DE MESA v.
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS granted motion and case was subsequently
PHILIPPINES, INC., PEPSICO INC.,
(Quisumbing, Aug. 19, 2005)
FACTS:
 Same as Mendoza v. Pepsi Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. which affirmed CA decision and
Rodrigo v. Pepsi Cola Products Philippines,
Inc., which also affirmed CA decision
 facts culled from said CA DECISIONS
 petitioners are bearers of soft drink bottle caps
numbered 349 which is the winning
 combination in a contest which PEPSI sponsors
 Respondent is a domestic corporation engaged
in production, bottling, distribution of bottling
drinks, PEPSICO is foreign
 D.G. Consultores from Mexico is the firm that
handled the said promotions, tasked to
randomly pre-select pre-winning numbers and
send to respondents a list of 60 winning
numbers with their corresponding security
codes. The process of selection was approved
by DTI.
 From Feb 17 to May 8, 1992, respondents
seeded 1000 numbers (60 winning, 510
nonwinning, remaining 430 were unused). To
prevent tampering of winning numbers, DTI
requested for list of winning numbers and it was
deposited in a safety box.
 Due to its success, PEPSI tapped D.G. again to
predetermine 25 more winning numbers for the
extension of the Number Fever promo for 5
more weeks (May 10-June 12,1992)
 May 25, 1992 - respondents announced 349 as
winning number for May 26 draw. The same
night, Quintin Gomez of PCPPI’s Marketing
Services called DTI Director informing her that a
mistake had occurred.
 Numerous holders were not paid, leading to
filing of separate complaints for specific
performance and damages.
 Two of the complaints that pushed through were
the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases.
 Mendoza case was dismissed for lack of merit
by RTC and CA, and ultimately in SC.
 Same thing happened in Rodrigo case. In SC,
MR was also filed but was also denied with
finality.
 Prior to resolution of Mendoza and Rodrigo
cases, herein petitioners filed with RTC a
motion
to leave to 1) adopt previous testimonial and
documentary evidence in the 2 cases, and 2)
archive the case until final resolution of two
cases, which were then pending in CA. RTC
archived.
 Feb 5, 2002 - Rodrigo case became final and
executory
 Feb 20, 2002 – respondents filed for motion to
dismiss, invoking stare decisis.
 RTC granted motion to dismiss ratiocinating:
“The said doctrine embodies the legal maxim
that a principle or rule of law which has been
established by the decision of a court of
controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other
cases involving similar situation.”
-Petitioner asks Court to review, contending that
res judicata and stare decisis do not apply,
since there is no identity of parties, and that the
latter is not a hard and fast rule. They were
also complaining of breach of contract.
ISSUES and HOLDING:
1. W/N the present case is barred by Mendoza
and Rodrigo decisions - YES.
 The principle of stare decisis et non
quieta movere is entrenched in
ARTICLE 8 of the Civil code
 “ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.”
 In the instant case, the legal rights and
relations of the parties, the facts, the
applicable laws, the causes of action,
the issues, and the evidence are exactly
the same as those in the decided cases
of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence,
nothing is left to be argued. The issue
has been settled and this Courts final
decision in the said cases must be
respected. This Court’s hands are now
tied by the finality of the said judgments.
 We have no recourse but to deny the
instant petition. PETITION DENIED.
TITLE: Veloso, Jr. v CA, GR no. 116680, August
28, 1996
NICOLAS VELOSO, JR., CONCEPCION VELOSO
PATALINGHUG, EDUARDO VELOSO, LIGAYA
VELOSO ROA, RAFAEL VELOSO,
EMERENCIANA VELOSO CABIGON, DOMINGO
VELOSO
and EMMANUEL VELOSO, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR.
14, BAYBAY, LEYTE, CORSINI MIRAFLOR
AVELLANA, AUREO PEÑALOSA MIRAFLOR,
EDDIE PENALOSA MIRAFLOR and DOUGLAS
PEÑALOSA MIRAFLOR, respondents.
Ponente: Justice Bellosillo
Petition: for review on centiorari of the decision of
Court of Appeals.
Topics: Res Judicata
Doctrines and Provisions:
Res Judicata: the Latin term for "a matter [already]
judged", a case in which there has been a final
judgment and is no longer subject to appeal; and
the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude)
continued
litigation of a case on same issues between the
same parties.
Facts:
 September 12, 1988, Respondents Corsini
Miraflor Avellana, Aureo Peñalosa Miraflor, Eddie
Peñalosa Miraflor and Douglas Peñalosa Miraflor
filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages
against Nicolas Veloso Sr. and petitioners Nicolas
Veloso Jr., Concepcion Veloso Patalinghug,
Eduardo Veloso, Ligaya Veloso Roa, Rafael
Veloso, Emerenciana Veloso Cabigon, Domingo
Veloso and Emmanuel Veloso before the Regional
Trial Court. The subject matter of the complaint was
Lot No. 8422-F covered by TCT No. 22393 in the
name of Crispina Peñalosa Miraflor, deceased
mother of respondents.
 August 31, 1990, RTC decided in favor of the
respondents.
 May 28, 1992, CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
 October 12, 1992, Supreme Court reaffirmed CA
and RTC’s decision.
 September 20, 1993, Petitioners seek annulment
of the decision from CA.
 July 24, 1994, CA ruled against petitioners as it
found that the controversy had already been settled
by this Court and that the contention that the trial
court did not have "any power or authority to
amend, alter or modify the decision of a co-equal
court, the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Br.
III and Br. VIII," should have been raised in the
previous proceedings.
Issues and Holdings:
1. Whether or not CA erred in refusing to declare
the decision of the trial court void for having been
rendered allegedly in violation of the doctrines of
res judicata and the law of the case?
No, CA is correct in refusing the petition. The cases
petitioner has mentioned is a different case all
together, and is not being overlapped by the
previous case. The first case (R- 205) the lot (Lot
No. 8422-F) is not a part of the decision; while the
second case (B-122) has different defendants who
has not taken part on the case (B-1043) at hand.
Now under the guise of a petition for annulment of
judgment, petitioners in effect are seeking a second
cycle of review regarding a subject matter which
has already been fully and fairly adjudicate. That
cannot be allowed
Ruling:
The petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent
Court of Appeals dated 29 July 1994 is AFFIRMED.
(Leovillo) Agustin v. Court of Appeals and
Filinvest Finance Corp., G.R. No.
107846, 18 April 1997
FACTS:
 The petitioner was not able to fulfill his
promissory note for the amount of P43, 480.80
which was payable through monthly
installments and secured by a chattel mortgage
over an Isuzu diesel truck, both of which were
subsequently assigned to private respondent
Filinvest Finance Corporation.
 Due to failure of payments, private respondent
demanded the payment ofthe entire balance or
the possession of the mortgaged vehicle.
However, none of them were made. So, private
respondent filed a complaint with the RTC
Branch 26, against petitioner with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of replevin or the payment
of P32, 723.97 plus the interest. Trial ensued
and a
writ of replevin was issued by RTC Branch 26.
 Private respondent was able to acquire
possession of the vehicle but the vehicle was
no longer in running condition and several parts
were missing which the private respondent
replaced. The vehicle was then foreclosed and
sold at public auction.
 Private respondent subsequently filed a
“supplemental complaint” claiming additional
reimbursement of P8, 852.76 as value of
replacement parts including the expenses
incurred in transporting the mortgaged vehicle
from Cagayan to Manila.
 Petitioner, on the other hand, moved to dismiss
the supplemental complaint arguing that RTC
Branch 26 had already lost jurisdiction over the
case because of the earlier extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. The lower court
granted the motion and the case was
dismissed.
 Private respondent elevated the matter to the
appellate court which set aside the order of
dismissal and ruled that repossession expenses
incurred by the private respondent should be
reimbursed. This decision became final and
executory, hence the case was accordingly
remanded to the RTC Branch 40 for reception
of evidence to determine the amount due from
petitioner After trial, RTC Branch 40 found
petitioner liable for the repossession expenses,
attorney’s fees, liquidated damages, bonding
fees and other expenses in the seizure of the
vehicle in the aggregate sum of P18, 547.38.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which
the RTC Branch 40 modified its decision by
lowering the monetary award to P8, 852.76, the
amount originally prayed for in the supplemental
complaint. Private respondent appealed the
case with respect to the reduction of the amount
awarded.
 Petitioner, likewise, appealed impugning the
trial court’s order for him to pay private
respondent P8, 852.76, an amount over and
above the value
received from the foreclosure sale. Both
appeals were consolidated and the modified
order of RTC Branch 40 was affirmed.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
to no avail. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
 Petitioner contends that private respondent’s
repossession expenses have been amply
covered by the foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage, hence he should no longer be held
liable.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is allowed in a subsequent
appeal and in this petition to resuscitate and revive
formerly settled issues by the appellate court.
RULING: NO. The petitioner is not allowed in a
subsequent appeal and in this petition to
resuscitate and revive formerly settled issues. The
findings of
RTC Branch 40, as affirmed by the appellate court,
were confined to the appreciation of evidence
relative to the repossession expenses for the query
or issue passed upon by the respondent court has
become the “law of the case”.
The principle of “law of the case” is applied to an
established rule that when an appellate court
passes on a question and remands the cause to
the lower
court for further proceedings, the question there
settled becomes the law of the case upon
subsequent appeal."
In this case, it is clear that the appellate court had
already settled the propriety of awarding
repossession expenses in favor of private
respondent. The remand of the case to RTC
Branch 40 was for the sole purpose of threshing out
the correct amount of expenses and not for
relitigating the accuracy of the award.
Having exactly the same parties and issues, the
decision in the former appeal is now the
established and controlling rule. Therefore,
petitioner is not allowed in a subsequent appeal
and in this petition to resuscitate and revive
formerly settled issues. Judgment of courts should
attain finality at some point in time, as in this case,
otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al., G.R. No.
173148, 06 April 2015
FACTS:
 The present case involves a property dispute.
The parcel of land is located on the
northeastern bank of Jalaud River. On one side
of the river is the petitioner’s property (Lot No.
861) while on the other side is the respondents’
property (Lot No. 7328). The Jalaud River that
separates these parcels of land, flows along the
northeast side of Lot 861 and the southwest
side of Lot 7328. But sometime in the 1970s,
the
 Jalaud River steadily changed its course and
moved southwards towards the bank where Lot
7328 lies, leaving its old riverbed dry.
Eventually, the course of the Jalaud River
encroached on Lot 7328 which resulted to
progressive decrease of its size whereas the
banks adjacent to Lot 861 gradually increased
in land area.
 Degayo and the tenants believed that the area
was an accretion to Lot 861 and so, the tenants
commenced cultivating and tilling that disputed
area with corn and tobacco.
 The respondents, on the other hand, argued
that the disputed property was an abandoned
riverbed, which should rightfully belong to them
to compensate for the erstwhile portion of Lot
7328, over which the Jalaud River presently
runs.
 Respondents filed a complaint for ownership
and
damages against the tenants with the RTC
Branch 27 of Iloilo, entitled Dinglasan et al v.
 Jarencio et al. Degayo sought to intervene in
that case but her motion was denied. Thus,
Degayo initiated the present suit against the
respondents for declaration of ownership with
damages, with the RTC Branch 22 of Iloilo.
 Petitioner alleged to have acquired Lot 861 by
inheritance by virtue of a Quitclaim Deed and
that she had been in possession of that land
since 1954. She likewise stressed that the area
in dispute was an accretion to Lot 861.
 Meanwhile, notwithstanding the previous denial
of her motion to intervene in the former civil
case, Degayo was able to participate in the
proceedings therein as a witness for the
defense. During her direct examination, Degayo
testified on the same matters and raised the
same arguments she alleged in her recent
complaint: that she acquired Lot No. 861 by
inheritance by virtue of a Quitclaim Deed; that
she had been in possession of that land since
1954; and that the area in dispute was an
accretion to Lot No. 861.
 Afterwhich, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27,
rendered its decision in the former civil case, in
favor of the respondents. The tenants filed an
appeal but they failed to file an appeal brief,
resulting in a dismissal of their appeal.
 Meanwhile, in the suit filed by Degayo, the
Court found in favor of Degayo and declared
the property in question as an accretion to Lot
861.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
but their motion was denied. Hence,
respondents filed an appeal with the CA.
 The CA granted the respondents’ appeal and
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC
Branch 22 in Degayo’s suit. In granting the
appeal, the CA noted that the disputed
properties are abandoned riverbeds. Being
abandoned riverbeds, the property in question
rightfully belongs to the respondents as the
owners of the land now occupied by the Jalaud
River. The CA also noted that the previous RTC
Branch decision in the former civil case is
conclusive to the title of the thing, being an
aspect of the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment.
 Degayo sought a reconsideration of the CA
decision but the CA denied her motion. Hence,
Degayo filed the present petition for review on
certiorari with the SC.
ISSUE: WON the decision in the former case filed
by the respondents against the tenants constitutes
bar by prior judgment in the present case filed by
the petitioner.
RULING: YES. The decision in the first civil case
filed by respondent Dinglasan against the tenants
constitutes bar by prior judgment in the present
case.
Res judicata that rests on the principle that “parties
should not be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once; that, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction . . .”
The concept of res judicata as bar by prior
judgment is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim, demand or cause of action. In this case, the
first civil case filed by the respondents against the
tenants has attained finality in view of the tenant’s
abandonment of their appeal to the CA. Records
also show that decision was adjudicated on the
merits. The court also found that there was an
identity of parties in the former civil case and the
present case. There is identity of parties where the
parties in both actions are the same, or there is
privity between them, or they are
“successors-in-interest” by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity. Therefore, the decision in the first civil
case filed by the respondents constitutes bar by
prior judgment in the present case filed by the
petitioner.
ABUEVA vs WOOD G.R. No. L-21327 January
14, 1924
JOHNSON, J
The parties:
Petitioners are members of the Independence
Commission. The creation of the commission was
ratified and adopted by the Philippine Legislature
on the 8th day of March, 1919. Twenty-six of the
petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives and four are members of the
Senate of the Philippine Islands and they all belong
to the democratic party;
Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, Manuel L.
Quezon and Manuel Roxas, Presidents of the
Independence Commission. Sued as well are the
Acting Auditor, the Executive Secretary and the
Secretary of the Independence Commission.
This is an original action commenced in the
Supreme Court by the petitioners for the writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to exhibit to
the petitioners and to permit them to examine all
the vouchers and other documentary proofs in their
possession, showing the disbursements and
expenditures made out of the funds of the
Independence Commission.
FACTS:
By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine
Islands provided for a standing appropriation of
one million pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable
out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not
otherwise appropriated, to defray the expenses of
the Independence Commission, including publicity
and all other expenses in connection with the
performance of its duties; that said appropriation
shall be considered as included in the annual
appropriation for the Senate and the House of
Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each
house, although the appropriation act hereafter
approved may not make any specific appropriation
for said purpose; with the proviso that no part of
said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular
Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the
payment or payments authorized by said act
Petitioners averred that as members of the
Independence Commission they are legally obliged
to prevent the funds from being squandered, and to
prevent any investments and illicit expenses in
open contravention of the purposes of the law.
Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested
the respondents to permit them to examine the
vouchers and other documentary proofs relating to
the expenditures and payments made out of the
funds appropriated for the use of the Independence
Commission.
Respondents have denied and continue denying to
permit the petitioners from examining said vouchers
and documentary proofs.
ISSUE: Can the Court compel the respondents to
address the claims of the petitioners
HELD:
Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands and head of the executive
department of the Philippine Government, is not
subject to the control or supervision of the courts.
Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as
Chairman of the Independence Commission, are
mere agents of the Philippine Legislature and
cannot be controlled or interfered with by the
courts.
As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of
the subject of the action because section 24 of the
Jones Law provides that: “The administrative
jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts, whether of
funds or property, and all vouchers and records
pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive”
The determination of whether the accounts of the
expenses of the Commission of Independence
should be shown to the plaintiffs or not is a
question of policy and administrative discretion, and
is therefore not justiciable.
JOSE A. ANGARA vs THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for
having received the most number of votes.
On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro
Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
“Motion of Protest” against the election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
after the passage of Resolutions N0.8 confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly
against whom no protest had thus far been filedo.
Praying, among other-things, that said respondent be
declared elected member of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said
position be nullified
Issue:
Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the
affirmative?
HELD:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in
our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. For example,
the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far
made a check on the legislative power that this assent
is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a
law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as
the case may be, of the National Assembly. The
President has also the right to convene the Assembly
in special session whenever he chooses. On the other
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on
the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence
of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court
shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial
power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence
to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
Conclusion:
(a) That the government established by the
Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive
and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to
resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial
review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that
no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes
of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the
present Constitution went into effect, each house of
the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all
the powers previously exercised by the legislature
with respect to contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of its members, to the
Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to
the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the
implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing
protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the
National Assembly were to retain the power to
prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner
of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution
repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively
the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section
478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond
or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs
and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member against whom no protest had
been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and
cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which
protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission

was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein
petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not
in any manner toll the time for filing protests against
the elections, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.