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Niklas Luhmanns Theory of Autopoietic Legal Systems, by Hugh Baxter (2013)
Niklas Luhmanns Theory of Autopoietic Legal Systems, by Hugh Baxter (2013)
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ligion, and also law) (see Luhmann 1982). First BASIC PRINCIPLES
trained as a lawyer, Luhmann was known in OF LUHMANN’S LATER WORK
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168 Baxter
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mass media, and the family.1 Most of these the system, completing the feedback loop (see
subsystems, too, “operate independently of Easton 1965, pp. 29–32).
spatial boundaries” [Luhmann 2012 (1997), In contrast to virtually all sociological sys-
p. 96].2 Luhmann describes the political system, tems theory developed before his autopoietic
however, as partly regionally and not simply turn in 1982, Luhmann refers to systems not
functionally differentiated—that is, organized primarily as open but as operatively closed
in part by territory [Luhmann 2004 (1993), or normatively closed—though, to complicate
p. 484]. The legal system, too, is for him territo- matters, also as cognitively open. Consider first
rially differentiated into different legal orders. what Luhmann means by operative or norma-
Nonetheless, he writes, we still can speak of tive closure. He sees the societal system and
a global legal system—albeit one largely with- its subsystems not as associations among indi-
out centralized legislation or decision-making vidual persons—the traditional conception of
capacity (pp. 468, 481–82). Luhmann goes be- society—but as a network of operations. These
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
yond many theories of globalization in reject- operations are communications. Through com-
ing the idea of world society as a global system munication, society carries itself forth and re-
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of nation-states [Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 10]. produces itself as a system. Given Luhmann’s
Territorial states, he says, are simply not social definition of society as a network of communi-
systems in his sense of the term [Luhmann 2004 cations, the idea that it is closed by those opera-
(1993), p. 480]. tions called communications is a tautology. The
A focus on systems has been prominent in boundary between societal system and nonso-
social theory for decades. The version of so- cial environment is the boundary between com-
cial systems theory probably best known to le- munications and noncommunications. Accord-
gal theorists—and Luhmann’s usual foil—is the ing to Luhmann, information does not enter
open systems approach developed during the from the environment into the system; instead,
1960s under the influence of advances in cyber- information always is produced internally,
netics and information theory. This generation within the system, according to procedures and
of social systems theorists emphasized the per- standards and criteria proper to that system it-
meability of the boundary between system and self [Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 37, 116]. Yet,
environment. Inputs to and outputs from the Luhmann says repeatedly, this idea of operative
system regularly cross the system boundary in closure—the idea that communications within
a relation of exchange or interchange between a system link directly only to other communi-
system and environment (see, e.g., Easton 1965, cations within that same system—is consistent
pp. 25–26; Buckley 1967, p. 50.) Through this with the idea of causal relations between sys-
process, the system receives inputs from its en- tem and environment [Luhmann 2004 (1993),
vironment, processes them, and converts them pp. 34, 74; 2012 (1997), pp. 70, 80, 105, 381,
into outputs fed back to the environment. In 477]. Luhmann’s theory, however, does not fo-
turn, information about the outputs’ effects on cus on system/environment relations as causal
the environment and the system flows back into relations.
A system’s operative closure is the basis
for its autonomy or autopoiesis.3 The term
autopoiesis means literally self-production
1
For a fine account of the relation between Luhmann’s idea of [Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 52]. Autopoietic
differentiation and Weber’s conception of cultural and social
rationalization, see Michailakis (1995). systems produce themselves—their operations
2
Luhmann [2012 (1997), p. 96] writes that “only the polit- and their structures—through their own
ical system along with the legal system of modern society
can be regionally differentiated in the form of states.” Other-
wise, Luhmann understands regional differences as just “dif-
3
ferences in the involvement in and reaction to the dominant Luhmann seems often, though not always, to use the terms
structures of the world system of society” (p. 96). interchangeably.
operations. So much is a tautological conse- [Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 42; see also
quence of operative closure [Luhmann 2004 Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 83]. Instead, it is in
(1993), p. 78]. Luhmann rejects emphatically the nature of a hypothesis. “All that matters,”
the idea of relative autonomy or relative he says, is whether it can generate further
autopoiesis (see pp. 95–98). Either a system hypotheses that will lead to “fruitful science”
is autonomous and autopoietic, or it is not. [Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 83 n.11]. I will
He rejects the idea of relative autonomy as follow that approach here, leaving it to the
essentially useless because it is a purely negative reader to determine whether Luhmann’s work
formulation that excludes nothing (pp. 96 n.47, can produce fruitful insights.
390 n.29, 467 n.19). As long as we conceive In further specifying his basic idea of au-
of autonomy as freedom from external causal topoiesis as operative closure, Luhmann de-
influence, then it would seem clearly mean- scribes societal subsystems as closed with re-
ingful to speak of relative autonomy, that is, of spect to a code. By code, Luhmann means a
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autonomy, so conceived, as a matter of degree. distinction between two opposed values, such
And Luhmann admits that his own notion of as true/false for the scientific system and le-
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autopoiesis is not by itself rich in explanatory gal/illegal for the legal system. The code de-
power [Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 32]. But fines the societal subsystem’s unity and is
Luhmann’s theory, recall, is not a causal theory. unique to that system (at least as a code)
Though not denying a system’s dependence on [Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 118–19]. All sub-
its environment, Luhmann’s basic theoretical system communication is organized with re-
decision is to investigate societal systems from spect to this code. For some subsystems,
within and define them in terms of their own Luhmann identifies media—his full term
operations (the communications that are each is symbolically generalized communications
system’s elements). And so for Luhmann’s ob- media—that implement the subsystem’s code.
jectives, the causality-based notions of relative The function of such media is to motivate com-
autonomy or relative autopoiesis are useless.4 municative acceptance (p. 193). Money, for the
The idea of autopoiesis was introduced in economic system, and power, for the political
1972 by biologists Humberto Maturana and system, are the clearest examples of such me-
Francisco Varela. Beginning from laboratory dia. For some subsystems, Luhmann identifies
work on visual cognition in frogs and pigeons, primary and secondary media and codes. The
they sought to develop a general theory of living economic system, for example, has a primary
systems [see Maturana & Varela 1980 (1972), medium of property (with a binary code of own-
pp. xiv–xvi]. An obvious question for Luhmann ing/not owning) and a secondary medium of
is whether the theory can be extended to so- money (whose code is pay/not pay) [Luhmann
cial systems. Does Luhmann’s work rest on a 2012 (1997), pp. 207, 220; see also Luhmann
giant but unsustainable biological metaphor? 2004 (1993), pp. 391, 393]. The political sys-
Why would we think that the same principles tem’s primary medium of power is secondarily
will be illuminating both for cell biology and coded through the medium of law [Luhmann
for a theory of world society? 2012 (1997), p. 220]. These secondary media
Luhmann insists that the idea of autopoiesis and codes have developed only in some sub-
is neither analogy nor biological metaphor systems and only in the most recent stages of
social evolution. Luhmann describes them as
“indispensable for the modern rationality and
4
He does allow that one can use an input/output schema distinctness of the corresponding media codes”
“as a crudely simplified model in order to sort out facts” (p. 220).
[Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 382 n.5]. But “for the sociological Luhmann gives two reasons why subsys-
perspective and especially for systems-theoretical analysis,
causal explanations are so difficult that they are inadvisable tems’ codes must be binary. First, he suggests
at the level of general theoretical propositions” (p. 344). that a code arises from and reflects the binary
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yes/no, acceptance/rejection structure of all system’s (operative) closure is the basis for its
communication (pp. 62, 135, 190, 276). Sec- (cognitive) openness [Luhmann 2004 (1993),
ond, he maintains that a code with more than p. 34; 2012 (1997), p. 110].
two values would be too complex for decision But if Luhmann does not want to investi-
[Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 185, 427]. With a gate causal relations between societal subsys-
binary code, by contrast, the negation of one tems, such as those between economy and law,
code value (e.g., true) allows crossing to the then how are these systems related to one an-
other code value (false) [Luhmann 2012 (1997), other? Luhmann approaches this question with
p. 216]. This crossing from one code value to three basic concepts: irritation, structural cou-
the other is a special case of a more general no- pling, and coevolution.
tion: crossing as a transition from a marked or By irritation, Luhmann [2004 (1993),
indicated side of a distinction (generally a pos- pp. 258–59, 383; 2012 (1997), p. 66] means a
itive value) to the unmarked or nonindicated system-internal event, though one occasioned
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
side (generally a negative value). System media, by the environment. Events in a system’s envi-
such as money and power, facilitate the cross- ronment may present anomalies, surprises, or
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the autopoietic systems can be related in a way between system and environment. Evolution is
other than boundary-crossing input and output not necessarily a harmonistic process.
(pp. 381–82). For Luhmann, evolution is the transfor-
An important element of Luhmann’s the- mation and renewal of a system’s relation to
ory, and a point of connection for the notion its environment. His revised social evolution-
of structural coupling, is Luhmann’s concep- ary theory sees modern society’s evolution as
tion of systems as evolving entities. He re- occurring largely through structural couplings
jects the premise of earlier social-evolutionary among functional subsystems. As Luhmann
thought—social Darwinism, in particular— puts it, “The onus of explanation is now on
that evolution implies progress [Luhmann 2012 the concept of ‘structural coupling’” (p. 269).
(1997), p. 260]. He rejects also the idea of evolu- In this way, evolution becomes coevolution—
tion as adaptation to the environment (pp. 69– coordination, though not intentionally directed
70, 253). Nor does he believe that evolutionary or purposive [Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 231,
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
advances are the solutions to preexisting prob- 252; 2012 (1997), p. 307], in the evolution-
lems. Instead, Luhmann argues, the problems ary development of, for example, law and poli-
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that are solved through advances “arise with the tics. Luhmann describes certain long-term pat-
advances” (p. 307). terns of coevolution as structural drifts—for
All of that tells us only what evolution is example, “towards the welfare state, positive
not. The central positive idea Luhmann [2004 law, and a decentralized economic development
(1993), pp. 230–31] retains from other evolu- controlled by budgets and balances” [Luhmann
tionary approaches is that evolution involves 2004 (1993), p. 421].
mechanisms of variation, selection, and restabi- One final noteworthy aspect of Luhmann’s
lization. Variation, he says, occurs at the level of general theory is its emphasis on paradox. His
system elements or operations [Luhmann 2012 conception of paradox is expansive, going well
(1997), p. 273]—communication, in the case of beyond narrowly logical paradoxes. He refers,
the comprehensive societal system, and system- for example, to the paradox of court decision:
coded communication, in the case of functional “Courts have to decide even when they cannot
societal subsystems (such as the legal system). decide, or at least not within reasonable
An indeterminacy in legal doctrine, for exam- standards of rationality” (p. 289). To most,
ple, may produce different ways of understand- that claim would seem only to diagnose a
ing and carrying forward past court decisions difficulty of judicial decision under conditions
(variation). The process of decision (selection) of high complexity, not to state a paradox. The
carries forward and transforms system struc- term decide appears to be used in two senses:
tures. Restabilization, in the evolution of living (a) issue some ruling or another, however ill
beings rather than societies, is “performed by founded and uncertain, versus (b) issue a ruling
the formation of populations” (p. 292). With so- that meets high standards of judicial rationality.
cietal systems, the term restabilization refers to And so, few would speak here of a paradox.
“sequences of building structural changes into a Similarly, Luhmann refers to strict liability
system”—that is, making the selected structures as a paradox, because it “provides liability in
a more durable feature of the evolving system the case of legally produced harm” (p. 417). A
(p. 294). It is concerned “primarily . . . with the more natural explanation of (American) strict
system itself in relation to its environment” liability would note, more simply, that it is a
(p. 274). Functional subsystems—such as law, second principle of liability in a legal system
economy, politics, and science—he maintains, that more commonly grounds liability on fault.
have more and more assumed the function Conduct subject to strict tort liability may
of restabilization for the societal system as a not be unlawful or illegal in the sense that the
whole. Luhmann distinguishes the idea of resta- actor is at fault or has committed a crime, but
bilization from the older idea of equilibrium it is unlawful in the sense that it is subject to
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liability. Strict criminal liability is of course whether Luhmann’s systems theory offers new
more in tension with usual ideas of criminal insights into this recognized problem.
liability, but it seems amenable to the same Luhmann connects the idea of paradox
kind of explanation—that it is a secondary to the idea of observation. By that term, he
principle of liability, invoked either for good “means simply distinguishing and indicating”
policy reasons or perhaps sometimes simply as [Luhmann 2012 (1997), pp. 34, 69]. That means
a matter of history and inertia [cf. Hart 1994 drawing a distinction and marking—a synonym
(1961), p. 173, suggesting that strict liability in for indicating (see Borch 2011, p. 52)—one side
morality, but not in law, “at least approaches a or the other. Consider an example. A system’s
contradiction in terms”]. These broad uses of code, of course, is a distinction, and a legal
paradox seem to me unproductive.6 decision will use the distinction between legal
Much more interesting and productive is and illegal and indicate or mark some conduct
Luhmann’s use of paradoxes of self-reference. as legal and some as illegal. An observation
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Here the ordinary meaning of paradox is not is a communication and thus an operation of
strained, and Luhmann is able to generate novel the system [Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 325]. It
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insights and perspectives. The most basic exam- marks or indicates one side of the distinction by
ple of a self-referential paradox concerns the using the system’s own standards and criteria—
application of a binary subsystem code—such for example, the legal system’s criteria for
as legal/illegal or true/false—to itself [see, e.g., legality or illegality. Luhmann [2004 (1993),
Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 102, 182, 187, 191.) p. 460] thus speaks of a schema of observation
Is the distinction between legal and illegal, ba- generated within a system. Within every such
sic to communication within the legal system, schema, Luhmann maintains, there is a blind
itself legal or illegal? If (as it appears) it can- spot. The observational schema cannot be
not be said to be either, then there would ap- observed from within itself. All attempts to do
pear to be a foundational problem, or problem so lead to paradox [King & Thornhill 2003,
of origins, for the legal system (p. 227)—and, pp. 19–20; Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 460; 2012
by extension, for every subsystem with coded (1997), pp. 45, 104, 326]. A special case of this
communication. In the legal system, as will be problem is the necessarily paradoxical result
discussed below, the problem appears if one of applying a system’s code to itself—asking,
asks what makes the legal system’s basic law, for example, whether the distinction between
the constitution, valid. Of course H.L.A. Hart legal and illegal is legally valid (or invalid).
worked this same ground in arguing that the ul- Paradox is not, in Luhmann’s view, fatal to
timate basis of legal validity, the so-called rule of a system’s operations. A significant strand of
recognition, is neither legally valid nor legally Luhmann’s thought develops the idea of para-
invalid. The issue in the discussion below will be dox management. The foundational idea here
is the distinction between first- and second-
order observation [Luhmann 2012 (1997),
6
Other alleged paradoxes that would seem to fit in this p. 224]. First-order observation is a system’s
category are (a) the sovereignty of the people, when (says ordinary communication—its observation of
Luhmann) the people collectively are “the one who cannot the world in terms of the subsystem’s code
decide at all” [Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 365]; (b) the para-
dox of the objective validity of subjective rights (p. 415); and (e.g., legal/illegal). Second-order observation,
(c) law’s positivity, that is, the circumstance that “law is valid by contrast, is a system’s observation of its own
for the very reason that it can be changed” (p. 452). More first-order observation—or, one might say, a
promising, in my opinion, and distinct from the paradoxes
of self-reference mentioned below in text, are (a) the para- system’s reflexive understanding of the way
doxes of total freedom and total equality (p. 226) and (b) the in which it operates. From this second-order
paradox of modern sovereignty, that is, “the binding of nec- position, one may observe the way in which
essarily unbound authority” (p. 408). For investigations into
Luhmannian legal paradoxes, see, for example, the essays col- first-order observers assign code values (e.g.,
lected in Perez & Teubner (2006). legal and illegal). But because second-order
p. 45]. For that, one would need third-order be understood as valid in the legal system”
observation. Although in principle one could [Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 107; see also
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thus speak of n-order observation, with no pp. 108, 115]. “Morality as such,” Luhmann
limit on n’s magnitude, in practice Luhmann maintains, “has no legal relevance” (p. 112). In
speaks primarily of first- and second-order these senses, Luhmann’s thinking aligns with
observation, occasionally of third-order obser- the main line of legal positivism. In further
vation, and never in any systematic way of any claims, Luhmann echoes particular variants
higher-order observation (Borch 2011, p. 59). of legal positivism. References to extralegal
A second term Luhmann uses in discussing concepts and criteria are increasing, Luhmann
paradox management is unfolding. Second- notes, particularly in judicial (and especially
order observation, he says, is the unfolding constitutional) decisions. But they are juridified
of (first-order) paradoxes [Luhmann 2004 when incorporated, and thus they may have
(1993), p. 212]. This unfolding involves, in a different and specifically legal meaning
his analysis, the reentry of the distinction within the legal system (pp. 113–14, 120–21,
between system and environment into the 213). Echoing Hart’s idea of secondary rules,
system’s communication [Luhmann 2012 Luhmann notes that law not only restricts
(1997), pp. 105–6]. Luhmann refers to this as a conduct but also facilitates it. Luhmann par-
distinction, within a system’s communication, ticularly emphasizes contract as a device for
between self-reference and external (or other-) massive amounts of law creation, classifying it
reference. Through this reentry of the system’s as a category of legal decisions alongside court
distinction from its environment, legal commu- rulings and legislation (pp. 104, 130). He notes
nication can “observe its own operations and further, in agreement with Hart, that the law of
their effects” [Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 105]. property and of corporation formation allows
Luhmann’s explanations for how reentry can private citizens to create law [p. 163; see also
manage or unfold paradox are not well de- p. 401 (describing law as giving private citizens
veloped at the level of general theory. More a slice of political power); accord Hart 1994
clear, however, and taken up below, are his ac- (1961), p. 41 (law of contracts, trusts, wills,
counts of how this sort of deparadoxification for example, makes a private citizen “a private
takes place in the legal system in particular. At legislator”]. Finally, consonant with Hart,
the level of general theory, Luhmann argues Luhmann suggests that his approach still leaves
that the dissolution of paradoxes “has to be me- place for “a moral judgment of law” [Luhmann
diated by mechanisms of structural coupling” 2004 (1993), p. 225; cf. Hart 1994 (1961),
(p. 409). The coupling he discusses most is the pp. 207–12]. To say, as Luhmann does, that
link between law and politics provided by the law is an autonomous system is not to say that it
constitution. cannot be evaluated from other points of view.
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But Luhmann has little patience for the But although he rejects the idea of law’s
old debate between positivism and theories of foundation in an ultimate rule of recognition
natural law. Despite the persistence of this long- or Grundnorm, Luhmann retains and develops
running jurisprudential debate, the idea of legal Hart’s idea that law ultimately cannot ground
positivity has lacked a genuine counterconcept itself as legally valid. He frames the problem as
since the decline of medieval ideas of divine law one of paradox in the self-application of law’s le-
[Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 77]. The substitute gal/illegal code (pp. 227, 284). Still, unlike Hart,
distinction, “between law and morals,” in Luhmann sees law’s basic paradox as genera-
Luhmann’s view, “does nothing for legal the- tive. Paradoxical though these attempted solu-
ory” beyond “providing confirmation that law tions remain, from the basic paradox have been
is positive law and that it can also be assessed developed successively the ideas of the king as
morally (without immediate legal effects)” sovereign, the sovereignty of the people as a
(p. 77). If we retain the idea of legal positivism, collective body, and the foundational charac-
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
he says, it would be only “more or less a matter ter of a written constitution (see pp. 362, 365,
of semantic tactics” (p. 454). The standard posi- 409). As is his usual pattern, and as will be dis-
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tions in the perennial debate, which Luhmann cussed below, Luhmann addresses these strate-
characterizes as positivity and reason, are gies of paradox management through the idea of
eighteenth-century formulae that “have too lit- structural coupling—specifically, the coupling
tle complexity, and overvalue and homogenize between law and politics that the constitution
the points of view that guide them” (p. 448). establishes.
Luhmann’s disinterest in conventional
debates over legal positivism is not just a Legal theory as the legal system’s self-
matter of ennui. He rejects, first, the idea, description. According to Luhmann, systems
common to many nonpositivist approaches as such as the legal system may be described
well, that a legal system is to be understood as either from the inside or from the outside. But
a collection or system of rules. Hart’s idea of even an external description, he thinks, needs
law as union of primary and secondary rules to present law “as a system that describes itself
is in fact “precisely . . . the target of the con- and constructs theory about itself ” [Luhmann
cept of autopoiesis” (p. 130). The elements of 2004 (1993), pp. 422–23]. Luhmann presents
Luhmann’s legal system are communications— a system’s self-description as a special form
operations—and not rules. Further, Luhmann of observation, one that reflects “the unity of
rejects the idea, common in positivist theories, the system” (p. 424). In contrast to ordinary
of a hierarchy of rules resting on an ultimate legal theories one finds at work in court
rule of recognition (Hart) or Grundnorm (Hans decisions or in legal arguments, legal theory
Kelsen). Luhmann defends a temporal rather as self-description does not necessarily guide
than hierarchical theory of legal validity: “The everyday legal practice (p. 425). Still, according
only available test,” he writes, “is the success to Luhmann, the legal system’s self-description
of the ongoing change of the status of the must accept, among other things, the system’s
system’s validity, of the ongoing connecting of binary legal/illegal code, the idea (most usually
one operation to the next, of the autopoiesis associated with the late Ronald Dworkin) of
of the system” (p. 131). The governing image “only one correct decision” in each case, and
is not hierarchy but recursive connection. In the principle that decisions should rest on good
place of the old positivist idea of hierarchical legal reasons and should be respected (p. 428).
sources of law, Luhmann proposes the idea Obviously the idea that the legal system
of legal validity—to be discussed below—as is describing itself and theorizing about it-
circulating symbol. And this symbol is not self is counterintuitive. Yet it follows from
static but dynamic, as it “refers to changes in Luhmann’s initial theoretical decision to focus
the state of law” (pp. 124, 130, 443, 473). on systems rather than persons or groups and to
see those systems as constituted by communi- believes that it no longer makes sense to speak
cations rather than persons who communicate. of, in particular, national economies.
Luhmann insists that his exile of the knowing The internal structure of the functionally
human (or transcendental) subject from the differentiated legal system reflects a distinct and
center of his theory does not simply reinstate apparently rather old form of differentiation,
that unitary subject, this time as a supraindivid- “one that predates modern forms of differentia-
ual thinking, perceiving, self-describing system tion.” Luhmann describes this form as a distinc-
of communication. An adequate description of tion between center and periphery. The pre-
the activity of legal theory, however, must see modern arrangement Luhmann [2004 (1993),
the multiple conflicting theories and multiple p. 302] has in mind is the old difference between
perspectives from which those theories could town and country. In his center/periphery
be said to issue. If we can say that the legal schema, courts occupy the center. But center
system describes itself in legal theory, it may be does not mean most important (p. 292). Luh-
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
simply that within the collection of communi- mann’s theory is not court centered in the way
cations that invoke or otherwise appropriately that American legal theory traditionally was
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concern the legal/illegal code—the elements court centered.7 Similarly, the periphery is pe-
of the legal system—some of them meet the ripheral not in the sense of being unimportant;
criteria for self-description that Luhmann it is peripheral in that it is the contact zone for
has set forth. Luhmann’s own account of the other functional systems. Luhmann places at
history of legal theory follows a path that the periphery legislation and contract, which,
to most would seem more straightforward, we will see, establish structural couplings to the
referring for example not to the legal system’s political and economic systems, respectively.
generation of positivist theories, but to the Luhmann does not explain a certain cate-
positivist theories put forth by Hart and Kelsen. gory difference here. The center of the legal
I find it at least questionable whether anything system, the subsystem of courts (p. 275), is a
is gained by the locution “the system describes network of institutions. The periphery, by con-
itself.” I continue to pursue this point below. trast, is stocked with either two forms of le-
gal communication (legislation, contract) or the
various communications that exemplify those
The Center/Periphery Model of the forms (the various statutes and contracts his-
Legal System’s Internal Structure torically found in the legal system). With his
Luhmann sees the system of world society as insistence that systems have elements and that
differentiated functionally into subsystems for those elements are communications, one would
(to name his usual examples) economy, poli- think that Luhmann would describe the legal
tics, law, science, education, the mass media, system’s internal differentiation as a differen-
medical care, religion, art, and family. Although tiation of communications. The presence of
functional differentiation is the primary form courts, rather than judicial communications (es-
[Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 109], the political pecially opinions but also, for example, court
and legal systems are in Luhmann’s view re- rules), seems an unusual feature.
gionally differentiated as well (p. 96). This of
course is Luhmann’s concession to the contin-
ued existence of the so-called nation-state. Al-
though other systems show regional variations 7
A good example is Dworkin’s (1986) Law’s Empire, which in
in development, Luhmann sees these differ- its opening and closing pages places courts in the empire’s
ences as showing nonetheless congruent trends capital city and crowns judges as the empire’s princes (see
and as consistent with “the unity of the sys- pp. vii, 407). Dworkin defends courts’ centrality in ways that
Luhmann would reject. For a more extended treatment of
tem of [world] society” (pp. 92–93, 96). With Luhmann’s center/periphery scheme and Dworkin’s empire
many other contemporary thinkers, Luhmann metaphor, see Baxter (1998), pp. 2018–21.
176 Baxter
LS09CH08-Baxter ARI 26 September 2013 12:16
But the function Luhmann assigns the legal state court systems have similar structures. As
system’s center seems to require an institution the term regional court of appeals suggests,
rather than a mere assemblage or network territorial differentiation structures the federal
of communications. The function is paradox court system. And one sees a fourth sort of
management. We have seen that for Luhmann, internal functional differentiation as well: The
the central paradox of the legal system is the US Court of Federal Claims, US Court of
paradox of the legal code’s self-application— Appeals for Veterans Claims, and US Court of
the impossibility of determining whether the Appeals for the Federal Circuit all are courts
distinction between legal and illegal is itself with specialized subject-matter jurisdiction
legal or illegal. And if that question cannot (see pp. 294–95).
be answered, then how can the legal/illegal Luhmann does not address the point, but
distinction be applied to decide cases according within a federal system such as the United
to law? This is the sense in which legal decision States, national and state or provincial courts
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
itself is for Luhmann inherently paradoxical are differentiated from one another partly
(see pp. 283–84, 291). functionally and partly hierarchically. Federal
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Courts, according to Luhmann, have the courts, of course, are courts of limited juris-
task of unfolding this paradox. He seems to diction. Vast areas of the legal landscape are
link his assignment of this task to the idea that governed by state rather than federal law. The
courts, alone among legal actors, are legally relation among the federal courts and state
compelled to decide. Although legislators and courts seems to be one of functional differ-
those engaged in contract may refrain from entiation but with hierarchy as to federal-law
law-changing decisions, courts must decide all questions that the state courts decide (with re-
cases properly before them (though of course view sometimes available in the US Supreme
not necessarily on the merits). Presumably for Court). Among the state systems of courts, the
this reason, and probably also because he (like relation seems to be nonhierarchical differen-
more conventional thinkers) notes courts’ spe- tiation based on territory. American courts as
cial obligation to issue consistent decisions a whole, of course, are differentiated territori-
(p. 297), Luhmann sees courts as charged with ally from other nation-states’ courts (and have
unfolding the central paradox of legal decision. structural couplings with territorially differen-
Here Luhmann mentions also what above I tiated political systems). This is part of the sense
called a looser sense of paradox: the need to de- in which Luhmann sees the legal system as still
cide without ever having full information and differentiated territorially as well as function-
sometimes without being able to meet “rea- ally. These different forms of differentiation de-
sonable standards of rationality” (p. 292). Un- termine the way in which a particular court’s
folding a paradox means working it out tempo- decisions link up with (or not) the decisions of
rally rather than at a single moment. Courts’ other courts. Ideas of precedential and merely
task of paradox management therefore is ongo- (more or less) persuasive authority are linked to
ing. I find Luhmann’s ideas most interesting in these forms of differentiation. Here too, once
connection with constitutional decision mak- one begins thinking matters through, it quickly
ing, and I take up that question in the section becomes clear that any talk of the legal system
on the constitution as mechanism of structural communicating in one way or another is in an
coupling below. important sense misleading. The legal system
Within this center of courts, Luhmann of a world society is differentiated according to
identifies, in addition to functional and center/ several principles into various subsystems, and
periphery, a third sort of differentiation: hier- so the parent system has no single voice and no
archical. Federal courts in the United States, single apparatus of perception or thought.
of course, are arrayed from district court to re- One metaphor Luhmann uses to address
gional court of appeals to the Supreme Court; the relation between legal center and legal
periphery is parallel processing (p. 296). Leg- (p. 392). Since the legal realist movement of the
islatures and those engaged in contract also are 1930s, a popular legal metaphor for property
producers of legal validity, and they of course has been a bundle of rights, such as the rights
also operate within space that is legally (among to use, to exclude, and to dispose of the prop-
other ways) structured. Free from the pressure erty and to reap benefits from it. These rights
of compulsory legal decision, legislation and correspond to economic interests. They are at-
contract can be more selective in channeling tempts within legal communication to perceive
irritations from the environment. Luhmann’s through external reference the legal system’s
understanding of the legal periphery is consis- economic environment. Viewed from the other
tent with contemporary theories of legal plu- side, the economic significance of property de-
ralism. He identifies there the production not pends upon, among other things, whether and
just of state law (through formal state legisla- to what extent the legal system will provide
tion) but also of “new forms of privately pro- enforceable protection to economic interests.
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
duced law.” Here Luhmann refers to “the in- Those interests are meaningful in economic
ternal law of organizations, and . . . law created communication as greater or lesser amounts of
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178 Baxter
LS09CH08-Baxter ARI 26 September 2013 12:16
amounting to one-eighth of a cubic foot in roof tion existing in the law” (see U.C.C. Sec. 2–
space for which the owner “would have had 202, comment 1). The greater project of some
no other use” [Loretto 1982, p. 443 (Blackmun legal realists was to replace occasional and hap-
J, dissenting)]. In another example of the di- hazard connections between law and economy
vergence between legal and economic under- with a more systematic observation of economy
standings of land’s value, the Court acknowl- in the law—and the reflexive incorporation of
edged in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council this observation into the law itself. Viewed from
(1992, p. 1020 n.8) that the rule it developed the other side, the Uniform Commercial Code
might provide full compensation for a 100% (for example) “treated businessmen,” not just
deprivation of value but no compensation at all “lawyers and judges,” as “principal addressees”
for a 95% diminution. This result seems eco- (Twining 1973, p. 304).
nomically senseless. But from the perspective Luhmann’s work provides a frame for an-
of legal communication, the Court explained, alyzing these connections between law and
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
“takings law is full of these ‘all-or-nothing’ economy—and for understanding their limits.
situations.” Despite their structural coupling—or perhaps
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One similarly can analyze contract as a precisely because of their structural coupling—
mechanism for structurally coupling law and law and economy remain separate systems. The
economy. The legal term contract has an eco- dream sometimes attributed to realism—that
nomic counterpart, exchange [Luhmann 2004 law might one day mirror the world of eco-
(1993), p. 393].8 In the idea of the expectation nomic transactions—was unrealizable, for rea-
interest, contract law models its economic en- sons Luhmann’s work can explain. Legal doc-
vironment, vindicating what it takes to be the trine responds to internal pulls as well, and to
usual economic interest of a contracting party. pulls also from politics, the other system to
Application of the rule, through valuation of which it is coupled. Luhmann notes also that
this interest, requires a court or jury to ob- legal language, despite its specialization, is still
serve at least a small slice of the economic sys- “a part of society’s language” [Luhmann 2004
tem. Economically minded commentators have (1993), p. 125]. Thus, moral conceptions also
identified and endorsed other rules that re- may be taken up into law.9 And so contract doc-
quire further economic observation and could trine includes also morally responsive notions
be thought to incorporate norms of economi- such as unconscionability, duress, and undue in-
cally reasonable behavior into contract law. Ex- fluence. Further, and perhaps even more inter-
amples include the ideas of efficient breach, the esting, law’s observation of other social spheres
lost volume seller rule, and the (so-called) duty is structured, enabled, and limited by its rules
to mitigate damages. The Uniform Commer- (particularly its rules of evidence), standards,
cial Code can be understood in part as an at- and procedures. Those rules and procedures
tempt to replace legalistic constructions with are not identical to the ones found in its en-
increasingly economically sensitive inquiry. Its vironment, whether we think of the economic
parol evidence rule, for example, refers courts system or (to consider the system specialized in
and juries to “the commercial context” of con- knowledge production) science. One of course
tractual terms and (ironically, it would seem) can seek to improve law’s ability to perceive or
“definitely rejects” the idea that written con- model its social environment, but the two sys-
tract terms gain meaning “by rules of construc- tems still will remain distinct.
9
With respect to constitutional law, Luhmann usually treats
8
Unlike the case of property, according to Luhmann, there the reference to or incorporation of moral norms as an occa-
is no term common to the two systems. (This claim might be sion for criticism [see, e.g., Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 233–
more plausible in German than in English.) 343, 411–12].
180 Baxter
LS09CH08-Baxter ARI 26 September 2013 12:16
system’s unity in a way that the analytical rela- as the foundational document of a legal system
tion between government/opposition and gov- and source of that system’s legal validity, the
erning/governed at first did not. But to describe constitution’s own validity cannot be estab-
the political system’s medium, power, as coded lished through ordinary legal means (p. 126).
through the legal system’s medium, law, is to This last point is, of course, a version of
undermine the idea of separate political and le- law’s foundational paradox—the impossibility
gal systems. The idea of system-specific codes of establishing legally the validity of the le-
and media, after all, is Luhmann’s fundamental gal/illegal code—and a version of Hart’s prob-
basis for distinguishing between systems. lem of foundation for the rule of recognition.
Luhmann suggests a way out of this diffi- Hart’s strategy is to ground the rule of recog-
culty with an alternative formulation. Law does nition in the fact of its acceptance, especially
not code political power, he indicates at one official acceptance (see Hart 1994, pp. 100–17).
point; instead, the political system’s adminis- It makes no sense, he argues, to say that the ul-
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
trative apparatus is “programmed in the form timate standard of legal validity is either legally
of law” (p. 366). This formulation seems more valid or legally invalid (pp. 107–8). Luhmann
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promising. The two systems’ communications describes the strategy adopted in the Ameri-
comprehend law in very different ways. From can Constitution: “The constitution itself con-
the side of the legal system, law has an inter- tains the proclamation of the constitution and
nal culture, based in a specific form of argu- externalizes this symbolically by a reference
mentation. For a question to count as a legal to the . . . will of the people” [Luhmann 2004
question, Luhmann notes, it must take on a (1993), p. 406]. The legal system, in Luhmann’s
particular form. Such is the function of ideas term, thus externalizes the paradox by referring
such as justiciability: “Problems must be turned it to politics—in this case, however, extraordi-
into justiciable form to have access to law. This nary politics.
means that they can be defined recursively in None of this of course changes the fact
relation to the historical condition of the legal that the Constitution’s framers ignored the
system and the validity of law.”10 Further, legal conditions for amendment stated in the Con-
claims typically must be articulated specifically stitution’s predecessor document, the Articles
as rights claims (p. 366). From the perspective of Confederation, choosing to write an entirely
of law, there is no law-free space (p. 368). But new document rather than amend the old.
from the side of the political system, by con- If law is law only by reference to prior law,
trast, law appears simply as an instrument for then the Constitution is not law. The solution
realizing political goals (p. 370). to law’s fundamental paradox is not a legal
solution, says Luhmann, but instead a political
The Constitution as mechanism of struc- solution (p. 410).
tural coupling. Luhmann proposes an Recall that, according to Luhmann, the
additional coding for the legal system: the dissolution of systems’ paradoxes “has to be me-
distinction between constitutional and non- diated by mechanisms of structural coupling”
constitutional law that developed, of course, (p. 409). Unsurprisingly, then, he characterizes
with the rise of the constitutional state (p. 120). the constitution as a mechanism of structural
Constitutional law exempts itself from the usual coupling. As such a mechanism, it has a double
rule that new law trumps old (p. 405). Further, significance, with different meaning in each of
the coupled systems. “For the legal system it is
a supreme statute, a basic law. For the political
10
Obviously, such doctrines can be more or less restrictive. system it is an instrument of politics” (p. 410).
But some version of a justiciability requirement seems un- This mechanism of structural coupling offers
avoidable. To take Luhmann’s [2004 (1993), p. 366] exam-
ple, it seems unimaginable that a court could have decided an unfolding or dissolution for the politi-
the question of whether to reunify Germany. cal system’s own foundational paradox: the
paradox of sovereignty, that is, “the paradox of law” and “a symbol for the dynamic stability of
the binding of necessarily unbound authority” the system” (i.e., its persistence through legal
(p. 408). The constitution operates as an change). The idea of validity does not ground
instrument of politics in prescribing conditions the legal system; instead, it is a product of the
for the legal exercise of power. In Luhmann’s very legal operations that it qualifies. In Luh-
(perhaps misleading) term, the constitution mann’s systems-theoretical vocabulary, “valid-
legally codes political power. And so the mech- ity is an eigenvalue of the legal system; namely
anism of structural coupling, the constitution, a value that is constituted by the recursive per-
“provides political solutions for the problem of formance of the system’s own operations and
the self-reference of the legal system and legal one that cannot be used anywhere else” (pp. 124–
solutions for the problem of the self-reference 25, emphasis in original). In another formula-
of the political system” (p. 410). tion, Luhmann describes validity as a circulat-
Unlike Hart’s solution to law’s basic ing symbol (p. 130).
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
paradox, Luhmann’s unfolding of the paradox All of this is, at the very least, an innova-
does not depend simply upon a hierarchy of tive approach to an age-old problem: the basic
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182 Baxter
LS09CH08-Baxter ARI 26 September 2013 12:16
the same territorial bounds, I leave to others. its difficulty. The idea of social subsystems as
His successors, most notably Teubner, have distinct but structurally coupled poses a prob-
set out on this general task (see Teubner 2011, lem for differentiated modern society (or if one
2012). Exploration of this work would require prefers, societies): How do the various sub-
another article; perhaps the present one will systems (or if one prefers, discourses) fit to-
make Teubner’s work more accessible. gether? The problem is particularly acute for
A second difficulty is that many theorists law and politics, both of which systems have
will reject Luhmann’s work because it is ambitions to regulate and direct the other so-
constructed so as to unask, one might say, cial spheres. Luhmann’s theory suggests that
questions of differential social, economic, and regulation must both link up with and respect
political power. Luhmann, often polemical, the autonomous logic of the regulated sphere
is perhaps at his most polemical when he ad- and also maintain the autonomous logic of the
dresses those who want a social or legal theory regulating sphere (whether law or politics). In
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2013.9:167-184. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
to have a (leftist) critical edge. For theorists thinking about regulation and such boundary
of this persuasion, Luhmann’s work unalloyed problems, Luhmann’s work, even if unpalatable
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would be insufficient. But many inspired by as a full-scale substantive theory, can be un-
Luhmann’s work occupy the left-hand side of derstood as a methodological recommendation:
the political spectrum. Teubner is one such Think from the inside out, and attend to the
thinker; Marx-inspired sociologist Bob Jessop differences across systems that even the same
is another (see Jessop 1990). term (e.g., constitution, property, negligence,
Still, many legal theorists, and even many insanity) might have.
sociologists of law, will find Luhmann’s work The same sort of caution seems appropriate
unattractive for a variety of reasons, not all of for those engaged in interdisciplinary scholar-
them political. I want to suggest, however, that ship. It seems appropriate, also, for those—legal
Luhmann’s formulation of boundary problems theorists or otherwise—who have ambitions for
is a source of his work’s strength as well as their work to affect the wider social world.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might
be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
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184 Baxter
LS09-FrontMatter ARI 4 October 2013 14:19
Annual Review of
Law and Social
Science
v
LS09-FrontMatter ARI 4 October 2013 14:19
a Relational Approach
Susanne Karstedt p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 383
Middle Eastern Law
Chibli Mallat and Mara Revkin p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 405
Indexes
Errata
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