |E00 i = |E11 i. We have UE |0i |Ei = a1 |0i |E00 i , and the final shared secret message/key of the session (Kg ) is 590

550 UE |1i |Ei = a4 |1i |E11 i , which means that E introduces no shared between d and g using a random number rd , that is not 591

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592 included in the pre-shared secret information Kdg , IDg , IDd [5] G. Alagic, J. Alperin-Sheriff, D. Apon, D. Cooper, Q. Dang, and J. Kelsey, 650

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726 2021. Hamilton, ON, Canada, in 2016 and 2018, respec- 799
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744 vehicles networks,’’ Egyptian Informat. J., vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 83–93, the M.Math. degree from the University of Water- 810

745 Mar. 2022. loo, in 2003, and the Ph.D. degree in combinatorics 811

746 [35] A. S. Rajasekaran, A. Maria, F. Al-Turjman, C. Altrjman, and L. Mostarda, and optimization from the University of Waterloo, 812

747 ‘‘Anonymous mutual and batch authentication with location privacy of in 2009. From 2009 to 2012, she was a Scien- 813

748 UAV in FANET,’’ Drones, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 14, Jan. 2022. tific Collaborator at the Security and Cryptography 814
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750 A. Srikanth, ‘‘Toward efficient security-based authentication for the Inter- cation Sciences, Swiss Federal Institute of Tech- 816
751 net of Drones in defense wireless communication,’’ Soft Comput., vol. 26, nology Lausanne (EPFL). From 2012 to 2016, she 817
752 no. 10, pp. 4905–4913, May 2022. was a Senior Information Security Consultant in cryptography at the Cana- 818
753 [37] Y. Tan, J. Wang, J. Liu, and N. Kato, ‘‘Blockchain-assisted distributed dian Imperial Bank of Commerce. Since 2016, she has held a faculty position 819
754 and lightweight authentication service for industrial unmanned aerial at the Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson University), where 820
755 vehicles,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., early access, Jan. 12, 2022, doi: she is currently a Canada Research Chair and an Associate Professor at the 821
756 10.1109/JIOT.2022.3142251.
Ted Rogers School of Information Technology Management. She is also the 822
757 [38] C. Pu, A. Wall, K.-K.-R. Choo, I. Ahmed, and S. Lim, ‘‘A lightweight and
758 privacy-preserving mutual authentication and key agreement protocol for
Founder and the Director of the Cybersecurity Research Laboratory. Her 823

759 Internet of Drones environment,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 9, no. 12, research interest includes development of novel cybersecurity designs based 824

760 pp. 9918–9933, Jun. 2022. on emerging technologies. She investigates challenges and opportunities 825

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762 and factoring,’’ in Proc. 35th Annu. Symp. Found. Comput. Sci., Nov. 94, landscape of cybersecurity. 827

763 pp. 124–134. Dr. Mashatan is a Certified Service Oriented Architect (SOA) with Hons. 828
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773 uav-market-analysis SHOHINI GHOSE received the B.S. degree in 832

774 [44] (May 2022). Federal Aviation Administration. [Online]. Available: physics and the B.A. degree in mathematics from 833

775 https://www.faa.gov/uas/ Miami University, Oxford, OH, USA, in 1996, 834

776 [45] L. Chen, ‘‘Report on post-quantum cryptography,’’ Nat. Inst. Standards and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in physics from 835
777 Technol., Gaithersburg, MD, USA, Tech. Rep. NISTIR 8105, 2016. the University of New Mexico, in 1999 and 2003, 836
778 [46] W.-Y. Hwang, ‘‘Quantum key distribution with high loss: Toward global respectively. 837
779 secure communication,’’ Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 91, no. 5, Aug. 2003, From 2003 to 2005, she was a Postdoctoral 838
780 Art. no. 057901. Research Fellow at the University of Calgary. 839

781 HUSSEIN ABULKASIM (Member, IEEE) Since 2005, she has held a faculty position at Wil- 840

782 received the B.Sc., M.Sc., and Ph.D. degrees in frid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada. She is 841

783 computer science from South Valley University, currently a Professor of physics and computer science, and the NSERC Chair 842
784 in 2004, 2012, and 2016, respectively. for Women in Science and Engineering. She is also the Director of the Laurier 843
785 From 2006 to 2011, he was a Web Devel- Centre for Women in Science. She is the author of two books, and more 844
786 oper with the Center for Information and Com- than 60 articles, and has given over 200 invited talks about her work. Her 845
787 munication Technology, South Valley University. research interest includes quantum information science. Her research team 846

788 From 2012 to 2014, he was with the College was the first to observe a connection between chaos theory and quantum 847

789 of Computer Sciences and Information Systems, entanglement. 848

790 Jazan University. From 2019 to 2021, he worked Dr. Ghose is a TED Senior Fellow and a 2017 Inductee into the Royal 849
791 as a Postdoctoral Researcher with the Cybersecurity Research Laboratory, Society of Canada’s College of New Scholars, Artists and Scientists. She 850
792 Toronto Metropolitan University. He is currently working as an Assistant is a past President of the Canadian Association of Physicists and sits on 851
793 Professor of computer science with the Department of Mathematics and the Scientific Advisory Board of the UNESCO International Basic Sciences 852
794 Computer Science, New Valley University. His current research interests Program. She is the first Canadian member of the Working Group on Women 853

795 include quantum cryptography, cybersecurity, IoT security, and blockchain in Physics of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics. 854

796 security. 855

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