Opposition To Attorney

1 BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM,
DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C.

2 John V. Berlinski (State Bar No. 208537)
jberlinski@birdmarella.com
3 Julia B. Cherlow (State Bar No. 290538)
jcherlow@birdmarella.com
4 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
5 Telephone: (310) 201-2100
Facsimile: (310) 201-2110
6
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
7 Jonathan M. Moses (admitted pro hac vice)
Adam L. Goodman (admitted pro hac vice)
8 Remy Grosbard (admitted pro hac vice)
Jessica L. Allen (admitted pro hac vice)
9 51 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
10 Telephone: (212) 403-1000
Facsimile: (212) 403-2000
11
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
12 William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC
13
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
14 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
15
16 WILLIAM
B. PITT, an individual; and Case No. 22STCV06081
MONDO BONGO, LLC, a California limited
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
17 liability company,
DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE’S
Plaintiffs, MOTION TO STRIKE PRAYER FOR
18
ATTORNEYS’ FEES FROM SECOND
vs.
19 AMENDED COMPLAINT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
20 ANGELINA JOLIE, et al., AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
Defendants.
21 Filed concurrently with Opposition to
22 AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS. Demurrer, Opposition to Jolie’s Request for
Judicial Notice, Request for Judicial Notice,
23 Proposed Order, and Declarations
24 Judge: Hon. Lia Martin

Dept: 16
25 Date: November 15, 2023
26 Time: 9:00 a.m.
27 Reservation ID: 269966417033

Action Filed: February 17, 2022
28 Trial Date: Not yet set
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE’S

MOTION TO STRIKE PRAYER FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES FROM SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 5
4 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................... 6
5 LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................................................... 6
6 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................... 7
7 I. Mondo properly pleads its Luxembourg law claim. ................................................. 7
8
II. Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees is a substantive issue, not a procedural
9 one. ............................................................................................................................ 8
10 III. The governmental interest analysis mandates application of Luxembourg

law to Plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’ fees. .............................................................. 9
11
A. Luxembourg law providing for attorneys’ fees is consistent with
12 California’s exceptions to the “American rule.” ......................................... 10
13
B. Luxembourg’s interest in allowing for the recovery of attorneys’
14 fees outweighs any limited interest in the application of the
“American rule.” ......................................................................................... 11
15
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 13
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3 Cases
4 Arno v. Club Med Boutique Inc.,
5 134 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................................. 9, 12
6 Aronson v. Advanced Cell Tech.,

196 Cal. App. 4th 1043 (2011) ................................................................................................ 10
7
Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club,
8 16 Cal. 3d 313 (1976) ................................................................................................................ 9
9 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly,
241 U.S. 485 (1916) .................................................................................................................. 8
10
11 Clausen v. M/V NEW CARISSA,
339 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................... 8
12
Cnty. of L.A. v. Superior Ct.,
13 78 Cal. App. 4th 212 (2000) ...................................................................................................... 8
14 Cutler v. Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n,
441 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ..................................................................................... 9, 12
15
Hurtado v. Superior Ct.,
16
11 Cal. 3d 574 (1974) ...................................................................................................... 7, 8, 10
17
Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,
18 39 Cal. 4th 95 (2006)........................................................................................................... 9, 10
19 Navellier v. Sletten,
106 Cal. App. 4th 763 (2003) ............................................................................................ 10 n.4
20
Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co.,
21 22 Cal. 3d 157 (1978) ........................................................................................................ 11, 12
22
PH II, Inc. v. Superior Ct.,
23 33 Cal. App. 4th 1680 (1995) .................................................................................................... 6
24 Reich v. Purcell,
67 Cal. 2d 551 (1967) ...................................................................................................... 7, 8, 11
25
Rosenthal v. Fonda,
26 862 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1988) ................................................................................................. 12
27
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Dickstein Shapiro LLP,
28 389 F. Supp. 3d 794 (C.D. Cal. 2019) ..................................................................................... 12
3
1 Stokus v. Marsh,
217 Cal. App. 3d 647 (1990) ............................................................................................... 9 n.3
2
Torres v. City of San Diego,
3 154 Cal. App. 4th 214 (2007) .................................................................................................. 10
4 Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Ct.,
5 24 Cal. 4th 906 (2001)............................................................................................................... 7
6 World Wide Imps., Inc. v. Bartel,

145 Cal. App. 3d 1006 (1983) ................................................................................................... 8
7
Statutes
8
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021 .................................................................................................... 10 n.4
9
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(a)(10) ........................................................................................ 5, 10
10
11 Lux. Civ. Code, Art. 6-1......................................................................................................... passim
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4
1 INTRODUCTION
2 Defendant Angelina Jolie moves to strike the reference to attorneys’ fees in Plaintiffs Brad
3 Pitt and Mondo Bongo LLC’s Prayer for Relief on the ground that that there is no “basis under
4 which the Court could award attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs in this matter.” Motion to Strike at 2.
5 The motion unnecessarily burdens the Court, because all that Plaintiffs seek in their Prayer for
6 Relief is “attorneys’ fees and costs, as provided by law.” Second Am. Compl. at 54 (Prayer for
7 Relief ¶ I) (emphasis added).
8 The Code of Civil Procedure expressly permits recovery of fees where authorized by
9 “law.” Id. § 1033.5(a)(10)(C). Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of Action pleads a claim for Abuse of
10 Rights under Article 6-1 of the Luxembourg Civil Code, and Luxembourg law provides for fee-
11 shifting in connection with this claim as part of its damages regime. Decl. of Prof. André Prüm
12 (“Prüm Decl.”) ¶ 20. There is thus at least one “basis under which the Court could award
13 attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs in this matter.”
14 Jolie makes three arguments in an effort to confuse and avoid this straightforward analysis.
15 First, Jolie contends that Plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’ fees should be stricken because
16 Plaintiffs’ underlying Luxembourg law claim cannot withstand demurrer. This argument is
17 discussed in Plaintiffs’ opposition to Jolie’s demurrer and fails for the reasons stated therein.
18 Second, Jolie argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to seek fees because Jolie is a
19 Californian, not a resident of Luxembourg. But well-established case law holds that one need not
20 be a resident of a foreign state to be subject to claims or defenses in California under the foreign
21 state’s law.
22 Third, Jolie asserts that California courts must always apply California’s default
23 “American rule” generally barring recovery of attorneys’ fees because this issue is procedural in
24 nature. Not true again. Where, as here, the foreign state’s law allows attorneys’ fees as damages,
25 the analysis is substantive in nature, not procedural, and attorneys’ fees can be recovered.
26 Jolie’s motion to strike should be denied. 1
27
1
28 Jolie argues the Court should strike Pitt’s prayer for attorneys’ fees because the Luxembourg
5
1 BACKGROUND
2 In 2008, Pitt and Jolie jointly acquired Château Miraval, a French estate and vineyard,
3 through their California LLCs: Mondo, for Pitt, and Nouvel, for Jolie. ¶¶ 32–34. 2 They did so by
4 causing Mondo and Nouvel to purchase shares of Quimicum S.à.r.l, a Luxembourg limited
5 liability company whose only asset is Château Miraval. ¶¶ 32–33.
6 On March 25, 2013, Mondo and Nouvel agreed to the Quimicum Articles of Association
7 (the “Quimicum Articles”). ¶ 44. Section 5.4.3 of the Quimicum Articles prohibits transfer of
8 Quimicum shares to non-shareholders without approval of 75% of shareholders, giving either
9 entity the right to veto any sale. Id. Additionally, Article 13 of the Quimicum Articles
10 incorporates by reference a Luxembourg statute providing that if a shareholder rejects a proposed
11 transfer of shares to a third party, that shareholder may elect to purchase the shares on the same
12 terms offered to the third party or cause Quimicum to buy back the shares. ¶ 45.
13 The Complaint’s Fifth Cause of Action alleges that Jolie’s purported sale of Nouvel to
14 Tenute del Mondo (a subsidiary of the Stoli Group spirits conglomerate) sought to circumvent these
15 provisions of the Quimicum Articles in violation of Article 6-1 of the Luxembourg Civil Code.
16 ¶¶ 185, 187; Prüm Decl. ¶¶ 7–19; Exs. B–P. Mondo further alleges that as a result of Jolie’s
17 violation, it was “denied its rights under the Quimicum articles” and suffered damages in amount
18 to be proven at trial. ¶¶ 188–89.
19 Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief seeks “attorneys’ fees and costs, as provided by law.” Prayer
20 for Relief ¶ I.
21 LEGAL STANDARD
22 Although motions to strike may be used to challenge requests for specific types of relief,
23 the Court of Appeal has “emphasize[d] that such use of the motion to strike should be cautious and
24 sparing” and that the motion to strike must not be treated as “a procedural ‘line item veto’ for the
25
claim is brought by Mondo alone. Motion to Strike at 11. This procedurally deficient argument
26 for a “line item veto” fails because Jolie’s notice of motion and motion do not separately request
that relief and because there is no way to grant it as a technical matter.
27
2
Citations to ¶ are of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (referred to as the “Complaint”).
28 Exhibits referenced herein are attached to the concurrently filed Declaration of Julia B. Cherlow.
6
1 civil defendant.” PH II, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. App. 4th 1680, 1683 (1995).
2 When choice of law is disputed, the Court “must . . . determine the governmental policy of
3 its own and the suggested foreign laws” and decide which “is the appropriate one” to apply to the
4 issue at hand. Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581 (1974); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d
5 551, 553 (1967) (the Court must “find the proper law to apply based upon the interests of the
6 litigants and the involved states”).
7 ARGUMENT
8 Jolie argues that Plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’ fees should be stricken from the
9 Complaint because (a) the Fifth Cause Of Action fails as a matter of law; (b) attorneys’ fees
10 awards are procedural and therefore governed by California law; and (c) choice-of-law analysis
11 mandates application of California law to this issue. Jolie is incorrect about all three of these
12 arguments, and her motion to strike should be denied.
13 I. Mondo properly pleads its Luxembourg law claim.
14 Jolie first argues that her motion to strike should be granted because Luxembourg law
15 purportedly does not apply to her. Motion to Strike at 8. This is the same argument Jolie makes
16 in her demurrer to Count 5, and it should be rejected for the same reasons set forth in Plaintiffs’
17 opposition thereto. Namely, Jolie’s cases do not support her position. For example, Jolie cites
18 Hurtado to argue that “[a]s the forum, California ‘can only apply its own law.’” 11 Cal. 3d at 581.
19 But Hurtado explains in the very next sentence what that means: when conducting a choice-of-
20 law analysis, the court “does not choose between foreign law and its own law, but selects the
21 appropriate rule of decision for the forum to apply as its law to the case before it.” Id. (emphases
22 added). In other words, California courts can apply the law of a foreign state as California’s own
23 law, which is all Plaintiffs are seeking here, so long as the “party litigant”—foreign or otherwise—
24 “timely invokes the law of a foreign state.” Id.
25 Jolie also quotes dicta from Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court to assert that only
26 non-Californians may invoke foreign law. 24 Cal. 4th 906 (2001). But Washington Mutual was
27 addressing when California law may be applied on a class-wide basis despite the presence of non-
28 resident class members—a question that has no application to the set of facts presently before this
7
1 Court. Moreover, two of the seminal California choice-of-law cases make clear that California
2 residents may invoke foreign law. See Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d at 578 (California residents invoked
3 law of Mexico); Reich, 67 Cal. 2d at 555 (California residents invoked law of Ohio).
4 Through her shell entity, Jolie bought shares of a Luxembourgish entity, exercised control
5 over those shares, and purportedly sold them. ¶¶ 32, 43, 111. As Plaintiffs’ Luxembourg law
6 expert Professor Prüm explains, Luxembourg has a “strong interest” in regulating such
7 activities. Prüm Decl. ¶ 6. There is no reason Jolie’s sale should be outside the reach of
8 Luxembourg statutory law. Id. (Luxembourg law “applies equally to individuals and entities
9 regardless of nationality.”).
10 II. Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees is a substantive issue, not a procedural one.
11 Jolie next asserts that California courts uniformly apply California law in deciding whether
12 attorneys’ fees awards are available because the issue is necessarily procedural. Motion to Strike
13 at 8. Not so. That is because Luxembourg law provides a substantive right to attorneys’ fees as
14 damages in connection with claims made under its Article 6-1 of its Civil Code. Prüm Decl. ¶ 20;
15 Exs. Q–R. Indeed, Luxembourg courts have widely recognized “as a matter of principle that the
16 fees a litigant must pay in order to win a case in court constitute compensable damages whose
17 origin is the fault of the unsuccessful party.” Prüm Decl. ¶ 20; Ex. Q.
18 As Jolie’s own cases demonstrate, the availability of fees as damages is a substantive issue.
19 World Wide Imps., Inc. v. Bartel, 145 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1012 (1983) (“law which gives or
20 declares the right” is substantive law, whereas law that governs “mode of procedure by which a
21 legal right is enforced” is procedural ); see also, e.g., Cnty. of L.A. v. Superior Ct., 78 Cal. App.
22 4th 212, 230 (2000) (“Rules defining the measure of damages in a tort action are clearly
23 substantive not procedural.”); Clausen v. M/V NEW CARISSA, 339 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th Cir.
24 2003) (collecting cases and holding that right to damages “is substantive, for ‘the question of the
25 proper measure of damages is inseparably connected with the right of action’” (quoting
26 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 491 (1916))).
27 None of Jolie’s cases stands for the proposition that entitlement to attorneys’ fees is
28 procedural in the first instance. The best case she can muster is a non-binding Ninth Circuit case
8
1 that entertained “some doubt” as to whether the specific attorneys’ fees provision at issue should
2 be treated as substantive, and then elects to “not decide whether the issue of attorneys’ fees is
3 substantive or procedural under California law.” Arno v. Club Med Boutique Inc., 134 F.3d 1424,
4 1425 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to look to foreign law in the context of an
5 attorneys’ fees award, an act Jolie wrongly submits is contrary to California law. Id. at 1426.
6 That is certainly no grounds to determine that the substantive law of Luxembourg providing for
7 attorneys’ fees as damages is somehow procedural in nature—and it is not. See also, e.g., Cutler
8 v. Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 441 F. Supp. 863, 866 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (applying
9 substantive English law allowing fees while noting that California “is free to apply its own
10 appropriate procedures for determination and enforcement” of fees awards). 3
11 III. The governmental interest analysis mandates application of Luxembourg law to
Plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’ fees.
12
13 California applies a three-step governmental interest test to resolve disputed choice-of-law
14 issues. Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 95, 107 (2006). First, “the court
15 determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to
16 the particular issue in question is the same or different.” Id. Second, if they are different, the
17 court determines whether each jurisdiction has an “interest in the application of its own law under
18 the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 107–08 (emphasis added). Third, if “the court
19 finds that there is a true conflict, it carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of the
20 interest of each jurisdiction in the application of its own law ‘to determine which [jurisdiction’s]
21 interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other,’” and
22 selects the law of the jurisdiction “‘whose interest would be the more impaired if its law were not
23 applied.’” Id. at 108 (quoting Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 320 (1976)). Here, it is
24
3
25 In addition, to gin up support for the incorrect proposition that Plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’
fees is procedural, Jolie omits a crucial word from her quotation of Stokus v. Marsh, 217 Cal. App.
26 3d 647, 651 (1990) that makes clear that municipal courts are permitted, not required, to treat fees
awards as procedural to assert jurisdiction. Compare Motion to Strike at 8 (“fees are costs, not
27 damages, and ‘hence fall [sic] outside the substantive demand of the complaint,’”) with Stokus,
28 217 Cal. App. 3d at 651 (“. . . hence can fall outside the substantive demand” (emphasis added)).
9
1 plain that if Mondo prevails on Count Five, Luxembourg law would also apply to its right to
2 recover attorneys’ fees in connection with that claim.
3 A. Luxembourg law providing for attorneys’ fees is consistent with California’s
exceptions to the “American rule.”
4
5 Even though California generally follows the “American rule” against fee-shifting, the
6 Code of Civil Procedure provides for numerous exceptions. Indeed, “[a]ttorney fees are allowed
7 as costs to the prevailing party when authorized by any of the following: contract, statute or law.”
8 Torres v. City of San Diego, 154 Cal. App. 4th 214, 224, 226 (2007) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
9 § 1033.5(a)(10) and allowing recovery of fees authorized by “law”). Because the Code allows
10 attorneys’ fees to be recovered as costs to the extent they are authorized by “law,” and
11 Luxembourg law authorizes fees to be recovered in connection with the Luxembourg claim at
12 issue, there is no conflict between California and Luxembourg law. See Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d at
13 580 (“There is obviously no problem where the laws of the two states are identical.”). 4 Indeed, all
14 Plaintiffs seek in their prayer for relief is an award of “attorneys’ fees and costs, as provided by
15 law.” Prayer for Relief ¶ I (emphasis added). That should be the end of the analysis. Jolie
16 nonetheless raises various red herrings, none of which compels a different conclusion.
17 First, it makes no difference that Plaintiffs bring other claims under California law.
18 Motion to Strike at 10. The claim at issue—the one that provides for attorneys’ fees—is asserted
19 under the law of Luxembourg. As Jolie herself notes, where choice of law is disputed, choice-of-
20 law analysis proceeds on an issue-by-issue basis. Id. at 9 (citing Aronson v. Advanced Cell Tech.,
21 196 Cal. App. 4th 1043, 1050 (2011)); see also Kearney, 39 Cal. 4th at 100.
22
4
Jolie’s reliance on authority standing for the proposition that a plaintiff may not seek fees as
23 damages under California law, Navellier v. Sletten, 106 Cal. App. 4th 763, 777 (2003), misses the
24 point—the issue is whether there is an entitlement to fees as damages under the Luxembourg
statute at issue. Jolie’s assertion that under California law “fees cannot be awarded in a contract
25 action unless the parties specifically bargain for it in their agreement” also misses the mark.
Motion to Strike at 11. First, Jolie’s characterization of this case as a “contract action” neglects
26 that choice-of-law analysis is undertaken issue by issue and that Mondo seeks fees in connection
with a claim under the Luxembourg Civil Code. Second, Jolie’s reliance on Code of Civil
27 Procedure section 1021 is misplaced because that section expressly provides that “parties to
28 actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs,” including fees as authorized by law.
10
1 Second, while Count Five was filed in California and of course involves California
2 residents and a sale of a California company, that does not mean that California law governs a
3 claim brought expressly under Luxembourg law. The seminal case establishing California’s
4 governmental interest test, Reich, demonstrates as much. In Reich, the California Supreme Court
5 concluded that California did not have an interest in applying its law to the claims at issue even
6 though both plaintiffs and defendants were California residents and plaintiffs brought claims in
7 California. 67 Cal. 2d at 555–56 (undertaking issue-by-issue analysis to determine California’s
8 interest in each issue and concluding that it had none).
9 B. Luxembourg’s interest in allowing for the recovery of attorneys’ fees outweighs
any limited interest in the application of the “American rule.”
10
11 If the Court finds a conflict exists between California and Luxembourg law here (and it
12 should not), it must then continue to the “comparative impairment” analysis, which “attempts to
13 determine the relative commitment of the respective states to the laws involved.” Offshore Rental
14 Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 166 (1978). Here, in the event Mondo prevails on its
15 Luxembourgish abuse-of-rights claim, the comparative impairment analysis weighs in favor of
16 applying Luxembourg law to the narrow issue of the fee request.
17 As set forth in Plaintiffs’ opposition to Jolie’s demurrer, Luxembourg has a strong interest
18 in regulating the activities of its registered corporations, as well as the relationships of direct and
19 indirect shareholders of those companies. Prüm Decl. ¶ 6. In connection with that interest, the
20 Luxembourg Civil Code provides for a claim of “Abuse of Rights” in circumstances where a party
21 appears to respect the apparent letter of the law, but violates the law due to the abusive nature of
22 its exercise of its right. Id. ¶ 8. Luxembourg law applies equally to individuals and entities,
23 regardless of nationality, and it applies regardless of whether the Luxembourg company or
24 agreement at the center of the dispute possesses assets in another country. See id. ¶ 6. Moreover,
25 the provision underlying this claim was enacted by Luxembourg’s legislature; it is not a matter of
26 contract law. 5 See id. ¶ 7, 20. If the Court were to disregard Luxembourg law here, it would
27
5
Jolie asserts that there is “no contractual fee provision.” Motion to Strike at 8. But Plaintiffs do
28 not seek attorneys’ fees on the basis of any purported contractual right.
11
1 impair Luxembourg’s “strong interest in protecting out-of-state residents . . . in order to
2 encourage” business in that country. See Rosenthal v. Fonda, 862 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.
3 1988); Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 168 (foreign state’s “vital interest in promoting freedom of
4 investment and enterprise” extends to out-of-state investors).
5 As set forth above, Luxembourg law also permits parties to claim attorneys’ fees as part of
6 the damages they have suffered. Prüm Decl. ¶ 20 (“[T]he fees a litigant must pay in order to win a
7 case in court constitute compensable damages whose origin is the fault of the unsuccessful
8 party.”). This is a critical feature of Luxembourg’s compensatory damages system, and it furthers
9 the policies the Luxembourg legislature had in mind when it enacted Article 6-1. Id. Using
10 California’s general fee-shifting rule here would substantially impair Luxembourg’s policies of
11 deterrence and compensation. Cutler, 441 F. Supp. at 865–66.
12 On the other hand, because California already carves out exceptions to its general rule
13 against fee-shifting, “applying [Luxembourg] law would merely carve out an additional exception
14 to California’s rule against attorneys’ fees and would not as significantly impair California’s
15 interests in generally requiring parties to bear their own fees.” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Dickstein
16 Shapiro LLP, 389 F. Supp. 3d 794, 844 (C.D. Cal. 2019), vacated in part on other grounds, 839 F.
17 App’x 105 (9th Cir. 2020).
18 Jolie cites a single case for the proposition that California’s interest outweighs
19 Luxembourg’s on this discrete issue: Arno, 134 F.3d at 1425. But Arno is easily distinguished.
20 There, unlike here, the foreign law authorizing the recovery of attorneys’ fees did not provide
21 those fees as part of a compensatory damages system. Instead, the French law giving rise to the
22 fees claimed in Arno was merely “an administrative provision” that was “enacted to alleviate
23 inequities in the then existing French scheme of attorney compensation.” Id. at 1426 (expressly
24 distinguishing application of English law in Cutler on the ground that the French law was “not
25 enacted as a component of France’s tort compensation system”).
26 In sum, even to the extent the Court concludes that California has some interest in applying
27 its general policy against fee-shifting in this case, the comparative impairment analysis weighs in
28 favor of applying Luxembourg law on this narrow issue.
12
1 CONCLUSION
2 For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny Jolie’s
3 motion to strike.
4
5 DATED: October 27, 2023 By:
John V. Berlinski
6
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
7 Jonathan M. Moses (admitted pro hac vice)
Adam L. Goodman (admitted pro hac vice)
8 Remy Grosbard (admitted pro hac vice)
Jessica L. Allen (admitted pro hac vice)
9
BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM,
10 DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C.
John V. Berlinski (State Bar No. 208537)
11 Julia B. Cherlow (State Bar No. 290538)
12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
13
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 William B. Pitt v. Angelina Jolie

Case No. 22STCV06081
3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1875 Century
Park East, 23rd Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561.
6
On October 27, 2023, I served the following document(s) described as PLAINTIFFS’
7 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE’S MOTION TO STRIKE PRAYER
8 FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES FROM SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF on the
9 interested parties in this action as follows:
10 SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
11 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused the document(s) to be
sent from e-mail address jkinsey@birdmarella.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in
12
the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic
13 message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
14 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
15
Executed on October 27, 2023, at Los Angeles, California.
16
17
18
Jessica D. Kinsey
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PROOF OF SERVICE
1 SERVICE LIST
William B. Pitt v. Angelina Jolie
2 Case No. 22STCV06081
3 Paul D. Murphy Laura W. Brill
Daniel N. Csillag Daniel Barlava
4 MURPHY ROSEN LLP KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP
100 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 1300 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 1725
5 Santa Monica, CA 90401 Los Angeles, CA 90067-4013
Telephone: (310) 899-3300 Telephone: (310) 556-2700
6 Email: pmurphy@murphyrosen.com Email: lbrill@kbkfirm.com
Email: dcsillag@murphyrosen.com Email: dbarlava@kbkfirm.com
7 Counsel for Defendant and Cross- Counsel appearing specially to challenge
Complainant Angelina Jolie jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants
8 Roland Venturini and Gary Bradbury
9 Joe Tuffaha Keith R. Hummel

Prashanth Chennakesavan Justin C. Clarke
10 LTL ATTORNEYS LLP Jonathan Mooney
300 South Grand Ave., Ste. 1400 CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
11 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Worldwide Plaza
Telephone: (213) 612-8900 825 Eighth Avenue
12 Email: joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com New York, NY 10019
Email: Telephone: (212) 474-1000
13 prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com Email: khummel@cravath.com
Counsel for Defendant and Email: jcclarke@cravath.com
14 Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC and Email: jmooney@cravath.com
Defendant Tenute del Mondo B.V. and Counsel for Defendant and
15 specially appearing to challenge jurisdiction Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC and
on behalf of Defendants Yuri Shefler, Alexey Defendant Tenute del Mondo B.V. and
16 Olivnik and SPI Group Holding, Ltd. specially appearing to challenge jurisdiction
on behalf of Defendants Yuri Shefler, Alexey
17 Olivnik and SPI Group Holding, Ltd.
18 Mark Drooks S. Gale Dick
BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, Phoebe King
19 NESSIM, DROOKS, LINCENBERG & Randall Bryer
RHOW, P.C. COHEN & GRESSER LLP
20 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor 800 Third Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561 New York, NY 10022
21 Telephone: 310 201-2100 Telephone: (212) 707-7263
Email: mdrooks@birdmarella.com Email: SGDick@CohenGresser.com
22 Counsel appearing specially to challenge Email: PKing@CohenGresser.com
jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants Email: rbryer@cohengresser.com
23 Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, Counsel appearing specially to challenge
and Families Perrin jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants
24 Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence,
and Families Perrin
25
26
27
28
PROOF OF SERVICE

Opposition To Attorney

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Opposition To Attorney

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1 BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM,

DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C.

24 Judge: Hon. Lia Martin

27 Reservation ID: 269966417033

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE’S

10 III. The governmental interest analysis mandates application of Luxembourg

6 Aronson v. Advanced Cell Tech.,

6 World Wide Imps., Inc. v. Bartel,

2 William B. Pitt v. Angelina Jolie

9 Joe Tuffaha Keith R. Hummel

You might also like