Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2336 November 12, 2014

(Formerly A.M. OCA-IPl No. 11-3695-RTJ)
ESTHER P. MAGLEO, Complainant,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT ATTY.
ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, Respondents.
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a sworn Complaint-Affidavit,1 dated July 12, 2011, filed by Esther P. Magleo
(complainant) charging respondents Judge Rowena De Juan-Quinagoran (respondent judge) and Atty. Adonis A.
Laure, Clerk of Court V (respondent CoC), both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 166, Pasig City (RTC), with
Gross Misconduct, Gross Partiality, Acts Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciciary, Violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel relative to Criminal Case No. 137860-PSG, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Esther Magleo y Pampolina, for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Complainant is the accused in the aforementioned criminal case. She averred that in an Order, dated May 13, 2010,
Judge Nicanor Manalo, Jr. (Judge Manalo)granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her of the charge of estafa.
Thereafter, the prosecutor filed a motion to inhibit Judge Manalo from the case which was later re-raffled to Branch
166, RTC, Pasig City, presided over by respondent judge.
Complainant avers that, instead of motu proprio dismissing the case on ground of double jeopardy, respondent judge
through her Order, dated November 4, 2010, overturned the order of acquittal and set the case for reception of
defense evidence on February 23, 2011.2 Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by
respondent judge in her February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order.
On February 11, 2011, complainant filed a petition for certiorari (With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order)
before the Court of Appeals (CA)questioning the propriety of the Omnibus Order.3 Complainant asserts that the
November 4, 2010 and February2, 2011 orders of respondent judge were indicative of her gross partiality and lack of
knowledge of the existing laws and jurisprudence, violating complainant’s right against double jeopardy.
She further stated that she did not receive a notice of hearing for June 8, 2011. 4 Despite such omission, respondent
judge still issued a warrant of arrest on June 9, 2011. She was surprised when agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) forcibly arrested her on June 15, 2011. She added that while on her way to the NBI office, a lady
agent called the personnel of Branch 166, RTC, Pasig City, to inquire on the amount of the complainant’s bail, but
the personnel said that there was no bail indicated. The personnel was said to be reluctant in giving any information
and asked, "Nadampot ninyo na ba, nadampot nyo na ba siya."5
According to complainant, she examined the order of arrest and it appeared that the amount of bail recommended
was erased to bar her from posting the bond for her temporary liberty. She claimed that on the same day, she
instructed her bondsman to proceed to Branch 166 to inquire about the proper amount of bail. Respondent CoC and
the staff, however, treated the bondsman with hostility, annoyance and indifference. 6
The next day, on June 16, 2011, complainant’s son and her lawyer talked to respondent judge and the latter agreed to
fix the amount of bail at ₱40,000.00. Respondent judge, however, initially refused to sign the order and advised them
to file a motion to lift the warrant of arrest. Complainant averred that when her son inquired why the same was not
signed, the court secretary arrogantly said, "Huwag mo na ako tanungin, yun ang order ni Judge makikipagtalo ka pa
e sumunod ka na lang, wala ka namang magagawa."7 Thereafter, upon filing of an ex-parte Motion to Lift Warrant of
Arrest, respondent judge granted the same and complainant was released from NBI custody around 5:30 o’clock in
the afternoon of the same day. To aggravate her ordeal, police officers proceeded to complainant’s house on June 27,
2011 to enforce anew the warrantof arrest, but her counsel sent an e-mail to the arresting officer, furnishing him a
copy of the order lifting the order of arrest.8
Complainant avers that these acts show how cruel,ignorant and unorganized respondent judge is in running her
office. It would also show that respondent clerk of court and the court staff exhibited hostility, partiality and wanton
disregard of respect.
In their Joint Comment,9 dated August 10, 2011, the respondents stated that when the case was re-raffled to Branch
166, RTC, Pasig City, in view of the inhibition of Judge Manalo, there was a pending motion for reconsideration of
the May 13, 2010 Order granting complainant’s Demurrer to Evidence.
In her February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order, respondent judge emphasized the reasons for overturning the order granting
the demurrer to evidence. In its pertinent parts, the Omnibus Order reads:
Clearly, when the accused filed the demurrer to evidence, the prosecution has not rested its case yet. Thus, the
granting of the demurrer to evidence is not proper considering that it was filed prematurely.
The reason why the defense is not allowed to file a demurrer to evidence before the prosecution rests its case is best
articulated in the case of Valencia vs. Sandiganbayan. The Supreme Court discussed that:
[a] demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence. As such, a demurrer to
evidence or a motion for leave to file the same must be filed after the prosecution rests its case. But before an
evidence may be admitted, the rules require that the same be formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be considered by
the court. A prior formal offer of evidence concludes the case for the prosecution and determines the timeliness of
the filing of a demurrer to evidence.
As held in Aquino v. Sison [G.R. No. 86025, November 28, 1989, 179 SCRA 648, 651,-652], the motion to dismiss
for insufficiency of evidence filed by the accused after the conclusion of the cross examination of the witness for the
prosecution, is premature because the latter is still in the process of presenting evidence. The chemistry report relied
upon by the court in granting the motion to dismiss was disregarded because it was not properly identified or
formally offered as evidence. Verily, until such time that the prosecution closed its evidence, the defense cannot be
considered to have seasonably filed a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same.
Thus, the filing of the demurrer to evidence before the prosecution could rest its case and the subsequent granting
thereof effectively denied the prosecution’s right to due process.10 [Emphases supplied]
The complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the November 4,2010 and
February 2, 2011 Orders, but it was dismissed by said appellate court on August 15, 2011 for lack of merit.11
The respondents further stated that contrary to the allegations of complainant, the latter and her counsel were duly
notified of the hearing on June 8, 2011, as evidenced by: (1) the February 23, 2011 Constancia12 with return
card13 showing that the notice was duly received by complainant and her counsel; (2) the court calendar for June 8,
2011;14 and (3) the certification issued by the post office.15
The respondents also averred that complainant failed to identify the court personnel who allegedly said "Nadampot
ninyo na ba, nadampot nyo na ba siya." Moreover, they claimed that there was nothing wrong even if the court
personnel indeed asked the same.16 With respect to the allegation that the court personnel treated the bondsman with
hostility, they claimed that no bondsman went to their branch that day. Even assuming that the bondsman indeed
went to their branch, the court personnel were justified in not divulging any information due to the confidentiality of
the court records.17
The respondents likewise stressed that the order of arrest did not state a bond for complainant’s temporary liberty
because she jumped bail by failing to appear in court for the June 8, 2011 hearing. Thus, the original bail bond in the
amount of ₱40,000.00 was forfeited and an order of arrest was issued.18
Respondent judge explained that she did not immediately sign the draft order granting bail because she could not
motu proprio lift the warrant of arrest as there was no motion filed by the complainant’s lawyer. 19 When
complainant’s lawyer, however, filed the proper motion to lift the order of arrest, she promptly acted on the motion
and complainant was released immediately from NBI custody. She alsostated that it was already beyond the control
of the court if the PNP officers attempted to serve the warrant of arrest despite the order lifting the same.
In her 31 August 2011 Reply,20 complainant reiterates the allegations she made in her complaint, claiming she did not
receive any copy of the notice of the hearing for 08 June 2011. In their 07 September 2011 Joint
Rejoinder,21 respondents counters that complainant was duly informed of the 08 June 2011 hearing. On September
16, 2011, the OCA received complainant’s Comment22 on the Joint Rejoinder withthe attached affidavit of Ronald P.
Magleo, her son, narrating the 15th and 16th June 2011 incidents. On September 23, 2011, the OCA received the
Joint Reply23 to the Comment (on the Joint Rejoinder filed by the respondents). Finally, on October 4, 2011,
complainant’s Comment24 on Respondent Judge Joint Rejoinder was filed with the OCA.
The OCA then recommended that the administrative case be referred to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals,
who shall cause the same to be raffled among the Justices of the said Court, for investigation, report and
recommendation.25
The Court's Ruling
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed transgressions in the performance of their duties
warranting the imposition of disciplinary penalties.
The Court rules in the negative.
At the outset, this Court finds that there is no need to refer the administrative case to the CA as the facts and
arguments stated in the pleadings are sufficient for properadjudication of this case. Claim of Gross Partiality for
reversing an Order Granting the Demurrer to Evidence
Complainant asserts that respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law and evident partiality when she
overturned the order granting the demurrer to evidence because it would constitute as a violation to her constitutional
right against double jeopardy.
Complainant argues that a dismissal due to such order is considered as acquittal which bars a subsequent opening of
the criminal case.
This Court is convinced that respondent judge acted in accordance with the law and jurisprudence. It was the
February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order26 which elucidated the clear legal basis why respondent judge continued the
criminal casedespite the earlier order granting the demurrer to evidence. Generally, if the trial court finds that the
prosecution evidence is not sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on
the merits of the casewhich is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed. 27
The current scenario, however, is an exception to the general rule. The demurrer to evidence was premature because
it was filed before the prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal offer
of evidence of the prosecution when complainant filed her demurrer to evidence. 28 Hence, respondent judge had
legal basis to overturn the order granting the demurrer to evidence as there was no proper acquittal. The complainant
elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certioraribut it sustained her ruling. 29 The CA decision reads:
Indubitably, an order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the caseon the merits, and it
amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has previously made some
exceptions.30
People v. Tan31 eruditely instructs that double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham. In addition, in People v. Bocar, 32 this Court rule that there is no double
jeopardy when the prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the trial court.
The circumstances obtaining in this controversy placed it within the realm of the exception.
The records demonstrate that the prosecution, with respondent Oilink International Corporation as private
complainant, had not yet rested its case when the Demurrer to Evidence was filed and eventually granted by the RTC
Branch 161.
The RTC Branch 161 should have ruled on the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence before acting on petitioner’s
Demurrer to Evidence. Having failed to do so, there is nary a doubt that no double jeopardy attached. Petitioner’s
blind insistence that she is made to face trial after having been acquitted carries no conviction. 33
Though the CA decision has not reached finality, it only goes to show that the respondent judge acted in good faith
as she merely followed precedents.
Claim of Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for not serving the Notice of Hearing
In the February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order of respondent judge, it was stated that the next scheduledhearing was on
February 23, 2011.34 On the said date, however, respondent judge was on leave of absence due to an illness. The
Constancia, dated February 23, 2011, stated that the trial was to resume on June 8, 2011.
Complainant asserts that she did not receive the February 23, 2011 Constancia and, for said reason, she was not able
to attend the June 8, 2011 hearing. The respondents, however, were able to submit numerous documentary proofs
stating that complainant indeed received the notice of hearing, to wit: (1) Certified true copy of the subject
Constancia, dated February 23, 2011; together with the two return cards pasted on the back thereof; (3) the certified
true copy of the court calendar for June 8, 2011; and (4) the Post Office Certification that complainant and her
counsel were notified about the said hearing date.
Between the bare allegations of complainant that she did not receive the Constancia and the substantiated claim of
the respondents that the notices were served, the Court tends tobelieve the latter.Thus, complainant has no acceptable
excuse to be absent on the June 8, 2011 hearing. Her failure to attend now seems to be a deliberate attempt to ignore
such important trial date and the consequences of her absence are attributable to her alone.
Claim of Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for issuing a Bench Warrant
It must be noted that complainant was only granted provisional liberty when she applied for bail. Such provisional
liberty could be taken away if she would violate any of the undertakings stated therein. One of the conditions for bail
is that the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court or the Rules of Court. 35
As a consequence of failing to attend the trial when so required, a bench warrant was issued against
complainant.1âwphi1 A bench warrant is defined as a writ issued directly by a judge toa law-enforcement officer,
especially for the arrest of a person who has beenheld in contempt, has disobeyed a subpoena, or has to appearfor a
hearing or trial.36 The provision on bench warrant is expressed under Section 9, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which
states that "[w]hen a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court may issue
another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be forfeited and confiscated, or both."
(Underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence dictates that the primary requisite before a bench warrant shall be issued is that the absent-party was
duly informed of the hearing date but unjustifiably failed to attend so.37 As stated above, complainant was
undeniably notified of the June 8, 2011 hearing but she failed to attend.
Complainant also averred that respondent judge committed erroneous conduct (1) when she issued a bench warrant
without specifically stating the amount of bail bond and (2) for not motu proprio lifting the bail bond when
complainant’s son and lawyer showed their willingness to apply for bail.
According to respondent judge, the June 9, 2011 order of arrest failed to state a bail bond because complainant
jumped bail by failing to appear in court for hearing on June 8, 2011. The Court finds this acceptable because when
an accused fails toappear in person as required, the bond shall be declared forfeited. 38 Also, it is not required by the
Rules of Court that the amount of new bail bond be stated in the bench warrant. The Court cannot chastise
respondent judge for an act notrequired by the Rules. Absent any abuse of discretion, it is sufficient that the bail
bond was fixed after complainant was arrested. Such would bethe proper time for the judge to consider whether to
increase, decrease or retain the amount of bail based on the guidelines. 39
Moreover, there is nothing in the Rules which mandates a judge to motu proprio lift the bench warrant once the
accused expresses his intent to be released on bail. Without any provision to the contrary, Section 1, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court40 governs such that a motion must be filed to seek affirmative relief. In the present case, respondent
judge acted within the scope of her authority when she required complainant’s son and lawyer to file an ex parte
motion to lift the order of arrest. When the motion was filed and the prosecutor did not express any objection,
respondent judge deemed it fit to impose the same amount ofbail at ₱40,000.00. Respondent judge immediately
entertained complainant’s son and lawyer when they came to her branch despite her scheduled hearing and as a
result, complainant was released on that same day.
In the absence of a showing that the acts complained of were done with malice or intention to violate the law or
disregard the Rules of Court or for some corrupt motive, they would, at best, constitute errors of judgment which do
not amount to serious misconduct.41
Claim of Performing Acts Unbecoming of a Judge and Court Personnel due to the court personnel’s discourtesy
Complainant claims that respondent CoC and some court personnel were disrespectful in conversing with her
bondsman, her son, and her lawyer. During her arrest, one of the court personnel said "Nadampot ninyo na ba,
nadampot nyo na ba siya." When the bondsman visited the branch, he claimed to have been snubbed by the
personnel. Also, complainant’s son received an arrogant remark from the court secretary stating "Huwag mo na ako
tanungin, yun ang order ni Judge makikipagtalo ka pa e sumunod ka na lang, wala ka namang magagawa." On the
other hand, the respondents denied that their court personnel made those rude remarks, and claimed that even
assuming that those remarks wereindeed made, these were justified remarks under the circumstances of the
situation.42
While the allegations of complainant were not fully substantiated, the Court disagrees with the respondents that
disrespectful remarks made by court personnel should be tolerated and even considered "justified remarks." The
respondents, and all court personnel for that matter, should be reminded that the image of the Judiciary is mirrored in
the kind of conduct, official or otherwise, which the personnel within its employ display, from the judge to the
lowliest clerk. Impolite language and improper tone should be avoided. Professionalism, respect for the rights of
others, good manners and right conduct are expected of all judicial officers and employees. Thus, all employees are
required to preserve the Judiciary's good name and standing as a true temple of justice. 43 For such improper remarks,
the respondents and their court personnel are admonished.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondents Judge Rowena De Juan-Quinagoran and Branch Clerk of Court
Atty. Adonis Laure is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondents and their court personnel, however, are hereby ADMONISHED to be always courteous in dealing with
litigants and the public in the performance of official duties.
SO ORDERED. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice
 EN BANC August 30, 2016
A.C. No. 9920 [Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant vs.
FORMER JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Respondent

PER CURIAM:
A judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a solemnizing officer.
This disbarment complaint is an offshoot of our Decision in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et
al.1 Respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Tormis), together with other judges and employees of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Cebu City, was dismissed for turning the solemnization of marriages into a business. 2 Tormis was dismissed
from the service for the second time, and this Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate disbarment proceedings
against her.
On July 3, 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, led the judicial audit.team created by the Office of the Court
Administrator to investigate Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City for alleged misdeeds in
the solemnization of marriages.3

Two (2) undercover agents from the judicial audit team, posing as a couple, went to the Palace of Justice to ask about the
marriage application process.4 They were told by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy."5
Fearing that the male undercover would be recognized by the court employees in Branch 4, the two agreed that only the female
undercover would go inside the court. 6 She was then assisted by a woman named Helen.1âwphi1 Helen assured the female
undercover that their marriage process could be hurried. 7 She also claimed that it was possible for the marriage to be
solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated when the marriage license became available. 8
The Office of the Court Administrator found that the respondent judges in that case connived with the court personnel, who
acted as "fixers" in solemnizing marriages.9 The judges heedlessly kept solemnizing marriages despite irregularities in the
requirements provided under the law.10

In the Resolution dated July 10, 2007, this Court treated the judicial audit team's memorandum as an administrative complaint
against the respondent judges, including Tormis.11 The judges were directed to file their comments on the charges against
them. 12 They were also suspended pending resolution of the case.13
On August 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepafio of the Office of the Court Administrator
submitted a Memorandum dated August 29, 2007 and Supplemental Report. 14 The Report stated that:
Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team. The team reported that out of the
643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. The logbooks of the
MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts'
custody.
There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan,
Cebu. There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. The town of Barili,
Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours. Liloan, Cebu,
on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City. 15 (Citations omitted)

The Report included the court employees' admissions of their participation in the alleged misdeeds. The following personnel
substantiated the charges against Tormis:
(1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the Municipal Trial Court in.Cities, Cebu City, confirmed that she would
personally assist couples who wished to be married by checking that their documents were complete before referring them to
the judges, including Tormis;16
(2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer of Branch 6 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, "narrated several
anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu
despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili." 17 These marriages were solemnized by Tormis; 18
(3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
would aid couples in the solemnization of their marriages by referring them to the judges;19
(4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, "admitted that she assisted
couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and
Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not strict about couples' attendance in the family planning seminar"; 20
(5) Marilou Cabafiez, Court Stenographer of Branch 4 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, admitted that she
would assist couples and refer them to the judges, including Tormis.21 She added that "during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the
month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage
Solemnization";22
(6) Rebecca L. Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, admitted that "she
usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to get married under Article 34 of the Family
Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten pesos (₱10)";23 and
(7) Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, admitted that she did not examine marriage applications.24
Couples who were not Barili residents could obtain a marriage license from her, provided that they had relatives residing in
Barili;25
Affidavits of private individuals were also attached to the records.26 Among these individuals was Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera
(Baguio-Manera), a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu. Baguio-Manera claimed that her marriage was solemnized by Tormis
with the aid of "Meloy," who asked for a fee of ₱l,500.00.27 She and her then fiance were not required to present a marriage
license; they were only directed to bring their birth certificates.28 She averred that while Article 3429 did not apply to them, their
marriage certificate was marked with the annotation, "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under
Article 34 of Executive Order No. 209."30
On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the Resolution requiring all the judges involved, including Tormis, to
comment on the Supplemental Report. 31 The Resolution also directed the Process Servicing Unit to furnish all the judges with a
copy of the Report.32 Further, all the court personnel involved were asked to show cause why they should not be disciplined for
their misconduct. 33
In her comm~nt, Tormis denied the charges against her.34 She claimed that the action of the Office of the Court Administrator
was an "entrapment."35 According to her, there was nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the same date the marriage
license was issued.36 In view of the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she relied on the presumption of regularity. 37 Tormis
asserted that she should not be blamed for assuming that the affidavits were true since judges are not handwriting experts. 38
Tormis also claimed that Baguio-Manera's affidavit was hearsay.39

She averred that when Baguio-Manera and her husband was asked about the affidavit, they confirmed the truthfulness of their
statements, particularly that they had been living together for five (5) years.40 Lastly, Tormis blamed the filing clerks for the
irregularities in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala.41
On November 12, 2007, Tormis, together with Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early
Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of the Case.42 This Court lifted the suspension of the judges but forbade them
from solemnizing marriages.43 On December 7, 2007, both judges moved for early resolution with a waiver of formal and/or
further investigation and to dismiss.44 This Court noted their Motion and affirmed the relief they sought, thus allowing the
payment of the judges' unpaid salaries and benefits from July 9, 2007.45
The Office of the Court Administrator, through a memorandum dated June 15, 2010, found Tormis guilty of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted
a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with
an expired license.46
This Court upheld the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator and noted the individual liability of the judges:
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage
certificates actually examined. However, the monthly report of cases showed that she solemnized three hundred five (305)
marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007. The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court started to
use a logbook to keep track of marriages.
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents such as the marriage license,
certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. In several instances, only affidavits were submitted
by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry.
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity of the required documents
particularly the marriage license. The judicial audit team found numerous erasures and superimpositions on entries with regard
to the parties' place of residence. In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B.
Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES
ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it.
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the marriage
requirements' authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the given address of the
parties.1âwphi1 These irregularities were evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who
were married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu
City." However, there was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage certificate showing that Secuya's address
is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City."47
This Court ruled that:
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would have been DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation, had she not been previously
dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30- MTCC);
....
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna, should
be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge.48
(Emphasis in the original)
The affidavits of Celerina Plaza (Plaza) and Crisanto Dela Cerna (Dela Cerna) resulted from Marilou Cabanes' (Cabanes) and
Helen Mongaya's (Mongaya) separate supplemental comments on the charges against them. 49 Cabanes, then Court
Stenographer of Branch 4, named Plaza as Tormis' assistant, in charge of meeting couples at their lobby.so On the other hand,
Mongaya, then Court Interpreter of Branch 4, attached Dela Cerna's affidavit to her comment.51
Plaza claimed to be Tormis' personal aide since 2002.52 She alleged that after Tormis' suspension in 2006, she was directed to
find couples who wanted to get married.53 She was also told to direct the parties to Branch 4 and find Cabanes or "Meloy."54
In his affidavit, Dela Cerna stated that he was employed as Tormis' personal aide.55 He claimed that during the investigation,
Tormis directed him and Tormis' children to bring all the marriage certificates from her office to her house. 56
In view of Judge Necessario, et al., the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the case be docketed as A.C. No. 9920
(Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691) and entitled Office of the Court Administrator v. Former Judge Rosabella M Tormis.57
On June 18, 2013, this Court approved the docketing of the case and directed respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis to
comment on the disbarment charge against her.58
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification59 dated August 12, 2013 asking the Office of the Court Administrator to
state the particular Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility that she had violated as basis for her disbarment.
In the Resolution60 dated September 10, 2013, this Court noted the Urgent Motion for Clarification and directed the Office of
the Bar Confidant to inform respondent of the particular Canons that she had violated.
On November 29, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant sent respondent a letter informing her that the charges in her
administrative cases as a judge were the grounds for her disbarment.61
It cited A.M. No. 02-9-02- SC, 62 which provides that administrative cases against judges shall also be considered as
disciplinary charges against them as members of the bar.63 Some administrative cases against judges stand on grounds that
similarly violate the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or on other
breaches long recognized as grounds for discipline of lawyers. The Office of the Bar Confident reiterated that, in those cases the
respondent judge may be directed to comment on the complaint and explain why he or she should not be punished as a member
of the bar.64
The letter cited the previous administrative charges against respondent, thus:
(a) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, 65 where respondent was dismissed from service, had she not been previously dismissed from
service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-181766 for gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law by turning
solemnization of marriage into a business;67
(b) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692,68 where respondent was suspended for six (6) months without salary for gross misconduct for
repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant with her comment; 69
(c) A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC70 and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC,71 where respondent was fined ₱5,000.00 for gross violation of Rule
114, Section 1772 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure by inappropriately approving the bail posted by an accuse m a
criminal case;73
(d) A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609,74 where respondent was severely reprimanded for her "unauthorized receipt of cash bond and
keeping the same in her house";75
(e) A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817,76 where respondent was dismissed from service for gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court
rules, directives and circulars, and gross ignorance of the law;77 and
(f) A.M. No. MTJ-001337,78 where respondent was reprimanded after being found "guilty of improper conduct for trying to
influence the course of litigation in Criminal Case No. 99796- 12."79 She, together with another judge, was admonished for her
"unbecoming conduct as dispensers of justice."80
Respondent filed her one-page Comment81 on January 10, 2014, asking this Court to grant her peace of mind.82 She states that
she is adopting her Motion for Reconsideration83 in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 as her Comment on the disbarment case against
her.84 In this Motion, respondent enumerates her previous administrative cases with her justifications.
For A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692, respondent claims that she had furnished the complainant with a copy of her comment three (3)
times.85 She avers that the complainant even acknowledged the receipt of her comment through her manifestation, as noted in
this Court's July 30, 2003 Resolution.86 Despite this, she was still fined ₱2,000.00 for her repeated defiance to this Court's
directive to furnish the complainant with a copy of her comment.87 She believed that the case ended upon resolution and upon
this Court's noting her payment of the fine. However, she claims that:
[The Supreme Court] made an underground evaluation of the case and made it appear that when she complied with their
Resolution in 2 March 2005 to impose a fine of ₱2,000.00, it was already an admission that "[s]he (respondent) refused to
present proof of service to complainant of her Comment or she did not furnish complainant with said document[.]" 88
For A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC, respondent claims that this Court "obviously ignored" her
explanation.89 She asserts that she was the only available judge at that time since she was working from Mondays through
Saturdays and even Sundays due to her load of cases. 90
For A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609, respondent questions why this Court ruled that she deliberately made untruthful statements in her
Comment with the intent to deceive this Court.91
For A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, respondent claims that the audit was conducted one (1) day after she had served a prior
suspension.92 She argues that since she was not in her court for a long time, she cannot be faulted for knowing nothing about
what has been happening in her sala during her absence.93 She alleges that the Clerk of Court, her co-respondent in the case,
"could have manipulated it so that even if the cases had already been disposed of some years back he made it appear that this
had remained unacted upon."94
For A.M. No. MTJ-001337, respondent claims that the dismissal of the judges was based on an alleged "entrapment." She argues
that it was impossible for her to act on the marriage of the undercover agents because she was in Tacloban City for her high
school reunion.95 She was merely indicted based on the statements of Plaza and Dela Cerna, who had been intimidated by Atty.
Rullyn Garcia, Office of the Court Administrator judicial audit team head.96 On March 18, 2014, this Court noted respondent's
Comment and resolved to refer the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report, and recommendation. 97
In its Report and Recommendation98 dated August 24, 2015, the Office of the Bar Confidant noted that the Office of the Court
Administrator, represented by Atty. Miguel Mergal, presented Plaza and Dela Cerna as their witnesses. 99 Respondent also
requested Atty. Rullyn Garcia's presence in the proceedings.100
However, none of the witnesses participated in the proceedings. Hence, the parties were required to just submit their respective
memoranda for evaluation.101
The Office of the Court Administrator filed a memorandum102 dated February 27, 2015 quoting the facts and ruling in Judge
Necessario, et al. It avers that Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies "are beside the point and these have been rendered moot
because of their failure to appear at the hearings scheduled by the Office of the Bar Confidant." 103
The Office of the Court Administrator argues that respondent should be disbarred due to gross misconduct for her participation
in the solemnization of marriages. 104 It points out that the various administrative charges against respondent "clearly shows that
she does not possess high standards of competence and reliability required of a practicing lawyer." 105
On the other hand, respondent's memorandum106 dated February 26, 2015 mainly anchored on the claim that Atty. Rullyn
Garcia's report submitted was falsified. 107 Respondent claims that Atty. Rullyn Garcia intimidated the court employees and
caused them to "admit whatever allegations he brought up during the investigation."108 She prays that the case be dismissed for
lack of substantial evidence since Plaza's and Dela Cema's affidavits were not personally attested to by the affiants. 109
The Office of the Bar Confidant, after conducting the proceedings and considering the memoranda of the parties, recommended
that the disbarment case against respondent be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.110 It emphasized that formal
investigation is indispensable in disbarment proceedings:
For the charge of gross misconduct for the irregularities in the solemnization of marriages as the basis for this disbarment
proceedings.
This case was set for hearing. During the scheduled hearing, the representative from OCA manifested that they are presenting
two (2) witnesses in the persons of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto Dela Cerna. The purposes of their testimonies are for them to
substantiate the allegations against former Judge Tormis, identify and authenticate the existence and veracity of their respective
affidavits submitted to the Court. However, the two witnesses failed to appear during the proceedings of this case. Thus, their
affidavits are considered hearsay and inadmissible in evidence ... in this proceeding. The affidavit are [sic] not entirely reliable
evidence in court due to their incompleteness and inaccuracies that may have attended in their formulation. The affidavit does
not purport to contain a complete narration of facts and that court testimonies are generally viewed as more reliable as they are
subjected to cross examination from the opposing party .... Likewise, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, the OCA audit team head, failed to
appear. The purpose of his testimony would be to shed light more on whether the alleged affidavits executed by Celerina Plaza
and Crisanto Dela Cerna were actually and voluntarily submitted to the Court and, if so, who required them to execute and
submit the same to the Court.
....
\The determination of the merit of th[ ese] disbarment proceedings may not be relied upon solely on the premise of the dismissal
from the service of former Judge Tormis. As earlier discussed, the grounds for dismissal from the service of former Judge
Tormis, in her capacity as presiding judge, in administrative matter is different from this disbarment proceedings against her.
Otherwise, the Court would have ruled on the disbarment aspect, which shall be incorporated in the decision of dismissal from
the service of former Judge Tormis in one decision only. As provided for under the constitutional right to due process, former
Judge Tormis should be given full opportunity to be heard and confront witnesses against her in th[ ese] disbarment
proceedings. This constitutional right should not be denied to former Judge Tormis, who cried for due process since her
dismissal from the service.
....
For the dismissal from the service, in her capacity as judge, for gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of
the law in performance of her duties as presiding judge.
Former Judge Tormis cried for justice in dismissing her from service, as presiding judge, without according her due process.
She was not given the opportunity to be heard but the only basis of her dismissal from the service was the
testimonies/allegations against her of some courts [sic] personnel, who were allegedly intimidated by the judicial audit team,
during the judicial audit. She was not given the chance to confront nor furnished copies of the said court personnel's
testimonies. She was denied her constitutional right against searches and seizures of documents from her sala when the audit
team obtained documents and records, as evidence against her, when they conducted the investigation in her sala, since she was
not informed of the said audit.

In A.M. No. P-08-2520, the Court held that he rights against unreasonable searches and seizures as provided under Section 2,
Article III in the Constitution may be invoked even in administrative proceedings. The exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2),
Art. III of the Constitution also bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such "right. The fact that the present case
is administrative in nature, does not render the above principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta vs C.A., any violation of
the aforestated constitutional right renders the evidence inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings.
Records show that all the administrative sanctions against former Judge Tormis were all for simple gross inefficiency or neglect
of duties and gross ignorance of the law in the discharge of her duties and responsibilities as the presiding judge of the MTCC,
Br. 4, Cebu City. Neither of these findings held her for gross misconduct, which constitute immoral conduct, that would tend to
affect her standing and moral character as an officer of the court and as a member of the Bar. Further, she has never been found
guilty for graft and corruption during her entire service in the judiciary as a member of the bench in the lower court that would
cause her automatically disbarred from the practice of law.
Finally, the counter-charges of former Judge Tormis against Atty. Rullyn Garcia may not be given due course in th[ese]
proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that the disbarment case against
former JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.111 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)

The issues for resolution are as follows:

First, whether the alleged irregularities committed by respondent in the solemnization of marriages, where she was found guilty
of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law, constitute gross misconduct warranting her
disbarment;
Second, whether Plaza's and Dela Cema's affidavits are indispensable in finding that respondent's acts constitute gross
misconduct and merit the penalty of disbarment; and
Lastly, whether respondent's long line of administrative sanctions should affect her standing as a member of the bar.
Although this Court recognizes the indispensability of the appearance of Plaza and Dela Cerna in the proceedings before the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the disbarment case cannot be dismissed solely based on this.
An affidavit is commonly recognized as hearsay evidence.112 Since it is often prepared not by the affiant but by another person
who makes use of his or her own language in writing the statements, it is generally rejected unless the affiant is placed on the
witness stand to testify.113 "Courts take judicial notice of the fact that an affidavit does not purport to contain a complete
narration of facts."114 Court testimonies, therefore, are favored because these can be subjected to cross exammation.115
Plaza and Dela Cerna failed to appear in the proceedings before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The Office of the Bar
Confidant noted that their testimonies would have supposedly confirmed the charge against respondent regarding the alleged
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages.116 Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies would have likewise verified the
existence and veracity of their affidavits.117

Similarly, Atty. Rullyn Garcia failed to appear in the proceedings. His purported testimony would have disproved the accusation
that Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies were executed with his intimidation.118 Due to their absence, Plaza's and Dela Cema's
allegations in their affidavits were rendered inadmissible.119 Nevertheless, despite the inadmissibility of the affidavits, this Court
in Judge Necessario, et al. upheld the finding of the judicial audit team that respondent committed irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages. This Court ruled that these findings had sufficient basis and were supported by evidence, pertinent
laws, and jurisprudence.120 Respondent was held guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law
warranting her dismissal, had she not been previously dismissed from service in another case.121

The administrative case against respondent in Judge Necessario, et al. Should likewise be considered as a disciplinary
proceeding against her under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices od the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts;
and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of
the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for
such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent
Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of
the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
While respondent blatantly violated particular Canons of Judicial Ethics with her participation in the alleged marriage scam, she
similarly breached the following Canons on the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession ....
....
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law[.]
Membership in the bar is an essential requirement for membership in the bench.122 "[T]he moral fitness of a judge also reflects
his [or her] moral fitness as a lawyer.".123 Consequently, a judge who violates the code of judicial conduct similarly violates his
or her lawyer's oath. 124
Respondent's act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in utter disregard of the law and jurisprudence clearly constitutes gross
misconduct. The repetitiveness of her act shows her clear intent to violate the law. She disregarded the lawyer's oath, which
mandates lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. In view of this, either the penalty of suspension or disbarment
is warranted. Rule 138, Section 27 provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)
Gross misconduct is an "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." 125 To
consider gross misconduct "the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule
must be manifest[.]" 126

The Supplemental Report of the Office of the Court Administrator made the following findings:
III On Judge Rosabella M Tormis
1. Based on the documents, i.e., marriage certificates and other supporting documents, actually examined, she solemnized a total
of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007, while the monthly reports of cases reflected a total of three
hundred and five (305) marriages she solemnized from 2004 to 2007.
2. It was only last July that her court started using a logbook to record the marriages she solemnized, which, as of the date of the
judicial audit and investigation, reflected a total of sixty-three (63) marriages for that month.
3. Of the 181 marriages she solemnized, one hundred thirty-one (131), or 72.38% were solemnized under Article 34 of the
Family Code, while fifty (50), or 27.62% were with marriage licenses.
4. Of the 50 marriages with marriage license, forty (40), or 80% marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of
Barili, Cebu, while the remaining ten (10), or 20%, were obtained from other local civil registrars.
5. The following marriages were solemnized by her with no or incomplete supporting documents:
....
6. The following marriages were solemnized by her even if the
validity of the supporting documents, especially the marriage licenses
presented, appear to be questionable[.]
7. The authenticity of the requirements for the following marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code, by reason of the (a)
circumstances of the cohabitation, (b) minority during the period of cohabitation, and (c) given address of the contracting
parties, appears to be questionable:
8. In almost all of the marriages solemnized by her, there was no proof that the solemnization fee of ₱300.000, as required under
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, was paid by the contacting parties. 127
The act of solemnizing marriages without the required marriage license constitutes misconduct. 128 The positive testimonies
substantiate that respondent solemnized marriages without previously issued licenses; hence, respondent's act deviates from the
established rule.129 In Aranes v. Occiano:130

[A] marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license
that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. 131
Tupal v. Rojo132 explained the role of a judge as a solemnizing officer:
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted. The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among
these formal requisites is a marriage license.

A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of the legal
disqualifications to contract marriage. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the
marriage license presented.

If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry,
they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the
affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of
any legal impediment to marry each other. The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the
parties' qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage. Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. 133 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

Although it is true that marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code merit exemption from a marriage license, respondent
should have complied with the mandate of personally ascertaining the circumstances of cohabitation of the parties. Records
reveal that the declarations embodied in the required joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties do not actually represent the
accurate circumstances of their alleged cohabitation.134

In addition, there were marriages solemnized by respondent involving foreigners who only submitted affidavits in lieu of a
certificate of legal capacity to marry.135 In cases where one or both of the contracting parties are foreigners, Article 21136 of the
Family Code provides that a certificate of legal capacity to marry is necessary before the acquisition of a marriage license. As
the solemnizing officer, respondent should have ensured that pertinent requirements were secured before the issuance of the
marriage license. Thus, the absence of a certificate of legal capacity to marry should have prompted her to question the
propriety of the issuance.
The connivance between respondent and the court employees is settled. The court employees acted as "'fixers' and
'facilitators" 137 that mediated between the judges and the contacting parties. Apparent are the superimpositions and erasures in
the addresses of the contracting parties so they would appear to be residents of either Barili or Liloan, Cebu. 138 For the
contracting parties to easily obtain their marriage license, discrepancies between their true addresses as declared in their
marriage certificates and their addresses in their marriage licenses were made. The contracting parties were able to get married
despite incomplete requirements. Thus, the handwritten marginal notes of monetary figures attached to the marriage certificates
show the presence of consideration.139

Marriage is recognized under the law as an inviolable social institution, which is the foundation of the family. 140 In Beso v.
Daguman.141
[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with
safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon
it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would
shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. 142
Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of marriage. As a judicial officer, she is expected to know the law
on solemnization of marriages.143 "A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he [or she] must also be conscientious
and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office[,] should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties."144
Similarly, as a lawyer who is an officer of the court, respondent should have not permitted herself to be an instrument of any
violation of law. Her careless attention in dispensing with the necessary requirements of marriage and in conniving with court
employees to further monetary interests underscores her utter disregard of the sanctity of marriage.

Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his or her professional dealings or in a private capacity, is basis for suspension or
disbarment.145 Possession of good character is a fundamental requirement not only for admission to the bar but also for the
continuance of exercising the privilege to practice law.146 However, as a rule, disbarment is only warranted in cases of
misconduct that "seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court." 147
Respondent's undue haste in repeatedly solemnizing marriages despite incomplete and irregular requirements shows
indifference to her role as an officer of the court. The repetitiveness of her acts shows her proclivity in transgressing the law and
protecting these violations with her authority. A lawyer, as an officer and an essential partner of the court in the solemn task of
giving justice, is given the grave obligation of maintaining the integrity of the courts. 148 This is especially so with judges. A
judge is "the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For
the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
follow."149 In Samson v. Caballero:150

The first step towards the successful implementation of the Court's relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit
members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is
extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good example to the
bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is - and should be - higher than that of the average
person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge.151
Respondent was involved in infractions that warranted her prior administrative sanctions. Her long line of cases shows her
depravity of character, in that she remained undeterred by the past penalties she had incurred. Considering that she was
repeatedly involved in administrative charges, the severe penalty of disbarment should be meted against her. Disbarment does
not equate to a sanction stripping a lawyer of his or her source of living.152
It is intended to "protect the administration of justice that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and
reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them."153 As held in Foronda v. Guerrero: 154
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.155
Respondent's conduct has fallen short of the strict standards required by the legal profession. Hence, her repeated failure to live
up to the values expected of her as an officer of the court renders her unfit to be a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis is DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to respondent's personal records, to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for dissemination to its chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial
agencies, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]
REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental, Respondent.

LEONEN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating
the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.1
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Judge Rojo
allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation 2 and
issued them to the contracting parties.3 He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage. 4 These "package
marriages" are allegedly common in Bacolod City.5
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were
notarized on the day of the contracting parties’ marriages.6 The affidavits contained the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO Judge
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular
No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex
officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of
cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. 9 Thus, Judge Rojo
cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized
affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to present
their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law.
These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple and elementary to
ignore."10
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the father of Frialyn Tupal.
Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex
only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay Frialyn’s case. 12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was
connected with his official functions and duties as a judge.13 The Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary14 does not prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
they will solemnize.15 Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public.
Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. 16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their competent pieces of
evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be
the same persons who executed the affidavit.17 The parties’ identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties
whose marriage they solemnized.19 He pleaded "not to make him [complainant Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag and
chopping block"20 since other judges also notarized affidavits of cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined ₱9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating
the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal
trial court judges’ official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members
of the Judiciary,21 a judge’s duty is to personally examine the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing
the marriage ceremony.22 Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties
whose marriage they will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended a fine of ₱1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized.23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the
law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge
Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in
their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their
official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the function of
notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of
1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications
on the scope of this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents connected only with the
exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation
and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the
performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their
extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from
engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial
jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio:
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have neither lawyers nor
notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public
may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public,
provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer
(Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. 24
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or
notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
Among these formal requisites is a marriage license.26
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of the legal
disqualifications to contract marriage.27 Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the
marriage license presented.28
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to
marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. 29 Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of
cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. 30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must
personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other. 31 The judge must also execute a sworn statement that
he personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage. 32 Article 34
of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal ratification of cohabitation.
— In the case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally
interview the contracting parties to determine their qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the
contracting parties as to the fact of having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of
any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a) and (b) and
that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who
notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties
have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the
judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize
marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for
marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the
affidavit’s statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the
affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the
irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he solemnized their
marriages]."33 He notarized documents not connected with his official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus,
Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not
expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he cannot be prohibited from notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation.
To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the solemnizing officer’s duties to examine the affidavit of cohabitation and
to issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been complied with redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot
objectively examine a document he himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary assume that "the person authorized by law to administer
oaths" who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who performs the marriage ceremony are
two different persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from notarizing "private documents x
x x [bearing] no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges." 34 Since a marriage license is a public
document, its "counterpart," the affidavit of cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit
of cohabitation, he notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity." 35 The affidavit
of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose," remains a private document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents. As discussed,
affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official duty to solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is to "eliminate competition between judges and private lawyers in
transacting legal conveyancing business."36 He cited Borre v. Judge Moya37 where this court found City Judge Arcilla
guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing a deed of sale. Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits
of cohabitation, he did "not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing
business."38 Thus, he did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context in which this court stated that "[judges] should not
compete with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business." 39
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal conveyancing business." So
long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate of candidacy. In
Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr.,41 this court fined Judge Galapon for notarizing the verification page of an answer filed with
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The documents involved in these cases were not used to transact
"legal conveyancing business." Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of violating Circular
No. 1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were not connected with his official function and duty to
solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in
Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the municipality or circuit of the judge’s
court constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.42
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the
practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the contrary. 43
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him.
Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. – x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules.
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the
instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not personally know the signatory, he must require the
signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their
affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were personally known to him or that the parties presented
their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They personally appeared before
him to subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also interviewed them on their qualifications to contract marriage.
Thus, the parties to the affidavit of cohabitation need not present their competent pieces of evidence of identity. 44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties personally known to
him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits. To personally know the parties, the
notary public must at least be acquainted with them.45 Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties
personally known to the notary public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v. Judge How 46 where this
court held that "[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations x x x" 47 were defenses
against gross ignorance of the law charges. His good faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold him
administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres] only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment x x x."48 Good faith "does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable
legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error." 49
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial
jurisdiction before notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires notaries public to personally know
the signatory to the document they will notarize or require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. These
are basic legal principles and procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine times
is not good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity,50 "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer." 51 If the law involved is basic, ignorance
constitutes "lack of integrity."52 Violating basic legal principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a serious charge: 53
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; 54
b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; 55 or
c. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.56
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of the
law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges’ practice of notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in
Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6)
months sufficient sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law.1âwphi1 They should act with caution
with respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical requirements as in this case will be dealt with
strictly.
WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His
suspension is effective upon service on him of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.
SO ORDERED. MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN Associate Justice
 EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-2224-MTJ), April 03, 2018
ROSILANDA M. KEUPPERS, Complainant, v. JUDGE VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 2, ISLAND GARDEN CITY OF SAMAL, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction violates Article 7 of
the Family Code, and is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
He should be properly sanctioned.
The Case
This administrative matter commenced from the 1st Indorsement dated November 4, 2009,1 whereby the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao endorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
appropriate action the complete records of the case initiated by affidavit-complaint by complainant Rosilanda
Maningo Keuppers against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. She thereby charged respondent
Judge with estafa; violation of Republic Act No. 6713; and grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.2

The complainant averred in her affidavit-complaint executed on June 6, 20083 that on May 12, 2008, she and
her husband, Peter Keuppers, went to the Local Civil Registrar's Office (LCRO) of Davao City to apply for a
marriage license because they wanted to get married before Peter's departure on May 22, 2008 so that he could
bring the marriage certificate with him back to Germany; that Julie Gasatan, an employee of the LCRO,
explained the process for securing the license, and apprised them that it would be virtually impossible to
solemnize their marriage before May 22, 2008 because of the requirement for the mandatory 10-day posting of
the application for the marriage license; that Gasatan then handed a note with the advice for the couple to
proceed to the office of DLS Travel and Tours Corporation (DLS Travel and Tours) in Sandawa, Matina, Davao
City to look for a person who might be able to help the couple; that in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours,
Lorna Siega, the owner, told the couple that the marriage processing fees charged by her office would be higher
than the P600.00 fee collected in the City Hall in Davao City; that Siega assured that the couple would
immediately get the original as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copies of the marriage certificate;
that Siega then required the couple to fill up forms but instructed the couple to leave the spaces provided for the
address and other information blank; that the couple paid P15,750.00 to Siega purportedly to cover the fees of
the solemnizing Judge, the certification fee, the security fee, the City Hall fee, the service fee and the passport
fee; and that Siega later on confirmed to the couple the date, time and place of the solemnization of the
marriage.

According to the complainant, respondent Judge solemnized the marriage on May 19, 2008 in the premises of
the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; that the staff of the DLS Travel and Tours later on handed to the
couple the copy of the marriage certificate for their signatures; that on the following day, May 20, 2008, the
couple returned to the DLS Travel and Tours to pick up the documents as promised by Siega; that the couple
was surprised to find erroneous entries in the marriage certificate as well as on the application for marriage
license, specifically:
(a) the certificate stating "Office of the MTCC Judge, Island Garden City of Samal" as the place of the
solmenization of the marriage although the marriage had been solemnized in the office of the DLS Travel and
Tours in Davao City;
(b) the statement in the application for marriage license that she and her husband had applied for the marriage
license in Sta. Cruz, Davao City on May 8, 2008 although they had accomplished their application on May 12,
2008 in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours; and
(c) the statement in their application for marriage license on having appeared before Mario Tizon, the Civil
Registrar of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, which was untrue.

In his comment dated February 2, 2010,4 the respondent professed no knowledge of how the complainant had
processed and secured the documents pertinent to her marriage; denied personally knowing her and the persons
she had supposedly approached to help her fast-track the marriage; insisted that he had met her only at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage, and that the solemnization of the marriage had been assigned to him;
asserted that the documents necessary for a valid marriage were already duly prepared; and claimed that he was
entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties considering that the documents
submitted by her had been issued by the appropriate government agencies.
He contended that he should not be blamed for the erroneous entries in her certificate of marriage because the
same had been merely copied from her marriage license and from the other documents submitted therewith, and
also because he had not been the person who had prepared the certificate;
 and that he had only performed the ministerial duty of solemnizing the marriage based on the proper documents
submitted to him, with the real parties involved having personally signed the certificate of marriage before him.

The respondent also denied receiving any amount for solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her
husband; and pointed out that he had not been aware as the solemnizing officer if any of the documents
submitted by her was spurious.

He recalled that she had freely and voluntarily signed the certificate of marriage; and that it was the same
document that had been filed in the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Davao City. He declared that the marriage
certificate itself stated the place of the solemnization of the marriage; and that he did not alter, modify or amend
the entries therein.

Report & Recommendation

of the Investigating Justice

Upon the recommendation of the OCA,5 the Court referred the complaint to the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de
Oro City for investigation, report and recommendation. The complaint, originally assigned to Associate Justice
Pamela Ann Abella Maxino for such purposes, was re-assigned to Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy in
view of the transfer of Associate Justice Maxino to the Cebu Station of the Court of Appeals.
On August 10, 2012, Investigating Justice Sempio Diy submitted her report and recommendation as the
Investigating Justice,6 whereby she concluded and recommended as follows:

The undersigned Investigating Officer, in the course of the investigation, has been hurled with overwhelming
evidence that the marriage between complainant and Peter Keuppers was held only in the premises of DLS
Travel and Tours Corporation, Sandawa Road, Matina, Davao City, and was solemnized by respondent. Several
witnesses for complainant affirmed the same. More importantly, this Office has conducted an ocular inspection
of the premises of DLS Travel and Tours. During said inspection, it was confirmed that the premises shown in
Exhibits "G", "G-1", "G-2", "G-3", "G-4", and "G-5" where respondent is seen solemnizing a wedding, is the
same place subject of the ocular inspection. Hence, the DLS Travel and Tours building is, in fact, the actual
venue of complainant's wedding.

It is also of equal importance to note that respondent admitted that he indeed solemnized the subject marriage
outside of his jurisdiction. In fact, in his testimony, respondent stated:

A: Rosilanda Maningo was really begging that the marriage be performed since that was the very day of the
marriage as the German fiance will be leaving soon. Because of pity, I accommodated the parties. I risked your
honor because I didn't want that the marriage be postponed as it was for the best interest of the couple because
according to Rosilanda Maningo that was the only day, the German fiance was leaving for Germany. So, I
decided to solemnize the marriage in the office of DLS Travel and Tours.

The fact that respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction is further bolstered by his own
admission that he solemnized the marriage of complainant and Peter Keuppers at DLS Travels and Tours and
not in his territorial jurisdiction in the Island Garden City of Samal.
Indeed, respondent knows the possible consequence of the aforementioned act when he said:

A: I was thinking your honor that there was a sanction but because of my honest intention to help the parties
because they were already begging that the solemnization be performed [sic]. I was honest with my intention
and my conscience was clear.
Be that as it may, this Office is of the opinion that notwithstanding that respondent had no hand in the
preparation and processing of the subject marriage, he indeed solemnized a marriage outside of his territorial
jurisdiction, subject to sanctions that the Office of the Court Administrator may impose.

The above-quoted Article 8 of the Family Code clearly states that a marriage can be held outside the judge's
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
accordance with Article 29; or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

Inasmuch as respondent's jurisdiction covers only the Island Garden City of Samal, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in Davao City.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant or her fiance Peter Keuppers was at the point of death
or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to respondent
that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or a place other than his sala. What in fact appears on
record that respondent took pity on the couple and risked sanctions to attend to the urgency of solemnizing the
marriage of complainant and Peter Keuppers.
In Beso vs. Daguman, the Supreme Court held:
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and render
justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply
the law; he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature
of their office[,] should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.

The undersigned Investigating Officer believes that taking pity on the Keuppers couple is not enough reason for
respondent to risk possible sanctions that may be imposed upon him for not observing the applicable laws under
the circumstances. It is his sworn duty to conscientiously uphold the law at all times despite the inconvenience
that it may cause to others.

Significantly, Canon 6, Section 7 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates:
-xxx- Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.

It is likewise worth mentioning that respondent cannot be charged with ignorance of the law considering that he
knew the consequences of his actions and he also cannot be seen as a judge that demonstrates a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law. Lastly, it also does not appear from the records that he has
been previously charged with any offense or that there is/are any pending administrative case/s against him.

RECOMMENDATION:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed respondent is guilty of solemnizing a marriage outside
of his territorial jurisdiction under circumstances not falling under any of the exceptions as provided for in
Article 8 of the Family Code. Considering, however, the factual milieu of the instant case and the peculiar
circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be meted a fine
of P5,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense in the future will be
dealt with severely.

Issue

Was respondent Judge liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service?

Ruling of the Court

We hold and find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service for solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband outside his territorial jurisdiction, and
in the office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City.

Such place of solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7 of the Family Code, which pertinently provides:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

Furthermore, in solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband in the office premises of the DLS
Tour and Travel in Davao City despite the foregoing provision of the Family Code, respondent Judge flagrantly
violated the spirit of the law. Article 8 of the Family Code disallows solemnizing the marriage in a venue other
than the judge's courtroom or chambers, viz.:

Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)

Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so only out of pity for the complainant after she had supposedly
claimed that her German fianc� was soon returning to Germany and wanted to bring with him the certified
copy of the marriage certificate did not diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his dismissive and cavalier
attitude towards express statutory requirements instituted to secure the solemnization of marriages from abuse.
By agreeing to solemnize the marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at a place that had nothing to do
with the performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial Judge, he demeaned and cheapened the inviolable social
institution of marriage.
Article 8 of the Family Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere, which emphasizes that the place of
the solemnization of the marriage by a judge like him should only be in his office or courtroom. Indeed, the
limiting phrase highlighted the nature and status of the marriage of the complainant and her husband as "a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman," and as "the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation."7

The only exceptions to the limitation are when the marriage was to be contracted on the point of death of one or
both of the complainant and her husband, or in a remote place in accordance with Article 29 of the Family
Code,8 or where both of the complainant and her husband had requested him as the solemnizing officer in
writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated by them in their sworn statement to that effect.

Respondent Judge's offense was not his first act of gross misconduct concerning the discharge of the office of
solemnizing marriages. He had been charged on February 28, 2008 in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223 entitled Palma v.
Judge George E. Omelio, Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao City (then of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br.
4, Davao City), Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 2, et al. with having affixed his
signature as the solemnizing officer on the marriage contract without having actually solemnized the
marriage. The charge was in violation of Administrative Order No. 125-2007 dated August 8, 2007 (Guidelines
on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary). The Court declared him guilty of gross
misconduct, and fined him in the amount of P40,000.00.9 The present offense was committed on May 19, 2008.

Misconduct consists in the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, or, more particularly, in
an unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. It implies wrongful intention, and must not be a
mere error of judgment. Respondent Judge was guilty of grave, not simple, misconduct because he had at the
very least the wilful intent to violate the Family Code on the venue of a marriage solemnized by a judge, and to
flagrantly disregard the relevant rules for such solemnization set forth in the law.

The office of solemnizing marriages should not be treated as a casual or trivial matter, or as a business activity.
For sure, his act, although not criminal, constituted grave misconduct considering that crimes involving moral
turpitude are treated as separate grounds for dismissal under the Administrative Code.10 It is relevant to observe,
moreover, that his acts of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service seriously
undermined the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary.

The Investigating Justice recommended the imposition on respondent Judge of the measly fine of P5,000.00
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense in the future would be dealt with severely.
The recommendation did not take into account that the present charge was the second offense respondent Judge
committed in relation to his office of solemnizing marriages. Given that the charge was committed with a wilful
intent to violate the letter and the spirit of Article 7 and Article 8 of the Family Code, and to flagrantly disregard
the relevant rules for the solemnization of marriages set by the Family Code, the proper penalty was dismissal
from the service.

Yet, dismissal from the service can no longer be imposed in view of the intervening retirement from the service
of respondent Judge. Instead, the Court forfeits all his retirement benefits except his accrued leaves.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent JUDGE VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, the former
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del
Norte GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE SERVICE; and, ACCORDINGLY, DECLARES as forfeited all his retirement benefits, except his
accrued leaves, with prejudice to his appointment in the government service.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M.
TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu ·City; CELESTE P.
RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch
6, Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D. VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City; MARILOU
CABANEZ, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC,
Branch 3, Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City; and HELEN
MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City. Respondents.

PER CURIAM:
This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. It
requires that everyone involved in its dispensation ― from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk ― live up to the
strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public service." 1
THE CASE
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA).2 The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in
several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. 3 Certain
package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages. 4
THE FACTS
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and headed the audit team
created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City.5 A female and male lawyer of the
audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by
the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized
by other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The two
lawyers then agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application process.
Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if the
marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the
marriage certificate would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the
regularity of the process for a fee of three thousand pesos (₱3,000) only.6
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial audit team as a
formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective comments. 7 The Court also suspended the judges
pending resolution of the cases against them.8
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño submitted its
Memorandum dated 29 August 20079 and Supplemental Report.10 Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were
examined by the judicial audit team.11 The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages
were solemnized under Article 3412 of the Family Code.13
The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage
certificates in the courts’ custody.14 There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil
registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu.15 There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage
licenses obtained on the same day.16 The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and
entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours.17 Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away
from Cebu City.18
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government personnel, also reported the
following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by checking whether their documents
were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales afterwards; 19
2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were also "assistants" who
would go over the couples’ documents before these couples would be referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated
several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of
Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous marriages were solemnized by
Judge Tormis;20
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She admitted that after the
payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (₱300), a different amount, as agreed upon by the parties and the
judge, was paid to the latter.21 She admitted that she accepted four thousand pesos (₱4,000) for facilitating the irregular
marriage of Moreil Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a certain "Mang Boy"; 22
4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage licenses
were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not strict
about couples’ attendance in the family planning seminar. She also admitted that couples gave her food while the judge
received five hundred pesos (₱500) if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners were said to have
given twice the said amount. The judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos (₱1,500) for gasoline expenses if the
marriage was celebrated outside the chambers;23
5) Marilou Cabañez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, or Rosales.
However, she denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the audit team that during the 8th, 18th, and 28th
of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage
solemnization;24
6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the investigating team that Judge Gil
Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation
form on which he or the clerk of court would type the entries. The judge would then receive an envelope containing
money from the couple. Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage certificates; 25
7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team that couples looked for Judge
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City, "para menos ang bayad." 26 The
excess of three hundred pesos (₱300) that couples paid to Judge Econg as solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking
fund" of Branch 9;27
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to
get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten
pesos (₱10);28
9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred couples to Branch 2, Clerk of
Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple to the chambers of Judge
Necessario.29 He informed the judge that the couple only had birth certificates. 30 The respondent judge then inquired about
their ages and asked them if they had been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the marriage; 31 and
10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not scrutinize marriage
applications.32 Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from her Barili office because
these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu.33 She also added that while couples still need to submit a certificate
of attendance in the family planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of the application for marriage
license.34
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera was a resident of Panagdait,
Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fiancé wanted to set a marriage date. 35 Her younger sister who was
married in a civil wedding last year gave her the number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the
wedding was scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their birth certificates. No marriage
license was required from them. Meloy asked for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (₱1,500). According to
Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being
solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209".
Their marriage was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not
understand what that statement meant at that time. However, in her affidavit, she declared that the situation premised
under Article 34 did not apply to her and her fiancé.
Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007 affidavit, she recounted how she and
her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get married in February 2006. While logging in at the entrance, they were
offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (₱1,500). The guard also offered to become
"Ninong" or a witness to the wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not push through with the civil wedding at
that time.
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta,
Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu City, to
comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b)
directing the Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c) requiring the court
personnel listed below to show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them for their alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them in this administrative matter:
1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Cebu City;
4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
5) Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;
8) Helen Mongaya,Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas for
appropriate action on the administrative matter involving the violation of the law on marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez,
Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b)
directed the Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with a copy of the
Supplemental Report of the OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, to
comment within fifteen (15) days from notice on the statement of staff member Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9’s
court personnel received an amount in excess of the ₱300 solemnization fee paid by couples whose marriages were
solemnized by her. This amount goes to the court’s "sinking fund".36
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and its Supplemental Report, 37 the
respondent judges argued the following:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented to him by
contracting parties.38 He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required
affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before
he became a judge.39 He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence of an
impediment to marry.40 He also asks the parties searching questions and clarifies whether they understood the contents of
the affidavit and the legal consequences of its execution.41 The judge also denies knowledge of the payment of
solemnization fees in batches.42 In addition, he argues that it was a process server who was in-charge of recording
marriages on the logbook, keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages monthly. 43
Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to inquire whether the
license was obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident. 44
The judge believes that it is not his duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to determine its
authenticity because he relies on the presumption of regularity of public documents. 45 The judge also outlines his own
procedure in solemnizing marriages which involves: first, the determination whether the solemnization fee was paid;
second, the presentation of the affidavit of cohabitation and birth certificates to ascertain identity and age of the parties;
third, if one of the parties is a foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate of legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date of
arrival, and divorce papers when the party is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their witnesses questions
regarding cohabitation and interviews the children of the parties, if any. 46
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the judicial audit team during
the investigation an "entrapment".47 She also claims that there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of
the issuance of the marriage license and with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where
neither of the parties resided.48 As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that she cannot be faulted for
accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting experts. 49 The affidavits also enjoy the presumption
of regularity.50
Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay. 51 The respondent said that when Baguio-
Manera and her husband were confronted with the affidavit they executed, they affirmed the veracity of the statements,
particularly the fact that they have been living together for five years. 52 The judge also attributes the irregularity in the
number of marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks. 53
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. 54
He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he
presumes the regularity of the license issued.55 It is only when there is no marriage license given that he ascertains the
qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry. 56 As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge
believes there is nothing wrong with the fact that these are pro forma. He states that marriage certificates are required with
the marriage license attached or the affidavit of cohabitation only and the other documents fall under the responsibility of
the local civil registrar.
He surmises that if the marriage certificate did not come with the marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the
missing document might have been inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the proper local civil registrar. As
to the payment of the docket fee, he contends that it should be paid after the solemnization of the marriage and not before
because judges will be pre-empted from ascertaining the qualifications of the couple. Besides, the task of collecting the
fee belongs to the Clerk of Court.57 The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial duty. 58
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting
of Suspension and Dismissal of Case.59
This Court in a Resolution dated 11 December 2007 lifted the suspension of the respondent judges but prohibited
them from solemnizing marriages until further ordered.60
On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with Waiver of Formal and/or
Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss.61 In a Resolution dated 15 January 2008, the Court noted the motion and
granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the payment of their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other
economic benefits from 9 July 2007.62

THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA

In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010,63 the OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some court
employees, and the suspension or admonition of others. The OCA summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his
capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors
during the cohabitation.
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make sure that the solemnization
fee has been paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid and for solemnizing marriages
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the
required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a marriage without
the requisite marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the
required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel that prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit or
implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions and for giving false information
for the purpose of perpetrating an irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to indicate her
residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
providing couples who are to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for
assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. 64
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Corazon
P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabañez, for lack of merit.

THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most
severe penalty of dismissal from service.

THE COURT’S RULING

The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported by the evidence on record
and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and responsibility of keeping
the faith of the public.65
In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. This
Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice
which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. 66
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The respondent judges and
court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales are all
guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure
laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down
aspects of the solemnization process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the individual
liabilities of the respondent judges and court personnel vis-à-vis the evidence presented by the OCA against them.
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred twenty-three (1,123) marriages
from 2005 to 2007.67
However, only one hundred eighty-four (184) marriage certificates were actually examined by the judicial audit
team.68 Out of the 184 marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while one hundred five
(105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79 marriages with license, forty-seven (47) of
these licenses were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of the marriages he
solemnized with marriage license coming from Liloan for over a period of years. 69 There were also twenty-two (22)
marriages solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such missing as marriage license, certificate of legal
capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.70
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents such as marriage
licenses.71 The OCA found that the place of residence of the contracting parties appearing in the supporting documents
differ from the place where they obtained their marriage license. 72 The documents invited suspicion because of erasures
and superimpositions in the entries of residence.73 Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of legal capacity to marry, a
mere affidavit was submitted by the parties.74 Variations in the signatures of the contracting parties were also apparent in
the documents.75
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code. These marriages
appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties show minority of one or both of them during
cohabitation.76 For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004 the marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old
Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are residents of Lapu-Lapu City.77
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the solemnization fee but the corresponding
marriage certificates cannot be found.78 The presence of the receipts implies that these marriages were solemnized.
Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to 2007. 79 However, the logbook showed that
he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272) marriages while the monthly reports of cases showed that he solemnized
five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the same period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75)
under
Article 34 of the Family Code.80 This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized under Article 34 in a four-year
period.81
There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge Necessario as solemnizing officers found
in his custody.82 There were also ten (10) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code where one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during cohabitation.83 To illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the
marriage of Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old. 84
There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting parties were residents of Cebu
City.85 The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the foreign party’s required certificate of legal capacity to
marry.86 Lastly, there was no proof of payment of the solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge
officiated.87
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage
certificates actually examined.88 However, the monthly report of cases showed that she solemnized three hundred five
(305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007.89 The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her
court started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.90
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents such as the marriage
license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. 91 In several instances, only affidavits
were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry. 92
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity of the required
documents particularly the marriage license.93 The judicial audit team found numerous erasures and superimpositions on
entries with regard to the parties’ place of residence.94
In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December
2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a
handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it.95
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the marriage
requirements’ authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the given address
of the parties.96 These irregularities were evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who
were married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan,
Cebu City." However, there was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage certificate showing that
Secuya’s address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City."97
Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to 2007 based on the marriage
certificates examined by the judicial audit team.98 However, only three (3) marriages were reported for the same
period.99 Out of the 121 marriages the judge solemnized, fifty-two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family
Code.100 Thirty-eight
(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil registrar of Barili,
Cebu.101 Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from the local civil registrar of Liloan, Cebu. 102 Nine (9) or 13.64% were from
other local civil registrars.103
There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications for marriage license,
certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage,
joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132)
marriages, with no corresponding marriage certificates.104 He solemnized two marriages of Buddy Gayland Weaver, an
American citizen, to two different persons within nine (9) months.105 No copy of the required certificate of legal capacity
to contract marriage or the divorce decree was presented.106
The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting documents such as the certificate
of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. 107 He solemnized nine (9) marriages under questionable
circumstances such as the submission of an affidavit or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of legal
capacity to marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as appearing in the marriage documents,
and the solemnization of the marriage on the same day the marriage license was issued. 108
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the solemnization fee of ₱300 was paid. 109 On
the other hand, there were twenty-six (26) marriages whose solemnization fees were paid late. 110
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples
were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures,
corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties’ place of residence. 111 These included indistinguishable
features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage
license.112 These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, 113the Court held that
inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in
Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo,114 defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a task expected of him and it is
gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding
official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing 115 or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on
different dates.116 The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application
process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did
not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere
affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article
21 of the Family Code117 displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing
the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the
qualifications of parties to contract marriage.118
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the
Family Code119 with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such
as the minority status of one party.120 The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages
ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint
affidavit of cohabitation.121 These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself. 122
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples where no marriage
license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on the same day
the marriage was solemnized.123

The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage
license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that
point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license
disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen,124 this Court held that:
…the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly
issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to
ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas,125 that "the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."
The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the
issuance.

It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the certificate from the embassy of
the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the judges should have been more diligent in
reviewing the parties’ documents and qualifications. As noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates coupled
with the presence of mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage license issuance.
The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party.
Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. 126 Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a
general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed.127

The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of
the Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. 128 The parties should have been capacitated to marry
each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage. 129
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family Code provides the requisites
for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. 130 The actions of the judges have raised a
very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the proper procedure
or check the required documents and qualifications.

In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano,131 the Court said that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void and
the subsequent issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the marriage. It is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage
without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are sworn to apply,
more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. It is not too much
to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.132

It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered Celerina Plaza, a personal
employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of Justice and offer services. 133 Crisanto Dela Cerna also stated
in his affidavit that Judge Tormis instructed him to get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house when she
found out about the judicial audit.134 In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the solemnization of marriages
not as a duty but as a business.135 The respondent judge was suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for
repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant a copy of her comment. She was also fined
the amount of five thousand pesos (₱5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374 RTC.136 She was reprimanded
twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-001337.137

Finally, in the very recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S.
Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated last 12 March 2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross inefficiency,
violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars and gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was dismissed
from service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2138 and 6139 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity
and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of
incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of
integrity."140 In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to
office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more
importantly of justice.141

The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following employees:
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty of grave
misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can facilitate the marriage and the
requirements on the same day of the lawyer’s visit.142

What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of ₱3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on
any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Mongaya’s claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other offices as the usual
practice143 is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its Memorandum, "Monggaya deliberately gave false information for
the purpose of perpetrating an illegal scheme. This, in itself, constitutes grave misconduct." 144 Sec. 52, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense.

In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:

Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress from the
courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary. In performing
their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s trust and confidence in this institution.
Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if
only to maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary.145
Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court personnel. Her actions placed doubts on
the integrity of the courts.
Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Cebu City, is guilty
of gross misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and demanded and accepted ₱4,000 from
them.146 The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA
and adopted by this Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to
indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.147 The claim that she gave the amount to a certain Borces who was allegedly the
real facilitator belies her participation in facilitating the marriage.
According to the OCA, when the couple went back for their marriage certificate, they approached Rodriguez and not
Borces.148 When Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage certificate had been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed
Sebial to fill up another marriage certificate.149
This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, merits a grave penalty.150 Such penalty can be dismissal from service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with
the required affidavit of cohabitation.151 On the other hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said
affidavit which according to Alesna costs ₱10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount involved in the transaction is
minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives the public the wrong impression that court personnel are making money
out of judicial transactions.152
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo153 that acts of court personnel outside their official functions constitute
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts violate what is prescribed for court personnel. The
purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia, Stenographer III of Branch 18, RTC,
Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted to the audit team that they
received food from couples they assisted.154

This is in violation of Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel
from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in
actions or proceedings with the Judiciary.
As recommended by the OCA, they are admonished considering that this is their first offense and the tips were of
minimal value. In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this Court held that commission of an administrative offense for the first
time is an extenuating circumstance.155
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA reports that Corazon Retuya
admitted initially that she received ₱5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary Grace Gabiana to secure necessary
documents.156 The information was volunteered by Corazon Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple.
However, she denies this fact later on in her Comment.157 Finding the earlier statement of Corazon Retuya as unclear and
lacking support from evidence, the Court adopts the findings of the OCA and decides to give her the benefit of the doubt.

The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabañez. Cabañez was only implicated in
this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who attested that they paid a certain "Meloy" ₱1,200
for the wedding under Article 34 of the Family through the assistance of Cabañez. 158
Cabañez denies that she was the one who assisted the couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the
personal assistant of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname "Meloy" not from Cabañez herself but
from Baguio-Manera’s younger sister.159 When Baguio-Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she did not
obtain confirmation that the said "Meloy" is Cabañez. The Court adopts the findings of the OCA that there is lack of
positive identification of Cabañez and finds merit in her denial. 160

The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg.
The judge was only implicated through the statement of Process Server Antonio Flores about an "alleged sinking fund".
No evidence was presented as to the collection of an excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge
Econg or her staff had knowledge of such fund.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:

1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would have been DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and disqualified
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation,
had she not been previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-
MTCC);
4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of violating
Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing
Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6)
months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma Valencia,
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that they
be ADMONISHED with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;

The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City;
Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and Marilou Cabañez,
Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna,
should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings against the
judge.

The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the Supplemental Report dated 14
August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation with respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez, Civil
Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones, Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage
licenses and to take the necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents’ files that are with the Office of the Bar Confidant and
distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
 EN BANC
[ A.M. No. RTJ-20-2582 (Formerly A.M. No. 20-06-74-RTC). August 16, 2022 ]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. PRESIDING JUDGE HERMES B.
MONTERO, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT ATTY. MA. GAY A. ERNI- PUENTENEGRA; AND PROCESS SERVER
ANNABELLE U. RODRIGUEZ, ALL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TOLEDO CITY, CEBU, BRANCH 59,
RESPONDENTS.

PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter arose from the findings of two (2) judicial audits conducted by the complainant Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59 (RTC Toledo Br. 59), where Presiding Judge Hermes
B. Montero (Judge Montero), Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Ma. Gay A. Erni-Puentenegra (Atty. Erni-Puentenegra), [1] and Process
Server Annabelle U. Rodriguez (Rodriguez; collectively referred to as respondents) are stationed. The first judicial audit was
conducted on July 9-11, 13, 2018 pursuant to Travel Order No. 88-2018 dated June 27, 2018; while the second judicial audit was held
on May 23 to June 1, 2019 pursuant to Travel Order No. 75-2019 dated May 17, 2019.[2]

The Facts
Due to the unconfirmed reports from Cebu City that RTC Toledo Br. 59 is regarded as "friendly" to the patties of annulment of
marriage/declaration of void marriage cases, the first judicial audit was conducted therein. [3] As a result thereof, various irregularities
were discovered, leading the OCA to direct the respondents to show cause as to why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them, as follows:

(a) As against Judge Montero, for his procedural infractions in cases involving annulment of marriages and/or declaration of nullity of
marriages, namely: (1) failure of trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respective respondent in those cases; (2)
absence of returns on summonses; (3) grant of motions to take the depositions of the plaintiff prior to the receipt of the notice of
appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General; (4) absence of an order directing the public prosecutor to investigate whether there
was collusion between the parties; and (5) the absence of the collusion report. In addition, Judge Montero was directed to take
appropriate action in thirty seven (37) criminal cases and one (1) civil case where no action was taken since they were raffled to RTC
Toledo Br. 59; twelve (12) criminal cases without further action for a considerable length of time; twenty-nine (29) pending motions in
criminal cases and seven (7) in civil cases; and eighteen (18) civil cases already submitted for decision. [4]
(b) As against Atty. Erni-Puentenegra, for her procedural infractions in the aforementioned cases involving annulment of marriages
and/or declaration of nullity of marriages. She was likewise directed to: (l) promptly apprise Judge Montero of the cases that require
immediate action, including those with pending motions or incidents, and the cases submitted for decision; and (2) to take appropriate
action on the mismanagement of various case records, including, among others, the stitching of all records/folders. [5]
(c) As against Rodriguez, for immediately availing of substituted service of summons, and merely making general statements in her
returns without indicating the various circumstances justifying a resort to substituted service. She was likewise directed to show proof
of her travel to serve the summonses in seven (7) other cases.[6]
Complying with the aforementioned directive, Judge Montero wrote letters dated February 28, 2019 [7] and March 18, 2019[8] where he
admitted having committed procedural lapses. However, he reasoned that due to his heavy caseload, he merely relied on the returns of
the summonses and failed to monitor its validity. Further, he was not aware of any procedural lapses because the judicial audit team
did not call his attention thereto. He stated that he immediately complied with all the directives of the OCA after receipt of the
Memorandum, and cured the procedural defects raised therein.[9]
For her part, Atty. Erni-Puentenegra wrote a letter[10] dated February 18, 2019 explaining that: (a) summonses were personally served
by the sheriff, and the service through publication was availed of only when personal service was unsuccessful; (b) annulment of
marriage cases were only set for pre-trial once all of the documents were on hand, and the delays in the belated attachment of the
registry receipts to the records were due to lack of manpower; and (c) she complied with the requests of the OCA, including the
transmittal of summons and copy of the petition when the address of the respondents is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
[11]

Finally, Rodriguez sent a letter[12] dated September 10, 2019, explaining that she had been with the RTC Toledo Br. 59 since
July 21, 1994 as a Utility Worker. While she was officially promoted to the position of Process Server only on March 1, 2020, she had
already performing functions related to such position as early as November 2, 2016, after Sheriff Melvin Destura (Sheriff Destura)
retired from service, and that it was Sheriff Destura who served the summons by publication in the questioned case, and she merely
continued that practice. [13] As regards the proof of travel, Ms. Rodriguez complied by attaching the copy of her flight tickets. Notably,
either no boarding pass was attached or if a copy was attached, no details as to the name of the guest, place of departure, flight
number, date and time of the boarding, were included.[14]
Meanwhile, the OCA conducted the second judicial audit, which uncovered further irregularities in Judge Montero's performance
of his duties, particularly: (a) his failure to require the accused in at least 141 decided drug cases to undergo the required drug
dependency examination under A.M. 18- 03-16-SC [15] before the rendition of decisions therein; and (b) his continued failure to act on
cases pending before his sala. Thus, the OCA again directed him to show cause as to why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him.[16]
In his defense, Judge Montero explained in his letter[17] dated September 2, 2019 that there is only one accredited drug
rehabilitation center in Cebu City, and the delay in the release of the drug dependency examination results as reported by the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology personnel would have made the accused to serve their sentence.
As such, only when the accused is charged with a violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 would he require the
accused to undergo drug testing. On the other hand, for those who are not subject of probation, he would issue warrants of arrest for
the service of their sentence.[18]

Further, in a Joint Affidavit [19] of Judge Montero, along with the public prosecutors assigned to RTC Toledo City Br. 59, the public
prosecutors manifested that they were aware of the absence of the drug dependency examination requirement under the plea
bargaining framework of drugs cases, however, such omission was not fatal since the convicted prisoners who applied for probation
were required to undergo drug testing by the Parole and Probation Office. The affidavit submitted by the public attorneys assigned to
the subject court substantially echoed the same statement.[20]

The OCA Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum[21] dated February 20, 2020, the OCA recommended that respondents be found administratively' liable, and
consequently, penalized as follows: (a) as for Judge Montero, that he be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, due to his willful
disregard of the law and his undue delay in rendering decisions and resolving motions.
While he should be dismissed from service, the OCA noted that since Judge Montero opted to retire from service effective November
1, 2019, such penalty of dismissal could no longer be imposed on him; and hence, he is instead meted with the accessory penalties of
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any public
agency, including government-owned or controlled corporation; (b) as for Atty. Erni Puentenegra, that she be found guilty of simple
neglect of duty and be fined in the amount of P262,671.00 to be paid within thirty (30) days from finality of the resolution of her
administrative case; and (c) as for Rodriguez, that she be found guilty of neglect of duty and be suspended from office for a period of
six (6) months, without salary and allowances, and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall warrant a more
severe penalty.[22]

In so recommending, the OCA found that Judge Montero blatantly violated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[23] when he repeatedly proceeded
with the hearing of different cases involving annulment of marriage/declaration of nullity of marriages despite: (a) failing to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of therein respondents (17 instances); (b) not having the required collusion report (13 instances); and/or
(c) the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) not being able to submit its Notice of Appearance yet (six [6] instances). Furthermore,
the OCA also found that Judge Montero blatantly disregarded A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC when he decided numerous drug cases without
directing therein accused the required drug dependency examination (five [5] instances). Finally, the OCA pointed out that Judge
Montero failed to resolve various cases and incidents pending before his sala within the reglementary period provided under prevailing
laws and rules (two [2] instances), thereby violating Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. As such, the OCA concluded
that the totality of Judge Montero's acts constitutes the offense of gross ignorance of the law for which he should be meted with the
ultimate penalty of dismissal from service. However, in light of his supervening optional retirement during the pendency of the instant
proceedings, the OCA recommended that in lieu of dismissal, Judge Montero should be meted with the accessory penalties of
dismissal as enumerated above.[24]

As to Atty. Erni-Puentenegra, the OCA found that she abjectly failed to monitor the returns of summonses, especially in cases
involving annulment of marriage/declaration of -nullity of marriages; to indorse summonses to the proper office of the clerk of court
having territorial jurisdiction over the respondents in said cases; and to object to Rodriguez' acts of serving summonses outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of RTC Toledo Br. 59. Furthermore, the OCA found that she allowed the aforementioned cases to proceed even
before: (a) the RTC Toledo Br. 59 acquired jurisdiction over therein respondents due to defective service of summonses; (b) the OSG
files its Notice of Appearance; and (c) the submission of the collusion reports in cases where no answer was received from therein
respondents. According to the OCA, Atty. Erni-Puentenegra's failure to exercise due diligence in the performance of her administrative
functions constitutes simple neglect of duty for which she should be meted with the penalty of suspension. However, in light of Atty.
Emi Puentenegra's supervening separation from the Judiciary due to her appointment as City Prosecutor of Toledo City, Cebu on
August 29, 2019, the OCA recommended that she be meted instead with a penalty of a fine in the amount of P262,671.00, representing
her salary in the Judiciary for three (3) months.[25]

Finally, the OCA also found that Rodriguez committed acts constituting simple neglect of duty. Particularly, those acts pertain to
Rodriguez' irregularities in the performance of her duties as process server when she: (a) immediately availed of substituted service
without first complying with the requisites in order to resort to the same; and (b) served summonses even outside the territorial
jurisdiction of RTC Toledo Br. 59. As such, the OCA recommended that Rodriguez be suspended for a period of six (6) months.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether respondents should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the findings of the OCA with certain modifications, as will be explained below.
I.
At the outset, it is important to note that on February 22, 2022, the Court En Banc unanimously approved A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC,
entitled "Further Amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court." On April 3, 2022, the publication requirement thereof had already
been complied with;[27] hence, Rule 140, as further amended is already effective.

In this relation, Section 24 of Rule 140, as further amended explicitly provides that it will apply to all pending and future
administrative disciplina1y cases involving Members, officials, employees, and personnel of the Judiciary, to wit:

SECTION 24. Retroactive Effect. - All the foregoing provisions shall be applied to all pending and future administrative cases
involving the discipline of Members, officials, employees, and personnel of the Judiciary, without prejudice to the internal rules of
the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the Supreme Court insofar as complaints against Members of the Supreme Court are
concerned. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, the Court shall resolve this case under the framework of Rule 140, as further amended.

II-A.
At this juncture, it bears pointing out that during the pendency of this case, Judge Montero applied for and was granted optional
retirement effective November 1, 2019.[28] This, however, will not preclude the Court from determining his administrative liability,
pursuant to Section 2 (2) of Rule 140, as further amended, which provides that "once disciplinary proceedings have already been
instituted, the respondent's supervening retirement or separation from service shall not preclude or affect the continuation of the same
xxx." In this regard, case law instructs that "for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must
be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an administrative case is
predicated on the holding of a position or office in the government service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not
lost by the mere fact that the public official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case." [29] As such, the
Court shall now proceed with the determination of Judge Montero's administrative liability.

"[The] conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law. Judges are the visible representations of law and justice, from whom the people draw the will and inclination to
obey the law. They are expected to be circumspect in the performance of their tasks, for it is their duty to administer justice in a way
that inspires confidence in the integrity of the justice system. Judges should exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with the statutes
and procedural rules, and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence. For, a judge who is
plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested in him." [30] Thus, a judge who disregards basic rules and
settled jurisprudence may be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure. In Philippine National
Construction Corporation v. Mupas, [31] the Court elucidated on this administrative offense as follows:
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge may also be administratively liable if
shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law
and jurisprudence. Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, the same applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. x x x
Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, failure to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. A judge is presumed to have acted with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial
functions. But a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars
enjoining their strict compliance, upends this presumption and subjects the magistrate to corresponding administrative
sanctions.

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official
duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty,
hatred, or some other like motive. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. Thus, unfamiliarity
with the rules is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hand. When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, he betrays the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges
owe it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence, they are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes
and procedural rules; they must know them by heart. When the inefficiency springs from a failure to recognize such a basic and
elemental rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent undeserving of the
position and the prestigious title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in had faith,
and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both cases, the judge's dismissal will be in order.[32] (emphases and underscoring
supplied)

As the OCA aptly found, Judge Montero exhibited a blatant and repeated disregard of even the most elementary rules of procedure in
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages cases, as well as drugs cases. Particularly, insofar as annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages cases are concerned, Judge Montero proceeded with the hearings thereof despite the presence of glaring,. if not
fatal, irregularities, such as failing to acquire jurisdiction over the person of therein respondents due to improper service of
summonses, not having the required collusion report, and not waiting for the Notice of Appearance of the OSG. In this regard, the
OCA is correct in giving scant consideration to Judge Montero's defense that he merely relied on the report of his staff regarding the
validity of the service of summonses, considering that as a magistrate, he is expected to have a strong grasp and understanding of the
law and rules of procedure, and he cannot pass the determination of the validity of summonses to rank-and-file personnel who are not
legal experts.[33] On the other hand, insofar as drugs cases are concerned, records show that Judge Montero would resolve such cases
even without making therein accused undergo the required drug dependency examination.

Verily, Judge Montero's repeated breaches of the express provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC are so
glaring, egregious, and thoughtless, and hence, are already tantamount to bad faith and/or grave abuse of authority. As such, it is only
proper that he be found administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure under Section 14 (j) of Rule 140, as further
amended.

In addition to the foregoing, the OCA further noted that Judge Montero should be found administratively liable for Undue Delay in
Rendering an Order, pointing out that: (a) in SPCA-T-06, the motion for the issuance of writ of possession, which was received by the
RTC Toledo Br. 59 on July 16, 2014, remains unresolved despite the Order dated May 4, 2015 setting the case for possible settlement;
and (b) Civil Case No. T-2553, an appealed case for ejectment is still unresolved despite the filing of the memorandum for the
defendant-appellant therein on April 16, 2019.[34] While the Court agrees with the OCA's findings in this regard, it must be noted that
under Rule 140, as further amended, the administrative offense of "Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision or Order, or in Transmitting
the Records of the Case" has already been subsumed, either under "Gross neglect of duty in the performance or non-performance of
official functions" under Section 14 (d), or "Simple neglect of duty in the performance or non-performance of official functions" under
Section 15 (b), depending on the seriousness thereof pursuant to case law on gross and simple neglect of duty.

In this relation, case law instructs that "[s]imple neglect of duty is defined as 'the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of
an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference.' However, when an employee's negligence displays want of even the
slightest care or conscious indifference to the consequences or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty, the omission is regarded as
gross neglect of duty. More precisely, there is gross neglect of duty when a public official or employee's negligence is characterized by
the glaring want of care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently, but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected." [35]

Given the foregoing jurisprudential definitions of the types of neglect of duty, and further considering that: (a) the aforementioned
incident and case has already been pending for years; and (b) Section 15 (1), Article VIII[36] of the 1987 Constitution only gives him
three (3) months to resolve the same, the Court finds Judge Montero also liable for gross neglect of duty in the performance or non-
performance of official functions under Section 14 (d) of the Rules.
11-B.

Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel[37] mandates that "[c]ourt personnel shall at all times perform official
duties properly x x x." Proper performance of duty includes compliance with the rules issued by this Court. Noncompliance or
violation constitutes negligence in the performance of duties.

As correctly recommended by the OCA, Atty. Erni-Puentenegra and Rodriguez should be found liable for "simple neglect of duty in
the performance or non-performance of official functions" under Section 15 (b) of Rule 140, as fu1iher amended for their failure to
comply with the existing rules on service of summons and the proper performance of their court functions as Branch Clerk of Court
and Process Server, respectively.

The Branch Clerk of Court is the administrative officer of the court and has control and supervision over the branch. [38] As correctly
observed by the OCA, "she is in charge with the efficient recording, filing[,] and management of court records, besides having
administrative supervision over court personnel. Having administrative supervision over the sheriff and the process server, Atty.
Erni-Puentenegra has the responsibility to monitor compliance with the rules and regulations governing the performance of their
respective duties."[39]
Clearly, Atty. Erni-Puentenegra failed to give proper attention to a task expected of her and was remiss in her duties as a Branch Clerk
of Court, i.e., failure to monitor returns of summonses, her oversight in the indorsement of summonses to proper office of the clerk of
court having territorial jurisdiction over the respondents, and not flagging Judge Montero about the defective summonses, and absence
of collusion reports and notice of appearance of the OSG. Nevertheless, her act did not exhibit the want of slightest care or willfulness
that would make her liable for gross neglect. Rather, it was the result of her carelessness. At this point, it must be stressed that the fact
of Atty. Erni-Puentenegra's supervening separation from the Judiciary due to her appointment as City Prosecutor of Toledo City, Cebu
on August 29, 2019[40] will not operate to moot the instant administrative disciplinary proceedings against her, in accordance with
Section 2 (2) of Rule 140, as further amended as already discussed above.

Finally, as to Rodriguez, case law instructs that a process server "serves court processes such as subpoena, subpoena duces
tecum, summons, court order and notices; prepares and submits returns of service of court process; monitors messages and/or
delivers court mail matters received and dispatched by him; and performs such other duties as may be assigned to him." [41] Thus, case
law instructs that a process server who is unable to serve mail matters should be found guilty of simple neglect of duty for failing "to
give proper attention to a required task."[42] — such as what Rodriguez did here. Verily, Rodriguez' defense that she only followed the
practice of former Sheriff Destura cannot be given any credence as the violation or non-observance of laws and rules shall not be
excused by disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary.[43]

III
Since the respective administrative liabilities of respondents had already been established by substantial evidence — or "that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion" [44] — the Court now goes to the proper
imposable penalties on them.

As to Judge Montero, he is found liable for the administrative offenses of"gross ignorance of the law or procedure" and "gross neglect
of duty in the performance or non-performance of official functions," both are serious charges under the Rules [45] punishable by any of
the following sanctions: (a) dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Supreme Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (b) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than six (6) months but not exceeding one (1) year; or (c) a fine of more than
P100,000.00 but not exceeding P200,000.00.[46] Furthermore, since Judge Montero is found liable for more than one (1) offense
arising from separate acts or omissions in a single administrative proceeding, the Court shall impose on him separate penalties for
each offense.[47]

Finally, Section 18 of Rule 140, as further amended provides that if the respondent is found liable for an offense which merits the
imposition of dismissal from the service but the same can no longer be imposed due to the respondent's supervening separation from
service except of death, he or she may be meted with the following penalties in lieu of dismissal: (a) forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Supreme Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, except for accrued leave credits; and/or (b) a fine in the amount of more than
P100,000.00 but not exceeding P200,000.00.
In view of the foregoing, and further considering that the penalty of dismissal from service could no longer be imposed on
Judge Montero due to his supervening optional retirement, the Court penalizes him as follows: (a) for "gross ignorance of the law or
procedure," he is meted out with the penalties of forfeiture of all the retirement and other benefits due him, except accrued leave
credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations, plus a fine in the amount of P200,000.00; and (b) for "gross neglect of duty in the performance or non-performance of
official functions," he is meted out with the penalty of a fine, also in the amount of P200,000.00.

As for Atty. Erni-Puentenegra and Rodriguez, they are equally found liable for the administrative offense of "simple neglect of duty in
the performance or non-performance of official functions," which is a less serious charge under the Rules [48] punishable by either: (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months; or (b) a fine of
more than P35,000.00 but not exceeding P100,000.00.[49] Since Atty. Erni-Puentenegra has already separated from the Judiciary and
hence, can no longer be suspended, she is meted out with a fine in the amount of P100,000.00. On the other hand, Rodriguez is meted
out with a penalty of suspension from office without salary and other benefits for a period of six (6) months, as recommended by the
OCA.
As a final note, it must be emphasized that "those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best
possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of
public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. In this light, the Court will
not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus
tainting its image in the eyes of the public,"[50] as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:

1. Respondent Judge Hermes B. Montero, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, is GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure, and accordingly, is meted with the penalties
of FORFEITURE of all the retirement and other benefits due him, except accrued leave credits,
and DISQUALIFICATION from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -
controlled corporations, plus a FINE in the amount of P200,000.00. He is also found GUILTY of Gross Neglect of Duty
in the Performance or Non Performance of Official Functions, and accordingly, is meted out with the penalty of a FINE in
the amount of P200,000.00;
2. Respondent Atty. Ma. Gay A. Erni-Puentenegra, then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, is GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty in the Performance or Non-Performance of Official Duties,
and accordingly, is meted out with the penalty of a FINE in the amount of P100,000.00; and
3. Respondent Annabelle U. Rodriguez, Process Server of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59
is GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty in the Performance or Non-Performance of Official Duties and accordingly, is
meted out with the penalty of SUSPENSION from office without salary and other benefits for a period of six (6) months.

SO ORDERED.