Chapter – Two

Historical Background of Tibet Factor in the Sino-Indian Geostrategic Relations

Tibet was one of the oldest civilization-state in Asia. The Tibetan civilization

formed on the bank of Yalung River which is situated near Lhasa, the capital city of

Tibet. Despite the sheer size of its land mass and bulk, Tibet was also known as the

centre of the Buddhist knowledge system. During the 7th and 8th centuries, Tibet

became the most powerful country in Asia in terms of political, military, diplomacy

and strategy. At the beginning of the 10th century, the formidable Tibetan Empire was

fragmented into many princely states due to internal conflict within the successors of

the thrown. Tibet as a Warrior Nation during the era of the Tibetan Empire was

transformed into a pacifist nation which had been ruled by the sectarian heads. Since

then, Tibet by itself professed inoffensive approach toward its neighbouring countries.

The spiritual orientations and initiations became a core value of the state

affairs which gradually pushed away from its aggressive foreign affairs. The

cultivation of spiritualism and building religious establishments across the Tibetan

Plateau tamed the fearless martial spirit of the Tibetans. It was one of the reasons for

Communist China to easily occupy Tibet in 1950. The loss of Tibet as a country in the

political map of the world has drastically altered Asia’s geopolitical dimension.

Therefore, the geopolitical importance of Tibet is highly signifying discourse in the

context of the Sino-Indian geostrategic relations.

India and China are the two largest countries in the continent of Asia. Both

India and China are civilization states whose history dates back to almost 5000 years.

These two nations shared a prolonged cultural bond and trade with each other. There

was no such recorded history of the political repercussion and military confrontation

36
between India and China before adopting the western notion of the nation-state model

in Asia.

The vast and wild plateau of Tibet and the formidable mountain range of

Karakorum served as a natural barrier between China and India. These natural barriers

such as the mighty snow-crowned mountains and rivers had ceased the large-scale

military expeditions. But the Chinese occupation over Tibet has sparked the

cartographical war between India and China. A new great game has been instigated

between India and China for expanding their sphere of influence in South Asia since

the disappearance of Tibet as an effective buffer state.

Today, whenever Indian diplomats visit China, they explicitly put the nature

of Sino-Indian relations in a modus way of cordial and friendly. But this sort of

bilateral relations between China and India has been downplayed in the form of a

hunky-dory diplomacy. When the Sino-Indian relation goes deeper into the

geopolitical significance and its aspects, the nature and salient features of Sino-Indian

relations are seen in an antagonistic and adversary approach. This is because the

centrality of Sino-Indian relations has incepted on the fate of the past, present and

future status of Tibet.

The geopolitical importance of Tibet determines the ultimate scope of the

Sino-Indian relations. Claude Arpi, an independent researcher on the Sino-Indian

geostrategic relations, succinctly wrote in The Pioneer, “Since a few years, whenever

Indian dignitaries visit Beijing; they are told by their Chinese hosts that the relations

between India and China are 2000-year-old and that during 99.9 per cent of this

period the contact has been cordial and friendly. They invariably add: Why much

importance should be attached to the 0.1 per cent? This point was reiterated by

37
Premier Wen Jiabao who had a 40 minutes tete-e-tete with his Indian counterpart

during their first encounter at the 10th ASEAN Summit held in Vientiane. Mr. Wen

once again mentioned that the “aberration” represented only 0.1 per cent of the

relationship”25.

The 0.9 per cent aberration period probably refers to the failed negotiations on

the border between 1958 and 1962. This statistical figure professed by the Chinese

Premier tries to subdue the complexity of the Sino-Indian relations rather bringing

concrete solutions. The Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, India’s forward policy

towards the Himalayan frontiers and the subsequent exile of His Holiness the Dalai

Lama and his entourages to India in 1959 infringed the India-China bilateral relations.

During the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, Indian

diplomats proposed a fast-track mechanism to sort out the breach of relations between

India and China. At the same time, the Prime Minister of India acknowledged and

reaffirmed the Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and accepted Tibet as an integral part

of China. In return, the Chinese government reaffirmed India’s sovereignty over

Sikkim.

Despite such understanding, the Chinese military incursions in the northern

part of Sikkim after the joint declaration between the two countries exposed the sheer

rivalry over the delimitation of the border between the Indian state of Sikkim and the

Chinese occupied Tibet. The delineation of the Sikkim-Tibet border was discussed

and approved by the Chinese and British delegates without the prior consent of the

Tibetan government and the Kingdom of Sikkim during the Anglo-Chinese

25
http://www.claudearpi.net/the-pioneer.

38
Convention in 1890. Today, the Sino-Indian border issues over Sikkim must be traced

back to the Anglo-Chinese Convention in 1890.

Similarly, the Sino-Indian border dispute in the Eastern Sector is the

McMahon Line. The demarcation of McMahon Line was signed by the

plenipotentiaries of British India and Tibet during the Shimla Convention in 1914.

Therefore, China argued that the Shimla26 Convention was illegal. However, India

contended that the McMahon line was the border between the Indian state of

Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet. But China claims the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh

as a Chinese territory, which is known as the South Tibet. Hence, the dispute over

border demarcations between India and China remains a core issue in the context of

Sino-Indian geostrategic relations.

Most of the Indian diplomats focus on the Sino-Indian bilateral relations in

terms of culture, trade, commerce and technology. On the other hand, most of the

Indian defence personal remains wary of Chinese initiatives towards South Asia. In

fact, there are multiple views among the Indian policy-makers regarding India’s China

policy. When it comes to the national interest, India’s national capacity and capability

have driven its foreign policy. India must rely on both of its soft and hard powers. But

the present world order is dominated by the realistic approach. And there is a little

space for the idealistic domains.

In order to counter the growing Chinese national and international powers, India must

look forward to its strategic thinking and military capacity. To achieve that, the

geopolitical importance of Tibet in the context of Sino-Indian geostrategic relations

26
Former summer palace of the British Indian officers, presently, the capital city of Himachal Pradesh,
India

39
implies to both India and China for creating comprehensive understanding between

each other.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the U.S posed as the only

superpower in the world. Today, China is challenging American supremacy.

Eventually, the U.S remains to be one of the most powerful nations in international

politics. The Sino-Indian strategic alliance has potential to challenge the American

supremacy, but the two Asian giants are unable to stick together as an alliance to

bulwark against the U.S hegemony. This is due to the prolonged history of trust

deficit between India and China since China’s invasion of Tibet. Though India sealed

the Tibet issue during the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, the Tibet factor remains a

core issue in the context of Sino-Indian geostrategic relations. Both India and China

cannot avoid the matter of Tibet till they resolve the Sino-Indian border disputes.

The Status of Tibet as a State

Tibet is geographically the highest nation in the world, also known as the roof

of the world. Tibet was an isolated, remote and a landlocked nation where she had no

contact with the rest of the world. The Tibetan people were deeply connected in the

world of the Tibetan culture and religion. The status of Tibet as a geopolitical victim

of the great game between the British Empire and the Russian empire in the late 19th

and the early 20th centuries created a political vacuum. Yet, Tibet remained as a

neutral country till 1951.

The western scholars, adventurists and common readers considered Tibet as a

land of Lama and the black magic. In fact, Tibet was a nation with a long recorded

history and civilization. Buddhism is a state religion of Tibet. Those scholars who

knew about Tibet regarded it was a country.

40
 Hugh Richardson, a British diplomat and historian explained the Tibet world

in two aspects, “In political Tibet, the Tibetan government has ruled continuously

from the earliest times down to 1951. The region beyond that to the north and east

[Amdo and Kham] is its ethnographic extension which people of Tibetan race once

inhabited exclusively and where they are still in the majority. In that wider area,

political Tibet exercised jurisdiction only in certain places and at irregular intervals,

for the most part, local lay or monastic chiefs were in control of districts of varying

size. From the 18th century onwards the region was subject to sporadic Chinese

infiltration. But in whatever hands actual authority might lie, the religious influence of

Lhasa was a long-standing and all-pervasive force and large donations of money and

valuable goods were annually sent to the Dalai Lama. In the text that follows Tibet

means the political Tibet except where otherwise state.”27

Tibet: Nation, Boundary and Population

Tibet is also called a land of snow which is surrounded by the ranges of Snow

Mountains: the Kunlun range in the north, the Hengduan in the east, the Himalayas in

the south and the Pamir and Karakorum in the west. These great mountains are the

source of many of Asia’s major rivers which includes the Brahmaputra, the Mekong,

the Yangtze, the Yellow River, the Sutlej and the Indus as these mountains have

heavy glaciers. Tibet plateau is located at an average altitude of 3,600 m. (12,000 ft.)

above sea-level and its landscape includes snow-mountains, glaciers, green forests,

vast grasslands and salt lake.

Tibet has shared a boundary with Pakistan, Mongolia, China, Burma, Bhutan,

Nepal and India. Charles Bell, the British political officer of Sikkim, observed that

27
Melvyn C. Goldstein, “Change, Conflict and Continuity among a Community Pastoralists: A case
study from western Tibet, (1950 – 1990)”, Resistance and Reform in Tibet, pp. 76 – 77.

41
“Tibetan do not necessarily take mountain ranges or rivers as their boundaries. When

on a tour of exploration through Bhutan to Tibet in 1904, I found that the boundary

between these countries at the tri-junction of Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim was what

Tibetans called an ‘upland-tree lowland-tree’28 boundary. In other words, the pine

forests belonged to Tibet and the bamboo forests to Bhutan, which means in effect a

contour of about 11,500 ft. above sea-level. A good, practical boundary no doubt, in

that it serves the agricultural and general needs of both countries, for the Tibetans

need the higher lands for grazing their yaks and upland sheep, while the Bhutanese

make great use of the bamboo. But its boundary not easily recognized by Western

People, who look for frontiers along high mountains ranges, which are easily

defended and can be delineated on the map.”29

The boundary between China and Mongolia are also demarcated by the

mountain range. The Tibetan boundaries with her neighboring countries were

delineated or demarcated by the natural barriers such as mountains ranges and rivers

and there was no history of Indo-Tibet border disputes before the Chinese invasion of

Tibet in 1950.

Tibet had no legally demarcated boundaries with its neighboring countries.

Traditionally, Tibetan population is six million. The physical geography of Tibet has

divided into three provinces which are U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo. The size of Tibet

is about 3.8 million sq. km (1.5 million sq. miles) or about fifteen times the size of

Great Britain and half the size of the United States of America. Most of the Tibetan

people live in the east and southeastern part of Tibet. The central part of Tibet is

scarcely populated due to its harsh climate conditions.

28
Ya-shing Mon-shing in Tibetan
29
Charles Bell, “Tibet Past and Present”, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 1996,pp. 5 – 6.

42
The Status of Tibet

The question of the status of Tibet was framed by the British imperialist for

serving their own national interest in the 19th century. The status of Tibet was charted

by British, Russia and China without the consent of the government of Tibet in the

early 20th century. These countries projected the status of Tibet in the form of various

political entities as sovereignty, suzerainty, independence, indirect rule, autonomy,

vassalage, protectorate, overlordship, and colony.

China claimed that historically Tibet is part of China, though they had only

occupied Tibet. The Chinese claim of sovereignty over Tibet has no historical proof

because Lord Curzon explicitly remarked that the Chinese control over Tibet is

fiction. Lord Curzon was one who adopted British India’s Tibet policy. Lord Curzon,

Governor General of British India, the architect of British policy towards Tibet from

1899 to 1905, stated that “Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is a fiction, a political

affectation; if we do nothing in Tibet we shall have Russia trying to establish a

protectorate in less than ten years. This might not constitute a military danger, at any

rate for some time, but would be a political danger. The effect on Nepal, Sikkim and

Bhutan would constitute a positive danger; we can, and stop a Russian protectorate

over Tibet, by being in advances ourselves.”30 It was strong evidence that the Chinese

suzerainty over Tibet is a fiction.

The question of the status of Tibet remained unresolved during the great game

between British India, Russia and China. During the same time, China was a weak

country because the Qing Dynasty had collapsed in 1911. Moreover, China as a

30
Tom Grunfeld, “The Making of Modern Tibet”, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987, p.50.

43
civilization-state had no political strategy to occupy its neighboring countries before

the 19th century. China also condemned the western concept of sovereignty.

The modern concept of the Chinese notion of a nation-state and its idea of

sovereignty has been imported from the European model of international politics.

China adopted the western concept of the nation-state when it became a Republic in

1912 and it began to strategize the occupation of its neighboring countries. Tibet was

one of the victims of the Chinese aggressive expansionist strategy because of the

failure of British India’s Tibet policy.

The formation of the Asian socio-political system was entirely different from

the western notion of the state and society. The European model of nation-state was

not applicable to the making of Asian nation building because the European countries

are formed based on the Westphalia nation-state doctrine. By contrast, the Asian

countries have evolved based on their own civilization.

McGranahan identifies five key features that made traditional statehood of

Europe: local determination and sanctioning of boundaries; sovereignty and boundary

not coterminous; overlapping zone between politics; no imperative for an external

ratification of rules; and privileging of power relationship between territory and centre

over territorial integrity31. According to this notion, the formation of the Tibetan

political culture and administration system are juxtaposed to what the west had

projected in their context.

The Tibetan nation evolved within the context of the Tibetan civilization itself.

Moreover, it was formed by its indigenous history, culture, society, religion and

31
McGranahan, “Empire and the Status of Tibet: British , Chinese and Tibetan Negotiation”, 1913 –
1934.

44
politics. On the contrary, the British and the Chinese have articulated the Tibetan

narrative in their own perspectives, which contrasts the original narrative of the

Tibetan civilization. Therefore; the British could not resolve the Sino-Tibetan border

dispute.

At the same time, the borders between British India and Tibet were not able to

demarcate because the British and Chinese distorted the political-cultural history of

Tibet. The British also distorted the geo-history of the Himalayan belt and created its

current geostrategic tension. All these historical blunders and distortions were caused

by the historical legacy of British imperialism in Asia.

Dibyesh Anand, Professor of international relations at Centre for Study of

Democracy, Westminster University, U.K, stated that ‘Due to their [Tibetan] own

familiarity with feudalism and with the Chinese international system of tributary

system, it is not surprising that the British interpreted the Sino-Tibetan relations in

terms of suzerainty and a protectorate system. British policy toward Tibet was shaped

by conflicting dynamics including the infeasibility of direct colonization, the security

of British India’s northern frontiers. The conceptualization of Tibet as a buffer state

with s strategic location, British commercial interests in the Chinese empire, shifting

alliance within Europe, and the like others. These conflicting interests shifted

overtimes.’32

By the early 20th century, British India gained extraterritorial control over the

cist-Himalayan regions of Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim and Assam. These regions shared

historical, cultural, linguistic, political and religious ties with Tibet. These Himalayan

kingdoms became British India’s protectorate states. British India hence designed a

32
DibyeshAnand, “Tibet a Victim of Geopolitics”, Routledge India, 2007, p.68.

45
rampart strategy where they charted Tibet as an outer rampart against the external

threats.

The adoption of the geopolitical status of Tibet as a buffer state in the heart of

Asia was a part of British India’s forward policy toward Central Asia. In order to do

so, the British wanted to bring Tibet as a player in the Great Game. But the

Government of Tibet rejected the British diplomatic proposals. To bring Tibet into the

great game directly, they launched a mission named ‘Tibet Frontier Mission’ which

was led by Colonel Francis Younghusband.

The mission was clandestinely in the form of the military expedition. This led

to a battle between Tibet and British India in 1903. The Tibetan soldiers were badly

defeated and Younghusband forced the Government of Tibet to sign a treaty in 1904.

Though British India called it a military expedition, the Tibetans considered it an

invasion of Tibet. The Treaty was called the Lhasa33 Convention which directly

brought Tibet under the guidance of British India. It was the turning point of the

India-China-Tibet geostrategic relations.

Early Foreign Contacts in Tibet

The Christian missionaries were the first westerners who contacted the

Tibetans. The Jesuits were the first among the missionaries who penetrated the

western part of Tibet. The Jesuits arrived in Tibet in 1624 and established a

missionary centre in Tsaparang. Tsaparang was a cultural centre of the western Tibet.

These missionaries not only spread Christianity but also collected information about

the Tibetan society, physical geography, cultural and life.

33
Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet.

46
 Subsequently, China and British used this information for making their own

diplomacy toward Tibet. Kangxi, the fourth emperor of the Qing Dynasty, ordered to

make the first atlas of China. In this atlas, he incorporated Tibet as a peripheral of

China through an account of the Jesuits. In the 1770s, the British decided to expand

their interests beyond the Himalaya for trade and relationship with Tibet. The

Governor General of Bengal, Warren Hasting dispatched George Bogler and Dr.

Alexander Hamilton to Shigatse in 1774 for establishing a cordial relationship with

Panchen Lama34. But the Government of Tibet did not accept British India’s offer due

to the Chinese Amban who instigated that the British were anti-Buddhist. Hence, the

British mission couldn’t achieve what they wished for.

Tibet faced two invasions in the 19th century: one from Kashmir and another

from Nepal. At the same time, China and the British fought the first Opium War in

1842. Due to this war, the British feared the deployment of Chinese forces in the

western Tibet which stood in front of the Indian Subcontinent. It was because British

India had no direct contact with Lhasa.

To make relations with Tibet directly, the British trained 130 Indians as a

government agent for the survey in Tibet. These agents penetrated Tibet disguised in

monk’s robe, trader and pilgrim. Their real mission was to conduct a secret survey in

Tibet. For the mapping of Tibet, they used rosary beads as a survey tool for measuring

distances and hid other survey instruments such as a paper in the prayer wheel which

most of the Tibetan carry for praying.

“In desperation, as the scholar Derek Waller found, the British cultivated

‘pundits’, Indians who had helped map the subcontinent and were now dispatched, in

34
Panchen Lama: the second highest lama in the Tibetan Buddhism.

47
disguise, into Tibet, equipped with compasses and 100-bead rosaries to discreetly

count their steps.”35 Among the spies disguised as Indian Pundits, Sarat Chandra Das

was the most successful with two visits to Tibet. In his first trip, he reached at the

Tashi-Lhungpo Monastery in 1879 where he studied Tibetan culture. In his second

trip in 1881, he stayed for 14 months and later compiled a report which was published

as a book in 1902. His secret survey report on Tibet was very helpful during the

British military expedition in Tibet in 1903. British India’s secret agents were not the

only foreign spies in Tibet at the time but Russia had also sent explorers and agents.

Those secret surveys and explorations subsequently led to the great game in Tibet

between Russia and Britain.

The Legacy of the British Raj

After the revolt of 1857, the East India Company’s control over India ended

and India was directly controlled by London. The British had a desire to expand its

power across the Himalaya and beyond where Sikkim was made a British protectorate

state in 1861. Subsequently, Bhutan became its protectorate state in 1865 and the

annexation of Assam in 1886 extended British India’s political administration.

At the same time, Russia sold Alaska to the United State of America in 1867

to avoid the British influence in the eastern part of Russia and shifted its focus on

Mongolia and Central Asia. Russia also had good cultural and religious ties with

Tibet. Many Russian Buddhists had come to Tibet for pursuing higher studies in

Buddhism.

The Russian forward policy was to check the British influence in the interest

of Russian territories. Apart from religious-cultural relations, Russia had an interest in

35
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/magazine/the-indian-spy-who-fell-for-tibet.html.

48
Tibet for preventing the British sphere of influence. Russia adopted a policy in

Central Asia to push its motive of a stronger Russia in Central Asia; the weaker

England is in India and the more conciliatory Britain will be in Europe. In such

circumstances, there would be a possibility which Russia will launch a military

expedition in Tibet.

The Government of Britain feared the possibility of Russian threat to India

through Tibet and Nepal. The British suspected a Buriat Mongol monk whose name

was Dorjieff. Later, he was appointed adviser of the 13th Dalai Lama and became a

very influential monk in the Depung Monastery. Dorjieff advised the Dalai Lama to

seek a patronage of the Tsar. It triggered suspicions in mind of the British strategists.

At the same time, the British wanted to open trade routes to China through Burma and

Tibet. But the British had no formal diplomatic relation with Tibet.

Augustus Raymond Margary, a British explorer and diplomat was killed by a

Chinese national. Under the pretext of Margary affair, England forced China to sign

the Chefoo Convention of 1876. One of the aims of this treaty was to allow a deal

with Tibet. China had not informed Tibet about the Chefoo Convention. The

Government of Tibet condemned the provisions of the treaty and decided to set up a

check-post at a settlement called Lingtu located at just 18 miles from Sikkim. The

British sent 2000 troops to destroy the check-post.

This border skirmish led to two more treaties: the Calcutta Convention in 1890

and the Anglo- Chinese Agreement in 1893. In March 1890, China and British signed

the Convention, which recognized the British right over Sikkim and the water-parting

of the Teesta River should form the boundary demarcation between Tibet and Sikkim.

49
 Subsequently, the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1893 was signed where the

Sikkim-Tibet border was demarcated. And, it had enshrined the trade regulations

which allowed the British to open a market in Yatung, eight miles on the Tibetan side

of the frontier. The Tibetans rejected whenever the British carried out the provisions

enshrined in the treaties because Tibet was not a signatory of them. The British

realized that the Chinese control over Tibet was a speculation. Hence, a direct link

with Lhasa was opted by the Government of British India. The same time, China was

waging war with Japan. The Government of Tibet did not accept the delimitation of

the Sikkim-Tibet border. Hence, to establish the direct communication link to Lhasa;

the British launched the military expedition in Tibet in 1903.

Lord Curzon and the British Invasion of Tibet

In 1899, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India granted a permission from London

to directly communicate with Lhasa. Curzon understood that China’s control over

Tibet was a fiction. He observed that the Russian influence might be endangered to

the British forward policy in Central Asia. For that, he decided to control Tibet to

block the Russian penetration in Tibet and to protect the British trade relations with

the Central Asian countries.

Curzon sent a lengthy dispatch to London in 1903 for proposing a tripartite

conference in Lhasa. But London suggested that the Nepalese incursion into Tibet

might be resolved without the involvement of the British force and money. Curzon

refused London’s suggestion and was finally granted permission to negotiate with

Tibet the terms of trade and frontiers. Neither China nor Tibetan agreed to meet

British delegates initially. But the British frequently put pressure on Tibet for having

negotiations as they feared the close relationship between Lhasa and St Petersburg.

50
 The 13th Dalai Lama expressed his approach in a letter which he wrote to his

friend, the Maharaja of Sikkim in 1900: “Why do the British insist on establishing

trade marts? Their goods are coming in from India right up to Lhasa. Whether they

have their marts or not, their things come in all the same. The British, under the guise

of establishing communications, are merely trying to over-reach us. They are well

practiced in all these political wiles.”36 His Holiness the 13th Dalai Lama perceived

the British invasion of Tibet in the name of trade relations.

London’s call for concrete proof of Russia’s influence in Tibet was not replied

by the Viceroy of British India. In these circumstances, speculative geopolitical news

spread which led to consternation in London. The news alleged that there was a secret

Sino- Russian Treaty in 1902 which appeared in the Chinese press. As per that treaty,

Russia has provided the assurance of the Chinese territorial integrity, but China must

assent Russia’s free move in Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang. Later, China and Russia

strongly condemned such allegations of a treaty. Yet, the British were not convinced

by the official condemnation from China and Russia.

The British viewed this treaty as a threat to British India. Curzon commended

the treaty, “I am myself a firm believer in the existence of a secret understanding, if

not a secret treaty, between Russia and China about Tibet: and as I have before said, I

regard it as a duty to frustrate this little game while is still time.”37 Though Russia had

a political interest in Tibet, it had not given geopolitical importance to Tibet as

compared to China and Britain.

36
Tom Grunfeld, “The Making of Modern Tibet: (Alastair Lamb –‘Some of Note on Russian Intrigue
in Tibet’)”, Routledge, 1996, p.51.
37
Alas Lamb, Some Note on Russian Intrigue, ‘Beginnings of the Lhasa Expedition’, The Journal of the
Royal Central Asian Society, p. 46.

51
 Charles Bell observed the danger of Sino-Russian forces stationed in Tibet:

‘Tibet was a chief bulwark of India’s northern frontiers, if Russian and China

remained in sympathy, British might expect trouble also in Burma, formerly under

Chinese overlordship, connected by race and religion with Tibet, but recently annexed

by force to the British dominions. And so, from Kashmir to Siam – over two –thirds

of the long land frontiers of India would have been replaced by constant unrest.’38 In

January 1903, Curzon sent the British Mission with an armed escort to Lhasa to

establish direct relations with the Dalai Lama for trade and commercial relations and a

permanent British representative at Lhasa.

British Invasion

British India’s invasion of Tibet was a failure of their diplomacy. It led to the

present protracting geopolitical conflicts in the Himalaya and in Tibet. The British

Mission to Lhasa discussed their strategic interests, trade and commercial interests

and border issues. The British called it the British military expedition in Tibet, but in

reality, it was the British military invasion of Tibet. Curzon wrote to Hamilton, the

secretary of state of India, “We seem, in fact, in respect of our policy towards Tibet,

to be moving in a vicious circle. If we apply to Tibet, we either receive no reply or are

referred to the Chinese Resident. If we apply to the latter, he excuses his failure by his

inability to put pressure on Tibet. As a policy, this appears to be unproductive and

inglorious”39. Curzon followed the British imperialistic strategy which commonly

strategizes that if trade could not lead, the flag could not follow. Such colonization

approach was applied to Tibet by the British.

38
Charles Bell, “Tibet Past and Present, Motilal Banarsidass”, New Delhi, 1996, p.74.
39
India Office Records, L/PS/7/148, Curzon to Hamilton, February 13, 1902.

52
 The mission was led by Colonel Francis Younghusband. This mission was

officially called as the Tibet Frontier Commission. The Chinese and Tibetan

delegations urged the British not to cross the frontier, but the British persisted and

reached in Khama Dzong. The British mission was stationed in Khama Dzong and

waited for a high-level Tibetan plenipotentiary and the Chinese Amban for the

Tripartite Conference. The Tibetan soldiers resisted the British mission. The British

killed most of the resistance soldiers during the battle between British India and Tibet

in 1903.

The British Mission fought its way to Gyantse. Younghusband and his

Mission reached in Lhasa on August 3; 1904. He did not trace any Russian presence

in Tibet. Due to the invasion, the 13th Dalai Lama and his entourage fled to Urga, the

capital city of Mongolia. The regent of Tibet took the political administration power

during the absence of the Dalai Lama. The Regent signed a treaty with the British

envoy on September 7, 1904. The treaty was known as Lhasa Convention. At Lhasa, a

convention was negotiated between the British and Tibetans with the assistance of

Amban40, the Nepalese representative and the Tongsa Penlop. The treaty that brought

the British and Tibet closer had the following provisions which were discussed and

ratified between them:

1. Two fresh trade marts were opened, namely, at Gyantse and Gartok, the latter

was presumably referring to a small trade Centre in the western Tibet, which

was known as Gar Gunsa.

2. The Tibetans abolished all dues of trade which came from India.

40
Chinese Political Commission in Tibet.

53
 3. An indemnity of half a million pounds was to be paid by the Government of

Tibet in seventy-five annual instalments. The Chumbi Valley will remain

under the British jurisdiction until the payment has been completed.

4. Without British consent, no Tibetan territory to be ceded and leased to any

foreign powers, no concession for roads and mines to be given and no Tibetan

revenue to be pledged to a foreign power or to any of its subjects. No such

power to be permitted to intervene in the Tibetan affairs, or to send agents to

Tibet.

The key purpose of the treaty was to make Tibet a protectorate of the British

Empire. In the absence of the Chinese envoy in Lhasa Convention, the British

changed the content of the 1890 treaty which was signed with the Chinese

government. Moreover, China and Russia did not condemn the British invasion of

Tibet. It was proven that Russian presence in Tibet was just a pretext for the British to

extend its sphere of influence in Tibet.

The aftermath of the British Invasion

After a year of signing the Lhasa Convention, the British changed its policy

towards Tibet. At the same time, Russia was defeated by Japan in the Russo- Japan

war of 1905, which instigated the first Russian Revolution. Russia became militarily

weak in central Asia after the defeat in the Russo-Japan war. Hence, the Russian

threat to British India had disappeared. The British ceased to worry about the Russian

threat, whereas China still stood at the front of the Tibetan Plateau which the British

viewed as a threat to British India.

A newly formed British Liberal government came into power at the end of

1905. The new London government had emphasized the importance of the Anglo-

54
Chinese and the Anglo-Russian relations rather than Anglo-Tibet relations. The

British compromised the geopolitical importance of Tibet and called back the British

mission from Lhasa. Then, the question of the Chinese suzerainty or sovereignty over

Tibet became a core issue of the Anglo-Chinese relations. In 1906, the Chinese

delegate, Tang Shaoyi, proposed the reopening of negotiation with the newly formed

British government. John Morley, the new head of India Office in London, accepted

the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet for enhancing the Anglo-Chinese diplomatic

relations.

In response to evidence of Russia’s renewed interest in Tibet, Morley

suggested an Anglo-Russian Entente. The Convention was signed on 18 August 1907

between Russia and British relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. It was because

of the geopolitical power transition that occurred in the Far East, the Middle East and

Europe after the defeat of Russia by Japan. Both parties accepted not to deal with the

Tibetans except through the Chinese, yet the British would have the right to deal with

the Tibetan authorities on the trade matters, while the Russian Buddhists have the

right to access in Tibet for pursuing the higher studies in the Buddhism.

The Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907 conceded the Chinese suzerainty over

Tibet without the consent of the Government of Tibet. Tom Grunfeld, the American

Tibetologist expatiated the term suzerainty, ‘To the best of my knowledge, this treaty

marks the first official use of the term suzerainty, in this particular context, Suzerainty

became a diplomatic term used to denote a conditions under which a dependent state

(in the case Tibet) enjoyed local autonomy over domestic matters, while living under

the rule of a more powerful entity (in this case China) that exercised control over

55
external affairs and defence. Sovereignty, on the other hand, describes a situation in

which one state exercise total control over another.’41

London preferred to withdraw Curzon’s British policy toward Tibet.

Therefore, the Curzon’s British India policy toward Tibet had failed. There was a big

difference of opinion between London and British India regarding their policy

towards Tibet. London had given priority to China rather than Tibet, but the British

Indian government gave priority on Tibet than China.

Lord Bryce, the British Ambassador in Washington, wrote to Grey: ‘There is a

sort of tragic interest in observing how the Chinese government, like a huge anaconda,

has enwrapped the unfortunate Dalai Lama in its coils, tightening them upon him until

complete submission has been extorted…. The history of the whole transaction

enforces once more the moral which seems that natural one to be drawn from the

British expedition into Tibet. The chief result of that expedition has been to

immensely strengthen the hold of China on Tibet, making it now almost a province of

the Chinese empire, and therewith to give British India upon the northern border

instead of the feeble and half-barbarous Tibetans, a strong, watchful, and tenacious

neighbor which may one day become a formidable military power’42.

At the same time, the Chinese had been consolidating their power in Tibet

since the Anglo- Chinese negotiation in 1906. The Chinese government began to

expand its sphere of influence in the Himalayan borderlands which were under the

prolonged spheres of British Indian influence. The Chinese Commissioner at Lhasa,

Chan Yin-tang, wrote: ‘China, Nepal, Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim might be compared

41
Tom Grunfeld, “The Making of Modern Tibet”, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987, p. 57.
42
Public Record Office, FO 535/12, No.3, Bryce to Grey. December 17, 1908. Enclosure to No.3,
Rockhill to Roosevelt, November 8, 1908.

56
to the five colours, viz. yellow, red, blue, black and green. A skilful painter may so

arrange the colours as to produce several beautiful designs or effects. It’s clearly

indicated that China might claim soon their control over Nepal and Bhutan. Sikkim

had been a British protectorate from 1890, and any Chinese military move against

Sikkim would have meant war with Britain. Bhutan was a weak state of the Himalaya,

but the Bhutanese chieftain Ugyen Wangchuk has accepted the British control over

Bhutan in terms of its external affairs. By the support of the British, Ugyen Wangchuk

became the first king of Bhutan and the kingdom of Bhutan was established in 1907.

For that, the Anglo-Bhutanese treaty was signed on January 8, 1910.

Months after the signing of the Anglo-Bhutan treaty, the Chinese general Zhao

Erfeng and his units of army entered Lhasa which caused the 13th Dalai Lama’s

second flee to India. The British strategists had seen that Chinese military aggression

might be coming through the North East Frontier Agency. ‘The problem of the North

East Frontier thus bids fair to be duplicated in the long run, and a double pressure

placed on the defensive resources of the Indian Empire. The man who advocated the

retention of Lhasa has proved not so far wrong, whatever the reasons for giving the

advice. The evacuation of the Chumbi Valley has certainly proved a blunder. The

strategic line has been lost, and a heavy price may be exacted for the mistake. China,

in a word, has come to the gate of India, and the fact has to be reckoned with’43.

W.F.O. Conner, one of the British Indian Government’s foremost experts on

Tibet described the strategic importance of the Chumbi Valley. It has divided the

border between Sikkim and Bhutan. But the Anglo -Chinese Convention and the

Anglo -Russian Convention coded that the Chumbi Valley shall be returned to the

43
Edited by Robert Barnett and ShirinAkiner, “Resistance and Reform in Tibet:’ British and Indian
Strategic Perceptions of Tibet”, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1996, p.24.

57
Tibetan authority after the completion of the indemnity. The indemnity was paid

completely in 1906. Conner briefed the possibility of the Chinese intrigue on the

Indian frontiers which exactly happened in 1962.

Lord Morley had retired as the Viceroy of India in 1910. He left a big

geopolitical vacuum in inner Asia. Sir Charles Hardinge succeeded after the

retirement of Lord Morley, but he could not coordinate with London regarding

British’s Tibet policy while the Chinese military was stationed in Tibet. Meanwhile,

China gradually started claims over the Himalaya regions. But, in November 1911,

the Manchu Dynasty in China collapsed. Sir Charles Hardinge perceived it as an

opportunity to revisit British’s Tibet policy.

The return of the 13th Dalai Lama to Lhasa and the collapse of the Qing

dynasty in China brought an opportunity to British India to resolve the Sino-Tibetan

conflicts. Moreover, His Holiness the 13th Dalai Lama turned towards the British for a

friendly neighbourhood as he stayed as a political asylum in British India. Therefore,

Hardinge proposed the making of the new Anglo - Tibetan relationship. He wanted to

send the British representative to Lhasa as a responsive gesture to the Dalai Lama’s

goodwill. However, Morley opposed the new British move towards Tibet. It failed

because London disapproved the proposal.

Morley confessed his guilt at the end, in his private letter to Lord Curzon after

the First World War: ‘It had crossed my mind many a time in these days that you

were right and Grey and I were wrong about the Anglo-Russian Convention’. The

Dalai Lama consolidated the Tibetan political power after he returned from exile. In

the year 1913, the Dalai Lama declared the proclamation of the independent of Tibet

and expelled all the Chinese residences from Tibet.

58
The Shimla Convention of 1914

After the British’s prolonged survey on the Assam Himalaya since the early

19th century, they perceived it as strategically vulnerable to the northeast of Indian

subcontinent. Therefore, the British wanted to settle the border between Tibet and the

North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). It was because Russia became militarily weak

after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. China had disintegrated into

warlordism after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. So, there was the least

possibility of the Russian and Chinese threat toward the Indian subcontinent.

At the same time, the British wanted to host the tripartite conference between

British India, Tibet and China. For that, the British invited China and Tibet at Shimla

in October 1913, which was known as the Shimla Conference. Sir Henry McMahon

was the British India representative, Lonchen Paljor Dorje Shatra was the Tibetan

plenipotentiary and Ivan Chen was the Chinese delegation. The objective of the

Shimla Conference was to discuss the status of Tibet, which would settle the Sino-

Tibetan border conflict in Eastern Tibet. For that, it would be divided into an Inner

and Outer Tibet where inner Tibet charted under the Chinese suzerainty. The Outer

Tibet would remain under the jurisdiction of the Government of Tibet.

After six months negotiating between the Tibetan and the Chinese

representatives for demarcating the Sino-Tibet border, Ivan Chan quit the conference

because China was not ready to accept the terms and condition of the convention. So,

China lost its stake in the Shimla Convention. In March 1914, McMahon and Lochen

Shatra signed a bilateral agreement on the delimitation of the Indo – Burma – Tibet

border which named it as the McMahon Line. Both the Tibetan and the British

delegations asserted that China would be deprived of the benefits of the provisions

59
from the confidential Anglo- Tibetan understanding unless it accepted the purpose of

the convention.

In the Shimla Convention, Tibet had legally ceded Tawang to British India, in

exchange, the British had verbally accepted to support Tibet over Sino-Tibet border

settlement against China. Along with this gesture, the British agreed to supply arms to

Tibet. In 1914, the First World War broke in Europe. Britain had entered the World

War and hence the focus of British foreign policy had shifted to Europe from Asia.

By the end of the First World War, to establish trust in the Anglo – Tibetan

relations, Charles Bell listed the military supplies for Tibet which he proposed to the

British government. Bell made it clear that ‘the Tibetan would be economically and

militarily dependent on us to just that extent that is desirable, and they will promote

our interests by promoting their own’. Charles Bell also tried to persuade London to

allow him to accept an invitation from the 13th Dalai Lama. Permission was finally

granted, and Bell arrived at Lhasa in 1920. As per Bell’s suggestion, the Dalai Lama

increased the Tibetan army from 5,000 to 15,000, a telegraph line was constructed

from Gyantse and Lhasa, a small hydro-electric power was built in the Tibet capital

and Tibetan police force was established with the aid of Sikkim police officers. Bell

had persuaded the Dalai Lama to access the British agents in Tibet which was

accepted by the Tibetan government. But after Charles Bell left Tibet, the British did

not follow-up on what he had proposed. Meanwhile, the British left India in 1947. A

newly independent India successively adopted the legacy of British India’s Tibet

policy.

60
Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations Since 1950

India and China faced a border standoff for the first time in the Himalayan

regions in the 1950s. Before the Sino-Indian border skirmish, India and China merely

connected in the form of cultural and spiritual bonds. It was Tibet which stood

between India and China. The Chinese government prudently displayed the Indo-

Chinese relations through the medium of spiritual connection and cultural tilts. The

Chinese government cautiously publicized the Chinese classic epic which is known as

the Journey to the West. The narrative of this epic is merely based on a travelogue

which is written by Heising Zing, who travelled across Central Asia and visited India

to study Buddhism during the 7th century. Apart from that, there was no major

historical event and exchange between India and China. The nature of Sino-Indian

relations signified in the form of neither amity nor foe. The entire geopolitical

landscape changed between India and China when China occupied Tibet in 1950.

Tibet served as a buffer state between India and China for more than a

thousand years. The convergence and divergence of Sino-Indian relations have been

formulated the day when the Chinese invaded Tibet. The Chinese invasion of Tibet

also devastated a prolonged ideal historical buffer state between the two Asian giants.

Frequent Chinese military intrusions across the Himalayan regions pose a security

threat to India.

Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar, the father of Indian Constitution, explicitly stated

during the discussion on Panchasheel Agreement in the Parliament in 1954, “Our

Prime Minister is depending on the Panchsheel which has been adopted by Comrade

Mao and the Panchsheel in which one of the clauses is the Non-Aggression Treaty on

Tibet. I am indeed surprised that our Hon’ble Prime Minister is taking Panchsheel

61
seriously. Hon’ble Members of the House, you must know that Panchsheel is one of

the significant parts of the Buddha Dharma. If Shri Mao had ever an iota of faith in

Panchsheel he would have treated the Buddhists in his country in a different manner.

Panchsheel has no place in politics. I don’t really know what is going to happen. By

letting China take control over Lhasa (Tibetan Capital) the Prime Minister has in a

way helped the Chinese to bring their armies on the Indian borders”44.

Eventually, Pandit Nehru did not take the Tibet matter seriously. India was a

newly independent nation facing intensive challenges. He was an idealist leader who

outlined his thoughts on the international orders. He strongly believed in the non-

alignment movement where he gained huge respect from the third world countries.

Nehru envisioned that India could play a bridge between East and West. Nehru

wished India would become a nation like what he said in the quotation, “….an Asian

state, traditionally friendly to China, without any legacy of conflict with Russia, yet

friendly to the West and following a middle way in its program of economic and

social change.”45 But Nehru’s idealistic view of the international approach was

subdued by the wave of cold war politics and China’s brutal invasion of the Tibetan

Plateau in 1959.

The Chinese civil war between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist

reached a critical stage in 1947. On the other hand, India attained independence from

the British. The Republic of India appointed K.P.S. Menon as India’s ambassador to

China. They read: ‘In China, the situation is difficult because the civil war is going

on. I have been on very friendly terms with Chiang Kai-Shek and we hold each other

in esteem. I have been friendly also with some of the prominent Communist leaders in

44
Dr. Ambredkar, Discussion on Panchsheel Agreement in the Parliament, 1954, New Delhi, Indian
leaders on Tibet, Department of Information and International Relation, CTA, Dharamsala.
45
Michael Brecher, “Nehru: A Political Biography”, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 599.

62
the North-West, though I have not met them. It would appear from American reports

that neither party in the Chinese dispute is free from blame. If American statesmen

say so despite their violent dislike of everything communistic, then it seems clear that

the Chinese Communists have no bad case. Our Ambassador in China, while

maintaining close and friendly relations with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Government, should

not himself become partisan in the civil conflict. Nor should he say anything

disparaging to either side. Some words I have used or written have been exploited by

the Chinese government as against the North-West Communist Government. If our

Ambassador in China has any opportunity, without causing ill-will to the Chinese

Government, to visit the North-West areas, he should seize it and explain to the

Chinese leaders there our general policy of friendly and no- interferences’.46

India called the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947,

where Tibet was admitted in the conference as an independent nation. Despite the

protest by the Chinese participants, the Tibetan delegates took part in the conference

with the status of an independent country. In 1949, the Chinese Communists defeated

the Nationalist and formed the government. Subsequently, President Chiang Kai-Shek

and his entourage fled to Taiwan. On 01 October, 1949, Chairman Mao declared the

People’s Republic of China as the Government of the Chinese and China became one

of the largest communist countries in the world. But most of the countries did not

recognize the Public’s Republic of China as a legitimate Chinese government during

that time.

In 1950, the Communist Party of China designed and declared an invasion of

Tibet in disguise of liberation. The People’s Liberation Army, so-called the Red Army

of China, invaded Tibet in late 1950. India failed to save Tibet eventually. The

46
K.P.S. Menon, “China Past and Present”, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1972, pp. 48-49.

63
disappearance of Tibet as an effective buffer between India and China brought a

geopolitical ramification to the Indian subcontinent. Acharya J.B. Kripalani succinctly

put a question of Tibet in the Lok Sabha Debate on 8 May 1959, “Recently we have

entered into a treaty with China. I feel that China after it had gone Communist,

committed an act of aggression against Tibet. The plea is that China had the ancient

right of suzerainty. This right was out of date, old and antiquated. It was never

exercised in fact. China has destroyed a buffer state (Tibet).”47

In international politics, when a buffer state is destroyed by a powerful

country, it is considered as a committing aggression against its neighbours. In the

Second World War, England waged a war against Germany not because Germany had

invaded England. But Germany had invaded Poland and Belgium. Poland and

Belgium were considered as buffer states between Britain and Europe. But India

failed to play international politics against the Chinese aggression over Tibet.

A Chinese note to India on May 11, 1962, was to state: “if one respects the

objective historical facts, one cannot but acknowledge that there has been a dark side

reconciled to the fact that Chinese Government is exercising its sovereignty over

Tibet”48. The Tibetan foreign minister, W.D. Shakabpa, came to India and reported

the Chinese aggressive method of the destroying Tibetan cultures and brutally killing

Tibetans in Tibet. But Nehru wished both Lhasa and Beijing to sort out the Tibet

crisis through a peaceful settlement. Rather than that, Nehru did not query the matter.

At the same time, Nehru adopted India’s forward policy which hit a hammer on own

feet, where Maxwell projected the Sino-Indian war of 1962 as India’s China War.

47
Acharya J.B. Kripalani, Speech on Tibet, LokSobha Debate, 8 May 1959, Indian leaders on Tibet,
Department of Information and International Relation, CTA, Dharamsala.
48
China White Paper, 1960 – 1962, Delhi.

64
 After knowing the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, to bulwark against the

Chinese military move in the Himalaya, Nehru hastily visited the Himalayan

kingdoms and signed a series of friendship and defense treaties from 1949 to 1951

with Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim. Despite Nehru’s political concession given to the

Chinese control over Tibet, the Chinese media consistently repudiated to Nehru. Most

of the Chinese media were state-sponsored.

One such paper called Nehru “a rebel against the movements for national

independence, a blackguard who undermines the progress of the people’s liberation

movement, a loyal slave of imperialism. Into his slavish and bourgeois reactionary

nature has now been instilled the beastly ambition of aggression.”49 Sardar Vallabbhai

Patel, India’s Home Minister and Nehru’s most senior Colleague in the government

suggested that ‘we must consider what new situation now faces because of the

disappearance of Tibet as we know it and the expansion of China up to our gates.

Throughout history, we have seldom been worried about impenetrable barrier… We

had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble’. Thus, India has faced new strategic

threats from the North and North-east of India.

Instead of focussing on the question of Tibet in Sino-Indian relations, India

joined in the sphere of the Korean conflict in the 1950s, where Nehru opposed the

allied force led by the United States of America. It was a timely opportunity for India

to resolve the Tibet issue and press against the Chinese illegal occupation of Tibet. By

contrast, India accepted to sign a bilateral agreement with China. The Chinese

Premiers Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Nehru signed the “Five Principles of

Peaceful Co-Existence” on April 29, 1954, which is known as the Panchsheel

49
K.K. Kaul, “U.S.A and Hindustan Peninsula (1952-1966)”, University of Michigan, 1977, p. 56.

65
Agreement. India formally conceded China’s claim over Tibet during the Agreement.

Legally, India sealed Tibet issue in 1954.

In January 1959, the Chinese premier Zhou En-Lai wrote to Nehru that China

did not accept the McMahon Line as a Sino-Indian border, which defined as a

boundary line between India and Tibet in the Eastern Sector of India. Meanwhile,

China claimed 104, 000 sq. km over territories which India had already published in

the Indian physical map. The complexity of Sino-Indian border disputes also sparks

off China’s India war in 1962. The lower-intensive Sino-India’s war was waged on 20

October 1962. India was defeated causing heavy causalities to the Indian army. The

Chinese army fought the war on two fronts. But China declared a unilateral ceasefire

on 21 November 1962 and withdrew voluntarily.

Sino-Indian relations had been deteriorating as an aftermath of China’s India

war in 1962. China diplomatically backed Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war in

1965 and 1971. Moreover, China supplied arms and financial assistance to the Indian

insurgency groups in the north-east states of India, especially to Naga insurgents in

Nagaland. In late 1967, there were two skirmishes between the Indian and Chinese

soldiers in Sikkim. The first border skirmish was fought at Nathu La and the second

was in Cho La. Due to China’s ferocious attack on India in 1962 and subsequently

Sino-Indian border skirmishes in Sikkim in 1967, India had ceased its diplomatic

relations with China.

India and China relations had been renewed during the Janata government. In

1978, the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Beijing

and resumed Sino-Indian diplomatic relations in 1979. In 1981, the Chinese Foreign

Affairs Minister, Huang Hua was invited to India for negotiating the Sino-Indian

66
border disputes. After the Huang visit, India and China held eight rounds of border

negotiations between December 1981 and November 1987, but the negotiations

achieved nothing.

Meanwhile, the Chinese military had intruded the Sumdorung Chu Valley of

the Tawang region. They started constructing a military post and a helicopter pad in

the Sumdorung Chu Valley in 1986. In February 1987, India declared Arunachal

Pradesh as one of the Indian states, which formally known as North East Frontiers

Agency (NEFA). The declaration of Arunachal Pradesh as the Indian state triggered

the military escalation in the Himalayan region. China often claims Arunachal

Pradesh as South Tibet.

The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988

brought normalcy to the relation between India and China. Both of countries issued a

joint communiqué which underlined restoration of Sino-Indian friendly relations

based on the fundamental principles of the Panchsheel doctrine. Apart from that, India

had promised to the Chinese counterpart that India would not tolerate any anti-

China’s political activities led by the Tibetans-in-exile in India. This phase of Sino-

Indian relations crumbled after India's nuclear tests in 1998. China criticized India’s

nuclear development. Meanwhile, The Indian Defense Minister George Fernandez

declared that "China is India's number one threat".

China displayed vocal support for Pakistan during the Kargil war in 1999

though it pressed Pakistan to withdraw from the war. In early 2001, His Holiness the

17th Karmapa, Urgyen Trinley Dorjee escaped from Tibet to India. It brought a

massive geopolitical speculation between India and China. China sharply criticized

67
India for granting a political asylum to the His Holiness Karmapa. The Karmapa

lineage has a range of followers across the Himalayan regions.

In 2003, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. During

the meeting, Indian Prime Minister acknowledged China’s claim over Tibet. In return,

China formally recognized Sikkim as an integral part of India. China and India then

formally opened Nathu La on July 6, 2006, which exemplified the normal relations

between India and China. The Doklam standoff between India and China has

redefined the nature of Sino-Indian relations. It anticipates as a new great game

between India and China.

The Militarization of the Tibetan Plateau

China occupied Tibet in 1959. After that, the Chinese government has divided

Tibet into five administrative regions. Except the Tibetan Autonomous Region,

remaining four regions are incorporated under the predominating Han Chinese

provinces. Tibet Autonomous Region was formally established in 1965 which shares

a border with India, Nepal and Bhutan. Tibet and Xinjiang are the most sensitive

regions in China. Both regions are considered to be of geostrategic importance to

India and China. China’s militarization of the Tibetan Plateau has a geostrategic

implication on India. The Chinese military deployment in the Tibet Plateau entails a

geopolitical ramification to its neighbouring countries, especially India. China has

occupied Aksai Chin area of Ladakh and it untiringly claims the Indian state of

Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet. China’s rapid infrastructure development in Tibet

intensified the mobility of the Chinese military deployment in the Tibet plateau.

68
The Strength of the People’s Liberation Army in the Tibetan Plateau

China’s militarization of the Tibetan Plateau is one of the most significant

three-track balance-of-power strategies in Asia. George Ginsburgs and Michael

Mathos rightly underlined the geostrategic importance of Tibet in their book titled

“Communist China and Tibet – The first dozen years” which is published in 1964.

Authors stated that “He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who

dominates the Himalayan piedmont, threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who

threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all the South-east Asia within his

reach, and all of Asia”.

The Chinese strategists already calculated the strategic importance of the Tibet

plateau to secure the Han mainland since the British invasion of Tibet in 1904. The

escalation of the Chinese military deployment on the Tibet plateau signifies China’s

security strategy against the Indian subcontinent. “China is following a three-track

balance-of-power strategy in Asia. First, the country is attempting to maximize the

power gap between itself and its strong Asian neighbors through focused military

modernization and simultaneously leverage its economic and political clout. Second,

China is using states such as Iran, Pakistan, the Central Asia republics, and Myanmar,

and to a lesser extent Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives, as proxies to gain

access to critical oil and gas resources and the Indian Ocean. Last, Beijing is using

soft power through multilateral economic and political engagement to enhance its

strategic influence across Asia”50.

The exact total strength of the People’s Liberation Army in Tibet is unknown.

The recorded statement of a former Tibetan PLA who escaped from Tibet in 1973

50
Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner edited “China’s Military Challenge”, Strategic Asia 2012-2013,
The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle and Washington, D.C, 2012, p.282.

69
revealed that “It is impossible to estimate the Chinese occupation force in our country

because of the strict secrecy regarding anything that is military or defence. We were

not allowed to talk about military affairs and are not supposed to know the exact

strength of even our company. Tibetans in the PLA are not permitted to mix with the

Tibetan populace. If we want to visit another army camp, we have to apply for a

permit”51. It is clearly indicated that the Chinese militarization of the Tibetan plateau

is much secreted and is a highly guarded confidential military strategy.

According to Tashi Chutter, the total number of the Chinese military

deployment in the Tibetan Autonomous Regions itself is 202,000.52 Tashi Chutter was

a CIA Tibetan Task Force who has clandestinely collected the report during the late

1990s and published it in 1998. “According to the Central Tibetan Administration in

Dharamshala, the estimated number of PLA troops deployed in Tibet stands at about

500,000 in the form of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the Chinese Frontier Guards

and the Garrison Duty Force”53.

In fact, China has deployed more than 500,000 Chinese armies in Tibet. Even

though, the traditional strength of the Tibetan population is 6 million, out of which 2.5

million Tibetans live in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. As per the demographical

number of the Tibetan population in Tibet, Tibet does not require a huge number of

military personals. Hence, China’s steady militarization of the Tibetan plateau has

been enhancing China’s security strategy toward the mainland of China and

manoeuvring China’s strategic influence in the South Asian countries.

51
Tenzin Tsultrim, “Militarization of the Tibetan Plateau and Its Significance”, Tibet Policy Journal,
Issue-5, Sarah Printers, Dharamshala, December 2016, p.53.
52
Tashi Chutter, “ Confidential Study on Deployment of Chinese Occupational Force in Tibet”, 1998.
53
“Reappraisal of India’s Tibet Policy”, foundation For Non-Violent Alternatives – An Institute for
Developing Peace Studies, New Delhi, October2013, p.21.

70
China’s Military Command

China has the world largest infantry force and it is the third largest military

power in the world. From 1985 onwards, China’s military theatre command was

formed into seven military command regions which were Beijing, Shenyang,

Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. China has been spending

intensive investment in the military modernization. Due to a rapid China’s military

modernization and reform, China has merged these seven military command regions

into five. From on February 1, 2016, China has formally declared the five military

command regions which are Eastern Theatre Command, Southern Theatre Command,

Western Theatre Command, Northern Theatre Command and Central Theatre

Command. These five military theatre commands are facilitating each other for the

joint military command Centre and a system for effective and efficient utilization of

the military resources during the emergency.

The Chinese president Xi Jinping conferred the military flags to the five newly

established military theatre commands and stated that “the move to establish the

theatre commands and form the joint battle command system is a strategic decision by

the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and the CMC to realize the

Chinese dream of a strong military. It is also a landmark progress in implementing the

military reforms and building the PLA's joint battle system.”54 The role and

responsibility of these five-theatre command are further highlighted by the President

Xi Jinjing which he said that “the five theatre commands are responsible for dealing

with security threats in their respective strategic scopes, maintaining peace, containing

54
http://english.sina.com/china/p/2016/0201/886940.html.

71
wars and winning wars, noting their pivotal role in safeguarding the country's overall

national security and military strategies.”55

Tibet Military Command

Before the five newly established military theatre commands, the Tibet

military district was controlled by the Chengdu military theatre command. Both

Chengdu military theatre command and Lanzhou military theatre command were

merged into the Western Theater Command in 2016. Meanwhile, the Tibet military

district as an earlier establishment has been promoted as the Tibet Military Command.

The Tibet military command is controlled by the Western Theatre Command.

Song Zhongping, a Beijing-based military expert stated that “The promotion

shows China is paying great attention to the Tibet Military Command, which will

significantly improve the command's ability to manage and control the region's

military resources, as well as provide better preparation for combat.”56 The Western

Theatre Command has direct control over the Tibetan plateau which also monitors

border security. Song Zhongping further added that “The Tibet Military Command

bears great responsibility to prepare for possible conflicts between China and India,

and currently it is difficult to secure all the military resources they need.”57 In fact, the

Tibet plateau is under Chinese military security surveillance.

Nuclear Weapon in Tibet

China tested its first nuclear weapon at Lop Nor on October 16, 1964. “Mao

was confident that nuclear weapon capabilities would allow China to assert its

55
Ibid.
56
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/982843.shtm.
57
Ibid.

72
"national will" toward policy goals and deter threats to national security.”58 China has

installed nuclear arsenals in the Northern Tibet. It brought the first nuclear weapon on

the Tibetan Plateau in 1971 and stationed in the Tsai Dam basin, in the north-eastern

district of Amdo. China’s primary nuclear weapon research and design facility, known

as the “Ninth Academy” is in Haiyan in Amdo District. “In 1998, N.K.Trikha

reported that there are reports that China had been developing Nagchuka, a site near

Lhasa, as an alternative nuclear test range, the earlier, being a Lopnor.”59 According

to the Global Zero Technical Report, June 2011, China is the third highest spender in

the development of nuclear weapons which cost around 7.6 billion dollars. “China

possessed the highest number of nuclear stockpiles in Asia with around 260 nuclear

warheads. The Tibetan region being vast and scarcely populated thus served as an

ideal place for nuclear testing.”60

Despite the installation of nuclear weapons in Tibet, China has been

clandestinely building conventional and strategic missiles in Tibet. According to an

Indian defence analyst Vijai K. Nair, “China has been upgrading its nuclear and

ballistic missiles to target India. Not only has the number of CSS-2 missiles with a

3,100 Km strike range employed by the 53rd Army at Jianshui remained unchanged

but the reported deployment of Dong Feng-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic

missiles along India’s border further underscores the reality of the Chinese threat”61.

Installing nuclear weapons and building strategic missiles in the Tibet plateau

strategically advantages to China for expanding its strategic influence in South Asia

and Southeast Asia as Tibet is the roof of the world. China could easily set the target
58
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/596_ (nuclear test).
59
Tenzin Tsultrim, “Militarization of the Tibet Plateau and its Significance”, Tibet Policy Journal – 5,
Dharamshala, 2017.
60
ibid
61
Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (ed), “China’s Military Challenge “, Strategic Asia-2012-2013,
The National Bureau of Asian research, Seattle and Washington, D.C, 2013. P.281.

73
to other countries from the roof of the world. Therefore, India must be seriously

consider the Chinese nuclear deployment in the Tibet plateau as a geostrategic

tension.

Infrastructure Development in Tibet

China has been transforming the Tibetan economy under the banner of the

western development campaign. “China is transforming the economy of Tibet through

urbanization, infrastructure development, industrialization and extension of rail, roads

and airport”62. China has invested billions of dollars in Tibet for promoting the

Tibetan economy. These investments have been spent largely on the infrastructure

development which sparsely benefits the local Tibetans. “These massive investments

in infrastructure build-up have increased the urbanization growth rate, meeting official

targets and also artificially catapulted Tibet’s GDP, which grew at an average of 12-

percent in 2015.”63

Most of the Tibetan populations in Tibet are living in villages which are very

remote. The connectivity of the road networks is inaccessible to most of the villages.

Therefore, China’s infrastructure development in Tibet is mainly serving China’s

security strategy. “This affords China to have an upper hand in case of a military

emergency as it can reinforce its units there quickly. The Middle Kingdom is

constructing an extensive network of roads, railways, airfields, pipelines and bases

which may point to offensive military operations. China, according to some reports,

62
“Reappraisal of India’s Tibet Policy”, Foundation for Non-violent Alternatives – an institute for
developing peace studies, New Delhi, October 2013, p.21.
63
http://tibetpolicy.net/comments-briefs/chinas-transport-infrastructural-build-up-in-tibet-impacts-
implications.

74
has deployed intercontinental missiles in northern Tibet which could hit targets in

northern India.”64

The steady infrastructure development in Tibet eventually implies a

geopolitical ramification to India. “Though the US report holds that thwarting any

American intervention in Taiwan remains PLA's "main strategic direction", New

Delhi can ill-afford to ignore China's increasing trans-border military capabilities, its

assiduous strategic encircling of India and hardening posture in the border talks. All

this might not startle the Indian defence establishment, which also keeps a close tab

on PLA, but the fact remains that China can now move over 30 divisions (each with

over 15,000 soldiers) to the LAC within a month to outnumber Indian forces by at

least three-is-to-one due to the huge military infrastructure build-up in Tibet.”65

Road Network

China has been connecting the mainland China and Tibet by building roads

since its invasion of Tibet in 1950. As soon as the PLA entered Tibet, they started

building roads in Tibet. The first two roads are Sichuan – Tibet and Qinghai- Tibet

highways. The construction of these two roads was started in 1951. “The work began

immediately after the arrival of 18th Army in Lhasa in September 1951. Priority was

given to motorable roads: the Sichuan-Tibet and the Qinghai-Tibet Highways.”66

These two highways strengthened the PLA’s capacity in Tibet.

At the same time, the Xinjiang-Tibet highway project was also started.

“Surveying for the Tibet-Xinjiang Highway cutting across Western Tibet (and the

Indian Territory in Ladakh) started at the end of 1951; construction began in

64
Martin McCauley, “Why Is China Engaged in a Military Build-Up in the Himalayas?”, Stirring
Trouble Internationally, September 17, 2009.
65
Rajat Pandit,“Pentagon Warns India of Chinese Build-up”, TNN, August 26, 2011.
66
http://claudearpi.blogspot.com/search?q=road+network+or+infrastructure+development+in+tibet

75
1953/54.”67 These highways in Tibet eventually served the PLA to supply the

logistics and deployed the soldiers during China’s India war in 1962. “According to

official reports, by the end of 2014, the total length of roads open to traffic in TAR

reached 75,000 km out of which 8,891 km have sub-high-grade surfaces or better,

accounting for 12.6 per cent of the total. 65 of all 74 counties in the TAR (88%) had

access to asphalt roads.”68

The Western highway or the Xinjiang – Tibet Highway starts at Amdo and

passes through Silling – Aksai Chin and connects Tibet with Xinjiang Province’s road

network at Mazar. Sichuan – Tibet Highway runs between Chengdu and Lhasa. It is

probably the most dangerous highway in the world. The road is very vulnerable to the

Indian air force and also from the Tibetan resistance force. The Yunnan- Tibet

Highway connects Yunnan Province to Tibet. It skirts Arunachal Pradesh form the

East and will be used if China decides to attack Lohit or Subansari districts of

Arunachal Pradesh. The Sino-Nepal highway is the only international highway in

Tibet. It connects Lhasa to Kathmandu. These highways would be useful to the

Chinese military mobilization in the South Asian region.

Railway Network

The railway network is one of the largest modes of transportation. The

construction of railway lines on the Tibetan plateau is a very difficult task. But China

has built the world’s highest railway lines in Tibet. The first idea of railway

construction in Tibet was formulated by the Chinese Nationalists in 1912. The idea

67
ibid
68
http://tibetpolicy.net/comments-briefs/chinas-transport-infrastructural-build-up-in-tibet-impacts-
implications/

76
was executed by the Communist Party of China in the 1950s. China’s first railway

project in Tibet was implemented during the Second Five-Year Plan in 1958.

In May 1958, China started the construction of railway line from Lanzhou to

Siling. The construction was completed in 1959. The railway line was operated after

two years of the completion. It was the first time in the history of Tibet that the

Tibetan plateau was connected to China through a railway line. “The work to extend

the railway line from Siling to the strategic town of Gormo was also launched in 1958

to coincide with the establishment of the Northwest Nuclear Weapon Research and

Design Academy at Xihai City, the capital of Tsojang Tibetan Autonomous

Prefecture.”69

In 1994, China started working on the Gormo-Lhasa Railway. During the Nine

and Tenth China’s Five-Year Plan meeting, China has decided to implement the Tibet

railway project. “Number One Survey and Design Institute of China’s Ministry of

Railways was instructed to prepare blueprints for a Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa Route and a

Lanzhou-Nagchu-Lhasa Route, and Number Two Survey and Design Institute for a

Chengdu-Nagchu-Lhasa Route and a Dali-Nyintri-Lhasa Route. In September 2000,

the two institutes submitted their blueprints to the Chinese Communist Party’s Central

Committee and the State Council”70. The Gormo-Lhasa Railway has been operated

since 2006. It has also extended to Shigatse, the second largest city in TAR. And it

further extending toward Sino-Indian borders. “There are also plans to extend the

Shigatse line to the Nepal border and further Chumbi Valley. China further plans to

69
China's Railway Project: Where will it take Tibet, Environment and Development Desk, Department
of Information and International Relations, Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamshala, 2001, p. 5.
70
Ibid.

77
extend the Golmud-Lhasa Railway to Yadong and Nyingchi. This line lies close to the

Indian border, near Sikkim and Arunachal”71.

The railway lines in Tibet eventually opt for dual purpose. It serves the

convenience of public transportation during peacetime and military during the war

time. “According to unnamed sources in the People’s Liberation Army has stated that

the railway would become ‘a main option’ for transporting soldiers. PLA Air Force

recently used this rail link to transport combat material including ballistic missiles to

Tibet to test if they can withstand the change of pressure.”72

Airport in Tibet

The Gonggar International Airport is the largest airport in Tibet, which was

constructed in 1965. After successful operating Gonggar Airport, China has

successively built another four major airports in Tibet which are Chamdo Bamda

Airport, Nyingchi Mainling Airport, Shigatse Peace Airport and Ngari Gunsa. These

five airports are actively operating in Tibet throughout the year. “There are nearly 15

airports on the Tibetan plateau.”73 These 15 airports include five in the Tibet

Autonomous Region, four in Sichuan province of Tibetan plateau, four in Qinghai

province and two in Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Gansu Province and Tibetan

Autonomous Prefecture of Yunnan Province.“The 14 major airbases it has constructed

on the Tibetan Plateau, along with innumerable satellite airstrips, provide the PLA air

71
Reappraisal of India’s Tibet Policy, Foundation For Non-Violent Alternatives – An Institute for
developing peace studies, New Delhi, 2013, p.22.
72
Ibid.
73
http://tibetpolicy.net/comments-briefs/chinas-transport-infrastructural-build-up-in-tibet-impacts-
implications/.

78
force the potential to dominate the airspace over Tibet and give it a capability, for the

first time, to execute combat operations over Indian Himalayas.”74

“The PLA/Civil integration of the airports in Tibet greatly helps Beijing to

'strengthen the infrastructure' and consolidate its presence on the Plateau, i.e. 'to

stabilize Tibet' and be ready in case of a conflict with India.”75 From 2019 onwards,

there will be three new airports in the western part of Tibet. These three new airports

are located near the Indian border. Those airports which are in the Tibet Autonomous

Region are strategically significant to India.

Tibet: The Source of Asian Rivers

The Tibetan plateau has been recognized as a third pole of the world recently.

The Chinese geologists by themselves referred to Tibet as a third pole. The Tibetan

plateau has deposited the world largest glaciers, next to the south and north poles. It is

also called the water tower of Asia because the Tibetan Plateau is the source of major

rivers in Asia. Moreover, the Tibetan Plateau serves as an ecological bridge between

East Asia and South Asia. For these reasons, Tibet is of environmental importance to

the South, the Southeast and the East Asian countries.

74
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/the-challenge-posed-by-chinas-military-posture-in-
tibet/
75
http://claudearpi.blogspot.com/search?q=airport+in+tibet.

79
 Map of Major Tibet Rivers

Source: Google.com

Tibet had a prolonged history of environmental conservation. The

methodology of the environmental conservation system was deeply rooted in the Bon

tradition. The Bon was the indigenous Tibetan religion. The concept of sacred

mountains, rivers, lakes and sky were practiced in the Bon tradition. For these basic

reasons, the local Tibetans prayed for the mountains, lakes and rivers as being sacred

vicinity. These belief systems eventually avoided mining activities and ecological

destruction.

Buddhism has also contributed to preserving and sustain the Tibetan

ecological system. Since the Chinese invasion of Tibet, there has been a massive

environmental destruction in Tibet which has had an adverse effect on Asian

countries, especially China and India. His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama advocates that

80
“The impact of climate change in Tibet is harsh. As the world focuses on climate

action at United Nations’ COP21 meetings, Tibet should be central to any progress

made. The Tibetan plateau needs protecting, not just for Tibetans, but for the

environmental health and sustainability of the entire world. As stewards of their own

land, Tibetans’ expertise should be part of tackling climate change.”76

Tibet is also known as the Land of Snow, which is referred to as a bloodline of

Asia. Tibet is situated at the heart of Asia, “with an average elevation of 4500 metres

above the mean sea level, Tibet stretches for almost 3,000 kilometres from West to

East and 1,500 kilometres from South to North. The plateau is ringed by fourteen high

mountain ranges – from the southern end, the mighty Himalaya, Khawakarpo and

Minyak Gankar mountain range. The glacier-fed rivers originating from these

mountains make up the largest river run-off from any single location in the world.”77

The Tibetan plateau contains more than 46,000 glaciers covering an area of 105,000

sq. km, the most glaciated region on earth. It is guarded to the south by the mighty

Himalayas, to the north by Kunlun, to its west by the Hindu Kush and Pamir ranges.78

The Tibetan Plateau is surrounded by the snow-capped mountains. These

snow mountains stores glaciers throughout the year. Among the fourteen major snow-

capped mountains in Tibet, the Hindu Kush Himalaya is considered as the largest

depository of ice mass. The Tibetan plateau is the source of many Asian rivers.

These major rivers are Yellow River, Yangtze, Mekong, Salween, Brahmaputra,

Karnali, Sutlej, and Indus, Arun and Manas, which flows in India, Inner Mongolia,

76
Blue Gold from the Highest Plateau: Tibet’s water and global climate change, International
Campaign for Tibet, Washington, and p.7.
77
Tenzin Norbu, “The (degrading) third pole”, Seminar 644, April 2013, p.31.
78
The Impacts of Climate Change on the Tibetan Plateau: A Synthesis of Recent Science and Tibetan
Research, Environment and Development Desk Department of Information and International Relations,
2009, p.2.

81
Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia

and Vietnam. “As a result, approximately 1.3 billion people directly depend on the

health of these major rivers. The total river basin area is estimated at above six million

square kilometres.”79

China’s domination of the roof of the world has strategic significance. Tim

Marshall, an author of “Prisoners of Geography”, rightly highlighted that “This is the

geopolitics of fear. If China did not control Tibet, it would always be possible that

India might attempt to do so. This would give India the commanding heights of the

Tibetan plateau and a base from which to push into the Chinese heartland, as well as

control of the Tibetan sources of three of China’s Tower’. China, a country with

approximately the same volume of water usage as the USA, but with a population five

times as large, will clearly not allow that.”80

China uses the Tibetan water as a strategic commodity to wage an energy war

with its neighboring countries. Therefore, this is the sole reason why China has not

signed any bilateral treaties regarding the sharing of water resources with any of its

neighbouring countries. China has not signed “1997 UN Convention on the Law of

the Non-Navigational Uses of International Waterways”. It clearly anticipated that

China wants to dominate the Water Tower of Asia as being an upper riparian state.

This act of monopoly over the Tibetan water triggers water security threat to the

South and Southeast Asian countries.

The damming over rivers is mainly purposing to produce the hydropower

development. But building dams over international rivers causes a heavy price to the

lower riparian states. China’s overbuilding dams on the Tibetan rivers anticipates the

79
Tenzin Norbu, “The (degrading) third pole”, Seminar 644, April 2013, p.31.
80
Tim Marshall, “Prisoners Geography”, Elliott and Thompson Limited, London, 2016, p.43.

82
water crisis in its neighbouring countries. “In 1949, China had only 22 large dams but

over the last six decades, it has constructed more than 80,000 dams. The country

which has the largest number of dams in the world with two -thirds of it located in the

Tibetan plateau, is still in the process of developing more dams to satiate its industrial

sector’s growing power demand. As of now, China has more than 87,000 dams and in

the last decade the country has installed more hydropower capacity than the rest of the

world combined.”81 China wants to build more dams in the Tibetan Plateau despite

the objection from the lower riparian states.

Brahma Chellaney, one of the leading Indian geopolitical experts has

explicitly highlighted the geostrategic significance of Tibet’s rivers. He states that

“China is engaged in the greatest water grab in history. Not only is it damming the

rivers on the plateau, but it is also financing and building mega-dams in Pakistan,

Laos, Burma and elsewhere and making agreements to take the power. Water is the

new divide and is going centre stage in politics. Only China has the capacity to build

these mega-dams and the power to crush resistance. This is effectively war without a

shot being fired.”82

Moreover, the process of diverting the Brahmaputra River from South to

North China and building the Mekong dam signifies the geostrategic importance of

the Tibetan Plateau. China started the construction for damming and diversion of the

Brahmaputra in Tibet since 2011. China has also built a barrage on the Sutlej River.

“China is in process of diverting the waters of the Brahmaputra to north China and

dam the Mekong in the upper reaches, which has huge consequences for over a billion

people inhabiting the Indus plain, Indo-Gangetic plain, Brahmaputra valley and the

81
http://tibetpolicy.net/comments-briefs/chinas-damming-of-the-river-a-policy-in-disguise.
82
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/aug/10/china-india-water-grab-dams-
himalayas-danger.

83
member nations of the Mekong River Commission.”83 The Chinese unilateral control

and regulation over the flows of the Tibetan rivers perturb the South and Southeast

Asian countries, especially during the monsoons.

The rapid infrastructure development and the intensive construction of dams in

the Tibetan plateau have heavily disturbed the Tibet’s environment. These

infrastructure developments and the process of urbanization in Tibet are causes of

climate change in the Tibetan Plateau. The large reservoir of the glaciers is melting.

The melting of glaciers has intensified hence posing an ecological catastrophe in Asia.

According to a major 2007 report, issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change, “Glacier melt in the Himalayas is projected to increase flooding, rock

avalanches from destabilized slopes, and affect water resources within the next two to

three decades. This will follow by decreased river flows as the glaciers recede.

Freshwater availability in Central, South Asia and Southeast Asia particularly in large

river basins is projected to decrease due to climate change which, along with

population growth and increasing demand arising from higher standards of living,

could adversely affect more than a billion people by the 2050s”.84

The melting glacier is a critical environmental crisis in the Tibetan Plateau.

The degrading permafrost and large scale deforestation have resulted in the

desertification of the Tibetan Plateau. According to Jane Qiu (2008), “82 per cent of

the Tibetan Glaciers in the Himalayas have already retreated in the past half-century.

In the past 40 years, Tibet’s glaciers have shrunk by 6,600 sq. km (as of 2006). It is

estimated that they are currently melting at a rate of 7 per cent per year.

83
Reappraisal of India’s Tibet Policy, foundation For Non-Violent Alternatives – An Institute for
developing peace studies, New Delhi, 2013, p.24.
84
IPCC 2007: 10

84
 A separate study by a NASA scientist (2010) revealed that 20 per cent of these

glaciers have retreated in the past 40 years and if the current trend continues, more

than 60 per cent of the existing glaciers could be gone in the next 40 years.”85 As

discussed above, the Tibetan Plateau is an ecological bridge between East Asia and

South Asia. But China uses Tibet’s water as a strategic asset to the lower riparian

states. It creates the water security crisis in South and Southeast Asia. Hence, the

geopolitical importance of Tibet as a ‘Third Pole’ signifies a Tibet factor in Sino-

Indian geostrategic Relations.

Conclusion

Tibet was one of the greatest Asian countries during the 7th to 9th centuries.

During these centuries, the Tibetan empires conquered China, Northern India, Nepal

and the several Central Asia’s nations and established marriage diplomacy with most

of its neighbouring kingdoms. Tibet had established cultural diplomacy with India.

Buddhism was adopted as a state religion and introduced the monastic learning

centres across Tibet. At the time, Tibet was glorified in terms of the hard and soft

powers.

After the Tibetan empire disintegrated in 842 A.D, the great Kingdom of Tibet

was fragmented into many princely states. By the help of Mongol chieftains, Tibet

was consolidated again. But the ruler of Tibet was a Lama. Under the rule of the

Sakya Lama, Cheoygal Phagpa, Tibet consisted of the three provinces. Since then, the

external affairs of Tibet’s relations with its neighbouring countries were dominated by

the Patron-Priest Diplomatic Relations. Since then, Tibet became a pacifist nation.

But the west had projected Tibet as a forbidden country.

85
http://tibet.net/2012/01/tibet-the-third-pole-importance-of-environmental-stewardship-2012/.

85
 The advent of the industrial revolution in Europe led the major powers to

chase for setting new markets. For that, they began to play great game power politics

for expanding their sphere of influences. British and Russia played the great game in

Central Asia in the 19th century. At the beginning of the 20th century, Tibet was

trapped in the great game. British India invaded Tibet in 1903 under the pretext of

being wary of Russian influence in Tibet. Instead of alarming Tibetans, the Chinese

strategists saw Tibet as a backyard of China. Since then, China has tried to occupy

Tibet. But, the British created Tibet as a buffer zone to protect the British India

Empire.

According to these geopolitical circumstances, the geopolitical importance of

Tibet was signified in the China- British India Relations. When India attained its

independence in 1947, the Republic of India inherited British India’s Tibet policy

toward China. Two years after the Indian independence, the Communist Party of

China came to the power and formed the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

Subsequently, China invaded Tibet in 1950. The Chinese invasion of Tibet

vanquished Tibet as a buffer state between India and China. China and India faced

their first ever military standoff in the Himalayan regions. Thus, Indo-Tibet border

was altered into the Sino-Indian border.

In 1959, the Tibetan spiritual and temporal leader, His Holiness the 14th Dalai

Lama and thousands of his entourage fled to India and established the Tibetan

government-in-exile in India in 1960. At the same time, China and India exchanged

several words of war over the cartography of the Himalayan border regions. In 1962,

India and China fought a short war. India lost China’s India war and faced heavy

causalities. Aftermath of China’s India war, India has revised its foreign policy

86
pragmatically. Since then, Sino-Indian border disputes lies as the centrality to the

India-China Relations.

Even though India has sealed Tibet issue in 1954, the geopolitical importance

of Tibet remains significant in the Sino-Indian geostrategic relations. Tibet is not a

barrier between India and China. It serves as a bridge between India and China. The

Sino-Indian border dispute is one of the core issues of these aspects. China’s steady

militarization of the Tibetan Plateau implies strategic ramifications to India.

Moreover, a rapid growth of infrastructure development in Tibet and connecting

railway lines, transportations and building airports proximity to the Indian borders are

considered as China’s strategic security. The process of diverting the Brahmaputra

River from South to North China, the excess construction of dams over the Tibetan

rives and controlling Tibet’s water as a strategic asset to the lower riparian states are

serious geostrategic implications to India.

87