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SPOUSES NOCEDA vs. DIRECTO
G.R. No. 178495. July 26, 2010.
DOCTRINE:
TWO MAIN RULES LAID DOWN BY THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA:
1. The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and constitutes a bar
to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or
any other tribunal;
2. Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or
decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not
the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same.
Conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
FACTS:
In 1986, respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo filed a complaint against her nephew, petitioner
Rodolfo Noceda, for “Recovery of Possession and Ownership and Rescission/Annulment of
Donation” with the RTC of Iba, Zambales.
Respondent alleged that she and her co-heirs have extrajudicially settled the property they
inherited from their late father in 1981, consisting of a parcel of land described as Lot 1121.
She donated a portion of her hereditary share to her nephew, but Rodolfo occupied a bigger
area, claiming ownership thereof since September 1985.
In 1991, the RTC rendered a judgment in favour of respondent where:
a. The extrajudicial settlement-partition was declared VALID;
b. Deed of Donation (June 1, 1981) revoked;
c. Ordered Noceda to vacate and reconvey the donated portion
d. Ordered Noceda to remove the house built inside the donated portion at his
expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00
e. Ordered Noceda to pay attorney’s fees.
The decision was appealed to the CA.
In 1995, spouses Dahipon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession, and
annulment of sale and damages against spouses Antonio and Domingo Arbizo, spouses
Rodolfo and Erna Noceda, and Aurora Arbizo-Directo with RTC Iba, Zambales.
In the complaint, Spouses Dahipon alleged that they were the registered owners of a parcel
of land designated as Lot 1121-A. The said land was issued pursuant to a Free Patent. They
claimed that the defendants therein purchased portions of the land from them without
paying the full amount.
Except for Aurora, a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties, as a result of
which, a deed of absolute sale was executed and TCT was issued in the name of spouses
Noceda for their portion of the land. Aurora, for her part, questioned Dahipon’s alleged
ownership over the same parcel of land by filing an adverse claim.
In the meantime, a decision was rendered in the appealed case before the CA ordering
Noceda to vacate the portion which was allotted to Aurora and affirmed the RTC decision.
Petitioners filed a petition for review but the same was denied in September 1999 since the
Court found no reversible error, much less grave abuse of discretion, with the factual findings
of the RTC and CA. The decision became final and executor, and a writ of execution was duly
issued by the RTC in March 6 2001.
In 2003, petitioners instituted an action for quieting of title against respondent. In the
complaint, petitioners admitted that first civil case was decided in favour of Aurora and a writ
of execution had been issued, ordering them to vacate the property. However, petitioners
claimed that the land, the subject matter of the first civil case, was the same parcel of land
owned by spouses Dahipon from whom they purchased a portion.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the Writ of Execution dated March 6, 2001.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied
the motion, holding that there was no identity of causes of action.
Trial ensued. After petitioners presented their evidence, respondent filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, stating that the claim of ownership and possession of petitioners on the basis of
the title emanating from that of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon was already raised in the previous
case. The trial court granted the demurrer to evidence. The CA affirmed.
Petitioners assert that res judicata does not apply, considering that the essential requisites as
to the identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action are not present.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata or Doctrine of Conclusiveness of Judgment is
applicable in the case at bar
HELD: YES
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1. There must be a final judgment or order
The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules, namely: (1) the judgment or decree of 2. Judgment/order must be on the merits
a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties 3. The Court rendering the same must have jurisdiction on the subject matter and the
and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of parties; and
action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue 4. There must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a causes of action
competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits
are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing
the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence.8 The first general rule
above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as “bar by former judgment”; while the second general
rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as
“conclusiveness of judgment.”

It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential
that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action,
and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v.
Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issue.

The foregoing disquition finds application in the case at bar. Undeniably, the present case is
closely related to the previous case, where petitioners raised the issue of ownership and
possession of Lot No. 1121 and the annulment of the donation of said lot to them. The
decision of the RTC was affirmed by the CA, and became final with the denial of the petition
for review by this Court. The petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to private
respondent Directo without the latter’s knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which
is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a
done against the donor. Clearly, therefore, petitioners have no right of ownership or
possession over the land in question.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such material fact becomes binding and
conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them. Thus, petitioners can no longer question respondent’s
ownership over Lot No. 1121 in the instant suit for quieting of title. Simply put,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

NOTE:

REQUISITES FOR THE APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA


INFANTE VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC.
G.R. No. 156596. August 24, 2007.
DOCTRINE:
The proper venue in an action for revival of judgment depends on the determination of
whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action.
Where the sole reason for action to revive is the enforcement of adjudged rights over a piece
of property, the action falls under the category of a real action for which the complaint
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.
A branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over a particular territory
defined by the Supreme Court.
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
FACTS:
On June 6, 2001, Aran Builders, Inc. filed an action for revival of judgment before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City. The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by the RTC of Makati City
Branch 60 in an action for specific performance and damages.
The Makati RTC judgment, which became final and executory on November 16, 1994. The
judgment ordered Adelaida Infante, within 30 days from finality of said judgment, to execute
a Deed of Sale of Lot No. 11, Block 9, Phase 3-A1, Ayala Alabang Subdivision; pay all pertinent
taxes in connection with said sale; register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and
deliver to Ayala Corporation the certificate of title issued in the name of respondent. The
same judgment ordered private respondent to pay petitioner the sume of P321, 918.25 upon
petitioner’s compliance with the aforementioned order. Petitioner refused to comply with
her judgment obligations despite private respondent’s repeated requests and demands, and
that the latter was compelled to file the action for revival of judgment.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the action for revival of judgment on the grounds that
the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was
improperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.
On September 2001, the RTC Muntinlupa issued an order denying the Motion to Dismiss. The
RTC reasoned that although the Decision was rendered by the Makati RTC, it must be
emphasized that at that time, there was still no RTC in Muntinlupa City, then under the
territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts, so taht the cases from this City were tried and
heard at Makati City. With the creation of the RTCs of Muntinlupa City, matters involving
properties located in Muntinlupa, and cases involving Muntinlupa City residents were all
ordered to be lititgated before these Courts (RTC Munti).
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Petitioner went to the
Court of Appeals via special civil action for certiorari. Petitioner asserts that the complaint for
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specific performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personal action and, therefore,
the suit to revive the judgment therein is also personal in nature; and that, consequently, the
venue of the action for revival of judgment is either Makati City or Paranaque City where
private respondent and petitioner respectively reside, at the election of private respondent.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the subject action for revival judgment
is “quasi in rem because it involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a real property’,
and that the venue lies in Muntinlupa City where the property is situated.
In 2002, the CA promulgated its Decision in favour of Aran Builders. The CA held that since
the judgment sought to be revived was rendered in an action involving title to or possession
of real property, or interest therein, the action for revival of judgment is then an action in
rem which should be filed with the RTC of the place where the real property is located.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision but the motion was denied.
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding that the complaint for
revival of judgment is an action in rem which was correctly filed with the RTC of the place
where the disputed real property is located.
Petitioner insists that the action for revival of judgment is an action in personam; therefore,
the complaint should be filed with the RTC of the place where either petitioner or private
respondent resides. Petitioner then concludes that the filing of the action for revival of
judgment with the RTC Muntinlupa should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
ISSUE: Where is the proper venue of the present action for revival of judgment?
HELD:
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the lapse of five (5)
years from entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a final and
executory judgment or order may be enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which
court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.
The proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of
judgment is a real action or a personal action. Applying the aforequoted rules on venue, if
the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place where the real
property is located. If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a
personal action that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant
resides.
The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine whether it is a real action
or a personal action.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared private respondent’s right to have the title
over the disputed property conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private
 CIV PRO DIGEST 9
respondent has an established interest over the lot in question; and to protect such right or
interest, private respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole reason
for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent’s adjudged rights
over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real action, for it affects
private respondent’s interest over real property. The present case for revival of judgment
being a real action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
place where the realty is located.

It is quite clear that a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over a
particular territory defined by the Supreme Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the
territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. However, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7154,
entitled An Act to Amend Section Fourteen of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Otherwise Known
As The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect on September 4, 1991. Said law
provided for the creation of a branch of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is
now the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority
to validly issue orders and processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.

FLORES VS. LINDO
G.R. No. 183984. April 13, 2011.
DOCTRINE:
The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of
money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the decision and resolution of the CA
FACTS:
October 31, 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan from petitioner Arturo Flores amounting to
P400,000 payable on December 1, 1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3%
surcharge in case of late payment.
To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a property in the
name of Edna and her husband Enrico Lindo, Jr. (respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory
Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued 3 checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonoured for
insufficieny of funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage
with Damages against respondents. The case was raffled to RTC Manila Br. 33.
In its September 30 2003 Decision, RTC Br. 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to
judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC found that the Deed was executed by Edna
without the consent and authority of Enrico. The Deed was executed on October 31, 1995
whereas the SPA executed by Enrico was dated November 4, 1995.
The RTC further ruled that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna
as he could file a personal action against her. However, the RTC ruled that it had no
jurisdiction over the personal action which should be filed in the place where the plaintiff or
the defendant resides in accordance with Secion 2, Rule 4 of Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.
Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC Br. 93 of San Pedro Laguna
which declared the deed of real estate mortgage as void in the absence of the authority or
consent of her spouse. The liability of Edna on the principal contract of loan however subsists
notwithstanding the illegality of the real estate mortgage.
On September 4 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against
respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42 RTC Manila.
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Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims. In addition,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of improper venue, res
judicata and forum-shopping, invoking the Decision of RTC Br. 33. In March 2005,
respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of
action.
RTC BR. 42 DECISION:
It denied the Motion to dismiss.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.
Br. 42 denied the MR.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO before the CA.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION:
It set aside the Orders of the RTC Br. 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
in denying respondents’ motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals ruled that on a non-payment of a note secured by a mortgage, the
creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor, that is recovery of the credit with
execution of the suit. The CA ruled that petitioner could not split the single cause of action by
filing separately a foreclosure proceeding and a collection case. By filing a petition for
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, the CA held that petitioner had already waived his
personal action to recover the amount covered by the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of
money on the ground of multiplicity of suits.
HELD: YES
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor,
that is, to recover the debt. The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal
action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security. An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be
multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another
depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.
Both the RTC Br. 33 and the RTC Br. 93 misapplied the rules.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition
or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also
state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
 CIV PRO DIGEST 9
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.”

In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31
October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The
execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing
offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a
valid contract.

However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the RTC, Branch
33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to become final and executory without asking the courts for an
alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the
declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to
observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s
avenue for recovery of the loan.

There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another,
or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience.” The principle of unjust enrichment requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
such benefit is derived at the expense of another. The main objective of the principle against
unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another
without just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this case considering that
Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid
without just cause.

Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a
substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of
Appeals, in the assailed decision, found that Edna admitted the loan, except that she claimed
it only amounted to P340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because
of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the
Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to submit her defenses before the RTC, Branch
42 on her claim as to the amount of her indebtedness.

FGU INSURANCE CORP. vs. RTC MAKATI CITY BR. 66 and G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORP.
DOCTRINE:
Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a higher court has become final and
executory and has been returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter is the
ministerial act of carrying out the decision and issuing the writ of execution.
Doctrine of Finality of Judgment or Immutability of Judgment; Under the doctrine, a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of
the land.
XPNS to Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment:
1. Correction of clerical errors;
2. Nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
3. Void judgments
4. Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.
NATURE OF THE CASE: Special Civil Action Petition for Mandamus
FACTS:
In 1994, GPS agreed to transport 30 units of Condura SD white refrigerators in one of its
Isuzu trucks from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc. (CII) in Alabang, to the Central
Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. On its way to its destination, however, the Isuzu truck
collided with another truck resulting in the damage of said appliances.
FGU, the insurer of the damaged refrigerators, paid CII, the insured, the value of the covered
shipment. FGU, in turn, as subrogee of the insured’s rights and interests, sought
reimbursement of the amount it paid from GPS.
The failure of the GPS to heed FGU’s claim for reimbursement, led the latter to file a
complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver with the
RTC. FGU presented evidence establishing its claim against GPS. GPS filed a motion to dismiss
by way of demurrer to evidence. The RTC granted said motion.
The RTC ruled, among others, that FGU failed to adduce evidence that GPS was a common
carrier and that its driver was negligent, thus, GPS could not be made liable for the damages
of the subject cargoes. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The case was then elevated to
this Court which rendered a decision agreeing that GPS was not a common carrier but
nevertheless held it liable under the doctrine of culpa contractual.
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In 2002, the Court denied GPS’ motion for reconsideration with finality. An entry of judgment
was issued certifying that the August 6, 2002 Decision of this Court became final and
executor on October 3 2002.
FGU filed a motion for execution with the RTC praying that a writ of execution be issued to
enforce the August 6 2002 judgment award of this Court in the amount of P204,450.00.
GPS filed its Opposition to Motion for Execution praying that the said motion be denied on
the ground that the latter’s claim was unlawful, illegal, against public policy and good morals,
and constituted unjust enrichment. GPS found that the insured transferred the ownership of
the subject appliances to FGU and in turn, FGU sold the same to third parties thereby
receiving and appropriating the consideration and proceeds of the sale. GPS believed that
FGU should not be allowed to “doubly recover” the losses it suffered.
Thereafter, GPS filed its Comment with Motion to Set Case for Hearing on the Merits. The
RTC granted GPS’ motion. FGU filed a Motion for Reconsideration. RTC denied MR thus, FGU
filed the instant petition for mandamus.
FGU argues that the decision is already final and executor and, accordingly, a writ of
execution should issue. The lower court should not be allowed to hear the matter of turnover
of the refrigerators to FGU because it was not an issue raised in the Answer of GPS. Neither
was it argued by GPS in the CA and in this Court. It was only brought out after the decision
became final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC Makati erred in reopening the case which had already
attained finality
HELD: NO
Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a higher court has become final and
executory and has been returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter is the
ministerial act of carrying out the decision and issuing the writ of execution. In addition, a
final and executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding thereto a relief not
originally included. In short, once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a
writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court’s ministerial duty. The lower
court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court or re-examine it for any other purpose
other than execution; much less may it review the same upon any matter decided on appeal
or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been
demanded.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any
act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
 CIV PRO DIGEST 9
But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the
socalled nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable. The exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment has been
applied in several cases in order to serve substantial justice.

In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the RTC that there is indeed a need to find out
the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators. For this purpose, a hearing is necessary to
determine the issue of whether or not there was an actual turnover of the subject
refrigerators to FGU by the assured CII. If there was an actual turnover, it is very important to
find out whether FGU sold the subject refrigerators to third parties and profited from such
sale.

These questions were brought about by the contention of GPS in its Opposition to Motion for
Execution that after the assured, CII, was fully compensated for its claim on the damaged
refrigerators, it delivered the possession of the subject refrigerators to FGU as shown in the
certification of the Accounting/Administrative Manager of CII. Thereafter, the subject
refrigerators were sold by FGU to third parties and
FGU received and appropriated the consideration and proceeds of the sale. GPS claims that it
verified the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators from the CII because it wanted to repair
and sell them to compensate FGU.

If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and FGU profited from the sale
after the delivery, there would be an unjust enrichment if the realized profit would not be
deducted from the judgment amount. “The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments
would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.”

DE LEON vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY;
PEA vs. HON. SELMA ALARAS, Acting Presiding Judge of Br. 135, RTC Makati
DOCTRINE:
Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the
possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the
defeated party’s claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.
A judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the general rule that the mere pendency of a
special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court
or court of origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order; It is true that there are instances where, even if
there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher
court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the
precept of judicial courtesy, but this principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception
rather than the rule.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 (by De
Leon) Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 (by PEA)
Two consolidated petitions.
FACTS:
IN 1993, petitioner Bernardo de Leon filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Makati City Br. 135 against respondent Public
Estates Authority, a GOCC, as well as its officers.
The suit for damages hinged on the alleged unlawful destruction of De Leon’s fence and
houses constructed on Lot 5155 situated in San Dionisio, Paranaque, which petitioner
claimed has been in the possession of his family for more than 50 years.
Essentially, De Leon prayed the following:
1. Lawful possession of the land be awarded to him;
2. PEA be ordered to pay damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on
Lot 5155;
3. An Injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA from committing acts which would
violate his lawful and peaceful possession of the subject premises.
The court a quo found merit in De Leon’s application for writ of preliminary injunction and
thus issued the Order dated February 8 1993.
CIV PRO DIGEST 9
PEA sought recourse before the Supreme Court through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer
for a Restraining Order, ascribing grave abuse of discretion against the court a quo for issuing
injunctive relief.
The 9th Division rendered a Decision dated September 30 1993, which held that the court a
quo did not act in a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power in issuing the writ
of preliminary injunction against PEA.
PEA appealed to the SC via a Petition for Certiorari insisting that Lot 5155 was a salvage zone
until it was reclaimed through government efforts in 1982.
In its Decision dated November 20, 2000, The Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a
public land so that De Leon’s occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not confer
ownership or possessory rights. Prescinding therefrom, no writ of injunction may lie to
protect De Leon’s nebulous right of possession.
The SC Decision became final and executor as no motion for reconsideration was filed. In due
course, PEA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that De Leon and persons
claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and peaceably surrender possession of Lot
5155.
Acting on PEA’s motion, the court a quo issued the first assailed Order dated September 15
2004 which issued the Writ of Execution.
De Leon moved for reconsideration thereof and quashal of the writ of execution. He insisted
that the court a quo’s Order for the issuance of the Writ of Execution completely deviated
from the SC’s Decision dated November 20 2000 as it did not categorically direct him to
surrender possession of Lot 5155 in favour of PEA.
Both motions were denied by the court a quo in the second disputed Order dated April 29
2005.
De Leon filed another Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC.
De Leon then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the two Orders of
the RTC of Makati City. In the same proceeding, De Leon filed an Urgent-Emergency Motion
for TRO and Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CA denied the same.
De Leon filed a second special civil action for certiorari with the CA seeking to annul and set
aside the same RTC Orders.
In 2006, PEA filed a Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Demolition praying that the
RTC issue a Special Order directing De Leon and persons claiming under him to remove all
improvements erected inside the premises of the subject property and, in case of failure to
remove the said structures, that a Special Order and Writ of Demolition be issued directing
the sheriff to remove and demolish the said improvements.

In 2006, The RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the Resolution of PEA’s motion. PEA
filed a MR, but was denied.
In 2007, PEA filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, resolve the petitions
in the CA. The CA dismissed De Leon’s petition on the ground of forum shopping.
Subsequently, the CA dismissed De Leon’s petition holding that an earlier decision
promulgated by the SC, finding the subject property to be public and that De Leon has no
title and no clear legal right over the disputed lot, has already attained finality. De Leon filed
MR but the CA denied the same.
Thereafter, PEA filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve re Writ of Demolition. The RTC issued an
Order holding in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s Motion pending receipt by the trial court
of the entry of judgment pertaining to the abovementioned case. PEA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. RTC denied the MR.
In 2008, De Leon filed the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision.
Subsequently, PEA filed the instant special civil action for certiorari questioning the Orders of
the RTC of Makati City.
The PEA was substituted by the City of Paranaque.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the RTC erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
a writ of execution placing PEA in possession of the disputed property
2. If PEA is entitled, whether or not the RTC should proceed to hear the PEA’s
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition
HELD:
1. NO
As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the
decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original
judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform
strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment
sought to be executed.
However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where
the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the
possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the
defeated party’s claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.
Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the
defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of
ownership which was rejected. This is precisely what happened in the present case. This
Court had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that De Leon
does not have any right to possess the land independent of his claim of ownership.
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It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the
decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.30 In the present
case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court and file an ejectment case simply to
establish its right to possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leon’s claims, the issuance
of the writ of execution by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of
this Court’s decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. Such writ
was but an essential consequence of this Court’s ruling affirming the nature of the subject
parcel of land as public and at the same time dismissing De Leon’s claims of ownership and
possession. To further require PEA to file an ejectment suit to oust de Leon and his siblings
from the disputed property would, in effect, amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.
2. YES
As to whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the
resolution of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition, Section 7, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court provides the general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for
certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin
does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order. It is true that there are instances where, even if there is no writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be
proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of
judicial courtesy. The principle of judicial courtesy, however, remains to be the exception
rather than the rule. As held by this Court in Go v. Abrogar, 398 SCRA 166 (2003), the precept
of judicial courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to
maintain the relevance of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, in the
amendments introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, a new paragraph is now added to Section 7,
Rule 65, which provides as follows: The public respondent shall proceed with the principal
case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its
expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a
ground for an administrative charge.
The Order of the RTC holding in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of
a Writ of Demolition also appears to be a circumvention of the provisions of Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, which limit the period of effectivity of restraining orders issued by
the courts. In fact, the assailed Orders of the RTC have even become more potent than a TRO
issued by the CA because, under the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the CA is effective only
for sixty days. In the present case, even in the absence of a TRO issued by a higher court, the
RTC, in effect, directed the maintenance of the status quo by issuing its assailed Orders.
Worse, the effectivity of the said Orders was made to last for an indefinite period because
the resolution of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition was made to depend
upon the finality of the judgment in G.R. No. 181970. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated
December 28, 2007 and March 4, 2008.
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