Philconsa vs. Gimenez, GR. No. 23326

10/10/21, 9:47 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 015
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 29, 1965 479

Philippine Constitution Assn., Inc. vs. Gimenez
No. L-23326. December 18, 1965.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.,

JOSE E. RoMERO, SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO
B. GUEVARA, PlO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ,
JOSE M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO
M. SERRANO, and ROMAN OZAETA, petitioners, vs.
PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO
SALITA and JOSE AVILES, respondents.
Constitutional law; Statute involving expenditure of public

funds; Personality of taxpayers to attack its constitutionality.—In
the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the
requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the
general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may,
therefore. question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761.)
Same; Republic Act 3836: Increase in emoluments of members
of Congress.—Republic Act No. 3836 provides for the retirement
benefits for members of Congress which, in effect, are increases in
the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of the Act,
which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately available thereunder without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition, in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Law violates equal protection clause of the
constitution.—The features of Republic Act 3836 are
discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 1.) In the first place,
while the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives who art- elective
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017c6a7b18113ac044c7000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/36
480
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
officials, it does not include other elective officials such as the

governors of provinces and the members of the provincial boards,
and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are
given retirement benefits after serving twelve years, not
necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and
employees are given retirement benefits after serving for at least
twenty years. In the third place, all government officers and
employees are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of
their length of service in the government, whereas, under
Republic Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24
years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to
six years' salary. Also, while the payment of retirement benefits
(annuity) to an employee who had been retired and reappointed is
suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth -
Act 186, as amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836.
Lastly, Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials
who are not members of the Government Service Insurance
System. Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various
retirement laws have to be members or must at least contribute a
portion of their monthly salaries to the System.
Same; Same; Title of law not germane to the subject matter.—
Under Republic Act No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of
section 12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended
by Republic Acts Nos, 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits are
granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System
who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of
age. This provision is related and germane to the subject of
Commonwealth Act 186. On the other hand. the succeeding
paragraph of Republic Act No. 3836 refers to members of
Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of
the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement
benefits, therefore, for these officials would relate to subject
matter, not germane to Commonwealth Act No. No. 186,
Same; Same; Same; Duty of court to declare void the statute.—
The re quirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in
its title is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to
Congress; it is mandatory. It is the duty of the courts to declare
void any statute not conforming to the constitutional provision.

(See Walker vs. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th Ed., Volume I, pp. 162164.)
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition

with preliminary injunction.
481
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 481

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M.
Aruego, Sotero H. Laurel and Felixberto M. Serrano for
themselves and for other petitioners,
Solicitor General for respondents.
REGALA, J.:
We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and

fundamental problem of the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials
of both houses (of Congress)." The suit was instituted by
the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for
short), a non-profit civic organization, duly incorporated
under Philippine laws, by way of a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor General
of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of both
Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers,
and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants
for the payment to any former Senator or former Member
of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation
gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise
restraining the respondent disbursing officers of the House
and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office from
paying the said retirement and vacation gratuities."
It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at
least to the end that it provided for the retirement of the
members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did,
is unconstitutional and void. The challenge to the
constitutionality of the law is centered on the following
propositions:
1. The provision for the retirement of the members and
certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of
the bill, in violation of section 21(1) of Article VI of the

Constitution.
482

2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to

circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of
the members of Congress during their term of office,
contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution.
3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class
legislation" because it allows members and officers of
Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and
gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for
every four years of service, which is not refundable in case
of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other
officers and employees of the government can retire only
after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a
gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for
every year of service, which, in any case. cannot exceed 24
months.
4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable
at the highest rate received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the
legislators to further increase their compensation in
violation of the Constitution.
The text of Republic Act No. 3836
The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:
"AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION(c), SECTION TWELVE OF

COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative? of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
"SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth
Act Numbered One Hundred eighty-six, as amended by Republic
Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is further amended to
read as follows:
(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of
age, who has rendered at least twenty years of service. The
benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal
contributions plus interest and the payment of the corresponding
employer's premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five

hereof, without interest, be only a gratuity equivalent to
483
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 483

one month's salary for every year of service, based on the highest
rate received, but not to exceed twenty-four months: Provided,
That the retiring officer or employee has been in the service of the
said employer or office for at least four years immediately
preceding his retirement.
'Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the
House of Representatives and to an elective officer of either House
of the Congress, regardless of age, provided that in the case of a
Senator or Member, he must have served at least twelve years as
a Senator and/or as a member of the House of Representatives,
and, in the case of an elective officer of either House, he must
have served the government {"or at least twelve years, not less
than four years of which must have been rendered as such
elective officer: Provided, That the gratuity payable to a retiring
senator. member of the House of Representatives, or elective
officer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for
every four years of service in the government and the same shall
be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be neither liable to
attachment or execution nor refundable in case of reinstatement
or reelection of the retiree.
'This gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned
which is hereby authorized to provide the necessary appropriation
or pay the same from any unexpended items of appropriations or
savings in its appropriations,
'EIective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity
under this subsection shall be entitled to the commutation of the
unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate
received, which they way have to their credit at the time of
retirement.'
"SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved, June 22, 1963."
The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the

respondent, filed its answer on September 8, 1964, and
contends, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that:
1. The grant of retirement or pension benefits under
Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the
petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation"
within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the

Philippine Constitution.
2. The title of the law in question sufficiently complies
484

Philippine Constitution Assn,, Inc, vs, Gimenez
with the provisions of Section 21, Article VI, of the

Constitution that "no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill."
3. The law in question does not constitute class
legislation,
4. Certain indispensable parties, specifically the elected
officers of Congress who are authorized to approve
vouchers for payments for funds under the law in question,
and the claimants to the vouchers to be presented for
payment under said items, were not included in the
petition,
5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit.
6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave
benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature of a
basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member"
and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their
salary.
A brief historical background of Republic Act No.

3836
Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No, 6051,
which was introduced by Congressmen Marcial R. Pimentel
of Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third
District of Leyte, on May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was
referred to the Committee on Civil Service. which on the
following May 8, submitted its REPORT No. 8129,
recommending approval of the bill with amendments,
among others, that the word "TWENTY" in the bill as filed
—representing the number of years that a senator or
member must serve in Congress to entitle him to
retirement under the bill—must be reduced to "TWELVE"
years, and ,that the following words were inserted, namely,
"AND THE SAME (referring to gratuity) SHALL BE
EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALL
NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT OR
EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF

REINSTATEMENT OR REFLECTION OF
485
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 485

THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the

proposed amendments was approved on second reading. It
was passed on third reading on May 13, 1963, and on the
same day was sent to the Senate, which, in turn, on May
23, 1963, passed it without amendment The bill was finally
approved on June 22, 1963. As explained in the
EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others
—
"The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section

12 of C.A. 180, as amended, will enable them to retire voluntarily,
regardless of age, after serving a minimum of twenty years as a
Member of Congress. This gratuity will insure the security of the
family of the retiring member of Congress with the latter
engaging in other activities which may detract from his exalted
position and usefulness as lawmaker. It is expected that with this
assurance of security for his loved ones, deserving and well-
intentioned but poor men will be attracted to serve their people in
Congress."
As finally approved, the law (Subsection [c], paragraph 2,

Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows a Senator or a Member of the
House of Representatives and an elective officer of either
House of Congress to retire regardless of age, To be eligible
for retirement, he must have served for at least twelve
years as such Senator and/or as member of the House of
Representatives. For an elective officer of either House, he
must have served the government for at least twelve years,
of which not less than four years must have been rendered
as such elective officer. The gratuity payable by the
employer or office concerned is equivalent to one year's
salary for every four years of service in the government.
Said gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to
attachment or execution, and not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree
First legal point—personality of the Petitioner to

bring suit.
The first point to be considered is whether petitioner

Philconsa has a standing to institute this action. This
Court has not hesitated to examine past decisions involving
this matter. This Court has repeatedly held that when the
486

petitioner, like in this case, is composed of substantial

taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests,
they are allowed to bring this suit. (Pascual v. Secretary,
G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales v.
Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802 [1963]).
The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-profit, civic
organization composed of several leaders from all walks of
life whose main objective is- to uphold the principles of the
Constitution.
In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual
v. Secretary, supra, this Court stated, among other things,
that "there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of
the taxpayers, laws providing: the disbursement of public
funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds
by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering-
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misappropriation of
such funds,1 which may be enjoined at the request of the
taxpayers." This legislation (Republic Act 3836) Involves
the disbursement of public funds, We are not, however,
unmindful of the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Massachusetts v. Mellon,
282 U.S. 447, holding that:
" x x x the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the

Federal Government is very different. His interest in the moneys
of the Treasury—partly realised from taxation and partly from
other.sources—is shared with millions of others; is comparatively
minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of
any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and
uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive
powers of equity."
The general view in the United States, which is followed

here, is stated in the American Jurisprudence, thus—
________________
1 Kubbs v. Thompson, 66 N.E. 2d 761; Reid v. Smith, 375 III. 147, 30

N.E. 2d 908; Fergus v. Russel, 270 111. 304, 110 N.E 130; Burke v.
Snively, 208 111. 328; Jones v. Connel, 266 III. 443, 107 N.E. 731; Dudick
v. Baumann, 349 III. 46 181 N.E 690.
487
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 487

"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give

the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute
the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys" (11 Am. Jur. 761; italics supplied.)
As far as the first point is concerned, We hold, therefore,

that the contention of the Solicitor General is untenable,
Second legal point—Whether or not Republic Act No.

3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in Art. VI,
section 14 of the Constitution.
The first constitutional question is whether Republic Act

3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution,
which reads as follows:
"The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives

shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual
compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each,
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and
exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives
and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators,
when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise
provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos" (italics supplied)
Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the

Constitution embodies some limitations and prohibitions
upon the members of Congress, to wit:
1. They may not hold any other office or employment

in the Government without forfeiting their
respective seats;
2. They shall not be appointed, during the time f or
which they are elected, to any civil office which may
have been created or the emoluments whereof shall
have been in
488

creased while they were members of Congress;

(Section 16, Article VI, Constitution)
3. They cannot be financially interested in any
franchise;
4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the
Government is an adverse party;
5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral
Tribunal; and
6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case
where an officer or employee of the Government is
accused. (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution)
In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law

(Republic Act 3019) also prohibits members of Congress to
'have any special interest in any specific business which
will directly or indirectly be favored by any law or
resolution authored by them during their term of office.
It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention
wisely surrounded the Constitution with these limitations
and prohibitions upon Members of Congress, This is a
practical demonstration or application of the principle of
checks and balances which is one of the peculiar
characteristics of our Constitution. In the light of this
background, can We conclude that Congress can validly
enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to
its members, without violating the provisions in the
aforementioned Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution,
regarding increase of the compensation act including other
emoluments?
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the
members of the National Assembly (unicameral body) was
fixed at P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to
P7,200 per annum by the enactment of the 1940
Constitutional amendment, when the unicameral body, the

National Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of
two bodies, the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act 4143, the
salary for the Members of Congress was raised to
P32,000.00
489
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 489

vs. Gimenez
per annum for each of them; and for the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to
P40,000.00 per annum each.
Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the
Constitutional Convention first determined the
compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount
fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum, but it embodies a
special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the full term of all the members of the National Assembly
elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other
words, under the original constitutional provision
regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase
the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of the members of
the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution,
Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco, Philippine Government and
Political Law, 4th ed,, p. 187)
This goes to show how zealous were the members of the
Constitutional Convention in guarding against the
temptation for members of Congress to increase their
salaries. However, the original strict prohibition was
modified by the subsequent provision when the
Constitutional amendments were approved in 19402
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned
Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation
"other emoluments." This is the pivotal point on this
undamental question as to whether the retirement benefits
as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the
purview of the term "other emoluments."
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded
"emolument" as "the profit arising from office or
employment; that which is received as compensation for
services or which is annexed to the possession of an office,
Aruego, Know Your Constitution, p. 58.
490

3
as salary, fees and prequisites."
In another set of cases, "emolument" has been defined as
"the profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as compensation for services, or which is annexed
to the possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites;
advantage, gain, public or private." The gain, profit or
advantage which is contemplated in the definition or
significance of the word "emolument" as applied to public
officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain, profit, or
advantage which is pecuniary in character. (citing
Taxpayers' League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P.
2d. 897, 901; 49 Wy. 28; 106 A.L.R. 767)
In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright v.
Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391, affirmed 234 N.Y.
548, 138 N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions
and retirement allowances are part of compensation of
public officials; otherwise their payment would he
unconstitutional.
In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N.W. 795, 125
Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used in Article 4, section 9,
of the Constitution of Minnesota, providing that 110
Senator or Representative shall hold any office, the
emoluments of which have been increased during the
session of the Legislature of which he was a member, until
after the expiration of his, term of office in the Legislature,
the word "emoluments" does not refer to the fixed salary
alone, but includes fees and compensation as the
incumbent of the office is by law entitled to receive because
he holds such office and performed some service required of
the occupant thereof."
From the decisions of these cases, it is evident that
retirement benefit is a form or another species of
emolument, because it is a part of compensation for
services of one possessing any office.
_______________
3 Reals v. Smith, 56 P. 690, 8 Wy. 159; Apple v. Crawford Country, 105

Pa. 300, 51 Am. Rep. 205; 14 Skly. Notes Cas. 322, 41 Leg. Int. 322;
Vansant v. State, 53 A. 711, 714, 6 Md 110; Town of Bruce v. Dickey, 6
N.E. 435.
491
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 491

Philippine Constitution Assn., Inc, vs. Gimenez
Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the

emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said
Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in
Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Third Legal Point—Whether or not the law in

question violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein

is that the features of said Republic Act 3836 are patently
discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, part, 1.)
In the first place, while the said law grants retirement
benefits to Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives who are elective officials, it does not
include other elective officials such as the governors of
provinces and the members of the provincial boards, and
the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered
cities.
The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our
Constitution has been fully explained by Us in the case of
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that the
classification to be reasonable must be based upon
substantial distinctions which make real differences and
must be germane to the purposes of the law.
As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the
United States (second edition), p. 1937, the principle of the
requirement of equal .protection of law applies to all
persons similarly situated. Why limit the application of the
benefits of Republic Act 3836 to the elected members of
Congress? We feel that the classification here is not
reasonable. (See also Sinco, Philippine Political Law 11th
ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law
492

[1938-62], p. 789; The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal.

Law Rev. 341.)
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act
3836 are given retirement benefits after serving twelve
years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most
government officers and employees are given retirement
benefits after serving for at least twenty years. In fact, the
original bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of
service.
In the third place, all government officers and employees
are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their
length of service in the government, whereas, under
Republic Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator
or Member of the House of Representatives upon being
elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement
benefits or equivalent to six years' salary.
Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity)
to an employee who had been retired and reappointed is
suspended during his new employment (under
Commonwealth Act 188, as amended), this is not so under
Republic Act 3836,
Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants
retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the
Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of
retirement benefits under the various retirement laws have
to be members or must at least 4contribute a portion of their
monthly salaries to the System.
The arguments advanced against the discriminatory
________________
4 In the case of Justices of the Supreme Court, Justices of the Court of

Appeals, Judges of courts of record—all contribute a certain amount to the
GSIS, although under a different plan of premiums from other members
(See R.A. 910, as amended by R.A Nos, 1057 and 2614). In the case of the
Armed Forces, officers and enlisted men are also members of the System,
but their retirement benefits are provided for under R.A. 340. However,
the Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the Commission
on Elections are entitled to retirement benefits, under R.A. 1568,
notwithstanding the fact that they are not members of the System,
provided they have at least 20 years of service.
493
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 493

features of Republic Act 3836, as far as Members of

Congress are concerned, apply with equal force to the
elected officers of each House, such as the Secretaries and
the Sergeants-at-arms, Under Republic Act 3836, the
Secretaries and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given
the benefits of retirement without having served for twenty
years as required with other officers and employees of the
Government.
Fourth Legal Point—Whether or not the title of

Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the sub-ject
matter expressed in the act.
Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the

title of Republic Act 3836 complies with the requirement of
paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,
which reads as follows:
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a

general disposition in all courts to construe the
constitutional provision with reference to the subject and
title of the Act, liberally,
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of
Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to
the public regarding the retirement gratuities and
commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to members
of Congress. It is claimed that petitioner learned of this law
for the first time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer
of the House, testified on January 30, 1964, before Justice
Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case, and
he revealed that in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement
law for its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the
fiscal year 1964-65, Republic Act No. 4164, provides:
"18. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the

Senate pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3836:
PROVIDED, That no portion of this Appropriation shall be
transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall have
been paid—P210,000.00."
494

Philippine Constitution Assn,, Inc. vs. Gimenez
In the appropriations for the House of Representatives the

following items appear:
"7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and

retirement of Members and employees of the House of
Representatives, as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616—
P1,300,000.00
"8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated
vacation and sick leaves as provided for under Republic Act No.
611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the
House of Representatives under Republic Act No. 1616—
P1,300,000.00."
In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No.

4642), the following item appears in the appropriations for
the Senate:
"13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel

pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1616: PROVIDED,
That no portion of this appropriation shall be transferred to any
other item until all approved claims shall have been paid—
P100,000.00."
It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-

1966, the item in the Senate for P210,000.00 to implement
Republic Act 3836 was eliminated.
In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966), the
following items appear:
"7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and

retirement of Members and employees of the House of
Representatives as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616—
P1,200,000.00.
"8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated
vacation and sick leaves as provided for under Republic Act No.
611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the
House of Representatives under Republic Act No. 1616—
P1,700,000.00.
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836,

amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c)
of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts
Nos. 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to
members of the Government Service Insurance System,
who have rendered at least twenty years of service re-
495
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 495

gardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to

the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of
Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to
elective officers thereof who are not members of the
Government Service Insurance System. To provide
retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would
relate to subject matter which is not germane to
Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of
the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of
Congress and elected officers, such as the Secretary and
Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any
manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186
establishing the Government Service Insurance System
and which provides for both retirement and insurance
benefits to its members.
Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the
requirement that the subject of an Act should be expressed
in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislation
that are being considered, in order that they may have the
opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or
otherwise, if they shall so desire (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 182; See also Martin,
Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965], p. 119)
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled
in two cases:
"The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes

as sufficient to reflect their contents is satisfied if all parts of a
law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not
necessary that the title be a complete index of the content."
(People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)
"The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably construed so as
not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary
legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than technical
construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with
496

Philippine Constitution Assn,, Inc. vs. Gimenez
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject."
(Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be

expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and explained in
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883, In this case, the
question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784,
known as the Public Land Act, was limited in its
application to lands of the public domain or whether its
provisions also extended to agricultural lands held in
private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited
to lands of the public domain as indicated in its title, and
did not include private agricultural lands. The Court
further stated that this provision of the Constitution
expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a
mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to Congress,
but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare
void any statute not conforming to this constitutional
provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama5
829; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164; See also Agcaoili
v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, Sec. 111.)
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act
3836, We conclude that the title of said Republic Act 3836
is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a
violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional
provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding increase
in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal
protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of
a bill shall not embrace more than one subject.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS.
Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby declared null and void, in
so far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress
_______________
5 18th Edition, Vol. I
497
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 497

Constitution Assn., Inc. vs. Gimenez
and the elected officials thereof, as being' unconstitutional.

The restraining order issued in our resolution on December
6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,

J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
Republic Act No. 3836 declared null and void in so far as

it refers to retirement of members of Congress and the
elected officials thereof.
ANNOTATION
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE OR ACTION
MUST BE RAISED BY PARTY (TAXPAYERS' SUIT)
Generally.—To entitle a private individual to invoke the

judicial power to determine the validity of executive or
legislative action he must show that he has sustained a
direct injury as a result of that action and it is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to
all members of the public. (Ex Parte Levitt, 802 U.S. 633;
See also Tileson vs. Ullman, 818 U.S. 448) .
The rule is that a person who questions the validity of a
statute or law must show that he has sustained, or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement (Custodio vs. President of the
Senate, G.R. No. L-117, Nov, 7, 1945; Manila Race Horse
Trainers' Association vs. De la Fuente, G.R. No. L-2947,
Jan. 11 1959). There must be a showing that petitioners'
interests are or about to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of the ordinance in question (Bautista vs.
Mun. of Mandaluyong, 52 O.G. 759), Unless a person is
injuriously aff ected in any of his constitutional rights by
the operation of a statute or ordinance (People vs. Vera, 65
Phil. 56), he has no standing. The invocation of petitioner
as motel operators of their alleged right to being free from
un-
498

reasonable search and seizure need not be taken seriously.

(Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association, Inc,
vs. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, Oct 23, 1967,
resolution to motion for reconsideration of decision in G.R.
No. L-24693, July 81, 1967).
In Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 43 Sup. Ct 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078 (1923), the United
States Supreme Court has determined that a taxpayer's

interest alone is too infinitisimal to justify a contest of the
validity of an Act of Congress. See also Williams vs. Riley,
280 U.S. 78, 50 S. Ct. 63, 74 L. Ed. 175 (1929).
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, recognizes that a
different rule prevails in many state courts with respect to
the contest of the validity of state laws. Taxpayers' actions
are allowed in a number of states to contest the validity of
a state statute. (Among others, Livermore vs. Waite, 102
Cal. 118, 25 L.R.A. 312, 86 P. 424; Crawford vs. Goldchrist,
64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 968; Lucas vs. American Hawaiian
Engineering Constr. Co., 16 Haw. 80; Littler vs. Jane, 124
111. 128, 16 N.E. 374; Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99
N.E. 1; Christmas vs. Warfield, 106 Md. 536; Sears vs.
Steel, 55 Or. 544, 107 P. 3; Mott vs. Pennsylvania R. Co., 30
Pa. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 664). Other states follow the ruling of
the United States Supreme Court (Schiefflin vs. Komfort,
212 N.Y. 520; 106 N.E. 675; Hurtchinson vs. Skimer, 21
Misc. 729, 49 N.Y. Supp. 36; Whiteface vs. Hooker, 73 Masc.
573, 133 N.Y.S. 534; State ex. rel Cranner vs. Thorson, 95
S.D. 149, 68 N.W. 202), in Asplund vs. Hannet, 31 N.M.
641, 249 P. 1074, 58 A.L.R. 573 (1926), the right of a
taxpayer is denied, although the court recognised the
increasing tendency to admit the right. The rule that the
taxpayer cannot, in his individual capacity as such, sue to
enjoy an unlawful expenditure or waste of state funds, is a
minority doctrine (52 Am. Jur. 5).
The prevailing view in the United States.—"In the
determination of the degree of interest essential to give the
requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a
499
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 499

Philippine Inc. vs. Gimenez
statute the general rule is that not only persons

individually affected, but also taxpayers, have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question the legality
or constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys." (11 Am. Jur. 761)
General Rule does not apply to U.S. Federal Laws.—The
U.S. Supreme Court in Commonwealth of Massachusetts
vs. Mellon and Forthingham vs. Mellon, 282 U.S. 447
(1923) held that the rule on taxpayers' suit does not apply
to federal statutes on the ground that the relationship of a
taxpayer of the United States to its Federal Government is
different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation

to Its government. Under the composite of government of
the United States, the of the "Union form part of the
integral part of the Federal Government in the
international sense, but each state enjoys internally a
substantial measure of sovereignty, subject to the
limitations of the Federal Constitution.
The Rule in the Philippines.—The relation between the
people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the one
hand, and the Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is
closer from a domestic viewpoint, to that between the
people and taxpayers of each state and the government
thereof except that the authority of the Republic of the
Philippines over the people of the Philippines is more f ully
direct than that of the states of the Union in so far as the
simple and unitary system of our national government is
not subject to limitations analogous to those Imposed by
the Federal Constitution upon the states of the Union, and
those imposed upon the Federal Government in the
interest of the states of the Union, Thus the rule
recognizing the right of taxpayers to question the
constitutionality of a statute appropriating local or state
public funds—upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court
(Crampton vs. Cabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) applies in the
Philippines (Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, et al., G.R. No. L-10405, December 29,
1960).
500

Philippine Constitution Assn., Inc. Gimenez
In the case involving the expropriation of a land by the

Province of Tayabas, taxpayers were allowed to intervene f
or the purpose of contesting the price being paid to the
owner thereof as being exorbitant If a taxpayer cannot
attack the validity of the executive order in question or a
law requiring the expenditure of public money, no one
under our laws could question the validity of such laws or
executive orders (Rodriguez contra El Tesorero de
Filipinas, L-3054, Agosto 26, 1949; Guerrero vs.
Commissioner of Customs, L-3055, Aug. 26, 1949; Barredo
vs. Commission on Elections, L-3056, Aug. 28, 1959, 45
O.G. 2411).
Like the petitioners in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases
the petitioner, the Governor of the Province of Rizal,
representing the most populated political subdivisions,
whose taxpayers a susbtancial portion of the burden of

taxation in the Philippines sufficiently justify the in action
(Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works
Communications, G.R. No. L-10405, Dee, 29, 1960).
The petitioner, as rice planter with a riceland of
susbtantial proportion and as taxpayer affected by the
purchase of the commodity effected with public funds
mainly raised by taxation, is entitled to a chance to sell to
the Government the rice it seeks to buy abroad and has
sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial
assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be
an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds (Gonzales vs.
Hechanova et al., G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1968; 60
O.G. 802).
Association or Group of Individuals as Parties in
interest.—When a petitioner like the case at bar, is
composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will
affect their vital interests, they are allowed to file suit The
petitioner, the Philippine Constitution Association, is a
nonprofit, civic organization composed of several leaders
from all walks of life whose main objective is to uphold the
principles of the Constitution. As taxpayers, petitioner may
bring an action to restrain officials from wasting
501
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 501

public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or

unconstitutional law (PHILCONSA vs. Mathay,L25554,
Oct. 4, 1986; See also PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, Dec. 18,
1965; Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257; Pascual vs. Secretary
of Public Works, L-10435, Dec. 29, 1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor
General, L-23825, Dec. 29, 1960; Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Assn, vs. Feliciano, L-24022, 3, 1965).
As to personality of a citizen to question the
constitutionality of a redistricting statute, see Macias vs.
Commission on Elections. G.R. No. L-18648, Sept, 14, 1961.
The People of the Philippines may challenge its own
laws.—The People of the Philippines by the Solicitor
General can be a proper party to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute (Government of the P.I. vs.
Springer, 50 Phil. 259). The people of the Philippines have
a substantial interest in contesting the constitutional
validity of a law- "Of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well settled

rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own
Iaws" (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 66). See also Morfe vs.
Malure, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968 on the right of
a public official to challenge the constitutional validity of a
statute.—JUDGE JORGE COQUIA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
See also Administrative Law: Commission on

Appointments; Commission on Elections; Citizenship; Civil
Service; Habeas Corpus; Double Jeopardy; Jurisdiction;
Municipal Corporation; Statutes: Public Officers, Quo
Warranto; Rice & Corn Importation Laws; and Slot
Machines.
See annotation on: Delegation of Police Power to Local
Governments, 8 SCRA 826.
1. Where inclusion of religious organization within the
coverage of Social Security Law is not unconstitutional.—
The inclusion of religious organizations within the coverage
of the Social Security Law does not violate the
constitutional prohibition against the application of public
funds for the use, benefit
502

or support of any priest employed by a religious

organization. The funds contributed to the Social Security
System are not public funds but funds belonging to the
members which are merely held in trust by the
Government. Even assuming that said funds are impressed
with a public character; nevertheless, their payment as
retirement, death or disability benefits would not violate
the said constitutional prohibition since such payment
would be made to the priest, not because he is a priest but
because he is an employee. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila vs. Social Security Commission, 1 SCRA 10.
2. Accused must be informed of the charge against him.—
Where the accused was charged with damage to a jeep
through reckless imprudence, he cannot be convicted of
damage to the merchandise of the jeep passenger through
reckless imprudence, A judgment punishing the accused for
an offense, of which he was not legally informed, denies
him due process of law. People vs. Despavellador, 1 SCRA

205.
3. Illegally seized evidence is admissible.—Illegally
obtained documents and papers are admissible us evidence,
if found to be competent and relevant to the case. Medina
vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 1 SCRA 303.
4. A government office like the Bureau of Printing is
immune from suits.—Any suit, action or proceeding against
the Bureau of Printing would actually be A suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself. The Government
cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its
objection. 1 SCRA 341,
5. Sale of land to an alien and then to a Filipino.—Where
land was sold to a Chinese, who later sold it to a Filipino,
the sale to the latter cannot be impugned. Herrera vs. Luy
Kim Guan, 1 SCRA 406.
6. Sale of land before the adoption of Constitution.—The
sale of land to a Chinese citizen before the adoption of the
Constitution cannot be assailed 021 account of his
citizenship. Id.
7. Where a judge of a Court of First Instance acted merely
(is a, delegate of the President.——The fact that the
President of the Philippines did not follow the
recommendation of a judge of First Instance, as to the
disposition of an administrative complaint against a justice
of the peace, who was investigated by the Judge, is not an
encroachment upon the power of the judiciary since the
said judge was acting as a delegate of the President, Abuda
vs. Auditor General, 1 SCRA 1316.
8. Ordinance No. 3941 affecting machine. is valid and
constitutional. Pinball machines in the different forms in
which they are operated are gambling devices in that the
winning therein depends mostly, it not wholly, upon chance
or hazard. Consequently, the municipal board of the City of
Manila acted rightly in enacting Ordinance No "941
providing therein that
503
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 503

no license for their installation or operation shall be

granted under any circumstances. Hence, said ordinance is
valid and constitutional it being a measure that comes
under the general welfare clause of the Charter of the City
of Manila. Miranda vs. City of Manila, 2 SCRA 618.
9. The test to determine whether the pinball machine is a

gambling device.—Whether the pinball machine is of a non-
flipper or one-ball type, or a flipper of five-ball type, the
same is deemed to be a gambling device for the reason that
the element of skilI involved is nil. Moreover, its operation
tends to encourage the gambling instinct of the player
which eventually leads to idleness, economic waste, dislike
for work, and criminality, especially among children of
school age, who are attracted by the lure and novelty of the
machine. And, as it has been aptly observed, the proper
test to determine if a. machine is a gambling device is
whether it encourages the gambling instinct (Dussault Co.,
etc. vs. Kilburn, 135 ALR 99). Id.
10. Slot machine is not per se a gambling device.—A slot
machine is not per se a gambling device, since it may be
used and played upon for innocent purposes, and courts
cannot, therefore, take judicial notice that every slot
machine is a gambling device because the use to which it is
put must determine its character. (Hearthly vs. State, 178
S.W. 2d 1, 178 Tenn. 345) Id.
11. Each department of the government is supreme
within the sphere of its legal duties.—Under the principle of
separation of powers, the executive, legislative and judicial
departments are coordinate, each supreme within the
legitimate sphere of its constitutional or legal duties. In the
same manner that the legislative has no authority to direct
the judiciary in the exercise of powers that are strictly
judicial, neither has the judiciary any power to command
the executive, or those holding executive powers, in the use
of functions that are purely executive. Fernandez-Subido
vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA 1054.
12. The executive functions in the City of Manila are
vested in the mayor.—In the City of Manila the executive
functions of government are vested in the mayor and the
method of their exercise is confided to his conscience,
judgment and discretion. The executive is the only judge,
under the responsibilities which the city charter imposes,
of the manner in which the executive powers shall be
employed, and he is answerable for his use or omission to
use, such powers only in the manner provided by the city
charter. (Note to Hawkins vs. Governor, 1 Arkansas 570,
33 Am. Dec, 346, 361). The Courts cannot interfere in the
exercise of his powers and functions, especially those of
purely executive character, as in the choice of his
appointees. Id.
13. Olongapo Justice of the Peace Court continues
exercising jurisdiction over offenses committed within the
U.S. Naval Base
504

in Subic Bay.—Inasmuch as the Justice of the Peace Court

of Olongapo even before its having been constituted as a
separate municipality, had been taking cognizance of all
offenses committed within the former U.S. Naval Base in
Subic Bay, and there having been no designation to the
contrary by the President of the Philippines pursuant to
Section 69, Republic Act 296, an amended, when the crime
was committed, the instant case is cognizable by the
Justice of the Peace Court of Olongapo which had exercised
jurisdiction over the place before the new town was formed.
Mallorca vs. Adolfo, 2 SCRA 1198.
14. Concurrence of the Senate is not required in executive
agreements.—While the concurrence of the Senate is
required by the Constitution in the making of "treaties"
(Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10 [7]),
"executive agreements" may be validly entered into without
such concurrence. Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern
Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 352.
15. Reorganization Plan No. 20-A insofar as it amends
Section 51 of the Workmen's Compensation Law is
unconstitutional. The powers given to the Workmen's
Compensation Commission by the Reorganization Act
cannot validly include the power to amend Section 51 of the
Workmen's Compensation Law for to do so would be
diminish the jurisdiction and the judicial power and
functions vested by law in the courts of record which
include the power to issue writ of execution which power
the Workmen's Compensation Commission never had
before the Reorganization Act was passed. La Mallorca-
Pambusco vs. Isip, 3 SCRA 242; Everlasting Pictures, Inc,
vs. Fuentes, 3 SCRA 539.
16. The procedure of enactment of laws by legislative
inaction is not countenanced.—Inasmuch as Congress
adjourned Its session without passing a resolution
disapproving or adopting Reorganization Plan No. 20-A,
the said plan did not become a law, for such a procedure of
enactment of laws by legislative enaction violates the
constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate
action by each House of Congress. Id.
17. Midnight or last minute appointment.—As a rule,
once an appointment is issued, it cannot be reconsidered
specially where the appointee has qualified. On the other
hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances

justifying revocation such as when mass ad interim
appointments (350) issued in the last hours of an outgoing
Chief Executive are to be considered by the Commission on
Appointments that is different from that existing at the
time of the appointment and the names are to be submitted
by an incoming Chief Executive who may not wholly
approve of the selections especially if it is doubtful that the
outgoing President exercised double care in extend ing such
appointments. Aytona vs. Castillo 4 SCRA 1.
505
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 505

18- Malacañang's practice is to submit ad interim

appointments only when the Commission an Appointments
is in session.—It is Malacañang's practice, which is logical,
to submit ad interim appointments only when the
Commission on Appointments is in session. One good
reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted
the appointment and qualif ied are submitted for
confirmation. Id.
19. An outgoing Chief Executive is duty bound to prepare
far the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming
President.—Id.
20. An ad interim appointment to be complete must be
submitted to the Commission on Appointments once the
same is constituted by law.—An ad interim appointment to
be complete must be submitted to the Commission on
Appointments once the is constituted. It cannot be
submitted to the Commission on Appointments of a
different Congress but only to the Commission on
Appointments of the Congress that has created it Id.
21. An appointment once complete, by the performance of
all acts required by law of the appointing power, is
irrevocable.—Id.
22. An appointment may be revoked by reason of errors
or fraud in the manner of appointments,—ld.
28. The Commission on Appointments is not a continuing
body but me that co-exists with the Congress that has
created it,—Id.
24. The continuity of the Commission on Appointments is
immaterial in determining whether an appointment may
still be revoked once issued.—The question of whether the
Commission on Appointments is or is not a continuing body
cannot affect the determination of whether the
appointment may still be revoked once issued. It is only

required by the Constitution that such Commission must
have an opportunity to approve or disapprove the
appointment, and its inaction, despite such opportunity,
must be understood as an expression of unwillingness to
approve it. Id.
25. Appointments made by the President have two
aspects, namely, the legal and the political.—Appointments
made by the President have two (2) aspects, namely, the
legal and the political. The first refers to his authority to
make the appoint ments. The second deals with the wisdom
in the exercise of such authority, as well as with its
propriety, whether a given vacancy or number of vacancies
should be filled, or who among the several qualified
persons shall be chosen, or whether a given appointment or
number of appointments will favor the political party to
whom the power of appointment belongs and will injure the
interest of a rival political party and to what extent, are,
essentially and typically political matters. Id.
506

Philippine Constitution Assn., lnc. vs. Gimenez
26. The principle of separation of powers forbids inquiry

into the motives of the executive department in making the
appointment.—ld.
27. Definition of "recess."—The term "recess," in its
broadest sense, means and refers to the intervening period
between adjournment of a regular session which cannot
continue longer than thirty days, and the convening thereof
in regular session once every year on the fourth Monday of
January or in special session to consider general legislation
or only such subjects as he (the President) may designate.
And such intervening period cannot refer to two different
Congresses, one that has adjourned and one newly chosen
or elected to meet in regular session as provided for by the
Constitution, or in special session by the call of the
President. Id.
28. Recess distinguished from adjournment.—Recess
means the period after the final adjournment of Congress
for the session and before the next session begins while and
adjournment during a session of Congress means a merely
temporary suspension of business from day to day, or for
such brief periods of time as are agreed upon by the joint
action of the two houses. Id.
29. Ad interim appointment does not with the end of the

term of office of some members of the Commission. on
Appointments.—An ad interim appointment does not
automatically lapse with the ending of the term of office of
the twelve Congressmen composing one-half of the
membership of the Commission on Appointments. The
Commission is a continuing body. Id.
30. Prohibiting employment of aliens in retail store is not
unconstitutional.—The nationalization of employment in
retail trade does not run counter to any provision of the
Constitution considering that its aim is not exactly to
deprive a citizen of a right that he may exercise under it
but rather to promote, enhance, and protect those that are
expressly accorded to a citizen such as the right to life,
liberty and pursuit of happiness. King vs. Hernaez, 4 SCRA
792.
31. Monopolistic control of retail trade by aliens justifies
nationalization of retail trade.—ld.
32. Under the principle of separation of powers, the
exercise of discretion of the Chief Executive may not be
interfered with by the Court.—When discretion is vested by
law in the President, and a presidential directive
apparently, if not evidently, satisfies the aims, purposes,
and objectives of a law, and the spirit, though not the strict
letter, of the law was followed and the attainment of its
objectives rendered possible. such exercise by the President
of his discretion may not be interfered with by the Court,
following the well-established prin-
507
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 507

ciple of separation of powers. In the case at bar, the

requirements of Rep. Act No. 698, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 1194, were substantially complied with and exercise by
the President of his discretion, by authorizing in a
presidential directive the importation of foreign Virginia
leaf tobacco for blending purposes, is in conformity with the
language, if not the strict terms, of the law. Climaco vs.
Macadaeg, 4 SCRA 930.
33. A person is deemed a resident of a place in a country
or state where he has his abode and lives there permanently.
—A person is deemed a resident of a place in a country or
state where he has his abode and lives there permanently.
It is, a place chosen by him freely and voluntarily, although
he may later on change his mind and live elsewhere. A
place in a country or state where he lives and stays

permanently and to which he intends to return after a
temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile.
Caraballo vs. Republic, 4 SCRA 1055.
84. Reapportionment of jurisdiction over compensation
claims to regional offices under Reorganization Plan No.
20-A is valid.—Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 5 SCRA 4410.
35. Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was not validly
passed.—A comparison between the procedure of
enactment provided in section 6(a) of the Reorganization
Act and that perscribed by the Constitution will show that
the former is in distinct contrast to the latter. Under the
first, consent or approval is to be manifested by silence or
adjournment or by "concurrent resolution." In either case.
the contemplated procedure violates the constitutional
provisions requiring positive and separate action by each
House of Congress, It is contrary to the "settled and well-
understood parliamentary law (which requires that the)
two houses are to hold separate sessions for their
deliberations, and the determination of the other." (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187). (Miller vs.
Mardo, L-15135, July 81, 1961.) Valderrama Lumber Mfg.
Co., Inc. vs. Administrator, 5 SCRA 531.
36. The conferment of judicial powers on regional offices
not previously exercised by said offices is invalid.—" x x x.
The Government Survey and Reorganization Commission
was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive
Branch of the National Government (See Section 3 of R.A.
No. 997, as amended by R.A. 1241), which, plainly, did not
include the creation of Courts x x x." Consequently, the
conferment of judicial powers on regional offices not
previously exercised by said offices is invalid. Id.
37. No person has vested right to an office, except one
who holds a, constitutional office.—No person has a vested
right to an
508

off ice, except one who holds a constitutional office. As a

rule, all offices created by statutes are, more or Iess,
temporary, tran sitory, or precarious, that they are subject
to the power of the legislature to abolish them. (See
Busacay vs. Buenaventura, L-5856, Sept 23, 1953.) The
Civil Service Law cannot stand in the way of the exercise
by the legislature of its power to alter, abolish, or create a

municipal corporation or of f ice. What is not counted is the
abolition of an office in bad faith to do away with a
particular incumbent and later recreating: the same
position and appointing thereto another person. Mendenilla
vs. Onandia, 5 SCRA 537.
38. Preventive suspension for 60 days applies to public
officers appointed by the President.—Garcia vs. Executive
Secre-tary, 6 SCRA 1.
39. Requisites of due process.—The requisites of due
process am: (1)' that one should have had due notice, actual
or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings, by
which his legal rights may be affected; (2) that he shall be
given a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his
rights, including the right himself to testify, to produce
witnesses. and to introduce relevant documents and other
evidence; (3) that the tribunal in or before which his rights
are adjudicated, is so constituted as to give reasonable
assumrance of his honesty and impartiality; and (4) that it
is a court of competent jurisdiction (Willoughby, Vol. 3,
Constitution of the United States, p. 1709). Id.
40. Provisions of statute an germane to title if not
inconsistent with general subject thereof.—The
constitutional requirement that the subject of a law shall
be expressed in the title thereof is satisfied if all parts of
the Iaw are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title of the bill. The title of Repubsic Act
No. 2263 reads as follows: "AN ACT AMENDING
CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETYNINE,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL
TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES." The general
subject is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be,
so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreignto the
general subject, will be regarded as valid. (Sinco,
Philippine Political Law, 11th ed, p. 225; See also Public
Service Commission vs, Recteweald, 290 111. 314, 8 A.L.R.
466; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th Ed., p. 172)
Cordero vs. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418.
41. Indefinite suspension of ejectment proceedings under
public Act 3435 is unconstitutional.—Republic Act No.
3435, which amends Section 4 of Republic Act No. 2616, is
confisca tory, because it allows the continuance of the
occupation of the land on the part of the tenant indefinitely
even if no expro-
509
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 509

priation proceedings are taken or contemplated, thus

taking f rom the owner his property without compensation
and depriving him of his dominical rights of ownership over
it without due process in violation of the Constitution.
Hence, said amendatory Act is unenforceable. Cuatico vs.
Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 595.
42. State has power to regulate rights to free speech and
assembly.—The rights to freedom of speech and to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of
the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions
of democratic countries. But the exercise of these rights is
not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the rights of the community of society, and
such power to regulate is termed the sovereign "police
power/' which may in turn be delegated to political
subdivisions, like municipalities and cities, which may
enact ordinances for the purpose. Gallego vs. People, 8
SCRA 818.
43. Court of Appeals may take cognizance of municipal
ordinances.—There is nothing in the law that prohibits a
court, like .the Court of Appeals, from taking cognizance of
a municipal ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule
123 of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial
notice of matters which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration. Id.
44. No execution may issue against the Government
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.—Belleng vs.
Republic. 9 SCRA 6.
45. The authority to issue a warrant of arrest cannot be
delegated.—Que Che Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA
28.
46. The President's power to order arrest of alien upon
filing of deportation charges is not expressly provided by
law.—Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon
whose authority the President's power to deport is
predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the power to
arrest. Id.
47. The guarantee against unlawful arrest in present
Constitution distinguished from previous organic law.—As
observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring
opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. vs. Villamil, et al.
(65 Phil. 230, 239), the provision of our Constitution which
guarantees the rights of an individual to be secured in his
person (Sec. 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine
Constitution} is not the same as that contained in the

Jones Law wherein this guarantee is placed among the
rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is
declared a popular right of the people and, of course,
indisputably it applies equally to both citizens and
foreigners in this coun try. Furthermore, our Constitution
specially provides that the probable cause upon which a
warrant of arrest may be issued must be determined by the
judge after examination under oath,
510

Philippine Constitution Assn., Inc. vs,, Gimenez
etc, of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce.

This requirement—"to be determined by the judge"—is not
found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do
not specify who will determine the existence of probable
cause. Hence, under these provisions, any public officer
may be authorized by the Legislature to make such
determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest
Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is,
therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual
may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the
purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable
cause, leading to an administrative investigation, The
Constitution does not distinguish between warrant in a
criminal case and administrative warrants in
administrative proceedings. Of course it is different if the
order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a
violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or
agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the
warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is
issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would
be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of
deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.
Id.
48. An executive officer cannot disregard the law even if
he believes that compliance will not benefit the people.—
Respondents' trend of thought, that, if an executive officer
believes that compliance with a certain statute will not
benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it, must be
rejected—we still live under a rule of law. Gonzales vs.
Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230.
49. The President may not, by executive agreement, enter
into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted
prior thereto.—Although the President may, under the

American constitutional system, enter into executive
agreement without previous legislative authority, he may
not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which
is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto, Id.
50. The main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress, not to defeat the same.—Under the
Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
intefere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of the veto power. He may no
defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status
of law, by indirectly repeating the same through an
executive agreement providing for the performance of the
very act prohibited by said laws. Id.
511
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 511

51. Statutory construction; Theory that in a conflict between

treaty and statute the latest in point of time shall prevail,
not applicable to executive agreements; Case at bar.—The
American theory that in the event of conflict between a
treaty and a statute. the one which is latest in point of time
shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for
respondents not only admit, but, also insist that the
contracts in question are not treaties. Said theory may be
justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United
States is a signatory require the advice and consent of the
Senate, and, hence, of a branch of legislative department.
No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without
completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional setup and that of the
United States. Id.
52. Civil authority is supreme, over the military.—The
injunction embodied in the National Defense Act (Section 2,
Commonwealth Act No. 1) that the civil authority shall
always be supreme, can only mean that while all
precautions should be taken to insure the security and
preservation of the State and to this effect the employment
of all resources may be resorted to, the action must always
be taken within the framework of the civil authority. Id.
53, It is the function of the National Security Council to
liberate on existence of emergency and not of the
Department of National Defense.—lt is not for the National

Defense to unilaterally determine the existence of a threat
of emergency, but for the National Security Council to do
so. Otherwise, any change in the political climate in any
region of the world is apt to be taken as an excuse for the
military to conjure up a crisis or emergency and,
thereupon, attempt .to override our laws and legal
processes, and imperceptibly institute some kind of martial
law on the pretext of precautionary mobilization measure
avowedly in the interest of the security of the state. Id.
54. Title of bills is not to embrace more than one subject.
—The provision in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2259 that
"all other officials now appointed by the President of the
Philippines may not be removed from office except for -
cause" is not violative of the constitutional injunction that
the title of bills is not to embrace more than one subject
because the matter of the conditions under which local
officials appointed by the Pres ident may be removed from
office is germane to the purpose of the bill, stated in its
explanatory note, to establish "uniformity in the number of
city officials, in the manner in which they are to be chosen,
in the extent of their powers, duties and functions," as well
as "equality in the rights and privileges enjoyed by the
512

Lim vs. Republic
residents of said cities, particularly the right to choose the

officials who should be at the helm of their respective city
governments." Besides, the provision in question was
debated on the floor of Congress, whose members were,
therefore, actually aware of its existence. (Inchong vs.
Fernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957.) Libarnes vs. Executive
Secretary, 9 SCRA 261.
55. Delegated powers may not be further delegated.—
Assuming arguendo that the power to order the arrest of an
alien may be deemed vested in the President through
delegation by the Legislature, so as an incident of his
inherent power to deport (Sec. 69, Revised Administrative
Code), that power cannot be delegated under the principle
of delegata potesta nonpotest delegare or upon the theory
that it is non-delegable because it involves the exercise of
judgment or discretion. (Qua Che Gan vs, Deportation
Board, L-10280, Sept. 30, 1963). Dalamal vs. Deportation
Board, 9 SCRA 382.
54. Even in administrative proceedings, due process

should be observed because that is a right enshrined in our
Constitution.—National Development Company vs.
Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429. - JOJO MA. LACSON
_________________
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Philconsa vs. Gimenez, GR. No. 23326

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Philconsa vs. Gimenez, GR. No. 23326

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10/10/21, 9:47 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 015

VOL. 15, DECEMBER 29, 1965 479

No. L-23326. December 18, 1965.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Constitutional law; Statute involving expenditure of public

480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Constitution Assn., Inc. vs. Gimenez

officials, it does not include other elective officials such as the

void any statute not conforming to the constitutional provision.

ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition

VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 481

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and

the bill, in violation of section 21(1) of Article VI of the

482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to

The text of Republic Act No. 3836

The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:

"AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION(c), SECTION TWELVE OF

employer's premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five

VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 483

"Approved, June 22, 1963."

The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the

within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the

484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

with the provisions of Section 21, Article VI, of the

A brief historical background of Republic Act No.

EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF

VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 485

THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the

"The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section

As finally approved, the law (Subsection [c], paragraph 2,

First legal point—personality of the Petitioner to

The first point to be considered is whether petitioner

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

petitioner, like in this case, is composed of substantial

" x x x the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the

The general view in the United States, which is followed

1 Kubbs v. Thompson, 66 N.E. 2d 761; Reid v. Smith, 375 III. 147, 30

VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 487

"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give

As far as the first point is concerned, We hold, therefore,

Second legal point—Whether or not Republic Act No.

The first constitutional question is whether Republic Act

"The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives

Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the

1. They may not hold any other office or employment

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

creased while they were members of Congress;

In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law

Constitutional amendment, when the unicameral body, the

VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 489

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

3 Reals v. Smith, 56 P. 690, 8 Wy. 159; Apple v. Crawford Country, 105

VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 491

Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the

Third Legal Point—Whether or not the law in

Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

[1938-62], p. 789; The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal.

4 In the case of Justices of the Supreme Court, Justices of the Court of

VOL. 15, DECEMBER 18, 1965 493

features of Republic Act 3836, as far as Members of