IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 12, NO.
1, JANUARY 2021
Distributed Observer-Based Finite-Time Control of
AC Microgrid Under Attack
Rentao Lu , Jie Wang , and Ziqiang Wang
Abstract—In this article, a novel distributed observer-based
finite-time control scheme is proposed to improve the resilience
of islanded AC microgrids under attack. Existing research on
microgrids under attack mainly focuses on detection technology
and attenuation technology, but rarely considers the key indicator
of convergence speed. The proposed control strategy can accel-
erate the convergence process of microgrids under attacks. The
designed controller can converge the frequencies and voltages of
the attacked microgrid to the reference values within a finite time,
while achieving accurate power sharing. The proposed strategy
has an improved performance compared with the conventional
control methods against attack by applying finite-time theory.
The effectiveness of the control in case of different types of
attack is verified by the simulation of an islanded AC microgrid
in MATLAB/Simulink.
Index Terms—Distributed observer-based finite-time control,
secondary control, frequency stability, AC microgrid, attack.
I. I NTRODUCTION
ECAUSE the power system vigorously promotes energy
B transition, the proportion of renewable energy has
increased rapidly in recent years. Microgrid gains much atten-
tion as it expedites the integration of renewable energy sources
with high -efficiency, reliability, and scalability [1]. In the
microgrid, multiple distributed generations (DGs) operate in
parallel to supply power for loads to enhance the reliabil-
ity and capacity of power supply. Therefore, ensuring proper
power sharing among all DGs and maintaining frequency and
voltage stability are prerequisites for stable operation of the
microgrid [2]. To achieve proper coordination and improve
efficiency of microgrid, many control strategies are proposed
to optimize microgrid performance [3].
Traditional centralized control utilizes the Microgrid Central
Controller (MGCC) to collect information and solve the
optimal value, then send the reference command to the local
controller [4]. Decentralized control relies on local information
to make decisions and obtain control instructions [5].
Distributed control realizes global observation and control by
exchanging information among neighboring units, combining
Manuscript received December 26, 2019; revised May 1, 2020 and July
20, 2020; accepted August 11, 2020. Date of publication August 19, 2020;
date of current version December 21, 2020. Paper no. TSG-01925-2019.
(Corresponding author: Jie Wang.)
The authors are with the School of Electronic, Information and Electrical
Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China (e-mail:
jiewangxh@sjtu.edu.cn).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this article are available
online at https://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TSG.2020.3017793
1949-3053 
c 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See https://www.ieee.org/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
157
the advantages of the first two controls and overcome their
shortcomings. Consequently, network-based distributed control
is widely implemented in islanded microgrids [6]–[8]. Recently,
multi-agent systems (MAS) based distributed consensus control
methods have become increasingly popular and many related
methods have been proposed [9]–[12]. Through the information
exchange among neighbor agents which depends on the com-
munication topology, the parameters of all agents will converge
to their reference values by consensus control. Some issues,
such as switching topology [12], communication delay [13],
noise-resilient [14], and battery energy storage system [15],
which affect the stability of microgrid, are well addressed in
corresponding distributed control strategy. Moreover, finite-
time theory has been implemented in consensus control to
accelerate synchronization process.
Recently, many distributed finite-time control methods
have been proposed to improve the control performance of
microgrid [16]–[24]. In [16], a finite-time consensus proto-
col under switching topology is proposed to guarantee the
convergence of frequency and voltage in a finite time. A dis-
tributed finite-time convergence algorithm based on feedback
linearization theory for restoration of frequency and voltage
is proposed in [17]. The average voltage regulation and cur-
rent sharing are studied in [18] and developed a finite-time
control scheme with reduced transient overshoot and chat-
tering. However, the coupling effect of current sharing and
voltage regulation is not discussed in the theoretical analysis.
In order to eliminate the coupling effect, a finite-time sec-
ondary control scheme which consists of four separate control
loops is proposed in [19]. A robust finite-time controller is
designed in [20] which irrespective of parameters uncertain-
ties, unmodeled dynamics, and disturbances. Moreover, a con-
sensus control architecture for heterogeneous battery energy
storage systems is presented in [21], where frequency/voltage
convergence and active/reactive power sharing in a finite
time period. The distributed energy storage system (DESS)
is utilized in [22] to enhance the resilience of microgrid and
ensuring finite-time convergence. Furthermore, for additional
application scenarios including low voltage microgrid [23] and
autonomous microgrid [24], corresponding finite-time control
methods have been proposed respectively.
Although distributed finite-time control has been widely
used in microgrids, there is no relevant finite-time control
method for the vulnerability of microgrid to attack caused
by distributed control. Existing research on microgrid attacks
can be divided into two classes. The first class focuses on
attack detection technologies. For example, a signal temporal
 158
logic (STL) detection algorithm is presented in [25], which
can identify two major types of cyber-attacks. In [26], the
attacked agent(s) can be accurately identified by a novel
cooperative vulnerability factor (CVF) framework. False-
data injection attacks (FDIAs) can be detected by com-
paring the candidate invariants and the actual invariants
in [27]. The second class is to strengthen the resilience of
microgrid to attacks and it can be achieved by secure con-
trol design or enhanced communication architecture. In [28],
a software-defined networking (SDN)-based network archi-
tecture is proposed to improve the resilience and security of
microgrid operations against cyber-attacks. It is shown in [29]
that designing a recursive systematic convolutional (RSC) code
and Kalman Filter (KF) based method is effective to eliminate
the effect of attacks. An observer-based controller with confi-
dence factors and trust factors is proposed for synchronization
of microgrid in [30]. Due to the lack of distributed finite-time
control considering attacks, this article proposes an observer-
based finite-time controller based on the observer proposed
in [30]. The designed controller can converge the frequencies
and voltages of DGs in finite time and achieve accurate power
sharing after the microgrid is attacked. Moreover, the effect of
attacks can be limited in the attacked agent(s) without spread-
ing in the communication network by the designed controller.
The stability and resilience of islanded AC microgrids can
been greatly enhanced by the proposed controller.
The main contributions in this article can be summarized as
follows.
1) A distributed observer-based finite-time control strategy
against attack is proposed to provide a reliable control frame-
work for islanded AC microgrid, where the frequency and
voltage of islanded AC microgrid under attack can converge
within settling finite time.
2) An improved attack detection and localization method
is proposed based on the confidence factor and trust factor
in [30], which can eliminate the defect of indistinguishability
between attacks and real disturbances.
3) Unlike existing finite-time control methods, this article
considers the vulnerability of distributed control to malicious
attacks and developed an observer-based finite-time control
based on the observer introduced from [30].
4) In comparison with conventional attack attenuation meth-
ods and detection methods, the proposed method has fast
convergence speed and shows a superior performance for
a stealthy attack.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section II
provides preliminaries of graph theory and corresponding
mathematical lemmas. In Section III, a cooperation control
of AC microgrids are discussed. The distributed observer-
based finite-time control scheme under attack is described in
Section IV. Digital simulation verification of the proposed con-
trol strategy performance is shown in Section V. Conclusions
are presented in Section VI.
II. P ROBLEM F ORMULATION
A. Preliminaries on Graph Theory
For a multi-agent system with N agents, the communication
network can be represented by graph G = (V, E, A), where
Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 12, NO. 1, JANUARY 2021
V = {v1 , v2 , . . . , vN } represents the set of nodes in graph G,
that is the collection of all agents; E ⊆ V × V represents
the collection of edges in graph G, that is the collection of
communication paths between agents, and A = {aij }n×n is the
non-negative weighted adjacency matrix of graph which repre-
sent the weight of communication lines between agents. Define
the edges of node vj to node vi as: (vj , vi ), which represent
node vj can receive information from node vi , aij is the weight
of edge (vj , vi ), aij > 0 if (vj , vi ) ∈ E, otherwise aij = 0. For all
nodes vi in this article, we have aii = 0. Node vi is called the
neighbor of node vj if (vj , vi ) ∈ E. The set of neighbors of the
node vi is given by Ni = {j|(vj , vi ) ∈ E}. The Laplace matrix of
the oriented graph G can be represented as L = D − A, where
 matrix is defined as D = diag{d1 , d2 , . . . , dN } with
the degree
di = j∈Ni aij . Moreover, because some nodes can be con-
nected to a virtual leader node by unidirectional edges, define
the pinning gain matrix as A = diag{ai0 }, where ai0 > 0 if
follower node vi is connected to the leader node across the
communication link (vj0 , vi ), otherwise ai0 = 0.
B. Corresponding Mathematical Lemmas
Lemma 1 [31]: Consider a double integrator system
ẋi (t) = yi (t) (1)
ẏi (t) = Aui (t) (2)
where A is a positive-definite matrix. To make the system glob-
ally asymptotically stable in a finite time, the control input is
designed as
ui (t) = −k1 sig(xi )α − k2 sig(yi )β (3)
where k1 , k2 > 1, sig(·)α = sign(·)| · |α , 0 < α < 1, β = 1+α 2α
,
the state variable xi (t) will achieve converge to the initial state
in a finite settling time under the designed control input.
Lemma 2 [32]: For continuous control system ẋ = f (x, t),
where f (0, t) = 0, if there is a function V(t) satisfy:
1) V(t) is positive definite and differentiable in the neigh-
borhood of the origin;
2) Existing real numbers c > 0 and 0 < d < 1 such that
V̇(t) + cV d (t) ≤ 0 (4)
V 1−d (t
0)
Let T ≤ c(1−d) . One has

limt→T V(t) = 0
(5)
V(t) = 0, ∀t ≥ T
(t0 )
1−d
i.e., V(t) reaches zero within finite time T ≤ Vc(1−d) .
Assumption 1 [30]: The communication link of each DG is
at least (2z + 1), where z is the number of attacked neighbors,
which means at least half of the information received by any
DG is intact.
Assumption 2: The attacker is assumed not to generate
a switch command to the executor, which is used to ensure
exist device to execute control command.
C. Cooperative Control of AC Microgrids
Consider an islanded AC microgrid with multiple distributed
generation resources, the block diagram is depicted in Fig. 1.
 LU et al.: DISTRIBUTED OBSERVER-BASED FINITE-TIME CONTROL OF AC MICROGRID UNDER ATTACK
Fig. 1. The block diagram of an inverter-based AC microgrid.
Hierarchical control scheme is implemented in the microgrid
to alleviate system performance.
In this article, DGs in the microgrid adopt SPWM modula-
tion mode, and the output voltage often has a large harmonic
component. The LC filter is used to filter out the harmonic
components and the stable voltage output is obtained by setting
the filter parameters reasonably. The inverter adopts double-
loop control, which is composed of outer-loop voltage control
and inner-loop current control. The output of the outer-loop
voltage control is used as the input reference signal of the
inner-loop current control. The outer-loop control has a longer
dynamic response, so the output voltage control is achieved
through a PI controller during the control process. In order to
speed up the response speed of the control system, the current
output by the filter inductor is used as the control variable of
the current inner loop controller. The primary droop control
uses ω − P and v − Q droop characteristics to keep system
voltage and frequency near nominal values.
The primary control which is based on droop technique is
given by
 B. Node Attack
ωi = ωni − mi Pi
(6)
Vi = Vni − ni Qi
where ωi and Vi are the output angular frequency and volt-
age magnitude of the ith DG, respectively; ωni and Vni are the
frequency and voltage amplitudes of the nominal set point,
respectively, which will be regulated by the secondary con-
trol; mi and ni are the droop coefficients of active power and
reactive power, respectively; Pi and Qi are the measured active
and reactive power, respectively.
Transform (6) into d-q reference frame form as
⎧ where xia is the injected false data of the ith DG, τi is the coef-
⎨ ωi = ωni − mi Pi
Viod = Vni − ni Qi (7)
⎩ oq
Vi = 0
oq
where Viod and Vi are the d-axis and q-axis output voltage
references, respectively.
The measured active and reactive power of DG i is given by
⎧ c  
⎨ Pi = ωc i V od I od + V oq I oq
ωi +s i i i i
c   (8)
⎩ Qi = ωc i V od I oq − V oq I od
ω +s i i
i
i i
where ωic
is the cutoff frequency of the low pass filter.
The design of secondary controller will be introduced in
Section IV.
Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
159
III. ATTACK M ODELS AND C OUNTERMEASURES
There are two main types of cyber-attacks in microgrids,
FDIA and DoS. FDIA produce adverse impact by injecting
false data to change the state variables of the attacked DG,
DoS destroy the stable operation of the system via interrupt-
ing data exchange between distributed controller by attacking
communication links. The DoS attack can be ignored because
the lack of certain information in the steady state has little
effect on the state of the observer. FDIA attacks are the main
objects in this article.
The AC microgrid is more susceptible to attacks that
become invisible due to communication restrictions between
DGs. The signals of attacks are mainly constant or arbi-
trary, and the arbitrary attack signal can be eliminated by
noise filtration techniques [33]. The constant signal attacks are
considered here, FDIA attacks are mainly divided into two
categories based on the consensus tracking protocol which are
studied in this article.
A. Link Attack
The link attack injects the false data into the transmission
data of the communication link, where the data receiving agent
of the communication link will receive the destroyed neighbor
information. The link attack applied on the communication
link between two agents which can be modeled by
yi = aij xi − xj + τj xja + ai0 xi − ωref (9)
j∈Ni
where xia is the injected false data of the ith DG, τi is the coef-
ficient of xia , where τi = 1 if there exists a false data injection,
otherwise τi = 0, yi is the measurements of ith DG.
The node attack directly injects the false data into the
agent and destroys the node information, the damaged node
information is sent to the neighbor node which thus causing
global instability. Attack on the controller can lead to entire
controller to be hijacked and this attack can be modeled by
 
yi = aij xi + τi xia − xj + τj xja
j∈Ni
 
+ ai0 xi + τi xia − ωref (10)
ficient of xia , where τi = 1 if there exists a false data injection,
otherwise τi = 0, yi is the measurements of ith DG.
It is clear that the system will reach different operating
states under different attacks. The information of each agents
will maintain a special deviation from the reference value
which represents the instability of the system. Accordingly,
the information of the neighbor node needs to be evaluated to
detect and locate the attack.
C. Detection/Localization Strategies
Distributed cooperative control is more prone to cyber-
attacks, the information exchange among distributed con-
trollers make the attack propagate across communication
 160
networks and lead to a network-wide instability. In order to
reduce adverse effects and prevent the propagate of attacks, an
improved attack detection and localization method is proposed
based on the confidence factor and trust factor in [30]. The
observer with confidence factors and trust factors is given by
 
x̂˙ i (t) = aij Cj (t)Tij (t) x̂i (t) − x̂j (t) + ai0 x̂i (t) − xref (11)
j∈Ni
where x̂i is the observation of DG i; xref is the reference value
of virtual leader node, Cj is the confidence factor, Tij is the
trust factor.
Remark 1: The distributed observer is designed to track the
reference information of the leader node, and the secondary
control can then be realized by using the local information
and the local estimation of the reference set point. The confi-
dence factor and trust factor are used to evaluate the fidelity
of the interactive information to achieve attack detection and
localization. The attack can be prevented from spreading
in the communication network by discarding the information
of the attacked node. The communication data is replaced from
the system information to the observations, the attack directly
acting on the system frequency or voltage is limited to the
attacked DG.
An attack detection and localization method is designed
based on the introduced observer and attack model. According
to the local neighborhood error define
x̂i (t) = xref (t) − x̂i (t)
 
bi (t) = hi aij x̂j (t) − x̂i (t)
j∈Ni
 
+ aij x̂j (t) + x̂i (t)
j∈Ni
where hi is a positive constant.
In the presence of attack, bi (t) will change from zero to
a positive value which can be used to detect the existence of
attacks. Therefore, we can check the value of bi (t) which pro-
vide essential information of attacks. Because of the presence
of attack, we have bi (t) = 0 for the attacked node and the
affected nodes.
Although attack detection is possible based on checking
the value of bi (t), locating the attack sources is crucial for
restoring microgrid to normal operations.
To achieve this goal, define
Ċi (t) = μdi (t) − μCi (t)
where μ > 0 is a weighing factor of Ci ; 0 ≤ Ci ≤ 1 with
σi
di (t) = (15)
σi + bi (t)
where σi is a set threshold for the confidence factor.
After attack occurs, bi σi for DG i which can be affected
by an attack. For a node attack, the value of Ci can be used
to locate the attack which can indicate the attacked node by
finding the minimum value of Ci , and the value of Ci depends
on the proximity of agent i to the attacked node.
For a link attack, the agent that receives information in
the communication link will obtain the damaged neighbor
Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 12, NO. 1, JANUARY 2021
information with false data injection. The agent needs to make
decisions based on the local information and neighbor agents
information to determine the destroyed data. The location of
attack cannot be detected only depending on the value of
confidence factor. Therefore, it is necessary to design a cor-
responding attack detection and localization method for the
information transmitted by the communication link.
To achieve this goal, define
ρij (t) = nxj (t) − xk (t) (16)
k∈Ni
where n is the number of neighbors of DG i.
During normal operation, ρij = 0 for all communication
links; in the presence of attack, DG i may receive false data by
the communication link from DG j which lead to ρij = 0. The
propagate of the attack in communication link may lead to
abnormal information of multiple agents. The proximity of
DG i to the attacked DG determine the magnitude of ρij , the
greater the magnitude of ρij , the more likely DG i is the attack
source or close to the attack.
εi
sij (t) = (17)
εi + ρij (t)
where εi is a threshold which is settled by considering
microgrid system.
ḟij (t) = χ sij (t) − χ fij (t) (18)
where X > 0 is a weighing factor of fij .
(12)
The trust factor of DG j for DG i is given by
 
Tij = max Ci (t), fij (t) (19)
(13) The trust factor of DG j for DG i is determined by ρij if
DG i is attacked. The greater the ρij , the more likely DG j is
the attacked node. Moreover, the information transmitted by
communication link from DG j to DG i would be discarded
once the trust value drops below the threshold i .
IV. D ESIGNING OF O BSERVER -BASED
F INITE -T IME C ONTROL
Based on the introduced observer, the design of secondary
controller can effectively prevent attack from spreading in the
network. However, the convergence speed of microgrid under
attack is important for the performance of controller, it is nec-
essary to speed up the stabilization process. In this section,
the observer-based finite-time control strategy is proposed to
(14) quickly converge the frequency and voltage of the microgrid
under attack, while achieving accurate power sharing.
A. Finite-Time Frequency and Active Power Control Design
To make the frequency converge to the reference value
in settling time after microgrid being attacked, a finite-time
observation control algorithm is developed as follow.
Based on the observer introduced above, the local tracking
error of frequency observation is given by
 
eω̂i (t) = aij Cj (t)Tij (t) ω̂i (t) − ω̂j (t) + ai0 ω̂i (t) − ωref
j∈Ni
(20)
 LU et al.: DISTRIBUTED OBSERVER-BASED FINITE-TIME CONTROL OF AC MICROGRID UNDER ATTACK 161

A double integrator system for synchronization error is e2ω̂i = aio ω̂i − ωref (30)
represented as j∈Ni

ėω̂i = kω̂i Hence it follows that
(21)
k̇ω̂i = uω̂i 1+α 1+α
V̇1 ≤ −(2λ) 2 V1 2 (31)
ωi = ė
where k ωi , the local error for k
ωi is given by
For 0 < α < 1 , by Lemma 2 [32], we have
ėω̂i (t) = aij Ċj (t)Ṫij (t) ω̂˙ i (t) − ω̂˙ j (t) + ai0 ω̂˙ i (t) (22)
2 1+α
j∈Ni
T1 ≤ 1+α
V1 (0) 2 (32)
From the Lemma 1 [31], considering the double integrator (2λ) (1 − α)
2

system (22) to achieve observation finite-time global stability, limt→T1 V1 (t) = 0
(33)
the control input is given by V1 (t) = 0, ∀t ≥ T1
 α  β
uω̂i = −cω1 sig eω̂i − cω2 sig ėω̂i (23) Then we obtain that V1 (t) converges to zero within finite
time T1 and e ωi = k ωi = 0, ∀t ≥ T1 , which means that the
where cω1 , cω2 > 1 is the controller gain, 0 < α < 1, β = 1+α
2α
. local neighbor tracking error would reduce to zero in settling
Theorem 1: The distributed finite-time controller (23) can time. Then the observations of all DGs can synchronize to
pin the observation of all DGs to the reference frequency ωref their reference ωref in finite time. This completes the proof.
asymptotically, the settling time T1 is shown in (32). The observations of all DGs have been regulated to converge
Proof: Rewrite the double integrator system (21) as to their reference frequency by the finite-time frequency obser-

ėω̂ = kω̂ vation controller (23). Then, a finite-time frequency control
(24)
k̇ω̂ = uω̂ = −cω1 sig(eω̂ )α − cω2 sig(kω̂ )β algorithm which based on the observation after stabilization is
developed as follow.
Take the Lyapunov function as
The frequency finite-time controller can be designed as:
1  λ
V1 = (eω̂ )T eω̂ (25) uωi (t) = −cω3 sig ωi (t) − ω̂i (t) (34)
2
It can be realized that where  ωi = ωref is a constant when t ≥ T1 ; c3 > 1 is the
 α  α
cω1 sig eω̂i = cω1 aij Cj (t)Tij (t)sig ω̂i (t) − ω̂j (t) controller gain; λ < 1 is the controller coefficient.
j∈Ni The frequency deviation generated by the primary control
β can be eliminated by the designed finite-time frequency con-
+ cω2 ai0 sig ω̂i (t) − ωref (26) troller (34). However, secondary frequency control may result
in the inability to accurately share active power. Therefore, it
Differentiating (25) yields
is necessary to ensure the accurate active power sharing while
V̇1 = (eω̂ )T ėω̂ achieving frequency stability:
⎛
N
 α mi Pi = mj Pj , ∀i, j (35)
= eω̂i ⎝cω1 aij Cj (t)Tij (t)sig ω̂i (t) − ω̂j (t)
i=1 j∈Ni where mi is the droop coefficient of active power.
⎞
 β To realize accurate active power sharing and fast stable
+ cω2 ai0 sig ω̂i (t) ⎠ (27) performance, the active power controller is designed as
 p
uPi (t) = −cPi aij sig mi Pi (t) − mj Pj (t) (36)
Following Lemma 2 [24] for an undirected network, (27) can
j∈Ni
be further written as
N
 1+α  1+β where cPi > 1 is the controller gain, 0 < p < 1.
1
V̇1 = − cω1 aij ω̂i − ω̂j  + 2cω2 ai0 ω̂i  Denotethe tracking error eωi = ωi −  ωi and ePi =
2 mi Pi − N1 N m P . For simplicity, the convergence of angular
i=1 i=1 i i
N N
  2  2 N
2  2 frequency tracking error eωi is discussed, and similar results
1
≤− cω1 aij 1+α ω̂i − ω̂j  − (cω2 ai0 ) 1+β ω̂i  can be obtained for the tracking error ePi .
2 Theorem 2: The distributed finite-time frequency con-
i=1 j=1 i=1
= −(e1ω̂ ) (L)e1ω̂ − 2(e2ω̂ ) (G)e2ω̂
T T troller (34) can pin the frequencies of all DGs to their
observation  ωi which is actually the reference frequency ωref
≤ −λ1 (L)(e1ω̂ )T e1ω̂ − 2λ2 (G)(e2ω̂ )T e2ω̂
1+α 1+β
when t ≥ T1 . The settling time Tω is shown in (40).
≤ − 2λ1 (L)V11
2
− 4λ2 (G)V12
2
(28) Proof: Differentiating eωi yields
 λ
where V1 is divided into two terms, V11 = (e1 ėωi = ω̇i − ω̂˙ i = ω̇i = uωi = −c3 sig ωi (t) − ω̂i (t) (37)
ωi ) e1
ωi , V1 =
T 2

(e2
ωi ) e2
T
ωi with Take the Lyapunov function as
 
e1ω̂i = aij ω̂i − ω̂j (29) 1 T
V2 (eω ) = e eω (38)
j∈Ni 2 ω
Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
 162 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 12, NO. 1, JANUARY 2021

Differentiating (41) yields where v̂i = vref is a constant when t ≥ T1 ; cv3 > 1 is the
N controller gain; γ < 1 is the controller coefficient.
 λ The voltage-reactive power droop control law is not suffi-
V̇2 = eTω ėω = eωi −c3 sig ωi (t) − ω̂i (t)
i=1 cient to achieve the goal of realize accurate reactive power
sharing, which can be given by
N
 λ N
 1+λ
= eωi −c3 sig eωi = −c3 eω 
i
ni Qi = nj Qj , ∀i, j (49)
i=1 i=1
  1+λ
where ni is the droop coefficient of reactive power.
N
 2 2
1+λ
≤ −c3 eω  = −c3 2
1+λ
2 V2 2 (39) To realize accurate reactive power sharing and fast stable
i
i=1 performance, the reactive power controller is designed as
1+λ  q
Due to c3 2 2 > 0 and 0 < 1+λ
2 < 1, one has uQi (t) = −cQi aij sig ni Qi (t) − nj Qj (t) (50)
j∈Ni
2 1−λ
Tω ≤ V2 (0) 2 (40)
1+λ
c3 (2) 2 (1 − λ) where cQi > 1 is the controller gain, 0 < q < 1.
 According to (48) and (50), we can write vni as follows:
limt→Tω V2 (t) = 0
(41) 
V2 (t) = 0, ∀t ≥ Tω  
vni = uvi + uQi dt (51)
Then we obtain that V2 (t) converges to zero within finite time
Tω and eωi = ωi − ωi = 0, ∀t ≥ Tω , which means that the local Therefore, the control inputs vni can realize voltage finite-
neighbor tracking error would reduce to zero in settling time. time stabilization and achieve active power sharing:
Therefore, the actual frequency of all DGs can synchronize to  
 
their reference ωref in finite time. This completes the proof. lim vi (t) − vref  = 0, vi (t) = vref , ∀t ≥ Tv (52)
t→Tv
According to (34) and (36), we can write ωni as follows:  
  N  N
 1  1
ωni = (uωi + uPi )dt (42) lim ni Qi − ni Qi  = 0, ni Qi = ni Qi , ∀t ≥ TQ .
t→TQ  N  N
i=1 i=1
Therefore, the control inputs ωni can realize frequency (53)
finite-time stabilization and achieve active power sharing:
 
  V. S IMULATION R ESULTS
lim ωi (t) − ωref  = 0, ωi (t) = ωref , ∀t ≥ Tω (43)
t→Tω The proposed observer-based finite-time control scheme will
 
 N  N be applied to an islanded AC microgrid with five DGs to verify
 1  1
lim mi Pi − mi Pi  = 0, mi Pi = mi Pi , ∀t ≥ TP . its effectiveness. Fig. 2 depicts the control flow of observer-
t→TP  N  N
i=1 i=1 based finite-time control scheme. The basic block diagram of
(44) the test system is shown in Fig. 3. Two different communica-
tion network topologies are presented in Fig. 4. The parameters
B. Finite-Time Voltage and Reactive Power Control Design of DGs, loads, and lines are shown in Table I. The controller
Similarly, the observer-based finite-time voltage controller gains are c1 = c2 = 2, c3 = 2, the coefficients for the sec-
and reactive power controller are given in this section. ondary controller are α = 0.8, β = 89 , λ = 0.8, the low
The finite-time voltage controller based on attack detection threshold of trust factor is set as Tij > 0.5.
is developed as follows:
Based on the observer introduced above and the defined A. Case I: Load Variations
tracking error system, the voltage controller is given by:
1) Case I-A (Stability Analysis): The performance of
 α  β
uv̂i = −cv1 sig ev̂i − cv2 sig ėv̂i (45) the designed controller under load variations is given in
Fig. 5(a)-(d). As shown in Fig. 5(a) - (b), the frequency of all
where cv1 , cv2 > 1 is the controller gain, 0 < α < 1, β = 1+α 2α
, DGs kept relatively synchronous and produced a small drop.
  It can be seen that the global synchronization of the frequency
ev̂i (t) = aij Cjv (t)Tijv (t) v̂i (t) − v̂j (t) + ai0 v̂i (t) − vref
has not been destroyed, and the voltage drop range at the load
j∈Ni
increasing node is larger than the voltage of other DGs. The
(46) frequency and voltage of each DG can be quickly restored to
ėv̂i (t) = aij Ċjv (t)Ṫijv (t) v̂˙ i (t) − v̂˙ j (t) + ai0 v̂˙ i (t) (47) the reference value. Fig. 5(c) - (d) show the changes of active
j∈Ni power and reactive power of each DG in the microgrid under
load changes. The power vacancy caused by the increased load
where v̂i is the observation of DG i; vref is the reference volt-
can be allocated to each DG according to the power sharing
age of virtual leader node, Cjv is the confidence factor, Tijv is the
protocol. Under the severe disturbance of load changes, the
trust factor.
proposed distributed controller is still capable of achieving
The finite-time voltage controller can be designed as:
 γ zero frequency deviation and voltage deviation while realizing
v̇i = uvi (t) = −cv3 sig vi (t) − v̂i (t) (48) accurate power sharing within a few seconds.

Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
 LU et al.: DISTRIBUTED OBSERVER-BASED FINITE-TIME CONTROL OF AC MICROGRID UNDER ATTACK
Fig. 2. The control flow of the observer-based finite-time control for ith DG.
Fig. 3. The test islanded AC microgrid with five DGs.
Fig. 4. The topology diagram of communication network.
TABLE I
T HE PARAMETERS OF THE T EST S YSTEM
2) Case I-B (Identify Load Change Analysis): The load
variations disturbance identification under distributed attack-
resilient cooperative control and distributed observer-based
finite-time cooperative control is compared. The confidence
levels and trust levels under load variations is given in
Fig. 6(a)-(b), it can be seen that both factors will be affected
and reduced, which means that the information will be given
corresponding weights. This misidentification of the load
Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
163
Fig. 5. Case I-A: (a) Frequencies of DGs, (b) Voltages of DGs, (c) Active
power of DGs, (d) Reactive power of DGs.
change as an attack may lead to decision failure and destabilize
the system. Fig. 6(c) - (d) show the change of detection factors
of the improved attack detection and localization method under
load variations, it can be seen that neither of the two vari-
ables has changed, which indicates that the improved attack
detection method can distinguish the real disturbance from the
attack.
B. Case II: Link Attack
Both the frequency link attack and the voltage link attack
are considered.
1) Case II-A (Frequency Link Attack): The communica-
tion link between DG 2 and DG 3 was being attacked and
a false data was injected into the information which trans-
mitted to DG 3. The attack is modeled by (9) to produce
a corrupted frequency information of f2 = 50.1Hz at t = 5s.
Fig. 7(a)-(d) show the performance of the proposed dis-
tributed observer-based finite-time cooperative control. The
frequencies and voltages can be regulated to converge to their
reference value in finite time which is about 10s. The active
power of different DGs has different variation trends after the
microgrid was attacked, but all of them can return to the stable
 164
Fig. 6. Case I-B with the distributed attack-resilient cooperative control:
(a) Confidence levels, (b) Trust levels; Case I-B with the distributed observer-
based finite-time cooperative control: (c) Confidence levels, (d) Trust levels.
Fig. 7. Case II-A: (a) Frequencies of DGs, (b) Voltages of DGs, (c) Active
power of DGs, (d) Reactive power of DGs.
state within a few seconds. It can be seen from Fig. 7(d) that
frequency attack has little effect on reactive power.
2) Case II-B (Voltage Link Attack): The voltage
information transmitted from DG2 to DG3 through the
communication link is injected with the false data which is
modeled by (9) to produce a destroyed voltage information
of v2 = 381pu at t = 5s. The resultant plot of all DICs
responses is shown in Fig. 8(a)-(d). Clearly, due to this
voltage link attack, the voltage of each DG increased slightly
and the frequency almost keeps unchanged. Similarly, the
active power and reactive power remain almost unchanged.
For link attacks, according to the simulation of two different
link attacks, it can be proved that the proposed observer-based
finite-time controller can effectively detect and locate the link
attacks, and achieve frequency and voltage stabilization within
a few seconds, while achieving accurate power sharing. In
addition, comparing the simulation results of the two attacks,
it can be seen that the voltage and active power of the system
Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 12, NO. 1, JANUARY 2021
Fig. 8. Case II-B: (a) Frequencies of DGs, (b) Voltages of DGs, (c) Active
power of DGs, (d) Reactive power of DGs.
under the frequency link attack will be affected. The voltage
link attack has almost no effect on the frequency and active
power of the system, which shows to some extent that the
frequency link attack is even worse for the microgrid.
C. Case III: Node Attack
Both the frequency node attack and the voltage node attack
are considered. The communication topology G1 cannot sat-
isfy the assumption 1 which will lead to failed to determine the
feasibility of the information. Therefore, the communication
topology G2 is implemented in this case to perform simulation
verification.
1) Case III-A (Frequency Node Attack): The entire
frequency controller of DG 2 was hijacked and lead to the
destruction of frequency and observation. The attack is mod-
eled by (10) to generate a compromised frequency information
of f2 = 50.1Hz between t = 5s and t = 15s. The effi-
ciency of the observer-based finite-time control is verified in
Fig. 9(a)-(d). In this case, the attack acts directly on the actual
frequency which cannot be eliminated by ignoring commu-
nication information. Therefore, the frequency of DG 2 is
maintained in an abnormal state during attack, which cause
the system voltage to fail to converge. The frequencies of the
remaining DGs quickly restored to the reference value after
the destroyed information is ignored. The voltage of each DG
shows a downward trend during the existence of the attack,
and gradually converges to a stable state after the attack is
removed. Active and reactive power are also in an abnormal
state due to the persistence of the attack.
2) Case III-B (Voltage Node Attack): The entire voltage
controller of DG 2 was hijacked and generate a compromised
voltage information of v2 = 381pu between t = 5s and
t = 15s. As Figs. 10 (a)-(d) shown, the voltages of other
DGs show a downward trend and the system frequency can
continue to keep in synchronous. The frequency and active
power of each DG have almost no change, and the reactive
power of each DG shows a different trend during the attack,
 LU et al.: DISTRIBUTED OBSERVER-BASED FINITE-TIME CONTROL OF AC MICROGRID UNDER ATTACK
Fig. 9. Case III-A: (a) Frequencies of DGs, (b) Voltages of DGs, (c) Active
power of DGs, (d) Reactive power of DGs.
Fig. 10. Case III-B: (a) Frequencies of DGs, (b) Voltages of DGs, (c) Active
power of DGs, (d) Reactive power of DGs.
but it can quickly return to the normal state after the attack is
removed.
For node attacks, it is clear that frequency node attack has
a worse impact on microgrids than voltage node attack. The
agent loses its control ability because the whole controller
is hijacked. At this time, the best solution is to remove the
information of the damaged node from the consensus proto-
col and conduct consensus tracking control for the remaining
intact agents. Although the attack cannot be eliminated and the
frequency or voltage of DG are abnormal, the proposed con-
trol protocol already provides the best solution for this attack
from the distributed control perspective.
D. Case IV: Comparing the Proposed Method With the
Method in [30]
To verify the superiority of the observer-based finite-time
controller proposed in this article on the convergence speed of
the microgrid under attack, a simulation comparison between
Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
165
Fig. 11. Case IV-A with the distributed attack-resilient cooperative control:
(a) Frequencies of DGs, (b) Voltages of DGs, (c) Confidence levels, (d) Trust
levels; Case IV-A with the distributed observer-based finite-time cooperative
control: (e) Confidence levels, (f) Trust levels.
the proposed method and the distributed attack-resilient coop-
erative control proposed in [10] is performed here. Two
different frequency attacks are simulated and compared here
as frequency attacks have a greater impact on microgrid.
1) Case IV-A (Frequency Link Attack): The simulation set-
tings are the same as Case II-A. Fig. 11(a)-(b) show the
performance of the attack-resilient distributed control, where
the frequencies and voltages of all DGs are asymptotically
stable over infinite time which is more than 25s, while the
proposed method can converge the system frequency and volt-
age to the reference value within 10s as seen in Case II-A. The
levels of confidence factors and trust factors under the two
methods are shown in figures Fig. 11(c)-(d) and Fig. 11(e)-(f),
the threshold of the trust factor was set as Tij < 0.5, it can
be seen from Fig. 11(d) and Fig. 7(f) that the information
transmitted by the compromised communication link would
be ignored once the corresponding trust factor lower than the
threshold. It is clearly to see the superiority of the proposed
approach in convergence speed by comparing the simulation
results. The steady speed of a system under attack is an
important index for operating performance. Consequently, the
proposed control approach can effectively respond to such
attacks and significantly improve the resilience and stability
of islanded AC microgrid.
2) Case IV-B (Frequency Node Attack): The simulation
settings are the same as Case II-B. The responses shown
in Fig. 12(a)-(d) reflect the performance of the distributed
attack-resilient control. The efficiency of the observer-based
 166 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 12, NO. 1, JANUARY 2021

Fig. 13. Experimental AC Microgrid Setup. (a) The AC microgrid with four
DGs; (b) Communication topology for four DGs.
Fig. 12. Case IV-B with the distributed attack-resilient cooperative control:
(a) Frequencies of DGs, (b) Voltages of DGs, (c) Confidence levels, (d) Trust
levels; Case IV-B with the distributed observer-based finite-time cooperative
control: (e) Confidence levels, (f) Trust levels.

finite-time control is verified in Fig. 12(e)-(f). Clearly, the

observer-based finite-time control can obviously accelerate the
convergence process which is obvious by comparing the con-
fidence factor and trust factor in the results. The proposed
algorithm can ensure the frequency converges in the set-
tling time which is an important property for the microgrid
operation.

E. Experimental Evalution
The proposed strategy is also verified experimentally by
using an AC microgrid comprising four DGs with the commu-
nication topology are shown in Fig. 13. The primary system
was built using lithium iron phosphate battery, inverter and
load. The control algorithm was written based on MATLAB-
Simulink software and ran in the real-time digital control
system rtunit. The signal acquisition was realized through
the connection of I/O port on the junction box. The on-line
debugging of the program and the real-time observation of
the running results can be carried out on the upper com-
puter, and the output analog signals can also be observed
through the oscilloscope. The setting of controller parameters
and reference values are the same as used in previous stud-
ies. Converter parameters are L=0.6mH, C=1.5mF. The local
loads are R1 = R2 = 10, C1 = 340μF.
A frequency link attack with amplitude of 0.1Hz as false
data is initiated at about 5 s. The effect of frequency link
FDIA on prototype AC microgrid system are shown in Fig. 14.
It can be seen that the emergence of attack destroys the
Fig. 14. Experimental evalution of frequency link attack: (a) Frequencies of
DGs, (b) Voltages of DGs, (c) mP of DGs, (d) nQ of DGs.
stability of the system and the distributed observer-based
finite-time control can realize the rapid recovery of the system.
The frequencies and voltages of all DGs can be restored within
the setting time, while realizing accurate power sharing.
A frequency node attack with f2 = 50.1Hz attacks the AC
microgrid system between t = 5s and t = 15s. Fig. 15 show
the performance of the attack-resilient distributed control in
the experimental evalution, where the frequencies and volt-
ages of all DGs can converge to their reference values within
15s. Fig. 15(c)-(d) show that the active and reactive sharing of
the system can be quickly achieved even when the frequency
of DG2 is abnormal under the power controller. After the

Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
 LU et al.: DISTRIBUTED OBSERVER-BASED FINITE-TIME CONTROL OF AC MICROGRID UNDER ATTACK
Fig. 15. Experimental evalution of frequency node attack: (a) Frequencies
of DGs, (b) Voltages of DGs, (c) mP of DGs, (d) nQ of DGs.
frequency node attack is removed, the change of the system
state will also affect the power sharing, and the power con-
troller can quickly realize the accurate power sharing of the
system in the new operating state.
VI. C ONCLUSION
The islanded AC microgrid distributed synchronization
under attack is solved in this article. Based on an observer
with confidence factors and trust factors, an observer-based
finite-time stability control method is proposed. The frequency
and voltage convergence speed of microgrid under attack are
greatly accelerated by the designed controller. Moreover, the
controller can limit the impact of cyber-attacks on the dynam-
ics of the microgrid. We only discuss the finite-time control
strategy under cyber-attacks, and cannot completely eliminate
certain types of attacks, so we would focus on more power-
ful attenuation techniques and control methods for physical
attacks in our future research.
R EFERENCES
[1] Y. Han, K. Zhang, H. Li, E. A. A. Coelho, and J. M. Guerrero, “MAS-
based distributed coordinated control and optimization in microgrid and
microgrid clusters: A comprehensive overview,” IEEE Trans. Power
Electron., vol. 33, no. 8, pp. 6488–6508, Aug. 2018.
[2] X. Lu, X. Yu, J. Lai, Y. Wang, and J. M. Guerrero, “A novel distributed
secondary coordination control approach for islanded microgrids,” IEEE
Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 2726–2740, Jul. 2018.
[3] M. Yazdanian and A. Mehrizi-Sani, “Distributed control techniques in
microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 2901–2909,
Nov. 2014.
[4] A. Nisar and M. S. Thomas, “Comprehensive control for microgrid
sutonomous operation with demand response,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid,
vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 2081–2089, Sep. 2017.
[5] J. M. Guerrero, M. Chandorkar, T. Lee, and P. C. Loh, “Advanced
control architectures for intelligent microgrids—Part I: Decentralized
and hierarchical control,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron., vol. 60, no. 4,
pp. 1254–1262, Apr. 2013.
[6] Q. Shafiee, J. M. Guerrero, and J. C. Vasquez, “Distributed secondary
control for islanded microgrids—A novel approach,” IEEE Trans. Power
Electron., vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 1018–1031, Feb. 2014.
[7] J. Lai, H. Zhou, X. Lu, X. Yu, and W. Hu, “Droop-based distributed
cooperative control for microgrids with time-varying delays,” IEEE
Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1775–1789, Jul. 2016.
Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
167
[8] J. W. Simpson-Porco, Q. Shafiee, F. Dörfler, J. C. Vasquez,
J. M. Guerrero, and F. Bullo, “Secondary frequency and voltage con-
trol of islanded microgrids via distributed averaging,” IEEE Trans. Ind.
Electron., vol. 62, no. 11, pp. 7025–7038, Nov. 2015.
[9] Z. Wang and W. Jie, “A practical distributed finite-time control scheme
for power system transient stability,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 35,
no. 5, pp. 3320–3331, Sep. 2020.
[10] F. Guo, C. Wen, J. Mao, and Y. Song, “Distributed secondary volt-
age and frequency restoration control of droop-controlled inverter-based
microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron., vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 4355–4364,
Jul. 2015.
[11] T. Zhao, Z. Li, and Z. Ding, “Consensus-based distributed optimal
energy management with less communication in a microgrid,” IEEE
Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 3356–3367, Jun. 2019.
[12] W. Liu, W. Gu, W. Sheng, X. Meng, S. Xue, and M. Chen, “Pinning-
based distributed cooperative control for autonomous microgrids under
uncertain communication topologies,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 31,
no. 2, pp. 1320–1329, Mar. 2016.
[13] L. Ding, Q. Han, L. Y. Wang, and E. Sindi, “Distributed cooperative
optimal control of DC microgrids with communication delays,” IEEE
Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 14, no. 9, pp. 3924–3935, Sep. 2018.
[14] N. M. Dehkordi, H. R. Baghaee, N. Sadati, and J. M. Guerrero,
“Distributed noise-resilient secondary voltage and frequency control
for islanded microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 4,
pp. 3780–3790, Jul. 2019.
[15] Z. Wang and J Wang, “A delay-adaptive control scheme for enhancing
smart grid stability and resilience,” Int. J. Elect. Power Energy Syst.,
vol. 110, pp. 477–486, Mar. 2019.
[16] X. Wang, H. Zhang, and C. Li, “Distributed finite-time cooperative
control of droop-controlled microgrids under switching topology,” IET
Renew. Power Gener., vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 707–714, Dec. 2017.
[17] S. Zuo, A. Davoudi, Y. Song, and F. L. Lewis, “Distributed finite-time
voltage and frequency restoration in islanded AC microgrids,” IEEE
Trans. Ind. Electron., vol. 63, no. 10, pp. 5988–5997, Oct. 2016.
[18] S. Sahoo and S. Mishra, “A distributed finite-time secondary average
voltage regulation and current sharing controller for DC microgrids,”
IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 282–292, Jan. 2019.
[19] Y. Hu, X. Wang, Y. Peng, J. Xiang, and W. Wei, “Distributed finite-
time secondary control for DC microgrids with virtual impedance
arrangement,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 57060–57068, 2019.
[20] N. M. Dehkordi, N. Sadati, and M. Hamzeh, “Distributed robust finite-
time secondary voltage and frequency control of islanded microgrids,”
IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 3648–3659, Sep. 2017.
[21] J. Hu and A. Lanzon, “Distributed finite-time consensus control
for heterogeneous battery energy storage systems in droop-controlled
microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 4751–4761,
Sep. 2019.
[22] Z. Wang and J. Wang, “A novel finite-time control scheme for enhancing
smart grid frequency stability and resilience,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid,
vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 6538–6551, Nov. 2019.
[23] Y. Xu and H. Sun, “Distributed finite-time convergence control of an
islanded low-voltage AC microgrid,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 33,
no. 3, pp. 2339–2348, May 2018.
[24] Z. Deng, Y. Xu, H. Sun, and X. Shen, “Distributed, bounded and
finite-time convergence secondary frequency control in an autonomous
microgrid,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 2776–2788,
May 2019.
[25] O. A. Beg, L. V. Nguyen, T. T. Johnson, and A. Davoudi, “Signal tem-
poral logic-based attack detection in DC microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Smart
Grid, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 3585–3595, Jul. 2019.
[26] S. Sahoo, S. Mishra, J. C. Peng, and T. Dragièević, “A stealth cyber-
attack detection strategy for DC microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Power
Electron., vol. 34, no. 8, pp. 8162–8174, Aug. 2019.
[27] O. A. Beg, T. T. Johnson, and A. Davoudi, “Detection of false-
data injection attacks in cyber-physical DC microgrids,” IEEE Trans.
Ind. Informat., vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 2693–2703, Oct. 2017.
[28] D. Jin et al., “Toward a cyber resilient and secure microgrid using
software-defined networking,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 8, no. 5,
pp. 2494–2504, Sep. 2017.
[29] M. M. Rana, L. Li, and S. W. Su, “Cyber attack protection and control of
microgrids,” IEEE/CAA J. Automatica Sinica, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 602–609,
Mar. 2018.
[30] S. Abhinav, H. Modares, F. L. Lewis, F. Ferrese, and A. Davoudi,
“Synchrony in networked microgrids under attacks,” IEEE Trans. Smart
Grid, vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 6731–6741, Nov. 2018.
 168 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 12, NO. 1, JANUARY 2021

[31] X. Lu, R. Lu, S. Chen, and J. Lu, “Finite-time distributed tracking con- Jie Wang received the Ph.D. degree in indus-
trol for multi-agent systems with a virtual leader,” IEEE Trans. Circuits trial automation from Northeast University, China,
Syst. I, Reg. Papers, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 352–362, Feb. 2013. in 1998. He is a Professor of power system and
[32] X. Lin and Y. Zheng, “Finite-time consensus of switched multiagent its automation with the Department of Electrical
systems,” IEEE Trans. Syst., Man, Cybern., Syst., vol. 47, no. 7, Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, where
pp. 1535–1545, Jul. 2017. he is also with a lab for the development of Flexible
[33] M. Basseville and I. V. Nikiforov, Detection of Abrupt Changes: Theory ac/dc transmission system technology and intelligent
and Application, vol. 104. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall, control. His research interests include stability anal-
1993. ysis and control of complex power system and smart
grids. His recent research interest is to establish
a series of theoretical analysis results of nonlinear
differential algebraic control systems and apply these results to the nonlinear
control of structure preserving power systems. Based on the differential alge-
braic Hamiltonian system and its periodic solution theory, the low frequency
oscillation analysis and control method of interconnected power grid are
presented. The symmetry and conserved quantity in Noether’s theory are
applied to restrict the existence of periodic solutions of power system.

Rentao Lu received the B.S. degree in electri-
cal engineering from Nanchang University, China,
in 2018. He is currently pursuing the master’s
degree with the School of Electrical Information
and Electronic Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong
University, China. His research interests include
control and stability analysis of microgrid and finite-
time control.
Ziqiang Wang received the M.S. degree from
the School of Electrical Information and Electronic
Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, in
2020, where he is currently pursuing the Doctoral
degree. His research interests include power system
nonlinear control, wide-area control, and finite-time
control.

Authorized licensed use limited to: M S RAMAIAH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 20,2023 at 05:28:33 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.