Vol. 8(5), pp.

30-40, November 2016

DOI: 10.5897/AJHC2016.0334
Article Number: 2BEC2D261581
ISSN 2141-6672 African Journal of History and Culture
Copyright © 2016
Author(s) retain the copyright of this article
http://www.academicjournals.org/AJHC

Review

The historical background to the Takyiman disputes

with Asante
Kwame Adum-Kyeremeh
Department of History, Legon, Box 12 Legon, Accra, Ghana.
Received 24 August, 2016; Accepted 21 October, 2016

This paper examines the historical background to the Takyiman disputes with Asante. The study
reveals that cordial relations originally existed between Takyiman and Asante. Asante defeat of
Takyiman in 1723 notwithstanding, Takyiman dutifully served the Asantehene as a vassal state. Under
British colonial rule, Takyiman asserted its autonomy but in 1949 failed to have nine of its villages
Asante seized in the 19th century restored to them. Together with other Bono states, Takyiman formed
the Bono Kyempim Federation (BKF) and seceded from the Asante confederacy. Since 1959, the
Asantehene has continually interfered in Takyiman’s chieftaincy affairs. This paper seeks to examine
the background to Asante’s interest in Takyiman affairs. It argues that the Asante and British
governments’ interference in Takyiman’s chieftaincy affairs was the major contributory factor to the
Takyiman-Asante disputes in the twenty-first century. This study relied on archival data than any other
source. Archival research differs from the traditional method which is based on the researcher’s direct
observation. The archival method concerns itself with data previously collected and kept in a
repository, not necessarily by the researcher. The archival research enabled me to collect data on what
actually occurred during the colonial period on the subject. Secondly, data was used from published
works on the subject through library research.

Key words:Takyiman, Asante, Asantehene, chieftaincy

INTRODUCTION

The state of Takyiman located in modern Brong Ahafo
Region of Ghana was in the closing years of the
seventeenth century among the most powerful Akan
states in the forest fringes of modern Ghana lying to the
north-west of Asante. Takyiman gradually expanded into
what became known as the Bono Manso state.
Takyiman‟s expansion is attributable to the expansion
and flourishing trade from Asante to northern Ghana until
her power and influence were destroyed in their war with
Asante in 1722/1723. Available evidence suggests that
tension and animosity exist between the chiefs and
people of Takyiman and the Asanteman Council. The
creation of the Bono Ahafo region notwithstanding, the
Asantehene blatantly interferes in the affairs of the
Takyiman state. For example, in 1988, Otumfuo Opoku
Ware II, the late Asantehene in a letter to J. J. Rawlings,
the then Head of State of Ghana stated that he
(Asantehene) was constrained to bring to Rawlings‟

Email: kadum-kyeremeh@ug.edu.gh.

Authors agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License 4.0 International License

attention the concern which certain decisions by
Government on Chieftaincy Affairs in the Ashanti and
Brong Ahafo Regions was causing him and the chiefs
and people of Asante. By 1996, the Otumfuo had
elevated some stools (chiefs) in the Takyiman area to
paramountcies. When fighting broke out between Asante
and Bono the citizens at Tuobodom in 1998, many
people died, others fled and properties were destroyed.
In March 2008, Oseadeeyo Akumfi Ameyaw IV,
Omanhene of the Takyiman traditional area accused the
Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II of usurping the
traditional powers of Takyimanhene by installing a new
paramount chief at Tuobodom describing the Otumfuo‟s
action as “unacceptable and will not be tolerated since
Tuobodom is within the Takyiman traditional area”. He
said also that the “Takyiman traditional area is not part of
Asanteman”. He is believed to have asked why the
Asantehene in the twenty-first century demanded that
certain villages and towns in the Takyiman area with
which Asante had geographical, economic as well as
social interests be part of Asante. (Agyekum, 2008:482).
The Takyimanhene demanded to know why the
Asantehene should foment trouble in the Takyiman state;
an area which he believed was enjoying relative peace.
Nana Ameyaw said that the Asantehene should avoid
sowing seeds of discord in areas which are not part of his
kingdom because the interferences by Otumfuo was
tantamount to “indulging in slavery” (Agyekum, 2008:
481). A Ghanaian Times newspaper source, (March 19,
2008) asserted that tension had been mounting in the
Takyiman state since the installation of an Omanhene in
Tuobodom by the Asantehene in December, 2007.
Agyekum (2008: 481) says that on 3rd Nov 2008, a letter
on the Ghanaweb, an internet source indicated that the
Asantehene had resorted to “setting the stage for hatred
between chiefs in the two regions instead of uniting
them”. The aforementioned cases indicate that tension
and suspicion exist between the Takyiman traditional
state and Asante chiefs, located in two neighbouring
administrative regions of Ghana.
Despite hostile relations between Takyiman and
Asante, very little documentary information is available
about the history of Takyiman‟s relation with Asante.
These include William Tordoff, Ashanti under the
Prempehs 1888 to 1935, Ivor Wilks, The Northern Factor
in Ashanti History, and Wilks, Asante in the 19th Century
(1975). The few publications on the Takyiman state have
their own shortcomings. The main objective of
Meyerowitz‟s works; The Sacred State of the Akan (1949)
and Meyerowitz At the Court of an African King (1962),
was, as she stated in Meyerowitz (1962) to commemorate
the heroic fight of Nana Akumfi Ameyaw III, King of the
Bono Takyiman State and his people for independence
from Ashanti and the restoration of the nine villages
which they had lost to Ashanti for the second time in
1935 (Meyerowitz, 1962: 5). These books discuss the
Takyiman state, its institutions and some social and
Adum-Kyeremeh 31
customary practices of the state than their relations with
Asante. Brempong and Warren‟s works titled The
Tekyiman State Histories of Stools and Deities provide
vital information but emphasize stories of deities in the
Takyiman state. Effa Gyamfi has made valuable
contribution to our knowledge of Takyiman in his „Oral
Tradition and Archaeology, A case study of the Bono
State‟ (1974) but unfortunately the information is mainly
archaeological evidence. Kwame Arhin‟s A Profile of
Brong Kyempim (1979), a collection of essays on the
Archaeology, History, Language and Politics of the Bono
people of Ghana, provides little information about
Takyiman chiefs‟ relations with Asante emphasizing just
the origins and achievement of Takyiman as a kingdom.
Busia‟s The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political
System of Ashanti (1951) and George Agyekum‟s Asante
and Brong Ahafo Regions’ Chieftaincy Affairs (2008)
provide useful information about chieftaincy in Asante
and the Bono areas. The two books however,
respectively discuss effects of British rule on chieftaincy;
and proceedings at the Coussey Commission of Enquiry
(1972 to 1976) into Bono chiefs‟ dispute with Asante.
These pieces of information are all useful in helping us to
understand the frequent disputes between Asante and
Bono chiefs in the Takyiman Traditional area. An
important element of Takyiman‟s history, namely, the
historical relations between Takyiman‟s chiefs and their
Asante counterparts has not been given much attention
by historians. The current study seeks to fill this gap with
a survey of Takyiman chiefs‟ relations with Asante‟s
chiefs during the long period of their subordination to
Asante in 1723 to 1959. This includes the period of
cordial relations, and the era of Takyiman chiefs‟ struggle
to control these nine Takyiman villages. The study is
relevant; it will provide more information to government
and civil organizations who seek a lasting solution to the
frequent Takyiman state‟s disputes with the Asante
central government.
The period of sacrifice, co-operation and service
Takyiman‟s relations with Asante can be described as a
long period of sacrifice and dedicated service from the
earliest times to the late 19th century interspersed by
periods of mistreatment of Takyiman chiefs and their
people. In order to understand this point, it is important to
examine some of the major developments that occurred
during this period and how these developments in one
way or the other affected Takyiman‟s relations with
Asante. Cordial relations between Takyiman and Asante
existed for several reasons; first, Takyiman and Asante
royal families belong to the Oyoko clan. Takyiman regards
the Asantehene as his brother (Daily Graphic Tuesday
May 10, 2005: 40). Secondly, Takyiman, like other
ancient states felt safe, and probably proud to be counted
as one of the vassal states of Asante. Thirdly, Takyiman
32 Afr. J. Hist. Cult.
became the successor state to Bono Manso when Asante
defeated the latter state in 1723. This also attracted
Asante to the Takyiman state. Takyiman‟s richness in
gold, and its control of the gold trade passages to
Begho‟s trading centres were the other factors that
encouraged Asante to be interested in the affairs of the
Takyiman state. Reindorf asserts that King Amoyaw
(Ameyaw) taught Opoku Ware how to make gold and
silver weights; to claim the estate of deceased chiefs or
generals, how to enact laws, and fining offenders in order
to add to his power and reduce the power of his subjects.
(Reindorf, 1966: 56). Whatever the accuracy of this
tradition is, it is said that certain innovations were made
in the Asante financial administration when Ameyaw, the
Takyiman chief was captured and sent to Kumasi in
1723. One of such innovations was the introduction of
awunyadee (death duties), a practice for which it was
useful to have the advice of Takyiman experts. (Reindorf,
1966: 72).
Another area in which Takyiman contributed to Asante‟s
development was in its effort in Asante wars. To be able
to assess the state‟s contribution, one needs to consider
the number of troops Takyiman as a vassal contributed,
during Asante‟s wars and the casualties on Takyiman‟s
side. This is imperative as it was the duty of every subject
state of Asante to contribute troops to Asante‟s military
campaign when called upon to do so. The first of
Takyiman contributions to Asante troops was in the Boti
war, sixty years after the defeat of Takyiman. Bafour
Twum, an Asante royal brought Asante into that war and
lost his life during the war. Takyiman is believed to have
fought gallantly in the war. Immediately after the war,
Wiafe, Bafour‟s successor rebelled against Asante‟s
domination. Supported by Gonja and Gyaman,
Takyimanhene Kofi Kyereme quickly dispatched
messengers to Kumasi to inform Asantehene of Wiafe‟s
plans. Nana Kyereme‟s action was perhaps to repay
Nkoranza for its involvement in the Takyiman-Asante war
that led to the defeat of Takyiman in 1723. This was to
win Asante‟s favour or perhaps to assure Asante of
Takyiman‟s allegiance to the Golden Stool. (Warren and
Brempong, 1971: 21-23). The Asantehene quickly
dispatched messengers to Nkoranza to verify the
authenticity of the allegation. Wiafe allegedly stood by his
word and even put to death one of the Asantehene‟s
messengers. This act actually provoked the Asantehene
who entreated Nana Kyereme not to put Wiafe to death
when captured. Kyereme and his Takyiman force saw
this as a great opportunity to avenge Nkoranza‟s
involvement in its defeat by Asante in 1723. Over the
years, Takyiman had haboured her hatred for Nkoranza
to the extent that Nana Kyereme abused the power given
to him and landed Takyiman in trouble. Instead of
Kyereme handing Wiafe to Asantehene, he took arbitrary
decision of offering the head of Wiafe to his stool.
Although, this angered the Asantehene, the Takyiman
chief had nonetheless helped to eliminate a rebel of the
Asante state. (Meyerowitz, 1962: 18).
Takyiman again helped Asante when in the 1790s,
Osei Kwame, the then Asantehene became so inclined
towards Islam and was destooled. This precipitated an
uprising in the northwest intended to restore Osei Kwame
to the Golden Stool. Through the instigation of the
Gyaman king, rebellion broke out in Gyaman. The rebel
forces threatened to take Kumasi. The chiefs of
Takyiman, Banda and Nkoranza were loyal to Opoku
Fofie, Osei Kwame‟s successor. The royal forces were
allowed to penetrate deep into the grassland north of
Sakyidumase where joint Kong-Gyaman force and their
allies battled an Asante army near the large town of
Barbanou. The forces of the Kong-Gyaman were far
larger than those of Asante. The Asante king therefore
called for, and received the support of the rulers of
Banda, Dwaben, Takyiman and Nkoranza to repel the
invaders. Thus, one can say that Takyiman as Asante
province helped Asante against enemies who had vowed
to carry the war to the Asante capital. (Dupuis, 1824:
245-246). It was in the struggle between chiefs in Kumasi
and their counterparts in the metropolitan districts of
Adanse, Bekwai, Kokofu, Dwaben and the provinces of
Kwawu and Gyaman that Takyiman stayed neutral. But
even Takyiman did so this on the grounds that chiefs in
metropolitan Asante should be allowed to sort out their
internal differences. Events in Kumasi then were viewed
by Kwabena Fofie, the Takyimanhene as the collapse of
the Asante central government. Therefore when war
broke out between Kumasi and Dwaben in 1875, Fofie
refused flatly to contribute troops to Kumasi‟s war effort.
After the end of the Dwaben hostilities, Mensa Bonsu
demanded an apology from Fofie and his renewal of
allegiance to the Golden Stool both of which Nana Fofie
refused to do. Fofie is said to have explained his refusal
to contribute troops to his inability to understand the
issues involved in the war and reasons which prevented
their resolution without arm conflict. (Wilks, 1993:271-
272).
The social relations between the Takyiman and Asante
in pre-colonial times were friendly. Asante‟s traders and
farmers settled on Bono land where they created
permanent settlements in modern Odomase, Nkoranza
and Nsoatre. These Asante traders and hunters were not
disturbed while going about their hunting and trading
activities. Several of the immigrants intermarried with the
Bono people. Takyiman tradition asserts also that Asante
citizens consulted Takyiman deities such as Guakro, Taa
kora, Taa Mensa and many others. The traditions assert
that the Asante were permitted to dig for gold on
Takyiman land. They sent the gold they obtained to the
Takyiman chief who gave them the one-sixth portion
given to all Bono miners. (Arhin, 1991: 3-4). As a vassal
state of Asante, Takyiman dutifully paid an annual tribute
of slaves, cows, sheep, cotton cloth and some silk
products and from time to time, provided large numbers
of able-bodied men to join the Asante army. Takyiman

provided between 6,000 and 12,000 men placed within
the Adonten division of the Asante army, a position in
which they were used as shock troops. (Wilks, 1975: 243)
Historical evidence suggests also that Asante benefitted
significantly from the peaceful and thriving economic
atmosphere that Takyiman‟s interest in trade, mining and
other economic activities provided. Asante engaged in
panning and deep pit mining of gold and trade during
Nana Ameyaw Akumfi‟ I‟s reign in the 14th Century.
Through panning, the miners collected gold dust with
cane baskets from the alluvium of rivers Tano, Tain, Bisi
and Awora. (Anquandah, 1982: 97). Gold particles were
also picked from the ground and along the banks of rivers
and streams after they had been exposed by rain. Miners
obtained greater quantities of mpokua (nuggets) of gold
by digging into the alluvium deposits along river banks.
With the use of Asoso (adze) and aso (hoe) the miners
sank shafts of between two and three feet in diameter,
and about thirty and sixty feet deep into the alluvium.
(Effa-Gyamfi, 1978: 55).
Gold became an important commodity of trade in the
Bono Manso state with Asante and northern Ghana.
People transported it by head-loading quantities weighing
between five and a thousand tons to Bona and Kong in
present-day La Cote d‟Ivoire which were important
markets for the Asante gold trade. Takyiman and Asante
craftsmen made golden, brass and iron products for the
chief‟s palace and for sale to traders who patronized the
Bono markets (Garrard, 1986: 101). Nana
Oburumankoma, chief of Takyiman is said to have
introduced cowrie shells and gold dust to facilitate the
exchange of goods in the barter trade between Asante
and its neighbours in the 14th century. (Asihene, 1980).
The nsennea (scale) and the abramboo (gold weights)
became the standard system of weighing gold. It became
easier to exchange products, as the abramboo were in
different units of kokuo, nsua, asuanu and asuansa with
kokua being the highest unit, and asuansa was the
smallest unit. (Aboagye interview). Asante participated
actively in the gold and kola trade across Takyiman and
the Salaga to North Africa. Asante‟s trade to the north of
Africa constituted an important source of revenue to
Asante and helped it in its rise as a powerful kingdom
and empire. In pre-colonial times, Asante‟s traders freely
exchanged their products in the Takyiman and other
Bono markets at Ahwenekoko, Bonduku and Kintampo
without hindrance (Adum-Kyeremeh, 2000: 44). Another
important commodity of trade besides gold was kola nuts
collected mainly by women and children from Takyiman
and other forest areas during May and November. It was
sold to the Hausa, Mossi and Berber traders. Kola, to
these traders was an indispensable stimulant and a
necessity for the travelling trader. The availability and the
high demand for kola sustained the Asante-Northern
Ghana trade to the nineteenth century when rubber and
cocoa trade replaced it in the 1890s.(Arhin, 1967: 6).
Asante and Takyiman traditions assert that Asante
Adum-Kyeremeh 33
obtained the first yam seeds from Nana Ameyaw Kwakye
during the reign of Osei Tutu I. Takyiman traders sold
their wares of pottery, cloth, kola and the kyem (shield of
baboon skin), in the Kumasi market. From Tafo, Kaase,
Ofinso and Ohwim in Asante, the Takyiman people
obtained European cloths, salt and kola. Kintampo,
Atebubu and Donkoro Nkwanta, which were located
along the Trade Routes from Asante to the northern
markets served as resting places for Asante‟s traders.
Takyiman oral traditions assert also that the Asante were
permitted to dig for gold on Bonoland. They sent the gold
they obtained to the Bono chiefs who gave them the one-
sixth portion given to all Bono miners. Trade and other
economic activities went on smoothly between Asante,
Takyiman, Hausa and Berber traders from North Africa
throughout the 18th and the 19th centuries. (Arhin, 1965:
13).
Takyiman as an Asante Vassal state
Takyiman‟s defeat in their war with Asante in 1723 made
her a vassal state. Available historical data suggests that
the chiefs and people of Takyiman suffered indignities as
members of the Asante confederacy. Some of her lands
were placed under Bafuor‟s rule and Takyiman became
part of Nkoranza territory. (Rattray, 1932: 112) says that
the Brongs, when conquered became vassals of the
confederacy and they were called upon in times of war.
Coupled with these was the patchwork of political
allegiances introduced in the Takyiman state which
formed part of measures to prevent Takyiman from
consolidating her power in a single unifying block. Nine of
Takyiman‟s most influential villages called Tano-Subin
villages were put directly under separate Kumasi chiefs
as follows: Nkyiraa/Tuobodom-Nsumankwaahene,
Ofuman I-Adumhene; Ofuman II/Branam-
Dadeasoabahene; Subinso/Tanoboase-Anantahene;
Tanoso-Ahenkrohene; Buoyem-Asantehemaa. (Wilks,
1975: 245). These villages became part of their
respective assigned Kumasi divisions. They paid part of
the head stool‟s debt, fought in front of the occupant of
the head stool and any revenue derived from the said
villages was divided between the supervisor chief and the
Asantehene. Additionally, the Takyiman king, the queen
mother, and other important Bono citizens were taken as
prisoners.
Takyiman‟s state treasury was plundered and changes
were made in the Asante revenue system after the
Asante army defeated Bono-Manso and Takyiman in
1723. Reindorf (1932) states that the whole treasury of
the Takyiman kingdom was taken by Asante whose
power was greatly increased by this victory and that
several improvements were made by Amoyaw‟s
(Ameyaw) advice, on the government and social
conditions of Asante (Reindorf, 1895: 87). Takyiman‟s
strength was diminished by the Asante policy of
34 Afr. J. Hist. Cult.
„containment‟ through which some parts of Takyiman
were directly administered by Kumasi clan chiefs. This
policy hampered Takyiman‟s ability to form a formidable
force to challenge Asante or any of its satellite states.
Any such attempt would have meant that Takyiman
wanted to fight Nkoranza and the Asante kingdom as a
whole. In Asante, it was unconstitutional of any of the
Asante provinces to wage war without the consent of the
Atebubuhene. (Atta, 1992: 20-21). Takyiman oral
tradition asserts also that the state took part in the
Asante-Gyaman war fighting on the side of Asante. After
the war, the Asantehene invited the Takyimanhene and
his traditional priests to a victory parade in Kumasi. After
the parade, Takyimanhene was made to surrender his
villages, including, Tanoso, Tanoboase, Tuobodom,
Buoyam, Nkyiraa, Ofuman and Branam to Asante. It is
not known whether these villages came under Kumasi‟s
jurisdiction at the time of Opoku Ware I in the early
eighteenth century, or later. (Meyerowitz, 1965: 20)
asserts that this action took place; and was actually a
form of revenge for the act done by Nana Kofi Kyereme,
an ex-Takyimanhene for killing Wiafe an Nkoranza royal
in the 19th century (Warren and Brempong, 1971: 23).
It would be recalled that Asante developed a policy to
prevent Takyiman and other Bono people in its northern
territory from trading directly with the coastal towns.
These states were expected to purchase their
commodities from the Asante middlemen who had in
most cases monopolized the interior trade and more
significantly, controlled the movement of firearms to the
interior. However, after the 1874 war, this monopoly was
weakened by the interruption of trade between Kumasi
and Salaga by the eastern Bono who had blocked the
trade route and refused to allow any Asante traders to go
beyond Kintampo. In 1875, Mensa Bonsu, began an
intrigue to win back some of the rebellion districts and to
strengthen the tottering Asante kingdom. In the same
year, Wankyi provoked Takyiman by claiming part of
Takyiman as its own. Asante deemed the ensuing
Takyiman-Wankyi conflict as a blessing. Bonsu instructed
the Gyamanhene to arbitrate over the dispute. When
Takyimanhene Fofie refused to observe the truce that the
Gyamanhene had called for, the Asante government
ordered the forces of Wankyi and Nkoranza to assist
Gyamanhene to occupy the Takyiman town. (Wilks,
1975: 271). Knowing very well that his action would
infuriate Asante, Nana Fofie sent a message through
Gyarko, his nephew and heir apparent, and Nsuapim, a
Buoyam royal to Gyamanhene for support in case Asante
forces attacked Takyiman. Fofie urged the rest of his
subjects including inhabitants of the Tano-Subin villages
to accompany him to Gyaman in case of attack.
With the exception of Buoyam which initially agreed to,
the rest of the Tano-Subin villages influenced by Asante,
declined Fofie‟s request. At Buoyam, the people rebelled
against their chief and threatened him with destoolment if
he attempted to support Takyiman in any war. Takyiman
was swiftly attacked compelling Ohene Kwabena Fofie
and his supporters to flee to Gyaman. At Buoyam and
Ofuman, Takyiman forces encountered serious
exchanges with the Asante soldiers. It is said that about
one third of the Takyiman people who fled lost their lives.
Takyimanhene tried in vain to regain his state. Takyiman
was described as the „province‟ of Abora a coastal state,
far away from Takyiman in 1883. (Goody, 1968: 1).
Takyiman was disenchanted with Asante‟s rule following
the prolonged indiscriminate attacks, exaction of heavy
tributes and killing of Takyiman citizens. The people
always wanted the fall of Asante and used the
opportunity offered them by the Apuo festival to point out
Asante‟s ungratefulness, and to express their delight at
Asante‟s troubles. In an apparent claim that it was the
Bono who introduced the nsennee (gold weights) to
Asante, Takyiman apuo songs for example taunted; “we
made scales for the Asante porcupines, they only used
them to cheat us. The Asante chiefs may have bought
them but he did not buy us.” (Rattray, 1932:104). When
the British captured Nana Prempeh I in 1896, Takyiman
apuo songs taunted Asante by saying; “They know
nothing about guns, had they known about guns, would
they have let the Whiteman to seize their king Prempeh
and Yaa Akyaa without firing a gun?” (Rattray, 1932:153-
156). It is said that the people of northern Asante
including the Takyiman and Atebubu peoples who had
been paying tribute and supplying men to fight in Asante
wars seceded after 1874 and would have offered their
allegiance to the British if the British had shown any sign
of willingness to accept it. (Takyimanhene‟s petition,
1949). The impetus for autonomy was provided by the
British government‟s land and administrative policies on
Asante in the 20th century.
British colonialism and the Takyiman State
Following the British government‟s annexation of Asante
in 1901, the Asante Native Administrative Ordinance
(NAO) (1902) was passed to enforce the annexation
order. Under this, Asante was divided into four provinces.
These included the Western Province that comprised
some Bono states including Berekum, Wam (Dormaa),
Takyiman, Ahafo, Gyaman and Wankyi. Nkoranza,
Atebubu, Krakye and later, Banda and Mo constituted the
Eastern Province. Kumasi chiefs were forbidden from
their involvement in matters in these territories and other
territories that did not concern their own territories. Each
division was thus, made to regulate its own internal
affairs under the direct supervision of District
Commissioners (DCs). Commissioners served as points
where chiefs could enquire about their status viz-a-viz
that of the Asantehene and his sub-chiefs. For example
in 1924, Geofrey Parker, the District Commissioner of
Wankyi/Takyiman reported to the Chief Commissioner
that the chiefs of the Wankyi district had ever since

Prempeh‟s return been anxious and nervous as to their
exact status. Asante interfered in Takyiman and other
Bono states‟ affairs. In 1927, Mr. Ballentine, the
Provincial Commissioner of Sunyani informed the
Akwamuhene of Kumasi that he had no business
interfering in the Bono division‟s chieftaincy affairs.
(PRAAD, BRG 2/1/8).
With respect to land policy issues, the Kumasi division
was the most affected. Prempeh‟s deportation led to
widespread changes in Asante‟s political affairs by the
British government. One such change was the British
government‟s policy of land alienation and ownership. In
implementing this land policy, the British employed
practical considerations. Administratively, it was found
both convenient and efficient to place the more distant
Kumasi subjects under the immediate control of the
Asante Amanhene living nearest to them. When two
Amanhene contested for Kumasi villages, the British
chose those ones who had not sided openly against the
British. It could also give to the chief, who, using tradition,
put forward a strong claim to the village or villages in
question. It was through this last policy that the
government placed the villages in the Tano-Subin valley
which had served various Kumasi chiefs since the time of
Opoku Ware under Takyiman. (Tordoff, 1965: 141).
Direct British interference in Asante affairs persisted from
the early 20th century until 1935 when Sir Shanton
Thomas, deemed it necessary for Asante‟s old system of
administration to be restored. In his letter to Sir Philip
Cumliffe-Lister on 1st March 1934, Sir Shanton explained
the reasons why there should be the restoration of the
Asante confederacy. He believed that the restoration of
the Asante Confederacy had always appeared inevitable
after the release of Prempeh I from exile in the
Seychelles. Although, in the eyes of the government, he
returned as a private citizen, Asantes always believed
that their king had returned. (Metcalfe, 1964: 636-637).
Shanton wondered whether the return of Prempeh had
greater significance than would the restoration of the
Asante Confederacy with official recognition of Prempeh
as Asantehene. On the part of other Asante chiefs, he
asserted, although, the decision to repatriate Prempeh I
was a great thing, it still left Asante incomplete. These
chiefs supported the proposal to re-instate Prempeh as
Asantehene stating that without an Asantehene, there
could be no confederacy. (PRAAD, BRG 2/1/8). For
Shanton Thomas, Asante did not delight in merely giving
official recognition to an office which Asante, in-spite of
all past vicissitudes had not ceased to recognize but
rather one of restoring nationhood to the people and
making them more complete. On the question of why
there needed to be restoration, Shanton commented that
the great masses of the people earnestly desired it and it
was the principle of the then colonial government that
people should be governed in accordance with their
wishes. Concerning the significance of the inclusion in
the Confederacy of Takyiman and other Bono divisions of
Adum-Kyeremeh 35
Wam Pamu (Dormaa), Nkoranza, Atebubu, Gyaman,
Abease and Berekum, Shanton asserted that these were
of the same stock with Asante and that the political
amalgamation of the Asante and the Brong would make
for a stronger state and make administration easier.
(Metcalfe, 1964). On the other hand, the Takyimanhene
and his elders proposed for a comprehensive review of
all customs and institutions to fulfil the agenda for total
restoration of the Asante confederacy. He categorically
rejected any suggestion for Takyiman to join the
confederacy. The chief wanted to maintain the status his
state has had since 1900. He objected to the return to
pre-colonial status. The chief argued “if the government
proposes to patch all broken traditions to conform to the
order of native customs in a peaceful restoration, then
Nkoranza lands must be restored to Takyiman to whom
the lands formerly belonged”.
The British colonial administration was bent on
implementing Indirect Rule and ignored all protests. At
the durbar held in Kumasi on 31 January 1935 to restore
the confederacy, the Governor of the Gold Coast, Sir
Arnold Hudson, declared Prempeh II formally as the first
Asantehene under the British government. In his speech
Sir Arnold stated that the ancient royalties of Asante
divisions are henceforth, officially to be recognized and
sanctioned and that… the domestic affairs and the
property rights of properly constituted divisions will not be
interfered with unless the native authority concerned
invites assistance. Takyiman interpreted these
pronouncements to mean that there would be no
changes in institutions and internal relationships unless a
particular part of the confederated states invited outside
involvement. In fact, Sir Shanton proposed that the Bono
divisions should be allowed, if they wished to join the
confederacy. (Tordoff, 1965: 339). While the colonial
government‟s principle of non-interference was reflected
in the speech to restore the confederate states, Asante‟s
standpoint of the restoration was different. The
restoration was deemed incomplete until the
Asantehene‟s rights and privileges were restored to its
fullness and Asantehene was allowed to return to his
pristine status. It is therefore, not surprising that at their
first sitting of the Confederacy, the Kokofuhene tabled a
motion calling the Councilors to implore the government
to “clothe” the Asantehene with the constitutional right to
interfere in the councilors‟ internal affairs and the
restoration of Kumasi lands. This call was reflected in the
closing speech of the Asantehene during the second
session of the council when he informed the council
about the appeal to the Government to restore his lands
to him because other towns laughed at him when they
hear that Kumasi lands had been taken away.
(Confederacy Minutes, 1942: 7).
In the series of editorials entitled “the spiritual signi-
ficance of land in Asante”, the Pioneer added its voice to
the call. It wrote that the restoration of the confederacy
without her lands seems a hollow act. In another editorial
36 Afr. J. Hist. Cult.
comment, the paper argued that when its own lands have
been taken away from it, the Golden Stool could not
properly adjudicate upon land cases. (The Pioneer
March, 1940: 7-9). In 1936, Takyiman, which had
previously objected to joining the confederacy changed
her position and joined the Asante Confederacy. The ex-
Nifahene of Takyiman explained that Takyiman joined the
confederacy to avoid the disintegration of the Takyiman
state. Asantehene had assured the Tano-Subin villages
of his support and that of government to grant them
official recognition as a separate Native Authority if they
abandoned Takyiman and joined the confederacy.
Additionally, Asante migrant settlers in some of the
villages intermarried with Bono citizens and so marriage
relations increased pro-Asante sentiments in the
Takyiman paramountcy. Takyiman decided to join the
confederacy to stop the disintegration of Takyiman
through the disaffection of its villages comprising
Nkyeraa, Ofuman No. 1, Branam, Subinso, Tanobuase,
Tuobodom, Ofuman II, Buoyam and Tanoso (Atta 1993:
36). Despite joining the Confederacy, Takyiman lost the
Tano-Subin villages again to Kumasi. Takyiman
protested vehemently against the decision that the Tano-
Subin villages should be made to serve their Kumasi
overlords. The Takyiman chief asserted that whilst in
exile at Gyaman, Prempeh I agreed to return the villages
to them if they reciprocated that gesture and returned to
Takyiman. They indeed acted upon that promise but for
the unfortunate deportation of Prempeh I, no
formalization of that negotiation was made. Takyiman
also made reference to the so-called treaty with the
British in 1897. These stories were in doubt because
Takyiman did not produce any real evidence to back
these assertions. (Petition, 1949).
The restoration of the Asante Confederacy also brought
in its wake the legitimacy of positions of certain chiefs
and their lands. The Committee of Privileges was
established to look into the legal and constitutional status
of any matter that might arise as a result of the
restoration. At the proceedings held by this committee
(Committee of Privileges), all the disputed villages were
called to testify and give any information which would
help ensure the peaceful settlement of the dispute. The
testimonies indicated that the villages were divided in
their allegiance to Takyiman. For example, the
Nkyiraahene emphasized that his ancestors served
Asante when Opoku Ware I was king till government
placed them under Takyiman in 1900. During the
Takyiman-Asante war of 1722/23, the people of Nkyeraa
helped Takyiman against Asante. After the war, Nkyeraa
was made to serve Asante through the Nsumankwaahene
of Kumasi. Though the then Nkyeraahene was the son of
Takyimanhene, they are independent of Takyiman.
(Proceedings in Agyekum, 2008: 314-315). The Ofuman
No-1 chief briefed the committee by first tracing origins of
the state. The chief mentioned the earliest encounter
between the founder and the queen mother of Takyiman
but rejected the fact that they served Takyiman.
According to him, when the war broke out in 1723, they
refused to help Takyiman. It was Dadiesoabahene who
placed the state under the Asantehene. As the Takyiman
people fled to Gyaman, he continued, Ofuman I pursued
them. There was no communication between Prempeh
and the exiled Takyiman people. Although, the founder
was not a Takyiman royal by birth, by accepting to hunt
for the Takyiman queen mother, he automatically became
connected with the Takyiman paramountcy. The
Branamhene stated that after the 1723 war, his ancestors
allied with Ofuman No. 1 and were serving
Dadiesoabahene. Branam sought protection from
Takyiman as a bond existed between Branam and
Takyiman before the war.
Apart from the afore-mentioned Tano-Subin villages,
the rest acknowledged their previous relations with
Takyiman before the 1723 war and the subsequent
attachment with their various Kumasi clan chiefs. Though
these villages had blood affinity with Takyiman, yet most
of them, including Buoyam, Tuobodom and Tanobuase
were resolved to serve their former overlords since the
same authority that placed them back to Takyiman rule
was again demanding that they should go back and serve
their former Kumasi clan chiefs. (Agyekum, 2008: 314-
323). On account of these revelations, the Report of the
Committee of Privileges suggested that Takyiman had no
case since she could not substantiate her claims;
especially the alleged promise by Prempeh to restore to
them the Tano/Subin villages. More importantly, the
readiness of some of these villages to serve their Asante
overlords did not favour Takyiman. When the
Takyimanhene threatened to report to higher authority
about the decision of the Committee of Privileges, the
commissioner‟s response was that any individual who
desired to do so was of course, perfectly at liberty to
petition His excellency, the Governor on the point at issue
and if such a person desired to do so, he (commissioner)
would forward the petition for His Excellency‟s
consideration. (Petition, 1949). Takyiman considered the
loss of the villages very seriously because of the
importance of the villages to the state. The Omanhene
laid out strategies to reclaim the lost villages including
taking legal action against the Asantehene. To this, the
confederacy council responded by informing the Chief
Commissioner that it was unconstitutional for any Asante
person be he a chief or otherwise to institute an action
against the occupant of the Golden Stool. The rule was
that anyone who did so was deemed rather to have taken
action against Asanteman; not the Asantehene as an
individual. (Petition, 1949).
With the support of the British authorities, the Tano-
Subin Native Authority was created with its headquarters
at Tuobodom by order No. 26. Takyimanhene saw this as
the fulfillment of a secret agenda designed by Asante and
the British to break and dis-member her. Accordingly,
when the Tano-Subin Native Authority was established,

the Takyimanhene was convinced that the Confederacy
Council and the Government had conspired to destroy
her and the only alternative was to secede from the
confederacy. Takyiman left the confederacy under the
pretext that the inclusion of the Asantehene as a panel
member in the case in which he was equally interested
was in itself a case of bias judgment. It lacked fairness as
this gave Asante undue advantage. (PRAAD RAO,
2/104). The British, who were bent on ensuring success
of the indirect rule policy in a united Asante, however,
ignored Takyimanhene‟s petitions to secede. Instead, the
British sought to compel Takyiman to remain in the
Asante confederacy. For example, in 1947, Major C.O.
Butler, the Chief Commissioner of Asante visited
Takyiman to confer privately with the Takyimanhene and
assured the Omanhene that he would be given a
reasonable compensation and a six months tour of the
United Kingdom (U.K.) if he reconsidered his decision to
secede but Ameyaw rejected the offer. The chief is said
to have been enraged by what he described as “an
annoying letter” he received from the Chief
Commissioner (C.C.) of Asante reminding him that by
trying to disturb the Asante nation, he was kicking his
head against a stone.(PRAAD BRG, 2/2/33).
By early July 1948, all attempts to persuade Ameyaw
not to remain in the Asante Confederacy had failed. The
British Colonial authorities planned to exile him. This
forced Ameyaw to seek asylum in La Cote d‟Ivoire. In late
July 1948, the District Commissioner of Wankyi was
asked to close down the Takyiman Native Authority. All
appeals by Takyiman to the British to restore its authority
failed. The plight of the people of Takyiman worsened
when the British withheld all grants to the schools in the
Takyiman district. It became the responsibility of the
Takyiman people to administer the schools. Men and
women voluntarily donated towards the well-being of
teachers in the Takyiman schools. By August 1948 it had
become evident that the British would not relinquish their
support for Asante. Consequently, on 28 August, 1948
Nana Ameyaw wrote to the Asanteman and the Chief
Commissioner, Asante, informing him about Takyiman‟s
withdrawal from the confederacy. By December 1948, the
Takyimanhene had secured the assurance of the three
Tano-Subin villages of Tuobodom, Tanoso and Offuman
II to support him if he withdrew from the confederacy.
(Arthur, 1965: 50). In January 1949, the DC of Sunyani
suggested to the British government not to issue
gunpowder to the Bono chiefs and to withdraw education
and food grants to members of the Bono Kyempim
Federation (B. K. F.) formed by the Takyimanhene to
pursue its agenda but Ameyaw was unyielding. (PRAAD
BRG, 2/2/33). In the same year, Asanteman dispatched
the Asante palace police to harass and attack the
Takyiman Omanhene and his people. In a cablegram
message of 22nd June, 1950, the Takyimanhene reported
to the Chief Commissioner attributing the attacks to
Takyiman‟s interest in the nine villages. The telegram
Adum-Kyeremeh 37
message emphasized “the whole people and chiefs of
Takyiman, seriously protest against the molestation of
Takyimanhene‟s supporters by the Asantehene‟s police
due to political claims by Takyiman for the nine villages.
(PRAAD ADM, 54/1/13).
The Takyimanhene’s petition and government’s
reaction
In the meantime, Dr. J. B. Danquah, a popular Ghanaian
lawyer in the 1940s and 1950s served as Takyimanhene‟s
counsel. He supported the Takyiman chief to submit for
transmission to the British Crown three copies of a sixty-
five page Petition with supporting documents. The chief
“prayed” to the British crown for the re-consideration of its
decision to return the Tano-Subin villages. References
were made to Oral Tradition and to Ward, Reindorf,
Claridge and other secondary material on Takyiman
tradition and history. Other references were to the letters
and correspondences between Takyimanhene and British
Colonial officials. (Petition, 1949). The Omanhene
appealed and prayed that the decision of the 1935
Committee of Privileges by reason of which Takyiman
villages were severed from their native allegiances to the
Takyiman Stool and made part of the Kumasi Division be
set aside as ultra vires and unjust. It mentioned the treaty
of 5th June, 1897, in which Queen Victoria pledged to
“befriend and to protect the Takyimanhene and his entire
country.” It argued; the policy of the government or of the
administration of Asante in accepting that decision and
acting upon it be reversed on the grounds that the said
policy was pursued from a mistaken view of the facts and
from ignorance of the Treaty obligations of His Majesty
(Petition). The petition described as highly provoking and
unjust assaults and detention of the Takyimanhene‟s
supporters who had been detained and seriously beaten
at the hands of Asantehene‟s police.
In view of these alleged and real periods of Asante‟s
mistreatment of the Takyiman chiefs and other Bono
chiefs, the Bono Kyempim Movement appealed to the
British government for recognition of their Federation.
They appealed to government to accede to their petition
to withdraw from the Asante confederacy. The British
authorities were still against dividing up Asanteman, on
the grounds that administration of the confederacy would
be rendered more difficult in a divided Asante. Hence,
they refused to recognize the Bono Federation (PRAAD
ADM, 54/1/13, Accra, DC Wankyi‟s Report 1952). In
Ofuman and Branam, the Asantehene‟s police arrested
loyals of the Takyimanhene including Kwasi Ankomah,
Kwabena Asuman and Kofi Krah on charges of swearing
an oath to sever relations with the Asantehene. These
charges, the Senior District Commissioner‟s Office
refuted. He informed the Chief Commissioner that the
Asantehene had already given instructions that no
Takyiman subject should be arrested on a charge of
38 Afr. J. Hist. Cult.
refusing to serve him (PRAAD ADM, 54/1/3). In Ofuman
I, an Asante Chief, Kwasi Dua collected £500 from
inhabitants as cocoa, cocoyam, corn, cassava, yams and
groundnut tributes; an action the Takyimanhene
described as a recipe for turmoil and trouble. Although,
the chief reported this to Goldie-Scot, no action was
taken paving the way for the said chief to swear the Great
Oath on Ofuman II people. The DC only threatened to
send Dua to Kumasi to be beaten and molested but the
case at court was left pending. (PRAAD ADM, 54/1/13).
Whilst awaiting the submission of the main Petition, the
Takyimanhene sent a Supplementary Petition with
information believed to have been given by Mr. Bryden,
described as an authority in Asante history. With respect
to this petition, the Chief Commissioner of Asante
described it as a partisan document. The Chief
Commissioner doubted that the British government will
feel disposed to discuss the decision of the Committee of
Privileges on the matter of the Takyiman villages. Before
the Petitions were dispatched from the DC of Sunyani‟s
office, the Commissioner‟s assessment of the two
Petitions was that there was nothing new in the
arguments put forward by the Takyiman chief and his
counsel. The Chief Commissioner‟s concern was rather
to request J. B. Danquah, the Takyimanhene‟s counsel to
confirm in writing to the effect that the Takyimanhene and
his elders had no intention of leaving the Ashanti
Confederacy Council. (PRAAD ADM, 54/1/13). In
October, 1949, W. N. L. Goldie-Scot, Asst. District
Commissioner Wankyi/Sunyani wrote to Mrs. Meyerowitz,
an anthropologist in Takyiman, refuting several claims by
Takyimanhene Ameyaw that his contribution to the
increase in revenue collection was very insignificant. He
emphasized, “it was not through Ameyaw‟s instructions
that the Tano/Subin villages contributed so much revenue
in the 1948 Financial Year…the chief may only have told
his supporters in these villages to pay what was agreed
to at the Estimates Meeting, to help develop the nine
villages in case they were eventually returned to him”.
The Commissioner stressed that the Area Chiefs and
their supporters controlled the Tano/Subin Estimates
Meetings. In his opinion, these, by far outnumbered those
who supported Nana Akumfi Ameyaw, the Takyimanhene.
The Tano/Subin villages Area Treasury, the
Commissioner observed, had the wholehearted support
of the great majority of the people. He believed that this
caused the increase in revenue from individual villages
and from voluntary contributions unparalleled in the entire
Wankyi sub-district in 1949. To him, this would be
impossible in the case of a Treasury which did not
command the support of the people. At the same time,
the DC accused the Takyimanhene of allowing two lorry
loads of his supporters to go to Tanoso during a riot. The
Commissioner condemned this continued interventions of
Takyiman in Native Affairs of other states including
Tanoso stating that the chief had no jurisdiction whatever,
outside the Takyiman division. In the DC‟s view, the
presence of the Takyimanhene‟s supporters and native
Constables in Tanoso, and the arrest of the Tanosohene
were precipitated by the Takyimanhene‟s interference
and were done with deliberate intentions (PRAAD ADM,
54/1/13). Goldie-Scot used other occasions to caution the
Takyiman Native Authority for continuous interferences in
Tanoso and in the affairs of other villages. For instance,
following repeated complaints from the Tanoso village
that the Takyiman Native Police personnel were being
sent round the villages with instructions and threats from
the Takyiman chief, the DC reminded the Takyimanhene
that he or his police had no jurisdiction whatever, outside
the Takyiman Division whether in uniform or not. He
declared also that he would fully support charges in a
native court against the chief if he, the chief, tried to
exercise police powers within the jurisdiction of that court.
He warned that the Takyiman Native Authority Police had
never been legally constituted as a Police Force and
therefore had no powers whatsoever, even inside the
Takyiman Division to arrest or detain people. He
emphasized; owing to the suspension of your native
authority, you do not possess such powers, and your
police force is therefore vested with no powers whatever
within or without the Takyiman division (PRAAD ADM,
54/1/13).
The British Colonial Authority signed an order
suspending the Takyiman Native Authority for a further
six months from mid-July 1950, and as expected, an
approval given for further suspension of the Takyiman
Native Courts for seven months. The Takyimanhene‟s
Petition to the British Crown also remained on the Gold
Coast, five months after it had been submitted to Goldie-
Scot, the DC of Wankyi/Sunyani. The Chief Commissioner
assigned three unconvincing reasons for this delay. First
the great length of the Petition necessitated prolonged
study. Secondly, there were other works that put
pressure on the Chief Commissioner and thirdly, it was
the Chief Commissioner‟s wish that the Petition should be
read before it left his office (PRAAD ADM, 54/1/13).
Regarding the supplementary petition to the British
crown, the Commissioner‟s response was that to him the
version of the martial history given by the petitioners was
not correct, and that, the history that had been accepted
by the Takyiman administration was incorrect. For him,
the history in the Second Petition would not significantly
affect the recommendations in the Report of the
Committee of Privileges. He described as “generally
unsound” the large conclusions based on the 1897 Treaty
and the Hull report, both in the memorandum and in the
supplementary petition. He described the memorandum
in particular as a document that tended to obscure certain
fundamental facts.
In response to the Takyimanhene‟s calls for the nine
villages to be returned to Takyiman, the Commissioner
reiterated that the issues about property rights could be
determined in the courts and that it was not within the
power of the executive to determine claims to the

ownership of land. The Commissioner emphasized, “by
the Takyimanhene asking for the “villages” to be restored
to him, he meant that the decision on the land owned by
the village stools could not be taken by an executive
ruling. He reminded the chief that “a decision in any
particular case must be arrived at judicially, if there
should be a dispute, and not by an executive decision”.
(PRAAD ADM, 54/1/13). Amidst this misunderstanding,
the Privy Council decided that Takyiman had a stake in
Ofuman I, one of the nine Takyiman villages. It decided
that the issue of over lordship of subjects, which formed
the second element of the Takyiman claim could be
looked into by a committee of enquiry, or on reference, by
the Confederacy Council. In 1950, the British government
reminded the Takyimanhene that the state joined the
Confederacy when the then Takyimanhene took an oath
to the Asantehene. This did not differ from the manner in
which an oath is taken by sub-chiefs to their Divisional
Chiefs. They considered the allegiance owed by the
Takyimanhene to be “in full force” which the mere
inclusion of the Asantehene in the Committee of
Privileges would not invalidate. The Takyimanhene‟s
appeal was in this way “extinguished entirely.” The
Commissioner argued; “the fact that Ashanti is a
Confederacy did not support the (Takyimanhene‟s)
contention.” The Takyimanhene was accused of breaking
his oath and committing a criminal offence by refusing to
attend Council meetings; and for refusing to rescind that
decision until his state‟s petition had been granted and
the villages returned. (PRAAD ADM, 54/1/13).
With reference to Takyiman as a Native Authority, the
Commissioner stressed emphatically that it was
inadvisable to use the term „Native Authority‟ to refer to
the chief and elders of Takyiman. He argued that chiefs
were persons who acted for the stool in dealing with, or
litigating about land; they were people who by custom
exercised administrative functions and that as a matter of
policy, they were generally but not invariably also the
persons who constituted the statutory local government
body. For the Commissioner, the three sets of functions
were however legally distinct. This situation becomes
apparent if a Native Authority is suspended (as the
Takyiman Native Authority) and that the chief and his
elders could still fulfil the other two functions in either
case (PRAAD ADM, 54/1/13).
The Takyimanhene deemed it unjust that the British
government‟s interferences in its state‟s affairs, an illegal
aggression and an effort at the dismemberment of his
state. He saw the Committee of Privileges Report in
particular as direct undermining tactics of Major F.W.F.
Jackson‟s, prejudging of the Governor‟s decision by his
principal adviser in Asante affairs, and a conspiracy by
government and Asante to destroy her. (PRAAD ADM
54/1/3, Petition, 1949). The chief looked for an opportunity
to fulfill his objective spelt out in the aims of the Bono
Kyempim (chiefs‟) movement. The formation of the
National Liberation Movement (NLM), a political movement
Adum-Kyeremeh 39
formed in Kumasi in 1954 appears to have provided the
opportunity for that. The NLM sought to achieve a federal
independent Ghana with a liberal-democratic constitution.
It declared that Asante was a nation and should remain
so. (Austin, 1970). The NLM‟s objective appealed to
Asante‟s ethnic nationalist sensibilities but ran counter to
the BKF‟s position and objectives. It provided an avenue
for the Takyiman-led Bono movement to speed up its call
for secession. After 1959, the CPP assured Takyiman
and the other Bono chiefs that their wishes would be
provided. By 1959, every indication was that the Bono
Ahafo Region would be created. Despite the rigorous
contests between Asante and Takyiman for ownership of
the nine villages, the issue of traditional allegiances in the
new region was totally ignored by the CPP government.
The Parliamentary Act that set up the Region merely
stated that the creation of the Bono Ahafo Region was
done for administrative purposes. This blatant disregard
of Takyiman‟s sovereignty by Asante and the British
government sowed seeds for the frequent inter-state
disputes in Takyiman paramountcy. Takyiman-Asante
disputes surfaced few years after the creation of the
Bono Ahafo region. Disputes and have persisted into the
21st century. All efforts by individuals and government
have been unsuccessful in finding a lasting resolution to
Takyiman-Asante chieftaincy and land disputes.
CONCLUSION
It has been pointed out that the Takyiman state at the
beginning of the eighteenth century was showing signs of
disunity as a result of internal problems. Unfortunately for
the state, their king brought trouble upon himself and the
whole state. The resultant trouble was the defeat of
Takyiman by the Asante army in 1723. Takyiman came
out from the war as a vassal state of Asante and until the
1890s, there was a somewhat peaceful accommodation
of Takyiman‟s new status in the Asante Central
Administration as mutual and friendly relations persisted.
Takyiman chiefs and their elders suffered cases of
indignities as vassals of Asante despite rendering
sacrifice and service to Asante and also co-operating with
its rulers in the post-1723 period. Takyiman provided
more men to fight in Asante wars, and because they were
placed in the vanguard position, suffered heavy
casualties. Besides, the Takyiman people paid heavy
tributes in products and money.
In 1895, a punitive expedition from Asante attacked
Kwabena Fofie, Takyimanhene compelling a section of
the Takyiman chiefs and their families to migrateto
Gyaman for twenty years. The British defeat of Asante
and the exile of Prempeh enabled Takyiman to reassert
its independence which lasted from 1900 to 1935.
Takyiman lost theTano-Subin villages again to Asante
after a few years of autonomy from Asante. Towards
ensuring success of the Indirect Rule policy, the British
40 Afr. J. Hist. Cult.

government ignored Takyiman‟s petitions and all appeals
for the return of its villages. The chiefs in most of these
villages related closely with Asante central, paid homage
and owed traditional allegiance to the Asantehene and
other Asante chiefs. Takyiman chiefs supported the
Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in its struggle with the
Asante-based National Liberation Movement (NLM). The
failure of the CPP to address the issue of traditional
allegiance before the Brong-Ahafo region was created
threatened peace and stability in Takyiman chieftaincy
after 1959.
Conflict of interests
The author has not declared any conflict of interest.
Arthur J (1965). Brong Ahafo Outlook. Kumasi: University Press.
Asihene EV (1980). The Apoo Festival. Accra: Ghana Publishing
Corporation.
Austin, Dennis, (1970). Politics in Ghana 1946-1960. London: Oxford
University Press.
Dupuis, J, (1824). Journal of a Residence in Ashantee. London: W.
Bulmer and Co.
Goody J, Watt I (1968). Literacy in Traditional Societies. London:
Cambridge University Press.
Meyerowitz EL (1962). At the Court of an African King, London: Faber
and Faber Limited.
Rattray RS (1932). Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland. London: O. U. P.
Reindorf CC (1966). The History of the Gold Coast and Asante. Accra:
Ghana University Press.
Tordoff W (1965). Ashanti under the Prempehs 1888-1935. London:
Oxford University Press.
Wilks I (1993). Forests of Gold: Essays on the Akan Kingdom of Asante.
Athens: Ohio University Press.
Wilks I (1975). Asante in the Nineteenth Century, the structure and
Evolution of a Political Order. London: Cambridge University Press.

REFERENCES

Agyekum G (2008). Asante and Brong Ahafo Region‟ Chieftaincy affairs

“Underlying Causes diagnosed”. Accra: Thomson Press.
Anquandah JR (1982). Rediscovering of Ghana‟s Past. London:
Longman Sedco.
Arhin K, Drah FK (1979). A Profile of Brong Kyempim, Essays on the
Archaeology, History, Language and Politics of the Brong Peoples of
Ghana. Edited with Introduction by Kwame Arhin, Accra: New Times
Corporation.
Arhin K (1985). Ghana Today (2) Chieftaincy (Ghana Publishing
Corporation)