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1. Yap Weng Ken & Anor v Mohd Hero & Ors and another case
[2018] MLJU 109
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KUCHING 3 MAHKAMAH TINGGI
 YAP WENG KEN & ANOR v BESRAYA (M) SDN. BHD. & ORS

CaseAnalysis
| [2018] MLJU 109

Yap Weng Ken & Anor v Mohd Hero & Ors and another case
[2018] MLJU 109
Malayan Law Journal Unreported

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)

FAIZAH JAMALUDIN JC

RAYUAN SIVIL NOS WA-12BNCVC-27-03 OF 2017 AND WA-12BNCVC-32-03 OF 2017

26 January 2018

Sri Kumar (The Chambers of Sri Kumar) for the plaintiff.

Amrit Kaur (Satwinder Singh with her) (Dhaliwal & Co) for the defendants.
Barvina Punnusamy (Athi Seelan Mahathir & Partners) for the second third party.

Faizah Jamaludin JC:

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENTINTRODUCTION

[1]These are my grounds of judgment in respect of the Defendant’s appeal and the Plaintiff’s cross-appeal in Civil
Appeal No. WA-12BNCVC-27-03/2017 (“Appeal 27”) and the Second Third Party’s Appeal in Civil Appeal No. WA-
12BNCVC-32-03/2017 (“Appeal 32”) against the judgment of the learned Sessions Court Judge (“SCJ”) after full
trial in the case Summons No. A53KJ-422-06/2015 at the Sessions Court.

[2]The Plaintiff in the Sessions Court, Mohd. Hero, had claimed against the Defendants, Yap Weng Ken and Soon
Yik Tractor Work damages resulting from a road accident that occurred on 10.4.2014 between the Plaintiff’s
motorcycle and the backhoe driven by the first Defendant on Lebuhraya Sungai Besi Sambungan Timur, Kuala
Lumpur. The Defendants had issued Third Party Notices against the third-parties, Besraya Sdn. Bhd., Road Builder
(M) Sdn. Bhd. and Ban Hing Machinery Sdn. Bhd.

[3]The learned SCJ had in his judgment, after full trial, allowed the Plaintiff’s claim.

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(a) On liability, the learned SCJ apportioned 50% of liability against the Defendants and 50% against the
Second Third Party. The Plaintiff and the First Third Party were found not liable.

(b) On quantum, the learned SCJ allowed damages as follows:

NO ITEM AMOUNT ON 100% BASIS (RM)

1. Above knee amputation 80,000.00

2. Scars and abrasion 10,000.00

3. Medical expenses at HUKM 1,160.00

4. Expenses for EZ Ride 1,720.00

5. Expenses for Poliklinik Grewal 305.00

6. Cost of prosthetic leg 558,780.00

7. Loss of earnings (RM500.00 per 72,000.00

month for 12 years)

TOTAL 723,975.00

[4]Dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned SCJ, the parties appealed and cross-appealed to judge in chambers
of the High Court. The appeals and cross-appeal are as set-out in paragraph [5] below. For ease of reference, the
parties are referred in this Judgment as they were in the Sessions Court.

[5]The appeals before this Court arising from the Sessions Court’s judgments are:

(a) Appeal 27: The Defendants’ appeal against the decision of the learned SCJ in respect of liability on
quantum only in respect of the award made for the prosthetic;

(b) Appeal 27: The Plaintiff’s cross-appeal against the quantum awarded by the learned SCJ;

(c) Appeal 32: The Second Third Party’s appeal against the entire decision of the learned SCJ in respect of
both liability and quantum.

Both appeals were consolidated and heard together in a hearing before me.

[6]The parties to these appeals and cross-appeal are:

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NAME PARTY IN SESSIONS COURT

Mohd Hero Plaintiff ● Driver of motorcycle no. WNC 3154 (“motorcycle”)

Yap Weng Ken First Defendant ● Driver of backhoe no. BHC 7311 (“backhoe”)

Soon Yik Tractor Works Second Defendant ● First Defendant’s employer

Besraya (M) Sdn. Bhd. First Third Party ● Concessionaire of Besraya Expressway i.e.
Lebuhraya Sungai Besi Sambungan Timur into Plaza Tol Loke
Yew, Kuala Lumpur

Road Builder (M) Sdn. Bhd. (141314-H) Second Third Party ● Main contractor appointed by 1st Third
Party

[7]The Third Third Party was the subcontractor appointed by Second Third Party. It is not party to these appeals
and cross-appeal as the Defendants had withdrawn their third-party proceedings against the Third Third Party on
15.11.2016.
THE DEFENDANTS’ CASE & APPEAL

[8]It is the Defendants’ case that on 10.4.2014, the First Defendant was doing his daily maintenance work by using
the backhoe on the Lebuhraya Sungai Besi Sambungan Timur, Kuala Lumpur (”Highway”). As the Plaintiff was
turning left, suddenly the Plaintiff who was riding the motorcycle came from the left side collided with the left front of
the backhoe. At that material time, the Highway was not yet opened for public use.

[9]The Defendants filed Third Party proceedings against the Third Parties for indemnification against the Plaintiff’s
claim.

[10]The Defendants in Appeal 27 submits that the learned SCJ had erred:

(a) in making a finding of law that the accident site was a road under section 2 of Road Transport Act.

● The Defendants argue that this finding contradicts the learned SCJ’s finding of fact that the said road
was not opened to the public yet and that the Plaintiff was a trespasser at the time of the accident. The
Highway was still under construction and there were barriers placed at all entrance and that the public
were in fact not permitted to be on it or use it any way. It is not road as defined under section 2 of the
Road Transport Act;

(b) in failing to consider the evidence that all entrances to the accident site were closed with barriers;

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(c) based on the finding of fact that the Plaintiff was a trespasser at the time of the accident, the learned SCJ
failed to consider if the Defendants owed the Plaintiff a duty of care and failed to consider the issue of
volenti non fit injuria; and

(d) failed to consider the issue of contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff.

[11]On quantum for the prosthesis, the Defendants submit that the learned SCJ erred:

(a) in failing to take the average between the quotation for the prosthesis obtained by the Plaintiff and that by
the Defendant; and

(b) in failing to take into consideration contingencies and vicissitudes of life and accelerated payment.

THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE & CROSS-APPEAL

[12]In Appeal 27, the Plaintiff’s case is that on 10.4.2014, he was riding the motorcycle from Sungai Besi towards
Ampang. When he arrived at the Highway, the backhoe driven by First Defendant which was travelling in the same
direction, suddenly without signalling switched lanes and collided into the Plaintiff’s motorcycle.

[13]The Plaintiff is cross-appealing against the quantum of the special damages awarded for his future loss of
earnings. The Plaintiff submits that the learned SCJ did not give any reasons why he decided that the average
earnings of the Plaintiff is RM500 per month. Based on the Plaintiff’s salary slips for the months of January,
February and March 2014, the Plaintiff’s salary was RM3,594.00, RM3,457.50 and RM2,904.00 respectively.
Therefore, his average monthly salary is approximately RM3,318.00 per month. After deducting 1/3 for costs of
living expenses, the Plaintiff’s monthly earnings RM2,212.00. As the Plaintiff was 31 years old when the accident
occurred, the multiplier used is as follows:

55-31 years ÷ 2 = 12 years x 12 months x RM2,212.00 = RM318,528.00

[14]On liability, the Plaintiff submits that the Defendants did not plead the issue of the status of the road and did not
raise the issue during the trial to be addressed/ examined by any witness. The Plaintiff argues that parties are
bound by their pleadings and that the Defendants failed to obtain any declaration that the Highway was not a road
under s.2 of the RTA.
THE SECOND THIRD PARTY’S CASE & APPEAL

[15]In Appeal 32, the Second Third Party’s case is that at the time of the accident, the Highway has yet to be
opened to public. Even though the Highway has been completed but the maintenance work was still ongoing. The
Highway was only opened to the public on 15.4.2014.

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[16]The Second Third Party says that it has taken appropriate precautions on the Highway. The said Highway is
under the obligation and control of First Third Party as it is the concessionaire of the Highway.

[17]The Second Third Party submits that:

(a) The learned Sessions Court judge had erred when he decided to hold the Second Third Party 50% liable
towards the Plaintiff’s claim but found that the Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent despite making a
finding of fact that he was a trespasser.

(b) There was enough evidence before the Sessions Court Judge to show that the cause of the accident was
due to the negligence of the First Defendant, who had made a clear admission to his fault. There was also
contributory negligence on the Plaintiff who had trespassed onto the said Highway, which was not open to
the public and by doing so had assumed his risk willingly.

(c) Since it was the Defendants who brought the Second Third Party into the action involving the Plaintiff, the
burden is on the Defendants to prove their claim as pleaded.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION(A) LIABILITY(i) Was the accident site a “road” under s. of the RTA?

[18]The Plaintiff submits the issue that the accident site was not a “road’ under s.2. of the RTA was not pleaded as
a defence by the Defendants and neither did they challenge nor suggest to any of the witnesses during the trial that
the accident site was not a road. Furthermore, they also never obtained a declaration from the High Court that the
accident site was not a road.

[19]Just as it is settled law that parties are bound by their pleadings, it is also settled law that pleadings cover only
facts and not law. The Court of Appeal in Majlis Bandaraya Shah Alam v. Only One Foot Reflexology Sdn. Bhd.
[2017] 7 CLJ 557;; [2016] 1 LNS 1735 held that even if an issue of law was not pleaded but it was raised at the
submission stage, it remains a point of law. Nallini Pathmanathan JCA in delivering the judgment of the Court of
Appeal held that:

[18] As stated at the outset, we dismissed the appeal with costs. This was primarily because we were of the considered
opinion that by-law 28 of the Beauty and Health Centre (Shah Alam City Council) By-Laws 2007, requires that the official of
the city council undertaking the enforcement is authorised in writing by the Mayor. There was no evidence that there was
any such authorisation………. Even if this issue of law was not pleaded, but raised at the submission stage, it remains a
point of law, which comprises an essential pre-condition to the exercise of an enforcement action by an official of the City
Council. The inability to provide any such authorisation, rendered the enforcement exercise undertaken, wrongful and
illegal. To that end, we upheld the decision of the learned High Court Judge.

[40] ……………….. As such the jurisdictional issue takes precedence over the pleading point. In any event, the City Council

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cannot be said to have been taken by surprise because it was incumbent on them, in the exercise of the powers under by-
law 28, to be aware of the limits of such powers under by-law 28. The failure to specifically plead this point does not
prejudice the City Council.

[emphasis added]

[20]Accordingly, I find that the Defendants failure to plead the point of law that the accident site at the material time
was not a “road” under s.2 of the RTA does not prejudice them.

[21]“Road” is defined under s. 2 of the RTA as follows:

(a) any public road and any other road to which the public has access and includes bridges, tunnels, lay-bys,
ferry facilities, interchanges, roundabouts, traffic islands, road dividers, all traffic lanes, acceleration lanes,
deceleration lanes, side-tables, median strips, overpasses, underpasses, approaches, entrance and exit
ramps, toll plazas, service areas, and other structures and fixtures to fully effect its use;

(b) for the purposes of sections 70 and 85, also includes a road under construction; and

(c) for the purpose of sections 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and 45A, also includes a parking place.

S. 70 and s.85 of the RTA are not applicable to this case as s.70 relates to the power of the Minister to restrict the
use of vehicles on specified roads and s.85 relates to submissions and the Minister’s approval of construction of
access and drains and laying of public utility installations to existing roads.

[22]The Minister of Transport is empowered under s. 3 of the Federal Roads Act 1959, to declare a road as a
federal road. S. 3 of the FRA states as follows:

Power to declare roads, etc., to be federal

3. The Minister may after consultation with the Government of the State concerned, by order declare any road, bridge, ferry
or other means of communication in any State to be Federal.

[23]The Minister ordered in Perintah Jalan Persekutuan (Lebuh Raya Sungai Besi) 2014 which was published in the
government gazette P.U. (A) 101, that the Highway be declared as a Federal road with effect from 15.4.2014.

[24]The accident happened on 10.4. 2014, a few days before the Highway was declared a Federal Road and
opened to the public. Accordingly, at the time of the accident the Highway was not a road pursuant to s.2 of the
RTA.

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[25]Based on the above, I disagree with the learned SCJ’s finding of law that the Highway was a road at the time of
the accident. This Court finds that the Highway was not a “road” pursuant to s.2 of the RTA.
(ii) Was the Highway closed the public at the time of the accident?

[26]It is the Second Third Party’s case that it had taken all reasonable measures as the main contractor for the
construction works on the Highway to prevent the public from accessing the Highway.

[27]As against the Plaintiff, the First Defendant pleaded that the road was closed to the public at the time of the
accident. He also pleaded that the road had been blocked for access. Under the particulars of the Plaintiff’s
negligence pleaded in paragraph 8 of his Defence, the Defendants aver that the Plaintiff purposely entered a road
that was blocked for access. The First Defendant had pleaded against the Plaintiff,

4. Selanjutnya Defendan Pertama menyatakan bahawa oleh kerana pada masa material itu kerja kerja pembinaan dan
maintenance harian sedang dijalankan di jalan tersebut yang berada dalam milikan dan kawalan Otoriti Lebuhraya
(Highway Authority) yang berkenaan dan jalan tersebut ditutp [sic] kepada orang awam, kemalangan tersebut tidak dapat
diramalkan (not foreseeable). Seorang wakil dari Otoriti Lebuhraya (Highway Authority) yang berkenaan telah
mengesahkan bahawa jalan tersebut sedang dalam pembinaan dan maintenance harian dan belum dibuka untuk laluan
awam.

[28]However, as against the Second Third Party and the Third Third Party, the Defendants pleaded that the
accident was caused and/or contributed by the Third Parties because they had failed to close the road. The
Defendants pleaded that the Third Parties,:

“…… gagal menutup jalan tersebut dengan sekatan sekatan dan/atau sekatan sekatan yang mencukupi dan berkesan
sepanjang masa yang material itu ……..

………. gagal memasang tanda tanda amaran dan/atau amaran yang mencukupi dan berkesan dan juga gagal
memasangkan papan amaran memberitahu orang awam tentang pekerjaan pembinaan oleh jentera berat di Leburaya
tersebut.”

[29]The Defendants’ witness at trial (“SD1”) testified during the trial that there were warning signs placed at the
entry of the Highway that there is no entry because there were construction works on-going. SD1 testified there was
a sign board stating “No Entry” and “Awas kerja-kerja pembinaan dihadapan”. There was also steel at the entrance
and a guard manning the entrance into the Highway. Also, there were barricades placed at the entry of the Highway
The barricades can be seen in photograph at ROA vol. 2 pg 517.

[30]Two other witnesses of the Defendants i.e. SD2 and SD3 also testified that there were barriers placed to

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prevent the entrance into the Highway and there was a “No Entry” sign placed at the mouth of the Highway which
was barricaded.

[31]It is trite law that the Defendants cannot adopt two different cases in a suit. They cannot as against the Plaintiff
plead that the Highway was closed to the public and as against the Second Third Party, the Highway was not
closed to the public. The Court of Appeal in Cheah Theam Kheng lwn City Centre Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) & Other
Appeals [2012] 2 CLJ 16 said that:

[105] We categorically say that the liquidator cannot blow hot and cold to suit him whenever he feels like it. He cannot
approbate and reprobate in the same breath. On the one hand, he claims that the High Court order dated 26 July 2001
overrides or displaces a statute which render the said order invalid and yet he has the audacity to continue to act as a
liquidator by virtue of the said order. In the words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v. News
(UK) Ltd And Others [1990] 3 All ER 376, at pp. 383 to 384:

There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not
allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitudes towards another:
he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt
an inconsistent stance.

[Emphasis added]

[32]Accordingly, the Defendants should have elected which position to take. Either the Highway was closed to the
public and therefore the Plaintiff was a trespasser or the Highway was not closed to public and therefore the Plaintiff
was not a trespasser. They cannot, to paraphrase Abdul Malek Ishak JCA in Cheah Theam Kheng lwn City Centre
Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) & Other Appeals and Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v.
News (UK) Ltd And Others , “blow hot and cold” and adopt inconsistent positions vis a vis the Plaintiff and the
Second Third Party.

[33]Based on the evidence of the Defendants’ own witnesses, I find that the Highway was closed to the public at the
time of the accident. For this reason, I agree with the learned SCJ’s finding of fact that the Plaintiff was a trespasser
when he was using the Highway at the material date.
(ii) Did the Defendants’ prove their case against the Second Third Party?

[34]As regards the Defendants’ third-party proceedings against the Second Third Party, the proceedings must be
looked at as independent proceedings between the Defendants as plaintiffs and the Third Parties as defendants.

[35]Pursuant to s.102 of the Evidence Act 1950 (“EA”) the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on the person

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who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. The Court of Appeal in Selvaduray v. Chinniah [1939]
1 LNS 107; ; [1939] 1 MLJ 253 held that:

“... the onus was on the plaintiff to prove his case and that, the position at the conclusion of the trial being exactly even, the
plaintiff had not discharged the onus which was on him and his action must fail.”

[36]The evidence led by the Defendants’ witnesses during the trial showed that the cause of the accident was the
negligence of the First Defendant. The First Defendant, who was the driver of the backhoe, admitted that he did not
give any signal or turned back before switching the lane to the left. This fact was confirmed by SD7 who was an
eyewitness of the accident. It was also established that the entrance of the Highway was barricaded. The
Defendants had failed to adduce any evidence that the entrance of Highway was not properly closed.

[37]As such, this Court takes into cognisance that there was no negligence on the part of the Second Third Party
who, from evidence adduced at trial, had properly maintained and barricaded the Highway at the material time.

[38]The evidence led by the Defendants’ witnesses during trial showed that the cause of the accident was the
negligence of the First Defendant. The Defendants failed to prove any negligence on the part of the Second Third
Party. For this reason, this Court is unable to agree with the learned SCJ’s finding that the Second Third Party’s
negligence contributed to the accident and that it is 50% liable for the accident between the First Defendant and the
Plaintiff.

[39]Therefore, this Court finds that the First Defendant’s negligence is the main cause of the accident. Further, this
Court finds that at the time of the accident, the Highway was not a road under the RTA and the Plaintiff was
trespasser onto the Highway.

[40]Based on these reasons, the decision of the trial judge with regards to liability is hereby set-aside. This Court
finds that the Defendants are 70% liable and the Plaintiff is 30% contributory negligent for the accident.
(B) QUANTUM(i) Prosthetic Leg

[41]In Appeal 27, the Defendants appealed against the decision of the Learned SCJ in respect of the quantum
awarded for the Plaintiff’s prosthetic leg. The Defendants’ counsel submits that the award was wrong as the learned
SCJ did not take the average sum of the two quotations for prosthetic leg in the assessment reports provided by
Plaintiff and the Defendants. The learned SCJ did not give his reasons in allowing the award for prosthetic leg but
awarded a sum of RM558,780.00 which is the amount stated in the Plaintiff’s report.

[42]The Plaintiff’s prosthetic assessment report was prepared by Mr. Santosh Kumar Prasad of Central Limb Centre
Sdn. Bhd. Mr. Prasad is a Certified Prosthetist & Orthotist and Master of Prosthetist & Orthotist. The assessment

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report contains a detailed evaluation of the stump and an explanation of the main components of prosthesis and the
reasons why it is needed for the Plaintiff.

[43]The Defendants’ prosthetic assessment report was prepared by K.K. Prosthetic & Orthopaedic Equipment Sdn.
Bhd. It did not state the qualifications of the person who did the assessment for K.K. Prosthetic & Orthopaedic
Equipment Sdn. Bhd. Therefore, it is not clear to this Court whether the person who made the assessment was
similarly qualified as Mr. Prasad of Central Limb Centre Sdn. Bhd. It also did not have any write-up on the type and
main components of the prosthesis quoted and an explanation why the prosthesis quoted is suitable for the Plaintiff.
There was only a one page assessment and prescription form accompanying the quotation.

[44]For this reason, I find that it is safer and more prudent to rely on the assessment report and quotation for the
prosthesis submitted by the Plaintiff. Accordingly, this Court affirms the decision of the learned SCJ as regards the
quantum of the prosthetic leg.
(ii) Deduction contingencies, vicissitudes of life and accelerated payment

[45]On the issue of deduction contingencies, vicissitudes of life and accelerated payment in considering quantum
awarded for the prosthetic leg, the Defendants’ counsel argues that since the Plaintiff is a Bangladeshi, he would
want to go back to Bangladesh where the cost of living is much lower. Therefore, the learned SCJ should have
deducted 1/3 of the prosthetic leg’s cost. The Plaintiff’s counsel denies that the Plaintiff wants to go back to
Bangladesh. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff came to Malaysia to find employment and will continue to work in
Malaysia.

[46]It is settled law that the decision of whether or not to make deductions for contingencies, vicissitudes of life and
accelerated payment is entirely at the discretion of the Court. The Court of Appeal have held that it is not wrong for
the Court to make 1/3 deductions for contingencies, vicissitudes of life and accelerated payment and it is also not
wrong for the Court not make such deductions (see Takong Tabari v. Government of Sarawak & Ors & Another
Appeal [1998] 4 CLJ 589 and Noraini Omar & Anor v. Rohani Said & Another Appeal [2006] 1 CLJ 895). The High
Court in Intan Nirwana Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Srimahendran Lingam Maniam & Anor; Nayanasegar Haruskrushna
[third party] [2011] 1 LNS 1698 held that:

[20] The approach used by the learned SCJ in the present case in adopting a direct multiplier of 40 years was, thus, not
without basis or erroneous. The decision not to deduct 1/3 for contingencies could not be regarded as wrong in law or
principle or in breach of s. 28A (2), Civil Law Act. Being a claim for nursing care and other items for future use, the direct
multiplier method could be used without any deduction being made. This ground of appeal that a wrong multiplier had been
used by the learned SCJ in respect of the disputed items, therefore, fails.

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[47]For this reason, I find that the learned SCJ’s decision in not deducting contingencies, vicissitudes of life and
accelerated payment from the quantum awarded for the prosthetic leg was not erroneous. Therefore, this ground of
appeal fails and the learned SCJ’s decision is upheld.
(iii) Loss of earnings

[48]The Plaintiff’s counsel submitted that the learned SCJ erred in deciding that :-

“…….. secara purata kehilangan pendapatan diputuskan sebanyak RM500 sebulan dan pengiraannya adalah seperti
berikut iaitu:-

RM500 x 12 bulan x 12 tahun (55-31 ÷ 2) = RM72,000.00 ”

[49]The Plaintiff argues there was no explanation on how the learned SCJ arrived at the sum of RM500 despite the
facts that the Plaintiff’s average monthly income is RM3,318.00. After deducting 1/3 of the cost of living, the
average of Plaintiff’s income should be at RM2,212 per month. The Defendants, on the other hand, submit that the
witness representing the Plaintiff’s employer i.e. SP2 did not bring any original documents to show the Plaintiff’s
monthly income. During cross examination, SP2 agreed that she has no knowledge of the documents pertaining to
the Plaintiff’s employment. Hence, SP2’e evidence was hearsay and it is inadmissible.

[50]The Plaintiff’s salary slips three months prior to the accident (marked as exhibit P7) shows that Plaintiff’s
average basic monthly salary is RM2,300.00 without overtime. I did not take into account the overtime earned
during those three months because such earnings were variable and depended on whether the Plaintiff performs
the overtime or not. This Court finds that taking the Plaintiff’s average basic monthly salary less 1/3 of living
expenses, the Plaintiff’s average of monthly income is RM1,533.00. The calculation for the Plaintiff’s loss of
earnings are as follows:-

RM1,533 x 12 months x 12 years (55-31 ÷ 2) = RM220,752.00

[51]Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s appeal against the quantum awarded for his loss of earnings is allowed. The decision
of the learned SCJ is set aside. This Court finds that the quantum for the Plaintiff’s loss of earnings is
RM220,752.00.
DECISION

[52]This Court’s decision with regards to Appeal 27 and Appeal 32 are as follows:

(a) Liability: The decision of the learned SCJ is set-aside. Liability is found to be 70% against the Defendants
and 30% against the Plaintiff.

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(b) Quantum for prosthetic leg: The Defendants’ appeal is dismissed. The decision of the learned SCJ is
affirmed.

(c) Quantum for loss of earnings: The Plaintiff’s cross-appeal is allowed. The decision of the learned SCJ is
set-aside. This Court finds quantum for the Plaintiff’s loss of earnings is RM220,750.00.

End of Document

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