Chapter – Four

Tibet Factor in Sino-Indian Geo-strategic Relations – A Research Analysis

The strategic importance of Tibet as a buffer or bridge in the Sino-Indian

geostrategic relations has posed a security concerns to both India and China. To

strategically explore the Tibet factor in Sino-Indian relations is the primary research

analysis of this study. Hence, conceptualizing the theoretical framework is critical to

framing the foundations to examine the importance of the Tibet factor in Sino-Indian

geostrategic relations. This chapter mainly focuses on the critical analysis of the

literary textual discourses. It will draw out how the Tibet factor has shaped the Sino-

Indian geostrategic relations in the Himalayan border regions. It has been identified

the nature of the study into two aspects.

Firstly, the nature of India-China-Tibet geostrategic relations can be

understood with the reference to realist theory of international relations. This study

has applied the strategic triangle theory. The strategic triangle approach is one of the

most tangible aspects of the theory of balance of power. This approach was developed

during the cold war era. Applying the strategic triangle theory to this study is to better

understand the nature of India-China-Tibet geostrategic relations in the context of the

theoretical analysis. The disappearance of Tibet in the international political map is a

hindrance to applying this theory, but the representation of Tibet as a non-state actor

in the international community has a wedge to view the study through the strategic

triangle prism, because Tibet (was) is a civilization-state for which its capability and

performance are more applicable rather than the criteria elements of traditional nation-

state entity.

122
 Secondly, the Tibet factor in Sino-Indian geostrategic relations can be

understood in the form of a new great game between India and China for expanding

their sphere of influence in the South Asian region. These two natures of Sino-Indian

geostrategic relations can be tested by examining the importance of Tibet factor as the

strategic depth. An assessment of the strategic importance of Tibet mainly reflects

through the primary source of data which have been collected by the researcher during

the field survey. The researcher has visited the Indo-China border regions for

observation and participatory research. Hence, the research analysis of this study

mainly dealt with the textual discourse and the field survey report of the study.

The study has been analyzed in the form of strategic triangle theory. In the

view of this theory, Tibet acts as a wing which demonstrated its favor towards both

British India and the Republic of India.

Strategic Triangle between India-China-Tibet

The strategic triangle is a comprehensive approach to understand the

complexity of India-China-Tibet geostrategic relations. The strategic triangle can be

ascertained by observing the nature of the three bilateral relations.124 Robert S. Ross

pointed out that “strategic triangle relations were distinguished by a significant degree

of strategic interdependence, and the security of each state was significantly shaped

by the nature of the relationship between the other two.”125 According to Lowell

Dittmer, “the preconditions for a triangular relationship are that each player

recognizes the strategic salience of the three principals, and the relationship between

any two will be affected by each player's relationship to the third.”126 Ashok Kapur

124
Huei-Ming Mao, “The U.S.-China-Russia strategic Triangle Relationship –Since the Beginning of
the Bush Administration”, Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, 2002,p.78.
125
Ibid.
126
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259379057.

123
has brought the concept of strategic triangle between India-China-Tibet. According to

Ashok Kapur, “A triangle (or a multipolar) relationship between countries is strategic

when polarities are deeply entrenched and the issues in conflicts are either settled by

war.”127

A case of Tibet, a non-state actor, as a player in the strategic triangle relations

is relevant in the context of this study because the Tibetan Buddhist culture has

dominated across the Himalayan community. “The theoretical implication is that

strategic triangles deal primarily with state actors but the involvement of non-state

actors (the Tibetans and supporters of Tibet in the world community) is not excluded

if the issue raised by the non-state(s) is a part of the diplomatic discourse among

nation-states.”128 The domination of Buddhism and Tibetan cultural affiliation across

the Himalayan borderland has played a significant role in the China-India-Tibet

strategic triangle relations.

The strategic triangle relations between China-India-Tibet have been

categorized into three phases. The first phase of the China-India-Tibet strategic

triangle was formed between British India, Republic of China and Tibet from 1904 to

1947. The second phase was formed between People’s Republic of china, India and

Tibet from 1950 to 1962. The third phase has been formed since aftermath of the

Sino-Indian war of 1962.

First Phase of the China-India-Tibet Strategic Triangle (1904-1947)

The first phase of the China-India-Tibet strategic triangle was formed between

China (Qing Empire and Republic of China), British India and the government of

Tibet. A seed of this strategic triangle was sown during the Chefoo Convention in
127
Ashok Kapur, “India and the South Asian Strategic Triangle”, Routledge, New York, 2011, p.52.
128
Ibid.

124
1876 which was ratified only in 1885. It was further discussed during the two

different conventions (1890 & 1893) signed between China and British India

regarding the status of Tibet affairs. The enshrined provisions of these two Anglo-

Chinese Conventions were nullified by the government of Tibet when British directly

approached the Tibetan authority. And, it led to the British India invasion of Tibet in

1903-1904.

Following the invasion, the spiritual and temporal head of Tibet, the 13th Dalai

Lama fled to Mongolia and China to seek political asylum. The British had pushed the

government of Tibet to sign a treaty in 1904, which is known as “Lhasa Convention”.

In the Lhasa Convention, the government of Tibet accepted the British diplomatic

relations with Tibet which has been discussed in the chapter two of this study. And

then, Tibet was formally made a buffer state bulwark against the Chinese and Russian

threats to the Indian subcontinent.

The British invasion of Tibet in 1903 posed as a strategic threat to China,

which brought the Chinese military campaign to Tibet in 1905. The brutal Chinese

military campaign forced the 13th Dalai Lama’s exile for the second time, on this

occasion to India. During His Holiness the 13th Dalai Lama’s exile in India, the

government of Tibet blended closer to British India. After the collapse of the Manchu

regime in 1911, China became a weak country. Therefore, the Chinese threat to

British India waned. At the same time, the government of Tibet expelled all the

Chinese residences from Tibet and proclaimed Tibet as a sovereign state. In 1913,

British India invited Tibet and China to Shimla for settling the Sino-Tibet border and

the status of Tibet. The tripartite negotiation-cum-agreement between China, Tibet

and British India took place at Shimla in 1913-1914. The Shimla Convention was

signed, but the Chinese delegations had quit the Convention without ratifying it. Tibet

125
and British India had signed the agreement, which enabled the drawing of the

McMahon Line in 1914. Tibet had legally ceded Tawang to British India.

In the first phase of strategic triangle, Tibet as an independent nation had

signed an agreement with British India. Tibet served as a buffer state between China

and British India in this triangle relation. The British were the ultimate winner of this

because Tibet acted favorably to the British. The first phase of China-British India-

Tibet strategic triangle ended when the British left India in 1947.

Second Phase of the China-India-Tibet Strategic Triangle

The British quit India in 1947. The Republic of India was formed under the

leadership of Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru. Two years later, China was ruled by the

Communist Party of China which formed the People’s Republic of China on 01

October 1949. At the same time, Tibet was under a leadership crisis. The 13th Dalai

Lama had passed away in 1933. The reincarnation of the 13th Dalai Lama, Tenzin

Gyaltso, the 14th Dalai Lama, was too young to take the spiritual and temporal power

of Tibet.

Adding to these factors, Tibet was militarily weak because the conservative

Tibetan leaders objected the modernization of the Tibetan military system. The newly

independent India did not see Tibet as strategically significant. As soon as the British

quit India, they left a political vacuum behind in the region. The vacuum was filled by

China’s military intervention in Tibet in 1950.

On the other hand, India did not follow the British India’s rampart strategy

towards inner Asia. Instead, Nehru adopted non-aggressive policy while the Chinese

government launched an aggressive expansionist policy. India was aware of China’s

126
invasion of Tibet in 1950. Despite the Chinese threat at India’s backyard, India and

China signed an agreement in 1954, which is known as the Panchsheel Agreement. As

per provisions of the agreement, India acknowledged the Chinese sovereignty over

Tibet.

China occupied the entire plateau of Tibet in 1959 without much effort.

Subsequently, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and his entourage fled into India for

political asylum. India accepted the Dalai Lama’s request for political asylum in

India. The Tibetan exile government was established in Dharamshala in 1960, the

Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. The granting the asylum for the Tibetan leader by

the government of India antagonized the Chinese leadership. Since then, the

relationship between India and China began to deteriorate.

In this strategic triangle, India lacked in its strategic calculation, and Tibet was

militarily weak. These circumstances made it favourable for China’s invasion of

Tibet. At the same time, Tibet, which had acted as a buffer between India and China

had disappeared. Subsequently, it led to the China-India military face-off in the

Himalaya in 1962. In the second phase of the strategic triangle, China was the pivot as

well as the winner. The disappearance of Tibet as a nation-state in this phase of the

strategic triangle is a historical tragic, which caused the Sino-Indian war of 1962

where India had to bear a heavy price. Both India and Tibet were victims in the

second phase of China-India-Tibet strategic triangle relations. Yet, it has brought

India and Tibet together despite the loss of Tibet as a sovereign-state entity. In the

second phase of the triangle, China’s aggression over India proved that Tibet was a

buffer state in India’s security strategy.

127
Third Phase of the China-India-Tibet Strategic Triangle

The third phase of China-India-Tibet strategic triangle relations deal with the

hypothesis of the study which plays a very significant role in this research analysis.

Even though Tibet is a nation without a sovereign-state, the profile of the Tibetan

freedom struggle movement across the international community has altered the

making of Sino-Indian geostrategic balance in South Asia, particularly in the

Himalayan borderlands.

Today, China has governed the Tibetan political administration in Tibet, but it

has failed to deliver its legitimacy over Tibet because both the Tibetan government

and its leader are in exile, in India. Despite the Chinese occupation over Tibet, the

Tibetans did not accept the Chinese rule. The people of Tibet have assented the Dalai

Lama as the legitimate leader and the Tibetan government in exile as the legitimate

government of Tibet. Hence, the Tibetan freedom movement is against the illegal

Chinese occupation over Tibet.

Moreover, the International community has firmly supported the cause of

Tibet. Tibetans across the world are considered as one of the largest lobbyists against

the Chinese occupation in Tibet. The Tibetan cause and its freedom struggle

movement have become the most important aspect in the third phase of the China-

India-Tibet strategic triangle. Professor Ashok Kapur, an advocate of the China-India-

Tibet strategic triangle has highlighted the importance of Tibet factor in this context.

“This triangle may be described as a Delhi-Beijing-Dharamshala triangle.”129

In this web of strategic triangle, India is a host country for the Tibetan

refugees and the Central Tibetan Administration, which is centered in Dharamshala,

129
Ashok Kapur, “India and the South Asian Strategic Triangle”, Routledge, New York, 2011, p.76.

128
the second capital of the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. Through its diplomatic

relation with China, India has agreed with China that it will not allow any anti-China

activities by the Tibetan people on the Indian soil, and China has reciprocated by

maintaining the Sino-Indian border as a status quo.

The frequent Chinese military incursions over the Indian Himalayan borders

have created trust-deficit between India and China. And also, it perturbs India’s

border security management in the frontiers. The untimely Chinese encroachment

over the Indian frontiers is one of the key factors which make the third phase of

China-India-Tibet strategic relations complex. Let’s examine this from the Tibet point

of view in the third phase of the strategic triangle relation between China, India and

Tibet.

Tibet Factor in the Third Phase of Strategic Triangle Relations

As per the above discussion on the theoretical assumption of strategic triangle,

the trilateral relations must be engaged among three countries. These three countries

must be independent nations. Even though Tibet as a nation without a state in the

context of international relations, it plays a significant role in the Sino-Indian bilateral

relations. Tibet factor is central to the Sino-Indian border disputes. China has many

strategic cards to play against India’s sphere of influence in South Asia. By contrast,

India has only one card and that is the Tibet Card. Professor Dawa Norbu is one of the

renowned advocates of this strategic perspective.

Moa Zedong considered it a great loss for China when he received the report

of the Dalai Lama’s escape from Tibet in 1959. “His Holiness the Dalai Lama is the

most venerable guru in the Buddhist world. In generally, Guru or Lama has given

guidance to his followers. Followers also follow the path that shown by their guru or

129
Lama. The relationship between Guru and his followers is unique. It signifies a

karmic relation. Therefore, a position of a lama(s) is the foremost important religious-

social status in the Buddhist world. In these circumstances, India has wisely used the

Tibet Card securing the Himalaya border regions. Here, Tibet Card means a blessing

of the Dalai Lama.”130

In the Indian strategist’s circle, a notion of Tibet Card is very relevant. ‘One

good reason for our concern is that our border lies with Tibet and not with Han China.

Therefore, any lasting agreement upon the border cannot be reached until the Tibetans

are also a party at the talks.’131 Despite China’s legitimacy claims over the Himalaya

borderlands, the Himalaya always forms the border between Tibet and India. Most of

the Himalayan inhabitants are Tibetan stocks who have not accepted the Chinese

legitimacy over their land. Hence, the Tibetan establishment in India has the capacity

and potential to be the third party in the third phase of China-India-Tibet strategic

triangle relations.

Examines the Tibet Factor in China-India-Tibet Strategic Triangle Relations

The researcher has identified five factors which exarmines the Tibet factor in

the third phase of the China-India-Tibet strategic triangle relations. These five factors

are the Sino-Indian border dispute, establishment of the Special Frontiers Force,

Tibetan Buddhism, the importance of the Tibet environment and the status of the

Dalai Lama in the Himalayas. The arguments of these five factors are mainly based on

the information which the research has collected during the field survey of this study.

130
Interviewed to Mr Dorjee, a senior citizen who served more than 25 years in the Indian intelligence
circle, 10 July 2017, Dorjeeling, West Bangle.
131
Shankar Sharan, “India Tibet & China – An Agonising Reappraisal”, India Tibet Friendship
Society, Delhi, 1996, p.55.

130
Tibet Factor in Sino-Indian Border Disputes

The border conflicts between India and China in the Himalayas is one of the

longest territorial boundary disputes in South Asia. Despite having the 23 round of

Sino-Indian border discussions, the Sino-Indian border conflicts have not resolved

yet. The details of the Sino-Indian border disputes have been discussed in the chapter

three of this study. It is because the Tibet issue has centered in the Sino-Indian border

dispute. Besides, this study has identified how the denizens of the Himalayan regions

are crucial when the Sino-India border discussion takes place between India and

China.

During the field survey research in the Sino-Indian border regions in 2017, the

researcher observed that Tibetan stocks in the Sino-Indian regions are most reliable

inhabitants to India. These people are the denizens of the Himalayan frontiers. They

are firmly cooperated with the agencies of the Indian government. It is mainly

because they are firmly influenced by the Tibetan culture and religions. They are

mentally disturbed by the Chinese destruction of Tibetan culture and religion in Tibet,

because these people are deeply connected to the Tibetan cultural universe. Therefore,

they are given firm solidarity towards the restoration of the Tibetan freedom

movement. According these inhabitants of the Himalayas, the restoration of the

Tibetan Buddhist culture is the foremost priority.

Establishment of the Special Frontier Force

The Special Frontier Force (SFF) is a secret paramilitary force at the time of

the establishment. It is also known as Establishment 22. The establishment of 22 is a

code name. It is established on 14 November 1962 by a joint effort of the Central

Intelligent of America (CIA), the Indian Intelligence Agency (IB) and the Tibetan

131
delegates to bulwark against the Chinese force in Tibet. The primary goal of SFF is to

conduct the covert operations in Tibet. But, India did not operate SSF in Tibet.

Since the establishment of SFF, India has operated 22- commandoes in various

covert operations in India. These Commandoes are posting in India’s frontiers. These

unsung commandoes’ contribution during India’s Bangladesh liberation war was

considered as one of the most remarkable services toward India. Commandoes are

highly trained in guerrilla warfare, rock climbing, low intensive combats and counter-

terrorism. Moreover, the Special Frontier Force is the deadest covert operation force

in India which Chinese perceives a tough challenge when India and China may be

waged war in the Himalayas.

During the field survey of the study132, the researcher interviewed ten former

veterans of SFF. Except one of them, the rest requested for anonymity. The most

common and painful answer of these veterans can be highlighted in just one word -

“regret”. Regret for not getting a chance to fight with the Chinese soldiers. These

former veterans joined the Special Frontier Force to fight against the Chinese. Though

their hopes had vanished, their spirit remains intact.

Achu Aakloe, a former veteran, a resident of Sakya Tibetan Society in

Puruwala, Himachal Pradesh, had fought in the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971. He

stated that “his battalion bravely fought for the mother India and he was very proud of

as being a soldier who brought victory to the motherland.”133 The Chinese are wary

about existence of the SFF and its potential and capacity in the field of covert

operations.

132
The field survey interviews are conducted in Dehradun, Puruwala in Himachal Pradesh,
Dharamshala and Dorjeeling on 16th May to 10th July 2017.
133
Interviewed to AchuAakloe, a residence of Puruwala Tibetan Settlement, Himachal Pradesh, 5 June
2017.

132
Tibetan Buddhism as a soft Power of India

Buddhism is a soft power of India and an indigenous religion of India. But

Buddhism was destroyed during the foreign invasions in India while the Tibetans

have preserved it. Most of Buddhist doctrines were thoroughly translated into the

Tibetan language during the first and the second diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet. Tibet

was the centre of Buddhist studies in the Himalayan regions before the Chinese

invasion of Tibet in 1950. The Tibetans brought all the Buddhist texts while escaping

from Tibet to India in 1959. Subsequently, hundreds of Tibetan monasteries are

established across India. These monasteries are central for the ancient Nalanda

Buddhist studies.

Today, the Himalayan Buddhist monks and nuns are studying in these

monasteries. Hence, the influence of Tibetan Buddhism is deeply rooted in the

Himalayan border regions. Monasteries are serving as a pacifier in the Himalayan

border communities. Monks and nuns are considered as moral police in these regions.

The social security in the Himalayan regions is mainly settled by the monasteries. For

instance, Tawang Monastery in Monyul, Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim, Tabo

Monasteries in Spiti and Hemis Monastery in Ladakh . These monasteries have been

significant for restoring peace and tranquility in the Himalayan border. Thus, these

monasteries have a strategic significance towards India.

The Tibetan monasteries across the Tibetan plateau and the Himalayan regions

served as a moral police for maintaining the social security in the Tibetan world.

Wang Lixiong, a Chinese expert on the Tibetan affairs, has highlighted a discourse on

moral police in his book called an “Unlocking Tibet”. He discussed that there are two

police in Tibet. First one is the state operational police forces such as a paramilitary

133
force and military force where they are using heavy arms and ammunition which cost

heavily on its defence budget. And the second is responsible for moral policing which

is linked with the karmic faith.

In this context, people are afraid to commit sins or crimes which go against the

karmic faith in the doctrine of the Tibetan Buddhism. Therefore, the Communist Party

of China is systematically destroying the Tibetan culture, language and religion.

“Barnett argues that the CCP continues to be wary of traditional Tibetan social

practices such as conflict mediation by Lamas and environmental activism. Various

analysts and academics have concluded that China will continue to pursue its strategy

to “re-educate” the people and influence the Lamas and social organizations in

TAR.”134

Both India and China are projecting Tibetan Buddhism as a soft power of their

respective nations which is known as Buddhist diplomacy. Tibetan Buddhism is

steadily emerging in the West. It also signifies as the moral authority of Tibet over the

Himalayan regions. “China and India have been trying to bridge the trust deficit that

emerged after Doklam stand-off. But the unease between China and India on the Tibet

issue reveals the undertones of a rivalry to control the future of Tibetan Buddhism and

the government-in-exile.”135

The head of Tibetan Buddhism is the Dalai Lama who often says that he is a

son of India. He further elaborated that his brain is restored by the ancient Nalanda

Buddhist thought and his body is nurtured by the Indian dal and rice. Hence, Tibetan

Buddhism and the Dalai Lama are critical factors in the Sino-Indian geopolitical

adversary.

134
https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/the-great-game-for-the-future-of-tibetan-buddhism.
135
Ibid.

134
Importance of the Tibetan Environment

The global climate changes highlight the importance of environment in the age

of science and technology. Particularly, the Tibetan environment is very crucial for

both India and China. Moreover, the Tibetan environment bridges between the South

Asian monsoon and the South East and East Asia’s monsoon. “The

environmental importance of Tibet as the maker of the Asian monsoon and as the

retainer of the largest concentration of glaciers outside of the two Poles that feed the

life-giving waters of the 10 major river systems that sustain millions downstream are

recent discoveries.”136

China’s heavy infrastructure development on the Tibetan plateau directly

threatens the Tibetan ecological system. Under the schemes of China’s hydropower

projects, it has been building many dams across the major rivers of Tibet. The plateau

of Tibet is considered as a water tower of Asia. The Chinese scientists named it a

“third pole”. Two third of world glaciers are deposited in the Tibetan Plateau. Due to

steady urbanization and infrastructure development in Tibet, there have been

unprecedented natural calamities often happening in and out of Tibet.

The damming of the major Tibetan rivers gives China a strategic depth in the

South and Southeast Asian regions. The damming on the major rivers of Tibet directly

holds strategic ramification to the lower riparian countries. India is one of them who

may face the challenge of China’s strategic depth. “Damming of rivers and the

proposed river diversion schemes in Tibet come in the wake of the looming water

crisis in Asia. Experts say water is poised to overtake oil as the world’s scarcest vital

resource. China’s plans for the various use of the rivers originating from Tibet are

136
http://tibetpolicy.net/?post_type=publications.

135
intensifying the heated debate about their likely consequences for downstream

nations.”137

A Tibetan environmental expert, Lobsang Youtso, was interviewed by the

researcher. During the interview, he had mentioned that “China has built a dam on the

Brahmaputra River in Tibet, which is known as Zangma Dam. It created a strategic

depth toward India and its neighboring countries. China is likely to build another three

dams on the Brahmaputra.”138 China has leverage over South Asia by using the

Tibetan water as a strategic asset. Damming and diversion of the rivers in Tibet

seriously cause environmental degradation and ecological threat to South Asia. Thus,

the environmental importance of Tibet signifies the Tibet factor in Sino-Indian

geostrategic relations.

The present and Future Status of the Dalai Lama

The stature of the Dalai Lama is the foremost important factor in the Sino-

Indian geopolitical relations. The Dalai Lama institution was one of the longest

spiritual and political institutions which ruled Tibet for three hundred and eight

years139 before China’s invasion of Tibet in 1950. After Tibetans exile, the exile-

government of Tibet and Tibetan freedom struggle movement was continuously led

by His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama.

In 2001, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama had abolished the centuries-old

Dalai Lama Institution in the Tibetan polity. He remains as a spiritual leader of

Tibetans and Buddhists across the world. He devolved his political power to the

people and to an elected political leader of the Tibetan community. Tibetan

137
http://tibet.net/?p=10274.
138 th
Interviewed to Lobsang Youtso, a research scholar in the Central for East Asia Studies, JNU, 17
August 2018, Dharamshala.
139
Three hundred and eight years rule of the Dalai Lama institution traced from 1642 to 1950.

136
democracy is a gifted one which was founded without any bloodshed or revolution.

The researcher has coined a ‘Gifted democracy’ in the Tibetan political discourse. A

gifted Tibetan democratic transition in exile has been recognized by the people of

Tibet.

The person of Tibet refers to six million Tibetans who reside in and outside of

Tibet. The people of Tibet recognized the Dalai Lama as the legitimate leader of

Tibet. Even though China has physically controlled Tibet, the Tibetans have not

accepted the Chinese rule over them. It amply indicates that China’s rule over Tibet is

illegitimate. The legitimacy is a core issue over China’s rule in Tibet. It has

implications for India’s Himalayan security strategy because Tibet is the first line of

defence for the Indian subcontinent.

The aspiration of Tibetans and Tibetan stocks in the Himalayan regions are

influenced by the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama is the highest religious leader in the

Tibetan Buddhist world. Tibetan Buddhism flourished across the Tibetan plateau,

Mongolia, China, Nepal, across the Himalayan belts, Bhutan and India. Hence, the

Dalai Lama is the legitimate leader as recognized by the people of the Tibetan plateau

and its periphery.

The Dalai Lama is a symbol of peace and unity in the Tibetan Buddhist world.

He is considered as a manifestation of the Avalokiteshvara or Chenrezig (Bodhisattva

of Compassion). The title Dalai Lama itself is a Mongolian word which is known as

the Ocean of Wisdom. The Mongolian prince Altan Khan bestowed a title of “Dalai

Lama” to Sonam Gyaltso in 1578. The Dalai Lama is omnipresent across inner Asia

and beyond. The fourth Dalai Lama, Sonam Gyaltso was born in Mongolia in 1589.

The sixth Dalai Lama, Tseyang Gyaltso was born in Tawang in 1683, which is

137
situated in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. It signifies that the future Dalai

Lama would be born in any country.

Moreover, in the realm of the Tibetan Buddhist world, the Dalai Lama is

recognized as a living Buddha. The significance of the Dalai Lama in the Himalayan

regions has withstood the test of time since the reign of the 5th the Dalai Lama in

1644. For instance, India’s frontiers such as Ladakh, Tawang and Spiti are considered

as the most peaceful regions despite the Chinese untimely incursions into these

regions. Such a social security domain in these regions are empowered by the value of

Buddhist doctrines which generated by the eminent Tibetan Buddhist Lamas such as

the Dalai Lama.

The Himalayan regions are sensitized in terms of border security, cross-border

migration, military standoff, incursions, socio-political stability and infrastructure

development. India could not develop the social-economic and political landscape in

the Himalayan border regions. During the field survey visit to Tawang, Sikkim and

North East of India in the March 2017, the study observed that roads and connectivity

infrastructure across regions are poorly developed. These roads on some of the highest

mountains in the world are dangerously narrow and not maintained. Most of the roads

are broken and blocked by landslides and heavy snowfalls. Due to this, the

connectivity in these regions remains to be backward and limited.

Despite the poor infrastructure, these regions have maintained peace and

tranquility ensuring social stability. The core reasons behind the stable social security

are the monasteries in these regions and the highly revered spiritual leaders. For

instance, the last visit of the 14th Dalai Lama to Tawang in March 2017 brought

Arunachal Pradesh in the global media hubs. During the Dalai Lama’s three-day

138
teaching at the Tawang Monastery, more than four lakh people gathered in Tawang

seeking an audience with him. Many of them walked nearly weeks to reach Tawang.

To these peripheral Buddhists, the spiritual quest is the priority. These

Himalayan Tibetan stocks are the ultimate defenders of the Himalayan borderland.

The Dalai Lama’s visits in Tawang in the April 2017 and Ladakh in the July 2017 and

in the July 2018 signified the importance of his role in the Sino-Indian border

security.

The Dalai Lama’s visit to The Dalai Lama’s message of religious harmony,

peace, social justice and compassion have inspired the Himalayan inhabitants for

maintaining peace and a stable society. Such practices complement India’s border

security management to a great extent. It also indicates that India has been using the

Dalai Lama card for maintaining its Himalayan border regions.

The Communist Party of China perceived the Dalai Lama as a threat to China.

Despite China’s acquisition against the Dalai Lama as a separatist, the Dalai Lama

adopted a middle way approach to deal with the Chinese which gained great

international support. Among the Indian think tanks circle, there are different views

about the middle way approach of Tibet. So far, India’s Tibet policy is cautious in

nature. But China regards the issue of Tibet as an issue of the Dalai Lama by

projecting the Tibet issue as a matter of the Dalai Lama.

China also factors the age of the Dalai Lama. But the Dalai Lama devolved his

political power in 2001 and passed it on to the Tibetan people’s elected leader known

as Sikyong. The aspiration of the Tibetan people inside Tibet is the return of the Dalai

Lama in. This has caused unrest inside Tibet which has heavily cost to the Chinese

security apparatus. China regarded the issue of Tibet as its core issue since 2008. At

139
the same time, the government of India has adopted the Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy

in 2014. The posture of the post-Dalai Lama scenario is another serious matter of

consideration for both India and China.

Thus, the stature of the Dalai Lama remains to be a major determinant

between India and China. A Tibetan who was educated in a Chinese school from the

eastern part of Tibet shared information about how a Chinese military general’s view

on the stature of the Dalai Lama. The respondent had requested for anonymity, “The

tragic escape of the Dalai Lama from Tibet in 1959 poised a geostrategic ramification

to China. Unrest in Tibet does directly link with the Dalai Lama. If the Dalai Lama

lives in Tibet under the control of China, China need not necessarily deploy heavy

military force in Tibet to maintain its social security. The unrest will rather happen in

the Indian Himalayan regions. Lamas are the pacifier of the social conflicts. Because

of the Dalai Lama’s presence in India, the Indian Himalayan regions are secured and

stable. Losing Dalai Lama is a great loss to China to secure a stable Tibet.”140

In the theory of cosmology, interdependence is the most comprehensive

doctrine of Buddhism. And, the Guru-Chela relationship is the most unique

characteristic tilt. The Dalai Lama is considered as the root Guru of Tibetan

Buddhism. This belief system is deeply rooted in the socio-religious life of the inner

Asians. For these reasons, China has been systematically destroying Tibetan culture,

language and religion within Tibet.

The Government of India regarded the Dalai Lama as a guest. The Dalai Lama

is also the greatest advocate of the ancient Indian thought, especially the Nalanda

School of thought. The Dalai Lama has explicitly stated that he is a son of India. And,

140
Interviewed on 18th August 2018, Dharamshala.

140
His Holiness considered himself as a messenger of the ancient Indian thought. He

carries the value of traditional Indian thoughts across the world. In this context, the

Dalai Lama would be regarded as a symbol of Indian soft power in the international

forum. It highlights India’s Buddhist diplomacy.

The presence of the Dalai Lama in India brings thousands of foreign tourists

and researchers to study Buddhism. The Dalai Lama has promoted an image of India

as the land of Buddhism which has enhanced India’s Buddhist diplomacy at the global

stage. The Dalai Lama’s visits to Ladakh, Spiti, Sikkim and Tawang spread India’s

soft power in these regions. Despite China’s protest against the Dalai Lama’s visits to

these regions, India has timely let the visits happen. The government of India states

that the Dalai Lama is a guest of India and he can visit any part of Indian Territory.

Whenever the Dalai Lama visits Tawang, the Chinese officials put their claim forward

over Arunachal Pradesh. Hence, the stature of Dalai Lama serves India’s leverage on

the Sino-Indian geopolitical crisis in the Himalaya.

The stature of Dalai Lama is a serious matter of concern to both India and

China. China believes that the issue of Tibet will disappear when the 14th Dalai Lama

passes away. China has systematically managed a successor to the 14th Dalai Lama.

China wants to appoint the 15th Dalai Lama as a Chinese Dalai Lama. But China’s

calculation of the post-Dalai Lama era is a myth because the Dalai Lama is an

international figure where he has millions of followers across the world.

The government of India does not have a precise arrangement so far on this

issue. But the Indian think tanks are speculating on the stature of the future Dalai

Lama. The stature of Dalai Lama and the issue of Tibet is deeply connected with

India, China and the international community. Thus, the third phase of strategic

141
triangle between China, India and Tibet will continue until the Tibet issue is resolved

through negotiations. In this regard, the middle way strategy of the Central Tibetan

Administration is a key to end the China-India-Tibet strategic triangle. This is

because; the middle way strategy has the potential to arrive at a win-win-win solution

bringing a robust relation between China, India and Tibet.

New Great Game: Rise of China and Its Strategic Implications to India

The strategic triangle between China, India and Tibet in the Himalayan

borderland is considered as a new great game between India and China. The rise of

China and its expansionist policy towards South Asia has posed a geostrategic

challenge to India.

The rise of China has labelled a new power dimension in the world order. At

the same time, an emerging India could become a potential competitor to China.

China and India share one of the longest borders in the world. Moreover, China’s

recent economic growth and two-digit defence budget have made India aware of the

need for strategic diplomacy and geopolitical conscious.

India plays a crucial role in the evolving new world order. India has a greater

influence in the South Asian society, both culturally and geopolitically, much before

the Chinese entry in South Asia. Therefore, India has perceived itself as a sui generis

nation in the Indian sub-continent in terms of culturally, psychologically and

geopolitically. The rise of China in Asia, particularly in South Asia, has pushed India

into strategic tension.

142
Rise of China

The rise of China is an anecdotal evidence of the contemporary history of

international relations. The international community has a mixed reaction to the

Chinese economic boom. In fact, the emergence of China has greatly influenced the

world economic order today. Since Deng Xiaoping introduced the new path of the

Chinese economic development, China has achieved unprecedented economic growth.

“When Deng Xiaoping put China on the path of reform, its economy was smaller than

India’s. Today, China is four times India’s size”.141

It has been thirty-seven years since China opened its economy to the outside

world. Today, “It ranks as the third leading exporter and importer in the world after

the European Union and the United States. If EU is not treated as an integrated

economy and thereby excluded, then China ranks second as a leading exporter and

importer”.142

The Chinese economy has to compete with the might of the United States.

Along with economic development, China also has the world’s largest armed force

with a combined strength of about 2.2 million men and one million reserves.

“Defining interest in terms of power is the mainstay of realism in international

politics. However, it appears that in the current century, interest is defined in terms of

not only power but also wealth. The US and China are perfect examples of its

complex interdependent international order”.143 India has potential to challenge the

141
Raghav Bahl, Superpower? Seminar 617, January 2011, p.41.
142
Ng BeoyKui, The Economic Rise of China: Its Threats and Opportunities from the Perspective of
Southeast Asia, ‘Paper’ presented at the inaugural international workshop ‘China World’ on March
2006 at Asia Research Centre, Copenhagen Business School, p.3.
143
Caron Natasha Tauro, Recipe for Great Power Status: A call for align India’s foreign policy and
military strategy, World Focus, Vol.XXXVI, No. 2, November 2015, New Delhi, p.95.

143
Chinese influence in South Asia and hence plays an inportant role in making the

balance of power in the new world order.

South Asia is the fastest growing region in the world. It has a capacity and

potential to become one of the leading markets in near future. Therefore, China’s

entry into the Indian sub-continent is one of the biggest challenge and opportunity for

developing its regional integration and security strategy.

China’s Engagement Policy towards Indian Sub-continent

China’s engagement policy towards Indian sub-continent began since the

Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950. The loss of Tibet as a traditional buffer state

between India and China has changed the geopolitical dimension in both inner and

outer Asia. The Chinese strategists considered India as a key player to contend the

Chinese sphere of influences in the Indian sub-continent. Moreover, China’s

ambitious maritime silk route strategy has created a new dimension of geostrategic

implication in the Indian Ocean Region. Let us examine how China’s engagement

policy drives them towards the Indian sub-continent.

The mighty Himalayan range has demarcated the geographical setting between

the Indian sub-continent and inner Asia. Today, the Himalayan region is considered as

a low-intensity conflict zone between India and China. George Ginsburg and Michael

Mathew stated that “He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalaya piedmont, he who

dominates the Himalaya piedmont threatens the Indian subcontinent and may well

have all of South Asia within his reach and with that all of Asia.”

The Chinese diplomats considered Tibet as a ‘backdoor’ of China. They

adopted a hard-core military and strategic mechanism as a foreign policy towards

144
Tibet and South Asia. In Maoist view, Tibet was the palm with five fingers- Nepal,

Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh-Xinjiang and India’s northern area such a Tawang district.

China could not develop the ‘five fingers of Tibet’ as a sphere of influence without

full control over Tibet.

It has been exactly sixty-six years since the establishment of PRC and sixty-

five years since the Chinese invasion of Tibet, but China has not pacified the unrest in

Tibet. The 2008 unrest in Tibet is one of the latest implications of the Chinese foreign

policy towards India, Nepal, and Bhutan. A sense of vulnerability of the Tibet issue is

the biggest obstacle of the Chinese western development policy initiative which is

also known as ‘Go West Policy’. “Go West Policy is not only supposed to alleviate

poverty in those areas but also to have a positive impact on the rest of the country. For

that reason, it must not be considered as a simple regional program but as a national

strategy with global political implications.”144

The ultimate goal of the ‘Go West Policy’ is to link trade diplomacy towards

the Indian sub-continent by crossing the Tibetan Plateau. Tibet issue as a vulnerability

in terms of geopolitics and strategic diplomacy implies to China’s economic and

military strategy of engagement towards India and her shadow states.

After the loss of Tibet as a buffer zone, India has defined Nepal as a defence

line between India and China. The Chinese government began to develop

infrastructure in Tibet for expanding their territorial and diplomatic strategy towards

the South Asian countries. Subsequently, India signed defence treaties with Bhutan

144
Thierry Mathon, “Tibet and Its Neighbors – Moving towards a new Chinese strategy in the
Himalayan Regions”, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 4, July-August 2005, University of California Press,
p.505.

145
(August 8, 1949), Nepal (July 31, 1950), and Sikkim (December 5, 1950) to check

China’s advance strategic move in the Himalayan regions.

Today, the Indo-Nepali relations have deteriorated since Nepal has adopted the

new constitution. The new constitution has excluded the aspiration of Madhesis and

Janjatis in the Terai region. Fifty-one per cent of the Nepali population is living in

these regions who are of Indian origin. “Even in Nepal since a new constitution was

adopted without considering the aspirations of Madhesis and Janjatis in the Terai

region had provided opportunities for China to fish in troubled South Asian

waters.”145

The Indo-Nepal border blockade in 2016 and its consequent scarcity of

cooking gas, petrol, and basic commodities shifted Nepal’s dependence towards

China. Many in Kathmandu are happy with the Nepal Government’s new approach

which has turned its eyes towards China. During the field survey in Nepal in the July

2016, the study observed that the Nepali people have welcomed the Chinese

development in Nepal. Most shops and restaurants in Kathmandu put the Mandarin

language on the nameplates which shows that the Chinese tourists are booming in

Nepal.

Nepal openly challenges India’s big brother approach towards Nepal and has

welcomed Chinese investments in Nepal. An editorial in the Himalayan Times

mentioned the MoU between NOC and Petro-China: “Nepal has ended the four-

decade-old monopoly of the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) for the supply of petroleum

products to Nepal”. In October 2016, China had agreed to grant 1.3 million litre petrol

for resolving the oil crisis in Nepal. “In the long-term, it signifies that China will

145
www.dailyo.in/politics/india-nepal-ties-madhesis-china-south-asia-tibetans-dalai-lama-
saarc/story/1/7690.htmil.

146
replace India as the main supplier of commodities; which will have serious political

consequences.”146

China has been successfully formulating its foreign policy in Nepal since

2008. The vulnerability of the Tibet issue and China’s penetration into Nepal has

created a geostrategic tension in the Sino-Indian border regions. It clearly shows that

China is getting closer to the Indian sub-continent in terms of geostrategic and geo-

economics. Therefore, the geopolitical complexity and sensitivity of the Tibet issue

drive China’s engagement towards the Indian sub-continent.

China’s engagement in the Indian sub-continent is mainly focused on

investment and political development. Indian sub-continent is the fastest growing

region in the world. It consists of 1.6 billion people which are a huge market for

China. China is the second largest world economy after the USA. Moreover, China

has charted the Indian sub-continent as part of the Chinese grand development

strategy, which is known as the ‘One Belt, One Road’.

China’s OBOR stretches across 130 countries around the world. Therefore, the

Chinese participation in SAARC summits is considered as their strategy for getting

into south Asian markets. China’s trade diplomacy towards the Indian sub-continent is

considered as its grand development strategy has a political motive which is to

establish China’s supremacy in the South Asian region.

China’s engagement in the Indian sub-continent deals with the Indian Ocean.

New land and border conflicts have been emerging after the partition of Indian sub-

continent in 1947. Due to drastic geostrategic transition in the Indian Ocean, India

finds herself in a difficult position to claim her traditional jurisdictions in the Indian

146
Claudearpi.blogspot.

147
Ocean. Since the 1990s, “India has repeatedly underlined the expanded geographic

scope of India’s maritime interest. The phrases from ‘Aden to Malacca’ or ‘the Suez

to the South China Sea’ were re-injected into the national security discourse.”147

At the same time, China’s national strategic interest in the Indian Ocean has

been enhanced for expanding their trade diplomacy and geostrategic influence. More

importantly, the rise of China as an economic power has brought its national interests

into the Indian Ocean Region searching for energy and natural resources. “At end of

February 2006, external reserves of China recorded US$853.7 billion, overtaking

Japan (US$850.1billion) as the world’s largest holder of foreign exchange reserves.

Thus, it has been recognized that with its sheer size of the economy and its rapid

expansion, China has begun to serve as an engine of growth not only in Asia but even

globally.”148

In fact, “China is highly dependent on imported energy to sustain its economy.

China has been importing 56 per cent of its oil from the Middle East. Conservative

estimates project that China will import almost two-thirds of its oil needs by 2015 and

three-quarters by 2030.”149 China’s naval expansionism in the India Ocean highlights

its geostrategic tension towards India.

Under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has strategized to

connect the maritime silk route and economic Silk Road to develop the Chinese

economy. China wants to develop the connectivity between the Himalaya and the

Indian Ocean. To serve this purpose, China has to bring Nepal, Bangladesh, Sir Lanka

and Burma within the sphere of its influence. These South Asian nations are trapped
147
C. Raja Mohan, India’s new role in the Indian Ocean, Seminar 617, January 2011. P.47.
148
Ng BeoyKui, The Economic Rise of China: Its Threats and Opportunities from the Perspective of
Southeast Asia, Asian Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers, 2006-15, p.3.
149
Shishir Gupta, The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte, Hachette India,
2014, Gurgaon, p.140.

148
under the Chinese economic debt which has pushed these countries to come under the

Chinese influence. All the South Asian countries except India could potentially

become China’s shadow states in the coming years. This could result in India being

isolated in the South Asian region. Due to this possibility of strategic tension in the

Indian Ocean Region, India must employ its strategic assets to check China’s move in

both the Himalayan region and the Indian Ocean. The Tibet card is one of the most

reliable strategic assets for India to timely push back China.

Doklam Standoff as New Great Game between China and India

On 16 June 2017, India and China had a military standoff at the Doklam plateau.

After 73 days, the Doklam standoff was diplomatically resolved. Though the Doklam

standoff had ended, the dispute over Doklam is yet to be settled. This yet again proves

that the Great Game power politics over the Himalayan belt has been activated for

expanding the sphere of influence between the two Asian giants.

China has instigated the new great game under the banner of the Belt and Road

Initiative, which India has rightly objected to. The Doklam standoff is just a minor

show of the ‘cloak- and – dagger’ game in the context of the new Great Game

between India and China. In fact, Doklam is just a piece of barren land, but it serves

as geostrategic significance in the context of the ‘triangular strategic relationship’

between Chinese- occupied Tibet, India and Bhutan.

Doklam was traditionally Sikkim – Tibet- Bhutan tri-junction

The fact is that Doklam was traditionally Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan tri-junction. It

was a blunder when the international community allowed Tibet to be eliminated as a

state-actor in the Doklam tri-junction. There was historically no China- India- Bhutan

149
tri-junction at Doklam. Currently, the Doklam tri-junction demarcation is designed

and executed by China’s expansionist ambitions. Doklam is a Tibetan name. Dok

means nomad and Lam means path. Hence, Doklam means a nomad path.

One of the leading Tibetan historians, Professor Tsering Shakya advocates that

“Although until 1913, Doklam was under the control of the Tibetan government in

Lhasa, an enclave in Doklam was granted to Kazi Ugyen Dorjee, one of the most

important political figures in Bhutan, who served as the intermediary between British

India and Tibet”. Prof. Tsering Shakya’s argument is deeply connected to the

Bhutanese historical accounts. The first king of Bhutan Ugyen Wangchuk granted Ha

Dzong to Kazi Ugyen Dorje. Ha Dzong is one of the Bhutanese districts which is in

north-west Bhutan, next to Tibet. Since then he functioned as the governor of Ha.

Incorporation of an enclave in Doklam into Ha was hence practical.

Ha historically shared a traditional border with Dromo (Chumbi Valley), in

southern Tibet, which was under the jurisdiction of Phari Dzong of the Tibetan

government. Doklam is situated between Chumbi Valley of lower Dromo and Ha

Dzong of Bhutan. Hence, Doklam was historically a tri-junction between Tibet,

Bhutan and Sikkim. The border between Bhutan and Tibet has not demarcated. In the

1960s, China and Bhutan had a dispute over the Doklam plateau. Since the 1970s

onwards, China and Bhutan have had 24 rounds of negotiation regarding the Sino-

Bhutanese border dispute with no progressive result.

Bhutan Serves as a Buffer State

Among the historical state actors in the tri-junction at Doklam, Bhutan is the only

surviving sovereign state today. Before the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, Tibet

served as a buffer state between British India and China. Tibet’s historical role as a

150
buffer has now shifted to Bhutan and Nepal. This aspect of the geostrategic

importance of Bhutan to both India and China was not highlighted by the international

community.

The world has acknowledged Bhutan as a strong buffer between India and

Chinese-occupied Tibet post the Doklam standoff between India and China. Bhutan is

a geographically sandwiched nation between Chinese-occupied Tibet to its north and

the Republic of India to its south, and it is exactly located between the two Indian

states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh to its west and east respectively. Both the

Indian states share a border with Tibet.

The Doklam crisis has highlighted the role of Bhutan as a strong buffer between

the two Asian giants. Bhutan has no diplomatic relations with China and it is the only

South Asian country which has no border dispute with India. The relations between

Bhutan and India have been maintained on the basis of the 1949 Friendship Treaty

which was renegotiated in 2007. Therefore, Bhutan is the only reliable buffer state

between India and the Chinese occupied Tibet.

Chumbi Valley as a strategic Pivot

Chumbi Valley is considered as a strategic pivot for India and China since the

beginning of the 20th century. Topographically, the valley is shaped like a dagger

between Bhutan and the Indian state of Sikkim. The Chumbi Valley intersects many

mountains passes between Bhutan and India. It serves as a trade route during

peacetime and as a highway during the war. The British used the Chumbi Valley as a

route to invade Tibet in 1903. Subsequently, the Chinese nationalists perceived the

British invasion of Tibet as a direct threat to China. The Chinese nationalists called

151
Tibet as China’s open back door. The British interests in Tibet were to make the

country serve as a bulwark against the expanding Tsarist Russian Empire and China.

After the British withdrew from the Indian sub-continent in 1947, the South

Asian political map drastically changed. The Indian sub-continent was divided into

India and Pakistan West and East. The partition of India had weakened the country

and in 1950 China invaded Tibet and drew new boundary lines with India and Bhutan.

The creation of East Pakistan next to the Indian state of West Bengal made

India strategically vulnerable. The partition created for India what strategic experts

call the “Chicken Neck” which is a narrow strip of land linking India’s mainland to its

seven sister states of the northeast. The Chinese road construction in Doklam brings

‘China’s Dagger’ closer to India’s ‘Chicken Neck’, which India recognizes as its

strategic Achilles heel.

Creating Psychological Turmoil in the mind of People in the Himalayan Region

The doklam standoff has created insecurity and psychological turmoil in the

Himalayan region. The Himalayan belt is considered as the first line of defence of the

Indian sub-continent against any potential Chinese expansionism. Most of the

Himalayan inhabitants are traditionally of Tibetan stock who is traditional, spiritual

and peace-loving people. The doklam standoff and the subsequent Chinese incursion

in Uttarkhand’s Barahoti on July 25 2017 and stone pelting incident at the Pangong

Lake in Ladakh in mid-August 2017 disturbs the peace and tranquility of the

Himalayan region.

152
The Issue of Tibet in India-China Relations Crested with the Doklam Standoff

At the peak of the Doklam standoff, the question of past, present and future

status of Tibet was raised and discussed openly. The former defence minister of the

government of India and Samajwadi Party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav raised the

status of Tibet as an independent nation in the Indian parliament. The status of Tibet

is an inseparable factor in India-China relations. The dispute between India and China

over India-Tibet boundary can never be resolved without solving the issue of Tibet.

Tibet is a victim of the Great Game in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The Great Game goes on in the new form between India and China. The recent

Doklam crisis is an indication of the new Great Game. Therefore, resolving the issue

of Tibet is a key factor for bringing harmony and balance between India and China

and for ending the new Great Game.

The Doklam standoff firmly proved that the new great game is being played

between India and China for expanding their own sphere of influence in the

Himalaya. Before Doklam standoff sparked, scholars and experts on India-China

relations explicitly articulated that the new great game between India and China in the

Himalaya is a myth. The Doklam standoff amply indicated that India and China were

seriously engaging in the strategic rivalry.

Conclusion

The geostrategic importance of Tibet signifies the validity of Tibet factor in

the context of the Sino-Indian geostrategic relations in the Himalaya. Most of the

Indian think tanks have argued that the validity of Tibet Card is a myth. The study has

researched the validity of Tibet Card in the Sino-Indian geostrategic relations in the

153
Himalaya at the grass-root level. The study has also brought the valid arguments with

findings to prove that Tibet factor does matter in the Sino-Indian geostrategic

relations.

The stature of the post-Dalai Lama, China’s strategic encirclement India,

India-China standoff in Doklam, China’s economic trap in South Asia, India’s

reactionary strategy and China’s infrastructural development in Tibet further enhances

the Tibet factor in the Sino-Indian geostrategic ties in the Himalaya. All these aspects

make the third phase of the China-India-Tibet strategic triangle relevant.

154