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A Multilateral Network of Research Labs
A Multilateral Network of Research Labs
A Multilateral Network of Research Labs
How should we conduct research on safe and aligned defensive AIs, and with what
kind of governance frameworks? To begin with, it is essential that we keep defensive
methodologies confidential. We should not publicly share many aspects of this
research or publish it in the usual academic fashion. Doing so would make it much
easier for bad actors or a rogue AI (with access to everything on the internet) to design
attacks that circumvent new defenses. Should this research foster advances in AI
capabilities, it is crucial that we not disclose those advances to the world. Our aim is
for defensive AIs to surpass the intelligence of rogue AIs, which are likely to have
been designed based on the most recently published cutting-edge research. This
approach to confidentiality mirrors national-security or military-research strategies in
many countries, with the key difference being that the anticipated conflict is between
humanity and rogue AIs.
It is also critical that research on defensive AIs not be conducted in isolation in just
one or a handful of countries. Instead, it should be coordinated by and carried out in
many countries. Why? First, because the deployment of proposed defenses may
necessitate the cooperation of multiple governments, as computer viruses, like
biological viruses, respect no borders. Additionally, as discussed above, avoiding the
concentration of power is critical, as it poses a threat to democracy and geopolitical
stability. Moreover, if a single democratic country controls the most advanced AI
systems, and a significant and unusual political event cripples democracy in that
country, humanity as a whole could be in danger. Concentration of power in the hands
of a few for-profit companies or AI operators is also problematic and could arise
because power or the appeal of power tends to corrupt, the more so when that power
is vast. The formation of a cooperative group of democracies working together on the
design of well-governed, safe, defensive AI would offer several benefits:
It reduces risks by avoiding single points of failure: If one of the labs intentionally or
unintentionally gives rise to a rogue AI and if the labs have been sharing their
progress, the rogue AI will face several good AIs of at least equal capability, rather
than become the single dominant power on the planet if the lab that produced it had
been substantially ahead of the others.