Pascor vs.

NLRC & Rances; GR 76595; May 6, 1988 Re: Authentication Facts: Due to a POEA decision rendering Rances (employee of Pascor) as being liable for inciting another officer to insubordination etc., Rances sought to enforce an award allegedly granted him by a Dubai Court against Pascors foreign principal. Rances presented as evidence what purports to be an "original copy of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic script and language, with a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines." Issue: WON the Dubai decision can be enforced against Pascor. Held: NEGATIVE. Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25. The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of that decision, but that translation is legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a non-official language (like Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or Filipino. There is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government. Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English languages has been shown. The English translation submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.

Sps Mapue vs. IAC; GR 70856; Nov. 11, 87 Re: Public Documents are presumed to have been regularly executed Facts: Sps Mapue obtained a loan from respondents in the amount of P19,500 evidenced by a promissory note and an original real estate mortgage ratified by a Notary Public. Subsequently, Sps obtained an additional loan resulting to an amended real estate mortgage ratified by another Notary Public. Sps failed to pay, thus being the only bidder, defendant extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage. Sps moved to set aside the foreclosure on the ground of fraud. Issue: WON the extrajudicial foreclosure can be set aside on the ground of fraud in the execution of the original real estate mortgage/amended real estate mortgage. Held: NEGATIVE. The evidentiary value of a notarial document guaranteed by public attestation in accordance with law must be sustained in full force and effect unless impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof. Under the law they are entitled to full faith and credit upon their face. In fact, it has long been settled that a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear., convincing and more than merely preponderant.

People vs Guamos; GR 109662; Feb. 21, 95 Re: Testing the accuracy/credibility of witness Facts: Guamos was found guilty of raping Michele (then 8 years old). On appeal of the decision of the trial court, Guamos sought to discredit and exclude the testimony of the rape victim upon the ground that she had not answered the questions posed to her at cross-examination during trial (which were complicated to be answered for adults more so for a 9 year old). Issue: WON the testimony of Michele should be discredited. Held: NEGATIVE. It is the right of every party to cross-examine a witness "with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his [or her] accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue." It is also the duty of the witness to answer questions put to him or her, subject to certain exceptions. In the instant case, defense counsel did not ask the Court to enforce his right and to compel the witness (Michelle) to perform her duty. As noted, the trial judge had instructed defense counsel to simplify his questions. Defense counsel, for his part, neither complained about this directive nor complied with it. Counsel for appellant seeks to make much of the fact that Michelle Dolorical did not answer some of the questions of defense counsel on cross-examination. This failure does not detract from the admissibility or credibility of Michelle's testimony. Firstly, this appears to the Court to be a case of failure of Michelle to answer some questions rather than an obstinate refusal to do so. In formulating those questions on cross-examination, defense counsel obviously did not take into account that he was cross-examining a child of tender age (Michelle was approximately nine [9] years of age at the time she gave her testimony in open court) susceptible to confusion and probably easily intimidated. It is clear, that defense counsel exercised no substantial effort to present intelligible questions to complaining witness Michelle Dolorical designed to elicit straightforward answers. The Court considered that she, in all probability, simply failed to grasp some of the questions put to her on crossexaminations. The defense had made it very difficult if not practically impossible for her to answer those questions intelligently and truthfully.

People vs. Manalo; GR L-55177; Feb. 27, 87 Re: Court may examine witness for clarificatory questions Facts: Manalo pleaded guilty in killing his co-convict. On appeal he raised that the intervention made by the trial judge during cross-examination showed lack of impartiality and objectivity. And that by such act of intervention, the judge had already concluded that appellant was guilty of murder and had resolved to convict him; that the trial court had functioned "both as judge and prosecutor" asking questions of witnesses "calculated to establish treachery, premeditation and motive"; that the questions raised by the trial court were exceptionable ones, being "leading, misleading, caged for opinions or were objectionable on the ground of the witness' incompetence"; and that therefore, appellant "never had a fair chance." Issue: WON the act of intervention of the trial judge during cross examination deprived Manalo of his constitutional rights. Held: NEGATIVE. A trial judge is accorded reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to make the record speak the truth. In such an effort, a judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party.

In the present case, the trial judge did not transgress the permissible limits of judicial inquiry. It appears that the judge merely sought to clarify to himself whether or not treachery and evident premeditation had indeed attended the killing of Alfredo dela Cruz, as alleged by the prosecution. All that the questions propounded by the judge indicates that he was not particularly skillful in cross-examination and that he found it difficult to operationalize words which themselves imported conclusions. Finally, the questions posed by the trial judge did not ultimately impose any prejudice upon Manalo. The questions raised by the trial judge sought to draw forth answers which did not relate to whether or not Manalo had in fact killed dela Cruz. Manalo had not only entered an intelligent and valid plea of guilty; that he had killed his fellow convict dela Cruz was established by independent and overwhelming evidence.

Villalon vs. IAC; GR 73751; Sept. 4, 86 Facts: A civil case for annulment of a deed of sale, among others, was filed by Neval et al against Atty. Villalon. Previously, Neval et al also filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Villalon. During the trial of the civil case, Atty. Villalon introduced in evidence some of Neval et als testimonies in the disbarment proceeding which were allegedly inconsistent with their testimonies in the civil case for the purpose of impeaching their testimonies. The trial court granted the Motion to Strike filed by Neval et al on the ground that its admission would violate the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings; and that the same cannot be waived. Issue: WON the attorney subject of a disbarment proceeding may waive his right to its confidentiality and thus present the inconsistent testimonies therein in a civil case. Held: AFFIRMATIVE.

By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to impeach the credibility of their adverse parties' witnesses (granted under Secs. 15 & 16 of R. 132) by proving that on former occasions they had made statements inconsistent with the statements made during the trial, despite the fact that such statements are material to the issues in the Civil Case. The subject matter involved in the disbarment proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification of the deed of absolute sale in petitioners' favor, is the same issue raised in the Civil Case wherein the annulment of the said deed of absolute sale is sought. While proceedings against attorneys should, indeed, be private and confidential except for the final order which shall be made public, that confidentiality is a privileged/ right which may be waived by the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional reputation it is vested, pursuant to the general principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, among others.In fact, the Court also notes that even private respondents' counsel touched on some matters testified to by NEVAL in the disbarment proceedings and which were the subject of cross examination.