Rishipal@Rishipal Singh Solanki v. Raju & Anr.

Criminal Appeal No 541 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl) No 1743 of 2022)
Bench: Justices DY. Chandrachud and Surya Kant
Issues: Whether the reasons which weigh Court in cancelling the bail to co accused would also apply in
case of bail preferred by another accused in relation to the same FIR and incident.
Ratio: Reasons which have weighed with this Court in cancelling the bail which was granted to the co-
accused would equally apply to the case of the first respondent which also arises out of the same first
information report and incident.
Provisions List: Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 302
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
Judgment: As a matter of fact, the reasons which have weighed with this Court in cancelling the bail
which was granted to the co-accused would equally apply to the case of the first respondent which also
arises out of the same first information report and incident. We accordingly allow the appeal and set
aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 9 November 2021 granting bail to the

surrender no later than within a week from the date of this order.

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first respondent. The application for bail shall accordingly stand dismissed and the first respondent shall

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M/S Shree Vishnu Construction v. The Engineer in Chief Military Engineering Services
Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 5306/2022; 01-04-2022
Bench: Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna

Act?

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Issues: Delay in the appointment of an Arbitrator will frustrate the object and purpose of the Arbitration

Ratio: As per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11 - The arbitration applications for

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the appointment of an Arbitrator are required to be decided and disposed of at the earliest, otherwise the
object and purpose of the Arbitration Act shall be frustrated.
Orbiter: It is a very sorry state of affairs that the arbitration application under Section 11 has been

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decided and disposed of after a period of four years.

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Provisions List: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11
Judgment: The arbitration applications for the appointment of an Arbitrator are required to be decided
and disposed of at the earliest, otherwise the object and purpose of the Arbitration Act shall be frustrated.
Even as per the amended Arbitration Act, the arbitration proceedings are required to be disposed of
within one year. If the Section 11 application itself is not decided within one year, even the purpose and
object of the amended Arbitration Act shall also be frustrated. Under the circumstances, we direct the
Registrar General of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad to submit a detailed
report/statement before this Court on or before the next date of hearing pointing out how many Section
11 applications are pending before the High Court and from which year. Such report to be submitted on
or before 19.04.2022.

Principal Commissioner of IT(Central) v. M/S Mahagun Realtors (P) Ltd.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2716 OF 2022; April 05, 2022 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION (C) NO. 4063 OF 2020)
Bench: Corum: Justices U.U. Lalit and S. Ravindra Bhat
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8Ma9Ocompany?
Issues: Whether amalgamation wind
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Whether income tax notice invalid merely because it was sent to amalgamating company?
Ratio: As per Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 2 (1A) - Companies Act, 1956; Section 394 (2), 481 -
Despite amalgamation, the business, enterprise, and undertaking of the transferee or amalgamated
company which ceases to exist, after amalgamation, is treated as a continuing one, and any benefits, by
way of carry forward of losses (of the transferor company), depreciation, etc., are allowed to the
transferee.
tr-5G7A4J5E8AWhether corporate death of an entity upon amalgamation per se invalidates an assessment
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order ordinarily cannot be determined on a bare application of Section 481 of the Companies Act, 1956

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 (and its equivalent in the 2013 Act), but would depend on the terms of the amalgamation and the facts
of each case.
Provisions List: Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 2 (1A), - Companies Act, 1956; Section 394 (2), 481.

Cases Referred:
1. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hukamchand Mohanlal 1972 (1) SCR 786- Section 159 of the Act
related to a legal representative’s tax liability. It casts liability upon a legal representative in the event of
death of her or his predecessor, to pay tax.
2. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Amarchand Shroff 1963 Supp (1) SCR 699 - The assessee ordinarily
had to be a living person and could not be a dead person. By Section 24B the legal personality of the
deceased assessee was extended for the duration of the entire previous year in the course of which he
died.
3. Commissioner of Income Tax v. James Anderson- the expression "any tax which would have been
payable by him under this Act if he had not died" cannot be deemed to have supplied the machinery for
taxation of income received by a legal representative.
4. Dalmia Power Limited & Ors v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 1, Trichy 15 (2020)

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14 SCC 736 and McDowell and Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnataka Central 16

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(2017) 13 SCC 799- The assessee had taken over a sick company-HPL – by amalgamation; HPL ceased

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to have any identity after amalgamation. The relative rights, however, were determined in terms of the

5.
scheme of amalgamation.

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Bhagwan Dass Chopra v. United Bank of India (1998) 1 SCR 1088 and Singer India Ltd. v. Chander
Mohan Chadha (2004) Supp (3) SCR 535- .there can be no doubt that when two companies amalgamate

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and merge into one, the transferor company loses its identity as it ceases to have its business. However,
their respective rights and liabilities are determined under the scheme of amalgamation, but the corporate

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identity of transferor company ceases to exist with effect from the date the amalgamation is made

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effective."

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Judgment: Companies Act, 2013; Section 170 - Companies Act, 1956; Section 394 (1)(a) -
Amalgamation is unlike the winding up of a corporatetr-5N entity.
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shell of the corporate entity is undoubtedly destroyed; it ceases to exist. Yet, in every other sense of the
term, the corporate venture continues – enfolded within the new or the existing transferee entity. In other

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words, the business and the adventure lives on but within a new corporate residence, i.e., the transferee
company. It is, therefore, essential to look beyond the mere concept of destruction of corporate entity
which brings to an end or terminates any assessment proceedings - Upon amalgamation, the cause of
action or the complaint does not per se cease depending of course, upon the structure and objective of
enactment. The quest of legal systems and courts has been to locate if a successor or representative exists
in relation to the particular cause or action, upon whom the assets might have devolved or upon whom
the liability in the event it is adjudicated, would fall.

Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2273 OF 2022 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) DIARY NO. 13202 OF 2020)
Coram: Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and PS Narasimha
Issue: Validity of forcible dispossession of private property of a person without following due process
of law.
Ratio: Under the Constitution of India, 1950; Article 300A - Forcible dispossession of a person of their
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private property without following process of law, was violative of both their human right and
constitutional right under Article 300-A.
Orbiter: High threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and
even more so when done by the State.
Provisions: Constitution of India, 1950; Article 300A.
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 Cases Referred:
1. Entick v. Carrington and by this court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh- It is the cardinal
principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due process, or
authorization of law.
2. Bishandas v. State of Punjab- rejected the contention that the petitioners in the case were trespassers and
could be removed by an executive order.
3. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors.- Under law, the possession of a
lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession
is prohibited.
4. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service- doctrine of laches in
Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
5. P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22- In a case where the
demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to
promote justice, and not defeat it.
6. Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh- This court, in Vidya Devi (supra) facing an almost identical
set of facts and circumstances – rejected the contention of ‘oral’ consent to be baseless and outlined the

7.
responsibility of the State.

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State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar- (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769- the right to property

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is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right.
8.

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Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC- The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot

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arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.

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Judgment: It is a rule of law that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due process or
authorization of law - Rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher

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responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within the confines of legality, and therefore, not

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tarnished the basic principle of the rule of law. There is a need for written consent in matters of land

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acquisition proceedings - contention of 'oral' consent is baseless. Appeal against Himachal Pradesh HC
judgment which disposed of a writ petition challenging dispossession and seeking compensation -

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Allowed - In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled

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to compensation in terms of law - State directed to treat the subject lands as a deemed acquisition and

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appropriately disburse compensation to the appellants.

Haryana Urban Development, Karnal v. M/s Mehta Construction Co. & Anr.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2693 OF 2022 (SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 6137 OF 2022)
(DIARY NO. 23287 OF 2020)
Corum: Justices Ajay Rastogi and Sanjiv Khanna
Issue: Can an arbitral award be set aside merely on an erroneous application of law or misappreciation
of evidence?
Ratio: Under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34 - Arbitral award can be set aside by the
court if the court finds the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. The
award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of erroneous application of law or by misappreciation
of evidence.
Provisions: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34, Section 43 Section 21,
Orbiter: No plausible explanation could9Obe4Ogiven by the objector, for filing the objections at a belated
stage. tr-5N7R4N5L8M

Judgment: As per sub-section (3) to Section 34 of the Act, an application for setting aside an award is
to be made within three months from the date on which a party filing objections under sub-section (1) to
Section 34 has received the arbitral award; or, if a request has been made under Section 33, from the
date on which that request has been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. However, the proviso states that
the court may condone the delay of a period of up to thirty days in filing of the objections if it is satisfied
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that the4J5E
tr-5G7A applicant is prevented by sufficient cause from making an application under Section 34(1) of the
Act.

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 Neetu Tripathi v State of UP & Anr
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.3997/2021
Bench: Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh
Issue: Delay in Cross-Examination Of Witness.
Ratio: Criminal Trial - Once the witness is in the witness box and is being cross-examined every
endeavor must be made to ensure that the cross-examination is completed on that day.
Provisions: Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 406 506, 392, 120-B IPC.
Judgment: We are informed by the complainant that there are four private witnesses. The grievance
made is that whenever the first witness is under cross-examination and after a couple of questions the
matter is deferred. If it is so, we cannot appreciate it. Once the witness is in the witness box and is being
cross-examined every endeavor must be made to ensure that the cross-examination is completed on that
day. This is more so looking into the nature of the case before the Court which is not a complex criminal
trial.

Chairman cum Managing Director Fertilizer Corp of India Ltd. v. Rajesh Chandra Srivastava
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2260 OF 2022 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C) NO. 26844 OF 2016)
Bench: Justice Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian

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Issue: Whether an ad hoc payment made to the workers pursuant to the interim orders passed by this
Court form part of “wages”.

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Ratio: An ad hoc payment made to the workers pursuant to the interim orders passed by this Court in a
previous round of litigation does not form part of “wages” within the meaning of the expression under
Section 2(s) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, for the purpose of calculating gratuity.

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Orbiter: Keeping in mind the above definition, if we go back to historical facts, it would be clear that
the employees initiated the first round of litigation before various High Courts, for the grant of the benefit

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of revision of pay scales, way back in the year 1996, on the ground that the employees of other PSUs

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have been granted revision on par with the Government servants. It will thus be clear that what was

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claimed in the first round of litigation was not what was payable in accordance with the terms and
conditions of employment.

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Provisions: Under Section 2(s) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972

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Cases List: Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, (1977) 2 SCC 329- “We clarify that
wages will mean and included basic wages and Dearness Allowance and nothing else”.
Judgment: It is a fundamental principle of law that a party who is in the enjoyment of an interim order,
is bound to lose the benefit of such interim order when the ultimate outcome of the case goes against
him. Merely because of the fortuitous circumstance of the Voluntary Separation Scheme coming into
effect before the transferred cases were finally dismissed by this Court by an order dated 25.04.2003,
creating an illusion as though the last drawn pay included this ad hoc payment, it is not possible to go
against the fundamental rule that the benefits of an interim order would automatically go when the party
who secured it, failed in the final stage.

Noel Harper & Ors. v. Union of India

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 566 OF 2021
Coram: Justices AM Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari, and CT Ravikumar
Issue: Whether a mere plea of 'inconvenience' grounds to challenge the constitutional validity of
legislation.
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Ratio: Mere plea of inconvenience is not enough to assail the constitutional validity of legislation.
Orbiter: As a matter of law, the validity of the amendments must be tested on the touchstone of tenets
underlying Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.
Provisions: Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution, 2020 amendments made to the Foreign
Contribution (Regulation) Act 2010.
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Cases Referred:
1. Ombalika Das vs. Hulisa Shaw- The legislature enjoys considerable latitude while exercising its wisdom
on the basis of inputs collated from a different quarter.
4
2. Shreya Singhal and K.S. Puttaswami- it is open to the Court to test the amendment on the touchstone of
manifestly arbitrary.
3. Anuradha Bhasin vs. Union of India & Ors. - the underlying consideration of appropriateness, necessity,
and the least restrictive measure compliant law, will also be of no avail.
Judgment: Mere plea of inconvenience is not enough to attract the constitutional inhibition. The Courts
ought not to adopt a doctrinaire approach in construing the amended provisions and undermine the
legislative intent of strengthening the regulatory mechanism concerning foreign contribution. There is
intrinsic evidence to indicate that the change effected by the amendments is to serve the legitimate
Government purpose and has a rational nexus to the object of the Principal Act and the amendments and
that the preamendment dispensation (unamended Section 7) was not sufficient to effectively regulate the
acceptance and utilization of foreign contribution as predicated by the Principal Act. Assuming that some
inconvenience is likely to be caused to few applicants, the constitutionality of a statute cannot be assailed
on the basis of fortuitous circumstances and more so when it being only a one-time exercise to ensure
the inflow of foreign contribution through one channel only, being a precondition for grant of permission.

State of Rajasthan v. Banwarilal

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) Diary No. 21596/2020; APRIL 08, 2022
Coram: Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna

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Issue: Can an inadequate sentence be imposed merely because long period has lapsed by the time
criminal appeal is decided?

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Ratio: Merely because a long period has lapsed by the time the appeal is decided cannot be a ground to
award the punishment which is disproportionate and inadequate- the trial Court had already taken a very

High Court ought not to have interfered with the same.

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lenient view while imposing the sentence of only three years' rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, the

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Orbiter: Criminal appeals are being disposed of in a cursory manner and by adopting truncated methods.

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The practice of disposing of criminal appeals by adopting shortcuts is deprecated.

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Provisions: Section 307 IPC.

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Cases Referred:
1.

2.
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Soman v. State of Kerala, (2013) 11 SCC 382- Courts ought to base sentencing decisions on various
different rationales — most prominent amongst which would be proportionality and deterrence.
Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648- One of the prime objectives of the
criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with
the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done.
3. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Udham, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 300- Sentencing for crimes has to be
analysed on the touchstone of three tests viz. crime test, criminal test and comparative proportionality
test.
4. Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 359-
Judgment: Merely because a long period has lapsed by the time the appeal is decided cannot be a ground
to award the punishment which is disproportionate and inadequate. The High Court has not at all
adverted to the relevant factors which were required to be while imposing appropriate/suitable
punishment/sentence. As observed hereinabove, the High Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal
in a most cavalier manner. The High Court has disposed of the appeal by adopting shortcuts. The manner
in which the High Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal is highly deprecated. In cases, like the
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present one, the accused didtr-not press any challenge to the conviction and prayed for reduction in
sentence and the same is considered and an inadequate and inappropriate sentence has been imposed
without assigning any further reasons and without adverting to the relevant factors which are required
to be considered while imposing appropriate punishment/sentence. We deprecate such practice of 15
disposing of criminal appeals by adopting shortcuts.
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 Mallada K Sri Ram v. State of Telangana
Criminal Appeal No 561 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP(Crl) No 1788 of 2022)
Coram: Justices DY Chandrachud and Surya Kant
Issue: Whether preventive detention be ordered merely because a person is implicated in a criminal
proceeding?
Ratio: The personal liberty of an accused cannot be sacrificed on the altar of preventive detention merely
because a person is implicated in a criminal proceeding.
Orbiter: The powers of preventive detention are exceptional and even draconian.
Provisions: Article 226 of the Constitution.

Cases Referred:
1. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740- every disorder does not meet the threshold of
a disturbance to public order, unless it affects the community at large.
2. Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 415 - while such an apprehension may be a
ground for considering the cancellation of bail to an accused, it cannot meet the standards prescribed for
preventive detention unless there is a demonstrable threat to the maintenance of public order.
3.

punishment without trial.

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Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana, (2018) 12 SCC 150- a preventive detention order that is passed
without examining a live and proximate link between the event and the detention is tantamount to

4.

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Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427- while the ordinary procedural
hierarchy among courts must be respected, the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 extends
to protecting the personal liberty of persons who have demonstrated that the instrumentality of the State
is being weaponised for using the force of criminal law.

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Judgment: A mere apprehension of a breach of law and order is not sufficient to meet the standard of

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adversely affecting the “maintenance of public order”. Callous exercise of the exceptional power of

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preventive detention by the detaining authorities and the state - Respondents directed to take stock of

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challenges to detention orders pending before the Advisory Board, High Court and Supreme Court and
evaluate the fairness of the detention order against lawful standards. In this case, the apprehension of a

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disturbance to public order owing to a crime that was reported over seven months prior to the detention

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order has no basis in fact. The apprehension of an adverse impact to public order is a mere surmise of

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the detaining authority, especially when there have been no reports of unrest since the detenu was
released on bail on 8 January 2021 and detained with effect from 26 June 2021. The nature of the
allegations against the detenu are grave.

Chandra Prakash Mishra v. Flipkart India Pvt. Ltd.

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2859-2861 OF 2022 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) Nos. 3384-3386 OF
2017)
Coram: Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose
Issue: Can order be termed "mala fide" just because it is illegal, erroneous or perverse?
Ratio: Under Administrative Law, every erroneous, illegal or even perverse order/action by a Statutory
authority, by itself, cannot be termed as wanting in good faith or suffering from malafide.
Orbiter: For imputing motives and drawing inference about want of good faith in any person,
particularly a statutory authority, something more than mere error or fault ought to exist.
Judgment: Appeal challenging adverse9ORemarks 4O
made in the Allahabad HC judgment regarding a
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Statutory authority is allowed.tr-5N
Even if the High Court found that the impugned actions of the authorities
concerned, particularly of the appellant, had not been strictly in conformity with law or were irregular
or were illegal or even perverse, such findings, by themselves, were not leading to an inference as a
corollary that there had been any deliberate action or omission on the part of the Assessing Authority or
the Registering Authority; or that any 'tactics' were adopted. Nothing concrete is available on record to
impute motives in the appellant, even if his actions/omissions while functioning as Assessing Authority
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otherwise called for disapproval.

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 Mafat Lal v. State of Rajasthan
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s).592 OF 2022 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No(s). 1806 of 2021)
Coram: Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Vikram Nath
Issue: Whether Section 366 IPC would be attracted only when there is a forceful compulsion of
marriage?
Ratio: Section 366 IPC would come into play only where there is a forceful compulsion of marriage, by
kidnapping or by inducing a woman. This offense also would not be made out once the abductee has
clearly stated that she was in love with the accused and that she left her home on account of the disturbing
circumstances at her parental home as the said relationship was not acceptable to her father and that she
married the accused on her own free will without any influence being exercised by the accused.
Provisions: Section 366 IPC
Judgment: Kidnapping would necessarily involve enticing or taking away any minor under eighteen
years of age if a female for the offence under Section 363 IPC. In the present case, the abductee had
clearly stated that she was neither taken away nor induced and that she had left her home of her own free
will. Section 366 IPC would come into play only where there is a forceful compulsion of marriage, by
kidnapping or by inducing a woman. This offence also would not be made out once the appellant no. 2

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the abductee has clearly stated that she was in love with the appellant no.1 and that she left her home on

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account of the disturbing circumstances at her parental home as the said relationship was not acceptable

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to her father and that she married appellant no.1 on her own free will without any influence being
exercised by appellant no.1.

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Sanjay Gupta & Ors. v. State of U.P. through its Secretary

Bench: Justice Hemant Gupta and v. Ramasubramanian

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WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 338 OF 2006; APRIL 12, 2022

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Issue: Liability on state & organizers to compensate victims in Meerut fire tragedy.

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Ratio: Allahabad High Court Chief Justice to nominate within two weeks a District Judge or Additional

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District Judge to work on a day-to-day basis for determining the compensation payable to the families
of the victims of the fire that broke out during a consumer fair in Meerut in 2006. Computation of

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compensation in accordance with the principles of just compensation as in the case of an accident under

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the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.

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Orbiter: The mere fact that the cause of the accident is unknown does not prevent the plaintiff from
recovering the damages, if proper inference to be drawn from the circumstances which are known is that
it was caused by the negligence of the defendant.
Provisions: Constitution of India, 1950; Article 21, 32, 226, Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952.

Cases referred:
1. Sanjay Gupta & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
2. Nilabati Behera (Smt.) alias Lalita Behera v. State of Orissa & Ors.
3. Sube Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.,
4. Shri Sohan Lal v. Union of India & Anr.,
5. Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors.,
6. Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors.,
7. Praga Tools Corporation v. Shri C.A. Imanual & Ors.
8. Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra9OShankar Patil
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tr-5N7RTragedy
9. Association of Victims of Uphaar v. Union of India & Ors.
10. Green Park Theatres Associated (P) Ltd. v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy & Ors.
Judgment: Infringement of Article 21 may be an individual case such as by the State or its functionaries;
or by the Organizers and the State; or by the Organizers themselves have been the subject matter of
consideration before this Court in a writ petition under Article 32 or before the High Court under Article
226. Article 21 of the Constitution of India has to be read into all public safety statutes since the prime
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object of5Epublic
tr-5G7A4J safety legislation is to protect the individual and to compensate him for the loss suffered.
Duty of care expected from State or its officials functioning under the public safety legislation is,
therefore, very high. The Commission under the Act shall be appointed either by the Executive or by the
7
Legislature but not by the Judiciary in terms of the provisions of Inquiry Act. - In respect of criminal
charges, an accused can be tried by a Court of law and not merely on the basis of the report of the
Commissioner under the Inquiry Act. Res ipsa loquitor - Res ipsa loquitor is resorted to when an accident
is shown to have occurred and the cause of the accident is primarily within the knowledge of the
defendant.

Sanjay Patel v. State of U.P.

M.A.No.1997 OF 2021 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.5604 of 2009
Coram: Justices AM Khanwilkar and Abhay S. Oka
Issue: Plea of juvenility, of Applicant who has undergone the sentence for 17 years.
Ratio: Juvenility Plea of an applicant whose murder conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court by
dismissing SLP in 2009. Juvenile Justice Board passed an order holding that, on the date of commission
of the offense, his age was 17 years 07 months and 23 days. The applicant has undergone a sentence of
17 years and 03 days. It will be unjust to send the applicant to the Juvenile Justice Board. He shall be
forthwith set at liberty provided he is not required to be detained under any other order of the competent
Court.
Provisions: Section 7A of the JJ 2000 Act.

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Judgment: As per the 2000 Act, only the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under Section 4 thereof had

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jurisdiction to try a juvenile in conflict with the law. Under Section 7A of the 2000 Act, an accused was

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entitled to raise a claim of juvenility before any Court, even after the final disposal of the case. Such a
claim was required to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the 2000 Act. Subsection (2)
of Section 7A provided that if after holding an inquiry, the Court found the accused to be juvenile on the

k e
date of commission of the offence, the Court was under a mandate to forward the juvenile to the Juvenile
Justice Board for passing appropriate orders. Subsection (2) of Section 7A further provided that in such

n
a case, the sentence passed by Criminal Court shall be deemed to have no effect in such a case. In view

a
of the categorical finding recorded in this case by the competent Juvenile Justice Board, which is based

r
on documentary evidence, in view of subsection (2) of Section 7A, the applicant is required to be
forwarded to the Juvenile Justice Board. Under Section 15 of the 9O
2000
4O Act, the most stringent action

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which could have been 3 taken against the applicant, was of sending the applicant to a special home for

o
a period of three years.

T Jahir Hak v. State of Rajasthan

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 605 OF 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7003 of 2021)
Bench: Justices KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy
Issue: Can the long period of incarceration already undergone be relevant in deciding a plea of bail?
Ratio: - In the nature of the case against the appellant, the evidence which has already unfolded and
above all, the long period of incarceration that the appellant has already undergone, time has arrived
when the appellant be enlarged on bail.
Orbiter: We bear in mind the fact that the prosecution seeks to examine as many as 109 witnesses of
which only 6 witnesses have been fully examined so far.
Provisions: Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 43D(5).
Cases Referred: Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb (2021) (3) SCC 713- delay in trial can be a ground for
bail under UAPA.
Judgment: The condition in Section 43D9O(5) of the Act of 1967 has been understood to be less stringent
4N5L8M 4O
in7RNarcotic
than the provisions containedtr-5N Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, as already
noticed by us. We would think that in the nature of the case against the appellant, the evidence which
has already unfolded and above all, the long period of incarceration that the appellant has already
undergone, time has arrived when the appellant be enlarged on bail.

9B4I
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