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Research & Social Science

Manuscript Draft

Manuscript Number: ERSS-D-17-00028R1

Title: "Institutional orientalism" as a barrier for Concentrating Solar

Power electricity trade in the Mediterranean region

Article Type: Research paper

Section/Category: Social science and energy studies

Keywords: Concentrating Solar Power; Mediterranean Solar Plan/Desertec;

Postcolonial theories; Institutional orientalism.

Corresponding Author: Dr. Luiz Souza, Ph.D.

Corresponding Author's Institution: UNICAMP

First Author: Luiz Souza, Ph.D.

Order of Authors: Luiz Souza, Ph.D.; Estevão Bosco, PhD; Alina Gilmanova,
M. Sc.; Leila Ferreira

Abstract: This article interweaves energy studies and postcolonial

theories. We argue that the concepts and theories developed by
postcolonialist scholars to criticize the cultural and epistemological
relations of power between Europe and its former colonies can be expanded
to analyse the failure of international energy cooperation projects such
as the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) and Desertec. Based on model
studies conducted by the German Aerospace Centre (DLR), we present
socioeconomic and environmental criteria to question whether such
projects are mutually beneficial or constitute an asymmetrical
exploitation of solar resources. Furthermore, we analyse the risks
discussed in the literature about the MSP and Desertec, and identify that
they are actually European misrepresentations of Middle East and North
African (MENA) countries with negative implications for Concentrating
Solar Power investments in the region. Finally, we present a conceptual
definition of "institutional orientalism", arguing that such distorted
perceptions of risks are rooted in historical imbalances of power. These
asymmetries reproduce mechanisms of wealth transfer and pressure MENA
countries to adopt European patterns of energy regulation and governance.
Title Page with Author details

Title: Postcolonial theories and energy studies: Institutional orientalism as a barrier for Concentrating Solar
Power electricity trade in the Mediterranean region.
Authors: a) Luiz Enrique Vieira de Souza (Centre for Environmental Studies and Research – University of
Campinas; b) Estevão Mota Gomes Ribas Lima Bosco (Centre for Environmental Studies and Research – University of
Campinas); c) Alina Gilmanova Cavalcante (Institute of Philosophy and Humanities – University of Campinas); d)
Leila da Costa Ferreira (Centre for Environmental Studies and Research – University of Campinas).
Correponding author: Luiz Enrique Vieira de Souza – lenriquesol@yahoo.com.br
Permanent address: Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas Ambientais (NEPAM). Rua dos Flamboyantes, Cidade
Universitária Zeferino Vaz, Campinas, São Paulo, Brasil, CEP 13083-866.
Abstract: This article discusses the transmediterranean commerce of green electricity with reference to
postcolonial studies. We argue that the concepts and theories developed by postcolonialist scholars to criticize the
cultural and epistemological relations of power between Europe and its former colonies can be expanded to analyse
renewable energy projects involving Northern and Southern countries. The discussion is based on cooperation projects
that promote the deployment of Concentrating Solar Power plants in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA)
countries as an alternative for the local demand of electricity, as well as export to Europe. Based on feasibility studies
conducted by the German Aerospace Centre, we present social and environmental criteria for the question whether such
projects are mutually beneficial or asymmetrical exploitation of solar resources. Furthermore, we analyse the risks
discussed on the literature about Desertec and the Mediterraenan Solar Plan, and identify that they are actually
European misrepresentations of MENA countries with negative implications for CSP investments in the region. Finally,
we present a conceptual definition of “institutional orientalism”, arguing that such distorted perceptions of risks are
rooted on historical imbalances of power that reproduce mechanisms of wealth transfer and pressure MENA to adopt
European patterns of energy regulation and governance.
Highlights: 1) Transmediterranean commerce of CSP electricity with reference to postcolonial studies; 2)
Discussion on the (a)symmetries and power imbalances of Northern-Southern RE projects; 3) “Institutional orientalism”
as a barrier for CSP investments in MENA countries; 4) “Provincialization” of energy discourses.
Keywords: Concentrating Solar Power; Mediterranean Solar Plan/Desertec; Postcolonial Theories;
Institutional Orientalism.
*Detailed Response to Reviewers

Ms. Ref. No.: ERSS-D-17-00028

Title: Postcolonial theories and energy studies: Institutional orientalism as a barrier for
Concentrating Solar Power electricity trade in the Mediterranean region
Energy Research & Social Science

We thank very much the editor and the reviewers for the critics and suggestions that helped
us to further improve our paper. In the following pages, we address the critics point by point.

#EDITOR

Dear Dr. Souza,

Peer reviewers have commented on your above paper. They are interested in your article but ask for
a set of revisions before it can be reconsidered for publication. If you feel that you can suitably
address the reviewers' comments (included below), I invite you to revise and resubmit your
manuscript. Keep in mind that in many cases it will be sent back to the same reviewer(s) for another
round of assessment. For these reasons, it is important to carefully address the issues raised in the
comments.

My own take is that this is a very novel piece of research, that would bring an interesting new
dimension to the body of work published in ERSS. However, before it can be accepted for
publication, some revisions are needed. Three reviewers assessed the manuscript, with a split
decision ranging from 'accept' through to 'revise'. Overall my decision is 'revise' as I feel that more
needs to be done to orientate this manuscript towards ERSS, at present it reads like a piece for
Energy Policy with a dominance of references from this journal. Please engage more thoroughly
with the key debates of the ERSS journal.
Most references were taken from Energy Policy and RSER because the MSP debate had its
apex between 2009-2013. ERSS was firstly launched in 2015, when the MSP had already come
to a stalemate and scientific production on the topic had significantly declined. However, We
quoted some papers published in ERSS, and the inaugural article by B. Sovacool is
particularly important for the investigation because the research agenda implied in the
definition of “institutional orientalism” has great affinities with some points of the research
agenda defined as the scope of ERSS.

In addition, I would suggest shortening the title to around 15 words or less as it is quite long at
present. As all of the reviewers note, the spelling and grammar also require some attention in this
article, it might be worthwhile having it professionally proofread before submission. Done.

REVIEWER #1
This manuscript investigates the reasons for why the Mediterranean Solar Plan failed, by reversing
the “traditional” perspective of Europeans searching for shortcomings in North Africa and instead
seeks why shortcomings in Europe caused the MSP to fail. As such, it is an interesting manuscript,
and a timely one too – drawing lessons from the MSP and Desertec debacles are important for both
the ongoing energy policy discussions in Europe and for the beginnings of an energy transition in
MENA.
I am convinced that this will be a very good and really interesting paper, but it needs revisions
before it can be published. In particular, the article needs to have a clearer and better justified
structure of both the text and the analysis. My comments and thoughts are below.
Major comment:
It is not quite clear exactly which failure you refer to – and there are several ones, but they may
have failed for different reasons. The MSP and Desertec are not the same thing. Their visions are
very different (e.g. 20 GW renewables for export and domestic use in MENA by 2020 in MSP, 100
GW CSP exports to Europe by 2050 in Desertec); further, even the Desertec visions are different
(e.g. DLR studies balances system through point-to-point imports of dispatchable CSP, Dii balances
the system through stochastic smoothing of mainly wind imports). So which one(s) is your focus,
why, and are the reasons for their failures the same?
The failure we referred to consists on the inexistence of real progress on CSP electricity trade
in the Mediterranean region, and it is explicitly presented in the title of the article. In the
introduction, we clearly defined the “desertec concept” and the MSP. These two ideas are not
exclusive at all and the Desertec members expressed their full support to the MSP as an
important step for the accomplishment of their own and more ambitious plan of 100 GW CSP
export to Europe. In short, the real failure is associated with the dismay of negotiations for
CSP exports and to the fact that – after several years of its announcement and only two and
half years before its deadline – there is less than 5% of the MSP original goal already built or
in progress. In relation to the different views of how this export of electricity would be
balanced, we explicitly referred to the DLR study, which we consider a more rational
alternative than the alternative presented by DII. The facts that we conducted an interview
with professor Franz Trieb and that the only picture of the article is a DLR point-to-point
connection model also prove that we were specific on this issue.

The truly major comment:

- One major problem with the paper is its structure, which is both unclear (at least towards then end)
and repetitive. A stricter structure would vastly improve the paper, and I believe it is a necessary
step to make it publishable. The beginning of the article, up to section 3.1, is relatively easy to read
and follow. After that, it become chaotic, and especially section 4 and the Conclusion are largely
loose arguments piled on top of each other than a coherent argument. To a large extent, especially in
section 3.1-4.2, there are quite many unsubstantiated statements that mainly appear to fill the
function of bringing in lots of little arguments against the mainstream Eurocentric view. You have a
structure of giving two/three main fields of European arguments against the MSP – security and
regulation/stability, and possibly environmental arguments – and I strongly suggest to reframe
sections 3 and 4 along these two, to make the argument easy to follow. This would also mean to
kick out all statements that don’t easily fit into each of your categories.
- The introduction is good and does not really need to change much.
- Section 2 can be shortened, but is quite clear. I would take out the methodological parts in the last
paragraphs and put them in a section of their own: these are methods, and not theory.
We accepted this suggestion and created different sections for the theoretical framework and
the methodological approach.
We also shortened and condensed the assertions that we considered repetitive.

Section 3 is quite unclear to me: what function does this section fulfil? You fill in a few details
about the MSP, Article 9 and so on here – things that were missing in the introduction. You need to
put this “background: what is MSP/Desertec?” in ONE place (either here, or in the introduction).
On page 7 (in the pdf, no page numbers on the pages themselves), you put in two dimensions for
analysis: security (undesirable (for Europe) because of European dependence) and neo-colonialism.
These are not the dimensions that you use for your analysis (which are rather security,
regulation/instability and perhaps environment): this is confusing.
We considered that presenting the details of Article 9 was not decisive for our argument and
suppressed this paragraph. However, section 3 (now 4) fulfils an important function in the
article because it discusses whether CSP electricity trade is indeed a rational enterprise, both
from the European standpoint as well as from the MENA perspective. Some stakeholders
have argued that Europe does not really need this option – and this was an important issue in
the controversy between DII and the Desertec Foundation. In this section, we assumed the
correctness of the DLR point of view that, without dispatchable power provided by CSP
imports, Europe will face serious problems for accomplishing its energy transition due to the
high oscillatory character of PV and wind energy. From the MENA standpoint, we argued
that CSP electricity export does not NECESSARILY configure “solar colonialism”, since this
point also provoked a huge controversy. Instead of reaffirming that Desertec or the MSP
represent unequal trade, as in the historical case of fossil fuels, we presented more concrete
parameters for the evaluation of the circumstances in which it might be a win-win situation:
value-chain participation, environmental precautions and technology transfer.
In other words, this discussion was indeed necessary because if Europe could make its energy
transition to 100% renewables without the contribution of CSP dispatchable power or the
participation of MENA, there would make no sense to present European narratives as an
“institutional orientalist” barrier. We would simply conclude that the adversaries of CSP
electricity trade are right in considering it irrational and putting the issue permanently aside.
In any case, we rewrote the last paragraph of section 3 in order to clarify the function of
section 4 in the structure of the article. A complementary argument was presented in a
sentence added to the paragraph right before sections 4.1-4.3. In this point we affirm that
“narratives focused on the 'inadequacy' of energy market regulations in MENA countries do
not take into consideration that any concession to minimize the European perception of the
“risks” would be more likely in a scenario in which EU institutions had made concrete
proposals that might increase the commitment of Southern governments in the negotiation
process”. After such modifications, we think that the nexus between sections 4 and 5 is clearly
established.

A key point of the paper is that Europe blaims MENA countries for the failure of MSP (or Desertec,
or both, but I think only MSP really). That’s not exactly how I’ve perceived the MSP debate, but
there is for sure such an element. What is missing is a section precisely describing these claims:
what exactly does “Europe” say, and who is “Europe”? Without that, you’re sort of debunking a
myth that is unknown (or possibly one that doesn’t really exist).
We consider this critique very unfair. “Europe” has several meanings in our article, but these
meanings are always clearly defined in each context and we consciously preferred not to
present a strict analytical definition of what “Europe” might be because in this case we would
act in a very essentialist manner, proceeding in the very same way that European literati treat
non-European people.
In any case, “Europe” means the financial institutions that make capital costs impracticable
based on false assumptions of risk, such as terrorism. “Europe” means EU institutions that
are unable to formulate concrete proposals and criticize Southern countries for their
insufficient liberalization of energy markets (while there are several cases – not only in
MENA, but around the world – in which the local situation got worse after adopting the
measures suggested by Northern countries). “Europe” means the epistemological posture
criticized by the postcolonialist scholars who have clearly demonstrated that Europeans have
plenty of difficulties in recognizing as rational those parameters and procedures that do not
coincide to a large extent with their own standards.
Besides, our point about “institutional orientalism” makes reference to dozens of articles
listed in the bibliography which were written by Europeans who expressed those prejudices
criticized by us. It is true that a convincing argumentative strategy would be to add several
quotes embedded in “orientalist views”, but in this case we would exceed the limit of
characters to a large extent and present as a book what we chose to publicize as an article.

I would re-dedicate section 3 to describing the “European perspective”, and really show what the
Europeans say, define the dimensions of the “orientalisation” or reversal of the perspective by that.
By dimensions I mean the arguments (of “Europe”, or the clusters of specific supposed reasons for
the failure of the MSP; practically, these should be the subheadings of your Resuls section, section
4). Otherwise one cannot understand a) what your dimensions/arguments for analysis are, or b) why
these dimensions are the most important ones.
In relation to what “Europe” says, it is expressed in the categories of terrorism, political
instability and pressures for energy regulation, also with plenty of examples in the literature
to which we refer in the article.
However, we consciously preferred to make an interpretative analysis centred on the idea of
“institutional orientalism” than hypostatizing the “European perspective”, after all there is
more than one “European perspective”. The DLR, for instance, is also the European
institution which conducted very serious and important studies that we regard as positive
attempts to make the idea of cooperation on CSP electricity more concrete. In short, our
critique is not against the Europeans in general, but against some distorted views expressed
by some (not all) European stakeholders in the MSP debate.

- In section 4 come the really big problems, namely that you start “debunking myths” in a rather
wild and unstructured way. There is no clear connection to section 3: the dimensions of analysis, or
subheadings or what you call them, are not at all the same, or even similar. Further, it is very strange
to have section 4 called “conceptualizing orientalism” (that’s theory, or possibly method!; and you
don’t really conceptualise anything here). I would put all the “conceptualisation” – i.e. your
method/framework – in section 2 or at least before section 3 (the “European complaints”).

We respectfully disagree that there is any failure in conceptualizing “orientalism” after

presenting the empirical elements which we consider necessary for this step.
However, since our argument is an interpretative one and “institutional orientalism” as a
concept is progressively defined throughout the article, we considered appropriated to
redefine the titles of sections 5 and subsection 5.1
But saying that we “debunk myths” is an abstract critique. Have we not concretely shown –
based on other researches previously published – that terrorism has never been a big issue in
the EUMENA energy commerce? Is it a myth that Europe criticizes the energy regulation
framework in MENA countries without solving its own energy issues (such as the decisive
intervention of private companies and energy lobbies in the definition of its energy policies)?
It is true that there is insufficient data about the interference of lobbies because, as the
German say, they act hinter den Kulissen. Is it also not true that the political stability is
different in each MENA country and that even so the authors that we criticize continue
generally referring to the “political instability” in MENA countries as a barrier for energy
cooperation? We deconstructed misrepresentations, and to affirm that we “debunked myths”
constitutes an easy irony that escapes from the discussion without really showing in which
point our critique is false or insufficient.

- I would restructure it so that section 4 are the Results, holding aspects of both the current sections
3 and 4, but in a clear and well justified structure. Perhaps along the criticisms 1) security; 2a)
insufficient regulation; 2b) instability (or the two latter as one subsection), and perhaps 3)
enviromment, and then DO the “orientalisation” in each section.
- The energy security issue is handled by referring to a number of studies on the matter (although
references to the only two studies looking at terrorism and Desertec are uncited – Smith Stegen et al
2012 in Risk management, and Lilliestam 2014 in Energy Policy)). That’s fine, especially when
adding the insight of these two terror studies.
The third paragraph of section 5.1 was written in order to add these complementary
references.
- Then you complain that Europe tries to fit MENA into its market framework, and sees a lack of
liberalisation as an obstacle. That is really interesting, and it would be interesting to see you turn
that around (i.e. the obstacle is the liberalisation in Europe: MENA states have no one to talk to and
negotiate with). But at the same time, as things went, the closed markets of MENA were an
obstacle: if investment must be private as the state cannot/doesn’t want to invest - then market
frameworks must at least ALLOW private investment, which was not the case in most MENA
countries. Similarly, it is a quite silly argument to say that the investment risk in MENA is a product
of European imagination: clearly, the investment risks in Egypt and Libya are very different –
objectively speaking – than in Finland or Denmark. This is not a “misrepresentation” of regulation
deficits in MENA: it’s a fact. Focus on reframing the liberalisation issue instead.
Of course risks in Libya are different from risks in Finland, but risks in Morocco, Jordan and
Algeria are considerably lower than in Libya and even so most of the literature and financial
institutions do not take that sufficiently into consideration. The same might be said about the
issue of market regulation: it differs from country to country and – instead of discussing the
situation of each country in accordance to its particularities, the literature still treats the
region as a single block. We have clearly shown that such “institutional orientalism” is the
result of European misrepresentations and also an incapacity (or a strategy?) of some
European stakeholders to deal with Europe's own responsibility in the failure of trans-
Mediterranean commerce of electricity.
The limits and the purpose of this article do not allow us to reframe the issue of liberalisation,
because it would demand detailed and country to country specific studies. However, one of the
contributions of our paper is precisely to call attention for the necessity of such studies, and
establish a research agenda that encompasses such concerns.

- Stability is a point on which you only touch, and I think you cannot go too deep: after all, the Arab
Spring did put the last nail in the Desertec coffin (perhaps it was dead before). That type of
instability is both objective and absolutely detrimental to large-scale investment. An interesting
question here could be WHY there was instability in the MENA: did Europe cause that too? Maybe
you don’t want to touch that. One interesting thing here, however, is what one means by “stability”:
is Italy stable and Libya unstable, or is Italy with its 45 governments in 45 years less stable than
Libya, which had one government for 35 years? Still, the RISK in MENA is higher, but maybe for
other reasons that are discussed in European media.
We added the following sentences in the conclusion: “European stakeholders repeat ad
nauseam that MENA regimes are unstable, as if the whole region were still in the same
turmoil as Libya and Syria. They affirm that the Arab Spring “put the last nail in the
Desertec coffin”, but do not explain why negotiations did not resume in the subsequent period
when demonstrations and clashes have ceased or significantly moderated. Meanwhile, the
erratic policies towards RE incentives in Spain and Italy are completely absent from the MSP
debate.”

- The environmental aspects are strange and your argumentation is not so good. Of course CSP will
have environmental impacts where the stations stand: if they stand in MENA the impact there will
ALWAYS be larger than if they’re not there. The interesting question is whether the (rather small)
environmental impacts are outweighed by a) the (monetary) compensation MENA states get, and b)
the overall climate savings.
Section 4.2 was partially rewritten. We also completely rewrote the second paragraph of
section 5.2.
The DLR studies have already shown that CSP climate savings outweigh its environmental
impacts. Actually, the worries rely mainly on the water issue which might be addressed by
using waste heat from CSP plants to feed desalination facilities.
In relation to the quality of our argumentation about the environmental aspects, we would say
that it is a rather conventional one because it replies most of the things that have been said
about Desertec. The specific contribution – which we make now clearer in the conclusion – is
that “institutional orientalism” might be also seen as an unbalanced and irrational view in the
sense that it completely detaches the environmental risks and the serious threats of climate
change from the discussion about the investment risks. In other words, “institutional
orientalism” inflates the risks of CSP investments in MENA, while our critical analysis inverts
this question and asks about THE RISKS OF NOT MAKING SUCH INVESTMENTS.

- The technology transfer point seems completely detached from the rest: this is in fact something
the MENA states lamented, not something Europe pointed out as a reason for MSP failure. If you
keep this, I would urge you to tell me exactly what this “technology transfer” is – surely, it is not
merely a company giving away its intellectual property to a developing country for the “greater
good”?
Exactly because it is something that MENA countries lamented and not something used by
Europe to blame MENA that this discussion is situated in section 4.3 and not in the section
devoted to “institutional orientalism”. As we mentioned above, sections 4.1-4.3 are attempts to
present concrete criteria for the negotiations, after all the Desertec Foundation has
highlighted this point without saying if and how European companies would really transfer
any technology.
Indeed, technology transfer is one of the bottlenecks of international negotiations on climate
change and it cannot be demanded from us that our article would present the final solution
for one of the acutest dilemmas faced by mankind. But if the solution is not giving away
intellectual property for the “greater good”, it also cannot mean selling it for countries which
are not the main responsible ones for climate change and barely have financial founds to
increase the performance of their health and education systems. Providing loans with very low
interest rates so that Southern countries could acquire such rights in a fair trade would be a
possible path, but the idea of “institutional orientalism” has identified precisely the opposite
attitude.

- The interesting thing with this paper is how it reverses the perspective to take the side of MENA.
That however cannot mean that you can be wholly uncritical of the situation and development in
MENA. For example, by referring to the goof policies of Algeria and the introduction of targets
across the region, you just show that you do not know what you’re talking about: for a number of
reasons, the Algerian FIT has never been used (practically banning foreign or private investors is
one reason), and having targets means nothing if there is no support policy to back them up – and
only Morocco has such a policy on a meaningful scale.
The information about the Algeria FIT was taken from an article published in Energy policy,
a quite respectful journal in the area of energy studies (doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.10.005). In
any case, we replaced this data with information about the creation of New Energy Algeria
(NEAL), which was created with the purpose to encourage the domestic production, use and
export of renewable energy.

MENA has not done its policy homework. That is ONE reason for why MSP/Desertec failed. It’s
not very meaningful to try and deny that: instead, you need to acknowledge the problems on the
MENA side, and then draw attention to the fact that these are not the ONLY problems – there are
many problems in Europe too, and even if MENA were perfect, MSP would not have flown.

MENA has given some steps (timid, maybe) in the direction of more RE incentives. But
Europe has not done its homework too and even so we do not have dozens of articles in the
literature saying that Europe should make arrangements in order to facilitate international
energy cooperation.
- Section 4.2 is simply bad, and reads like a compilations of why the Europeans are wrong (or even
why they are arrogant idiots), or a compliation of platitudes (“MENA is not a homogenous
country”…). I would take all of it out, and only put in the things that fit into the revised, stricter
structure.
By reading our article, the reviewer should have noticed that postcolonialist scholars do not
intend to act towards Europeans the same way Europeans act towards Southern people. We
would invite you to take a better look at the discussion about “provincializing Europe” where
we say “This idea [ provincializing Europe] has an important methodological value in that it
distinguishes the critique of historical asymmetries from any manichean interpretation that might
sound as “postcolonial revenge””.

Besides, assertions like “MENA is not a homogeneous country” SHOULD be platitude, but
our article has clearly shown by referring to dozens of articles that it is unfortunately not that
obvious yet. When the reviewer says “risks in Libya are different from risks in Finland”, he is
somehow implicitly treating the whole region as if it were Libya. Let's forget Libya and Syria
for a second and try to think why investments do not occur even in those other countries
where they could indeed take place?

We do not criticize only Europeans (arguments which are not “simply bad”, but clearly
referred to the bibliography and to other obvious facts that for some reason unfortunately
never come up in the MSP debate). The reviewer should have noticed that we criticize MENA
countries because of fossil fuel subsidies and we also question if their policies towards RE
incentives are really guided by environmental criteria or by the economic strategy of saving
fossil fuel resources for a more “opportune” situation.

- The Conclusion appears largely disconnected from the contents of the paper: with a better
structure before, it will be possible to briefly pull together a) what you found out with respect to
each dimension, and b) why that is important. Right now, I don’t see that you do any of that, but
when the paper has been restructured and tightened, I think it will be easy to re-write the
conclusions. The same goes for the abstract, which describes what you did rather than explain what
you found out.
We rewrote some aspects of the conclusion. We also reformulated the abstract in order to
make it shorter and more assertive.

Smaller comments
The language is good throughout, with only a few minor typos (“specially”, or mistakes/strange
things (such as “climate changes”) – nothing that another proof-read wouldn’t take care of. Except
in section 4.2: here the language is imprecise and incorrect in many places.
Language mistakes were revised.
On page 7, you can cite the final deliverable for workpackage 3 of the BETTER project: it says this
too, but may be a better source than your interview.
References to the BETTER project are already implicit when we added the recent
publications by Franz Trieb and Denis Hess.
Also on page 7: is it really Europe’s fault that local populations did not profit from oil/gas exports?
Or is this perhaps also or mainly the fault of local elites and rulers?
Both Europe and local elites are responsible for that. First of all, because the Northern
countries have had a strong influence in MENA countries' politics during the last centuries.
They have supported those elite sectors more favourable to their interests and undermined
political actors that they considered suspicious (Hasn't Italy supported Gadaffi for a long
time?). Second, Europe always presents a list of conditions for trade, and a more equal
distribution of oil and gas revenues has never had the same importance in the negotiation
process as the liberalisation of markets, for instance.

For the resource curse discussion on page 8, you may want to cite Eisgruber (2013, Energy Policy):
there is now NO source or reference supporting your argument. Done

Page 8: for the win-win discussion, you may want to cite Schinke, Klawitter 2014 (Sustainable
desert power, Germanwatch) or other work of Schinke’s reflecting on the sustainability of the
Ourzazate complex. This work had already been cited in the first version of the article that we
submitted to peer-review analysis (reference no. 39 of the first version).

Similarly, on pages 6-9 (section 3) you describe the narrative of Desertec, but without citing the one
Desertec narrative analysis I am aware of (Lilliestam & Hanger, 2016 Energy Research and Social
Science).
We read this article, but it is not mentioned in our article because we have some objections to
the way the authors present the “decentralisation controversy”.

On page 9, you argue that the water use will be unsustainable, but without putting your number into
context (is 4.1 million m3 much or little, compared to the maximum sustainable consumption?), or
reflecting on whether this number is actually correct. For example, Damerau et al (2011, Energy
Policy) argue that the water demand is small, and much smaller than for the current oil/gas exports.
Most MENA countries already make an unsustainable use of their water resources in which
they exploit “fossil water” to cover their demands. For this reason, even if the use of water for
cleaning CSP mirrors is only a fraction of what is used in local agriculture, it would represent
a sort of water export to Europe implied in the electricity commerce. However, the argument
we highlighted is that this issue can be solved in a relatively simple way in that waste heat of
CSP plants is used to feed seawater desalination facilities (The best reference for discussing
this issue is DLR, 2007, which we mentioned in the article)

Isn’t the interconnection capacity Spain-Morocco 600 MW?

This is not the number we found in the literature. Anyway, this information was supressed
because we considered the paragraph about Article 9 superfluous in our argumentation.

In section 2: don’t “attempt to eventually translate…”: say what you do, not what you intend to do.
Section 3.1: what is “considerably inferior to European standards”? And what is “(PPP)”?
Labor conditions and remuneration of MENA workers as important criteria to define if such
enterprises contribute to the reproduction of historical asymmetries (it is explicit in the
sentence right before the one you mention). PPP means Power Purchase Parity. We added it to
the list of abbreviations.

What are the “north- Atlantic countries”? I though you were talking about “Europe”, or perhaps the
European Union countries?
“North-Atlantic countries” is a category regarded by many postcolonisalist as an
epistemological block.

4.2: why are “environmental criteria a more comprehensive parameter”? For what? What is the
reason? And why is it important? Like so much in this section: I don’t understand.
We rewrote the third paragraph of this section in order to make it clearer. But since IPCC
2007 it should be obvious why environmental criteria should be regarded as a more
comprehensive parameter. There are some stakeholders that do not recognise the seriousness
of the climate crisis, but their influence in the scientific field is progressively lower, even
though it still remains very strong in the political arena.

Section 4.2: it would be even cheaper for developing countries to wait until richer countries have
pushed renewables through the learning curve and then invest. Investing now (or in2010) would not
save much global emissions (since the NA countries emit little), but it would have been costly for
them.

“On the other hand, it is also improper to characterize in advance trans- Mediterranean CSP
electricity trade as solar colonialism by associating it with the history of fossil fuel exploitation
(Eisgruber, 2013). Contrary to fossil fuels, solar energy is theoretically inexhaustible and
European imports would therefore not diminish to any extent the opportunities for local
utilization of such resource. It is precisely the contrary, because European investments would
scale-up the manufacture of CSP components, and the reduction of costs implied in this
process – associated with the payment of adequate electricity revenues for exporting countries
– would facilitate the economic conditions for MENA countries to advance their CSP projects
for the supply of local demand.” (section 4).

4.2 If “European narratives blame MENA” – then show me how, which these narratives are, and
structure your analysis around that (see big comments above). Answered above.

4.2 Poverty eradication is hardly the reason for energy subsidies in MENA. In oil exporting
countries it is rather a (extremely inefficient) way to distribute revenues, and in the other countries a
means to enable poorer citizens to use modern energy at all.
We presented the poverty eradication discourse without conferring any validity to it. On the
opposite, we criticized it as an irrational premise. It is clearly expressed.

REVIEWER #2: Review for Manuscript Number: ERSS-D-17-00028

Accept with minor revisions: accepts the paper as long as the author responds adequately to
reviewer/editor comments, the paper proceeds to editorial review with no peer re-review (editor
reserves the right to send it to peer review)

The paper presents original new ideas and a well-structured article which is definitely in interest of
the broad scientific community and rightly placed in Energy Research & Social Science. I
congratulate the author for this meaningful and rich paper which reflects the current status of
research!
The paper discusses the barriers of a Trans Mediterranean energy initiative based on dispatchable
CSP and the subjective matter of decision makers. The definition of institutional orientalism is well
described and a very powerful field in social science to make even deeper research. However the
paper has minor shortcomings which I would like to mention in the following:

p. 1 L. 8 The DLR did no feasibility studies but model studies which analysed the rough picture of a
CSP transfer. A feasibility study is defined as a review of feasibility in project management. While
the DLR did no project in building such power plants or transmission lines the studies have just
characters of a model. Corrected

p.1 L. 52 …to the European Union to supplement European power plants. Done
P.1 L.54 - see comment feasibility study above - Done
p. 2 line -1 … (HVDC) overhead lines, underground cables and sea cables, implying acceptable
losses of about 3%... Done
p. 2 L. 24 … of up to 400 billions €2006 (time value of money of the year 2006) Done
p. 2 L. 55 - see comment feasibility study above - Done
p. 5 L. 0 there is a typo "immature" corrected
p. 5 L. 55 … desalination plants with dispatchable CSP, PV and wind electricity … Done
p. 6 L. 12 … depend on the construction of separate and projectable point-to-point transmission
lines from power plants in MENA to centres of demand in Europe. Done
p.6 L. 33 … more economic suitable done

p.6 L. 35-40 … character of PV and wind turbines - whose storage processes depend on long,
medium or short term storages (gas, water or electrochemical storage) that would also represent
financial and resource cost. Besides, the option for building an European supergrid to compensate
such oscillations would demand a huge expansion of transmission lines. (Delete section in brackets)
Done.

Reference: Boie, I. 2016. Opportunities and challenges of high renewable energy deployment and
electricity exchange for North Africa and Europe - Scenarios for power sector and transmission
infrastructure in 2030 and 2050. Renewable Energy. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2015.10.008
Done

p. 7 L. 0 Figure 1. Model of point-to-point HVDC transmission lines between …. Eichstetten

Figure 1: Please avoid German language in the figure legends. You can also use the figure of the
Four Motors for Europe from
http://elib.dlr.de/88775/1/Verleihung%20des%20Studienpreises%20VDI-GEU.pdf (p. 8) and refer
to the methodology in reference 50.Done

p. 8 L. 31. If you like to, insert a short discussion of the production possibilities in Europe and
North Africa of mass products and high end products. Is Europe only able for high end? You can
also quote the following reference: http://elib.dlr.de/103225/
We are grateful for the suggested reference, yet the word limits do not allow us include this
information.

p.10 L. 47. There might be a space too much between widely and disseminated corrected

p. 12 L. 2 mechanisms of wealth transfer - I did not understand this section please clarify what
exactly you mean "difficult and expensive"
Because of subjective misinterpretation of risks, international financial institutions charge
higher interest rates from MENA countries. By “difficult and expensive” we mean the results
provided by Kommendantova/Schinko. Existing data shows that, due to the costs of capital,
the amount of investments for building CSP plants in MENA countries is the same as in
Europe, although MENA is rich in solar resources and Europe is not (solar irradiance is a
very important factor to the definition of CSP costs).

p. 14 L. 8 solar power plants would be an important measure sharing the benefits with a majority of
participants (please highlight the advantages)
Here we refer to the work of Denis Hess, who argues that “community administration of
thermal solar power plants would be an important measure for avoiding that benefits in the
Southern shore of the Mediterranean are restricted to MENA elites”. The premise is that a
more inclusive administration would imply more transparent use and distribution of
resources from electricity exports. We have only referred to the main argument and given the
reference because we cannot exceed the limit of 10000 words and also because we think that it
would be a bit digressive to detail the arguments presented by Hess.
Please list the abbreviations: PPP, IPCC, MENAREC, GHG, GDP Done

Lastly, there is a fatal error in the manuscript which should be corrected:

p.6 l. 32: "with indigenous dispatchable renewable sources over a certain threshold. (Reference is
not 50 but http://elib.dlr.de/77976/1/REMix_Thesis_YS.pdf)

Thank you, we corrected it.

#REVIEWER 3

This is a qualitative study examining the Mediterranean Solar Project from a postcolonial
perspective. The topic is definitely appealing to the readership of the journal and I would
recommend publishing the paper after fixing a few typos e.g. HDVC instead of HVDC. Done.
*Manuscript (without Author identifiers)

“Institutional orientalism” as a barrier for Concentrating Solar Power electricity trade in the

1
Mediterranean region.
2
3
4 Abstract: This article interweaves energy studies and postcolonial theories. We argue that the
5 concepts and theories developed by postcolonialist scholars to criticize the cultural and
6
epistemological relations of power between Europe and its former colonies can be expanded to
7
8 analyse the failure of international energy cooperation projects such as the Mediterranean Solar
9 Plan (MSP) and Desertec. Based on model studies conducted by the German Aerospace Centre
10 (DLR), we present socioeconomic and environmental criteria to question whether such projects are
11 mutually beneficial or constitute an asymmetrical exploitation of solar resources. Furthermore, we
12
13
analyse the risks discussed in the literature about the MSP and Desertec, and identify that they are
14 actually European misrepresentations of Middle East and North African (MENA) countries with
15 negative implications for Concentrating Solar Power investments in the region. Finally, we present
16 a conceptual definition of “institutional orientalism”, arguing that such distorted perceptions of risks
17 are rooted in historical imbalances of power. These asymmetries reproduce mechanisms of wealth
18
19 transfer and pressure MENA countries to adopt European patterns of energy regulation and
20 governance.
21
22 Keywords: Concentrating Solar Power; Mediterranean Solar Plan; Desertec; Postcolonial Theories;
23 Institutional Orientalism.
24
25
26
27 Abbreviations
28
29 CO2 Carbon dioxide KWh Kilowatt hour
30
31
32 CSP Concentrating Solar Power MASEN Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy
33
34 DII Desertec Industrial Initiative MENA Middle Eastern and North African
35
36 Middle East North Africa Renewable
37
38
DLR German Aerospace Centre MENAREC Energy Conference
39
40 DNI Direct Normal Irradiation MSP Mediterranean Solar Plan
41
42 EU European Union NA North Africa
43
44
GDP Gross Domestic Product PPP Power Purchasing Parity
45
46
47 GHG Greenhouse gases SWH Solar Water Heater
48
49 Trans-Mediterranean Renewable
50 HVDC High Voltage Direct Current TMEC Energy Cooperation
51
52
53 Intergovernmental Panel on
54 IPCC Climate Change TWh/y Terawatt hour per year
55
56
57
58 1. Introduction
59
60 In light of the risks associated with global climate change, the Trans-Mediterranean
61
62 1
63
64
65
 Renewable Energy Cooperation (TREC) developed the “Desertec concept”, which initially
consisted of a cooperation programme for energy, water and climate security in Europe, North
1
2 Africa and the Middle East. The idea was to take advantage of the high Direct Normal Irradiance
3
4 (DNI) levels in the Sahara Desert and other arid regions in Southern Mediterranean countries in
5
6 order to build thermal solar power plants. The latter would provide dispatchable power to sustain
7
8 local demand and also to export part of this green electricity to the European Union in order to
9
10 supplement power plants [1].
11
12 The discussions around the project were largely based on a series of model studies
13
14 conducted by the German Aerospace Centre (DLR) in cooperation with energy research institutions
15
16 from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco [2]. According to the results of these investigations, the
17 total technical potential for Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) plants in seven selected MENA
18
19 countries – Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia – was calculated to
20
21 about 538,000 TWh/y, which means that less than 0.2% of the local desert lands suitable for CSP
22
23 plants would be enough to supply 15% of the electricity demand expected in Europe by 2050 [3].
24
25 The electricity generated by CSP stations could be transmitted from MENA to Europe by High
26
27 Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) overhead lines, underground and sea cables, implying acceptable
28 losses of about 3% every 1,000 kilometres [4].
29
30
31 On the other hand, it is assumed that MENA countries would benefit considerably from CSP
32
33 investments in their territories. Besides accumulating revenue from electricity exports, MENA
34 countries might assign a strategic role to the construction of CSP plants, in view of their growing
35
36 power demand. This growth is linked to the increase in local populations and the prognosis of
37
38 economic development which are expected to push total electricity consumption to levels equivalent
39
40 to the EU by the middle of this century [5]. In addition, the deployment of CSP stations offers an
41
42 alternative solution for the harsh water stress in the region, considering that such electricity could be
43
44
used to power seawater desalination plants in a sustainable way [6,7].
45
46 This idea gained force when the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) – a political
47
48 cooperation framework between the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries that succeeded the
49
50 Barcelona Process – launched in 2008 the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) as one of its six
51 flagships [8]. The MSP aimed at developing 20 GW of new RE capacities and achieve significant
52
53 energy savings around the Mediterranean by 2020. The highlights of this initiative would be the
54
55 construction of large scale thermal solar power plants and the improvement of North-South
56
57 interconnections in order to make possible the export of green electricity from MENA to Europe
58
59 [9].
60
61 In the period after its announcement, the MSP received great attention from the international
62 2
63
64
65
 press and some European governments praised the initiative as a relevant cooperation project in the
area of climate and energy [10]. The Desertec Foundation was created with the purpose of
1
2 advocating massive investments of up to 400 billion euros (Time Value of Money/2006) for CSP
3
4 deployment in the Mediterranean region. The Desertec Industrial Initiative (DII) emerged as a
5
6 consortium of energy suppliers, service providers, solar companies and financial institutions which
7
8 assumed the commitment of bringing the “Desertec concept” to life [11].
9
10 However, sceptical voices were heard on both shores of the Mediterranean expressing the
11
12 possibility – or even the desirability – of implementing the MSP. From the European side, it was
13
14 argued that importing electricity from MENA countries would reinforce energy dependency and
15
16 make the EU susceptible to political pressures in the sense that Desertec electricity could be
17 managed as an “energy weapon” in international negotiations [12]. Critics were also formulated in
18
19 relation to the risks of terrorism, the appropriateness of the local energy regulations and the political
20
21 instability of the region [13, 14, 15].
22
23
From the perspective of Southern countries, it was raised that the MSP would not configure
24
25 a mutually beneficial project, but an asymmetrical enterprise in which the exportation of CSP
26
27 electricity could be more properly characterized as “solar colonialism” [16, 17]. According to the
28
29 representative from the African Network for Solar Energy, “many Africans are sceptical.
30
31 [Europeans] make promises, but at the end of the day, they bring their engineers, they bring their
32
33 equipment, and they go. It is a new form of resource exploitation, just like in the past” [18]. The
34 arguments that the positive impacts will be negligible and that the European business will appear as
35
36 the main winner are particularly sensitive to colonial dominance that constituted the past relations
37
38 between Europeans and many Southern Mediterranean countries [19].
39
40 This article presents an interpretative argument for the question of whether – and under
41
42 which circumstances – the MSP might indeed be considered a “win-win situation” for its
43
44 stakeholders. We approach this problem through a discussion on the model studies published by the
45
46 German Aerospace Centre and the data collected in a semi-structured interview with the coordinator
47
48 of this research centre [20], while the bases of our analysis are normative socioeconomic and
49
50 environmental criteria to be presented in section four. Therefore, this article contributes to a
51 research program that investigates the (a) symmetrical conditions for transnational RE cooperation
52
53 projects involving developed and developing nations [21].
54
55
56 In connection with this investigation problem, we will examine the reasons why the MSP
57 has presented only meagre results up to the present. This question has been widely discussed in the
58
59 literature about CSP cooperation projects in the Mediterranean region, but we consider that most
60
61 analyses are either insufficiently comprehensive or even misinterpretations, which conceal those
62 3
63
64
65
 lines of force responsible for bringing the MSP to a stalemate. Hence, we offer an original view on
the barriers to the trans-Mediterranean trade of CSP electricity by discussing the European
1
2 narratives about the MSP within the theoretical framework of postcolonial studies [22, 23, 24, 25].
3
4
5 As stated by Gurminder Bhambra [23], postcolonial approaches aim at challenging
6
dominant Northern narratives and reconfigure them to provide more adequate and inclusive
7
8 categories of analysis. In the next section, we will clarify our theoretical framework with a brief
9
10 introduction to postcolonialist critique, focusing on some specific sociological concepts that we
11
12 regard as particularly consistent with the attempt of formulating a renewed and non-eurocentric
13
14 interpretation of the MSP and the “Desertec concept”.
15
16 Postcolonial studies have predominantly emphasized the historical, cultural and epistemic
17
18 aspects responsible for maintaining the hierarchies and power imbalances between the European
19
20 matrix and its former colonies. Postcolonial scholars have mostly worked on critical analysis of
21
22 social mentalities and subjectivities, ideologies and symbolic practices that reproduce historical
23
asymmetries even after the official closure of the colonial domination. However, the materiality of
24
25 the social and political relations that make possible the reproduction of colonial discourses have
26
27 remained insufficiently theorized [26]. For this reason, the present research must also be seen as an
28
29 empirical contribution to the highlighting of distortions provoked by Eurocentric representations of
30
31 North-South cooperation projects in the area of energy infrastructure.
32
33 We will demonstrate in section five that European misperceptions of the risks involving the
34
35 MSP are based on subjective representations of the MENA region which are widely disavowed by
36
37 empirical data [27]. Finally, we will argue that misrepresentations on the threat of terrorism and
38
39 political instability constitute decisive obstacles for the accomplishment of the MSP, not only
40 because they undermine the necessary governmental support, but they also increase the capital costs
41
42 of the whole project [28]. We present, therefore, a conceptual definition for “institutional
43
44 orientalism” that discloses a normative role that pressures for modifications in the energy legislation
45
46 of MENA countries so that the strengthening of a regional Mediterranean energy market might be
47
48 achieved in accordance with European regulatory patterns. We assert that institutional orientalism
49
50 effaces and diverts attention from substantial conflicts of interest within the EU which obstruct the
51 path for a sustainable energy transition.
52
53
54
55
56 2. Theoretical framework: The postcolonial critique of self-referred European
57
58 narratives.
59
60
61
62 4
63
64
65
 There is an old African myth in which the relationship between the colonizer and the
colonized is metaphorically represented by two different masks: The European mask has a big
1
2 mouth and small ears. The African mask, on the contrary, has a small mouth and big ears [29].
3
4 Notwithstanding the diversity of interpretations among postcolonial theorists, their common ground
5
6 lies in the basic assumption that colonialism is a decisive and constitutive – although disguised –
7
8 element of self-referred European narratives on modernization.
9
10 In the field of sociological theory, postcolonial scholarship challenges the universals of
11
12 modernity and modernization as they are commonly represented within this discipline [22, 30, 31,
13
14 32]. It questions the canons of classical sociology in which basic categories – such as “nation-state”,
15
16 “market”, “industrial society” and “bureaucratic rationality” – were not only seen as impersonal,
17 specialized and formal categories, but also as the main indices along which non-European countries
18
19 were measured and classified in accordance with abstract patterns of “modernization” [23].
20
21
22 In other words, postcolonial critique discloses the fundamental relations between loci of
23
enunciation and epistemic power. According to Gayatri Spivak [33], this task consists in revealing
24
25 the concealed subject of European jurisprudence, political economy and cultural discourses that
26
27 pretend to have no geopolitical determinations. In spite of its pretence of universality, Western
28
29 epistemology has structured multiple narratives which reaffirm the “specialness” of Europe parallel
30
31 to the “incompleteness” of other regions of the world. This social image has subsisted even after the
32
33 official decline of colonialism in the form of a global classification system which elevates the
34 European civilization to the status of a universal standard and continues to reinforce political and
35
36 economic asymmetries between centres and peripheries [22, 34, 35].
37
38
39 Hence, European epistemology disguises its colonialist significance in that it presents itself
40 as unconstrained by any geocultural and geopolitical orientations, while promoting a system of
41
42 research that is to a great extent the result of the previous imperialist gnoseological procedure of
43
44 geographically labelling non-European cultures. Although, the “other” is recognised, it is generally
45
46 perceived as irreconcilably and incommensurably “other” [23]. In the area of cultural studies,
47
48 Edward Said [25] developed the concept of “orientalism” that became a seminal idea for the
49
50 critique of cultural essentialisms and for the constitution of postcolonial theories as an important
51 research field within social sciences. In general lines, Said defined “orientalism” as a discourse of
52
53 power in which “Orient” and “Occident” are ontologically and epistemologically distinct from each
54
55 other.
56
57 After analysing a vast set of influential works produced by Western scholars on non-
58
59 European cultures, Said verified that the “Orient” was nothing but a precarious intellectual construct
60
61 based on essentialist and distorted representations that obliterated the existing diversity of peoples.
62 5
63
64
65
 Consequently, the “Orient” was an invention of literati from North-Atlantic countries that reduced
the empirical multiplicity of non-Europeans by describing them as exotic, sensualistic, religiously
1
2 fanatic and dangerous. In short, “orientalism” was also an implicit value judgement in which the
3
4 “other” was basically seen as opposed to rational procedures of thinking and inasmuch inferior to
5
6 the European civilization [25].
7
8 It would not be reasonable to suppose that the institutional framework of a nation might be
9
10 completely independent and separated from its cultural features. Therefore, we intend to discuss in
11
12 more detail how the concept of “orientalism” assumes heuristic importance for the deconstruction
13
14 of the European misrepresentations about the MSP. We will argue in section five that
15
16 misconceptions and distorted views of the risks involved in the trans-Mediterranean commerce of
17 CSP electricity also play the role of implicitly pressuring MENA countries to adopt measures and
18
19 regulations more in consonance with the rules and prerogatives of the European energy market. In
20
21 short, we will point to an “institutional orientalism” that is highly prescriptive in the sense that the
22
23 evolution advocated for the energy sector in Southern Mediterranean countries is actually a set of
24
25 reforms towards European ways of energy governance.
26
27
28
29
30
3. Methodological Approach
31
32
33
34 We rely on the notion of “provincialising Europe”, such as developed by Dipesh
35
36 Chakrabarty [24], as a procedure to reveal the geopolitical determinations of European narratives
37
38 about the failures of trans-Mediterranean cooperation on CSP infrastructure. This idea has an
39
40 important methodological value in that it distinguishes the critique of historical asymmetries from
41
42
any manichean interpretation that might sound as “postcolonial revenge”. Indeed, Chakrabarty
43 affirms that “provincialising Europe” is not a project which consists of neglecting or discarding
44
45 European thought, which he considers as indispensable and inadequate at the same time for the
46
47 comprehension of non-European realities. On the contrary, he regards European thought nowadays
48
49 as a common heritage which also affects former colonies and for this reason must be renewed from
50
51 the peripheries.
52
53 This research must therefore be understood as a critical effort to discuss the MSP from its
54
55 margins, which means that we will not approach MENA countries by regretting their insufficiencies
56
57 and concluding that their energy regulation framework is still “immature” for transnational
58
investments in CSP electricity. Instead, we translate the “Desertec concept” in accordance with the
59
60 realities of Southern Mediterranean countries and reassert their agency towards a decarbonisation
61
62 6
63
64
65
 path.

1 As a methodological reference, “provincialising Europe” contributes to the reinterpretation

2
3 of Western knowledge from the borders of developed countries and enables a clearer view of those
4
5 effective contradictions that separate Europe from its own ideals of rationality. Such procedure will
6
prepare the conditions for a more balanced understanding of the MSP, identifying the pragmatic
7
8 reasons why many Southern Mediterranean countries have formulated RE programs and
9
10 pronounced themselves in favour of CSP investments in their territories. It also provides the critical
11
12 framework to highlight the “orientalist” arguments implicit in the European literature about the
13
14 MSP and Desertec, which recurrently echoes the pressure for reforms in MENA countries, without
15
16 clearly pointing out the energy interests within Europe that have concretely hindered the
17 accomplishment of the MSP.
18
19
20 Nevertheless, it would not be analytically coherent to present all the controversies around
21
22 the MSP as synonyms of what we call “institutional orientalism”. There were also questions with
23
the purpose of verifying the premises of rationality underlying this project in the light of more
24
25 comprehensive socioeconomic and environmental criteria: 1) What are the relevant environmental
26
27 aspects of the trans-Mediterranean commerce of CSP electricity? 2) Would it be preferable for
28
29 Europe to continue investing in RE programs within its own territory and thus avoid all the
30
31 difficulties associated with MSP? 3) What would be the benefits – or the disadvantages – for each
32
33 shore of the Mediterranean in case the MSP turns to reality? The DLR has developed several model
34 studies in order to clarify these points, and since it is important for the argument presented in this
35
36 article to differentiate legitimate scepticism about the feasibility of CSP cooperation projects from
37
38 those objections embedded in “institutional orientalism”, we dedicate the next section to discussing
39
40 under which concrete circumstances the MSP might be a mutually beneficial enterprise.
41
42
43
44
45 4. Trans-Mediterranean CSP electricity trade: Asymmetrical exploitation of solar
46
resources or new energy cooperation paradigm?
47
48
49
50
51 There is a growing consensus among scientists that climate change is already in process and
52
53 that the MENA region is very likely to become one of the most affected territories worldwide [37].
54
55 It is expected that a combination of higher temperatures and decreasing and more erratic
56
57 precipitation will intensify the already acute water stress and accelerate the desertification process
58
[6, 38]. By now, climate change impacts are leading to displacement and migration in countries like
59
60 Morocco. This means that, in the absence of a comprehensive mitigation program, migration
61
62 7
63
64
65
 pressures tend to increase with severe consequences not only for MENA, but also for European
countries [39].
1
2
3 Even though average energy consumption per capita in MENA is five times lower than in
4
5 France, it has steadily increased since 1980 and population growth associated with economic
6
development will push their energy demand further until the middle of this century [40]. Despite the
7
8 region’s vulnerability to climate change, investments in RE have been considerably low, accounting
9
10 for only 4% of global investments in alternative energy technologies [41]. Hence, the MSP favours
11
12 Southern Mediterranean countries presenting a sustainable alternative for their growing demand and
13
14 thus preventing a twofold increase in energy emissions in the business as usual scenario [42].
15
16 The assertion that CSP investments constitute a sustainable option for MENA countries is
17
18 based on the fact that it produces only 16g of CO2/KWh, while the figures for steam coal and
19
20 combined cycle natural gas plants amount to 900g and 450g of CO2/KWh respectively [3,5].
21
22 Considering that water demand is expected to drastically rise and that the use of fossil fuels for this
23
purpose is not viable in the long run, the ecological benefits for the region are also connected with
24
25 the possibility of feeding seawater desalination plants with CSP electricity [6, 38, 43].
26
27
28 From the European perspective, CSP imports would play a decisive role for the
29
accomplishment of its purpose to reduce GHG emission between 80% and 95% by 2050 [44]. Its
30
31 function in the European energy mix would be highly strategic because CSP provides dispatchable
32
33 power, which makes it suitable for compensating oscillations in the energy grid. Hydropower,
34
35 geothermal and biomass are also RE technologies with analogous regulation functions, but the
36
37 European potential for exploiting these sources is rather limited and, in the case of biomass, also
38
39 dependent on import from third countries [20, 45].
40
41 Nevertheless, the discussion around whether the MSP configures a mutually beneficial
42
43 project must address two fundamental objections: 1) Importing CSP electricity from MENA is
44
45 undesirable because it would reinforce European energy dependence; 2) The MSP is an enterprise
46
based on resource exploitation destined to maintain Southern Mediterranean countries in a subaltern
47
48 position in relation to their former metropolises. The first restriction is based on the assumption that
49
50 investing in domestic RE sources constitutes a more rational strategy because it makes European
51
52 “energy security” less vulnerable to external disturbances [46]. The second restriction lies on those
53
54 concrete historical experiences in which North-Atlantic countries benefited from MENA fossil fuel
55
56 resources without really contributing to local prosperity [47].
57
58 Approximately 50% of the EU's total energy requirements are met by non EU-members and
59
60 this proportion is expected to rise to roughly 70% in the next two decades [19]. The EU is relatively
61
62 8
63
64
65
 poor in fossil fuel resources and – taking into account the current status of technological
development – it is not capable of covering its electricity needs with indigenous RE sources over a
1
2 certain threshold [48]. CSP is based on thermodynamic principles that make it more economically
3
4 suitable for storing energy. Therefore, it is capable of providing dispatchable power to compensate
5
6 the highly oscillatory character of PV and wind turbines, which depend on long, medium or short
7
8 term storage processes that would also represent financial and resource costs. Besides, the option
9
10 for building a European supergrid to compensate such oscillations would demand a huge expansion
11 of transmission lines [20].
12
13
14 Figure 1. Model of HDVC direct connections between CSP plants in Marrakesh and Missour
15
16 (Morocco) and consumption centres in Daxlanden and Eichstellen (Germany)
17
18
19
20 Source: [49]
21
22
23 Apart from the technical reasons that point to the necessity of external cooperation for
24
25
implementing an ambitious energy transition roadmap, the arguments that associate European
26 insulation with “energy security” are inaccurate, given that the MSP actually diversifies EU energy
27
28 sources. “Let's consider a scenario (I) in which Europe depends only on Russian gas and a scenario
29
30 (II) in which Europe would depend on Russian gas and Moroccan solar energy. What happens then
31
32 with the risks? Considering that we have no reason at all to consider Morocco less reliable than
33
34 Russia, the risks would fall 50%. Instead of having one supplier, now we have two” [20]. CSP
35
36
electricity import cannot be regarded as one-side dependency, but rather as a mutual dependency
37 project, contributing to stabilizing and strengthening the relations between partner countries
38
39 inasmuch as electricity export revenues would become an important component of MENA's GDP
40
41 [12].
42
43 On the other hand, it is also improper to characterize in advance the MSP as solar
44
45 colonialism by associating it with the history of fossil fuel exploitation [50]. Contrary to fossil fuels,
46
47 solar energy is theoretically inexhaustible and European imports would therefore not diminish to
48
49 any extent the opportunities for the local utilization of such resource. Actually, it is precisely the
50
51 contrary, European investments would scale-up the manufacture of CSP components: the reduction
52
of costs associated with the payment of electricity revenues to MENA exporting countries would
53
54 facilitate the economic conditions for the execution of CSP projects to cover local demand.
55
56
57 However, we also consider erroneous to peremptorily affirm that the MSP constitutes a
58
“win-win situation” on the basis of abstract representation of opportunities, while erasing the
59
60 existing social realities and the specificity of regional interests. Even though transnational
61
62 9
63
64
65
 cooperation on solar energy projects indeed appears as a comprehensive response for the mitigation
of climate change, it requires social legitimization from the citizens of the countries supposed to
1
2 take part. If it is correct to affirm that the risks associated with climate change need scientific
3
4 measurement in order to become visible [51], then it is also true that the benefits of avoiding them
5
6 are invisible as well, and might consequently be insufficient to mobilize the necessary social effort
7
8 for pushing forward the transition towards RE. Therefore, we assume that trans-Mediterranean
9
10 commerce of CSP electricity has not taken its definite shape yet and its asymmetrical or mutually
11 beneficial character is still an open question dependent on the negotiation process between Europe
12
13 and MENA over the concrete circumstances for its implementation.
14
15
16 In this sense, we will briefly analyse three issues that we regard as fundamental for the
17 realization of the MSP in relatively symmetric conditions: 1) the local participation in the CSP
18
19 value-chain, 2) the environmental impacts of such enterprise 3) the dimensions of knowledge and
20
21 technology transfer. This discussion is also important for reasons linked to the narratives around the
22
23 “inadequacy” of energy market regulation in MENA countries. These do not take into consideration
24
25 that any concession to minimize the European perception of the “risks” would be more likely in a
26
27 scenario in which EU institutions make concrete proposals which increase the commitment of
28 Southern governments in the negotiation process.
29
30
31
32
33 4.1 The local participation in the CSP value-chain: The majority of energy suppliers,
34
35 service providers, solar companies, finance and insurance corporations that participated in the
36
37 foundation of the DII were European, predominantly German firms. A first step towards a larger
38
39 involvement of industry partners from MENA was the admission of Nareva (Morocco) and Cevital
40 (Algeria), while others such as Sonatrach (Algeria), ACWA Power (Saudi Arabia) and Taqa Arabia
41
42 (Egypt) took part in some of the existing CSP projects in the region [52, 53].
43
44
45 The local manufacture of CSP components and the creation of qualified jobs are decisive
46
conditions for the social legitimization of solar projects in the exporting countries. It has been
47
48 shown that national States tend to pragmatically formulate their energy policies in view of the
49
50 potential benefits of the RE industry for GDP growth [54], which in the case of the MSP means that
51
52 the support given by local governments is highly dependent on the participation of their respective
53
54 national industries in the CSP value-chain.
55
56 Depending on the scale of solar projects in MENA, it is also likely that European companies
57
58 might have interest in building manufacturing capacities in the region. According to Ragwitz [55], it
59
60 is estimated that in a scenario with more than 5 GW of CSP deployed in the Sahara Desert, North
61
62 10
63
64
65
 African participation could reach almost 60% of the value-chain by 2020, creating between 64,000
and 79,000 permanent local jobs. Nonetheless, the labour conditions and remuneration of MENA
1
2 workers are important criteria to define if such enterprises contribute to the reproduction of
3
4 historical asymmetries. If it were considerably inferior to European standards (PPP), then it would
5
6 characterize a “race to the bottom” model based on the low costs of labour, which would also be
7
8 disadvantageous from the perspective of European workers [56].
9
10
11
12
13
4.2 Environmental impacts of CSP electricity trade and mitigation strategies: The core
14 of the discourse that legitimates the “Desertec concept” and the MSP is the urgency of energy
15
16 transition in view of the disruptive effects of climate change on ecosystems and, consequently, on
17
18 human societies [1, 41, 57]. According to the IPCC [37], the burdens of the climate crisis are to be
19
20 carried mainly by Southern countries, which are precisely those societies devoid of financial
21
22 resources for implementing mitigation and adaptation strategies. Even though the climate prognoses
23
are not so harsh for North-Atlantic countries, they are certainly to be affected in such crisis,
24
25 inasmuch as the environmental refugees tend to increase migration pressures along their borders.
26
27
28 Thus, CSP deployment is regarded as a cardinal action to prevent climate disruptions. In the
29
model developed by Hess [49], it has been considered that using this technology to generate 9.32
30
31 TWh/y could save up to 8.4 Million tons of CO2 emissions. However, the author has also identified
32
33 some risks and possible environmental damages involved in the construction and operation of
34
35 thermal solar power plants, emphasizing the importance of conducting an impact assessment
36
37 evaluation in order to verify the optimal routes for the HVDC cables so that environmental damages
38
39 are minimized in the exporting, importing and transit countries [2, 4].
40
41 The issue of water requirements for cooling the system and cleaning the mirrors is
42
43 particularly sensitive. Even if efficiency techniques are applied, i.e. dry cooling mechanisms, it is
44
45 assumed that circa 4.1 million cubic meters of water would be necessary for generating 13.7 TWh/y
46
[49]. Hence, it is imperative to develop seawater desalination plants powered by RE technologies
47
48 from the very initial stages of the MSP because it would be irrational and unfair to invest in solar
49
50 energy for European consumption at the cost of an exacerbation of the harsh water stress in the
51
52 MENA region [38]. If these issues are taken into account, environmental benefits of CSP electricity
53
54 will largely compensate its impacts.
55
56
57
58
4.3 The dimensions of knowledge and technology transfer: Even if the negotiation
59
60 process is successful in guaranteeing favourable economic conditions and environmental benefits
61
62 11
63
64
65
 for MENA, the trans-Mediterranean energy cooperation will remain an asymmetrical enterprise,
unless concrete measures for knowledge share and technology transfer are taken. In this sense, the
1
2 EU has identified technology transfer as a major priority for the MSP and stated that RE projects in
3
4 Southern Mediterranean countries should lead to the emergence of local industry activity, job
5
6 creation, as well as research and innovation capacities [8].
7
8 Scientists from universities and research centres in MENA have collaborated with the DLR
9
10 by providing the necessary data for the CSP studies published between 2005 and 2007 [2, 4, 6, 45].
11
12 This research collaboration has continued further and taken place at six MENAREC editions, where
13
14 German and MENA scientists have discussed a wide range of issues related to CSP deployment,
15
16 including innovative and smart technologies. In such occasions, scientists have gathered with
17 representatives from the industry, policy-makers and government officials to discuss the existing
18
19 barriers for cooperation in solar projects and possible solutions for them [58].
20
21
22 Nevertheless, concrete actions for technology transfer have not been implemented yet and it
23
is very unclear how this issue is expected to progress. The CSP market is highly oligopolistic and it
24
25 is doubtful whether companies such as Siemens and Schott Solar will have the intention of sharing
26
27 their know-how with MENA industries and consequently renounce their competitive market
28
29 advantages [13]. For this reason, EU actions have been limited to expertise cooperation, which does
30
31 not meet MENA expectations of technology transfer and might merely represent a modality of soft
32
33 power [59]. In case no compromise is achieved, CSP programs would either rely on massive R&D
34 investments from local governments or imply that MENA countries would remain in a position of
35
36 dependency vis-à-vis European companies.
37
38
39
40
41 5. Elements of “Institutional Orientalism”: Energy Market and Policy,
42
43 Regulation/Stability, and Security.
44
45
46 In the previous section we highlighted some important conditions for the MSP to be
47
48 characterized as a mutually beneficial energy alliance. We also identified possible distortions that
49
50 could aggravate the existing asymmetries between Europe and MENA and thus corroborate those
51
52 pessimistic voices that identify transnational CSP electricity trade as a new version of resource and
53
54
knowledge-based colonialism.
55
56 Based on the postcolonial critical references discussed in section two, we now deconstruct
57
58 European misperceptions on the obstacles to CSP cooperation with MENA countries. We argue that
59
60
subjective representations of the risks involved in such projects express mainly orientalist views
61
62 12
63
64
65
 regarding the conflicts and institutions in MENA that are widely disseminated in academic articles,
in the press, as well as in the approach to European financial organizations. Eventually, it will be
1
2 clear that – even though empirical references contradict orientalist narratives – such
3
4 misrepresentations are in the very core of the hindrances to the accomplishment of the MSP.
5
6
Furthermore, by following the methodological path developed by Dipesh Chakrabarty [24],
7
8 we “provincialise” the European energy discourse and argue that the usual emphasis on the risk
9
10 dimension of CSP investments is implicitly associated with the pressures for MENA countries to
11
12 adopt the European energy regulation framework and thus favour the interests of European private
13
14 companies. Also based on empirical references, we suggest that the current policy cohesion within
15
16 the EU for an ambitious project like the MSP is insufficient and that business interests have blocked
17 the steps for an energy agreement more in consonance with ecological premises. At the same time, a
18
19 brief presentation of the targets formulated by NA countries for RE deployment and the policies
20
21 developed by them in the field of solar energy will contribute for disavowing the European
22
23 statement concerning the “institutional maturity” of MENA countries. As we mentioned above, our
24
25 intention is to instigate neither a “colonial revenge” nor an anti-EU discourse, but to deconstruct
26
27 misrepresentations on the issue and thus contribute to the negotiation process between EUMENA
28 countries on a more rational basis.
29
30
31
32
33 5.1 The negative impacts of “institutional orientalism” for CSP investments in MENA
34
35 countries: Nadejda Komendantova and her research team have developed relevant qualitative
36
37 studies on risk perception among stakeholders in the business of RE development in NA. They have
38
39 interviewed European participants of workshops focused on the MSP and DII who are involved
40 with CSP projects in Southern Mediterranean countries, asking them to identify the major barriers
41
42 and risks connected with investments in RE capacity for local use and electricity export. Experts
43
44 from industries, financial sector, scientific community and political actors were interviewed and
45
46 questioned about their level of concern in relation to a pre-ordained list of risks. The results have
47
48 shown that three issues were rated as highly concerning: regulatory risks (complexity and instability
49
50 of national regulations); political risks (low level of political stability and lack of support from
51 national governments) and force majeure risks (natural and human-made disasters, including
52
53 terrorism) [60].
54
55
56 It is important to have in mind that the concerns expressed by the stakeholders reflect their
57 subjective judgments, which might not exactly correspond to the empirical reality of NA countries.
58
59 This gap is particularly clear when one considers terrorist attack threats to the energy infrastructure.
60
61 Scholvin [13], for instance, contested the Desertec project due to the “unstable security situation in
62 13
63
64
65
 many MENA countries – particularly the menace of terrorist attacks – that could hinder the
realisation of the project”. Contrary to such view, Lacher and Kumetat [15] have conducted a
1
2 systematic investigation of EU-NA energy relations and verified that local conflicts have had no
3
4 impacts on the energy supply to Europe. Algeria, Egypt and Libya are major suppliers of crude oil
5
6 and natural gas to Europe and – except for minor incidents which were not responsible for any
7
8 significant disruption – sabotage acts have not compromised the stability of energy trade between
9
10 EU and NA.
11
12 Karen Stengen [61] has developed a methodology for assessing the risks posed by terrorist
13
14 groups to CSP infrastructure in NA. The conclusion pointed out that the vulnerability is low and
15
16 could be further mitigated by improving security in major energy facilities and contingency
17 planning (2012). According to Lilliestam [62], even though electricity imports are more vulnerable
18
19 than gas imports, neither Desertec electricity nor fossil fuel imports represent a serious menace to
20
21 Europe. The risks are inexpressive due to the high systemic resilience and also because attacks to
22
23 energy infrastructure have low symbolic appeal to extremist groups.
24
25 The antecedents of energy commerce in the region also disavow the assertions that local
26
27 political disputes might exert a deterrent influence on trans-Mediterranean CSP electricity.
28
29 Concerns regarding political stability do not take into consideration that NA countries established
30
31 RE targets and solar programs that have been progressively implemented in spite of the protests and
32
33 constitutional changes that followed the “Arab Spring” [27, 63, 64]. Even though NA presents
34 different energy scenarios, local governments have mostly developed new institutions and finance
35
36 mechanisms in order to support the advance of alternative energy technologies. In Algeria, the
37
38 government established the New Energy Agency (NEAL) with the purpose of encouraging domestic
39
40 production, use and export of renewable energy, while Morrocco has created a national agency for
41
42 solar energy (MASEN), that is currently responsible for building the largest CSP complex
43
44
worldwide at Ouarzazate with a combined capacity of 500 MW [65, 66].
45
46 Based on some premises of postcolonial theories – particularly E. Said's critical appraisal of
47
48 Western misrepresentations on non-European cultures [25] –, we define “institutional orientalism”
49
50 as a complex set of distorted perceptions that interpose barriers to symmetrical cooperation
51 initiatives between Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries. Therefore, institutional
52
53 orientalism might be concretely identified in those narratives that have Northern countries as their
54
55 epistemological loci of enunciation, blaming Southern partners' “insufficiencies” for the failures in
56
57 transnational enterprises. Such narratives are incapable of discerning relevant specificities between
58
59 non-Western peoples – while the distances perceived in relation to self-referred European criteria of
60
61
rationality constitute the basis for assigning to Southern countries the responsibility for the non-
62 14
63
64
65
 fulfilment of the (potentially) mutual beneficial aspects of infrastructure projects.

1 A typically orientalist suspicion on the political reliability of energy suppliers in an eventual

2
3 “Desertec scenario” was expressed by Fred Pearce [67], whose purpose was to discredit the idea of
4
5 trans-Mediterranean CSP electricity by affirming that Europe would then be hostage to MENA
6
countries. He creates a false parallel between solar electricity and oil dependency so as to affirm
7
8 that Southern Mediterranean countries would take advantage of their position as energy exporters
9
10 for political blackmail. This argument disconsiders that fossil fuels are finite resources that can be
11
12 stored for large periods of time, differently from RE export revenues that would cease, if electricity
13
14 is not transferred in a relatively short time after its generation.
15
16 Lilliestam and Ellenbeck [68] accurately criticized the idea that MENA countries might use
17
18 CSP electricity as an energy weapon by demonstrating that Europe would be able to cope with
19
20 transmission disruptions through capacity buffers and demand-response mechanisms. These authors
21
22 simulated different scenarios and concluded that Europe would be susceptible to extortion and
23
political pressure only in the extreme arrangement that all NA countries unite in using the “energy
24
25 weapon”. Furthermore, they argue that in the scenario in which Northern and Southern
26
27 Mediterranean partners are successful in creating a negotiation framework that provides mutual
28
29 benefits and shared prosperity, electricity export revenues would become an important component
30
31 of local GDP. In this case, importing and exporting countries would develop interdependence ties
32
33 that would minimize not only the risks of energy conflicts, but even broader geopolitical risks.
34
35 In other words, European narratives and risk perception of CSP investments in the MENA
36
37 countries are determined by subjective factors with pronounced orientalist content. The instrumental
38
39 dimension of European narratives is to pressure Southern Mediterranean countries to adopt EU
40 rules as parameters for the modification of their own energy institutions and regulation framework.
41
42 Indeed, the EU's strategy of external governance consists to a high degree in shaping international
43
44 agreements and negotiations so that target countries are induced to embrace its normative directives
45
46 in their domestic legislation [14]. Thus, the appeal for “closing the regulatory gap” among MSP
47
48 partners consists actually in demanding that MENA countries follow the European path, implicitly
49
50 taken as more rational than their Southern counterparts'.
51
52 As well as in other institutional fields, EU demands in the energy sector mainly tend to
53
54 induce privatization and market liberalization. Even though a more detailed analysis disavows a
55
56 positive evaluation of such policies in those countries where they were applied [40], the adoption of
57 European rules appears as a necessary condition for the flow of investments and bank loans.
58
59 Schinko and Kommendantova have demonstrated [28, 60] that the costs of capital for CSP
60
61 investments are highly dependent on the risk premium factor, which basically defines the interest
62 15
63
64
65
 taxes for financial loans. The costs of capital vary significantly according to the perceived risks that
investors associate with specific projects, even though these subjective judgments do not
1
2 necessarily find empirical validation. “If a CSP investor in NA could acquire project financing at a
3
4 cost equivalent to that in Europe, the LCOE could be reduced from USD 0.21/KWh to USD
5
6 0.15/KWh or by 32%” [28].
7
8 The deconstruction of European narratives around the risks associated to the MSP has
9
10 consequently pointed to three major implications of institutional orientalism. In the politico-
11
12 normative sphere, institutional orientalism constitutes a power discourse that arbitrarily defines the
13
14 meaning of “rationality”, based on self-referred parameters. In transnational infrastructure projects
15
16 involving both developed and developing nations, it allows Northern countries to present their own
17 regulatory framework as the most suitable for the common enterprise and eventually also compels
18
19 Southern countries to modify their domestic rules. In the economic sphere, institutional orientalism
20
21 reproduces mutatis mutandis the colonial mechanisms of wealth transfer from Southern to Northern
22
23 countries because it legitimizes subjective risk narratives that make Southern countries' access to
24
25 international finance significantly more difficult and expensive. Finally, in the politico-cultural
26
27 sphere, the concept enables us to address the reproduction of historical world asymmetries as
28 geopolitics of knowledge regarding the technology transfer issue. In a historical perspective,
29
30 institutional orientalism brings to light constraining aspects of the previous colonialist processes
31
32 which remain currently effective as an imbalanced resource and knowledge-based exploitation
33
34 relying on political economy and intellectual property mechanisms.
35
36
37
38
39 5.2 Provincialising European energy discourses:
40
41 Our discussion around institutional orientalism has taken the postcolonial critique of
42
43 historicism as the theoretical insight for the deconstruction of pretence universalisms embedded in
44
45 European discourses for external energy governance. Nevertheless, if European standards for
46
energy regulation cannot be automatically prescribed for other regions, what criteria might then
47
48 serve as a reference for transnational energy cooperation between developed and developing
49
50 countries? What sort of reason might be seen as favourable to local interests in different cultural
51
52 perspectives, without disregarding the heterogeneity of sociohistorical contexts in which energy
53
54 policies are concretely formulated?
55
56 We define rational energy planning as the development of the energy infrastructure which
57
58 makes use of technological innovations to improve energy gains and explore renewable sources in
59
60 order to achieve energy security in accordance with sustainability criteria [69]. In this sense, we
61
62 16
63
64
65
 argue that environmental criteria present a more comprehensive basis for international energy
governance and transnational energy infrastructure projects because the reality of climate change
1
2 has made sustainability a cosmopolitan parameter [51]. Therefore, the configuration of a “win-win
3
4 scenario” regarding international energy cooperation projects such as MSP and Desertec, must be
5
6 evaluated taking the environmental space-time scale as the rational ground for the risk/benefit ratio,
7
8 subordinating economic and geopolitical criteria to substantive mitigation goals [70]. In other
9
10 words, “institutional orientalism” also expresses its sectary tendencies when corporate and political
11 action refuse to redefine their risk/benefit assessment criteria in accordance with the entangled
12
13 space-time conditions of the environment.
14
15
16 Notwithstanding European narratives that blame MENA institutions for the deficiencies of
17 the MSP, the stagnation of trans-Mediterranean CSP electricity trade is to a great extent related to
18
19 the low integration of EU energy policies [klein Staaterei]. National concerns on energy sovereignty
20
21 and disputes between different fields of the energy industry have impaired the development of a
22
23 unified energy approach within the EU, as well as the advancement of a coordinated policy with
24
25 Southern Mediterranean countries [11].
26
27 The existing energy policy framework in many EU countries is still one tailored to
28
29 conventional energy systems [5] and vulnerable to intense lobby disputes behind the curtains, both
30
31 between conventional and RE industry, as well as within different sectors of the RE industry. These
32
33 arguments are illustrated not only by the volume of indirect subsidies that annually benefit the
34 conventional energy industry, but also by the fact that European FDI in Libya, Egypt and Algeria
35
36 flow primarily to the hydrocarbon sector [60]. Furthermore, Germany is the second largest financer
37
38 of coal power plants abroad and even its PV industry has worked against CSP investments in the
39
40 Mediterranean region [71], while France has basically disregarded the MSP in favour of bilateral
41
42 cooperation in nuclear energy programs fostered by some MENA countries [17].
43
44 On the other hand, it is true that the anachronistic idea that fossil fuel subsidies contribute to
45
46 poverty alleviation is still an energy directive for several MENA countries. Nowhere else
47
48 mechanisms for keeping oil and gas prices artificially low are so widespread, and five of the top ten
49
50 subsidizers in the world are located in this region: Iran with USD 84 billion and Saudi Arabia with
51 USD 62 billion account for over a quarter of global pre-tax subsidies [72]. In spite of that, many
52
53 local governments have developed new institutional arrangements for the promotion of renewables
54
55 and established RE incentive programs so that in most cases updated RE deployment goals are
56
57 similar to EU targets for 2020 [64]. Therefore, since national energy scenarios vary considerably,
58
59 MENA cannot be regarded as a homogeneous region, as it is frequently the case in European
60
61
literature embedded in institutional orientalism. Further studies are necessary in order to provide a
62 17
63
64
65
 detailed panorama of the specific approaches to energy security and thus to avoid false
generalizations [55, 66, 73].
1
2
3 Due to the high levels of solar irradiance in MENA, the growing support for RE policies has
4
5 been translated in a set of specific programs for a bigger share of solar technologies in various
6
countries. The Egyptian government, for instance, aims at 20% of renewables by 2020 and intends
7
8 to deploy at least 6 GW of PV cells within this timeframe. Palestine is very representative in Solar
9
10 Water Heater (SWH) appliances, with an installed capacity that exceeded 1.5 million m2 and
11
12 accounted for almost 50% of SWH deployment in the Arab world at the beginning of the present
13
14 decade [27,64].
15
16 In 2009, the Tunisian government announced the “Tunisian Solar Plan” with the purpose of
17
18 achieving 4.7 GW of combined PV, SWH and CSP plants before 2030. This goal includes the
19
20 “TuNur Concentrated Solar Power Project” that intends to reach 2,250 MW of CSP utilities,
21
22 including the possibility of commercialising part of this electricity with Italy via HVDC submarine
23
cables [74]. As we mentioned above, Morocco has also established a national solar programme and
24
25 is currently building the 500 MW Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex, which will soon represent the
26
27 largest concentration of CSP plants worldwide [39]. Moreover, according to the study of Boie I.
28
29 [75], the share of RE in NA would reach nearly 100% by 2050, with CSP playing an important role
30
31 in the energy mix, while the electricity exports to Europe will gain particular importance in the
32
33 period after 2030.
34
35 However, in view of the European hesitation with regards to trans-Mediterranean CSP
36
37 electricity trade, MENA investments in thermal solar energy are either associated with energy
38
39 security concerns restricted to the national level or related to strategies destined to maximize the
40 revenues from fossil fuels. Both Tunisia and Morocco are energy dependent countries and their
41
42 respective solar programs are intended to reduce expenses related to energy import. On the contrary,
43
44 Algeria and Saudi Arabia possess large reserves of conventional fuels and in such cases the
45
46 construction of CSP plants is intended to minimize the domestic consumption of oil and gas so that
47
48 these resources can be sold abroad opportunely [76]. This later strategy constitutes a paradox from
49
50 the angle of environmental rationality because, even though it contributes to scaling up CSP
51 utilities, it maintains the energy entanglement with developed countries on the basis of fossil fuel
52
53 resources.
54
55
56
57
58 6. Conclusion
59
60
61
62 18
63
64
65
 This article presented CSP electricity trade as a rational approach to climate, energy and
water governance in the Mediterranean region. We discussed the question of whether CSP projects,
1
2 such as Desertec and MSP, represent mutually beneficial or asymmetrical enterprises in the energy
3
4 field, arguing that there is no a priori answer for this problem, and that an accurate characterization
5
6 depends on the terms of a transnational agreement, which were not defined yet. In this sense, we
7
8 presented concrete socioeconomic and environmental criteria as parameters for the negotiation
9
10 process: the participation of MENA countries in the CSP value-chain, the implementation of
11 mitigation strategies for the ecological impacts related to the construction and operation of CSP
12
13 plants and a more explicit definition of the conditions for North-South knowledge and technology
14
15 transfer. Denis Hess [49] has also thoroughly discussed these issues and added that the success of
16
17 CSP electricity trade depends on the development of common political goals between the countries
18
19 involved. Additionally, community administration of thermal solar power plants would be an
20
21 important measure for avoiding the restriction of benefits in the Southern shore of the
22 Mediterranean to MENA elites.
23
24
25 Furthermore, our specific contribution was to point out the relevance of postcolonial theories
26
27 for the analysis of concrete projects of energy infrastructure between developed and developing
28 nations. Based on the critiques developed by Said, Mignolo, Bhambra and Chackrabarty, we
29
30 presented a conceptual definition of “institutional orientalism” that enabled us to identify those
31
32 European misrepresentations on the MSP which blame MENA countries for the insufficiencies and
33
34 failures of trans-Mediterranean commerce of CSP electricity. European stakeholders repeat ad
35
36 nauseam that MENA regimes are unstable, as if the whole region were still in the same turmoil as
37
38
Libya and Syria. They affirm that the Arab Spring “put the last nail in the Desertec coffin”, but do
39 not explain why negotiations did not resume in the subsequent period, when demonstrations and
40
41 clashes had ceased or significantly moderated. Meanwhile, the erratic policies towards RE
42
43 incentives in Spain and Italy are completely absent from the MSP debate.
44
45 We presented “institutional orientalism” as a complex set of culturally based distortions that
46
47 highlights the risks for CSP investments in MENA and consequently results in a series of demands
48
49 for reforms in local energy regulations based on self-referred European patterns of energy
50
51 governance. We also called attention to existing research which demonstrates how the mainstream
52
53 European perception of risks make the access of MENA countries to the financial resources more
54
55
restricted and expensive, which contributes to raising the capital costs of the projects and,
56 consequently, the electricity prices paid by the final consumers [28, 64].
57
58
59 However, such studies show an important limitation because they focus on strategies for
60
61
mitigating the risks of CSP investments in MENA, rather than criticising the very basis of
62 19
63
64
65
 “institutional orientalism” which gives place to misrepresented risks. Besides, the notion of “risks”
assumed by these authors coincides with the narrow conception of risks which used by financial
1
2 institutions, without any regard to the incorporation of the social and environmental risks posed by
3
4 climate change scenarios. In this sense, they remain in the epistemological framework of
5
6 “institutional orientalism”, rather than pointing to the deconstruction of imbalanced and
7
8 asymmetrical energy discourses.
9
10 Finally, we provincialized both European and MENA attitudes towards CSP investments
11
12 with reference to the criteria of environmental reason. Due to the fact that environmental reason less
13
14 of a Eurocentric analytical category than a cosmopolitan parameter, it demonstrates a more
15
16 objective view on the respective barriers interposed by each shore of the Mediterranean for the
17 accomplishment of the MSP. Differently from colonial narratives based on the assumptions of
18
19 historicism, environmental reason has no teleological bias. The latter does not point to any energy
20
21 transition as a historical necessity, but as entangled rational projects which might also fail to
22
23 overcome those energy interests which are currently hegemonic in the Mediterranean region. While
24
25 “institutional orientalism” inflates the risks of CSP investments in MENA, our critical analysis
26
27 inverts this question and questions the risks of postponing such investments.
28
29
30
31 Acknowledgements
32
33
34
35
36 We are thankful to Professor Dr. Franz Trieb for sharing with us valuable information on
37
38 trans-Mediterranean CSP electricity trade. We also acknowledge the support from the São Paulo
39
40 State Research Foundation (FAPESP) and the National Council for Scientific and Technological
41
42
Development (CNPq).
43
44
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Figure
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