RENATO L. CAYETANO vs.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD
September 3, 1991
G.R. No. 100113

Facts:
- President Corazon Aquino Appointed Christian Monsod as the chairman of COMELEC.-
Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because according to him, the respondent fall short
of the ten year requirement for the position.- The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1),
Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)- June 5, 1991:
COA approved the appointment. - June 18, 1991: Monsod took his oath and assumed office. -
Petitioner prayed for certiorari and prohibition against Monsod.

Issue:
Whether or not Monsod is engaged in the practice of law for more than ten years.
Held:

Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-

entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The Commission on the basis of evidence
submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case,
there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.”

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent

[B.M. No. 1036,10 June 2003]
Ponente: Justice Carpio

FACTS:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. One day before the scheduled
mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees, Aguirre filed against Rana a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Barcharging him
with unauthorized practice of law among others. Aguirre alleges that Rana, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Aguirre further alleges that Rana
filed with the MBEC a pleading wherein Rana represented himself as counsel. Rana was
allowed to take oath but not to sign the roll of attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against
him. The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate, and its findings disclosed that
the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel
for the candidate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rana should be admitted to the Bar.

RULING:
No. The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Vice Mayoralty candidate
George T. Bunan before he took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to
the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Bunan. In the first paragraph
of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the undersigned counsel for, and in behalf
of Bunan. The latter himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.

Respondent himself also wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance
as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19
May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC
praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar. In
Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the
legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the
use of legal knowledge or skill. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do
so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself
counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be
a member of the Philippine Bar. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity,
legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. ABar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the Bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has
passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license. True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.
The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his Lawyer’s Oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Rana is DENIED
admission to the Philippine Bar. (Aguirre v Rana B.M. No.1036 June 10, 2000)

EN BANC

AC. No. 12418, March 10, 2020

AA TOTAL LEARNING CENTER FOR YOUNG ACHIEVERS, INC. REPRESENTED BY

LOYDA L. REYES, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

Before this Court is a Verified Complaint for Disbarment1 docketed as CBD Case No. 14-
4396 filed by complainant AA Total Learning Center for� Young Achievers, Inc. (AA),
represented by Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes) against respondent Atty. Patrick A. Caronan
(Caronan) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Sometime in 2012, respondent Caronan and Solly Cruz offered to sell to complainant
Reyes a parcel of land located in J.P. Rizal St. Ususan, Taguig City (subject property)
and claimed that they were representatives of Maricel A. Atanacio (Atanacio), the
registered owner of the subject property.

Finding the property suitable for AA's future campus, Reyes became interested in the
subject property and thus, went along with Caronan and conducted an ocular inspection
of the same. Thereat, Caronan briefly introduced Reyes to Atanacio who thereafter
immediately went off to another direction.2

On March 9, 2012, Caronan asked Reyes to meet him and Atanacio to discuss and
finalize the final purchase price of the subject property. During the scheduled meeting,
Caronan advised Reyes that Atanacio will no longer be joining them and that he
authorized him to finalize the purchase price on her behalf. 3

Relying on the representations of Caronan, Reyes agreed that the final purchase price
of the subject property shall be at Fifteen Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P15,650,000.00),inclusive of transfer fees and capital gains tax. Reyes also agreed to
pay Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) as earnest money and paid the
initial amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). 4

On March 23, 2012, Caronan collected from Reyes the balance of the earnest money
amounting to One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00). Reyes paid One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) in cash and tendered another Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) in check. The payment was duly acknowledged by Caronan. 5

Thereafter, another meeting was set by Caronan in Metrobank Fort Bonifacio for the
signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale6 and the payment of the initial 50% of the
purchase price. When Reyes arrived at the meeting place, Caronan informed her that
Atanacio will not be joining them and that she has already signed the Deed of Absolute
Sale. When the deed was presented to Reyes, indeed a signature was already affixed
above the name of Atanacio. Meanwhile, Caronan, in behalf of Atanacio, signed
the Memorandum of Agreement7(MOA) which embodied the terms and conditions of the
sale.8

Following the terms of the sale, Reyes issued a Metrobank Manager's check to the order
of Atanacio in the amount of Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) which was duly
acknowledged by Caronan. It was agreed that the balance of the purchase price shall
be paid upon transfer of the title to AA's name. The parties also agreed that the
processing of the payment of appropriate taxes and fees, as well as registration of the
sale in favor of AA, shall be undertaken by Caronan. 9

Meanwhile, Reyes gave Caronan Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) to
settle the Capital Gains Tax and the Transfer Fees by issuing another Metrobank check
amounting to Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) and tendering the
remaining One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) in cash. On even date, the Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) Metrobank check was encashed by Caronan.
The payment was again duly acknowledged by him.10

On April 13, 2012, Reyes was notified that the Metrobank Check amounting to Seven
Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) was already negotiated by Atanacio at Metrobank Taytay
Branch.11

Caronan, in the meantime, promised to deliver the title, under AA's name by the first
week of June 2012. He assured Reyes that the transfer will not be a problem since he is
friends with the Registrar of Deeds of Taguig. In the ensuing weeks, Caronan gave
updates and provided reasons for the delay in transfer. However, in July 2012, Caronan
could no longer be reached.12

Thus, on July 19, 2012, Reyes requested a meeting with Atanacio. She inquired about
the cause of the delay in the transfer of the title in AA's name considering that in
the Deed of Absolute Sale, Atanacio committed to immediately transfer the title of the
subject property in AA's name and especially since the payment of Seven Million Pesos
(P7,000,000.00) was already tendered to Caronan, her representative. Atanacio was
shocked upon hearing what Reyes said and categorically denied any participation in the
said sale transaction. She disowned signing any Deed of Absolute Sale and categorically
denied authorizing Caronan to negotiate in her behalf the sale of her property. She
maintained that she never received a single centavo from the transaction. 13

Alarmed, Reyes in turn immediately sought advice from her legal counsel who prepared
a letter demanding the return of the monies that Reyes paid in the total amount of
Seven Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P7,700,000.00). The demand letter
however remained unheeded.

Reyes eventually learned that aside from the misrepresentations employed by Caronan
in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and MOA, he likewise employed
fraudulent machinations in negotiating in his favor the Metrobank Manager's check
amounting to Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00). Caronan, in cahoots with a certain
Noraida Tanon (Tanon), introduced Tanon to the bank officials as Atanacio and the
payee of the check. By presenting fake identification cards, Caronan and Tanon
successfully facilitated the withdrawal of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) and
deposited the balance of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) in the account of Caronan's
wife, Rosana Caronan.14

In her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated August 22, 2012,15 Tanon admitted that she
impersonated Atanacio upon the instruction of Caronan. According to Tanon, she was
reassured by Caronan that her pretending to be Atanacio was legal and that as a
lawyer, he would never put her in harm's way. Tanon thus relied on Caronan's
representations and acceded to his plan.16

Verily, Caronan, through fraud and deceit, successfully appropriated for himself the
total amount of Seven Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P7,700,000.00) to the
detriment of AA. Thus, on November 22, 2012, complainant AA, as represented by
Reyes, filed a case against Caronan for estafa.17

Later on, complainants likewise learned that Caronan's real name is "Richard A.
Caronan" and that he assumed the identity of his brother, Patrick A. Caronan and used
his school credentials to obtain a law degree. It was also later found out that the real
Patrick A. Caronan filed a disbarment case against the respondent. 18 A criminal
complaint for violation of the Anti-Alias Law was likewise filed by AA against Caronan
and the same prospered into a full blown case.

Finally, Reyes, representing AA, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) the instant Verified Complaint against Caronan
accusing him of gross misconduct. The complaint alleged that the actuations of Caronan
constituted grave transgressions of the solemn oath of a lawyer and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility warranting his permanent disbarment. 19 AA and
Reyes thus prayed that Caronan be perpetually disbarred from the practice of law and
his name permanently stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent, on the other hand, denied all the accusations against him and averred that
the same were only lies perpetrated by complainant Reyes and her husband, Brigadier
General Joselito M. Reyes, to disparage his reputation. 20

He maintained that the present administrative complaint against him was a mere
retaliation on the part of Spouses Reyes for his filing of several criminal cases against
them before the Office of the Ombudsman. It was just a strategy on their part to learn
in advance his defense in the criminal cases he filed against them as well as to weaken
him "economically" since his legal practice was his only source of income. He averred
that apart from the present disbarment case, another one for the same cause of action
was filed by the Spouses Reyes against him and docketed as CBD Case No. 14-4301. 21

Respondent countered that the allegation against him regarding the negotiation of the
Metrobank Manager's Check in the amount of Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) was
simply unbelievable considering the rigid banking requirements in encashing a
Manager's check. Moreover, the same cannot be taken cognizance of by the CBD as the
case is already a subject of a separate criminal case. 22

Additionally, neither can the Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly executed by Tanon be

given weight considering that it was obtained through fraud and intimidation. The
affidavit was notarized by Atty. Cherry Belmonte-Lim (Atty. Lim), the Chairman of the
Bids and Awards Committee of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and a close
colleague of the Spouses Reyes.23

Respondent alleged that sometime in 2012, he was detained in PNP CIDG-NCR Camp
Crame for trumped up charges of illegal possession of firearms and explosives filed by
the Spouses Reyes. He claimed that the Spouses Reyes confiscated five Transfer
Certificates of Title covering properties in Nueva Ecija which were jointly owned by him
and his wife. The amount of the properties involved is far more than the Seven Million
Pesos (P7,000,000.00) imputed against him. Also, when the police searched his home
armed with a search warrant that was fraudulently obtained, several personal
properties belonging to the respondent and his family were forcibly taken and ended up
in the possession of the Spouses Reyes and the police.

Finally, anent the issue of his "identity", respondent maintained that the disbarment
case filed by a certain Patrick A. Caronan and docketed as CBD Case No. 14-4301, was
a mere reiteration of the complaint filed against him by Joseph G. Agtarap in 2009 in
A.C. No. 10074 wherein the Supreme Court already exonerated him from the charges.
Hence, the issue regarding his identity was already settled and cannot be re-litigated
upon on the basis of res judicata.24

In sum, the respondent moved for the dismissal of the instant disbarment for lack of
merit or in the alternative, for the proceedings to be held in abeyance pending
resolution of the same issues in the criminal cases filed against him by complainant
Reyes.25

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In his Report and Recommendation dated July 14, 2017,26 Investigating Commissioner
Ferdinand I. Di�o recommended the dismissal of the Verified Complaint for being
moot and academic in light of Our pronouncement in A.C. No. 11316 dated July 12,
2016 captioned "Patrick A. Coronan v. Richard A Coronan a.k.a. Atty. Patrick A.
Coronan" where "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" was ordered disbarred and stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys. The Investigating Commissioner no longer passed upon the merits of
the Verified Complaint and instead quoted in toto the ruling of this Court in the
aforementioned case which highlighted the gross dishonesty and utter lack of moral
fitness on the part of the respondent when he assumed the name, identity and school
records of his brother.

In the Resolution dated February 22, 2018,27 the Board of Governors (BOG) of the IBP
resolved to adopt the findings of facts and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that the ultimate penalty of disbarment be imposed
upon respondent and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. The Resolution states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, with modification, and instead recommend the imposition upon the
Respondent Atty. Patrick A. Corona (sic) of the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT, and
that his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

The Issue Before this Court

Whether or not respondent Coronan should be disbarred and his name stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.

The Court's Ruling

This Court adopts the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to dismiss

the Verified Complaint for being moot in light of this Court's pronouncement in A.C. No.
11316 promulgated on July 12, 2016.28

Herein respondent is the same respondent involved in A.C. No. 11316. We also note
that respondent adopted the same defense he used in A.C. No. 11316 stating in
essence that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP BOG dismissed the administrative
case filed against him, and which case had already been declared closed and
terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.29

The dispositive portion of the Decision in A.C. No. 11316 is as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"

(respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and
take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate
civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any
representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in
the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education Certificates issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED;
and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in
the bulletin boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real
name, "Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine
Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.30

Considering the foregoing, there is no need to resolve the merits of the case and
determine whether or not "Atty. Patrick Caronan" is guilty of the violations imputed
against him. After all, disciplinary proceedings conducted by the IBP are reserved only
for those belonging in the legal profession. Clearly, respondent is not and was never a
member of the bar. Hence, the penalty of disbarment is not available to him. Besides,
AA and Reyes's prayer that respondent be forever barred from the law practice and his
name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys was already imposed upon respondent as among
his penalties in A.C. No. 11316.

Nonetheless, it is only fitting to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege bestowed by the State only on those who possess and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 31

In Heck v. Judge Santos,32 this Court elucidated, viz.:

The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential
to maintain one's good standing in the profession. It is a continuing requirement to the
practice of law and therefore does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon
proper complaint, into any question concerning one's mental or moral fitness before he
became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer. The rule is settled
that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct; even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite
to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. 33

We also take this opportunity to reiterate that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.34 There is no prejudicial question not proscription that will prevent it
from proceeding.35Double jeopardy or In Pari Delicto36 are also not available as defenses
as to bar the disciplinary proceedings against an erring lawyer. It should be noted that
it can be initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or the IBP and even without a
complaint and can proceed regardless of lack of interest of the complainants, if the
facts proven so warrant.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations
by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, they are in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. Public interest is their primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who
by their misconduct have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 37

All told, the privilege to practice the legal profession is not a permanent right and may
be taken away if one falls short of the requirements imposed by law.

WHEREFORE, the Court NOTES the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines in CBD Case No. 14-4396 dated February 22, 2018.
The Court ADOPTS the findings of fact of Investigating Commissioner Ferdinand I.
Di�o in his Report and Recommendation dated July 14, 2017 and ACCEPTS his
recommendation to dismiss the complaint for being moot in view of Our pronouncement
in A.C. No. 11316, without prejudice to pending or to be filed civil and criminal cases
against respondent.

This case is DECLARED CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 11032. January 10, 2023 ]

RE: ORDER DATED 01 OCTOBER 2015 IN CRIM. CASE NO. 15-318727-34, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (RTC), BRANCH 49, MANILA, AGAINST ATTY. SEVERO L. BRILLANTES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

ZALAMEDA, J.:

Before this Court is a question on the requirements for the lifting of an administrative order of
suspension from the practice of law.

Antecedents

In a Resolution1 dated 02 March 2020, this Court found respondent Atty. Severo Brillantes
(respondent) liable for violations of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the 26 November 2019 Letter of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and the
22 March 2018 Notice of Resolution of the Board of Governors of the IBP are NOTED. For violations
of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent ATTY. SEVERO L.
BRILLANTES is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. He is likewise
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution shall immediately serve his suspension. He shall
formally manifest to this Court that his suspension has started, and copy furnish all courts and quasi-
judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance, within five (5) days upon receipt of this
Resolution. Respondent shall also serve copies of his manifestation on all adverse parties in all
cases he entered his formal appearance.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to
Atty. Severo L. Brillantes' personal record. Copies of this Resolution should also be served on the
IBP for its proper disposition, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.
 Respondent received the copy of this Court's resolution on 08 February 2021.2 The following
day, he filed a Manifestation with Plea for Mercy3 (Re: Suspension from the Practice of Law) dated
09 February 2021 requesting that his suspension be reduced to one month only. This Court denied
respondent's plea for mercy in a Resolution4 dated 14 June 2021.

Subsequently, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Lift Order Suspending

Respondent from the Practice of Law,5 alleging that after his receipt of the copy of the Resolution
dated 02 March 2020, he desisted from the practice of law. He claims that he has furnished all
concerned adverse parties in the cases he has been handling, as well as the courts and quasi-
judicial agencies where he has entered an appearance with copies of his Manifestation dated 09
February 2021. Moreover, he has filed his Withdrawal of Appearance therein, attaching copies of the
emails6 sent as proof thereof. Citing various health problems, respondent apologizes for the delay in
notifying the aforesaid parties. He also contends that he has already complied with the six-month
period of suspension and thus, beseeches this Court for mercy and compassion. Allegedly, he has
already learned his lesson, and his family also suffered with him for seven months. He alleges that
he needs to attend to his clients' cases as soon as possible.

Recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)

In a Report and Recommendation7 dated 12 October 2021, the OBC recommends the lifting of
respondent's suspension, noting that respondent has served his suspension from the time he
received notice on 08 February 2021 until 08 August 2021. It opines that while respondent has failed
to submit certifications from the courts where he practices, as well as from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Chapter where he belongs, his sworn statement attesting to his compliance to the
order of suspension should be deemed sufficient compliance to the guidelines set forth in Maniago v.
De Dias (Maniago).8

On this note,the OBC observes that over the years, there have been varying interpretations of
the Court's guidelines in Maniago with respect to the requirements for lifting an order of suspension,
specifically the statement: "[t]he Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's
compliance with the order of suspension." The OBC has noticed that some respondents in
administrative cases file sworn statements of their compliance to the order of
suspension, and certifications from 1) the courts where respondents are practicing and 2) IBP
Chapter where they belong, affirming such compliance (certifications). However, there are also some
who, like respondent, consider the filing of a mere sworn statement sufficient for purposes of
reinstatement to practice.

The OBC states that a lot of similar motions to lift suspension have been held in abeyance
pending submissions of the said certifications. It also points out that because of the COVID-19
£A⩊phi£

pandemic, securing copies of such certifications has been burdensome as many courts and offices
have or had been placed in temporary lockdowns. It further notes that a lot of the respondents
seeking to comply with the Maniago guidelines are senior citizens who are at risk of contracting the
disease if they personally request these certifications from various offices. Finally, it opines that the
delay caused by requiring these certifications had caused an enormous economic burden to some
suspended lawyers whose only source of income is their exercise of profession. Thus, the OBC
recommends that the requirement on additional certifications be set aside and that the filing of a
sworn statement of compliance be deemed sufficient to reinstate suspended lawyers.

Issue

This Court is tasked to determine whether respondent's submission of a sworn statement of

compliance is sufficient for purposes of lifting a disciplinary order of suspension.

Ruling of the Court

One of the foundational precepts in legal ethics is that the practice of law is a privilege burdened
with conditions. To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "adhere to the rigid standards
of mental fitness, maintain the highest degree of morality, and faithfully comply with the rules of the
legal profession."9 This Court has invoked this principle to justify various other legal and ethical rules
which ensure that only qualified and competent individuals may practice law in the country. One
such rule governs disciplinary orders of suspension. Thus, when a lawyer is suspended, there is no
automatic resumption of practice after the expiration of the suspension period. The suspended
lawyer must comply with various requirements and secure an order from this Court prior to
reinstatement.10 In Maniago, this Court, laid down the guidelines for resumption of practice after
service of suspension, viz.:

After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court
shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
 Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and executory;

Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with
the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from
the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;

The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's compliance with the
order of suspension;

Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be
warranted.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

Maniago is categorical that the sworn statement of compliance is sufficient to prove the lawyer's
service of suspension. This Court seemed to confirm this in Reyes v. Vitan,12 where the Court
conditioned the granting of therein respondent's petition for reinstatement to his submission of a
sworn statement of compliance. In that case, the Court also affirmed the requirement of service of
copies thereof to the IBP and courts, as well as the warning that any false allegation in the sworn
statement shall merit a more serious punishment. The Court did not mention nor require additional
certifications from third parties verifying said respondent's service during the period of suspension.
This holding has been reiterated in Tan, Jr. v. Gumba.13

On the other hand, it appears that there is also a contrary stream of cases where this Court
specifically required independent proof of compliance to the order of suspension. In Miranda v.
Carpio,14 this Court instructed therein respondent "to file his sworn statement with motion to lift
order of suspension with certification to that effect, from the IBP Local Chapter where he is
affiliated, and from the Office of the Executive Judge of the courts where he practices his legal
profession, to affirm that he has fully served his six (6) months suspension." Similar certifications
were likewise required or submitted, in addition to the sworn statement of compliance in the cases
of Miranda, Jr. v.Alvarez, Sr.,15 and Ko v. Uy-Lampasa.16

Due to the apparent inconsistency in the implementation of Maniago, this Court deems it proper
to note and accept the OBC's recommendation. We now clarify and set the uniform rule that for
purposes of requests for lifting of the suspension, submission of a sworn certification of service of
suspension shall be deemed sufficient compliance to Maniago. While lawyers are neither prohibited
nor discouraged to attach supporting certifications from their local IBP chapters, and from courts and
quasijudicial agencies where they practice, their requests to resume practice will not be held in
abeyance on account of their non-submission.

This Court is cognizant of the effects of requiring lawyers to submit these certifications. Verily,
applying and processing of requests for certifications from various sources may have resulted in
prolonging the suspension more than the periods set by the Court. This is because the respondents
would have to wait for these offices to act on their requests. While temporary loss of the privilege to
practice law is a necessary offshoot of an administrative transgression, this Court did not, certainly,
intend to cause additional economic burdens to suspended lawyers by dragging out the period of
their suspension. As the OBC has noted, for most of the suspended lawyers, if not all, their only
source of income is derived from the exercise of their profession.

Likewise, the occun-ence of the COVID-19 pandemic may have further outstretched the time to
secure these certifications from various offices. Verily, the Court is not oblivious to the "new norm"
where courts and offices intermittently close their offices or regulate their operations in compliance
with health restrictions. To require all suspended lawyers, even those senior citizens, or
immunocompromised to get these certifications will not only cause delay but will also unnecessarily
put them at risk of contracting the COVID-19 virus. Thus, the Maniago guidelines should be
interpreted liberally, in that a suspended lawyer's submission of a sworn statement of compliance
shall be deemed sufficient to lift a previously issued order of suspension.

In any case, this Court finds that there are procedural safeguards in place to address the
probability of abuse. Every order of suspension imposed against a member of the Bar will still be
furnished to the: (1) OBC to be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney; (2) the
IBP for its information and guidance; and, (3) the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
irculation to all courts in the country. Further, as Maniago dictates, a -lawyer who submits a false or
untruthful sworn statement shall be subject to applicable criminal and /or administrative punishment.
 By making the process of lifting suspensions more efficient, this Court is not waiving its authority
to discipline erring lawyers or tolerating professional indiscretions but is merely balancing its
regulatory duty with practical considerations. Delaying and making the process of lifting disciplinary
sanctions disproportionately burdensome, albeit inadvertently, achieves no further noble objective.
Indeed, while the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time,
also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession
unreasonably.17

In this case, this Court notes that herein respondent's suspension ended at the time the country
was just starting to gain control of the pandemic through the administration of vaccines. As this Court
has recognized, it may not have been feasible to physically request and promptly obtain
certifications at that time. Nonetheless, in addition to his sworn statement of compliance to the order
of suspension, said respondent also submitted copies of email communications he sent to the
private adverse parties, concerned courts, and quasi-judicial agencies, notifying them of his
suspension. Given the circumstances, respondent's effo1is suffice, and this Court does not see any
merit in prolonging the lifting of his suspension, subject to the procedural safeguards discussed
above.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Severo Brillantes' Manifestation with

Motion to Lift Order Suspending Respondent from the Practice of Law is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, he is hereby ALLOWED to RESUME his practice of law effective
immediately.

For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, the following guidelines shall govern the lifting of the
penalty of suspension imposed against members of the Bar:

1. After a finding that the respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the
Court shall render a decision or resolution imposing the appropriate penalty;

2. The order of suspension shall be immediately executory upon receipt thereof by the
respondent lawyer;

3. Every order of suspension imposed against a member of the Bar shall be furnished to the: (1)
Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney; (2)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and (3) Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country;

4. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, the respondent lawyer shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has
desisted from the practice of law, has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her
suspension and has complied with all other directives of the Court relative to the order of
suspension;

5. Copies of such Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Executive Judge of the courts, or any quasi-judicial agencies where the
respondent lawyer has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared
as counsel;

6. The order of suspension shall be automatically lifted upon submission by the respondent
lawyer of such Sworn Statement that he or she has completed the service of suspension;

7. While respondent lawyers are neither prohibited nor discouraged to attach supporting
certifications from their local IBP chapters, and from courts and quasi-judicial agencies where they
practice, their requests to resume the practice of law will not be held in abeyance on account of their
non-submission; and,

8. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the respondent lawyer under oath
shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or even disbarment, as may be
warranted.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts, Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information
and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is also DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision
to the record of respondent Atty. Severo Brillantes as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan,

Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
 Hernando, J., On Leave.

On Leave.

EN BANC

[B.M. NO. 2112 - July 24, 2012]

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE

PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he
became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on
September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to
resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support
of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit: ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P.
Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

chanrobles virtual law library

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a
similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to
resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to
Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to
resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar
and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means
termination of the petitioner s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage
in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to
be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends
to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice.3 ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ

It can not be overstressed that: ςrαlαω

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected
with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court)
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of

morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4 ςrνll

chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law,
the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of
the following documents in relation to his petition: ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

chanrobles virtual law library

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following: ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau

of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his
good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and cralawlibrary

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator,

UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with
the MCLE.
chanrobles virtual law library

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the
MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the
petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume
his practice of law.
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees
no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED,

subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by
the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary
guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the
guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

*
On Leave per Special Order No. 1257 dated July 19, 2012.

**
On Leave.

1
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ

"I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
chanrobles virtual law library

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.

2
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, Petitioner, B.M. No.
1678, December 17, 2007.

3
R.A. No. 9225, Section 5.

4
Supra note 2.

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 11439. January 04, 2022 ]

BATAAN SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING COMPANY INC., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.

ANTHONY JAY B. CONSUNJI, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 filed by Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
Company Inc. (BASECO), through its Board of Directors, against Atty. Anthony Jay B. Consunji
(Atty. Consunji) for receiving excessive cash advances and professional fees from BASECO and
failing to render an accounting and liquidation of the said moneys in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Facts of the Case

 BASECO is a stock corporation engaged in the leasing of real properties for pier and port
operations, ship docking, provisioning and cargo handling. Meanwhile, Atty. Consunji was the legal
counsel of BASECO from 2005-2011.

According to the complaint, Atty. Consunji received several cash advances purportedly as
payment for professional fees and taxes due to the government from BASECO in the total amount of
P20,593,781.42, which consist of:

Date Description Amount Payee

09- SEC Registration of Joint Venture P1,150,000.00 Law Firm of Ramos
04-07 Corporation and other SEC registration
expenses2
04- Payment of Transfer taxes to Province P4,350,000.00 Anthony Jay Consunji
27-10 of Bataan, CGT, DST and registration
fee3
06- Payment of DST, CGT and other BIR P7,962,781.42 Anthony Jay Consunji
23-10 expenses4
03- Preparation and filing expenses for P51,000.00 Law Firm of Ramos
07-10 Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of
Bataan-Baseco Joint Venture Inc.5
03- Advances for professional fees for re- P110,000.00 Law Firm of Ramos
28-11 issuance of Engineering Island titles6
04- Representation regarding issuance of P500,000.00 Anthony Jay Consunji
13-11 new titles at Engineering Island7
04- Professional fee for reconstitution of P1,020,000.00 Anthony Jay Consunji
26-11 Engineering Island title8
04- Professional fee for titling of four parcels P850,000.00 Anthony Jay Consunji
26-11 of land in Engineering Island9
04- Representation re: reconstitution of P1,600,000.00 Anthony Jay Consunji
26-11 Engineering Island titles10
04- Representation re: titling of four parcels P3,000,000.00 Anthony Jay Consunji
26-11 of land in Engineering Island11
TOTAL: P20,593,781.42

Out of the P20,593,781.42 cash advances paid by BASECO, Atty. Consunji received
P4,350,000.00, as representation fees for the titling of the four parcels of unregistered land and
P2,730,000.00, as professional fees for the reconstitution of the lost titles of BASECO, both in
Engineering Island. Moreover, Atty. Consunji received the amount of P12,312,781.42, as payments
for the taxes due to the government on certain transactions of BASECO. These payments were
evidenced by the payment vouchers submitted by BASECO.

BASECO avers that Atty. Consunji failed to liquidate or account for the advanced professional
fees and taxes he received. Likewise, he failed to render the professional services he was supposed
to provide which include the titling of unregistered lands and reconstitution of lost titles in the
Engineering Island. Likewise, Atty. Consunji failed to submit the Official Receipts of the several taxes
he paid to the Province of Bataan and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Further, he did not
issue Official Receipts to BASECO with respect to the professional fees paid to him.

Moreover, BASECO contends that it was able to successfully secure the re-issuance or
reconstitution of the subject titles with the help of other lawyers, instead of Atty. Consunji, only for
the amount of P200,000.00.

On December 14, 2012, BASECO sent a Demand Letter12 to Atty. Consunji asking him for
accounting, liquidation and refund or reimbursement of the cash advances he received. However,
Atty. Consunji failed to heed from its demand.

Accordingly, BASECO filed charges against Atty. Consunji and its other former directors, officers
and employees for plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman docketed as OMB-C-C-
13-0429.
 BASECO made another demand13 from Atty. Consunji but he failed to respond hence,
BASECO filed the instant administrative complaint against him.

In a Resolution14 dated August 17, 2016, this Court required Atty. Consunji to file his Comment
to the Complaint within 10 days from notice. After requesting for five extensions of time to file his
comment, Atty. Consunji filed his Comment15 on December 22, 2016.

In his Comment, Atty. Consunji denies the charges against him. He argues that all the cash
advances he received were liquidated and well accounted for. He submitted all the liquidation
documents to the Finance Department of BASECO. Further, he avers that all the funds that were
released to him were duly approved by the Board of Directors and with the knowledge of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Comptroller. To support his defense, he
submitted the affidavits of former BASECO President Proceso L. Maligalig (Maligalig), Treasurer
Agustiniana Avelino (Avelino) and Finance Branch Chief Socorro Santos (Santos).

In a Resolution16 dated April 5, 2017, this Court required BASECO to file its Reply to the
Comment within 10 days from notice. On March 24, 2017, BASECO filed its Reply.17

In its Reply, BASECO contends that it is incumbent upon Atty. Consunji to account for and
liquidate the cash advances he received. It was his duty to document and retain proof of such
accounting and liquidation if, indeed, these were done or made. His failure to produce any objective
or documentary proof of accounting and liquidation suggests that he did not actually account for and
liquidate the cash advances.

With respect to his receipt of professional fees on the titling of the lands, Atty. Consunji did not
deny that he failed to complete the reconstitution of the land titles in Engineering Island, to which he
was paid for. Thus, for such failure to render the services required of him, BASECO argues that he
must return or refund the professional fees he received in relation thereto.

Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In a Resolution18 dated August 9, 2017, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt of the
record.

The IBP, through the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference Hearing19 dated June 8, 2018 notifying the parties of the mandatory conference to be
held on July 26, 2018 9:30 am at IBP Office. The parties were likewise directed to submit their
respective mandatory conference briefs 5 days prior to the scheduled hearing.

On July 23, 2018, Atty. Consunji, through counsel, filed a Motion for Cancellation of Mandatory
Conference20 citing as reason the prior scheduled hearing of his counsel at the Regional Trial Court
of Puerto Princesa on July 25, 2018, and his counsel's flight back will be on July 26, 2018 at 10:25
am.

In an Order21 dated July 26, 2018, the IBP-CBD continued with the mandatory conference
however, neither of the parties appeared. However, it noted the Motion for Cancellation filed by Atty.
Consunji. Thereafter, it directed the parties to submit their respective verified position papers within
10 days from notice.

After several extensions, Atty. Consunji filed his verified position paper.22 He reiterated the
arguments set forth in his Comment to the Complaint. In addition, he cited the Ombudsman
Resolution23 in OMB-C-C-13-0429 acquitting him of the charge of plunder and violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 for lack of substantial proof to support the charges against him. Lastly, he argues
that he tried to obtain the records from the Finance Department of BASECO however, all the
documents and records were seized by the PCGG on June 23, 2011.

BASECO did not file any position paper. The notices were returned unserved with a notation that
the complainant has moved out. BASECO failed to inform this Court and the IBP of the change of its
address, thus the IBP deemed BASECO to have waived its right to receive notices and other
pleadings as well as its right to participate in the proceedings.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In a Memorandum24 dated November 23, 2018, the IBP-CBD, through Investigating

Commissioner Sherwin C. De Joya, recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against Atty. Consunji for lack of merit.
 The Investigating Commissioner found that BASECO failed to establish through substantial
evidence that Atty. Consunji committed the acts complained of. In fact, BASECO did not even
participate in the proceedings before the CBD. All that it submitted were machine copies of the
annexes attached to its Complaint, which were not authenticated. There was no evidence to support
the alleged irregularities in the disbursements made to Atty. Consunji.

On the other hand, Atty. Consunji presented evidence to support his defense, which the
Investigating Commissioner gave more credence than the unsupported surmises and conjectures of
BASECO.

In a Resolution25 dated June 18, 2019, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) approved and
adopted the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to dismiss the
administrative complaint against Atty. Consunji. However, it resolved to impose against him a fine of
P5,000.00 for his failure to comply with the mandatory hearing requirement of the IBP-CBD.

Issue

The issue in this case is whether Atty. Consunji should be administratively disciplined

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds that Atty. Consunji violated Rule 16.01, Canon 16, and Rules 18.01 and 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, the Court reverses the findings and
recommendation of the IBP and holds Atty. Consunji administratively liable.

In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations in the

complaint rests on the complainant. A finding of guilt must be supported by substantial evidence or
that evidence which the reasonable mind might accept as adequate to establish a conclusion. The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.26

The Court holds that the complainant was able to prove by substantial evidence that Atty.
Consunji committed acts in violation of his duties and obligations as a member of the Bar under the
CPR.

Violation of Rule 16.01,

Canon 16 of
the CPR

Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the CPR provides:

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SMALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. (Emphasis supplied)

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer
great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.27 Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately
returned. A lawyer's failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.28

There is no dispute that Atty. Consunji received cash advances from BASECO for his
professional fees and for the payment of certain taxes due to the government. According to
BASECO, Atty. Consunji failed to liquidate and render an accounting of these cash advances.
BASECO sent two demand letters asking Atty. Consunji to account for and liquidate the funds he
received from them but Atty. Consunji failed to comply with the said demand.

On the other hand, Atty. Consunji argues that he was able to render an accounting and
liquidation of the fees he received and all these documents were submitted to the Finance
Department of BASECO. However, due to the seizure of BASECO's documents and files by the
security personnel of the PCGG, he can no longer obtain access to the accounting and liquidation
reports he submitted to BASECO. In his Comment and Position Paper, he provided the following
explanation to the cash advances he received, which the Court quotes:
 20.1 The amount of P1,150,000.00 was liquidated through original receipts
which were turned over to the Finance Department of complainant BASECO;

20.2 The amount of P4,350,000.00 was liquidated through official receipts which
were turned over to the Finance Department of complainant BASECO;

20.3 The amount of P7,962,781.42 was likewise liquidated through turnover of

official receipts to the Finance Department of complainant BASECO;

20.4 The amount of P51,000.00 was paid to Consunji by way of professional

fees for the preparation and filing of the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the
Bataan-BASECO Joint Venture Corporation. Surely, an official receipt therefor was
issued;

20.5 The amount of P110,000.00 was paid to respondent Consunji as initial

professional fees for the re-issuance of the titles for the properties of complainant
BASECO at the Engineering Island;

20.6 The amount of P500,000.00 was received by respondent Consunji for

settlement of representation expenses in relation to the properties of complainant
BASECO at the Engineering Island. This amount was subsequently liquidated
through acknowledgement receipts which were turned over to the Finance
Department of BASECO;

20.7 The amount of P1,020,000.00 was received by respondent Consunji as

professional fees for the reconstitution of titles of Engineering Island. An official
receipt therefor was issued;

20.8 The amount of P850,000.00 was paid to respondent Consunji as payment

of the last tranche of the latter's professional fees for the reissuance of the titles for
the properties of BASECO at the Engineering Island;

20.9 The amount of P1,600,000.00 represented the settlement of representation

expenses incurred in relation to the properties of BASECO at the Engineering
Island. This amount was liquidated through presentation of acknowledgment
receipts which were subsequently turned over to the Finance Department of
complainant BASECO;

20.10 The amount of P3,000,000.00 represented the settlement of

representation expenses incurred in relation to the properties of BASECO at the
Engineering Island. This amount was liquidated through presentation of
acknowledgment receipts which were subsequently turned over to the Finance
Department of complainant BASECO[.]29

The Court finds Atty. Consunji's contentions bereft of merit. The explanation he provided is
general and lacks substantiation. He merely stated that the receipts were turned over to the Finance
Department of BASECO without specifying the OR Nos. per transaction, the dates that these were
turned over and the officers who received the same. Further, in the receipt of payment for his
professional fees, he merely issued acknowledgment receipts instead of official receipts as required
by the law. He did not retain copies of these receipts for his record. All these circumstances lead the
Court to believe that no actual accounting and liquidation was done by Atty. Consunji.

It is incumbent upon a lawyer to keep records of his transactions with clients as a matter of
prudence and due diligence. Ethical and practical considerations require lawyers to issue receipts to
their clients, even if it was not demanded, and to keep copies of the said receipts for his own
records.30 Thus, he cannot simply claim that the records were already with the Finance Department
of BASECO. As a dutiful and prudent lawyer, he should have kept copies of these receipts and
records of transactions he had with BASECO. Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be
aware that he is accountable for the money entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means
of ensuring accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.

In this case, Atty. Consunji failed to provide evidence to show that he has already accounted for
and liquidated the cash advances he received from BASECO. It is his duty to show that all moneys
received from his client have been accounted for, that the money has been utilized for the purpose it
was given, and that there are corresponding receipts issued with respect to these transactions. Atty.
Consunji has not submitted any copies of the receipts he issued to BASECO with respect to the
professional fees he received in processing the titling of the unregistered lands and reconstitution of
lost titles in the Engineering Island. Further, he has failed to show copies of Official Receipts issued
by the Province of Bataan and BIR with respect to the payment of transfer taxes, capital gains taxes,
documentary stamp taxes and registration fees made by BASECO.

The taxes payable to the Province of Bataan and BIR were released to Atty. Consunji, as the
legal counsel of BASECO, in order to facilitate and process its payment to the concerned
government units. It is incumbent upon him to show that these moneys he received were properly
utilized to its purpose and that there are Official Receipts issued by the government as evidence of
payment of these taxes. The claim that the liquidation records of these cash advances were already
with the Finance Department of BASECO, which were seized by the PCGG, deserves scant
consideration. If the custody of these documents and records were really with BASECO or PCGG,
Atty. Consunji could have easily requested the IBP or the Court to order the former to produce these
records pursuant to Rules 21 and 27 of the Rules of Court. The IBP Investigators have the power to
issue subpoenas, take depositions and administer oaths pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court. However, Atty. Consunji failed to avail of these legal remedies. He failed to
rebut the allegation of BASECO that no accounting and liquidation has been made to the cash
advances released to him.

The affidavits of former BASECO officers Maligalig, Avelino and Santos are not sufficient to
absolve Atty. Consunji of his administrative liability. Both Avelino and Santos, Treasurer and Finance
Branch Chief respectively, testified on the process of budget approvals and release followed by
BASECO. Santos, as the Finance Branch Chief, had no statement indicating that she received
accounting and liquidation reports from Atty. Consunji. It was in the Joint Affidavit of Maligalig and
Avelino where they testified that all the moneys disbursed to Atty. Consunji were liquidated.
However, the Court finds their statement irrelevant and self-serving.

If indeed Atty. Consunji submitted the liquidation reports to the Finance Department, it should
have been Santos, the Finance Branch Chief at that time, who is the most competent witness to
testify having received these liquidation and accounting documents. However, there was no such
statement coming from her which leads the Court to believe that there was no actual accounting and
liquidation done for the moneys Atty. Consunji received from BASECO.

Further, under the Rules of Evidence, when the contents of a document are the subject of
inquiry in an action, the original document must be presented, as in this case, the original Official
Receipts of the transactions and liquidation report submitted by Atty. Consunji. It is only in
exceptional cases enumerated in Section 3, particularly Section 3(b) of Rule 130 that secondary
evidence may be admitted. Such exception cannot apply in this case because Atty. Consunji failed
to avail of his legal remedy to require BASECO or PCGG to produce the said documents, which
were purportedly in the latter's custody. Hence, the affidavits of his witnesses are not admissible to
support his claim that he actually liquidated the moneys advanced to him by BASECO.

Violation of Rules 18.01 and

18.03 of
Canon 18

Furthermore, the Court finds that Atty. Consunji also violated Rules 18.01 and 18.03, Canon 18
of the CPR, which state:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE

AND DILIGENCE

Rule 18.01 – A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service
if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who
is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

BASECO contends that despite receipt of his full legal compensation, Atty. Consunji failed to
complete his obligation to process the registration of the untitled lands of BASECO and the
reconstitution of the lost titles in Engineering Island. Atty. Consunji counters that he was not able to
do so because the PCGG seized all the documents and files of BASECO and prevented him from
gaining access to the documents in relation thereto. This was corroborated by the Affidavit of
Maligalig stating that Atty. Consunji was able to accomplish substantial preparatory works however,
he was prevented from completing the same because of the lack of relocation surveys and the
records, documents, and papers in relation to the properties in Engineering Island which were also
seized by the security personnel of PCGG.
 In the Memorandum of Agreement31 dated March 21, 2011, BASECO and Atty. Consunji
entered into a service contract wherein Atty. Consunji obligated himself to process the registration of
the untitled parcels of land of BASECO in Engineering Island. In consideration thereof, Atty.
Consunji shall be entitled to an acceptance fee of P1,200,000.00. In addition to the acceptance fee,
Atty. Consunji shall also be entitled to a success contingent fee, quoted hereunder:

3. In addition to the aforementioned acceptance fee, the SECOND PARTY shall

be entitled to charge and collect from the FIRST PARTY, a SUCCESS –
CONTINGENT – FEE of twenty-five percent (25%) of the fair market value of the
PROPERTIES that were successfully registered and titled in the name of the FIRST
PARTY or of the prevailing zonal valuation in the area or of real properties adjacent
in location to the PROPERTIES, whichever is higher.

4. The Success – Contingent – Fee shall become due and collectible by the
SECOND PARTY from the FIRST PARTY, upon his delivery to the latter, of the
certificates of title over the PROPERTIES in the name of the FIRST PARTY as well
as the corresponding Tax Declarations thereof, and within thirty (30) days
thereafter.32 (Emphasis supplied)

According to the records, Atty. Consunji received a compensation of P4,350,000.00 for the
issuance of new titles for the unregistered lands in Engineering Island, which consist of:

1. Representation regarding issuance of new titles at Engineering Island –

P500,000.00 (under Payment Voucher No. 2011-04-137 dated April 13, 2011)

2. Professional fee for titling of four (4) parcels of land at Engineering Island –
P850,000.00 (under Payment Voucher No. 2011-04-151 dated April 26, 2011)

3. Representation re: for titling of four (4) parcels of land at Engineering Island –
P3,000,000.00 (under Payment Voucher No. 2011-04-153 dated April 26, 2011)

It is not disputed that Atty. Consunji was not able to successfully deliver the certificates of title of
the four parcels of unregistered land of BASECO in Engineering Island. Despite the nonfulfillment of
his legal obligation in the MOA, Atty. Consunji received P4,350,000.00 as his legal compensation.
Knowing that this is in excess of the compensation he was supposed to receive, Atty. Consunji
retained such amount and did not bother to return the excess compensation he collected.

Moreover, Atty. Consunji received P2,730,000.00 for his legal services for the reconstitution of
the lost titles, which breakdown as follows:

1. Advances for professional fees for re-issuance of Engineering Island titles –

P110,000.00 (under Payment Voucher No. 2011- dated March 28, 2011)

2. Professional fee for reconstitution of titles of Engineering Island –

P1,020,000.00 (under Payment Voucher Mo. 2011-04-150 dated April 26, 2011)

3. Representation re: for reconstitution of titles of Engineering Island –

P1,600,000.00 (under Payment Voucher No. 2011-04-152 dated April 26, 2011)

Similar to the previous engagement, Atty. Consunji was not able to process the reconstitution of
the lost titles despite receiving his legal compensation.

From the foregoing, it is evident that Atty. Consunji was remiss in fulfilling his obligation to his
client. The affidavit of Maligalig stating that Atty. Consunji was able to prepare substantial
preparatory works is self-serving. If indeed Atty. Consunji was able to make substantial preparatory
works, he should have presented these works/documents to the IBP or the Court. Had he really
done substantial work for the processing of the titles, he could have submitted documentary or
object evidence to support his claim. There was no showing of what substantial preparatory works
were done and what specific actions were taken by Atty. Consunji to fulfill his legal obligation. He
does not deny having received the legal fees in relation to the engagements. Thus, it is incumbent
upon him to prove that he has duly complied with his obligation or that he has substantially
performed tasks to fulfill the same but was prevented from completing it for reasons not attributable
to him. However, Atty. Consunji failed to prove that he did his professional duties properly and
meticulously.

The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant's case
and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the CPR which
provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. A member of the legal
profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his
client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice.
Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the
client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

Failure to comply with such duty subjects the lawyer to administrative sanction.

Administrative Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the CPR. Lawyers should bear in mind that the practice of law is a profession, a form of
public trust, the performance of which is entrusted only to those who are qualified and who possess
good moral character. The appropriate penalty for a delinquent lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.33

In this case, Atty. Consunji received millions of pesos from his client as his legal compensation
but he failed to fulfill his obligation. He likewise received money in trust as payment for his client's
taxes but he did not render an accounting and liquidation of the moneys he received. Neither did he
present any Official Receipt or proof of payment of the said liabilities of the client. These acts are
evidently against the provisions of the CPR, the lawyer's oath and the law. The Court cannot turn a
blind eye on these palpable imprudence of Atty. Consunji for these constitute as blatant disregard
and desecration of the fiduciary duty, competence, diligence and loyalty that a lawyer owes to his
client.

Likewise, it is also the Court's mandate to ensure that the lawyer shall impose and charge
reasonable and proper attorney's fees in accordance with the efforts and time spent in the case. A
lawyer shall not unjustly enrich himself at the expense of the client. It must always be remembered
that the practice of law is not a business and a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of
justice. Hence, it is of utmost importance that lawyers maintain an honest and fair dealings with its
clients.

In this case, Atty. Consunji charged exorbitant legal fees to his client despite nonfulfillment of his
legal obligation. BASECO was able to process the reconstitution of the lost titles in Engineering
Island with the help of another lawyer only for the amount of P200,000.00 while Atty. Consunji
charged BASECO P2,730,000.00 for the same engagement but still failed to accomplish the
reconstitution. Having failed to complete his engagement, Atty. Consunji should have returned the
excess legal fees he received from his client. Instead, he retained the money and appropriated it
unto himself, to the damage and prejudice of BASECO. Such acts display Atty. Consunji's propensity
to take advantage of his clients in violation of his duties as a member of the Bar.

Based from the foregoing, the Court finds that Atty. Consunji's acts are so reprehensible and
disgraceful, and his violations of the provisions of the CPR are so blatant, demonstrating his moral
unfitness and unsuitability to discharge the duties of a lawyer. His actions besmirch the public
perception of the legal profession. As such, Atty. Consunji deserves the ultimate penalty of
disbarment

In Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III,34 the Court ordered the disbarment of Atty. Meneses III
after he failed to account for the money received by him from his client. Atty. Meneses III was given
P50,000.00 as the consideration for the out-of-court settlement in the case where his client was
involved. However, the settlement did not materialize. Despite that, Atty. Meneses III continued to
keep the money entrusted to him in his professional capacity in violation of his duty to immediately
return the same to his client. The Court ruled that such conduct on his part indicated his unfitness for
the confidence and trust reposed on him. Showing such lack of personal honesty or of good moral
character as to render him worthy of public confidence, constitutes a ground for disciplinary action
extending to disbarment.35

In Sison vs. Atty. Camacho,36 Atty. Camacho was meted out the penalty of disbarment for
violating Rule 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR. Atty. Camacho entered into a compromise agreement
without the authority of his client and he failed to account for the money he received from his client in
the amount of P1,288,260.00 intended for payment of additional docket fees. The Court therein ruled
that Atty. Camacho's acts are inexcusable and shameful to the legal profession. His failure to abide
by the legal duties and moral obligations of a member of the Bar and the damage and prejudiced
caused to the client because of such acts warranted the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.37

In Mariveles v. Atty. Mallari,38 the Court imposed the penalty of disbarment on Atty. Mallari after
he failed to file his client's appellant's brief with the Court of Appeals despite asking for several
extensions of time, in direct violation of Rule 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR. The Court ruled that Atty.
Mallari's act demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and
his client but also a shameless disregard for his duties as a lawyer. He is unfit for membership in this
noble profession.39

Lastly, in Enriquez v. Atty. Lavadia,40 Atty. Lavadia Jr. was disbarred after he failed to file
several pleadings which resulted to an adverse decision against his client. His client paid a total of
P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees relating to the preparation of the pleadings. However,
Atty. Lavadia Jr. failed to file the position paper which resulted to his client being declared to be in
default. He filed an appeal, moved for several extensions, but still failed to file the appeal
memorandum which resulted to the dismissal of his client's appeal. These acts revealed Atty.
Lavadia's nonchalant attitude to the cause of his client in violation of his duty under Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the CPR.41

Further, Atty. Consunji must return the amount of P12,312,781.42 to BASECO, which he
received in his professional capacity, for the purported payment of transfer taxes, capital gains tax,
documentary stamp tax and registration fees to the Province of Bataan and BIR. Likewise, he must
return the excess legal fees in the amount of P3,150,000.00 which he received in relation to his
engagement to register the untitled parcels of land in Enginering Island in the name of BASECO. As
above-stated, Atty. Consunji failed to successfully deliver the certificates of title of these parcels of
land. In accordance with the MOA dated March 21, 2011, he shall only be paid a success contingent
fee of 25% of the FMV of the properties upon delivery of the certificates of title. Failing to accomplish
his obligation, Atty. Consunji can only retain the acceptance fee of P1,200,000.00. Lastly, he must
return the amount of P2,530,000.00 as excess legal compensation he received for the reconstitution
of the lost titles. Assuming that he made substantial preparatory works for the said engagement, the
Court deems it proper to let Atty. Consunji retain P200,000.00 as his legal fees therefor, on the basis
of the principle of quantum meruit and in accordance with the customary fees actually paid for the
said transaction.

Payment for transfer

taxes, CGT, DST and
P4,350,000.00
registration fees to the
Province of Bataan
+
Payment for transfer P7, 962,781.42
taxes, CGT, DST and
registration fees to the BIR
____________
Total taxes advanced: P12,312,781.42
Legal fees received for the P4,350,000.00
registration of the untitled
parcels of land in
Engineering Island
-
Legal fees indicated in the P1, 200,000.00
MOA dated March 21,
2011
____________
Total excess fees advanced: P3,150,000.00
Legal fees received for the P2,730,000.00.
reconstitution of the lost
titles in Engineering
Island
-
Actual fees paid for the P200,000.00
successful reconstitution
of the lost titles
____________
Total excess fees advanced: P2,530,000.00

The practice of law is a privilege given to few, and it is granted only to those of good moral
character. The Bar maintains and aims to uphold a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their
clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Anthony Jay B. Consunji
is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 16.01, Canon 16, and Rule 18.01 and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-
stated, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.

Further, he is ORDERED to Return to Bataan Shipyard and Engineering

Company Inc. the amount of P12,312,781.42 intended for the payment of certain
taxes to the Province of Bataan and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the amounts of
P3,150,000.00 and P2,530,000.00 as excess legal fees he received from the latter
for his failure to complete his engagements which shall earn interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment. He is
further DIRECTED to submit proof of payment to the Court within ten (10) days from
his full payment.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
entered into the records of respondent Atty. Anthony Jay B. Consunji. Copies shall
likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED."

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier,

Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.