L-19-HTST412 - The End of Soviet Power and Communism in Eastern Europe – notes to ppt slides

Slide 1 By the early 1980s whilst the Soviet system was superficially ticking over quite nicely –
underneath the surface a stagnant economy was just one element of the systemic
problems that were constraining the Soviet system (in the sense of fulfilling the needs of
its citizens whist fulfilling practical and ideological needs of the system – e.g. for defence
and the promotion of socialism abroad). Certainly many in the Soviet Union were living
better than they had in many ways been living only half a generation before, but at the
same time issues such as high levels of education with low levels of social mobility and a
stagnant economy at a time when knowledge about the world outside the Soviet Union
created frustrations in a society with in many ways increasing expectations.
Superficially the Soviet Union was a powerful superpower that could challenge the US on
the global stage, and indeed in the late 1970s the US DoD talked up Soviet military
capabilities whilst being aware that the Soviet Union was falling behind the US
technologically – particularly in electronics and computer technology. By this time the
Soviet Union was pumping significant economic resources into an inefficient agricultural
sector and big-ticket defence projects that were not about the Soviet Union gaining
some sort of edge in the Cold War, but about the Soviet Union staying afloat and
maintaining some sort of parity in capabilities to defend itself and its existing interests
across the globe.
Slide 2 By the late 1970s, both the Soviet economy and the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev,
were undoubtedly in less than ideal shape. For some idea of Brezhnev’s failing health
and faculties, watch his 1979 New Year’s address to the Soviet people here (you don’t
need to understand the Russian to get a sense of his state):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1NnuPHuHJA
Despite an increasingly well-educated workforce and nominally vast R&D sector (largely
relating to defence) by 1965 – SU – almost abandoned domestic development of
computer systems (non-military) + accepted that would adopt Western technologies
with a time lag.
1950-1965 – total number of ‘scientists’ in SU – 162,500-665,000
By early 1970s- SU – ¼ of the world’s scientists, ½ world’s engineers, 1/3 of the world’s
physicists
SU – university population – doubled 1960-1970 (249,000-503,500)
SU – increasingly dependent on international trade, selling raw materials and importing
technology and agricultural products. E.g. even allowing for inflation, SU trade with UK +
France more than doubled 1964-1970. With the UK – 1964 – 382 million US, 1970 773.2
million US; with France 1964 – 205 million US, 1970 476.5 million US.
Slides 3-4 More than half of Soviet expenditure was on agriculture and defence. The growing
investment in the agricultural sector under Brezhnev (that had been underfunded under
Stalin and where ‘surplus’ grain had been sold on international markets for hard
currency, meaning that many Soviet citizens were undernourished) did lead to more
food, but increases in food supply not proportional to investment. In fact, the Soviet
Union ended up purchasing grain abroad – contributing to its increasingly unfavourable
balance of payments deficit.
The Soviet Union was in fact increasingly reliant on the West with an increasing balance
of payments deficit covered by loans from WESTERN banks! I.e. The communist world
was not only dependent on Western goods, but Western banks – a situation Stalin had
tried to avoid after WWII by not joining the IMF etc
Slide 5 During the early 1980s the Soviet Union continued to spout international revolutionary
rhetoric, but how much was it actually delivering on that rhetoric by the late 1970s? E.g.
by 1979 unwilling to provide significant support for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua knowing
that such support would inflame tensions with the US. Much Cuban international
revolutionary activity was not Soviet driven as many politicians in US thought, but the SU
was forced to support Cubans or lose face. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was all
about propping up a failing ‘friendly’ regime, not spreading revolution or Soviet power.
Slide 6-7 The Soviet Union had a significant ‘military-industrial complex’ as did the USA, and that
could promote its own interests within the USSR. Soviet defence spending was
extremely high by international standards even before the 1980s and the US Reagan
administration’s attempts to rekindle the Cold War arms race. Particularly expensive for
the Soviet Union was an enlargement of the Soviet Navy to allow the Soviet Union to
project power beyond the Eurasian land mass, and the ongoing cost of the war in
Afghanistan (invaded late 1979).
[A rousing video piece showcasing the Soviet armed in 1969:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jm2UvE1aLh8]
Slide 8 The Soviet economy was arguably saved by commodity prices and in particular OIL.
Note the oil prices rose during the 1970s as the Soviet economy was stagnating.
During the 1960s Soviet Union went from being a net importer to net exporter of oil.
In 1973 the Arab-Israeli War led to a leap in oil prices – a boon for the Soviet Union (and
Alberta!). As author Stephen Kotkin notes: ‘Without the discovery of Siberian oil, the
Soviet Union might have collapsed decades earlier’. As Kotkin also identifies in his book,
Armageddon Averted, some other oil exporting countries – often hostile to the US – used
high oil revenues to purchase military equipment from the USSR (e.g. Libya).
The Soviet Union of the 1960s and early 1970s was able to extract oil cheaply, but as
those easily accessible sources used up the increasing cost of extraction meant that the
Soviet Union not getting a meaningful return on costs of extraction (e.g. where oil was
also being used in the Soviet economy as if it was almost ‘free’, with heavily subsidized
sales to Eastern Bloc).
Vodka was also an important earner for the state (more later), but also contributed to
social issues (e.g. considerable alcoholism).
In 1986 – with a dramatic drop in world oil prices by 69% - the weaknesses of the Soviet
economy laid bare (once again – there are parallels with what happened in Alberta!).
Slide 9 Undoubtedly an increasingly highly educated Soviet population had increasing
expectations through 1970s and into 1980s, both material (see table) and in terms of
work and careers etc. However, there was only limited social mobility within the USSR by
this point (as those who had risen under Stalin were able to preserve privileges for their
offspring).
Many problems in Soviet society being ‘swept under the carpet’ - e.g. alcoholism
(alcohol-related deaths in the Soviet Union were 15.9 per 100,000 compared to 0.18 per
100,000 in the US for 1976, but alcohol sales were important for the state budget. Vodka
sales 1960 – 144.1 million dekalitres, by 1980 293.9 million. Vodka sales constituted a
staggering 7.3% of Soviet state income as of 1971 according to Soviet measures).
Slide 10 Indigenous socialists had attempted to reform Soviet-inspired governments in Eastern
Europe in the 1950s and 1960s – in 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia (‘The
Prague Spring’) – in both cases indigenous movements for change being crushed –
including the use of armed force. By the 1980s new movements for reform were
 emerging, most significantly initially the ‘Solidarity’ movement in Poland. By the early
1980s however, the Soviet leadership were no longer ‘Stalinist’, and in particular had
moved away from terror as a basic tool of government. Would they back hard line
governments in Eastern Europe during the 1980s in the same way they had in the 50s
and 60s? Intervention in Afghanistan might seem to have suggested yes, but that
commitment soon became a political and economic liability.
Slide 11 By the late 1970s and early 1980s it was increasingly clear that an aging Soviet
leadership was not up to the tasks of dealing with many of the issues facing the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. Brezhnev – undisputed leader of the Soviet Union
from 1973 and subject to his own ‘cult of personality’ died ‘on the job’ on 10 November
1982. He was replaced by Yurii Andropov – Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and General
Secretary of the CPSU from 12 November 1982. Andropov was also poor health as had
been the case for Brezhnev during the latter period of his leadership. Andropov was last
seen in public in August 1983, and died 9 February 1984. By April 1984 Chernenko had
clearly replaced Andropov as leader, but also in poor health. Chernenko died on 10
March 1985, having last been seen in public in December 1984!
On 11 March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev became the 3rd General Secretary of the Party in
3.5 years and was by far the youngest – only 54 years old!
Popular joke at the time – ‘What support does Gorbachev have in the Kremlin? None –
he walks unaided!’.
Gorbachev – came to power at a very challenging time, facing the crash in oil prices, the
ongoing war in Afghanistan, and a stagnant economy – all at a time when the Soviet
Union was also trying to maintain its prestige in the ongoing Cold War.
Slide 12 The war in Afghanistan was a wound for the Soviet Union in a number of ways, including:
nearly 14,000 killed (13,833), plus, more visibly, nearly 50,000 wounded (49,985);
veterans returned to the Soviet Union to tell of the war, contradicting the positive spin
on the war in the Soviet media; there was rising drug use in the USSR, in part amongst
veterans, and in part because of drugs smuggled from Afghanistan; plus the war had a
heavy financial cost.
Slide 13 Gorbachev’s initial ‘Perestroika’ policies were similar to those of Andropov and
Chernenko, e.g. anti-alcohol and drives for workplace discipline (cutting down on
absenteeism from work). The buzz word for Gorbachev’s 1985 policy programme was
‘uskorenie’ or ‘acceleration’. Gorbachev’s initial Perestroika policies however seem to
have had little impact. e.g. the anti-alcohol campaign of May 1985 led to cuts in the
production of spirits where lower alcohol sales hit the state budget and encouraged
home-distilled alcohol and organised crime! This policy earned Gorbachev the jocular
title ‘Mineral’nii sekretar’’ (as opposed to General’nii sekretar’) or ‘the Mineral Water
Secretary’ referring to his water rather than alcohol at meetings.
Slide 14 At the 27th Party Congress (March 1986) there was talk of ‘radical reform’ of the
economy, where the Brezhnev years were referred to as ‘years of stagnation’. Obstacles
to reform were identified as the Party and State bureaucracies. The solution was to be to
mobilize ‘the people’ to foster change and to remedy many of the ills of the Soviet
economy (e.g. corruption). Glasnost’ or ‘openness’ about issues on the part of the
government would give the people the chance to participate in an informed way
(demokratizatsiia) in change (with Gorbachev being seen as part of the solution, not the
problem!).
A major test for glasnost’ was the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the spring of 1986.
 News of the disaster was initially supressed, but gradually the Soviet government and
press attempted to face the issue in front on both a domestic and international
audience. For footage of the disaster, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=uxIJ_67naFw .
Slide 15 In order to try to improve the Soviet economy – that is to increase productivity and
access to goods and services – in some ways when Gorbachev started economic
Perestroika in earnest (what is often called Perestroika I) he was returning to NEP ideas
of allowing a little capitalism into the Soviet economy. For example, the November 1986
Law on Individual Labour Activity sanctioned private enterprise for individuals and
families as long as there wasn’t hiring of labour. In many ways this simply legalized the
existing ‘black market’ for goods and services not met by the centrally planned system.
The results were not however necessarily as hoped – prices increased and the reforms
were opposed by ministries and established interests within the Soviet system.
The June 1987 Law on State Enterprise sought to make Soviet enterprises more efficient
by giving them control over their own budgets – raising the spectre of layoffs for the first
time in many decades.
The costs of the Chernobyl and later Armenian earthquake cleanups were an added
burden on the Soviet economy at this time.
By 1988 the failure of the government to keep control of the money supply – i.e. it
printed more money to try to solve its problems! – added to inflationary pressure. The
money supply increased by just under 8% in 1987, 13.6% in 1988 and 19.5% in 1989. The
Soviet population was by now facing sharply declining standards of living.
Slide 16 At this time Gorbachev had the idea that it would be helpful – in order to overcome
entrenched interests in the bureaucracy and accelerate reform - if the Soviet population
was given more meaningful say in the election of Party and state officials. At this time
‘demokratizatsiia’ started to move from meaning giving options for the participation of
the population in a top-down process to popular participation in the election of officials
that would promote reform. As will be discussed more in the next lecture, early
experiments with multi-candidate elections within the Party tended to lead to the
election of reformers and opponents of the status quo whose agendas were soon more
radical than Gorbachev’s (e.g. Yeltsin).
Slide 17 At the same time as glasnost’ and perestroika were gaining more and changing meaning,
for Gorbachev engagement with the West was necessary to ratchet down tensions of
the Cold War and reduce the Soviet economic defence burden. There is however also
evidence that Gorbachev did have a sincere belief in the need for disarmament.
Gorbachev was willing to make concessions to the West even if the West was unwilling
to make the same levels of concession in return… Soviet diplomacy was no longer about
playing (or at least trying to play) hardball with the West as had been the case since the
1930s.
In 1989 the Soviet Union finally pulled its troops out of Afghanistan. There is strong
evidence that the US tried to prolong the conflict for as long as possible and not allow
the USSR to lose face and save resources with a pullout.
Slide 18 At the same time as the USSR was pulling out of Afghanistan it was starting to make
significant cuts in its support for socialist and quasi-socialist regimes abroad. Whilst
commitments to key allies (e.g. Cuba and Angola) did not suffer as major cuts as
liabilities such as the brutal regime of the Derg in Ethiopia, nonetheless the Soviet Union
was significantly reducing its influence on the world stage and essentially withdrawing
 from the struggle between ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’ on the world stage.
Slide 19 Not only were Soviet allies in Africa and Asia proving expensive for the Soviet Union but
also the Warsaw Pact nations in Europe (where there were not only the costs of
subsidized resources, e.g. oil, but also the cost of keeping Soviet troops in Eastern
Europe). Soviet Union under Gorbachev increasingly keen for financial reasons for them
to be more autonomous, and Gorbachev increasingly saw the issue of greater autonomy
as a moral issue. Certainly glasnost’ and perestroika seemed be giving the green light for
reformers in Eastern Europe to enact their own reforms – often meaning that they were
seeking to leave the Soviet orbit. Gorbachev was clearly willing by 1989 to see the
Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe leave the Soviet fold – most symbolically
illustrated with the bringing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequent re-
unification of Germany. The Soviet Union and its empire by now certainly seemed to be
imploding…
Now watch – CNN – The Cold War – The Wall Comes Down if you are interested!
Cold War - The Wall Comes Down 1989 - Part 23/24 - YouTube