Wachemo University

Collage Engineering and Technology

School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
Introduction.

Immanuel Kant’s celebrated investigation of human knowledge started from the

assumption that we have achieved rock-solid, indubitable(definite) knowledge – in
geometry through Euclid and in physics through Newton – and from the question of how
this was possible (especially in view of Hume’s demonstration of the invalidity of
inductive inference). Contemporary philosophy of science is a rich and multi-faceted
enterprise and so any one way of viewing it will inevitably leave out much of importance
and interest. Nonetheless, many of the classic debates and areas of current concern can be
introduced by investigating how Kant’s questions require modification in the light of the
development of science since his time and by investigating the attempts made to answer
those modified questions.(የአማኑኤል ካንት የተከበረው የሰው ልጅ ዕውቀት ምርመራ የጀመረው
ከዓለት-ጠንካራ፣ የማይዳሰስ (በተወሰነ) እውቀት - በጂኦሜትሪ በዩክሊድ እና በፊዚክስ በኒውተን - እና
ይህ እንዴት ሊሆን ቻለ ከሚለው ጥያቄ (በተለይ ከሁሜ) አንፃር ነው። የኢንደክቲቭ ኢንቬንሽን ዋጋ
እንደሌለው ማሳየት). የዘመናዊ ሳይንስ ፍልስፍና ሀብታም እና ብዙ ገፅታ ያለው ድርጅት ነው እና
ስለዚህ የትኛውም የእይታ መንገድ ብዙ ጠቀሜታዎችን እና ፍላጎቶችን መተው አይቀሬ ነው።
ቢሆንም፣ ብዙዎቹ የጥንታዊ ክርክሮች እና የወቅቱ አሳሳቢ ጉዳዮች የካንት ጥያቄዎች ከሱ ጊዜ
ጀምሮ ከሳይንስ እድገት አንፃር እንዴት ማሻሻያ እንደሚያስፈልጋቸው በመመርመር እና የተሻሻሉ
ጥያቄዎችን ለመመለስ የተደረጉ ሙከራዎችን በመመርመር ማስተዋወቅ ይቻላል።)

In fact now a day research in philosophy of science was, in our eyes, progressing. Due to
space limitations, we have not covered everything we might have, nor that we would
have liked. Something should have been said about the relation between sciences studies
and philosophy of science and again about history of science and philosophy of science.
We should have spent more time on the “continental” tradition and its relations to
philosophy of science. Many of the special sciences are ignored. We had only so many
chapters we could chose. Others might have chosen differently.(በሳይንስ ፍልስፍና ላይ
የአንድ ቀን ጥናት በአይናችን እየገሰገሰ ነበር። በቦታ ውሱንነት ምክንያት፣ ያለንን ወይም
የምንወደውን ሁሉንም ነገር አልሸፈንነውም። በሳይንስ ጥናቶች እና በሳይንስ ፍልስፍና መካከል
ስላለው ግንኙነት እና ስለ ሳይንስ እና የሳይንስ ፍልስፍና ታሪክ አንድ ነገር መባል ነበረበት። በ
"አህጉራዊ" ወግ እና ከሳይንስ ፍልስፍና ጋር ያለውን ግንኙነት የበለጠ ጊዜ ማሳለፍ ነበረብን። ብዙዎቹ
ልዩ ሳይንሶች ችላ ተብለዋል. ልንመርጣቸው የምንችላቸው ብዙ ምዕራፎች ብቻ ነበሩን። ሌሎች
በተለየ መንገድ መርጠው ሊሆን ይችላል።)

Different researchers have tried to build their introductory account of some central issues
in philosophy of science around a theme. But, just as they said it would from the outset,
any such thematic treatment is bound to leave out much of value. They have not touched
on some central issues – such as scientific explanation, the notion of causality and others.
Many of these will be dealt with in what follows. They have also not been able to discuss

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
those very important areas of philosophy of science which overlap with theoretical work
in the sciences themselves. Analyses of conceptual issues in the theory of general
relativity, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics have all been at the forefront –
and have, in turn, risen in especially sharp ways general philosophical issues about
determinism, locality and the like. More recent work has seen an extension into the
foundations of biology – particularly the structure of Darwinian Theory and of genetics;
and, especially via interest in causal models, into the foundations of the social sciences.
(በሳይንስ ፍልስፍና ውስጥ አንዳንድ ማዕከላዊ ጉዳዮችን በአንድ ጭብጥ ዙሪያ የተለያዩ
ተመራማሪዎች የመግቢያ ሂሳባቸውን ለመገንባት ሞክረዋል። ነገር ግን ገና ከጅምሩ እንደተናገሩት
ማንኛውም ዓይነት ጭብጥ ያለው ሕክምና ብዙ ዋጋን መተው አይቀርም። አንዳንድ ማዕከላዊ
ጉዳዮችን አልነኩም - እንደ ሳይንሳዊ ማብራሪያ, ምክንያታዊነት እና ሌሎች. ከእነዚህ ውስጥ ብዙዎቹ
በሚከተለው ውስጥ ይስተናገዳሉ. በሳይንስ ውስጥ ከቲዎሬቲካል ስራ ጋር የሚደራረቡትን በጣም
አስፈላጊ የሳይንስ ፍልስፍና ዘርፎችንም መወያየት አልቻሉም። ስለ አጠቃላይ አንፃራዊነት ፣ ኳንተም
ሜካኒክስ እና ስታቲስቲካዊ መካኒኮች ጽንሰ-ሀሳባዊ ጉዳዮች ትንታኔዎች ሁሉም በግንባር ቀደምትነት
ላይ ነበሩ - እና በተራው ፣ በተለይ ስለ ቆራጥነት ፣ አካባቢ እና የመሳሰሉት አጠቃላይ ፍልስፍናዊ
ጉዳዮች በተለይ በሹል መንገዶች ተነስተዋል። የቅርብ ጊዜ ስራዎች ወደ ባዮሎጂ መሠረቶች
ማራዘሚያ ታይቷል - በተለይም የዳርዊን ቲዎሪ እና የጄኔቲክስ መዋቅር; እና በተለይም በምክንያት
ሞዴሎች ፍላጎት ወደ ማህበራዊ ሳይንሶች መሰረቶች።)

The Royal Academy of Engineering wants to move engineering to the centre of society
by highlighting the crucial role that engineering plays in shaping our lifestyle and culture.
The contribution that engineering has made to intellectual history is central to this role.
Engineering has had an enormous impact in developing tangible benefits from the
complex body of knowledge that humanity has developed. Relativity theory and
Darwinian natural selection might be cited as pinnacles in the ever-progressing ascent of
human knowledge, but we should add the development of the World Wide Web and
space exploration as examples of the awe-inspiring level of understanding that has been
reached. Engineering has made an overwhelming contribution to our understanding of the
way the world works and how to make the world work for us.

There is great value in developing a better understanding the nature of engineering

knowledge and of engineering itself. This allows us to raise the profile of engineering by
demonstrating its role in developing sophisticated knowledge. It can also bring a sharper
understanding of engineering method, which can be of great value to engineering
education. It can also enable a clear formulation of what engineering is, in order better to
convey its value through public engagement.(የሮያል ምህንድስና አካዳሚ ምህንድስና
አኗኗራችንን እና ባህላችንን በመቅረጽ የሚጫወተውን ወሳኝ ሚና በማጉላት ምህንድስናን ወደ
ህብረተሰቡ መሃል ማሸጋገር ይፈልጋል። ኢንጂነሪንግ ለአዕምሯዊ ታሪክ ያበረከተው አስተዋፅዖ የዚህ
ሚና ዋና ነው። ኢንጂነሪንግ የሰው ልጅ ካዳበረው ውስብስብ የእውቀት አካል ተጨባጭ ጥቅሞችን

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
በማዳበር ረገድ ከፍተኛ ተጽዕኖ አሳድሯል. አንጻራዊነት ንድፈ ሃሳብ እና የዳርዊን ተፈጥሯዊ ምርጫ
ከጊዜ ወደ ጊዜ እየጨመረ በሚሄደው የሰው ልጅ እውቀት ላይ እንደ ቁንጮዎች ሊጠቀሱ ይችላሉ፣
ነገር ግን የአለም አቀፍ ድር እና የጠፈር ምርምር እድገትን ለአስደናቂው የአረዳድ ደረጃ እንደ አብነት
ማከል አለብን። ኢንጂነሪንግ አለም የሚሰራበትን መንገድ እና አለም እንዴት ለእኛ እንዲሰራ ማድረግ
እንዳለብን እንድንገነዘብ ከፍተኛ አስተዋፅኦ አድርጓል።

የኢንጂነሪንግ ዕውቀትን ተፈጥሮ እና የምህንድስና እራስን በተሻለ ሁኔታ መረዳትን ለማዳበር ትልቅ
ዋጋ አለው። ይህም የተራቀቀ እውቀትን በማዳበር ረገድ ያለውን ሚና በማሳየት የምህንድስና
መገለጫውን ከፍ ለማድረግ ያስችለናል። እንዲሁም የምህንድስና ዘዴን የበለጠ ግንዛቤን ሊያመጣ
ይችላል, ይህም ለኢንጂነሪንግ ትምህርት ትልቅ ጠቀሜታ ሊኖረው ይችላል. እንዲሁም በሕዝብ
ተሳትፎ እሴቱን በተሻለ ለማስተላለፍ ምህንድስና ምን እንደሆነ በግልፅ እንዲቀረጽ ማድረግ
ይችላል።)

As well as a better appreciation of the nature of engineering, the series aims to show that
there is much fuel for philosophers if they look to engineering for examples. Philosophers
may find in engineering enlightenment on the kinds of questions that they have struggled
with for centuries and no doubt philosophers will also find new issues to engage them.
Engineering work on artificial intelligence and information technology can, for example,
enlighten the philosopher’s questions about the nature of thought, consciousness and
language. The engineering process of synthesis and construction can inform metaphysical
questions about what the world is made of, how it can be broken down and what its
fundamental elements are.
There is, however, no point in engaging in a philosophy of engineering unless it has a use
- no engineer embarks on a project unless there is an end purpose for what they are
working on. The objective of this series is to demonstrate the complexity and richness of
engineering and the extent of its influence on human progress. It can be used to send out
the message to society that engineering is an important, rewarding and worthwhile
profession. In addition, the skills of philosophers in constructing and delivering clear
arguments could be of great use to engineers. If philosophy of engineering can help to
cultivate such skills in engineers, then engineers will have a stronger voice with which to
convey that message.

Engineering is a broad, interdisciplinary field and has links with the social sciences and
humanities as well as the natural sciences. The basic aim of the seminars was simply to
get engineers and philosophers together to share ideas and to identify research areas of
common interest. The Royal Academy of Engineering hopes that this will be the
beginning of a fruitful collaboration and that this, and the forthcoming second volume on
philosophy of engineering articles, will provide food for thought for philosophers and
engineers alike.(እንዲሁም ስለ ምህንድስና ተፈጥሮ የተሻለ አድናቆት፣ ተከታታዩ አላማው

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
ለፈላስፋዎች ለአብነት ምህንድስና ቢመለከቱ ብዙ ነዳጅ እንዳለ ለማሳየት ነው። ፈላስፋዎች
ለዘመናት ሲታገሏቸው የኖሩትን ጥያቄዎች በምህንድስና እውቀት ውስጥ ሊያገኙ ይችላሉ እና
ፈላስፋዎችም እነሱን ለማሳተፍ አዳዲስ ጉዳዮችን እንደሚያገኙ ጥርጥር የለውም። በአርቴፊሻል
ኢንተለጀንስ እና በኢንፎርሜሽን ቴክኖሎጂ ላይ የምህንድስና ስራ ለምሳሌ የፈላስፋውን
የአስተሳሰብ፣ የንቃተ ህሊና እና የቋንቋ ተፈጥሮን ጥያቄዎች ማብራት ይችላል። የማዋሃድ እና
የግንባታ የምህንድስና ሂደት ዓለም ከምን እንደተሠራ ፣ እንዴት እንደሚፈርስ እና መሠረታዊ አካላት
ምን እንደሆኑ ሜታፊዚካል ጥያቄዎችን ማሳወቅ ይችላል።
ነገር ግን ምንም ጥቅም ከሌለው በስተቀር በምህንድስና ፍልስፍና ውስጥ መሳተፍ ምንም ፋይዳ
የለውም - አንድም መሐንዲስ እየሰሩበት ላለው ዓላማ ካልሆነ በስተቀር ወደ አንድ ፕሮጀክት
አይጀምርም። የዚህ ተከታታይ ዓላማ የምህንድስና ውስብስብነት እና ብልጽግና እና በሰው ልጅ
እድገት ላይ ያለውን ተጽእኖ ለማሳየት ነው። ምህንድስና ጠቃሚ፣የሚክስ እና አዋጭ የሆነ ሙያ
መሆኑን ለህብረተሰቡ መልእክት ለማስተላለፍ ይጠቅማል። በተጨማሪም ግልጽ የሆኑ
መከራከሪያዎችን በመገንባት እና በማቅረብ ረገድ የፈላስፎች ችሎታዎች ለመሐንዲሶች ትልቅ
ጥቅም ሊኖራቸው ይችላል. የምህንድስና ፍልስፍና እነዚህን ችሎታዎች በመሐንዲሶች ውስጥ
ለማዳበር የሚረዳ ከሆነ፣ መሐንዲሶች ያንን መልእክት ለማስተላለፍ የበለጠ ጠንካራ ድምጽ
ይኖራቸዋል።

ምህንድስና ሰፊ፣ ሁለገብ የትምህርት መስክ ሲሆን ከማህበራዊ ሳይንስ እና ሰብአዊነት እንዲሁም
ከተፈጥሮ ሳይንስ ጋር ግንኙነት አለው። የሴሚናሮቹ መሰረታዊ ዓላማ መሐንዲሶችን እና ፈላስፎችን
አንድ ላይ እንዲያደርጉ እና የጋራ ፍላጎት ያላቸውን የምርምር ቦታዎችን ለመለየት ብቻ ነበር። የሮያል
ኢንጂነሪንግ አካዳሚ ይህ ፍሬያማ የትብብር ጅማሬ እንደሚሆን ተስፋ ያደርጋል እና ይህ እና
በመጪው የምህንድስና መጣጥፎች ፍልስፍና ላይ ያለው ሁለተኛ ጥራዝ ለፈላስፋዎች እና
መሐንዲሶች ተመሳሳይ ሀሳብ ይሰጣል።)

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
1. Philosophy Science and Engineering.
2.1.1. A Brief Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of science is an old and practiced discipline. Both Plato and Aristotle wrote on the
subject, and, arguably, some of the pre-Socratics did also. The Middle Ages, both in its Arabic
and high Latin periods, made many commentaries and disputations touching on topics in
philosophy of science.Of course, the new science of the seventeenth century brought along
widespread ruminations and manifold treatises on the nature of science, scientific knowledge and
method. The Enlightenment pushed this project further trying to make science and its hallmark
method definitive of the rational life. With the industrial revolution, “science” became a
synonym for progress. In many places in the Western world, science was venerated as being the
peculiarly modern way of thinking. The nine - tenth century saw another resurgence of interest
when ideas of evolution melded with those of industrial progress and physics achieved a maturity
that led some to believe that science was complete. By the end of the century, mathematics had
found alternatives to Euclidean geometry and logic had become a newly re-admired discipline.

But just before the turn to the twentieth century and in those decades that followed, it was
physics that led the intellectual way. Freud was there too, he and Breuer having published
Studies in Hysteria in 1895, but it was physics that garnered the attention of the philosophers.
Mechanics became more and more unified in form with the work of Maxwell, Hertz and
discussions by Poincaré. Plank derived the black body law in 1899, in 1902 Lorenz proved
Maxwell’s equations were invariant under transformation, and in 1905 Einstein published his
paper on special relativity and the basis of the quantum. Concomitantly, Hilbert in 1899
published his foundations of geometry, and Bertrand Russell in 1903 gave forth his principles of
mathematics. The development of unified classical mechanics and alternative geometries now
augmented and challenged by the new relativity and quantum theories made for period of
unprecedented excitement in science.
What follows provides a brief historical overview of the problems and concepts that have
characterized philosophy of science from the turn of the twentieth century until the present day.
This is presented in the form of conceptual and problemoriented history because I believe that

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
the real interest in philosophy of science and the lessons to be learned from its history are found
in the topics it addressed and the methods it used to address them. Further, the cast of characters,
and the specific articles and books can be easily researched by anyone who is interested. There
is, appended a selective chronological bibliography of “classical” sources.

A few caveats need to be stated from the start. First, I deal almost exclusively with certain
aspects of one Austro-Germanic-Anglo-American tradition. This is not because there was not
interesting and important work in philosophy of science going on in France and elsewhere. I do
this, first, because this tradition is the one that is formative for and dominant in contemporary
American philosophy (for good or ill), and, second, because it is the tradition in which I was
raised and about which I know the most. Another caveat is that space limitations and ignorance
often require the omission of many interesting nuances, qualifications and even outright
important facets of the history of philosophy of science. What I try to do is run a semi-coherent
thread through the twentieth century, in such ways that a developmental narrative can be
followed by those who have not lived within the confines of the discipline. Many scholars would
have done things differently. C’est la vie!
To provide some structure for the exposition, I shall break this text into three important periods:
• 1918–50s: Logical Positivism to Logical Empiricism
• 1950s through 1970s: New Paradigms and Scientific Change
• Contemporary Foci: What’s “hot” today
Researchers end this little essay by noting that the old questions and topics that had been raised
by the logical positivists, and even in previous 2000 years, have not disappeared. Philosophers of
science still puzzle over what makes a good explanation, what kind of evidence provides what
kind of confirmation for theory, and what is the difference between science and pseudo-science.
These are the perennial questions of philosophy of science. Today, we still try to answer them in
specific ways that will have effects on science and the larger world. Philosophers of science have
been instrumental in showing the non-scientific status of creationism and some versions of
sociobiology and, now, evolutionary psychology. They have discussed fruitfully the role of
scientific evidence in making decisions about nuclear energy plants or about levels of toxicity in

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
our environment. They have asked hard questions about how to discover mechanisms such that
finding them allows us to understand how systems of molecular biology or neuroscience work.
And they Peter Machamer 12 have continued to elucidate and elaborate the un clarities and
confusions in the special sciences. Of course, there is much left to do. There are always more
puzzles than people, more problems than solutions. The twentieth century saw many changes in
what are taken to be the important puzzles and problems, but even more importantly, these same
years have seen changes in how people need to be trained to approach problems and in what
solutions to problems must look like. Maybe this past century has only taught us that there are no
simple answers to truly complex questions. Yet, with this realization comes the awareness that
there must be pragmatic answers provided in a timely and efficacious manner. Decisions must be
made, and, hopefully, philosophy of science can help us to see how they may be made in better
ways.

2.1.2 Philosophy of Science: Classic Debates, Standard Problems, Future Prospects

Immanuel Kant’s celebrated investigation of human knowledge started from the assumption that
we have achieved rock-solid, indubitable knowledge – in geometry through Euclid and in
physics through Newton – and from the question of how this was possible (especially in view of
Hume’s demonstration of the invalidity of inductive inference). Contemporary philosophy of
science is a rich and multi-faceted enterprise and so any one way of viewing it will inevitably
leave out much of importance and interest. Nonetheless, many of the classic debates and areas of
current concern can be introduced by investigating how Kant’s questions require modification in
the light of the development of science since his time and by investigating the attempts made to
answer those modified questions.

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
Two radical – apparently “revolutionary” – changes of fundamental theory occurred in the early
twentieth century, those associated with the theory of relativity and with quantum theory. The
former had the more direct effect on Kant’s presuppositions and questions. If, at any rate, we
think of geometry as a synthetic description of the fundamental structure of space, then
Einstein’s revolution involved the rejection of Euclidean geometry in favor of the Riemannian
version of non-Euclidean geometry. Instead, for example, of two straight lines that are parallel
being extendable indefinitely without intersecting, the new geometry states that any two straight
lines (geodesics) eventually intersect. Far from being certainly true, Euclidean geometry (at least
as a “physical geometry”) is – it seems – not even true. Similarly, although Newton’s theory (of
mechanics plus universal gravitation) continues to be empirically adequate over a wide range of
phenomena (basically motions involving velocities small compared to that of light), it’s
fundamental claims about the structure of the universe – that space is infinite, that gravitation
acts at-a-distance, that time is absolute so that two events simultaneous in one reference frame
are simultaneous in all – are entirely rejected by relativity theory. Again, far from being certainly
true, Newtonian physics is, it seems, not even true. Indeed, given that relativity theory denies
action at a distance, suggests that space is finite (though unbounded), and entails that two events
that are simultaneous in one frame of reference will not be simultaneous in another frame that
moves relatively to the first, it is difficult for many to see intuitively how Newton’s theory could
count as even “close to the truth” (supposing for sake of argument that Einstein’s theory were the
truth).

These developments transform Kant’s question into a dilemma. Is there some way of interpreting
(or reinterpreting?) scientific theories so that the apparently radical nature of the revolutionary
shift from classical to relativistic physics becomes just that – merely apparent? If so, then it
might still be possible to argue that science when properly understood, delivers, if not outright
certainty, then some close approximation to it. If not, if we simply have to accept that scientific
development has involved revolutionary change at the most fundamental theoretical level, then
we presumably cannot reasonably rule out the possibility of still further revolutions in the light
of which our current theories will seem just as false as Newtonian theory now seems to us. And
in that case, the question becomes what makes science special at all from the epistemic point of
view?
2.1.3 Explanation

Although the subject of explanation has been a major concern of philosophy since Plato and
Aristotle, modern philosophical discussion of this topic, at least as it pertains to science, begins

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
with the so-called deductive-nomological (DN) model of explanation in the middle of the
twentieth century. This model has many advocates but unquestionably the most detailed and
influential statement is due to Carl Hempel (1965).
The DN Model
The basic idea of the DN model is that explanations have the structure of sound deductive
arguments in which a law of nature occurs as an essential premise. One deduces the
explanandum, which describes the phenomenon to be explained, from an explanans, consisting
of one or more laws, typically supplemented by true sentences about initial conditions. The
model is intended to apply both to the explanation of “general regularities” by other laws and the
explanation of particular events, although subsequent developments have largely focused on the
latter. The derivation of facts about planetary trajectories (e.g. Kepler’s laws) from the laws of
Newtonian mechanics, the gravitational inverse square law and appropriate information about
initial conditions is a paradigmatic illustration of the pattern of explanation that the DN model
attempts to capture.
2.1.4 Structures of Scientific Theories
A central aim of science is to develop theories that exhibit patterns in a domain of phenomena.
Scientists use theories to control, describe, design, explain, explore, organize, and predict the
items in that domain. Mastering a field of science requires understanding its theories, and many
contributions to science are evaluated by their implications for constructing, testing, and revising
theories. Understanding scientific theories is prerequisite for understanding science.
The two dominant philosophical analyses of theories have sought an abstract formal structure
common to all scientific theories. While these analyses have advanced our understanding of
some formal aspects of theories and their uses, they have neglected or obscured those aspects
dependent upon non formal patterns in theories. Progress can be made in understanding scientific
theories by attending to their diverse non formal patterns and by identifying the axes along which
such patterns might differ from one another. After critically reviewing the two dominant
approaches, the researcher use mechanistic theories to illustrate the importance of non formal
patterns for understanding scientific theories and their uses.
2.1.5 Experiment and Observation

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
People once believed a fabulous engine called the Scientific Method harvests empirical evidence
through observation and experimentation, discards subjective, error ridden chaff, and delivers
objective, veridical residues from which to spin threads of knowledge. Unfortunately, that engine
is literally fabulous. Lacking a single method whose proper application always yields
epistemically decisive results, real-world scientists make do with messy, quirky techniques and
devices for producing and interpreting empirical data which proliferate as investigators
improvise fixes for practical and theoretical problems which bedevil their research. Their
evolution is punctuated rather than linear – marked as much by abandonment and modification of
previously accepted tools and techniques as by conservation and accumulation.

Failing as they did to take into account the diversity and malleability of observational and
experimental practice, twentieth century philosophers of science who tried to derive highly
general a priori epistemic directives from theories of logic, rationality, judgment, and the like,
have been unable to answer important questions about the design and conduct of scientific
research. This chapter’s moral is that because of this failure, philosophers of science should pay
more attention to nuts and bolts details of observation and experimentation.

Although experiment and observation are undertaken to further a great many different purposes
(including discovering new effects for scientists to explain, filling in, and correcting details of
theories, developing, calibrating, and figuring out fruitful applications of equipment) the
researcher will be concentrating on just one – the production and interpretation of data for use in
testing theoretical claims and practical ideas about their applications.

2.2 Engineering and Philosophy

Philosophy has not paid sufficient attention to engineering. Nevertheless, engineers should not
use this as an excuse to ignore philosophy. The argument here is that philosophy is important to
engineering for at least three reasons. First, philosophy is necessary so that engineers may
understand and defend themselves against philosophical criticisms. In fact, there is a tradition of
engineering philosophy that is largely overlooked, even by engineers. Second, philosophy,
especially ethics, is necessary to help engineers deal with professional ethical problems. A case
study of ethics requirements for U.S. engineering curricula substantiates this point. Third,

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
because of the inherently philosophical character of engineering, philosophy may actually
function as a means to greater engineering self-understanding.

The thesis of the present paper is that, common presumptions to the contrary, philosophy is
centrally important to engineering. When engineers and engineering students not to mention
those who make use of engineering services dismiss philosophical analysis and reflection as
marginal to the practice of engineering, they are mistaken on at least two counts : historical and
professional.

It is also the case, I would argue, that engineering is important to philosophy and that
philosophers have made woefully insufficient efforts to appreciate and assess the technical
realities that they too often presume to criticize. Were philosophers to set their own discipline in
order with respect to engineering, philosophy would no doubt be even more important to
engineering than is presently the case.

Nevertheless, even granted the inadequate attention conferred on engineering by philosophy,

philosophy is of critical and increasing significance to engineering. The argument in support of
this thesis will, appropriately enough, rely in key respects on engineering experience. It will
proceed by means of a historical review of engineering efforts to do philosophy in part as
a self-defense against philosophical criticism. Then, in a central case study, it
will summarize and reflect on efforts in the United States professional engineering community to
incorporate philosophy into engineering education curricula. The later sections of the paper will,
however, make a more reflective effort to speculate about the deepening relations between
engineering and philosophy in an increasingly engineered world. Engineers are, I will finally
suggest, the unacknowledged philosophers of the postmodern world.

2.2.1 What is engineering and what is Engineering Knowledge?

The following questions were offered for consideration at the first seminar: what are the
intellectual foundations of engineering? What is engineering knowledge, and what is it to have
engineering knowledge? What can philosophers learn from engineering about knowledge? Do
engineering and science share a common goal in the quest for knowledge, and do they make
equal contributions to our knowledge of the natural world?

Prepared By Jemal Dawud

 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
In ‘Engineering and Truth’ Peter Lipton explores the nature of engineering knowledge in
comparison with philosophical accounts of scientific knowledge. His question is how
engineering differs from science and whether philosophical debates concerning science extend
naturally to engineering. Philosophers have long discussed whether we should take scientific
theories to be aiming at literal, descriptive truth about the world or whether they should be
considered merely as instruments for making accurate predictions. At first sight, engineers may
have no interest in the potential truth of theories, since they use them purely as a means to their
own practical ends. However, Lipton argues that the real situation may be more complex. Surely
an engineer will want to know that the theory is accurate and reliable if that theory is employed
in the design of some artifact, and what better guarantee of reliability is there than a theory’s
truth? As Lipton concludes, there is certainly a need for more exploration of the relation between
engineering knowledge and philosophical accounts of science. Science and engineering are close
cousins, despite any differences between them, so any philosophical account of science that
cannot extend, in adapted from at least, to engineering will be lacking.

When philosophers ask questions about knowledge, especially the fundamental, sceptical
questions, they do not ask what it is that we know, but how, if at all, we can know what we
know. This question is posed in a more practical form in Sir Tony Hoare’s paper ‘The Logic of
Engineering Design.’ Quite often computer programmers do not know how their own
programmes work or how they will perform in certain circumstances. Sir Tony argues that this is
a situation that can and should be avoided. His view is that if software engineering is carried out
on a rigorous scientific basis, then programmers will have a way of knowing how their
programmes will function and, more importantly, they will have a way of demonstrating that
they will so function. Therefore they can have demonstrable knowledge of what they know. Sir
Tony argues that this knowledge can be gained by using the methods of propositional logic - that
the conformity of an engineering design to a specification can, in principle, be established by a
basic proof in propositional logic. His view is that computer science, as it matures, will come to
rest on such perspicuous foundations.

In ‘Plato and the Internet: Liberating Knowledge from our Heads’, Kieron O’Hara argues that
traditional philosophical concerns about knowledge focus only on a limited range of the forms

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 Wachemo University
Collage Engineering and Technology
School of Civil and Construction
Department of Civil Engineering
that knowledge takes. Philosophers tend to think of knowledge as having the form of beliefs that
an individual can entertain in their mind or write down and pass on. Philosophers question
whether and when such beliefs can be considered knowledge. However, O’Hara points out that
often engineering knowledge does not take this form, but differs in two important ways. Firstly,
some engineering knowledge is a matter of ‘know how’ - a matter of having a skill or ability.
Know how does not take the form of belief and it is not something that can be written down or
otherwise formulated in words. Secondly, a great deal of knowledge, especially engineering
knowledge, is knowledge possessed by an organization. It is shared by the members of an
organization, or stored in records and on databases. Therefore, it is not knowledge that is in the
mind of an individual. O’Hara argues that computers and the Internet, products of engineering,
allow a great deal of knowledge to be shared and ‘outsourced’ in this way. This shakes up the
traditional philosophical picture of knowledge. O’Hara argues that philosophers should turn their
attention to such forms of knowledge and apply their skills to dealing with the practical problems
of using effectively the knowledge held by organizations.

Prepared By Jemal Dawud