CHAPTER 7 Hence, the present petition to SC on December 21, 1918, under section
513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as already stated. Apparently, the will
1. RIERA VS. PALMORALI G.R. NO. 14851. SEPTEMBER 13, 1919
Doctrine:
It is generally recognized that if a statute is ambiguous and capable of
more than one construction, the literal meaning of the words used may be
rejected if the result of adopting such meaning would be to defeat the
purpose of the legislature had in view.
FACTS:
Juan Pons y Coll (JUAN), a Spanish subject resident in the Philippine
Islands, died on April 16, 1918, in the city of Manila. The petitioner Antonia
Riera Y Botellas (RIERA) is the widow of the deceased and was at the time
of her husband's death residing in Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic
Islands (SPAIN).
19 April 1918 - the respondent Vicente Palmaroli (PALMAROLI), Consul
General for Spain in the Philippine Islands, produced in the CFI Manila a
document dated March 16, 1918, purporting to be the will of deceased
JUAN, and asked that it be admitted to probate. Publication was
accordingly made.
20 May 1918 - an order was entered admitting the will to probate. Owing to
the great distance between Spain and Manila and to the lack of adequate
means of communication (since the European War was ongoing) Riera
received no information of the probate proceedings until after Nov 14,
1918.
19 Jun 1918 RIERA received information of the fact of her husband's
death. She employed an attorney in Spain to address a letter to Wolfson &
Wolfson (law firm in Manila) requesting them to look after the interests of
RIERA in the estate of JUAN. Said communication was received by
Wolfson & Wolfson mentioned only on November 11, 1918.
29 Nov 1918, Wolfson & Wolfson appeared in the CFI on behalf of RIERA
and moved that the order of probate of May 20, 1918, be set aside in order
to allow RIERA to enter opposition. This application was made under
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure
CFI-Manila RULING: Denied by the CFI on the ground that more than six
months had elapsed since the date of the order of probate and prior to the
filing of the motion.
in question deprives RIERA of participation in the testator's estate — the
probate of the will was in fact prejudicial to RIERA.
RIERA claims that, as a party interested in the estate, she is entitled to be
heard in the matter of the probate of the will, having been prevented from
appearing and contesting the original application by circumstances over
which she had no control.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a party who is interested in the estate of a deceased
person, and who has been prevented by inevitable conditions from
opposing the probate of the will, obtain from the Supreme Court, under
section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order for a rehearing in the
CFI, it being alleged that she was not executed with the formalities required
by law and hence was improperly admitted to probate
RULING:
When, however, the Court of First Instance has, by the expiration of six
months, lost the power to relieve from its own judgment under section 113,
the remedy conceded by section 513 to the Supreme Court may be
resorted to, under the conditions stated in that section; and apart from the
restriction that the petition shall be filed within sixty days after the party
aggrieved first learns of the rendition of the judgment, there is no positive
limitation as to the time within which the petition may be filed in the
Supreme Court.
A judgment rendered by default, as the expression is used in section 513 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, has reference to the "default" mentioned in
section 128 of said Code. Such default can only occur in contentious
litigation where a party who has been impleaded as a defendant fails to
appear within the time required.
The proceeding to probate a will is not a contentious litigation, and
the judgment legalizing a will is not a judgment by default, as this term is
used in section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even in those cases
where no person appears to contest the probate of the will.
While the probate of a will is conclusive as to compliance with all formal
requisites necessary to the lawful execution of the will, such probate does
not affect the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will. With respect to
the latter the will is governed by the substantive law relative to descent and
distribution.
Petition denied.
2. RILLORAZA V. ARCIAGA
G.R. No. L-23848. October 31, 1967
FACTS:
On June 18, 1963, respondent Eulalia Banayat filed a criminal complaint at
the Municipal Court of San Fernando against petitioner for direct assault
upon a person in authority allegedly committed in Naguilian, La Union.
Petitioner moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, which was
denied. Thus, the hearing commenced.
On June 3, 1964, petitioner filed for certiorari and prohibition at the Court of
First Instance of La Union. On October 8, the Court declared the
proceedings at the Municipal Court of San Fernando null and void, and
directed the judge to desist from continuing with the hearing of the case,
and to transmit the records to the Municipal Court of Naguilian for the
necessary preliminary investigation. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipal Court of San Fernando has jurisdiction over
the case.
HELD:
Yes. A rule long respected is that jurisdiction of a court of justice to try a
criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is
instituted. Since prosecution here was started on June 18, 1963 when
Republic Act 2613 was in force, this law should be looked up to in
ascertaining whether or not the respondent Judge had jurisdiction to try the
case.
The lower court, however, is of the impression that the passage of Republic
Act 3828 on June 22, 1963, i.e., four days after the criminal complaint was
lodged in court, operates to divest the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La
Union, of jurisdiction, and place it in the Court of First Instance of the same
province. Republic Act 3828 limits jurisdiction of municipal courts in
provincial capitals and city courts only to crimes "committed within their
respective jurisdictions in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional or fine not exceeding P6,000 or both";
and also "when the justice of the peace court goes beyond the limits of the
jurisdiction it possesses at the time of the trial, its actuation may be
questioned as the offense with which the petitioner is tried is no longer
within the class of crimes placed by law under its jurisdiction." This is
incorrect.
Once jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, that jurisdiction remains
with the court until the case is finally determined therein. A subsequent
statute removing jurisdiction "will not operate to oust jurisdiction
already attached." Thus, passage of Republic Act 3828 did not take away
jurisdiction over the case from the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La
Union.
Furthermore, Republic Act 2613 and Republic Act 3828, like Republic Act
296 which they amend, neither speak of acts or omissions punishable by
law nor define crimes or provide penalties therefor, but merely describes
the jurisdiction of courts; hence they are not penal statutes, Consequently,
Republic Act 3828 cannot have, as it did not provide for, retroactive
effectivity.
3. LAUREL VS ABROGAR,
G. R. NO. 155076, FEBRUARY 22, 2006
FACTS:
Laurel was charged willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and use
the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting
International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and
completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae,
and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic
exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively
stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities.
PLDT claimed such the “international phone calls” which are “electric
currents or sets of electric impulses transmitted through a medium, and
carry a pattern representing the human voice to a receiver,” are personal
properties under Art. 416(3) Forces of nature which are brought under
control by science
Laurel claims that the telephone conversation is not synonymous to electric
current or impulses hence it is not susceptible of appropriation, thus cannot
be considered a personal property.

ISSUE:
W/N international long distance calls are considered personal property.
RULING:
No. Penal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the
fair meaning of the language used; and may not be held to include offenses
other than those which are clearly described, notwithstanding that the
Court may think that Congress should have made them more
comprehensive.
Words and phrases in a statute are to be construed according to their
common meaning and accepted usage. One is apt to conclude that
“personal property” standing alone, covers both tangible and intangible
properties and are subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the
words “Personal property” under the Revised Penal Code must be
considered in tandem with the word “take” in the law. The statutory
definition of “taking” and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all
personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft.
The general rule is that, only movable properties which have physical or
material existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper
objects of theft. As explained by Cuelo Callon: “Cosa juridicamente es
toda sustanciacorporal, material, susceptible de ser aprehendida que
tenga unvalor cualquiera.” According to Cuello Callon, in the context of
the Penal Code, only those movable properties which can be taken and
carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft.
Intangible properties such as rights and ideas are not subject of theft
because the same cannot be “taken” from the place it is found and is
occupied or appropriated.
4. VILLASENOR VS OCO- PERGUERRA,
G. R. NO. 180700, MARCH 4, 2008
FACTS:
On August 18, 2001, disaster struck. In the wee hours of the morning, the
Quezon City Manor Hotel went ablaze resulting in the death of 74 people
and injuries to scores of others. Investigation into the tragedy revealed that
the hotel was a veritable fire trap.
Petitioners, together with other officials of the City Engineering Office of
Quezon City, are presently facing criminal charges before the 5th Division
of the Sandiganbayan for the crime of multiple homicide through reckless
imprudence and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. They were
also charged administratively with gross negligence, gross misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service in connection with the
Manor Hotel inferno.
In two separate Orders dated August 29, 2001[5] and September 7,
2001[6] in the administrative case, petitioners Villaseñor and Mesa were
preventively suspended for a period of six (6) months, effective upon
receipt of the suspension order.
Petitioners opposed the motion, contending that they had already been
suspended for six (6) months relative to the administrative case, based on
the same facts and circumstances. They posited that any preventive
suspension that may be warranted in the criminal case was already
absorbed by the preventive suspension in the administrative case because
both the criminal and administrative cases were anchored on the same set
of facts.
In the assailed Resolution of July 3, 2007, respondent court granted the
prosecution's motion for suspension. It ordered the suspension of
petitioners for a period of ninety (90) days. The suspension of the accused
shall be automatically lifted upon the expiration of the ninety-day period
from the time of the implementation of this resolution.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the public respondent acted in Excess of Jurisdiction and/or
With Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Lack of Jurisdiction in
Ordering the Suspension Pendente Lite of Herein Petitioners Despite the
Fact That They Had Already Been Previously Suspended Administratively
Based on The Same Facts and Circumstances.
RULING:
No. It is well-settled that preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A.
No. 3019 is mandatory. It is evident from the very wording of the law:
Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public...
 funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and
in whatever stage of the execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Moreover, imposed during the pendency of proceedings, preventive
suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so
that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons,
from office. Thus, preventive suspension is distinct from the penalty.
While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation
of the charges against him, the latter may be meted out to him at the final
disposition of the case.
Moreover, the petitioners' contention that as a penal statute, the
provision on preventive suspension should be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in their favor.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 on preventive suspension is not a penal
provision. It is procedural in nature.
As the courts have already established, preventive suspension is not, in
actual fact, a penalty at all. It is a procedural rule. In fine, the preventive
suspension against petitioners must be upheld, as the Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion.
5. PEOPLE VS TERRADO,
G.R. NO. 23625, NOVEMBER 25, 1983
FACTS:
In November 1951 and May 1952, Gertrudes Obo, Remedios Gundran,
and Mariano Terrado applied for and were issued free patents for
contiguous parcels of land in Camarines Sur containing an area of more
than 23 hectares.
The said parcels of land were allegedly forest land and, hence, not
disposable; Terrado, Gundran, and Obo were charged before the CFI of
Camarines Sur on March 13, 1962, in three separate information for
falsification of public documents.
Pedro Terrado, a licensed private land surveyor; Casimiro Flores, a public
land inspector of the Bureau of Lands; and Bruno Gundran, the District
Land Officer, are also charged for falsification, preparing or causing to be
prepared, documents containing false narration of facts, more particularly,
the (1) applications for free patent; (2) notices of application for free patent;
(3) final inspection reports; and (4) first indorsements of District Land
Officer Bruno Gundran,
The officers made it appear to the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources that the applicants possessed all the
necessary qualifications and had complied with all the requirements of the
law to entitle them to a free patent when in truth and, as they all fully well
knew, all their manifestations were false and fraudulent and that the said
applicants had not complied with any or all of the requirements of the law to
entitle them to a free patent.
Before the arraignment, the defendants filed separate motions to quash the
information on the ground that the crimes charged in the information do not
constitute the offense of falsification of public documents and that the same
had already prescribed. After a proper hearing, the trial court dismissed the
information as aforesaid.
ISSUE:
WON Shorter prescriptive period is more favorable to the accused
RULING:
Yes. While the information sufficiently alleged the commission of
falsification of public documents under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code,
the offenses alleged to have been committed have already prescribed
since the preparation and submission of false affidavits in support of a
petition or claim respecting lands of the public domain is also punishable as
perjury under Sec. 129 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which
reads, as follows:
Sec. 129. Any person who present or causes to be presented, or
cooperates in the presentation of, any false application, declaration,
or evidence, or makes or causes to be made or cooperates in the
making of a false affidavit in support of any petition, claim, or
objection respecting lands of the public domain, shall be deemed
guilty of perjury and punished as such.
Falsification of public documents is punishable by prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed P 5,000.00. Prison mayor is an afflictive penalty, and hence,
prescribes in 15 years Perjury, upon the other hand, is punishable by
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, or from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four
(4) months, which is correctional in nature, and prescribes in ten (10)
years. However, Public Act No. 3326, as amended by Act 3585 and Act
3763, provides that “violations penalized by special laws shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following
rules:
(a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both;
(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years;
(c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two
years or more, but less than six years; and
(d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by
imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason,
which shall prescribe after twenty years”, so that perjury which is
punishable by imprisonment of from four (4) months and one (1)
day to two (2) years and four (4) months prescribes after eight
years.
Penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural, are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and
liberally in favor of the accused. As it would be more favorable to the
herein accused to use Section 129 of Commonwealth Act 141 and Act
3326, as amended, in connection with the prescriptive period of the
offenses charged, the same should be applied. Considering, therefore, that
the crimes were alleged to have been committed during the period from
May 15, 1952, to February 2, 1953, and the information was filed only on
March 13, 1962, or more than eight (8) years after the said offenses were
allegedly committed, the lower court correctly ruled that the crimes in
question had already prescribed.
6. AZARCON VS SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R. NO. 116033, FEBRUARY 26, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling
"dirt and ore. His services were contracted by the Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at its concession in Mangagoy,
Surigao del Sur. He engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime
Ancla whose trucks were left at the former's premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued
by BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods,
chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-
contractor of Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer.
A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by
Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR
the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered
himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Regional Director of BIR
stating that while he had made representations to retain possession of the
property of Ancla, he thereby relinquished whatever responsibility he had
over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment
from him.
The BIR Regional Director said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the
provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
malversation of public funds or property.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs., 4 mos. and 1 day of reclusion
temporal.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Azarcon is a public officer.
RULING:
No. SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for
lack of jurisdiction. Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when the
Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been
charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense
under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be
proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the
crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the
petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the
BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he
obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was
he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While
BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained
truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint
Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to
act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him
as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.
Note:
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or
would lead to an injustice.
7. MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
G.R. NO. 10214. NOVEMBER 4, 1915
FACTS:
The plaintiff imported into the Philippine Islands ten locomotive engines, to
be used upon its railroad. Some of the parts of said engines had been
manufactured in England, some of which had been sent to the United
States and there attached to said locomotives; that some of the parts had
been sent direct to Manila, to be attached to the locomotives in the
Philippine Islands; that said locomotives, together with said parts, were
admitted into the Philippine Islands free of duty.
The locomotives, except the parts which had been manufactured in
England, were admitted free of duty, under section 12 of the Philippine
Tariff Law of 1909. Those parts of said locomotives which had been
manufactured in England were admitted free of duty by virtue of the
provisions of section 10 of Act No. 1510.
Later the Collector of Customs canceled said free entry of said parts which
had been manufactured in England and admitted the same free of duty
under section 12 of the Philippine Tariff Law of 1909, instead of section 10
of Act No. 1510.
"Act No. 1510, the charter of the railway company, in its section 10
provides for the admission free of duty of all materials necessary for the
construction and equipment of the railroad lines covered by the charter.
Section 12 of the Tariff Act of 1909 provides for the free entry of all
articles, except rice, the growth, product, or manufacture of the United
States or its possessions to which the customs in force in the United States
is applied and upon which no drawback has been allowed.
Against the order of cancellation, the plaintiff protested, which protest was
overruled by the Collector of Customs. The plaintiff appealed to the CFI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the articles imported by the plaintiff should be admitted free
of duty.
HELD:
Yes. Under the facts stated in the opinion, that the articles imported by the
Manila Railroad Company, being material for the construction and
equipment of its railways, should be admitted free of duty.
8. MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs.
MARCOS
G.R. No. 120082. September 11, 1996.
DOCTRINE:
A claim of exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based
on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation
is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception.
FACTS:
Petitioner (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958,
mandated to “principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective
control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in
the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, and such other
airports as may be established in the Province of Cebu. Since the time of
its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from
payment of realty taxes in accordance with
“Sec. 14. Tax Exemptions. — The Authority shall be exempt from
realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its
political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.”
On October 11, 1994, however, the Office of the Treasurer of the City of
Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land
belonging to the petitioner located at Barrio Apas and Barrio Kasambagan,
Lahug, Cebu City, in the total amount of P2,229,078.79.
Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and
unjustified, claiming in its favor the aforecited Section 14 of RA 6958
which exempts it from payment of realty taxes. It was also asserted
that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental
functions, citing Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government units:
“Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
Government Units. — Unless otherwise provided herein, the
exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local
government units”
Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax
account, insisting that the MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation
whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of
Section 193 – Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privilege and Section 234
– Exemptions from Real Property Taxes of the Local Government
Code that took effect on January 1, 1992
“Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privilege. — Unless
otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives
granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA
No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Taxes.
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real
property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all
persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned
or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity
of this Code.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MCIAA is a “taxable person.”
HELD:
YES. The petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under
its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes.
The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of
the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except
real property tax.
As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is
unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that
security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the
legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay it.
Nevertheless, effective limitations thereon may be imposed by the people
through their Constitutions. Our Constitution, for instance, provides that the
rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable and Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation. So potent indeed is the power that it was
once opined that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." Verily,
taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal and
property for the support of the government.
Accordingly, tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government
and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are what we pay for
civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against
exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus
construed strictissimi juris– operates to separate the individual
from her group to ensure that criminal liability attaches for
individual, not imputed, conduct and mens rea— against the
taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption
from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on language in the law
too plain to be mistaken.
Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the
exception. However, if the grantee of the exemption is a political
subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not apply
because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce the
amount of money that has to be handled by the government in the course
of its operations.
Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for
purposes of real property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had
already become, even if it be conceded to be an “agency” or
“instrumentality” of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose
in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of
exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier
adverted to, applies to the petitioner.
9. CIR VS GUERRERO,
G.R. NO. 20812, SEPTEMBER 22, 1967
FACTS:
CIR denied claim for refund of sum of 2441.93 filed by administrator of
estate of Paul Gunn, substituted by A.D. Guerrero as special administrator.
Gunn operated an air transpo business under the name of Phil. Aviation
Dev’t. Claimed estate was entitled to the same rights and privileges as
Filipino Citizens operating public utilities including privileges in the matter of
taxation.
CIR disagreed; ruled that partial exemption to gasoline tax not included
under terms of ordinance and must be in accordance with the statute, to be
entitled to its benefits must show that US citizens were granted the same
as Filipinos.
The Court of Tax Appeals ruled in favour of Guerrero.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code allowing Filipinos
a refund of 50 percentum of the specific tax paid on aviation oil, could be
availed by citizens of the United States and all forms of business
enterprises owned or controlled directly by them in view of the privilege
under the Ordinance to operate public utilities in the same manner as to,
and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations owned or controlled by Filipinos.
HELD:
To the extent that a refund is allowable, there is in reality a tax exemption.
The rule applied with undeviating rigidity in the Philippines is that for a tax
exemption to exist, it must be so categorically declared in words that admit
no doubt. No such language may be found in the Ordinance. It
furnishes no support, whether express or implied, to the claim of
respondent Administrator for a refund. From 1906 to 1966, it has been
the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not
favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly
construed against the taxpayer. (Catholic Church vs Hastings and Esso
Standard Eastern, Inc. vs Acting Commissioner of Customs).
At the time when the Ordinance took effect in April 1947, the strict rule
against the exemption was undisputed and indisputable. Such being the
case, it would be a plain departure from the terms of the Ordinance to
predicate a tax exemption where none was intended. (Gold Creek Mining
Corp. vs Rodriguez 1938)
Tax exemption is not to be presumed and that if granted, it is to be most
strictly construed. No such grant was apparent on the face of the
Ordinance. No such grant could be implied from its history, much less from
its transitory character.
10. TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY,
G.R. NO. 24548, OCTOBER 27, 1983
FACTS:
On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the
license of logging operations on a public forest land in Olongapo.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Benjamin M. Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to
the Director of Forestry to grant
(a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered
thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and
(b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not
exceeding 3,000 hectares.
On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued
by the acting secretary, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of
Forestry which incidentally was the same date the license for petitioner was
signed.
Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to
the Court.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio
2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion in
revoking the license
RULING:
1. Yes. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to
the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on
which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked.
While the timber license might have been signed on December 19,
1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release,
no right is acquired by the licensee.
As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry no longer had any
authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-
appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license.
2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
11. VICENTE VS WORKSMEN COMPENSATION COMMISSION,
G.R. NO. 18241, DECEMBER 27, 1963
FACTS:
This is a case for a petition to review by certiorari of a decision of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission by petitioners against respondents.
Petitioner Santiago Vicente had been in the employ of respondent as plant
mechanic since July, 1952, while in the performance of his duties, he fell,
his chest and the back of his head hit a cement wall rendering him
unconscious for an hour, after which he continued to work. After two
weeks, he informed the respondent, thru the Manager Puyat, that he was
not feeling well, exhibiting some loss of memory which affected his work.
Petitioner was confined at the Philippine General Hospital, he was
diagnosed with cerebral atrophy with encephalopathy probably
secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis.
During the period of confinement, petitioner filed a claim for compensation
(Form No. 1), under Act No. 3428, with Regional Office of Department of
Labor, for the injury and consequent disability, resulting from the accident.
The company filed its Employer’s Report of Accident or Sickness (Form
No. 3), claiming that it did not have knowledge of the injury or the accident.
The hearing officer rendered judgment, dismissing the claim for
insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the above decision and prayed
that claimant be allowed to:
1. Present additional evidence to show that his disease or ailment was
aggravated by the accident;
2. That a joint examination be conducted on the claimant by an expert,
designated by the parties;
3. The motion for reconsideration be set for argument for a more vivid
ventilation of the issues.
WCC, en banc, denied the motion for reconsideration, neither did it
allow petitioner to present additional evidence or to hold a joint examination
of claimant hence this case.
ISSUE:
*In relation to Liberal Construction in Statutory Construction:
Whether or not the Workmen’s Compensation Commission erred in its
construction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
HELD:
YES, In the case at bar, the court stated that the petitioner’s claim should
be upheld, not only because the presumption of compensability was not
destroyed by respondent company’s evidence, but also because the
Workmen’s Compensation Act is a social legislation designed to give
relief to the workmen who has been the victim of an accident in the
pursuit of his employment and must be liberally construed to attain the
purpose for which it has been enacted.
As a rule, in Statutory Construction, statute enacted for the public good are
to be construed liberally. Statuta pro publico commodo late
interpretantur. Liberal construction means that the words should receive a
fair and reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent, spirit and
purpose of the law.
Hence, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the WCC, dismissing
petitioner’s claim for compensation for alleged insufficiency of evidence,
and ordered respondent Manager Puyat & Sons, Inc., to pay the petitioner
compensation to be computed by the WCC in accordance with the law.
12. CO Y QUING VS REPUBLIC
GR NO. L-10761
DOCTRINE:
For this reason, it is well settled that the procedure prescribed by law for
the naturalization of an alien "should be strictly followed.” In the
language of Corpus Juris Secundum, naturalization laws "should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against applicant for citizenship"
FACTS:
This is an appeal, taken by the OSG, from a decision, of the CFI Manila,
granting the petition for naturalization, citizen of the Philippines, of appellee
Celestino Co y Quing Reyes.
Appellant maintains that:
1. The lower court erred in not finding that the petitioner appellee
has failed to comply with all the requisites prescribed by the law to
acquire Philippine citizenship.
2. The lower court erred in finding that the petitioner-appellee
possesses all the qualifications prescribed by Revised
Naturalization Law.
3. The lower court erred in granting Philippine citizenship to the
herein petitioner-appellee.
ISSUE: W/N the CFI Manila erred in hearing this case and granting the
petition in the case at bar, despite the undisputed fact that said petition was
publish in the Official Gazette only once, instead of three (3) times, as
required in section 9 of Commonwealth Act 473
HELD:
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against
petitioner-appellee. The lower court erred in not finding that the petitioner
appellee has failed to comply with all the requisites prescribed by the law to
acquire Philippine citizenship.CFI of Manila erred in hearing this case and
granting the petition in the case at bar, despite the undisputed fact that said
petition was publish in the Official Gazette only once, instead of three (3)
times, as required in section 9 of Commonwealth Act 473.
Petitioner may contend, however, that the law provides that the publication
of the notice of hearing should be made for three consecutive weeks and
as the Official Gazette is now being published monthly, and not weekly as it
was before, petitioner cannot actually comply with law.
While it is true that the notice of hearing in question cannot actually be
published for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, it is no less
true that said notice may be published three times consecutively,
although not weekly, in the Official Gazette, and because the true intent of
the law is that the said notice be published 3 times, it is our considered
opinion that in the instant case the single publication of the notice of
hearing in question is not a sufficient compliance with law."
The grant of citizenship is only a mere privilege, and strict compliance with
law on the part of the applicant is essential.'
13. SANTIAGO VS COA
GR 92284
FACTS:
Petitioner Teodoro Santiago was employed in the COA as State Auditor IV
with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In 1988, he was assigned to the COA
Auditing Unit at the Department of Transportation and Communications
and detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA).
On August 10, 1988, the chairman of the MIAA board of directors issued
an office order formally designating the petitioner as Acting Assistant
General Manager for Finance and Administration, effective August 16,
1988.
The petitioner served in this capacity and collected the differential salary of
P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for a total compensation of
P13,068.00. He received this compensation until he was transferred to the
Presidential Management Staff.
On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in the government for
44 years. In computing his retirement benefits, the Government Service
Insurance System used as basis the amount of P13,068.00, the highest
basic salary rate received in the course of his employment. However, COA
disagreed and paid his benefits on the basis of only his monthly salary as
State Auditor IV. Petitioner requested for recomputation which was
denied.
On March 7, 1990, he came to this Court to seek reversal of the decision of
the COA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
The Solicitor General argues that the additional compensation received by
the petitioner was merely an honorarium and not a salary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a substantial distinction between the terms
appointment and designation in the given case.
HELD:
No. An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of
obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in
consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money. The
additional compensation given to the petitioner was in the nature of a
salary because it was received by him as a matter of right in recompense
for services rendered by him as Acting Assistant General Manager for
Finance and Administration. In fact, even Chairman Domingo referred to it
in his letter dated July 14, 1988, as the petitioner's "salary differential."
There is an accepted legal distinction between appointment and
designation. While appointment is the selection by the proper authority of
an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office, designation,
on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition of additional duties,
usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an
earlier appointment (or election).
In the law in question, the term "appointment" was used in a general sense
to include the term "designation." In other words, no distinction was
intended between the two terms in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966.
We think this to be the more reasonable interpretation, especially
considering that the provision includes in the highest salary rate
"compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity." This
need not always be conferred by a permanent appointment. A contrary
reading would, in our view, militate against the letter of the law, not to
mention its spirit as we perceive it. That spin seeks to extend the maximum
benefits to the retiree as an additional if belated recognition of his many
years of loyal and efficient service in the government.
14. LETTERS OF MRS. CORONA
A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC
FACTS:
Renato Corona became the Chief Justice of the Philippines on May 12,
2010 after an eight-year stint as Associate Justice in the High Court. He
occupied the judicial apex very momentarily: a year after his appointment
as Chief Justice, Articles of Impeachment were filed against him and he
was eventually indicted by the House of Representatives under Section 2,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution on the alleged grounds of betrayal of
public trust, culpable violation of the Constitution, and graft and corruption.
No objection or a motion for reconsideration was interposed against the
judgment of the Senate convicting him.
Cristina Corona is requesting the grant of retirement and other benefits to
the late former Chief Justice and her claim for survivorship pension under
Republic Act 9946.
The matter was then referred to the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAt) for
its report and evaluation. In a Report dated September 28, 2020, the OCAt
shared Mrs. Corona's opinion that a verdict in an impeachment case has
the sole effect of ousting the errant official from his/her post.
Its concurrence with Mrs. Corona, however, ended there. In its
interpretation of Sections 1 and 3 of RA 9946, the OCAt submits that it will
be a stretch to consider former Chief Justice Corona's removal by
impeachment tantamount to an act of resignation by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office that he held.
ISSUE:
W/N Mrs. Corona’s request must be granted.
RULING:
Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, judgment in cases of impeachment shall
not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.
Father Bernas elucidated on the matter:
The object of the process is not to punish but only to remove a
person from office. As Justice Storey put it in his commentary on
the Constitution, impeachment is "a proceeding, purely of a political
nature, is not so much designed to punish an offender as to secure
the state against gross political misdemeanors. It touches neither
his person nor his property, but simply divests him of his political
capacity." Put differently, removal and disqualification are the only
punishments that can be imposed upon conviction on
impeachment.
Also, Section 1 of RA 9946, yields two instances of retirement available to
a magistrate - first, a compulsory retirement at 70 years old; and second,
an optional retirement upon reaching 60 years of age. The following legal
requisites must concur for the optional retirement of a magistrate and the
consequent entitlement to the benefits under RA 9946:
(1) That the retiree be a magistrate, i.e., a Justice of the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the Court of
Tax Appeals, or a judge of the trial courts, shari 'a court, or of any
other judicial court;
(2) That the retiring magistrate has rendered at least fifteen (15)
years of service in the judiciary, in any other branch of the
government, or in both;
(3) That the retiring magistrate be at least sixty (60) years of age at
the time of retirement; and
(4) That the last three (3) years of public service by the retiring
magistrate be continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
The requirements are straightforward and have all been satisfactorily
complied with by the late Chief Justice.
Retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of
the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.
Having determined the entitlement of Chief Justice Corona to retirement
benefits, it naturally follows that his widow is likewise entitled to
survivorship benefits reckoned from the time of the demise of the late
Chief Justice until the widow's death or remarriage.
CHAPTER 8
1. BREHM VS REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-18566
FACTS:
Brehm was a non-resident alien of the Philippines. He filed a petition
however, to adopt his step-child. He argued that Article 335 of the New
Civil Code which prohibits a non-resident alien to adopt was inapplicable
because it covers adoption only for the purpose of establishing a
relationship of paternity and filiations where none existed, but not where
the adopting parents are not total strangers to the child. Petitioners further
contended that they could adopt pursuant to Article 332 of the New Civil
Code which expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a
stepfather.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Brehm as a non-resident may adopt a child.
HELD:
NO. Article 338 should be construed in connection with Article 335. Article
338 clearly states that "The following cannot adopt ... (4) non-resident
aliens." It is therefore mandatory because it contains words of positive
prohibition and is couched in negative terms, importing that the act required
shall not be done otherwise than designated. On the other hand, Article
338 provides that "the following may be adopted: (3) step-child by the step-
father or step-mother." This provision is merely directory and can only be
given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions
of Article 335, Moreover, it is Article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the
court over the case and before Article 338 may or can be availed of, such
jurisdiction must first be established. There is no question that petitioner
Brehm is a non-resident. By his own testimony, he supplied the conclusive
proof of his status, and no amount of reasoning will overcome the same.
For this reason, he cannot adopt.
Moreover, the court stated that they should construe, however, Article 338
in connection with article 335. Art. 335 clearly states that "The following
cannot adopt: ... (4). Non-resident aliens". It is therefore, mandatory,
because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the
negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise
than designated (50 Am. Jur. 51). On the other hand, Art. 338, Provides
"the following may be adopted: (3) a step-child, by the step-father or step-
mother", which is merely directory, and which can only be given operation if
the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Art. 335.
Moreover, as heretofore been shown, it is article 335 that confers
jurisdiction to the court over the case, and before Article; 338 may or can
be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be established. We ruled out the
adoption of a step-child by a step-father, when the latter has a legitimate
child of his own (Ball v. Rep., 50 O.G. 145; and McGee v. Rep., L-5387,
April 29, 1959).
2. CAPATI VS OCAMPO
GR NO. 28742, APRIL 30, 1982
FACTS:
Plaintiff Virgilio Capati was the contractor of the Feati Bank for the
construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. On May 23, 1967,
plaintiff entered into a subcontract with the defendant Dr. Jesus Ocampo, a
resident of Naga City, whereby the latter, in consideration of the amount of
P2,200.00, undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior walls and
columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications
indicated therein.
Defendant further bound himself to complete said construction on or before
June 5, 1967 and, to emphasize this time frame for the completion of the
construction job, defendant affixed his signature below the following
stipulation written in bold letters in the sub-contract: "TIME IS ESSENTIAL,
TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE' 67."
Claiming that the defendant finished the construction in question only on
June 20, 1967, plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga an
action for recovery of consequential damages in the sum of P85,000.00
with interest, plus attorney's fees and costs. The complaint alleged inter
alia that "due to the long unjustified delay committed by defendant, in open
violation of his express written agreement with plaintiff, the latter has
suffered great irreparable loss and damage ... "
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
the venue of action was improperly laid. The motion was premised on
the stipulation printed at the back of the contract, which reads:
That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may
be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Naga.
Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, claiming that their agreement to
hold the venue in the Court of First Instance of Naga City was merely
optional to both contracting parties. In support thereof, plaintiff cited the use
of the word "may " in relation with the institution of any action arising out of
the contract. The lower court, in resolving the motion to dismiss, ruled that
"there was no sense in providing the afore quoted stipulation, pursuant to
Sec. 3 of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, if after all, the parties are
given the discretion or option of filing the action in their respective
residences," and thereby ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
WON the venue of action was improper
RULING:
NO, we hold that the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is
simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file
their suits solely and exclusively with the Court of First Instance of Naga.
They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without
waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Since the complaint has been filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid
in accordance with Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
It is well settled that the word "may" is merely permissive and operates to
confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term
"may be" connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May" is an
auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.
3. PEOPLE VS TAMANI GR NO. 22160, JANUARY 21, 1974
FACTS:
Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court
on February 14, 1963.
Upon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel subsequently filed a
motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which was denied.
The lower court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by
registered mail on July 13, 1963 through the counsel’s wife.
Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10, 1963, forty-eight days from
July 24th, which is the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal.
Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that
the appeal was forty-eight days late.
They invoked Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which states that an
appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or
notice of the judgment or order appealed from.
ISSUE:
Whether the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of
promulgation of the decision.
RULING:
Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word “promulgation”
should be construed as referring to “judgment”, while “notice” should be
construed as referring to “order”. Tamani’s appeal is therefore 58 days late,
not 47, as Appellees contend; he only had a day left from the receipt of his
wife of the notice on July 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon
the appeal at hand “to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice”.
The word "must" in section 6 is synonymous with "ought". It connotes
compulsion or mandatoriness. The clear terms of section 6 leave no room
for doubt that the appeal should be effected within fifteen days from the
promulgation of the judgment.
Note:
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. —An appeal must be taken within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed
from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time
a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion
shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.
4. DE MESA VS MENCIAS GR NO. 24583, OCTOBER 29, 1966
FACTS:
Opponents for the Mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections
were Francisco De Mesa and Maximino Argana. The electorate’s choice,
as tallied by the local board of Canvassers, was de Mesa. Argana
protested the election of De Mesa. On March 18, 1964, however, an
assassin’s bullet felled De Mesa, and, forthwith Loresca was, by operation
of law, duly installed as his successor. In the election case, the protestant
Argana moved for the constitution of committees on revision of ballots.
On May 6, 1964, the court a quo required the protestee’s widow and
children to appear within 15 days from notice in order to be substituted for
the said protestee, if they so desired. They did not, however, comply. The
trial court did not order the opposing party to procure the appointment of
the legal representative of the deceased litigant stated under Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court.
SEC. 17. Death of party.—After a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or
within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails
to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party
to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
 representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased. . . . (Rule 3.)
Argana reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioner on
revision of ballots, but this time, without proposing any provision for
representation for the protestee whose widow and children he sought to be
declared “non suited”.
On June 23, 1964, without notice of the protestee and / or his legal
representative, the trial court granted the motion aforesaid. The trial court
adjudged the protestant Argana as the duly elected Mayor of Muntinlupa,
Rizal in the 1963 elections, and taxed the costs of expenses of the protest
against the estate of the deceased protestee De Mesa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirement for the procurement of a legal
representative of a deceased litigant is couched in the permissive term
“may” instead of the mandatory character of statutory provisions.
HELD:
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court applies to election contests to the
same extent and with the same force and effect as it does in ordinary civil
actions. And we declare that unless and until the procedure therein detailed
is strictly adhered to, proceedings taken by a court in the absence of a duly
appointed legal representative of the deceased protestee must be stricken
down as null and void. Considering that, in the case at bar, the trial court
failed to order the protestant to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased protestee after the latter's widow and
children had failed to comply with the court order requiring their
appearance to be substituted in lieu of their predecessor, but instead — in
derogation of the precepts of the Rule in question and in the total absence
of a legal representative of the deceased protestee — proceeded ex parte
with the election case, said court not only acted with grave abuse of
discretion but actually committed a clear extra-limitation of its lawful
jurisdiction which, perforce, tainted all its proceedings with the indelible
stigma of nullity
Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by
justice or public duty, or where it vests a public body, municipality, or public
officer with power and authority to take some actions which concerns the
public interests or rights of individuals, the permissive language will be
construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted
upon as duty. The judgment under review is reversed.
5. CRESPO VS MOGUL GR NO. L-53373, JUNE 30, 1987
DOCTRINE:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.
FACTS:
April 1977, Asst. Fiscal de Gala with approval of the Provincial
Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Crespo in the Circuit Criminal
Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed
a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the Sec. of Justice for the filing of the
information; which was denied. A motion for reconsideration was denied
too in order but the arraignment was referred to August 18, 1997 to afford
time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the accused in the CA, then CA restrained Judge
Mogul from proceeding with arraignment until further orders.
On March 22, 1978 undersecretary of Justice Macaraig reversed the
resolution of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. A motion to
dismiss was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the trial court attaching
Macaraig's letter. On November 1978, judge denied the motion and set
arraignment stating that the motion thrust induce the court to resolve the
innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced
before the undersecretary that disregards the requirements of due process
but also erodes court's independence and integrity, motion denied.
Crespo then filed a petition certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition in the CA. Praying
that the decision to move on with arraignment be reversed and set aside
declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect and
to dismiss the case and declare Crespo's obligation as purely civil.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a
criminal case filed by the provincial fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant
the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD:
YES. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case
is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.
6. NEYPES VS CA GR NO. 141524, SEPTEMBER 14, 2005
DOCTRINE:
The right to appeal is a neither natural right nor a part of the due proces. It
is a merely statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
FACTS:
The petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the
Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon,
Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and
respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were:
(1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the
Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2)
the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of
the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners'
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and,
on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on
July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998,
the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late.
The petitioners filed for certiorari and mandamus on the ground that they
filed their notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They argued that
the 15 -day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22,
1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration.
The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that 15-day period appeal should
have been reckoned the day they received the order dismissing the
complaint.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner’s appeal was filed out of time when petitioners received their
last final order of the court on July 22, 1998 and filed their notice of appeal
on July 27, 1998 and paid the appeal docket fee on August 3, 1998.
HELD:
No, petitioners’ appeal was filed on time. Under Rule 41 Section 3,
petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgement or final order to appeal
the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period
(March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead
opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the
MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. [15] It ruled
that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of
appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners,
however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of
15 days from receipt of the 'final order or the order dismissing their motion
for reconsideration.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15
days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15
days from receipt of the order (the 'final order') denying his motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes
final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3.
7. OCAMPO VS CABANGIS GR NO. L-3983 FEBRUARY 15, 1910
FACTS:
On the 26th of December, 1908, a judgment was entered in this case in the
following words:
Without prejudice to the filing of an extended opinion later, the judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant is absolved from the
complaint without special finding as to costs, and twenty days hereafter let
judgment be entered in conformity herewith, and ten days later let the
record be returned to the court wherein it originated, for appropriate action.
So, ordered.
No further decision was ever filed.
Two of the four justices who signed the decision are no longer members of
the court. The appellees now seek the cancellation and annulment of the
entry of judgment. They argued that no final judgment has ever been
entered, and that by reason of the changes in the personnel of the court
the more extensive opinion which was contemplated cannot now be filed.
Section 15 of Act No. 136 provides that "in the determination of causes all
decisions of the Supreme Court shall be given in writing, signed by the
judges concurring in the decision, and the grounds of the decision shall be
stated as briefly as may be consistent with clearness."
The decision of December 26, 1908, was in writing, and was signed by the
four justice who concurred therein, but no grounds are stated for the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Section 15 of Act No. 136 was intended to be
mandatory? Thus, make the decision ineffective?
RULING:
No. It is a directory statute. The conclusion of the majority of a court is the
decision of the court, regardless of the views of the members as to the
reasons which induce that conclusion.
A strict and literal compliance with this statute would often render it
impossible for the court to decide a case. The Act declares the manner in
which the Supreme Court shall perform the strictly judicial act of giving final
expression to its decision, but it does not say that the failure to comply
therewith shall render the decision ineffective.
There is, however, a broader ground upon which the decision may be
placed. The doctrine is well established in the various States of the Union
that the legislatures have no power to establish rules which operate to
deprive the courts of their constitutional authority to exercise the judicial
functions.

CHAPTER 9
1. UMALI VS ESTANISLAO GR NO. 104037, MAY 29, 1992
FACTS:
This is a case of petition for mandamus and prohibition to review the
decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, filled by petitioner
REYNALDO V. UMALI against respondents HON. JESUS P.
ESTANISLAO, Secretary of Finance, and HON. JOSE U. ONG,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 (AN ACT ADJUSTING THE
BASIC PERSONAL AND ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO
INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY
THRESHOLD LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 29,
PARAGRAPH (L), ITEMS (1) AND (2)(A), OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES)
amending the National Internal Revenue Code (adjusting the basic and
additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to
the poverty threshold level).
The Act was signed and approved by then President Corazon Aquino on
19 December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a
newspaper of general circulation. On 26 December 1991, the Commission
of Internal Revenue promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 stating
that the regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January
1, 1992.
In response the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus to compel the CIR
to implement RA 7167 in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and
prohibition to enjoin the CIR from implementing the revenue regulation.
ISSUE:
* In relation to effectivity of the Law:
1. Whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took effect upon its approval by the
President on 19 December 1991, or on 30 January 1992, i.e., after fifteen
(15) days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya" a
newspaper of general circulation;
* In relation to retroactivity of the Law related to our topic in Statutory
Construction:
2. Assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, whether or
not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income
earned or received during calendar year 1991.
HELD:
On the first issue: The Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30
January 1992, which is after fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14
January 1992 in the "Malaya”. As in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself which is indispensable. This
clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous
publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen (15) day period shall be
shortened or extended.
On the second issue; YES, the Court is of the considered view that Rep.
Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation income earned or
received during calendar year 1991.
The Court ruled that they should take effect on compensation income
earned or received from 1 January 1991.Since this decision is promulgated
after 15 April 1992, the individual taxpayers entitled to the increased
exemptions on compensation income earned during calendar year 1991
who may have filed their income tax returns on or before 15 April 1992
(later extended to 24 April 1992) without the benefit of such increased
exemptions, are entitled to the corresponding tax refunds and/or credits,
and respondents are ordered to effect such refunds and/or credits. No
costs.
As a rule, in Statutory Construction Statutes are to be construed as having
only prospective operation, unless the intension of the legislature to give
them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from
the language used. As in the case at bar some statutes are by their nature
retroactive in order to be implemented: remedial/curative statutes, as well
as statutes that create new rights. A retroactive statute violating the
constitution however shall not be applied.
2. IN RE: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC. GR NO. 32485 OCTOBER 22,
1970
PROSPECTIVITY/ RETROACTIVITY/ EX POST FACTO
FACTS:
Kay Villegas Kami, Inc. is a non-stock and non-profit corporation that
intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional
Convention who will propagate its ideology. However, Sec. 8 of R.A. No.
6132* prohibits an organization from supporting candidates for delegates to
the Convention. Hence, Kay Villegas Kami filed this petition for declaratory
relief to question the validity of this provision.
ISSUES:
WON Sec. 8 of RA No. 6132 is unconstitutional due to violating the due
process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression
WON (same) is an ex post facto law.
HELD:
NO. The provision in question is a valid limitation on the due process,
freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and
equal protection clause; because the same is intended to prevent the
prostitution of the electoral process and denial of equal protection of the
laws.
NO. The constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are
given RETROACTIVE EFFECT. Since Sec. 8 of RA No. 6132 is to be
given a PROSPECTIVE EFFECT (i.e. its penalties will apply only to
violations committed AFTER said law’s approval), the constitutional
inhibition on ex post facto laws shall not apply.
No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or allow
himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any
other organization, and no political party, political group, political
committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization or organized
group of whatever nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such
candidate or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or
support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against
his campaign for election:
Provided, that this provision shall not apply to the members of the family of
a candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, nor to
the personal campaign staff of the candidate, which shall not be more than
one for every ten precincts in his district:
Provided, further, That without prejudice to any liability that may be
incurred, no permit to hold a public meeting shall be denied on the ground
that the provisions of this paragraph may or will be violated: and Provided,
finally, That nothing contained herein shall be construed to impair or
abridge the freedom of civic, political, religious, professionals, trade
organization or organized groups of whatever nature to disseminate
information about, or arouse public interest in, the forthcoming
Constitutional Convention or to advocate constitutional reforms, programs,
policies, or proposals for amendment of the present Constitution, and no
prohibition contained herein shall limit or curtail the right of their members,
as long as they act individually, to support or oppose any candidate for
delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
 to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the
purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
3. PEOPLE VS FERRER GR NO. 32613 DECEMBER 27, 1972
outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is
used solely for definitional purposes. In fact, the Act applies not only to the
FACTS: Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint was filed against respondent individuals but on conduct.
Feliciano Co for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act after he
became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
Government of the Philippines.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the
same court, charging the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with
subversion after they were tagged as officers and/or ranking leaders, of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in
Republic Act No. 1700.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the
statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it
embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4)
it denies him the equal protection of the laws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 1700 or Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

HELD: 4. BUSTOS VS LUCERO, GR NO. L-2068 OCTOBER 20, 1948

No. Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of
attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The singling
out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative
intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does
not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof
for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party
FACTS:
The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary
investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and
after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if he
pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for the
petitioner moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form
provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to
petitioner's motion invoking Section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was
sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence,
and the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

ISSUE:
W/N Section 11, Rule 108 which defines the bounds of the
defendant’s right in the preliminary investigation of the violates Section 13,
Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribing that “the Supreme Court shall
have power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.”

RULING:
No. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule 108, like its 5. REPUBLIC VS SAMIA GR NO. 17569, MAY 31, 1963
predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive
right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this
respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which FACTS:
includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part
of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the
law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that
which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for
committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides
or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be
punished. (22 C.J.S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and
essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
6. PEOPLE VS ZETA GR NO. 178541 MARCH 27, 2008

FACTS:

7. CASTRO VS SAGALES GR NO. L-6359 DECEMBER 29, 1953
A retroactive law (in a legal sense) one which takes away or impairs vested
rights acquired under existing laws creates a new obligation and imposes a
new duty attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or
considerations already past.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 772 effective June 20, 1952 conferred upon the
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner "exclusive jurisdiction" to hear
and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, subject to appeal to this Supreme Court.
Before the passage of said Act demands for compensation had to be
submitted to the regular courts.
The fatal accident which befell Dioscoro Cruz, husband of plaintiff Carmen
Cruz, having occurred in January 1952 and action having been
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in August, 1952.
For the appellants, it is contended that the date of the accident, and not the
date of filing the complaint, should be considered because the right to
compensation of the laborer or employees or his dependents, like the
obligation of the employer to pay the same, begins from the very moment
of the accident.
ISSUE:
The resultant issue is the proper forum: either the courts or the Workmen's
Compensation Commission
HELD:
It is true that the right arises from the moment of the accident, but such
right must be declared or confirmed by the government agency empowered
by law to make the declaration. Republic Act No. 772 is very clear that on
and after June 20, 1952 all claims for compensation shall be decided
exclusively by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court.
This claim having been formulated for the first time in August,1952 in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the latter had no jurisdiction, at that
time, to act upon it. No constitutional objection may be interposed to the
application of the law conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission, because
the statute does not thereby operate retroactively; it is made to operate
upon claims formulated after the law's approval.
8. ORTIGAS & CO., LTD VS FEATI BANK & TRUST CO., GR NO. 24670
DECEMBER 14, 1979
FACTS:
Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited
partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly
organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to
the public.
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills
Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad
Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon
completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which
is that the use of the lots is to be exclusive for residential purposes only.
This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and
101511.
Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from
Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a
building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be
for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but
Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed
according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27
declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and
industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of
Feati.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 27 s-1960 can nullify or supersede the
contractual obligations assumed by the defendant.
HELD:
Yes. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably
described as “the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers” and
“in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the
exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it
is capricious, ‘whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a
denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee.
Police power “is elastic and must be responsive to various social
conditions; it is not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents
resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic
way of life.” We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the
individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state’s
exercise of its police power.
This general welfare clause shall be liberally interpreted in case of doubt,
so as to give more power to local governments in promoting the economic
Motion for reconsideration denied.
conditions, social welfare and material progress of the people in the
community. The only exceptions under Section 12 of the Local Autonomy
Act (R.A. 2264) are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between
a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other
hand. Said case is not present in this petition.
Resolution No. 27 s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA as an
industrial and commercial zone was passed in the exercise of police power
to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general
welfare of the people in the locality.

CHAPTER 10
1. IMPERIAL VS COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE GR NO. 7924,
SEPTEMBER 30, 1955

Motion for reconsideration of the decision in the above-entitled case.

In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellee is made to pay a license tax from the
fourth quarter of 1946 to the third quarter of 1950, the last date being the
date when Republic Act No. 588 was passed, amending Sec. 194 (s) of
Commonwealth Act No. 466, to the effect that "real estate dealer"
includes any person engaged in the business of "leasing or renting property
on his own account * * * as an owner of rented property or properties
rented, or offered to rent * * * ".

The retroactive application of the amending statute would affect the

plaintiff-appellee, who would be required to pay a tax which he was not
required to pay under the old statute.

The Legislature cannot be presumed to have intended to make the law

retroactive.
 by any legislative enactment unless express prohibitory words are used,
and jurisdiction duly acquired under an existing statute is not taken away
by a subsequent statute prescribing a different method of commencing an
action.
Thus, accordingly, rule that passage of Republic Act 3828 did not take
away jurisdiction over the case from the Municipal (Justice of the Peace)
Court of San Fernando, La Union.
2. RILLAROZA VS ARCIAGA GR NO. 23848 OCTOBER 31, 1967

FACTS:
On June 18, 1963, respondent Eulalia Banayat, head teacher, filed in the
Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, against petitioner, a criminal
complaint for the crime of direct assault upon a person in authority,
allegedly committed in Naguilian, La Union.
On June 3, 1964, petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of La Union
on certiorari and prohibition.
On October 8, 1964, the Court of First Instance of La Union came out with
an order declaring the proceedings conducted by respondent municipal
judge null and void, and directing him to desist from continuing with the
hearing of the case, and to transmit the record thereof to the Municipal
Court of Naguilian, La Union, for the necessary preliminary investigation.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N the court of San Fernando has a jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
Yes. As provided that, once jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired,
that jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally determined
therein. A subsequent statute removing jurisdiction "will not operate to oust
jurisdiction already attached." This Court, as early as 1913, observed that it
is a subversion of the judicial power to take a cause from a court having
jurisdiction before its final decision is given." So, it is that in Iburan vs. 3. BAKING VS DIRECTOR OF PRISON GR NO. 30364, JULY 28, 1969
Labes 87 Phil. 234, 238, we declared that where a court originally obtains
and exercises jurisdiction, jurisdiction will not be overturned and impaired
FACTS: good conduct allowances are awarded only to those who are serving their
sentences not to detention prisoners. Petitioners cannot be said to be
Petitioners concededly had been under detention for more than eighteen
serving sentence during the period of their preventive imprisonment. And
(18) years under the charge of respondent Director of Prisons when, on
this, even in the face of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code which
May 16, 1969, convicted petitioners for the crime of rebellion and
reduces petitioners' respective sentences by one-half of their preventive
sentenced each of them to ten (10) years' imprisonment. This decision has
imprisonment. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Article 29
since become final.
merely credits said time [of one-half of the preventive imprisonment] to
Previously, on March 31, 1969, petitioners Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. convicts by final judgment. Said article does not in any way imply that
Rodriguez registered their petition for habeas corpus. They claimed that detention prisoners, thereafter convicted by final judgment, have been
they had been denied the right to a speedy trial. On May 24, 1969, after serving sentence during their detention period.
this Court rendered its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of
Upon the law we read it, petitioners' remedy is not with this Court. The law
rebellion, Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez filed a motion for
is the law. We cannot change the law under the guise of interpretation.
early decision of their petition for habeas corpus and for their immediate
Under our system of government, we may not tread on forbidden grounds;
release, based primarily upon an averment similar to the other petition for
we cannot rewrite the law. This is the function of Congress.
habeas corpus before us in L-30603, filed on June 17, 1969.
For the reasons given, the petitions herein to set petitioners at liberty are
The present thrust of the two petitions is that petitioners should now be
hereby denied. No costs allowed. So, ordered.
released because they have already served the ten (10) year sentences
meted out to them.
Petitioners who have been detention prisoners prior to the finality of this
Court's judgment of May 16, 1969, lay heavy stress on the phrase "any
prisoner" in the English text of Article 97. In asking that the provision be
made to apply to them when they were still detention prisoners, they say
that the law does not distinguish between a prisoner who is serving 4. BENGZON VS INCIONG GR NO. 48706 JUNE 29, 1979
sentence and decision prisoner.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioners’ claim for the good conduct allowances be applicable
to them as detention prisoners
RULING:
No. The rule we should go by is that "a code enacted as a single
comprehensive statute, is to be considered as such, and not as a series of
disconnected articles or statutes." It must be stated that inasmuch as the
Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the
Spanish text governs.
By Art. 94, good conduct allowances are given only to the culprit who earns
the same "while he is serving his sentence" ("el reo mientras este
extinguiendo sentencia"). What is crystal clear in Article 94 then is that
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent and
personally against its Vice-President, Robert V. Hyde. Department of Labor
ordered that respondent Sta. Ines to pay complainant Lourdes E. Bengzon
the sum of P2,500.00 as separation pay; and respondent Robert V. Hyde is
to pay the complainant the sum of P300,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC alleging that respondent Sta. Ines should
be held solidarily liable with Hyde for moral and exemplary damages.
Respondent Hyde likewise appealed from the foregoing decision, assailing
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over his person as he was allegedly
improperly summoned.
Respondent Sta. Ines did not appeal but filed reply arguing that it never
authorized or ratified the act of Robert V. Hyde in dismissing petitioner and
that the NLRC was without power to adjudicate the issue of moral and
exemplary damages.
The NLRC rendered a resolution remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter
for further proceedings on the ground that no jurisdiction was acquired by it
over Hyde as respondent because of the failure at the start of the
proceedings to properly serve him with summons and a copy of the
complaint. Respondent Sta. Ines moved for reconsideration of the NLRC
resolution but the same was denied.
Respondent Sta. Ines filed an appeal to the Secretary of Labor but the
Secretary of Labor affirmed the resolution, later on Sta. Ines, appealed at
the Office of the President who likewise affirmed the resolution of the
NLRC.
During the pendency of the resolution of the NLRC, petitioner filed an
amended complaint with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of
Labor. Said complaint was transmitted and certified to the NLRC for
arbitration on the following issues: (1) reinstatement with backwages; and
(2) moral and exemplary damages of P400,000.00.
After due hearing the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering
respondent Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc., and Robert V. Hyde
to pay jointly and severally complainant Lourdes E. Bengzon separation
pay in the amount of P2,500.00 and the sum of P300,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.
All the parties in the afore-mentioned consolidated cases appealed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC.
The NLRC modified the decision appealed, that Respondent Sta. Ines-
Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc. is to pay the complainant P54,394.62 as
backwages, P2,000.00 as separation pay and P300,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages or the total sum of P354,394.62; The claim for
reinstatement of the complainant to the same position held by her prior to
her dismissal is denied and Respondent Robert V. Hyde is absolved from
any liability.
While the case was still in its pendency Presidential Decree No. 1367 was
promulgated, amending paragraph (3) of Article 217 of the Labor Code
Respondent Sta. Ines filed with the Secretary of Labor a notice and
memorandum of appeal of the decision of the NLRC and was later
opposed by petitioner.
Respondent Deputy Minister of Labor issued an Order affirming the
decision of the NLRC but modifying the same by setting aside the award of
damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. 1367.
Petitioner contends that respondent Deputy Minister gravely abused his
discretion in disclaiming jurisdiction on the issue of damages, as under
Article 217 of the Labor Code prior to its amendment by Presidential
Decree No. 1367, Labor Arbiters had jurisdiction to hear and decide claims
for moral damages arising out of employer-employee relations. Petitioner
points out that Presidential Decree No. 1367 was promulgated, long after
NLRC consolidated cases were decided by the Labor Arbiter on November
18, 1978, which decision was in turn affirmed, with modification, on appeal
to the NLRC on February 21, 1978.
Respondent Sta. Ines, however, invoking Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale
Veneer & Plywood, Inc., argues that petitioner's claim for moral and
exemplary damages is properly cognizable by the regular courts and not by
the National Labor Relations Commission and that Presidential Decree No.
1367 was promulgated on May 1, 1978 "to correct the erroneous
assumption of jurisdiction by Labor Arbiters and the National Labor
Relations Commission on issues of moral and other forms of damages."
On February 6, 1979, respondent Sta. Ines manifested before this Court
that it has fully satisfied the claim of petitioner with respect to backwages
and separation pay, in the total amount of P56,394.62, as evidenced by a
cash voucher dated February 2, 1979, duly signed by petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC prior to the enactment of
Presidential Decree No. 1367 have jurisdictional authority over damages
grounded on the dismissal per se of petitioner, since in fact, she asks for
reinstatement with backwages.
HELD:
YES, In the case at bar, petitioner's complaint was filed directly with the
Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor where the case was heard and
decided. At the time the case was heard and decided, the Labor Court had
jurisdiction over the case.
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final
determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the
rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect
that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.
Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive
effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the
enactment of the statute. We find the principles applicable to the case at
bar. To require petitioner to file a separate suit for damages in the regular
courts would be to “sanction split jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the
orderly administration of justice.
Hence, the court ruled that certiorari is granted and the respondent Deputy
Minister of Labor is directed to decide the appeal on the question of moral
and exemplary damages, inviting attention to the fact that in their “Notice
and Memorandum of Appeal”, private respondent raised only questions of
law and did not impugn the findings of fact of the NLRC as to the amount of
damages.
5. CITY OF DAVAO CITY VS RTC GR NO. 127383, AUGUST 18, 2005
DOCTRINE:
If Congress has the inherent power to abrogate the SIS itself, then it
necessarily has the ability to incit less detrimental burdens, such as
abolishing its tax- exempt status. If there could be legal authority
proscribing the Congress from enacting such legislation, such should be
sourced from the Constitution itself, and not from antecedent statutes
which were themselves enacted by legislative power.
FACTS:
April 8, 1994- GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public
Auction, scheduling public bidding of its properties in Matina and Ulas,
Davao City for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to
total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was subsequently reset by virtue of a
deadline extension given by Davao City.
July 28, 1994- GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on 3
parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction.
September 1994, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC. RTC issued
TRO for 20 days enjoining auction sale scheduled 7 days later. RTC issued
writ of preliminary injunction during the suit.
At pretrial, it was agreed that the sole issue for resolution was purely
question of law which is whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local
Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs,
have also withdrawn from the SIS its right to be exempted from payment of
realty tax.
RTC rendered decision in favor of SIS. It ruled that tax exempting statute,
P.D. No. 1146, was enacted prior to the Local Government Code. It noted
that the earlier law had prescribed two conditions in order that the tax
exemption provided therein could be withdrawn by future enactments (1)
that Section 33 be expressly and categorically repealed by law; and (2) that
a provision be enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from
any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the GSIS fund.
The RTC concluded that both conditions had not been satisfied by LGC. It
accorded weight to Legal Opinion No. 165 of the Secretary of Justice and
memorandum from Office of President concluding that Sec 33 was not
repealed by LCG.
MR Denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the
LGC-
HELD:
Yes. PD No. 1146 was enacted in 1977 by President Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers. Section 33 merely provided a general
rule exempting the GSIS from all taxes. However, Sec 33 of P.D. No. 1146
was amended in 1985 by President Marcos, again in the exercise of his
legislative powers, through P.D. No. 1981. It was through this latter decree
that a second paragraph was added to Section 33 delineating the
requisites for repeal of the tax exemption enjoyed by the SIS.
There is no doubt that the SIS which was established way back in 1937 is a
GOCC.It thus clear that Sec 1 of P.D. No. 1931 expressly withdrew those
exemptions granted to the SIS. PD No. 1931 did allow the exemption to be
restored in special cases through an application for restoration with the
Secretary of Finance, but otherwise, the exemptions granted to the SIS
prior to the enactment of P.D. No. 1931 were withdrawn. Notably, P.D. No.
1931 was also an exercise of legislative powers then accorded to President
Marcos by virtue of Amendment No. 6 to the 1973 Constitution.
Thus, P.D. No. 1981 was enacted, expressly stating that the tax-exempt
status of the GSIS under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 remained in place,
notwithstanding the passage of P.D. No. 1931. P.D. No. 1981 also
attempted to proscribe future attempts to alter the tax-exempt status of the
SIS by imposing unorthodox conditions for its future repeal.
These laws have to be weighed against the Local Government Code of
1992, which implemented the constitutional aspirations for a more
extensive breadth of local autonomy. However, the Court in ruling MCIAA
non-exempt from realty taxes, considered that Sec 133 of Local
Government Code qualified the exemption of the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities from local taxation with the phrase "unless
otherwise provided herein."
Evidently, Sec 133 was not intended to be so absolute a prohibition on the
power of LGUs to tax the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities.
In reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, it concluded
that as a general rule, as laid down in Sec 133, the taxing powers of local
government units cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and
charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units"; however, pursuant to Sec
232, provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area
may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned
by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person," as provided in item (a) of the first
paragraph of Section 234.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 12 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
NOTE:
- The statutory interpretations of these executive bodies do not hold
decisive sway upon the judiciary but are merely persuasive. These
issuances cannot derogate from the binding precept that one legislature
cannot enact irrepealable legislation or limit or restrict its own power or the
power of its successors as to the repeal of statutes. The act of one
legislature is not binding upon and does not tie the hands of future
legislatures
6. RAMIREZ VS CA GR NO. 23587, JUNE 10, 1976
 More specifically, a subsequent statute, general in character as toits terms
and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific
enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. This is so
even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include
what was set forth in the special act.

7. JALANDONI VS ENDAYA GR NO. 23894, JANUARY 24, 1974 A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a
general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalias
pecialibus non derogant. And this is true although the terms of the general
FACTS: act are broad enough to include thematter in the special statute.

In 1964 petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel in the Municipal At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the
Court of the Municipality of Batangas presided over by the respondent same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless
Judge. The respondent Judge set the case for hearing on the merits of the the statute, considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon
preliminary examination of the witness. Complainant, citing Article 360 of the part of the legislature.
the Revised Penal Code contended that respondent Judge was devoid of
jurisdiction to do so. Responded Judge based his action on what for him
was the consequence of the judiciary act as amended by Republic Act No.
3828, Section 87 of which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipal
judges in the capital of provinces with the court of first instance where the
penalty provided for by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six
thousand pesos or both. Libel is one of those offenses included in such
category.

ISSUE:
W/N Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code was amended by Republic Act
No. 3828, Section 87.

RULING:
No. It has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication
are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the
legislature so intended. It is necessary before such a repeal is deemed to
exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the
same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former.
There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character.
What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.