I-PAY CLEARING SERVICES PVT. LTD. V. ICICI BANK LTD.

Bench:
Justices R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy
Facts:
In this case, the arbitral award was challenged by challenged by ICICI Bank under Section 34 Arbitration
Act on the ground that the arbitrator had passed the award without recording any finding on one of the main
issues framed by the arbitrator. I-Pay Clearing Services moved an application under Section 34(4) for
remitting the award to the tribunal in order to make corrections in the award. This application was dismissed
by the High Court
Issue:
The Hon’ble SC decided on the issue that whether it is obligatory u/s 34(4) Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 to remit the matter to the Arbitration Tribunal.
Relevant Provision:
Section 34(4) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:

c o m
rs .
On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so
requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the
arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the

Ratio:

k e
opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.

n
The SC held that it is the discretion of the courts whether the matter should be remitted to the Tribunal.
Observations:

r a
1. In case of any patent illegality in the arbitral award, it is fit to be set aside and there is no reason to remit
the award to the tribunal for corrections.

p
2. Section 34(4) is a corrective measuretr-5U 7N4M
and 5R8R9S4R
cannot be used to remove patent illegalities from an arbitral
award.

Cases Referred:
To
3. In absence of any findings on the contentious issue between the parties, no amount of reasons can cure
the defect in the award and hence in such cases, there is no need to remit the matter to the tribunal.

1. Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. V. Crompton Greaves Ltd. tr-5D7G4C5E8J

9G4J
[(2019) SCC Online SC 1656]: The legislative
intention behind Section 34(4) is to make an arbitral award enforceable after giving an opportunity to
the Tribunal to cure any defects in the award. However, patent illegality cannot be cured by the help of
this provision.

8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
 MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION V. DILIP
UTTAM JAYABHAY
Bench:
Justices M R Shah and BV Nagarathna
Facts:
A bus driver was acquitted by a criminal court in a case of rash and negligent driving on the ground that the
prosecution was not able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and presence of contributory
negligence. The Labour Court held that acquittal in this case cannot be a ground to quash disciplinary
proceedings as there was negligence on the part of the driver. The Industrial Tribunal reversed the decision
of the Labour Court relying on the acquittal of the bus driver. The matter was appealed before the Hon’ble
Apex Court.
Issue:

o m
The main issue before the court in this case was that whether the acquittal of an accused person in a criminal

c
matter can be taken into consideration in a disciplinary proceeding against such person on the same facts.
Ratio:

rs .
The acquittal of a person in a criminal proceeding has no bearing or relevance on disciplinary proceedings
against such person
Observations:

k e
1. The standards of proof in a criminal case and in a disciplinary proceeding are different and also these

n
two proceedings operate in a different field.
2. The acquittal of the person was based on the fact that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond

p r a
reasonable doubt as there were lacunae in the testimony of witnesses and investigation officer. This
cannot be a ground to give relief in disciplinary proceedings.
tr-5U7N4M5R
8R9S4R

To tr-5D7G4C5E8J
9G4J

8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. VS MAHESHBHAI
TINABHAI RATHOD
Bench:
Justices CJI NV Ramana, AS Bopanna and Hima Kohli
Facts:
The petition under Section 34 for setting aside arbitral award was filed before the High Court with a delay
of 185 days. The Single Judge dismissed the application as it was beyond the prescribed time period. The
Division Bench of the High Court condoned the delay using Section 5 Limitation Act. 1963. This decision
was challenged before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
The main issue before the court was that whether a delay in application for setting aside an arbitral award
can be condoned under Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963 after the prescribed period under Section 34(3)
Arbitration Act has elapsed.
Relevant Provision:
Section 34(3) Arbitration Act:

c o m
rs .
It provides for a limitation period of 90 days to file an application for setting aside an arbitral award. Further,
if the party satisfies the court, an application to condone the delay can be made within a further period of 30
days.
Section 5 Limitation Act:

k e
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the

n
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or
the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the
application within such period.
Ratio:

p r a
Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963 cannot tr- 7N4M5R
be5Uused
9S4R
to8Rcondone any delay for setting aside an arbitral award

Observations:

To
beyond the prescribed period mentioned in Section 34(3) Limitation Act.

1. The provision for condonation of delay is self-contained in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.
2. Once the High Court has granted bail to a person after examining
tr-5D7G4C5E8J
case, there is limited scope of interference by the Supreme Court.
the grounds and circumstances of the
9G4J

Cases Referred:
1. Chintels India Ltd. V. Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd. [(2021) 4 SCC 602]: Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963
is not applicable so as to extend the limitation period prescribed under Section 34(3) Arbitration Act,
1996.

8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
 BHADAR RAM (D) VS JASSA RAM
Bench:
Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna
Facts:
A person who belonged the SC Category in Punjab purchased a property in Rajasthan belonging to a person of SC
Category of Rajasthan. Section 42 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 prohibits the sale, gift or bequest of a property
belonging to a member of SC community to any person who is not a member of such community.
Issue:
The main issue in this case was that the whether a person belonging to the SC/ST community of a particular
state where he originally resided, could claim the quota benefits in another state where he subsequently
migrated.
Important Provisions:
Constitution of India: Article 341, 342, 366(24) and 366(25).
Section 42 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955

c o m
Ratio:

rs .
The SC held that a member of the SC/ST community of a particular state where he resides, cannot claim
quota benefits in another state where he migrated.
Observations:

k e
1. The basic aim of restriction on transfer of properties under Tenancy laws is to protect the people of a

n
community of that particular state.
Cases Referred:

r a
1. Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College [(1990) 3 SCC 130]: The status of
SC/ST is determined via the notification issued by the President under Article 341/342 which is in

p tr-5U7N
relation to a particular state. This status 4M5R8R
cannot
9S4R
be claimed by a migrant in another state.

To tr-5D7G4C5E8J
9G4J

8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
 RATAN RAM V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Bench:
Justices CJI N.V.Ramana, A.S.Bopanna, Hima Kohli
Facts:
The trial court had convicted the appellant along with two other persons under Section 392 and 397 Indian
Penal Code, 1860. The matter was heard by the High Court and later appealed before the Supreme Court.
The plea for the appellant was that since the firearm that the accused was carrying had not been used during
the commission of the robbery, the charge under Section 397 IPC could not be framed against the accused
person.
Issue:

m
Whether the use of the weapon is a necessary ingredient to establish the charge under Section 397 IPC.
Relevant Provision:

.c o
Section 397 IPC: Robbery, or dacoity, with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt.
If, at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous

rs
hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person, the imprisonment with which
such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years.

e
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the use of weapon under Section 397 IPC does not mean that the weapon

under Section 397 IPC.

Observations:

a k
should be actually used. Mere brandishing or exhibition of the weapon is sufficient to establish a charge

n
p r
1. Section 397 does not automatically apply to all the co-accused unless Section 34 IPC has been used.
2. Only the offender who has used the weapon or8Rfirearm
tr-5U7N4M5R
9S4R shall be held liable under Section 397.

o
Cases Referred:
1. Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi [(2007) 12 SCC 641]: ‘Offender’ refers to the only culprit who

T
actually used a deadly weapon.

tr-5D7G4C5E8J
9G4J

8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
 JASDEEP SINGH JASSU VS STATE OF PUNJAB
Bench:
Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh
Facts:
The appellants were convicted under Section 304 Part I r/w 34 IPC, 1860. They challenged the invocation
of Section 34 for conviction of the appellants along with the other accused.
Issue:
The main issue in this case before the court was that whether the mere common intention is sufficient to
attract Section 34 IPC, 1860 or any act must be done in furtherance of such common intention.
Relevant Provision:

m
Section 34 (IPC): Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.:
When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such

Ratio:

.c o
persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

rs
The SC observed that mere common intention would not attract Section 34 IPC unless there is an act in
furtherance of such common intention.

e
Observations:
1. Section 34 IPC creates a deeming fiction by infusing and importing a criminal act constituting an offence

the common intention to the satisfaction of the court.

a k
committed by one, into others, in pursuance to a common intention. Onus is on the prosecution to prove

n
2. When a part of evidence produced by the prosecution to bring the accused within the fold of Section 34

r
IPC is disbelieved, the remaining part will have to be examined with adequate care and caution, as we

p
are dealing with a case of vicarious liability fastened
tr-5U7N4M5R
8R9S4R on the accused by treating him at par with the one

o
who actually committed the offence.
3. The intendment of Section 34 IPC is to remove the difficulties in distinguishing the acts of individual

T
members of a party, acting in furtherance of a common intention. There has to be a simultaneous
conscious mind of the persons participating in the criminal action of bringing about a particular result.
A common intention qua its existence is a question oftr-fact
5D7Gand also
4C5E8J 9G4Jrequires an act "in furtherance of the
said intention". One need not search for a concrete evidence, as it is for the court to come to a conclusion
on a cumulative assessment. It is only a rule of evidence and thus does not create any substantive offense.
4. The word "furtherance" indicates the existence of aid or assistance in producing an effect in future. Thus,
it has to be construed as an advancement or promotion.
Cases Referred:
1. Suresh v. State of UP, [(2001) 3 SCC 673]
2. Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar, [(2003) 1 SCC 268]
3. Chhota Ahirwar v. State of M.P., [(2020) 4 SCC 126]
4. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor (AIR 1925 PC 1)
5. Mehbub Shah v. Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 148) 4M5R8R9S4R
tr-5U7N
 MAHENDRA VS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Bench:
Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka
Facts:
20 persons face trial before the criminal court and 17 of them were acquitted. 3 of the remaining were convicted
under Sections 148, 323 r/w 149 and 325 r/w 149 IPC, 1860.
Issue:
The issue before the court was that whether less than 5 persons can be convicted by invoking Section 149
IPC, 1860.
Relevant Provisions:
Section 149 (IPC): Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of
common object:

o m
If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of

c
that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of

assembly, is guilty of that offence.

Section 141 (IPC): Definition of unlawful assembly

rs .
that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same

Ratio:

k e
The Supreme Court held that less than 5 persons can be convicted using Section 149 IPC only if the

n
prosecution proves that there was an unlawful assembly and there are other members who are either not

a
identified or not apprehended yet. The requirement of minimum 5 persons is essential to constitute an
unlawful assembly

r
p
Observations: 8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
1. If some of the accused persons are acquitted and the total number of the remaining accused persons is

To
less than five, then Section 149 cannot be used.

tr-5D7G4C5E8J
9G4J

8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
 S. AMUTHA V. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU & ORS
Bench:
Justices AM Khanwilkar and CT Ravikumar
Facts:
A preventive detention order was passed by the District Magistrate under the Tamil Nadu Act No. 14 of
1982 against the appellant. The appellant had challenged the detention order but the same was not heard
by the competent authority for a period of more than 2 months.
Issue:
The issue in this matter was that can a long delay in hearing the case of a detenu detained under preventive
detention law be a ground for release of the detenu.

m
Relevant Provision:
Article 22 of the Constitution.
Ratio:

c o
The SC held that if the detenu’s representation is considered after a long delay, this can a ground for

.
rs
quashing the detention order passed against the detenu.
Observations:

e
1. In such cases, the concerned authority is obliged to hear the matter with utmost dispatch.
2. The authority has to supply reasons for such delay in hearing the matter. If the reasons for delay are

an k
vague, then this is sufficient to act in favour of the detenu.

p r tr-5U7N4M5R
8R9S4R

To tr-5D7G4C5E8J
9G4J

8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
 RAJENDRA BHAGAT VS STATE OF JHARKHAND
Bench:
Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath
Facts:
The husband was convicted under Section 498-A IPC, 1860. The appeal was dismissed by the Sessions
Judge and in Revision, the High Court took notice of settlement between the parties but still confirmed the
conviction of the husband under Section 498-A IPC, 1860.
Issue:
The main issue before the court was that whether after settlement between the parties to marriage, the court
can still convict a person under Section 498-A IPC, 1860.

m
Relevant Provision:
Section 498-A IPC, 1860: Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty:

.c o
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to

rs
fine.

e
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that once the court has taken the cognizance of a lawful settlement between the

Observations:

a k
parties, a conviction under Section 498-A IPC, 1860 should not be made.

n
1. It is the duty of all courts to encourage genuine settlements of disputes in matrimonial cases.

p r
2. The object must be to secure the ends of justice.
3. A conviction under Section 498-A has serious8R9S
tr-5U7N4M5R
implications.
4R It may ultimately operate adverse to the

o
harmony and happy conjugal life of the parties.
Cases Referred:

T
1. B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana [(2003) 4 SCC 675]: The expected approach of the courts is to
reach bona-fide settlement in matrimonial disputes.
2. Bitan Sengupta v. State of West Bengal [(2018) 18tr-SCC 366]:
5D7G4C
settlement, the courts must accept it and compound the offences.
5E8J9GIf
4J the parties have reached a genuine

8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
 STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH VS JOGENDRA
Bench:
CJI NV Ramana, Justices AS Bopanna and Hima Kohli
Facts:
The trial court convicted the husband and father-in-law of the deceased woman under section 304-B, 306
and 498-A IPC, 1860. The accused had been demanding money from the deceased for the construction of
their house which her family members couldn’t give and resulted in harassment of the deceased leading to
her suicide. The High Court held that the offence under Section 304-B was not established as the demand
for money for construction of house cannot be treated as a demand for dowry.
Issue:

m
The main issue before the court in this case was that whether a demand for money for construction of house
would come within the purview of a demand for dowry.
Relevant Provisions:
Section 304-B (IPC). Dowry Death:

.c o
rs
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under
normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she

e
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or
relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

n
Section 306, Section 498-A IPC, 1860
Ratio:

a k
Observations:
r
A demand for money for construction of house is equivalent to a demand for dowry.

p tr-5U7N4M5R
8R9S4R

o
1. An interpretation of provision that would defeat the provisions of the law should be shunned by the
courts.

provision.
Cases Overruled:
T
2. Expansive meaning should be given to the term ‘dowry’ in order to bring all types of unlawful demands
within its purview.
3. Section 304-B is a deterrent for the society and hence liberal
tr-5D7G4C 5E8J9G4Jconstruction should be given to its

1. Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(2015) 6 SCC 477]: The term ‘dowry’ should be given liberal
construction.

8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
 GARMENT CRAFT VS PRAKASH CHAND GOEL
Bench:
Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi
Facts:
An ex-parte decree was passed by a civil court in which later an application for setting aside ex-parte decree
under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, 1908 was allowed by the court. The High Court, vide its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, set aside the order allowing application for setting aside
ex-parte decree.
Relevant Provision:
Article 227 of the Constitution. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court:

m
(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories
interrelation to which it exercises jurisdiction

(a) call for returns from such courts;

.c o
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the High Court may

rs
(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such
courts; and

e
(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such
courts……..

Order IX Rule 13 CPC, 1908

an k
Issue:

p r
The main issue before the court was that whether
tr-5U7N4M5R
the
8R9SHigh
4R Court was justified in reversing the order of the

o
civil court by the use of its supervisory jurisdiction.
Ratio:

T
The Supreme Court held that when the final finding of a matter is correct, then there is no need of
interference by the use of the supervisory jurisdiction.
Observations: tr-5D7G4C5E8J
9G4J
1. The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is not to correct every legal flaw.
2. This power must be used by the courts sparingly in appropriate cases.
3. The High Courts cannot act as a court of appeal under Article 227 and there is no power to re-appreciate
the matter.
Cases Referred:
1. Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate Pvt. Ltd. [(2001) 8 SCC 97]: The scope of jurisdiction under Article 227
is very limited. Exercising this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted
to matters where there is serious dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of
law.
8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
 VASUDHA SETHI V. KIRAN V. BHASKAR
Bench:
Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka
Facts:
The Punjab and Haryana High Court had issued several directions in a habeas corpus petition filed by a
husband for the custody of the child. The mother was directed to return to USA along with the child to USA
on or before 30.09.21. The mother challenged this order before the Hon’ble Apex Court on the ground that
the mother being the primary care-taker of the child, her rights must also be protected.
Relevant Provision:
Section 13 (Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956). Welfare of minor to be of paramount

m
consideration:
(1) In the appointment or declaration of any person as guardian of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of
the minor shall be the paramount consideration.

.c o
(2) No, person shall be entitled to the guardianship by virtue of the provisions of this Act or of any law

rs
relating to guardianship in marriage among Hindus, if the court is of opinion that his or her guardianship
will not be for the welfare of the minor.

Issue:

k e
The main issue before the court was that whether in the cases of child custody, the rights of parents are to

Ratio:

r n
be considered along with the best interest of the child.

a
The Supreme Court held that the rights of parents are irrelevant in cases of custody of a minor child. The

p
principle of welfare of minor is of paramount consideration
8R9S4R while deciding such cases.
tr-5U7N4M5R

o
Observations:
1. When a Court decides that it is in the best interest of the minor to remain in the custody of one of the

T
parents, the rights of the other parent are bound to be affected.
2. The orders for visitation rights are essentially passed for the welfare of minors and for the protection of
their right of having the company of both parents. Such
rights of the parents.
tr-5D7Gorders
4C5E8J9Gare
4J not passed only for protecting the

3. There can never be a straight jacket formula to decide the issue of custody of a minor child as what is in
the paramount interest of a minor is always a question of fact.
Cases Referred:
1. Kanika Goel v. State of Delhi [(2018) 9 SCC 578]: The issue regarding custody of a minor child and the
issue of the repatriation of the child to the native country has to be addressed on the sole criteria of the
welfare of the minor and not on consideration of the legal rights of the parents. The principle that the
welfare of the minor shall be the predominant consideration and that the rights of the parties to a custody
dispute are irrelevant has been consistently followed by this Court.
8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
 SEETHAKATHI TRUST MADRAS V KRISHNAVENI
Bench:
Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice M M Sundresh
Facts:
The respondents in this case had filed for specific performance of the contract with the original owner of
the land in dispute. This suit was decreed by the High Court. The appellants contested that the suit land had
been already sold to the purchaser by the original owner, who further sold the land to the appellant.
Relevant Provision:
Section 10 (Specific Relief Act, 1963). Specific Performance in respect of contracts:
The specific performance of a contract shall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions contained in

m
sub-section (2) of section 11, section 14 and section 16.

subsequent title:

.c o
Section 19 (Specific Relief Act, 1963). Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by

rs
Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against:
(a) either party thereto;

e
(b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee
for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract;
………………….
Issue:

an k
The main issue before the court was that whether a relief of specific performance can be enforced against a
bona-fide purchaser of the property.
Ratio:

p r tr-5U7N4M5R
8R9S4R
The Supreme Court held that a decree for obtaining specific performance of a decree cannot be obtained

To
behind the back of a bona fide purchaser especially when the transaction has taken place prior to the
institution of the suit for specific performance.
Observations:
1. Bona-fide subsequent purchasers would fall within the exception
tr-5D 7G4C5E8J9Gset
4J out in Section 19 (b) of the Specific
Relief Act being transferees who had paid money in good faith and without notice of the original
contract.

8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R
B.L. KASHYAP AND SONS LTD. VS JMS STEELS AND POWER CORPORATION
Bench:
Justices Vineet Saran and Dinesh Maheshwari
Facts:
The plaintiff had instituted a summary suit under Order 37 CPC, 1908. The defendants applied for leave to
defend the suit which were rejected by the trial court and the High Court.
Relevant Provision:
Order 37 Rule 3(5) CPC, 1908:
The defendant may, at any time within ten days from the service of such summons for judgment, by affidavit
or otherwise disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, apply on such

m
summons for leave to defend such suit, and leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon
such terms as may appear to the Court or Judge to be just:

.c o
Provided that leave to defend shall not be refused unless the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the

rs
defendant do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise or that the defence intended to be put up
by the defendant is frivolous or vexatious:

k e
Provided further that, where a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be
due from him, leave to defend the suit shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is
deposited by the defendant in Court.
Issue:

r an
The main issue before the court was regarding the scope of leave to defendant that is granted in a summary

p
suit. 8R9S4R
tr-5U7N4M5R

o
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that grant of leave to defend (with or without conditions) is the ordinary rule and

Observations:
T
denying it is an exception in summary suits.

1. A prayer for leave to defend is to be denied in such casestr-5D7Gwhere

4C5E8Jthe
9G4Jdefendant has practically no defence
and is unable to give out even a semblance of triable issues before the Court.
2. Where the defendant raises triable issues, but it remains doubtful if the defendant is raising the same in
good faith or about genuineness of the issues, the Trial Court is expected to balance the requirements of
expeditious disposal of commercial causes on one hand and of not shutting out triable issues by unduly
severe orders on the other.
3. In case of doubts about the intent of the defendant or genuineness of the triable issues as also the
probability of defence, the leave could yet be granted but while imposing conditions as to the time or
mode of trial or payment or furnishing security.
Cases Referred:
1. Mechelec Engineers and Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation 8R9S4R
[AIR 1977 SC 577]: The grant
tr-5U7N4M5R
of leave to defend a suit is the ordinary rule.
 G.T. GIRISH VS Y. SUBBA RAJU (D)
Bench:
Justices KM Joseph and PS Narasimha
Facts:
In a case for specific performance, the defendant had raised an issue that the such performance would be
against the Bangalore Rules of Allotment, 1972 and hence the contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant is not ‘lawful’ within the meaning of Section 23 ICA, 1872. The trial court refused specific
performance but granted refund of money to the plaintiff under the contract. The High Court reversed the
decision and granted specific performance.
Relevant Provision:

m
Section 23 ICA, 1872. What considerations and objects are lawful, and what not.:
The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless—

it is forbidden by law; or

.c o
rs
is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or
is fraudulent; or

e
involves or implies, injury to the person or property of another; or
the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy.

n k
In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement

a
of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.

Issue:

p r tr-5U7N4M5R
8R9S4R

o
The main issue before the court was that whether subordinate legislations would be included while
interpreting the term ‘forbidden by law’.
Ratio:

Observations:
T
The Supreme Court held that subordinate legislations/statutory rules are also ‘law’ within the meaning of
Section 23 ICA, 1872. tr-5D7G4C5E8J
9G4J

1. What is contemplated under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act is law, in all its forms, being
immunised from encroachment and infringement by a contract, being enforced.
Cases Overruled:
2. Union of India v. Col. L.S.N. Murthy [(2012) 1 SCC 718]: The word "law" in the expression "defeat the
provisions of any law" in Section 23 of the Contract Act is limited to the expressed terms of an Act of
the legislature".

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 STATE OF PUNJAB VS ANSHIKA GOYAL
Bench:
Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna
Facts:
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana allowed writ petitions and directed the State to issue a notification
providing for 1% reservation/quota for children/grand-children of terrorist affected persons/Sikh riots
affected persons in all private unaided non-minority Medical/Dental institutions in the State of Punjab. The
court further directed that the said reservation/quota shall apply to management quota seats as well. It further
directed that the fresh notification shall also provide for a sports quota of 3% in Government Medical/Dental
Colleges. The State of Punjab challenged this judgment before the Apex Court.

m
Relevant Provision:
Article 32 of the Constitution. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this part:

conferred by this Part is guaranteed.

.c o
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights

rs
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature
of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate,

e
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part……………
Issue:

k
The main issue before the court was that whether the State Government's action taking a policy decision to

n
prescribe a particular percentage of reservation/quota for a particular category of persons, can be interfered

a
with by issuance of a writ of mandamus, directing the State Government to provide for a particular

p r
percentage of reservation for a particular category of persons other than what has been provided in the policy
decision taken by the State Government. 5U7N4M5R8R9S4R
tr-

o
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the writ of mandamus cannot be issued to provide for reservation.
Observations:

T
1. Even if the under-representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in public services is brought
to the notice of the Court, no mandamus can be issued
for reservation.
by7Gthe
tr-5D 4C5ECourt
8J9G4J to the State Government to provide

2. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while issuing a writ of mandamus.
Cases Referred:
1. Gulshan Prakash (Dr.) and others v. State of Haryana and others [(2010) 1 SCC 477]
2. Chairman and Managing Director, Central Bank of India and others v. Central Bank of India SC/ST
Employees Welfare Association and others [(2015) 12 SCC 308]
3. Suresh Chand Gautam v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [(2016) 11 SCC 113]
4. Mukesh Kumar and another v. State of Uttarakhand and others [(2020) 3 SCC 1

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