PionBerlin VictimsExecutionersArgentine 1991

Of Victims and Executioners: Argentine State Terror, 1975-1979
Author(s): David Pion-Berlin and George A. Lopez

Source: International Studies Quarterly , Mar., 1991, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 63-
86
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International Studies Quarterly (1991) 35, 63-86
Of Victims and Executioners: Argentine State

Terror, 1975-1979
DAVID PION-BERLIN
The Ohio State University
AND
GEORGE A. LOPEZ
The University of Notre Dame
Scholars have found that state terror has been employed frequently against
subdued, if not fully compliant, populations. Scholars have argued that
regimes may attack groups whose characteristics seem incongruent with
their own ideological agendas. Having fully internalized a set of doctrines,
and being prone to exaggerate the extent and depth of the security threats
facing them, authoritarian regimes may provoke long periods of unre-
strained, disproportionate and unnecessary state terror. Drawing from the
recent scholarly attempts to stipulate the conditions associated with the
appearance of state terror, we delineate two major ideologies which have
guided the Argentine military to perpetrate state terror as standard policy.
In national security and free market ideologies, we claim, the Argentine
rulers of the Proceso period found the rationale for making the disappear-
ance of real and perceived adversaries a daily governmental routine. Com-
bined, these ideologies provided motives to sustain high levels of repression
and guidelines to select its victims. We examine social characteristics of the
victims of Argentine state terror and analyze organizational and legal forms
of coercion to reveal patterns that are consistent with ideological predisposi-
tions. We then demonstrate that individuals suffered a greater probability
of victimization if they were members of particular trade unions perceived
by the government to have obstructed its achievement of economic and
security goals. These and other trends lead us to conclude that ideology was
a motivating force behind the infamous Argentine "Dirty War."
Introduction
State terror is a premeditated, patterned, and instrumental form of government

violence.' It is planned, inflicted regularly, and intended to induce fear through
I To enhance stylistic variation, the terms state terror, political repression, and human rights abuses will be used
interchangebly in this paper. We are acutely aware of the differences in meaning these terms have, however slight
they may be. Repression refers to the use or threat of use of coercion by governing authorities to control or
eliminate opposition. State terror is a subset of repression, designed to inflict fear in a target population-(in order
to control their behavior)-by physically harming a victim with which the target population readily identifies
Human rights abuse is a normative expression, conveying the fact that a wrong has been committed in repressing
or terrorizing a victim. These terms are obviously closely associated with one another.
Authors' note: We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper provided by
Michael Stohl, Rhoda Howard, Scott Mainwaring, E. Ladd Hollist, John McCamant, Carol Stuart, Caroline
Domingo, and anonymous reviewers of ISQ.
X 1991 International Studies Association

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64 Of Victims and Executioners
"coercive and life threatening action" (Gurr, 1986:46). Though most scholars can
agree on these features, each new instance of state terror in the twentieth century has
spawned a set of nagging questions for the research community. First, why have so
many individuals become victims of the most severe form of intimidation and pun-
ishment, when less harsh forms of political coercion would have sufficed to control
them? Second, why are the worst forms of state terror often reserved for those who
engage in no form of protest or hostile action against the regime? Finally, how and
why are these non-dissenting populations singled out for victimization (Arendt,
1951; Kelman, 1973; Fein, 1979; Kuper, 1981)?
In certain cases, the espousal of invidious doctrines, coupled with the clear, public
identification and stigmatization of specific religious (Nazi Germany), ethnic (Bu-
rundi), or racial (South Africa) populations, make the selection of victims, if not the
choice of terror as a policy instrument, somewhat comprehensible. But in other
instances, both the choice of terror and the selection of victims seem unfathomable.
Such is the case of Argentine state terror under the military regime of the Proceso de
Reorganizacion Nacional (PRN or Proceso), which ruled from 1976 to 1983. During this
period of military rule known as the "Dirty War," an estimated 15,000 citizens
remain unaccounted for or are known to have been killed. This infamous time was
marked by numerous acts of state terror, the most frequent of which were disappear-
ances.2
International human rights offices were flooded weekly with reports of the abduc-
tions, murders and disappearances of a diverse mixture of citizens: teachers, scien-
tists, workers, clergy, professionals, even housewives and children. Apparently there
were no clear ethnic or religious patterns to these atrocities, and certainly no racial
ones in this overwhelmingly white population. Moreover, most of the victims had
never engaged in any political activity, let alone activity of a clandestine, violent, or
radical nature. The guerrilla forces, which had posed a security problem, were firmly
rebuked by the end of 1975 and could only commit sporadic and futile acts of urban
terror by early 1976. Rather telling is the fact that nearly seventy percent of the
disappeared were abducted in the privacy of their homes or while peacefully assem-
bled at work. Only twenty-five percent were arrested on the street, where they were
at least in a position to have publicly dissented (CONADEP, 1986:11). The state-
inflicted human rights abuses were scattered and, with a kind of Orwellian logic, the
agents of the military government seemed to strike arbitrarily, unpredictably, and
nearly everywhere against the alleged "enemies of the state."
The striking similarity of the depictions by survivors, friends, and perpetrators of
the methods of abduction and the severity of treatment gives weight to the idea that
this state terror was not only deliberate but centrally planned. In its investigation the
presidentially-appointed Argentine National Commission for the Disappeared
(CONADEP) has identified some 340 concentration camps hidden behind the walls
of military and police installations. Legal records show that the physical and psycho-
logical abuse of political prisoners committed in the camps occurred with the knowl-
edge-and in most instances under the direct supervision-of superior officers.
This lends weight to the argument that the "Dirty War" was an intended policy of
state.
If state terror was intentionally inflicted, then what motivated the Argentine gen-
erals to take such a course of action? In this study, we argue that Argentine state
terror was induced by the ideological beliefs of the junta leaders. More specifically,
the commitment to high levels of violence as a cornerstone of policy is best explained
2 A full account of the events leading up to the Proceso and of the Proceso itself will not be offered here, since the
subject has already been treated adequately elsewhere. See Schvarzer (1983), Waldmann and Garz6n (1983),
Simpson and Bennett (1985), and Buichanan (1987).

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DAVID PION-BERLIN AND GEORGE A. LOPEZ 65
by the regime's adherence to two distinct yet related doctrines. The first, an Argen-
tine variant of the national security doctrine, licensed broad and continuous attacks
against perceived "enemies of state" by claiming that the nation was embroiled in a
state of permanent or total war. In succumbing to the logic of war, which produced a
simplistic and even dichotomous view of the Argentine polity, the military junta
found a warrant to conduct an extensive campaign of terror.
Although state terror was pervasive, it also had its focal points. The second ideol-
ogy, a doctrinaire version of free-market economics, guided the state's hand in its
systematic selection of victims. Through an examination of data on the social charac-
teristics of the Argentine desaparecidos or disappeared, we find that repressive activity
can in part be associated with the collective affiliations of its victims. Based on its own
economic biases, the state systematically targeted members of unions perceived to be
opposed to the achievement of governmental economic objectives. Together, then,
these security and economic ideologies provided a motivation for the use of excessive
levels of state violence by the regime and the identification of the victims of such
violence.
Theories of State Terror
Although it still lags behind the prevalence of the phenomenon itself, our knowledge
of why governments terrorize their own populations has grown considerably over
the past decade (Duff and McCamant, 1976; Goldstein, 1978, 1983; Pion-Berlin
1983, 1988; Stohl and Lopez, 1984, 1986; Howard, 1986; Mason and Krane, 1989).
This literature has steadily narrowed the frame of reference from variables operative
in the wider political environment to more detailed analyses of government strategy
and elite decisions in order to name the conditions tLinder which national leaders and
their designated agents employ techniques of terror (Stohl and Lopez, 1986). De-
spite insights into the context and cost-benefit calculus of state violence, little has
been done to posit the specific belief systems that motivate state terror.
Other analysts have identified the decisional settings, pressures, and rules that
explain reliance on terror. Stohl and Lopez (1984) suggest that the resort to terror is
a policy choice made under particular national circumstances: either (1) when the
resident ruling group engages in a drive for control greater than what most observ-
ers would claim necessary for them to maintain power or (2) when the resident
ruling group is faced with institutional (usually non-violent) or extra-institutional
(usually violent) challenges to its power that cannot be eradicated through minimal
levels of force.
In their attempt to develop a more precise calculus of decision making, Duvall and
Stohl (1988) argue that ruling elites opt for terror when they perceive it to be a
useful, efficient, and uncostly tool to achieve desired ends. Operating from the
premise of rational choice, the authors assert that prior to resorting to state violence
decision makers calculate their relative capabilities and vulnerabilities as well as the
probability of achieving desired ends with minimal costs.
However reasonable and persuasive such a proposition may be in the abstract, it
seems less appropriate to the study of unprovoked terror against compliant popula-
tions. If an opposition is unarmed and relatively defenseless, then why should a
military regime bother with calculation of risk? Both the uncertainties and the costs
involved in the use of coercion should be minimal in light of the overwhelming
resource advantages the regime enjoys. Military regimes are much less preoccupied
with public image than are democratic regimes. They are quick to confer upon
themselves legitimacy by virtue of their "historic mission" and assumption of state
power. Furthermore, ruling elites are unlikely to bother with utility calculations in
the development of policy unless they have already been sufficiently motivated to

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consider so drastic a policy as unmitigated terror. A zealous determination to accom-

plish a mission and a faith in terror as a policy instrument may, in fact, obscure the
potential costs or risks involved from the policy maker's view. Thus, the issue of
underlying motive has eluded prior studies and demands considerable systematic
analysis.
Discovering motive may be even more pronounced a problem in the Argentine
case because a veil of secrecy still shrouds much of the armed forces' operations. So
far as we know, the military kept no records of their work, rarely brought formal
charges against their victims, and seldom accused them of violating laws. Moreover,
since the disappeared are all presumed to be dead, there can be no first-hand corrob-
oration of theories as to why each individual was detained, tortured, and/or exe-
cuted. Ideally, we would want to have the military's accounts of their prisoners'
alleged wrongdoings and the prisoners' statements of defense. In this manner, we
could create a general view of terror through the compilation of specific details. This
kind of information is simply not available. We do know, however, a great deal about
the ideology of those leaders who directed the Proceso Government, including their
view of the threat facing Argentina and their thoughts about the economy they
managed. In these two ideologies, one concerning the general polity and the other
the economy, we have what Gurr has termed the "identifiable cultural, ideological,
and experiential origins of state terror" (1986:65).
The Case for Ideology as a Source of Terror
Scholarship
Nearly forty years ago, Hannah Arendt first proposed that unprovoked terror could
find its origins in the ideological dispositions of state leaders (Arendt, 1951:6). The
purpose of totalitarian ideology was to construct a "fiction" about the nation's ills that
elites and masses alike would readily consume (1951:341-53). As Arendt explains,
the doctrine was fully internalized by the Nazis. Devoid of factual content, their anti-
Semitic doctrine was nonetheless touted as scientific, prophetic, and infallible, turn-
ing the extermination of Jews into a matter of historical necessity (1951:339): " The
assumption of a Jewish world conspiracy was transformed by totalitarian propa-
ganda from an objective, arguable matter into the chief element of the Nazi reality;
the point was that the Nazis acted as though the world were dominated by Jews and
needed a counterconspiracy to defend itself" (1951:352). Arendt added that this
brand of terror "continues to be used by totalitarian regimes even when its psycho-
logical aims are achieved; its real horror is that it reigns over a completely subdued
population" (1951:335).
Arendt's insight has received little attention and virtually no testing over the years.
The generation of scholars to which she belonged who were critical of totalitarian
rule themselves, earned well-deserved criticisms for their simplistic, deterministic,
and polemical accounts of communist tyranny. Arendt's own study of Nazi and
Stalinist terror fell into a genre obsessed with the inherent evils of totalitarian rule. It
failed to recognize the significant variations in political coercion found within com-
munist states. And yet, despite this weakness, her more general point about ideologi-
cally-induced terror is still relevant for contemporary scholars.
More recently, others have acknowledged the importance of ideology as an impe-
tus for genocide against non-hostile populations (Fein, 1979, 1984; Kuper, 1981),
but no one has concentrated on non-genocidal forms of state violence. Second,
ideological genocide as defined by these authors refers mainly to the dehumaniza-
tion of minorities, scapegoats, or other communal groups perceived to be different
from the dominant civilization; it does not include persecution of minorities or non-

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minorities defined by economic, political, or social position or opposition. Most re-

cently, Harff and Gurr (1988) have made an important analytical distinction between
genocide, where victims are defined by communal characteristics, and politicide,
where victims are defined "primarily in terms of their hierarchical position or politi-
cal opposition to the regime and dominant groups" (1988:360). Their ideological
variant of politicide, however, is restricted to Marxist-Leninist regimes that stigma-
tize their opposition with association with the old order or for lack of revolutionary
zeal. This does not allow us to uncover the ideological motivations and cognitive
mechanisms behind right-wing authoritarian terror as it occurred in countries like
Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile.
Aiguments
The search for ideological determinants of state terror must inevitably confront the
objection that rulers use ideological jargon simply to conceal the "real" motives
behind their political actions.3 These cunning disguises have no inherent value be-
cause they originate in underlying motives driven by pursuit of political and/or
economic advantage. Social science explanations can and should "bypass" the ideo-
logical prism by identifying the appropriate set of interests to be served by political
terror.
At issue is whether rulers accept rather than simply use the ideological precepts
they espouse (Markoff and Duncan Baretta, 1985). Are ideological pronouncements
demonstrations of conviction or simply ad-hoc rationalizations for political deci-
sions? This is an empirical question. There is no a priori reason to assume that ruling
elites are either uniformly instrumental on the one hand or purely principled on the
other. Undoubtedly investigations across regimes and time periods would reveal
instances of ideological commitment on one level and expediency on another. At the
same time examples would be found where self interest and ideological conviction
coexisted and were mutually reinforcing. Based on analysis of written discourse and
interviews with members of the Proceso government, it is our best judgment that
Argentine elites of the time did embrace their ideological precepts (to be described
below), though these were also consistent with their own political agendas. Therefore
ideology tended to be self-serving.4
In those instances where strong ideological commitment is found, it is worth not-
ing Robert M. Maclver's observation that though "man spins about him his web of
myth," that myth "mediates between man and nature. From the shelter of his myth
he perceives and experiences the world" (Rejai, 1971:5). Insofar as political agents
predicate their decisions, as well as their perceptions on their interpretations of
political reality, those interpretations should be the subject of social science's scru-
tiny. Unquestionably ideologies may mystify a subject's view of his or her political
surroundings. But as Helen Fein (1979:8) points out, regardless of how irrational
policy decisions based on exaggerated or even fictionalized accounts of political
reality (as in the case of Nazi Germany) may appear to be, they should be considered
"goal oriented acts from the point of view of their perpetrators" (emphasis ours). Mass
3 A classical (and non-Gramscian) Marxian analysis, for example, would argue that ideas are simply instruments
which elites may use to win broader support or compliance for the prevailing order (Tucker, 1972:136).
4 There are two strong reasons to believe that ideological conviction did exist in the Proceso government. First,
the ideas that were expressed were not conveniently invented just prior to the onslaught of terror. They had
permeated the ranks of the military years before and were elaborated upon in military journals, speeches, and
hemispheric security conferences. Second, the elites did not abandon their views when they were no longer
needed. Even during current episodes of relative calm under democratic rule, officers and civilians have continued
to repeat the same security themes espoused during the "Dirty War" (Viola, 1984, Martinez de Hoz 1994).

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murder is always a calculated choice by policy makers based upon the pursuit of
specific objectives. This obtains even where such objectives are ideologically derived
(Fein, 1979).
Once ideologies are assimilated, they serve as a "map" of social and political reality
for policy makers who would rather rely on these few guiding principles than be
forced to make new and diverse judgments in an uncertain environment (Knorr,
1976). Those maps sharpen some images of the political landscape while blurring
others, facilitating the selection of information and then decisions by greatly simpli-
fying a complex and problematic political situation. Of course policy makers nor-
mally engage in some degree of simplification (Jervis, 1976). The danger lies in a
rigid adherence to ideologies that are fundamentally discordant with objective events
(Knorr, 1976:85). Ideologies that are conceptually flawed, anachronistic, or simply
incompatible with contemporary reality are sure to inaccurately map the political
terrain of elites. Exaggerated or implausible accounts of national conditions are then
fully accepted, thus turning into an imperative the excessive use of violence by the
state against complacent populations.
We maintain that the Argentine regiine's relentless witch hunt against a relatively
compliant citizenry was motivated by a structured and yet misinformed set of expla-
nations of Argentine reality. Ideological beliefs shaped the military's cognitive
framework: security-related problems and their origins were identified, victims were
targeted, and strategies chosen. Prompted by ideology, the military turned a limited
battle against rebel units into an unnecessary and large-scale repression of the gen-
eral population. Notwithstanding our conviction that this policy of overkill was un-
necessary, it is evident that the military's ideological maps of reality were substan-
tively meaningful for them. For that reason, there should be links between the
substance of the military's ideology and its subsequent actions.
What follows is a discussion of two ideologies that we believe to have guided
Argentine state terror (Pion-Berlin, 1983, 1988; Lopez, 1986). The first, the Na-
tional Security Doctrine (NSD), provided the authorization for unmitigated state
violence against citizens. The second, a free-market ideology, provided a focus for
the selection of certain victims. To identify the specific Argentine variant of these
doctrines, we made a qualitative assessment of governmental discourse. Our proce-
dure was to review the political, security, and economic components of as many
military documents, speeches, press conferences, and interviews of the period as
were available. For example, all of the speeches and press interviews and some secret
directives of military president Jorge Videla (1976-1980) that were available (1976-
1977, 1979) were examined. A second source of information was magazine inter-
views with and editorials by General Ram6n Camps, who acted as a frequent ideolog-
ical spokesman for the military. As a former chief of police for Buenos Aires
Province, he was the person most responsible for the detention and disappearance of
individuals in the nation's populous capital. Because Argentina's was an institutional-
ized military regime, all remarks by individual officers of the state had the official
endorsement of the junta. Thus we can be confident that views expressed by these
two important officers reflected the opinion of the regime itself.
We read institutional documents as well, including the initial proclamation issued
by the junta upon assuming power in March of 1976, and the official document
justifying the junta's involvement in the Dirty War, published in La Nacz6n on April
29, 1983. For economic themes in particular, all of the speeches and press confer-
ences of the economics minister, Dr. Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, were examined
(from April 1976 to March 1981). Finally, we analyzed legal statements made during
the human rights trials of 1985 by and on behalf of former junta members Roberto
Viola and Basilio Lami Dozo. In all cases we took note of those security and economic
themes most frequently repeated and emphasized by the military government. It

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soon became apparent that individual statements were part of larger ideological
mosaics about national security and economic progress.5
The NSD and State Terror
With roots planted in French, North American, and Latin American military litera-
ture and goyernmental policy, the NSD is a set of ideas and principles about achiev
ing national security (Comblin, 1979; Tapia Valdez, 1980; Arriagada, 1981). All
states are security conscious, but within the NSD national security assumes over-
whelming importance. It becomes the yardstick by which policy success is measured,
and the beginning and the end of political life itself. The state, as the central institu-
tion of society, is charged with guaranteeing that security, and state managers are
therefore granted special prerogatives (Arriagada, 1980). In this regard the NSD is
obviously elitist, since it emphasizes the right of state authorities alone to decide the
public good. The achievement of national security objectives is often at odds with the
protection of individual freedom (Comblin, 1976). This tension is usually resolved in
favor of national security, as individual rights are illegally, repeatedly, and flagrantly
violated at the hands of the state. In that respect the NSD is authoritarian. It is
infused with ideological norms that attack Marxist principles and defend Western-
Christian values. It is strategic in refocusing the attention of the armed forces on
combating unorthodox forms of internal aggression that threaten national security.
Finally, it presumes that development and security are dependent upon one another
(Lopez, 1986).
In some sense the NSD in the 1970s became a generic ideological framework that
various Latin American military establishments have revised, reinterpreted, and se-
lectively borrowed from to suit their own needs. The Argentine variant of the NSD
had its genesis at the intersection of two external currents of thought. The first
current was French, which found its way to Argentina in the late 1950s with the visit
of military missions to Buenos Aires. The French, deeply entrenched in counterin-
surgency operations in Algeria, spoke from experience when they urged the Argen-
tines to confront the communist threat in a similar manner. They were taken very
seriously by those officers who were trained and indoctrinated into military life at
about that time and who would later rule during the Proceso. Despite the relative
calm Argentina enjoyed at the time and the populations' strong reluctance to affiliate
with parties of the left, a flurry of articles (some authored by French officers) soon
appeared in Argentine military journals, such as the Revista de la Escuela Superior de
Guerra, warning of the country's vulnerability to international Marxism. At the time
however, these views did not circulate much beyond the walls of military libraries and
barracks, and they certainly were not endorsed as official defense policy.
The second current of thought was North American. By the early 1960s the
specter of communism had come to haunt the Latin American military establish-
ments in the form of the Cuban revolution. Castro's victory induced the Kennedy
administration to undertake a thorough revision of U.S. security doctrine in the
region. What emerged was a blueprint for the continental defense of Western demo-
cracies coupled with a rationale for military engagement in domestic security and
development operations. Generally, national defense of territorial borders gave way
to a broader concept of national security that justified Latin American military in-
volvement in the region's politics to arrest external and internal "hostilities" of all
5This assessment is consistent with findings of a previous study about the Argentine military's perceptions of
national security threats (Pion-Berlin, 1988). In that study, the content of military public documents was analyzed
and coded by taking the subiects' repeated use of certain words and their synonyms as evidence of commitment to
one view or another.

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kinds. Argentine acceptance of the North American doctrine was revealed in 1964
by General and soon to be President Juan Carlos Ongania, who argued that while the
armed forces should normally remain subordinate to the constitutional authorities,
they must reserve the right to intervene should the government fall prey to "foreign
ideologies" and fail to conform to the new conventions of Western Hemispheric
security (1964:756-59). In concert with the U.S. security doctrine, Ongania had
given his military license to broaden its political role-which was used to overthrow
democratic governments in 1966 and 1976.
As it developed throughout the 1960s, the Argentine variant of the NSD was
notable for its excessive preoccupation with the perceived "agents of disorder"
those groups which would directly threaten national security-rather than with the
underlying structural conditions of underdevelopment that may have contributed to
that disorder. Unlike their Peruvian counterparts, the Argentines were not con-
vinced that the achievement of political stability could await the fruits of structural
change. Sensing more immediate dangers to the political order, the Proceso govern-
ment was determined to achieve security through direct confrontation with a per-
ceived enemy.
In fact, the centerpiece of Argentine security ideology was the principle that a state
of permanent or total war existed within their society (Ludendorff, 1941; Comblin,
1976; Arriagada, 1981). Subscribing to a fundamentally conspiratorial view of the
world, the NSD-minded generals were convinced that they were besieged by commu-
nist agents engaged in an international war against "Western Civilization and its
ideals." Argentina was a major theatre of operations in this ongoing global confron-
tation, often referred to as the "Third World War" (Camps, 1986).
This was an unconventional war whose subversive perpetrators were thought to
operate in disguised form. Having retreated from the conventional military battle-
field, the subversives would penetrate society to conduct multifaceted forms of strug-
gle. As Jorge Videla explains, "We define [subversion] as a global phenomenon that
has a political, economic, social, cultural and military dimension, that based on philo-
sophical or ideological assumptions, tries to penetrate within a population to subvert
its values, create chaos and through these means assume power violently" (1977:8).
Under such conditions, normal geographical and temporal demarcations between
war and peace become blurred, without borders or conclusions. General Roberto
Viola, who commanded the army during the height of the Dirty War and later
became military president, explains: "There were no clear battle lines, no large
concentration of arms and men, no final battle to signal victory" (La Raz6n, 1979:2).
The military turned this conception to its advantage tojustify continuous and broad-
scale counterattacks in its own defense. General Viola comments: "Since the entire
country is besieged by acts of violence, the army command has the inalienable right
to exercise its legitimate defense . . . juridical considerations about the definition of
a state of belligerency, within a revolutionary war, is a problem that is the exclusive
concern of the political leaders of the nation under attack" (1985:553).
Convinced that the enemy's chameleon-like transformations would prolong its life
span indefinitely, the Argentine military thrust itself into permanent combat readi-
ness (Comblin, 1976; Arriagada, 1981). Referring to the enduring and yet partially
concealed nature of this conflict, former Air Force General Basilio Lami Dozo said:
This aggression has not ended. The return of Argentina to constitutional rule has
demanded of the international Marxian movement and its affiliated organizations
designated to operate in our country [that they adopt] new strategies and tactics"
(1985:572).
The logic of war within this permanent struggle dictated that political life be
subordinated to the demands of combat. This produced a simplistic and dichoto-
mous view of the Argentine polity. Those who refused to demonstrate loyalty to the

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military and its government were declared in opposition to the regime and the state
itself. Those placed in opposition were treated as implacable enemies who must
consequently be eliminated rather than won over.
Typical of the response of state leaders during war, characterizations of political
foes were hostile and demeaning (Keen, 1986). Adversaries were frequently referred
to as subversives or terrorists, terms normally reserved for those thought to be
unscrupulous in their tactics and irredeemably immoral in character (Videla, 1979).
Willing to resort to any means to pursue ignominious ends, these foes could neither
be trusted to abide by negotiated settlements nor be permitted to remain even as
vanquished members of society. Only their complete extermination would ensure
the military's perceived need for total security. As Videla stated, "With the objective
[of securing social peace] we will combat, without respite, subversive delinquency in
all of its forms until its total annihilation" (1979:6). The armed forces were unwilling
to admit that relations with political foes could improve, that adversaries on one issue
could be allies on another, or that dissidents could redeem themselves. Their view
was politically blind and tended "to accelerate compulsively to the point of greatest
violence" (Arriagada, 1980:58).
In these two recurrent and interconnected themes, the condition of permanent
war and the logic of combat, we have what Herbert Kelman (1973) has referred to as
the loss of restraints against violence. In assuming that a condition of permanent
internal war existed, the Argentine national security ideology offered the military a
warrant for extensive and continuous terror in the name of protecting the nation. In
presenting combat as the operative form of engagement, the ideology justified the
routinization of terror. As mutually reinforcing tendencies, these themes made state
terror the cornerstone of governmental policy.
In sum, the regime employed a process of ideological deduction. It began with the
premise that national security is the state's paramount objective. It then defined the
security dilemma within a framework of permanent war. From there, particular
views about the polity and the opposition were formulated, as were the problems and
threats associated with the state of permanent war. Given these premises and the
perception of threat that they generated, the decision to use coercion became a
logical conclusion. This cognitive process is diagrammed in Figure 1.
What the NSD failed to do was to specify with precision who the targets of state
terror would be. Certainly those who taught and were taught "subversive" social and
political doctrines (teachers and students), those who questioned the legitimacy of
military rule (journalists), and those who were perceived to have compromised loyal-
ties to the Argentine nation (Jews) were suspect. But it is apparent from its own
pronouncements that the military was vague in its identification of the opposition.
According to President Videla himself, a subversive is "anyone who opposes the
Argentine way of life" (Simpson and Bennett, 1985:76). This discourse suggests that
state terror may have had an indiscriminate dimension which we will discuss later.
But it also masks the fact that the junta's campaign of terror had focal points as well.
To understand how some victims were singled out, we turn to the regime's economic
ideas.
The Economic Ideology of State Terror
The Argentine regime subscribed to a doctrinaire version of monetarist or free-

market economics found throughout the Southern Cone region of Latin America at
the time but by no means universally adhered to elsewhere (Vergara, 1984; Sheehan,
1987). These monetarists shunned even the most limited forms of government inter-
vention in markets which they believed to be inherently stable. Second, they were
obsessed with inflation and its causes, waging an eclectic battle against wage in-

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Ideology National security doctrine
r f Dichotomous view of polity

Views Permanent war thesis Opponents are enemies
Logic of combat Dehumanization of enemies
fl r Threats to:
Problem Revolution iF e Nation

Idetfcto uvrineRgm
Problem Subv~ersions Regimae
Ij Development
Target VaIeSee economic ideology for

Specification Vague specification
Threat perception a
Strategy High levels of terror
FIG. 1. National security ideology and the deduction of state terror.
creases, monetary expansion and fiscal irresponsibility. Though the military could
not claim any economic expertise, many officers were quickly enticed by the mone-
tarists' assertions that they had the most scientific, rational, and effective response to
the economic dislocations allegedly caused by labor-based, populist governments.
In particular, the military was irked by the economic practices of the previous
labor-dominated Peronist government, which the junta accused of a "manifest irre-
sponsibility in the management of the economy which had destroyed the productive
apparatus" (Review of the River Plate, 1976:405). In announcing their own plans for
economic recovery-which included specific adjustments such as limitations on gov-
ernment credit and current expenditures and deficits, and a general dismantling of
the state-led economy-the Argentine military was also making a serious indictment
of previous economic practices (Martinez de Hoz, 1981:1-15).
The Argentine military's monetarist economic team was obsessed with what it
perceived to be the excessive expansion of the state's economic functions (Review of
the River Plate, 1977:441.) The state, in its view, had wrongly assumed the burdens of
subsidizing poorly run firms, retaining unprofitable state owned enterprises, and
preserving and expanding public-sector employment. All of these unproductive ac-
tivities placed enormous strains on the federal budget, whose deficits were the force
behind Argentine inflation according to the monetarists (Martinez de Hoz, 1981: 1 -
15). The military's inherited excess of public spending over income was particularly
bothersome since it was attributed to "irrational" social and political pressures and
not to "rational" economic thinking (Estrada, 1984).
The functions of the Argentine state had, according to the military's economic
team, increased in proportion to the demands placed upon it by Peronist trade

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unions. Collective pressures had 1) forced state protection of highly unionized firms,
2) established the public sector as a refuge for workers displaced by the market, and
3) politicized price, wage, and managerial decisions. Each new state program not
only strengthened the trade union movement but stood as a reminder for future
governments that fiscal contraction could not be achieved without severe political
consequences. Unwilling or unable to bear the political costs of an austerity program,
"weak" democratic and authoritarian governments allowed the "irrational" alloca-
tion of public resources to persist unabated. Consequently, according to the eco-
nomic liberals, trade unions, weak government, and economic decline were three
sides of the same triangle.
It would have taken a regime thoroughly committed to free-market philosophy-
and prepared to use high levels of force-to weaken labor's grip on the state. At-
tempts had been made before, but none was as ambitious as those undertaken by the
Proceso government. The government's objective was to transform radically the Ar-
gentine economy and then to force the labor movement into the Procustean bed of a
free market. First, it proposed privatization, turning state entrepreneurial functions
over to the business sector. In those instances where transfer was not possible owing
to the complexity of the system or to its massive indebtedness, the firm would be
scaled back: deficits would be gradually eliminated by raising public service and
utility rates, cutting back operating costs, and eliminating surplus employees. Re-
strictions on state activities would achieve the ultimate objectives of lower deficits, less
monetary emission, and lower inflation. Second, it stripped away protective trade
and investment barriers and opened Argentina to the international economy (Cani-
trot, 1980; Ferrer, 1980; Schvarzer, 1983). The social objective of these economic
moves was to narrow the base and weaken the clout of Argentina's labor movement
by reducing opportunities for state-subsidized employment (Canitrot, 1980; Delich,
1983) and by exposing heavily unionized industries to the pressures of international
competition (Buchanan, 1987).
The military were only too anxious to cripple a movement that they believed had
intentionally undermined the foundations of the economy. Whether workers actually
engaged in protest against the monetarist plan or only intended to was not the point.
The regime's economic ideology held that, as collectivized rent seekers with an inher-
ent motive to protect their own interests via the interventionist state and wreak havoc
on the free operations of the market, organized labor was culpable and must be
punished.
If the economic ideology established some general contours for the state's political
strategies, we need more specific information to formulate meaningful hypotheses.
The trade union movement must be disaggregated. Its affiliated syndicates varied
according to their economic position and importance, their size, and their political
clout. Each of these could exert independent and yet related influences upon the
military. For example, harsher treatment might have been meted out for individuals
associated with unions that were larger in size, politically stronger, and more strategi-
cally positioned within the economy. If unionism can obstruct the ebb and flow of the
market through its rent-seeking practices, then larger unions will have greater
monopoly power, making them even more threatening to the regime. Regardless of
size, certain unions exerted a stronger political influence over the labor movement
and thus were more vulnerable to state terror. Others that were neither large nor
politically powerful were still vulnerable to state terror because they controlled jobs
in sensitive areas of the private or public economy that were to be transformed by the
regime's economic plan. In addition, the combined effects of union size, sectoral
placement, and political power upon the judgments of the Proceso government must
be considered.
Thus, beginning with normative premises about freely operating markets and the

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dangers of state intervention, the regime identified specific problems that prevented
economic growth: collective pressures imposed on government were antecedent;
public sector expansion, inefficiencies, deficits, inflation, and poor growth were de-
rivative. Next, the "agents of economic destruction" were perceived to be threaten-
ing to the economic order and were identified. Given the perceived dangers, the
regime then decided to resort to state terror. The process is shown in schematic form
in Figure 2.
Ideological Links
Though separate and distinct, the national security and economic ideologies of the
Argentine military regime were related and, at times, mutually reinforcing. Accord-
ing to the junta, economic stability could not be achieved without national security,
but neither could security be made permanent without economic stability (Junta
Militar, 1979:79-80). It is no coincidence that the military's view is reminiscent of
Ideology
Free market economics
Views
Anti-statist
Anti-collectivist
IZIE ZI Protectionism
Problem Public sector expansion
Identification Collective pressures Inefficiencies
Inflation
Poor economic growth
Target Collectivities:
Specification * Large
* Politically powerful
* Strategically placed
Threat perception
Strategy
Terror
FIG. 2. Economic ideology and the deduction of state terror.

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former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's own proclamation about the
Third World that "security is development and without development there can be no
security" (1968:149).
Though these links existed, the Proceso Government never emphasized develop-
ment as strongly as did the North American proponents of the NSD. It preferred
short-term economic adjustments to long-term economic planning. These adjust-
ments could be achieved by pressing the right macro-economic policy levers to mini-
mize state interference in the economy while providing the appropriate mix of
rewards and sanctions to the nation's producers. Still, such adaptations were consid-
ered necessary if the nation's security was to be achieved. To the extent that trade
unionists obstructed such measures, they placed in jeopardy the nation's security.
Trade unionists were thought of as domestic sponsors of subversion in league with
international agents of communism. Distinctions between Marxist, guerrilla, and
legitimate working-class organizations seemed to fade quickly in the military mind as
its war against subversion escalated.
The junta's own secret documents on the conduct of the Dirty War reveal that the
struggle against subversion included a special plan to penetrate industrial trade
unions (Videla, 1985) for the purpose of eliminating undesirable elements. Using
the same discourse of combat whether referring to guerrillas or to workers, Presi-
dent Videla called on the regime to carry out its "mission" through the "detection
and destruction of subversive organizations," particularly in the industrial and edu-
cational sectors of the country (Videla, 1985: 530). With the guidance of its economic
ideology, the junta identified particular agents of economic destruction. With the
support of its national security ideology, the junta unleashed a particularly ferocious
campaign of terror against them. Thus, in this instance, the two ideologies inter-
sected to serve the same ends.
Analyzing Patterns of Victimization
The Data
Three forms of data on state terror in Argentina were utilized in this study. The first,
information on the disappearance and eventual execution of political opponents,
was derived from an official list of desaparecidos made available to us by the Asamblea
Permanente Argentina de Derechos Humanos (The Argentine Permanent Assembly for
Human Rights). Founded in 1975, the Assembly's work in defense of human rights
under perilous conditions won it international praise. The Assembly contributed
valuable information on the disappeared to the presidentially-appointed Argentine
National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP), which produced the report
Nunca Mds, and it is these data on which we draw for this study. The Assembly's
information includes the name, age, sex, the place and date of apprehension, and, in
many instances, occupational and associational affiliations of some 5,500 individuals.
Since many families were reluctant to divulge all relevant facts about their disap-
peared relatives, we commonly encountered missing data. Moreover, we did not
have any information on the victims' ideologies or their religious or political party
affiliations. This has limited our analysis to social rather than political indicators.6
Nonetheless, an account of the social sphere is fully warranted, since Argentine
terror was disproportionately directed against organized labor. The organized work
force of Argentina comprises 38 percent of the economically active population. Yet
6 However incomplete, these data represent the most complete single source of information to date, on the
victims of state terror in Argentina before and during the period of military rule.

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48.1 percent of all the disappeared were blue- and white-collar workers. Our proce-
dure was to record those individuals for whom occupational or union identifications
could be made, yielding a total of 2,078 desaparecidos. Since all those listed by the
Assembly were presumed disappeared, we have no variation in terror technique
employed during the repression.
Despite these limitations, there are two advantages to using the Assembly's data.
First, it represents the most reliable data available, since a single organization and its
investigative staff asked the same set of questions about each of the victims. Second,
the Assembly's compilation allowed us to analyze the worst form of abuse committed
against Argentines. Certainly, if some sense can be made of the policy of disappear-
ance, then we will have made a significant step towards understanding the syndrome
of political terror as a whole.
The second kind of data was organizational. We were able to identify those unions
placed under military jurisdiction. Rather than destroy unions, which the govern-
ment feared would invite radical anarchical elements to infiltrate at factory levels, the
armed forces replaced elected union heads with high-ranking military officers. This
intervention suspended most normal trade-union deliberations while retaining
union structures. It is likely that in some instances intervention substituted for the
execution of rank-and-file members, while in other cases intervention and disap-
pearances clearly worked in tandem.
Finally, we examined information on repressive legislation aimed specifically at
state sector unions.
At the individual level, political repression represented the monthly total of per-
sons sequestered by security forces over a 52-month period between 1975 and 1979.
Though the military officially took power in March of 1976, its Dirty War actually
commenced the year before. For that reason, we include repression data from 1975.
Using occupational and union information for most of these victims, we then orga-
nized the monthly figures according to the following queries: 1) Had the victim been
affiliated with the organized labor movement? 2) If so, of which unions were they
members? 3) In which sectors were those unions located? 4) Were the unions politi-
cally important within organized labor?7 To make comparisons, we then divided this
repression data by the relevant standardized unit. Thus, the monthly repression data
for non-unionized workers were calculated as a proportion of the nonunionized,
economically active population as a whole, while the repression of unionized workers
was figured as a proportion of the organized labor force.
Data Analysis
Individual Union Traits. Table 1 examines differences in the repression of union-

ized as opposed to non-unionized individuals for the 1975-1979 period. The sample
of victims includes a wide array of blue- and white-collar workers, professionals,
technicians, scientists, artists, and journalists. As shown, the aggregate repression
rate for unionized individuals was nearly three times that of nonunionized individ-
uals. A difference of means test was then computed on the same repression data,
disaggregated on a monthly basis, for union and non-union affiliates. The average
monthly rate of repression for unionized workers was significantly greater (at a level
of .01) than that of independent workers, ruling out the possibility that such differ-
7The political impor-tance of a union r-efers to its influlence withini the labor imiovemenit anid Peronist pairty. Uniion
reputations have been established either throuIgh a histor-y of comilbativeniess againist authoritariani gover-iniments or
thiough conitr-ol over key positions within the labor conifederation. We conisider-ed both, relyinig oni ail exper-t in
Argentinie labor affair-s who rated LIuliOnls as either- politically impoitant or unimportant. See FerniAndez (1985).

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TABLE 1. Repression of union and non-union affiliates, 1975-1979.
Rate of
Level of Population Repression
Group Repressiona Population Size (per JOO,OOO)b
Non-Union 407 Economically Active

Population (Non-Union) 6,175,500 7
Union 771 Organized Labor Force 3,939,000 20
a The difference between these combined figures and the total of 2,078 desapareczdos used in this
study reflects the existence of missing values in the data, where the occupational statuLs of a victim was
known but his or her union membership status was not known.
b Derived by dividing repression levels into population size and then multiplying by 100,000.
Note: Economically active population data is taken from International Labor Organization, Yearbook
of Labor Statistics, 1978-1981; organized labor force data was compiled by totalling membership of all
unions registered with the Argentine Ministry of Labor.
ences were a product of chance. The results suggest that the military government
had indeed distinguished between these two groups of individuals, reserving harsher
treatment for unionists.
Next, as shown in Table 2, we examined the relationship between the size of a
union and the level of repression. We report figures reflecting average union mem-
TABLE 2. Union size and repression of members, 1975-1979 (N = 21).
Union Size as Repression Level

% of Organized Repression as % of Union
Union Labor (A) Level (B)a Size (C)
Metalworkers 6.78 109 16.1

Municipal Workers 6.35 22 3.5
Teachers 4.79 190 39.7
Construction Workers 4.74 75 15.8
Bank Employees 3.96 41 10.4
Railroad Workers 3.64 25 6.9
State Employees Association 2.18 65 29.8
Restaurant Workers 2.17 9 4.1
Textile Workers Association 1.87 34 18.2
Light and Power Workers 1.78 11 6.2
Automobile Transport Workers 1.43 27 18.9
Automechanics 1.37 77 56.2
Telephone Workers and Employees 1.01 14 13.9
Freightworkers 0.99 1 1.0
Traveling Salesmen 0.97 19 19.6
Meatworkers 0.96 15 15.6
Sugar Workers (Tucuman) 0.90 2 2.2
Carpenters 0.84 14 16.7
Wine Industry Workers 0.77 5 6.5
Postal Employees 0.72 2 2.8
State Oil Workers 0.65 14 21.5
Correlations: A with B: Pearsons r = 0

a Repression Level is the number of trad
the military between 1975 and 1979.

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berships during the Proceso period as a percentage of the total organized work force.
We then list corresponding repression levels (representing the total number of desa-
parecidos for each union for the 1975-1979 period) and percentages. As shown, the
correlation between the size of a union and the level of repression directed at its
members is highly significant. However, the association appears to be spurious-a
function of the fact that there are simply more individuals to terrorize in larger
unions-since the correlation between union size and repression as a percentage of
union size is insignificant. An important relationship nonetheless exists between
union size, monopolistic practices, and rates of repression, discussion of which must
await the analysis of paired union dimensions to be described below.
Aggregate levels and repression rates within sectors are shown in Table 3. If, in its
deliberations about whom to terrorize, the junta considered the sectoral location of
unions to be important, then separate patterns of terror should emerge between
those sectors on the one hand and a miscellaneous grouping of unions on the other.
Considering its biases, we surmise that the junta would have been more preoccupied
with unions and workers situated in strategic social and economic spheres. The
figures indicate that the rate of terror against educators exceeded that in the miscel-
laneous sector by a factor of 3.4, while terror in the manufacturing sector exceeded
miscellaneous terror by a factor of nearly 2. Meanwhile, the miscellaneous terror rate
was slightly larger than that found in the state and transportation/communication
sectors. Again, using the monthly breakdown of this aggregate data, difference of
means tests were performed comparing repression rates in the miscellaneous sector
to rates in each of the others. This was done to determine whether the average
repression score in any one sector was significantly greater than that in the miscella-
neous grouping of unions. If so, we could reject the null hypothesis that such differ-
ences were due to chance and infer that the junta had both distinguished between
these groups and meted out separate degrees of punishment for them.
Not surprisingly, repression rates in the manufacturing and educational spheres
turned out to be significantly higher (at a level of .01) than in others. However,
differences between the miscellaneous sector on the one hand and state and trans-
portation/communication sectors on the other were not statistically significant. The
higher rate of repression in manufacturing is consistent with the theory that the
military was determined to weaken unions in those establishments that were to be
radically transformed by its free-market project, chiefly the heavily unionized and
TABLE 3. Repressioni by union sectors, 1975-1979.
Rate of
Secto- Size Sector Size Repression
bv Numtiber of a's % of Lezel of bv Sector
Secto- Wor-kers Oigazed Labor- Rep-ession l) (1)er 100,000),
Manufacturing 457,877 15.41 248 54

State 614,580 15.61 151 25
EdUcation 188,854 4.79 190 100
TransportatioIn/Conm1i1unication 306,720 6.78 69 22
Miscellan1eoUs 564,970 14.35 165 29
a The suimii of wor-ker-s in thils COIluImn will e

sectolr.
bThe suimil of these r-epr-ession scores will be gr-eater- th<ln suimils for Taibles 2 or- 5 becalLuse three uLn1on0s ari-C sitUated
in nmore than onie sector.
cRatios ar-e derivedl by dlividing repr-essioni levels inito sectoral size and imutiltiplying by 100,000.

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protected manufacturing enclaves. Moreover, particular industrial unions were sin-

gled out for especially harsh treatment. As shown in Table 2, the Metalworkers
Union (Uni6n de Obreros Metalirgicos), which was the largest union in manufacturing
and second largest in the nation (comprising nearly 7 percent of the entire organized
work force), bore the brunt of the repression. So too did the very powerful autome-
chanics unions. Together, these syndicates controlled over 320,000 jobs in manufac-
turing enclaves built up during periods of state-subsidized industrialization which
were now to be dismembered by the regime's plan of economic openness.
We find an explanation for the high rates of repression against teachers and
professors in the military's national security ideology. As President Videla explained:
"A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads
ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization" (Amnesty Interna-
tional, 1978). This reflects the national security doctrine's redefinition of the
counter-subversive war to include a struggle against Argentine educators, who
would be most responsible for producing and reproducing ideas in conflict with the
military's vision of the national security state.
Evidence of the military's alarm about the educational sector was detailed in 1980
in a polemical narrative entitled "Evolution of Terrorist Delinquency in Argentina"
(Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, 1980). The report, which amounted to a specification of
the national security ideology, insisted that terrorism had found its official center in
the Ministry of Education under the previous Per6n government. The Ministry had
exerted moral and coercive pressure on teachers to spread Marxist ideology through
the elementary, high school, and university systems. The junta was determined to
"cleanse" the Ministry and the entire educational system of its ideological foes
(Spitta, 1983:90). Rectors and administrators were all appointed by and subordinate
to the military, thus ending the Argentine universities traditional autonomy. Because
they were dependent on the good graces of the university hierarchy and because
their employment contracts were often arbitrarily terminated, professors were so
uncertain about their status that nearly all practiced the art of self-censorship by
abandoning critical commentary and frank dialogue (Spitta, 1983:95). The educa-
tional environment was left nothing but a shell, which the junta ineptly filled with its
own dogma about the dangers of secular humanism and the importance of Church,
family, and related virtues of obedience, discipline and compliance (Spitta, 1983:90).
At first glance it seems curious that the repression rate for the state sector was not
higher. A cornerstone of the junta's economic program was its attack on state enter-
prise and bureaucracy, which it perceived to be politicized, overly subsidized, and
inefficient. The results need to be assessed in light of the government's legal-coercive
measures aimed specifically at state employees and their unions-measures whose
effectiveness may have obviated the need for the physical elimination of workers.
The Economics Ministry had issued a series of overlapping decrees in 1976 which
institutionalized arbitrary dismissals in the public sector. One such decree, the Ley de
Prescindibilidad (Law 21274) declared employees dispensable and dismissible without
warning, for reasons of "service," "national security," or "redundancy." This revoked
elements of the Per6nist labor stability law, which had prohibited dismissals except
for job-related blunders (Dimase, 1981). Four years later, the Economics Minister
boasted that the same law had made possible the firing of some 200,000 public
servants. A related decree made permissible the firing of public servants engaged in
activities of a "subversive" or "disruptive" nature. The purposefully vague wording
of these statutes made it virtually impossible for workers to tell whether they had
been terminated for economic or political reasons (Spitta, 1983:82).
Their uncertainty was heightened by the fact that there were financial remunera-
tions for those who denounced fellow workers. Erring on the side of caution, many
employees chose not to participate visibly in union affairs. Those who did were hurt

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TABLE 4. Political importance of unions and repression of members, 1975-1979.
Rate of
Total Level of Represszon
Union Category Membership Repression (per 100,000)
Politically Important Unions 1,235,710 442 36

Politically Unimportant Unions 688,400 329 48
Politically Unimportant Unions, excluding
Teachers Union 499,546 139 28
by an industrial security law with stiff prison sentences for all forms of direct action
aimed at interrupting or slowing down the rhythm of the work place (Fernandez,
1985:59). By casting doubts on the utility of collective action or even affiliation
through intimidating legal decrees, and by sharply reducing employment for arbi-
trary reasons, the government could achieve its desired ends without resorting to a
policy of disappearance. Since the state sector was singled out for legislation of this
kind (Dimase, 1981), legal decrees may well have substituted for a policy of disap-
pearance here and not elsewhere.
We thought that the transportation/communication sector of the economy would
be vulnerable to state terror. Included within this sphere are the railroad, automo-
tive transport, postal, and telephone employees' unions-all of which occupied sensi-
tive positions within the economy and which were able to interfere suddenly and
decisively with the flow of labor, goods, and information. On the one hand, repres-
sion was not appreciably higher for this sector or for any of its affiliated unions.8 On
the other hand, figures for military intervention into trade unions (Table 5) reveal
that both the state and the transportation/communication sectors experienced
higher proportions of intervention than all unions combined. Consequently, this
organizational form of state terror may have substituted for individualized terror in
this instance.
It must be acknowledged that the rate of terror for the miscellaneous grouping of
unions was higher than expected and commensurate with rates in two other sectors.
First, it must be assumed that members of unions within this grouping could have
been victimized for reasons other than their collective affiliations. Second, in light of
the national security ideology, the findings suggest that there is an indiscriminate
component to state terror. The Dirty War had an unpredictable edge to it. The
security forces abducted many unsuspecting citizens because false leads often led to
the sudden and arbitrary apprehension of individuals who were guilty of nothing
other than indirect association with someone else. Their victimization cannot be
easily dismissed; it comprises a more random feature of Argentine state violence that
has also been identified by the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared
(1986:4).
The data in Table 4 indicate that workers were not victimized because they were
members of politically important unions. In fact, the repression rate for politically
weaker unions was appreciably higher than for politically powerful unions. This
counterintuitive finding could be partially explained if we were to treat the teachers'
union as a point off the curve. One hundred ninety victims were reported for that
union, compared with an average of twenty-three victims for the remaining unions
within the politically unimportant category. Once teachers are subtracted from that
8 The railroad and telephone workers unions were part of both the state sector and the transportation/communi-
cation sector.

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TABLE 5. Military intervention into Argentine trade unions.
Number Number 5S,

Experiencing Expeietncznlg Expeienczntg
Union Characteristics Intervention No Intervention Intenrention
Large Unions 3 7 30
Sectors
Manufacturing 7 4 63.6
State 4 4 50
Transportation/Communication 2 2 50
Education 0 1 0
Politically Powerful Unions 10 6 62.5
All Unionsa 13 21 38.2
a Since three unions overlapped

not represent totals for each column.
group, the average rate of repression falls below that of the politically important
group. In addition, military intervention appeared to substitute successfully for the
execution of members of politically influential unions. Nearly 63 percent of the
politically powerful unions were seized by the armed forces-the second highest
proportion for any group so afflicted (see Table 5). Union intervention served as
both a complement to terror (as in the case of the manufacturing unions) and more
frequently as a substitute for terror (as in the case of the state, transportation/
communication, and politically powerful unions).
Paired Union Traits and Political Repression. We next considered the hypothesis that
repression may have been more pronounced against individuals within unions that
shared more than one of the critical characteristics we have described. Perhaps the
military junta perceived greater threats from unions that were large in size and
strategically positioned in the economy, large in size and politically important, or
sectorally strategic and politically important. Logically, the government could have
considered the harmful, cumulative, or interactive effects of these variables upon its
political and economic plans. If so, members associated with those unions would be
more likely victims of state terror than those not so associated. Analysis of these
paired union dimensions lends itself most appropriately to a nonparametric test such
as chi square.
To perform chi square, we converted union traits to nominal categories. Utilizing
the median-sized union (see Table 2) as the mid point, we categorized unions as
being either large or small. The four sectors (manufacturing, state, education and
transportation/communication) were collapsed into one in order to compare the
effects of strategic and non-strategic placement of unions upon levels of repression.
Politically important and unimportant groupings remained the same. The null hy-
pothesis would assert that if state terror was random, such measures would be in-
flicted in proportion to the total number of trade unionists located in each of the
groupings-in other words, higher levels would be expected where greater numbers
of workers were found. A rejection of the null hypothesis would occur where ob-
served frequency distributions were significantly different from those expected by
chance, as indicated by the chi square statistic.
We first examined union size in tandem with sectoral placement and found that
the highest repression total was for unions that were large and strategically posi-
tioned. Nearly two-thirds of those workers who were victimized were members of

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unions with both of these traits. By contrast, unions that were small and outside of
the strategic sectors attracted the lowest levels of repression. Chi square was signifi-
cant at .01. Next we performed two pairings of a union's size with its political
importance, the first with the teachers' union and the second without. In the first
instance, nearly 40 percent of the victims were members of large, politically powerful
trade unions, although an equal percentage was found in unions that were large but
politically unimportant. However, when the singular and disproportionate influence
of the teachers' union was subtracted from the politically unimportant category, the
combined impact of size and political importance became salient. Over half of the
victims were located in large, politically prominent unions, whereas only 20 percent
were in large and politically weak unions. In both contingency tables (not shown
here), considerably lower levels of repression were observed in small unions that
were politically unimportant. All observed frequencies were significant (at .01) and
the null hypothesis was rejected in each case.
In the final pairing, sectoral location was matched with political prominence. Here
too, the effects with and without the teachers' union were compared. Repression
levels were significantly greater where a union was strategically positioned and politi-
cally powerful, and even more so once the teacher's union was subtracted. Con-
versely, repression levels for non-strategic and politically weak unions were signifi-
cantly lower in both cases.
The chi square analysis indicated that it was not so much the size of a union alone
that was disconcerting to the military government as was its size coupled with other
dimensions. When union size was paired with sectoral placement, unusually high
levels of repression were observed. These findings support the theory that the mili-
tary was, as Canitrot (1980), O'Donnell (1984), and Buchanan (1987) have main-
tained, interested in breaking the collective spirits and identities of individuals to
create a compliant and atomized society. Association with large collectives was dan-
gerous where such unions were positioned to obstruct decisively the regime's eco-
nomic and security plans. Larger unions could wield greater monopolistic power
than smaller ones to safeguard private sector employment havens, keep wages "artifi-
cially high," and pressure the state to expend resources on social services and the
maintenance of a giant bureaucracy (Canitrot, 1980). The military clearly perceived
these practices as enormously threatening to its national security- and free-market
minded dictatorship. Employing the logic of a classic economy of force, the junta
believed that this threat could be reduced by executing a few unionists, thus dissuad-
ing the others from affiliating too closely with the labor movement.
The analysis also revealed that the political power of unions did enter into the
calculus of terror, but only when such unions were large and strategically centered.
Politically powerful syndicates with few members or with no critical function within
the economy apparently posed less of a threat to the military. In sum, the chances
that workers would be victimized by state terror were associated with key, combined
characteristics of the unions to which they were affiliated. Those particular union
features were apparently conspicuous to a regime obsessed with eliminating a per-
ceived collective challenge to its economic and security goals.
Conclusions
This study has found many consistencies between the patterns of terror on the one
hand and the assumptions of doctrine on the other. We can conclude that ideology
was a motivating force behind Argentina's Dirty War. In national security ideology
Argentine rulers found a warrant for the use of excessive force against perceived
enemies of state. Believing themselves to be at war, the military visualized a bifur-

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cated political system comprised only of regime loyalists and opponents. The regime
dehumanized its intended victims, expressed considerable hostility towards them,
and transformed those hostilities into a clear preference for coercive measures over
all others.
If security ideology explained the unprecedented levels of state violence, then
economic ideology helped to guide the regime in its selection of victims. Led by free-
market principles, the regime systematically victimized individuals who were affili-
ated with unions of special economic and political importance. In some instances, the
military resorted to organizational or legal forms of terror to achieve the same
results. Our findings sustain the view that the Proceso government feared and sought
to eliminate interest groups that represented potential interference with its plan to
liberalize the economy.
It is tempting though inadvisable to conclude that Argentine state terror was a
singular consequence of ideological fanaticism. The observed outcomes may be con-
sistent with alternative explanations. For example, the military's historical animosi-
ties toward Peronism are a matter of record. Since the fall of Peron in 1955, the
armed forces have repeatedly tried to limit the participatory rights of the Per6nist
party and its sympathizers. In light of the Dirty War's focused attack on Peronist-
dominated trade unions, state terror could well have been intended as an alternative
means of persecuting Argentina's majoritarian political movement. The findings of
this study do not permit us to rule out anti-Peronism as a motive, although such an
intention was certainly consistent with the regime's ideological predilections.
It would be equally inadvisable to infer that state terror was an inevitable result of
ideological fanaticism. The military did consider-though it ultimately rejected-
political options that would have reduced reliance on state terror. Advisers to the
junta suggested in 1978 that it invite members of the civilian opposition to serve in
government positions, thereby lending some legitimacy to the regime (Yofre, 1986).
Some members of the military were favorably disposed to the plan, but hardliners
ultimately prevented its adoption. Nonetheless, because the junta did have options
available to it and because the balance of forces shifted periodically within the mili-
tary between soft and hardliners, the decision to pursue continued repression should
be considered contingent and not inevitable.
Two other implications of the findings should be noted, one theoretical and the
other empirical. First, the discovery of a focal point for terror within a more diffuse
pattern of state violence is significant because it cautions against the simplification
and over aggregation of ideologies and their outcomes. It cannot be presumed that
regimes (of the left or the right) that practice terror are guided by monolithic belief
systems which yield uniform results. Though there were clear links between them,
the national security and economic ideologies were also separable. If the Argentine
military had subscribed only to national security ideology, its vision of and crusade
against the opposition would have been largely unfocused. Since practically all those
disloyal to the military regime were by definition perceived as intransigent enemies
of state, given the NSD's dichotomized view of the political system, then all those so
labelled should have been at equal risk of victimization. That was clearly not the case.
Ideological complexity can be found elsewhere. The centerpiece of Nazi ideology
was of course, anti-Semitism. But it was also punctuated with rudimentary versions
of nationalist, anti-communist, and anti-democratic doctrine that in combination
gave rise to complex and contradictory dimensions of terror that reached well be-
yond the confines of the Jewish community (Broszat, 1981). Likewise, right-wing,
authoritarian ideology should be thought of as an amalgam of pro-capitalist, anti-
communist, anti-democratic, geopolitical, and occasionally nationalistic themes
whose political effects are both convergent and divergent.
Second, our study warrants further searches for dossiers on the victims of political

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repression. Empirical evidence about victims will enable social scientists to investigate
cases akin to the Dirty War where intended targets are not unambiguously revealed
beforehand. Obviously, this study would have profited from a more complete depic-
tion of each victim. With multivariate information on hand, researchers could then
discover a multitude of individual and group attributes to help them piece together
the motives for terror. Subsequent investigations should make every effort to include
maximal amounts of information on victims' social, economic, political, racial, and
religious characteristics. Within the confines of its data, this study has shown that the
use of inferential and deductive arguments in tandem has advantages. In effect, by
working backwards from the data as well as forwards from the theory, our empirical
disclosures helped to sharpen our theoretical insights into terror. These, in turn,
should improve subsequent empirical research on state terror.
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PionBerlin VictimsExecutionersArgentine 1991

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Of Victims and Executioners: Argentine State Terror, 1975-1979

Author(s): David Pion-Berlin and George A. Lopez

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600389

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Of Victims and Executioners: Argentine State

State terror is a premeditated, patterned, and instrumental form of government

X 1991 International Studies Association

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Theories of State Terror

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consider so drastic a policy as unmitigated terror. A zealous determination to accom-

The Case for Ideology as a Source of Terror

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minorities defined by economic, political, or social position or opposition. Most re-

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The NSD and State Terror

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The Economic Ideology of State Terror

The Argentine regime subscribed to a doctrinaire version of monetarist or free-

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Ideology National security doctrine

r f Dichotomous view of polity

Problem Revolution iF e Nation

Target VaIeSee economic ideology for

Strategy High levels of terror

FIG. 1. National security ideology and the deduction of state terror.

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FIG. 2. Economic ideology and the deduction of state terror.

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Analyzing Patterns of Victimization

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Individual Union Traits. Table 1 examines differences in the repression of union-

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TABLE 1. Repression of union and non-union affiliates, 1975-1979.

Non-Union 407 Economically Active

Union 771 Organized Labor Force 3,939,000 20

TABLE 2. Union size and repression of members, 1975-1979 (N = 21).

Union Size as Repression Level

Metalworkers 6.78 109 16.1

Correlations: A with B: Pearsons r = 0

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TABLE 3. Repressioni by union sectors, 1975-1979.

Manufacturing 457,877 15.41 248 54

a The suimii of wor-ker-s in thils COIluImn will e

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protected manufacturing enclaves. Moreover, particular industrial unions were sin-

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TABLE 4. Political importance of unions and repression of members, 1975-1979.

Politically Important Unions 1,235,710 442 36

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TABLE 5. Military intervention into Argentine trade unions.

Number Number 5S,

a Since three unions overlapped