Risk Analysis Refueling Nozzles RA Refuelling Nozzles - Generic Rev3

RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT
BANLAW PIPELINE PTY LTD

Dry-Break Quick-Fill
Refuelling System
AUS21 Series
AUS22
AUS45
800 Series
1000 Series
Prepared By: Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd

Revision 3: October 2003
The Refuelling Specialists

CONTENTS
PAGE
1. Discussion of Risk Management Objectives 1
2. Details of Equipment 2
2.1 Principles of the Banlaw System 3
2.2 The 21 Series Nozzle 4
2.3 The 22 Nozzle 5
2.4 The 45 Nozzle 5
2.5 Receivers and Tank Vents 6
3. Contexts 9
3.1 Strategic Context 9
3.2 Organisational Context 9
3.2.1 Health & Safety Obligations – Employer 10
3.2.2 Health & Safety Obligations – Designer, Manufacturer, Supplier 10
3.3 Risk Management Context 11
4. Details of Authors 12
5. Outline of Risk Identification Methods 13
5.1 Action Error Analysis (AER) 13
5.2 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 13
5.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 13
6. Outline of Risk Assessment Methods 14
7. Risks Identified 15
7.1 Action Error Analysis (AER) 15
7.2 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 16
7.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 17
Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment i

Rev. 3 2003
7.4 Risk Ranking 18
8. Assessment of Risks 21
9. Risk Reduction and Control Measures 23
9.1 Liquid Storage Tank Pressure Certification 26
9.2 Correct Nozzle Operation 28
9.3 Specific Actions to Reduce the Occurrence of High Probability Risks 29
9.4 Product Warranty & Disclaimer 30
9.5 Banlaw “Zero Tank Pressure” Refuelling 30
9.6 Fuel Monitoring & Accountability 31
10. Risk Monitoring and Review 32
11. References 33
Appendix
A.1 Nozzle Performance Specifications
A.2 Additional Information
Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment ii

Rev. 3 2003
1. Discussion of Risk Management Objectives
Risk management aims to reduce the probability and impact of risks. Risk assessment aims to
identify the risks associated with a procedure, so that they may be effectively managed.
The assessment of risks is not an easy task, particularly where there is a high level of human
involvement. There are risks that may be classed as inconceivable within the bounds of proper
operating procedure and “common sense”, however the potential for such risks cannot be
discounted. Instead, risk management procedures can be made to incorporate measures to reduce
and discourage the occurrence of risks associated with human error.
In line with risk management guidelines, this report aims to identify, assess and prioritize,
address, and provide guidance to manage the risks associated with the use of Banlaw Quick-Fill
Dry-Break Refuelling Nozzles. The process of refuelling is an integral part of any mining
operation involving mainly plant equipment and fuel farm operators. Despite quick-fill dry-break
refuelling eliminating or minimizing many risks associated with conventional splash-fill
refuelling, alternative risks have emerged many of which involve serious consequences. This
report will address these risks, and provide procedures and advice for reducing their probability
and impact.
It is expected that this report will be incorporated into existing site risk management procedures.
As employees of Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd, the authors and contributors of this report do not
intend for its content to supersede existing risk management practices, but to only complement
such. It remains the responsibility of site personnel/management to assess the risks identified
in this report, and devise and implement adequate control measures to ensure the
recommendations of this report are properly considered. Due to the many variables involved
in the method of operation of quick-fill equipment between mining, railway, ports and
earthmoving sites, specific control measures have not been addressed in this report.
Recommendations however are given to assist site personnel in the selection of control measures.
Feedback: It would prove to be mutually beneficial if future communication regarding this report
could be maintained between Banlaw Pipeline and its recipient, so that future amendments and
reports remain factual and productive. Risk management remains a cooperative effort between
manufacturer/supplier and end-user.
Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment 1

Rev. 3 2003
2. Details of Equipment
Market leading service life and performance are the trademarks of Banlaw refuelling equipment.
Each part has been designed to be efficient, safe and effective. All parts are designed using good
engineering practice, and prototype equipment is thoroughly tested prior to production.
Banlaw dry-break quick-fill refuelling equipment provides many advantages over conventional
splash-fill methods. These include :
• higher refuelling rates - up to 1000 litres/min.

• maximizing tank liquid volumes by reduced diesel foaming
• automatic nozzle shut-off
• pressurized fuel delivery system reducing incidence of contamination ingress
• greatly reduced incidence and magnitude of fuel spillage
• option of remote fuel receiver placement, i.e. refuelling at ground level
In addition to the gains in efficiency, the level of human involvement has been reduced
particularly by the advantages of automatic nozzle shut-off and the option of remote receiver
placement. The need to gain often difficult access to the filler port on the top surface of the fuel
tank has been eliminated, thus assisting in the reduction of the number of human falls and
physical strain related injuries.
The constituent parts of a Banlaw nozzle are manufactured from materials including aluminium,
brass, mild steel, stainless steel and rubber compounds including viton, polyurethane, high-
temperature nitrile (HNBR) and Teflon (PTFE). There are 3 main models of Banlaw refuelling
nozzle. The models and their recommended maximum flow-rate are :
• 800 & 21 series nozzle - flow-rates <800 litres/min
• 1000 & 22 nozzle - flow-rates <1100 litres/min
• 45 nozzle - flow-rates <300 litres/min
Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd currently hold Australian Patents pertaining details of the:
• tank vent - valve inner diameter, and use of splash tube
• modifications to a locomotive diesel fuel tank to suit a dry-break receiver, 4 failsafe
air vents, 50mm drop filling tube, and quick-fill refuelling nozzle
• system for identifying a vehicle during refuelling (Banlaw Fuel Monitoring System -
BFMS)
• ball lock mechanism and rear chamber piston and spring assembly of a dry-break
quick-fill refuelling nozzle
• specific Patent on the use of a multi-position rear spring adjustment in the refuelling
nozzles
• adjustable piston spring retainer in the rear section of a refuelling nozzle (Pat.
Pending)
• low profile tank vent, manufactured from steel (Pat. Pending)
In addition, two US Patents are currently held regarding the ball lock mechanism and rear piston
and adjustable spring sensing chamber assembly of a refuelling nozzle.

Rev. 3 2003
2.1 Principles of the Banlaw Refuelling System
Figure 2.1.1: Overview of Banlaw System
The BANLAW Refuelling System uses both Dry-Break and Quick-Fill technology, producing an
environmentally friendly and more efficient method of liquid refuelling. Problems associated with
the conventional “splash-fill” method, such as spillage and foaming are eliminated, whilst
additional advantages such as higher refuelling rates and alternative filling points make the
Banlaw system a better way to refuel your equipment.
A Banlaw nozzle has been designed for all existing refuelling systems found in the mining and
rail industries. These include the BAM800, BAH800, BAR800, BAM1000, BAR1000, and the
AUS45, catering for refuelling rate requirements between 120 and 1000L/min. Associated
equipment such as tank vents, drop-tubes, nozzle receivers and receiver shells are custom fitted to
each tank or vehicle, along with receiver caps, nozzle anchors and operator instruction signs to
ensure the safe, trouble-free operation of the Banlaw system.
After the nozzle has been connected to the receiver and turned ON, fuel is allowed to pass through
the fill-point into the tank. Fluid continues to flow at the desired rate until the fuel level reaches
the float balls at the base of the vent. The balls seal against an O-ring at the base of the 3/4” vent
tube providing a positive air-tight seal within the tank. Fuel continues to flow until such time as
the required amount of pressure is developed in the tank - typically 15-100kPa, depending on the
spring setting of the nozzle, the flowrate and the specific filling application. This pressure is
transferred upstream through the nozzle where it is sensed by a patented piston style unit within
the nozzle, which promptly shuts the nozzle OFF thus terminating the flow of fuel into the tank.
The nozzle can then be safely disconnected and mounted in a secure position - such as a nozzle
anchor - ready for the next refuelling application. A 1/16” bleed hole in the vent valve allows the
tank contents to gradually return to atmospheric pressure - typically between 10-60sec - after the
vent has closed at the completion of refuelling.
To ensure the correct operation of the Banlaw system it is important to provide a constant high
flow area downstream of the nozzle with a minimum of flow directional changes. In addition, the
flow of air through the vent exhaust should not be impeded by restrictions. Such measures will
reduce the line pressure required through the nozzle and maximize the refuelling flow-rate. High
ratios of line pressure to flow-rate can lead to premature nozzle shut-down and hence partial tank
filling.
All Banlaw products are manufactured in accordance with of standard AS/NZS-ISO9001.

Rev. 3 2003
2.2 The 800 Series Nozzle
The recently introduced 800 series nozzles replaced the earlier 21 series nozzles. There are 3
models in the 800 nozzle series; mines (BAM800), railway (BAR800), and hydraulic (BAH800).
Each model has a unique nozzle body to suit the correct receiver. This distinction was made to
prevent incorrect coupling of incompatible fluid types i.e. diesel and hydraulic oil, when a number
of fluid types are transferred by similar refuelling equipment. The one exception is that a railway
nozzle will loosely couple to a mines receiver, however these parts are installed on machinery
which will rarely be used together and thus a problem with incompatibility should seldom occur.
To allow a variety of shut-off pressures, each Banlaw 800 series nozzle may be used with 1 of 5
available spring settings. One of 2 piston springs may be installed in a nozzle, offering 5 distinct
pressure ranges at which the nozzle will shut-off. Light (L), medium/light (ML), medium (M),
medium/heavy (MH) and heavy (H) settings provide the flexibility to cater for low to high nozzle
delivery head and flowrate demands. This flexibility is valuable when attempting to minimize the
amount of pressure built-up within the receiving tank at the point of nozzle shut-off.
Advice on the correct installation of the Banlaw 800 series nozzle and other associated parts of
the Banlaw refuelling system can be obtained from [1] & [2].
As illustrated in Figures 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, two designs of operating handle are used with the 800
series and 21 series nozzles. (NOTE: A “T-style” operating handle was originally used in the first
21 series nozzles produced by Banlaw, after which the design in Figure 2.2.2 was implemented).
Figure 2.2.1 – 800 Series Nozzle with “T-style” Operating Handle

Rev. 3 2003
Figure 2.2.2 - 21 Series Nozzle with “Knob-style” Handle
2.3 The 1000 Series Nozzles
The 1000 series nozzles were recently introduced to replace the earlier 22 series. The 22 series
was established after modifications were performed to the 21 series nozzle to achieve higher flow-
rates at equivalent line pressures i.e. reduce the hydrodynamic pressure drop across the nozzle.
The new 1000 series nozzle incorporates the same changes when compared to the 800 series
equivalent. The need for a flow-rate approaching 1000litres/min was requested by various railway
network authorities, in order to increase the refuelling efficiency of their diesel locomotives. The
1000 series nozzle is identical to the 800 series in external dimensions - refer Figure 2.2.1 - as all
modifications have been performed internally. A distinct fuel receiver was designed to accept the
1000 nozzle and maintain high flow-rates with low flow restriction.
As with the 800 series nozzle, the 1000 series offers the same ability to adjust the shut-off
pressure of the nozzle by varying the type of back spring used and also the position of the back
spring within the nozzle endcap. Unlike the 800 series, the 1000 series typically require the use of
only 4 of the 5 available settings – the light (L) setting is not used.
Advice on the correct installation of the Banlaw 1000 series nozzle and other associated parts of
the Banlaw refuelling system can be obtained from [4] & [5].
2.4 The 45 Nozzle
The 45 nozzle model contains no aluminium and was specifically designed during 1995 for the
underground mining industry. This nozzle incorporates an adjustable piston spring retainer - see
Appendix A.1 - which was necessary for the varied and often critical refuelling conditions under
which the nozzle is used.

Rev. 3 2003
Figure 2.4.1 - 45 Nozzle
The 45 nozzle is not suited to the rugged environments associated with large (heavy) vehicle
refuelling, and is principally used in underground black coal mining environments, in which the
use of aluminium is strictly forbidden.
2.5 Receivers and Tank Vents
A dry-break receiver and tank vent are the 2 remaining parts making up the quick-fill dry-break
refuelling process.
Banlaw Pipeline manufacture 2 vent tube lengths to cater for a variety of tank shapes to ensure the
correct volume of air remains in the tank - ullage - at the completion of refuelling. Tanks with a
relatively small fluid surface at the top of the tank with respect to tank volume e.g. horizontal
cylindrical tanks, usually require a longer vent tube than uniform section or broad shaped tanks.
Advice on vent positioning and the correct vent to be installed should be obtained from [6].
Nozzle Receiver Flowrate Capacity

AUS45 AUS46 300LPM (79GPM)
BAM800 (AUS21A) AUS23 800LPM (211GPM)
BAR800 (AUS21R) AUS23R 800LPM (211GPM)
BAH800 (AUS21B) AUS23B 800LPM (211GPM)
BAM1000 (AUS22) AUS43 1000LPM (264GPM)
Table 2.5.1: Nozzle and mating Receiver

NOTE: all flow capacities using diesel fuel

Rev. 3 2003
Vent Relief Pressure Maximum Recommended Flowrate*
AUS25A, 25B, 25C, 110kPa (16psi) 800LPM (211GPM)
25D, 25E-H
AUS25A-L, 25B-L, 49kPa (7.1psi) 800LPM (211GPM)
25C-L, 25D-L, 25E-C
25R, 25C-R
LEGEND: * The Maximum Recommended Flowrate (MRF) of a vent defines the maximum refuelling rate
at which a single tank vent may be used before the tank is subjected to a pressure of >5kPa during the
refuelling – i.e. prior to the vent closing. A single vent may be used above this MRF, however the tank will
be subject to increased tank pressurisation during refuelling, thus increasing the risk of only partial filling
of the tank due to premature nozzle shut-off – i.e. nozzle shut-off prior to the tank vent closing. Refer to
[6] for details. Flowrates in excess of the MRF will require 2 or more vents per tank.
Table 2.5.2: Banlaw Vent Specifications
NOTE: all flow capacities using AIR
Figure 2.5.1 - A Typical Dry-Break Receiver (AUS23 shown)

Rev. 3 2003
Figure 2.5.2 - A Typical Tank Vent (AUS25A shown)
The low profile vent - 25E series - is a vent used in applications where installation is restricted by
limited clearance between the top surface of the tank and its surrounds. The operating principles
of this vent are identical to those of the standard profile vent, despite the reduced height of the
vent cap.
From a risk management perspective, the risks associated with the use of a receiver and vent
singularly are relatively minor compared to the refuelling nozzle. Since the operation of both
parts rely on the use of the nozzle and hence any risks associated with such, the assessment
conducted in this report will principally deal with the operation of a nozzle.

Rev. 3 2003
3 Contexts
3.1 Strategic Context
Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd (formerly Banlaw Australia Pty Ltd) is 100% Australian owned and has
supplied refuelling and fluids handling equipment to the mining, rail, and associated industries for
over 25 years. The company began manufacturing its own product during the mid 1980’s, and has
since developed an extensive regional, national and international customer base. Banlaw is a
registered member of Lloyds Register Quality Assurance Ltd, and as such all Banlaw
manufactured products are made in accordance with regulations detailed in ISO9001. Banlaw has
established a comprehensive national and international distribution network, by harnessing the
outreach capability and experience of many respected companies already heavily involved in the
target market, often specializing in disciplines such as; refuelling, hydraulics, and mine vehicle
support.
- Contact Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd (Sales & Marketing) for the details of your nearest
authorised distributor and repair agent -
Servicing of products is performed in the Banlaw Pipeline factory located in Newcastle NSW
Australia and by authorized repair agents. Part of the Banlaw Pipeline Terms and Conditions of
Sale document refers to; “the performance of Banlaw equipment is conditional upon correct
installation and use in accordance with the specified operating procedures, and that the equipment
has not been damaged due to accident, misuse or neglect, or repaired or tampered with by any
person other than an authorized repair agent”. Banlaw accepts no liability for actions or
circumstances beyond these conditions.
3.2 Organisational Context
Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd holds the health and safety of its customers in high regard. Monitoring
the performance and operating environments of its products is often very difficult, due to the
remote and isolated areas in which the products are used. As a result, communication between
Banlaw, its distributors and customers, is critical to maintaining the effective monitoring and
management of risks. The sales and marketing people at Banlaw endeavour to maintain regular
contact with its client and distributor base in order to receive feedback on the operation of the
equipment, and also spend considerable time travelling to current and prospective customers to
witness the operating conditions first-hand. Any feedback received is valuable, and is passed on to
the appropriate recipient for assessment. All engineering concerns are recorded on a Corrective
Action Report (CAR) form for prompt consideration, in line with established Banlaw Pipeline
Quality Assurance procedures.
Contact details for management divisions within Banlaw Pipeline are:

• Managing Director – Bill CLIFTON (bill@banlaw.com.au)
• Production and Quality Assurance – Paul BUCKTON (paul@banlaw.com.au)
• Sales and Marketing – Nick FORAN (nick@banlaw.com.au)
• Fuel Monitoring and Electronics – John GREGORY (hoppy@banlaw.com.au)
• Product Engineering & Design – Adam PEATTIE (adam@banlaw.com.au)
• Finance and Accounting – Phil RANKIN (phil@banlaw.com.au)

Rev. 3 2003
3.2.1 Health & Safety Obligations – Employer
The underlining principle for workplace occupational health and safety is that the employer must
ensure, as far as is practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all its employees. For
example, under the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (Australia), an employer
must:
• identify hazards within the work environment
• assess risks within the work environment
• eliminate or control such risks
• review risk control measures
• provide instruction, training and information
• provide adequate supervision
• provide appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE)
• provide suitable amenities, first aid facilities and personnel
• provide adequate training and equipment in order to deal with an emergency
NOTES: 1. the above example is indicative of the NSW Act only – employers must refer
to the Act or Regulation relevant to their location for specific details
3.2.2 Health & Safety Obligations – Designer, Manufacturer, Supplier
As a designer, manufacturer and supplier of plant or equipment, Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd must
under the NSW OH&S Amendment Act 2000:
• identify hazards
• assess risks
• review risk assessment
• implement appropriate risk control measures
• supply adequate information to the supplier/user to ensure the safe and proper use of the
equipment, and to thus allow the supplier/user to conduct a suitable risk assessment for a
specific work environment
Under NSW OH&S Act, the enforcement and distribution of such information once received
remains the responsibility of the recipient. As such, Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd is not responsible for
actions or consequences resulting from activities performed contrary to the supplied information.
The prescriptive nature of a persons obligations in a certain capacity does vary in the National
Occupational Health and Safety Act and equivalent Acts of other Australian States, however the
nature of the above obligations remain similar and can thus the authors of this report consider they
be classed as relevant to the scope of this assessment within Australia.
With respect to environmental legislation e.g. the NSW EPA Protection of the Environment
Operations Act 1997, there exists requirements for persons regarding the welfare of the natural
environment i.e. land, air, and water. The underlying principle of such Acts is that no person shall
knowingly pollute the environment - except where a specific license has been issued by an
appropriate Authority - and that all reasonable effort should be made to protect the integrity of the
natural environment. As the supplier of a manufactured product, Banlaw Pipeline must therefore
ensure that during proper use the product itself does not either pollute the environment or
otherwise degrade its condition. This report will address any environmental risks present during
the prescribed use of the equipment, however it remains the users responsibility to ensure that
adequate environmental risk management procedures exist and are implemented, should an
incident occur.

Rev. 3 2003
3.3 Risk Management Context
To the best knowledge of Banlaw Pipeline, since Banlaw began manufacturing its own product,
there has been no documented case of an incident resulting in serious injury or environmental
impact caused by the equipment when used in accordance with correct operating procedures. This
is the standard which Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd strives to maintain. The objective of this study
is to establish safe working procedures for low risk refuelling of equipment, and provide
guidelines of effective risk management for the use of Banlaw refuelling equipment.
The activities considered in this report are those normally associated with dry-break quick-fill
refuelling. This being the “pressurised” transfer of fluid between two storage vessels via flexible
hose and/or fixed pipe and a nozzle/receiver assembly. The receiving vessel must be certified to a
pressure meeting the requirements set out in section 9.1, and includes the use of an approved tank
vent and a full pressure relief device (if required). The receiver may be either fixed to the tank
surface or remote located. Human involvement requires the manual manipulation of the nozzle
and attached flexible hose from the nozzle mounting/anchor point onto the fuel receiver. Once the
nozzle has been secured to the receiver, the operating handle is manually turned into the ON
position thus permitting the flow of fluid through the otherwise normally closed nozzle and
receiver assembly. After the nozzle has either been turned off manually during refuelling or has
turned off automatically at the completion of refuelling, the nozzle is manually removed from the
receiver and returned to the anchor point. These activities are the bounds within which this
assessment was conducted.
The success and relevance of this assessment and future amendments depends upon the
maintenance of effective communication between Banlaw Pipeline, its distributors, and its
customers. As mentioned in section 3.1, the often remote locations in which equipment is used
has historically hampered efforts to maintain lines of communication between the user and
supplier. Encouraging feedback remains a challenge to Banlaw staff, whose efforts have not been
assisted in the past by an apparent ‘discard, forget, and reorder’ mentality of many customers.
The scope of this assessment in terms of outreach will initially extend to all present and future
nozzle users. Depending upon demand, the distribution of this report may also extend to tank vent
customers. The similarities discussed in section 3.2 regarding equivalent safety and environment
Acts, should allow widespread acceptance of this assessment and its findings regardless of
legislative jurisdiction, and should also promote acceptance overseas.
Through future amendments, the future relevance of this assessment will be maintained for as
long as the equipment studied remains in use. Amendments will be conducted when prompted by
a design modification to the subject equipment, or a change to their operating conditions or
procedures. The details of such amendments will be distributed to past report recipients to ensure
all Banlaw Pipeline equipment users possess up to date information.

Rev. 3 2003
4 Details of Assessors
The details of persons responsible for the preparation and execution of this report are as follows:
1. Name : Adam PEATTIE

Company : Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd
Title / Position : Product & Design Engineer (Mechanical)
- Assistant Quality Assurance (QA) Manager
Education : - Bachelor Degree in Mechanical Engineering (Hons)
- Associate Diploma in Mechanical Engineering
- Attended Lloyd’s OH&S Appreciation Training Course 1999
Experience : - began current role/position with Banlaw Pipeline in March 1999
- 7 years previous work experience in the bulk materials (coal) handling
industry, including 4 years conducting technical performance
audits on coal processing plants
2. Name : Paul BUCKTON

Company : Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd
Title / Position : Production Manager
- Quality Assurance (QA) Manager
Education : - School Certificate
- Fitting and Machining Trade Certificate
- CNC Programming
Experience : - production overseer at a pump assembly plant
- 21 years trade experience in mining environment, including extensive
experience in all facets of fitting and machining
- 10 years as Production Manager at Banlaw Pipeline, overseeing
manufacture, machining, assembly and installation of all Banlaw
equipment

Rev. 3 2003
5 Outline of Risk Identification Methods
Risks can occur by human error, equipment failure, or a combination of both. The identification
of risks associated with a process is the crucial element of risk assessment. It must be conducted
systematically, in line with the objectives of the study. Not every risk can be identified, however
the assessors must be confident that no significant risk has been overlooked.
Of the techniques mentioned in [7] for risk identification, the following 3 methods were chosen to
satisfy the objectives of this report :
1. Action Error Analysis - considering steps in a procedure and analysing the possible
human errors involved i.e. extraneous act, error of sequence etc.
2. Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) - review of the consequences and
probability of various system abnormalities i.e. excessive line pressure etc.
3. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) - identification of the root causes of unwanted events
5.1 Action Error Analysis (AER)
This method is based on the analysis of possible human errors. It is achieved by considering each
step in a procedure and considering a series of probable errors, such as extraneous acts, selection
or omission errors, or miscommunication / misinterpretation of instructions. Blatant acts in breach
of correct procedure have been included in this analysis, as manually holding the nozzle in the
ON position whilst refuelling has historically posed the greatest risk to persons and equipment.
5.2 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
This method involves the systematic consideration of the probability and consequences of
different system abnormalities, such as excessive flow-rate and/or line pressure. HAZOP explores
the consequence of severe operating conditions, and attempts to resolve an issue that is deemed
unsatisfactory due to a combination of its probability and impact. For example, high flow-rates
may be necessary for high efficiency, however should this create frequent risks whose impact is
deemed too severe, the requirement is reviewed and alternatives devised.
Operating boundary conditions are supplied with each nozzle [8], as a result of extensive testing
at the Banlaw factory. Operation of equipment outside these limits can be detrimental to the
welfare and effectiveness of the system, and is not recommended.
5.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
FTA is used in establishing the fundamental causes of a defined unwanted event. The method
begins with the undesired event, after which possible causes are progressively identified until the
fundamental “root causes” are established. The structure often represents a tree, with the major
incident representing the trunk being supported by the series of fault lines symbolizing the tree
roots.
There are many incidents which can be caused by either human or equipment error. Some of those
risks identified using AER and HAZOP were again identified using FTA.

Rev. 3 2003
6 Outline of Risk Assessment Methods
In [7], risk assessment is described as “ the process used to determine risk management priorities
by evaluating and comparing the level of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels
or other criteria.”
For persons responsible for risk management, the varying degrees of detail used in expressing the
level of risk dictate the degree of effort and resources that are required. The authors of this report
have detailed various statements in section 10, which should be adopted by equipment users to
decide on the rationing of risk management resources.
Prioritizing risks according to their probability and severity can be achieved a number of different
ways. The most accurate method would involve the input of both manufacturer and user
cooperatively. From the objective of this assessment and the perspective of its authors, the method
used to prioritize risks will be the rapid ranking system. Estimating the extent of production loss,
equipment damage, and environmental impact can effectively be achieved only by the user, and
other people with a more intimate knowledge of the specific operating environment. The authors
of this report, whilst experienced in the field of refuelling cannot establish an understanding of
every operating site, but instead have cooperatively ranked each risk in accordance with an
environment perceived as typical. The scale used to rank each risk in this report according to its
probability and the likely effect on human welfare is numerical. The results are summarized in a
matrix or tabular format for ready access. As recommended in [7], lists A and B are used to rank
risks according to the assessed risk and the magnitude of the consequences respectively. Main
actions are discussed for list A in section 9.3, whilst section 9.4 describes recommended controls
for list B.

Rev. 3 2003
7 Risks Identified
7.1 Action Error Analysis
The following information details the human errors and their corresponding risks identified using
AER.
1. manually holding nozzle ON (includes attaching weighted objects to

nozzle operating handle)
(a) overfilling of tank (nozzle turned OFF before vent relief activated) -
fuel leakage through vent weep-hole whilst transporting tank
(b) overfilling of tank (nozzle kept ON after vent relief activated) -
subsequent exhausting of fuel through vent exhaust
(c) over-pressurization and possible rupture of tank (once tank full)
(d) artificial pressurization of engine fuel delivery system - engine revving or
flooding
2. attempting to couple nozzle to receiver whilst nozzle ON

(a) fluid pressure forcing nozzle back against operator
(b) possibility of momentary spurt of pressurised fuel from between nozzle
actuator and receiver
3. failing to use correct posture and secure footing to lift, carry, engage,
and disengage nozzle
(a) back injury whilst lifting
(b) feet slipping on unstable footing
4. failing to securely couple nozzle and receiver

(a) fluid pressure rapidly forcing nozzle back against operator
(b) possibility of momentary spurt of fuel from between nozzle actuator and
receiver
5. failing to establish air tight seal within tank - removal of or incorrect

installation of tank vent
(a) overfilling of tank (nozzle turned OFF before vent relief activated) -
fuel leakage through vent weep-hole whilst transporting tank
(b) overfilling of tank (nozzle turned OFF after vent relief activated)
subsequent exhausting of fuel through vent exhaust
6. placing foreign objects into front end of nozzle or receiver e.g.

attempting to force open nozzle sleeve or receiver poppet
(a) fuel spurting out under pressure – eye injury, skin contact
(b) damage to seals and subsequent fuel leakage
(c) damage to nozzle tube or receiver poppet spindle
7. vehicle moved or driven away whilst nozzle remains connected

(a) significant fuel spillage - particularly if no break-away valve installed
(b) damage to fuel delivery components - particularly if no break-away valve
installed
(c) nozzle, hose and break-away valve (if used) striking objects or persons being
passed by moving vehicle
Rev. 3 2003
8. installing incorrect vent(s) to tank
(a) nozzle failing to automatically shut-off at correct fuel level - overfilling and
subsequent spillage of fuel from tank
(b) premature automatic nozzle shut-off - tank only partially filled
(c) tank remaining pressurized at completion of refuelling
9. operating nozzle on tank not certified for use with quick-fill equipment
(a) premature automatic nozzle shut-off - tank only partially filled
(b) nozzle failing to automatically shut-off - overfilling of tank, subsequent
spillage from tank and possibility of tank rupture
10. connecting (routing) vent exhaust to interior of tank

(a) premature automatic nozzle shut-off - tank only partially filled
11. installing break-away valve contrary to guidelines detailed in [9]

(a) valve installed at height above eye-line level
(b) valve installed in such a configuration so as to require high levels of force to
create valve “break-away” operation – i.e. valve configured for tensile break,
rather than the required shear or “cantilever” action
7.2 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
There are two significant system abnormalities that can have a detrimental effect to the safety of
refuelling :
1. flow-rate through nozzle exceeding specification

(a) significant fluid leakage by removal of or damage to nozzle and receiver seals
(b) excessive turbulence induced vibration, causing damage to and possible
failure of receiver and nozzle components
(c) premature automatic nozzle shut-down - partial filling of tank
(d) excessive fuel foaming – leakage of foam from vent, and tank only partially
filled
2. line pressure (pump head) through nozzle exceeding Safe Working Pressure
– this includes “pressure spikes” or “fluid hammer”
(a) excessive fatigue stress to nozzle components - premature component failure
(b) rapid failure of nozzle components – rapid high pressure discharge of nozzle
components and fuel. NB: nozzle failure at high pressures typically occurs as
tensile break of nozzle tube or nozzle poppet, ejecting failed parts and fuel
from the front end of the nozzle.

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7.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
This method was adopted to establish the “root causes” of hazards experienced in the refuelling
process.
1. over-pressurization of fuel tank
nozzle held ON nozzle failing to shut-off inadequate tank

during refuelling at correct pressure design pressure
incorrect nozzle or vent(s) contact Banlaw agent

for tank
2. vehicle striking operator during refuelling
emergency brake, wheel chocks not engaged

or faulty
3. vehicle / equipment running OR tank not filling to FULL indicator

out of fuel prematurely
nozzle shut-off prematurely fuel siphoning from tank is gauge working correctly
through nozzle at
completion of refuelling
has FULL indicator been calibrated

for presence of Banlaw tank vent
excessive line pressure at vent exhaust port incorrect nozzle

nozzle due to high flow-rate obstructed shut-off setting
or restriction to flow into tank

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4. fuel leaking from front of nozzle
damaged /worn nozzle seals damaged / worn receiver body
excessive contamination on normal wear high level of particulate

receiver or in front area material in fuel
of nozzle
receiver caps failing to use nozzle not serviced dirty fuel filters
not used nozzle anchor
or plug
5. nozzle becoming detached from receiver
worn receiver ball nozzle failing to secure nozzle / receiver part

lock groove properly incompatibility
damaged ball lock check correct operating procedure
6. fuel exhausting from vent port during refuelling
nozzle failing to automatically incorrect tank faulty tank vent

shut-off at correct pressure vent(s) installation
incorrect nozzle model contact Banlaw nozzle manually air leak in tank
for tank / vent assembly agent held ON e.g. manual fill
point
7.4 Risk Ranking
The numerical rapid ranking system used for weighting each identified risk is a combination of
methods used in [7] and [10]. Initial ranking is achieved by assessing firstly the consequence of a
risk - the row position on the matrix - followed by its probability - the column position on the
matrix. The weighting of that risk is given by the number contained in the matrix cell chosen. One
weighting exists for each of the two assessment criteria i.e. human and environmental welfare.
The authors of this report have not assigned a weighting to the identified risks. This is due
to many variables that affect both the probability and the consequence (impact) of a risk
throughout the many varied working environments in which the Banlaw refuelling
equipment is used. For example; refuelling flowrate, pump “head” pressure, configuration/design
of tank and filling pipe/hose used, correct installation of vent(s) and break-away valves, and the
Rev. 3 2003
terrain and cleanliness of the work environment are all such variables. It would be difficult and
perhaps not in the best interests of effective risk management if the authors of this report i.e.
Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd, were to assume “typical” weightings for each risk identified. Instead,
the risk weighting and subsequent rankings will be left blank to allow each site or end-user
to assess each risk for their particular site and hence weight and rank each risk accordingly.
The authors have however included risk reduction and control measures in section 9 of this report.
The extent to which each measure is implemented and monitored will of course depend upon the
ranking of each risk as assessed by the end-user. Specific control measures must be adopted for
“high level” risks. The matrix format used is detailed below:
Consequence On Probability Of Occurrence

Human Welfare Very Likely Likely Unlikely Very Unlikely
Kill / Permanent
Disability 7
1 2 4
Serious Injury / Long
Term Illness 8 11
3 5
Medical Attention and
Sick Leave 9 12 14
6
First Aid Required 13 15 16
10
Table 7.4.1 - Personal Welfare Ranking Matrix
Consequence On Probability Of Occurrence
Environ. Welfare Very Likely Likely Unlikely Very Unlikely
Major Uncontained
Spill - EPA Action 7

1 2 4
Moderate Uncontained
Spill - EPA Action 8 11

3 5
Major Contained or
Minor U/c Spill 9 12 14

6
Moderate to Minor
Contained Spill 13 15 16
10
Table 7.4.2 - Environmental Welfare Ranking Matrix
The weightings that are underlined are dominant or key risks that are the focus of specific risk
control and reduction measures discussed later in section 9.

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Identified Risks and their Weighting Wght (H) Wght (E)
over-pressurisation of tank – tank rupture
over-pressurisation/filling of tank – spillage of fuel from vent
person struck with break-away valve or hose during a drive-away
ruptured fuel delivery line (no break-away valve) – fuel spillage
artificial pressurisation of engine fuel supply line
high pressure fuel spurt from front of nozzle – eye and skin contact
nozzle / hose assembly striking persons being passed by vehicle
overfilling of tank – spillage of fuel from vent during transportation
nozzle “fly-off” - nozzle forced back against operator
vehicle running out of fuel - tank only partially filled
injury whilst lifting / carrying nozzle assembly
injury due to insecure footing whilst mounting nozzle
nozzle leaking fuel from front end during refuelling and storage
structural failure or damage to nozzle components
Table 7.4.3: Risks and their Weighting – Human (H), Environmental (E)
Many of the risks shown in Table 7.4.3 can occur by a number of different ways ; i.e. by human
error(s) in section 7.1, by a system abnormality in section 7.2, and by an undesirable event in
section 7.3. For such a risk with multiple causes, the lowest weighting value i.e. the highest
conceived impact and probability for each cause, must be employed as the final weight for that
risk.

Rev. 3 2003
8 Assessment of Risks
The purpose of this section is to assist in the control of risks and to suggest methods by which the
target risk level or standard may be maintained.
Identified Risks and their Ranking Rank (H) Rank (E)

over-pressurisation of tank – tank rupture
over-pressurisation/filling of tank – spillage of fuel from vent
person struck with break-away valve or hose during a drive-away
ruptured fuel delivery line (no break-away valve) – fuel spillage
artificial pressurisation of engine fuel supply line
high pressure fuel spurt from front of nozzle – eye and skin contact
nozzle / hose assembly striking persons being passed by vehicle
overfilling of tank – spillage of fuel from vent during transportation
nozzle “fly-off” - nozzle forced back against operator
vehicle running out of fuel - tank only partially filled
injury whilst lifting / carrying nozzle assembly
injury due to insecure footing whilst mounting nozzle
nozzle leaking fuel from front end during refuelling and storage
structural failure or damage to nozzle components
Table 8.1: List of Ranked Risks – Human (H), Environmental (E)
There is the possibility of serious injury or death whilst using the equipment detailed in this
report. The probability of such an event is greatly increased if the correct operating procedures are
not followed.
The most severe consequence of any risk is human death. The authors consider 3 key risks as
having the biggest potential for a fatality or significant injury:
• nozzle “fly-off”: the event where a refuelling nozzle disengages from the receiver
during refuelling. Higher flowrates and fluid pressures leave the potential for more
rapid motion and thus higher impact of the nozzle and attached hose. The height of
the nozzle will also determine the impact of the nozzle onto persons (or objects)
below. E.g. the location of the fuel receiver on some large mining equipment is
several metres from ground level.
• installing a break-away valve at extended heights: as recommended in [9], a break-
away valve should not be installed above eye-level. This is to ensure in the event of a
drive-away that the free end of the valve – and the attached hose – will not fall onto a
person in the vicinity of the valve. As such, the use of a break-away valve on a
loading arm is not advisable due to; the extended installed height of the valve, the
typical use of a swivel joint on the arm to which the valve is attached thus placing the
valve in tension rather than the required “cantilever” action during a drive-away, and
also the force required to cause the valve to separate would typically exceed the
strength of the arm, thus negating the purpose of the valve. Due to the force required
to cause the valve to separate (i.e. break-away), the fuel hose often acts as an elastic
band by storing energy as it is stressed, and releasing the energy once the valve
breaks away. Thus the free end of the valve (and hose) will often travel at high speed
at break-away.
• Over-pressurisation and subsequent rupture of a fuel tank: any tank fitted with
quick-fill equipment must be rated to a pressure in excess of the pressure sustained
during the refuelling process. In addition, due to the “popular” practice of manually
holding the nozzle ON until fuel is observed exhausting from the vent exhaust – to
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assure the operator the tank is indeed full – the tank must be rated to a pressure in
excess of the emergency relief pressure of the Banlaw tank vent(s) fitted, or an
auxillary full-relief device if such a device is used. Such practice will greatly reduce
the risk of tank rupture i.e. catastrophic failure of the tank structure.
Although an incompressible fluid (such as diesel) does not store significant potential
energy (unlike a compressed gas) the ullage (air gap) in the top of the tank – being air
– will store energy. It is thus the amount of ullage and the pressure to which it is
subjected that will increase the risk of severe human injury in the event of a tank
rupture. This point could be best represented as a spring coiled within the tank. The
greater the ullage, the larger the spring. The higher the pressure, the greater the spring
is compressed. During tank rupture this energy is released. There is a reported case of
a fatality as a result of a ruptured fuel tank during refuelling – using equipment
similar to Banlaw product. Hence the need to control the risk of tank rupture is
important.
A number of the risks occur contrary to established correct procedure. Users must ensure that all
operators are properly trained and educated on the process of refuelling, and should not become
complacent by classing the task as “routine” or “one without substantial risk”. Many people tend
to fall into the danger of considering the task as “too familiar” or second nature, and although the
process of refuelling is not complex, there are hazards that may occur if simple checks and
procedures are not carried out. Most risks would be eliminated if operators were informed of the
principles of quick-fill refuelling and the correct operating procedure. Actions such as manually
holding the nozzle in the ON position or removing the tank vent would thus become informed
hazards.

Rev. 3 2003
9 Risk Reduction and Control Measures
“Risk treatment is the selection and implementation of appropriate options for dealing with risk”
[7].
On analysis of the risks identified and their root causes, the following key actions were identified
to reduce both the probability and severity of their occurrence. Many risks have multiple causes,
however control of all risks is best achieved by observing the following actions :
1. Ensure adequate training and education of all refuelling operators, on the principles of
the Banlaw system, correct nozzle, vent and receiver operation, and the hazards
associated with their misuse. Banlaw manufacture a printed steel sign that should be
displayed at each refuelling point.
2. Discontinue use of damaged or misused equipment. Contact only an authorised
Banlaw agent for prompt repair of Banlaw equipment.
3. Ensure each tank is tested and certified to a pressure representative of the vent(s) used
on the tank - see section 9.1. All tanks should be regularly inspected for corrosion and
other damage. Contact the tank manufacturer (OEM) for confirmation of the Safe
Working Pressure (SWP) for a specific tank.
4. Promptly cease operation of equipment which is failing to operate correctly. Contact a
Banlaw agent as soon as practicable should any fault be detected with Banlaw
equipment and to arrange prompt replacement or repair. Equipment that is clearly
worn or otherwise faulty should be promptly removed from service.
5. Cease or implement measures to discourage unauthorised modification of or tampering
with refuelling equipment. Such activities may damage equipment or otherwise affect
their proper operation
6. Install a Banlaw break-away valve to minimise both the risk of significant fuel spillage
and damage to refuelling equipment in the event of a vehicle “drive-away”.
7. Ensure all refuelling equipment – including break-away valves – is installed correctly
and properly maintained. Such information is contained in Technical Bulletins drafted
by Banlaw for their equipment. Contact your Banlaw agent for further details.
8. Ensure familiarity with the safe working specifications – i.e. flowrate and pressure –
of all Banlaw equipment used on-site. Refer to [8] for details, or contact your Banlaw
agent for confirmation.
1. The proper training and education of all refuelling operators is imperative in the effective
treatment of risks. Many risks occur as a result of ill-informed actions and poor judgement by
operators. The principles of the Banlaw system (see section 2.1) should be common knowledge to
an operator. Each person should be aware of the roles of each component - nozzle, vent, receiver,
receiver cap, nozzle anchor, and break-away valve - and the implications of their misuse. Banlaw
strongly recommend users display a sign - available from Banlaw - describing the correct
stepwise operation of a nozzle. This will encourage proper procedure, and will provide instruction
for untrained operators should it be required. The practice of manually holding the nozzle ON
whilst refuelling poses a significant risk to safety, whether the act be one of operator ignorance or
contempt for correct operating procedure. Educating each person on legitimate nozzle operation
and the risks associated with misuse will deter such actions.
2. Another common error encountered is the continuing use of damaged equipment. Damage
such as structural damage to the tank or refuelling parts must be corrected prior to any further use.
It must be understood that some sites operate refuelling equipment at considerable fluid (fuel)
pressure, and as such, the failure of such equipment must be treated as posing a significant risk to
operator safety. Equipment that is damaged or otherwise not working correctly should be
promptly removed from service and replaced. Banlaw have drafted a Preventative Maintenance

Rev. 3 2003
Program for their equipment, which states recommended change-out intervals for refuelling
system components. Refer to [11] for details.
3. As most work-sites have a variety of vehicles and storage tanks, the improper combination of
a nozzle and tank can occur. For instance, the use of a nozzle setup on a heavy (H), medium-
heavy (MH), or medium (M) shut-off pressure setting typically requires tanks to be fitted with a
standard series tank vent (110kPa relief pressure). A good example of this would be the use of a
medium (or higher) setting nozzle for the refuelling of a small lighting plant or skid pump fitted
with a “light” series vent (49kPa relief pressure), typically refuelled with a lighter setting nozzle.
The use of a higher setting nozzle to refuel a tank setup to accept a lighter setting nozzle greatly
increases the risk of tank overpressurisation and its associated risks. NOTE: there are exemptions
to this recommendation, for instance if it can be proved that the maximum tank pressure at nozzle
shut-off is <49kPa, then a light series vent may be used on that tank – contact Banlaw for further
details.
Conversely, if a light setting nozzle is used on a refuelling application typically undertaken with a
higher setting nozzle e.g. medium, the nozzle will suffer from premature shut-off, thus leading to
partial tank filling, and the need to manually hold the nozzle ON until the tank is filled.
To ensure the correct combination of tank vents and refuelling nozzles, it is important that a
competent person is involved in the selection of the refuelling equipment. Such persons include
an authorised Banlaw distributor, or Banlaw Pipeline direct. Proper selection of vents and nozzles
will minimise the risk of both tank overpressurisation and premature nozzle shut-off.
To make the identification of vent relief settings easier, Banlaw recently introduced colour coding
of all vent caps. The light series vents (49kPa) are fitted with a dark green cap, whilst the
standard series vents (110kPa) are fitted with red caps.
All tanks fitted with a quick-fill tank vent – such as the Banlaw vent – must be rated to a pressure
in excess of the vent relief pressure. That is, the Safe Working Pressure (SWP) of a tank must be
greater than the relief pressure of the vent fitted. The SWP of a tank should be obtained from the
tank manufacturer (OEM). As stated later in section 9.1, the Banlaw tank vent is NOT a full
pressure relief device for the range of flowrates for which it is rated – see Table 2.5.2. Thus, a
dedicated full relief device rated to the required flowrate must be installed if the tank pressure is
not to exceed the SWP of the tank. Such devices include burst discs and resettable spring biased
relief valves.
Refer to section 9.5 for information on the Banlaw FillSafe™ System – a system which terminates
the refuelling process without the need for tank pressurisation.
4. Another example of improper use is the continuing operation of equipment that is clearly
not functioning correctly. Such problems as premature nozzle shut-off, overfilling of the tank,
nozzle failing to couple to receiver securely, and fuel exhausting from the vent can occur due to
faulty equipment or an incorrectly specified installation. Other more minor problems such as fuel
leakage from the nozzle or fuel receiver, indicate the part is worn and is due for replacement or a
service. Any attempt to rectify a serious fault or malfunction must be performed by a competent
person. All Banlaw equipment should be serviced by an authorised Banlaw repair agent.
5. Dry-break technology was introduced to; increase the rate of refuelling, allow refuelling from
ground level, and to reduce the incidence of fuel spillage. Quick-fill equipment also makes the
theft of fuel more difficult, due to its “dry-break” technology. This practice whilst made more
difficult still occurs, and in some instances accounts for an unacceptable proportion of a user’s
fuel costs. Common methods include a person forcing the receiver poppet or nozzle sleeve open
with a screwdriver or similar object to drain fuel, or removing the tank vent in order to siphon the
Rev. 3 2003
tank contents. Both practices pose a threat to the welfare of the equipment, and hence the safety of
the refuelling operation. Damage occurring to either part may jeopardise its proper function,
whilst failing to reinstall the vent correctly may prevent an airtight seal forming within the
tank during refuelling. Whilst pilferage of fuel is difficult to prevent, inspection of the nozzle,
vent and receiver may indicate damage sustained as a result of fuel theft. Fuel theft is such a
problem on some sites that it has prompted management to install surveillance cameras and user
identification systems – such as key-tags – in an effort to reduce the volume of unaccounted fuel.
To further decrease the ease by which valuable fuel can be stolen, Banlaw manufacture an
electronic fuel monitoring system “FuelTrack™” which is used to account for every litre of
fuel & oil dispensed. Theft can be prevented by installing “automatic identification” refuelling
equipment and by enabling the “fuel security” option. This capability is only offered with the
FuelTrack™ system – no other fuel monitoring/management system in the world provides such
security. The system is available with 3 user/vehicle identification options; keypad, key-tag, or
fully-automatic identification. Refer to section 9.6 for further details.
6. The high incidence of vehicle “drive-away” with the nozzle connected prompted Banlaw to
design a break-away valve, to be installed at the start of the flexible hose section leading to the
nozzle. This valve limits the damage sustained by becoming the structural weak-link in the fluid
delivery line. Its function is to separate into halves under excessive shear load, providing a liquid
tight seal in each half of the delivery line. Spillage of fuel and tank siphoning are prevented so
long as the valve remains intact with the hose connected to the nozzle. With no break-away
valve installed, the magnitude of both damage and spillage would be much greater in the
event of a drive-away. To decrease the probability of an operator moving a vehicle whilst the
nozzle remains connected, warning signs or strobe lights could be installed to remind operators to
ensure the nozzle has been disconnected. Alternatively, the control of the warning lights could be
via a limit switch installed on the nozzle anchor or storage point. Thus the status of the light is
controlled by whether the nozzle is secured in its storage location, or located elsewhere i.e.
connected to a vehicle. Refer to [9] for guidelines on the installation and maintenance of the
Banlaw break-away valve.
7. Banlaw compose various Technical Bulletins and other publications to assist in the correct
installation, operation, and maintenance of its equipment. Copies of such publications should
be obtained from a Banlaw agent or from Banlaw direct – such information is also available from
the Banlaw Pipeline website or from the Banlaw Pipeline promotional CD. End-users must ensure
that such information is freely available to all persons responsible for the installation and
maintenance of refuelling equipment.
8. Banlaw conducts extensive testing of its products to ensure each item operates safely and
performs its proper function when used within the boundaries of its specification. Such
boundaries include; safe working pressures, burst pressures, and maximum recommended
flowrate. An end-user must ensure that all Banlaw equipment is used within these boundaries, and
must understand that the risks associated with the use of any item outside the specification may
have serious and unpredictable consequences. Such specifications are listed in [8], and will
include installation guidelines detailed in the relevant Technical Bulletins.

Rev. 3 2003
9.1 Liquid Storage Tank Pressure Certification
Detailed below are recommendations for the pressure testing and subsequent certification of
flammable or combustible liquid storage tanks, which are commonly used with Banlaw refuelling
equipment.
These guidelines were established after consultation with the Standards Association of Australia
(SAA), and Banlaw’s own investigation into relevant Standards and current practice.
Unless specified in various laws, regulations or practices, Australian Standards are not mandatory
but do reflect good safe practice which can be used as a guide for industry and any court action.
Laws are generally changing from a prescriptive (detailed) to a performance basis, leaving details
to the various parties and their suitable risk management. Users should check with their State or
Territory authority to establish specific details.
AS1692 “Tanks for Flammable and Combustible Liquids”, is the standard to which most existing
non-pressurised liquid storage tanks were designed and tested. This standard is based on a
maximum vapour space pressure of 35kPa, for both testing and working pressures, which places
it below the conditions experienced using a typical quick-fill nozzle and tank vent.
For working pressures below 50kPa, AS/NZS1200 - which covers AS1210 - will permit “good
engineering practice” to be used for the design of liquid storage vessels.
AS1210 “Pressure Vessels”, is applicable to liquid storage tanks subject to an internal pressure in
excess of that stipulated by AS1692. Whilst it is intended to apply to internal pressures exceeding
50kPa, it may be used if desired as a design and manufacturing standard for applications below
that value. It is a requirement of AS1210 that any tank subject to a pressure greater than 50kPa be
designed and tested in accordance with its guidelines, and that any such tank is registered with
authorities, e.g. Dept of Mineral Resources, WorkCover etc. Any tank designed under AS1210
would require a full relief device to be installed, limiting pressure to a maximum of 1.2 times the
maximum allowable working pressure.
According to SAA, the correct test pressure for a tank should be :
(a) in accordance with AS1692 for tanks within its scope

(b) at least 1.5 times the designers stated maximum allowable working pressure -
measured at the top of the tank
(c) at least 2 times the expected maximum allowable working pressure, elected by a
responsible person
(d) greater than both the emergency relief pressure of the Banlaw tank vent, and the relief
pressure of any full relief device installed
(e) applied with extreme care if air is used as the test medium - e.g. in accordance with
AS4037 “Pressure Equipment – Examination & Testing”.
The expected maximum working pressure is the maximum pressure experienced in the tank
during a normal filling operation, which should occur at the time of nozzle shut-down. To
estimate this pressure within the top of the tank at shut-down, the following information is
required to calculate the “pressure margin” i.e. the pressure required within the tank to initiate
nozzle shut-off:
• obtain the shut-off pressure for the nozzle specific to the refuelling flowrate. This
pressure is measured at the inlet to the nozzle swivel, and has been determined by
Banlaw after exhaustive flow testing of the nozzle for each spring setting (shut-off

Rev. 3 2003
pressure) available i.e. Light (L), Medium-Light (ML), Medium (M), Medium-Heavy
(MH) and Heavy (H)
• the static fluid head present between the nozzle and the top of the tank. For every
metre of static head (height) between the nozzle and top of the tank, the head pressure
is approximately 8.25kPa (diesel @ S.G. 0.84). Thus 2m is equal to 16.5kPa, etc.
• the dynamic head loss developed between the inlet to the nozzle swivel and the fuel
entry into the tank – an engineer or person with fluid mechanics knowledge will need
to calculate this loss. This loss must include the head loss through the swivel,
refuelling nozzle and fuel receiver. The remaining loss will be due to the losses
through pipe, hose, bends, fittings, valves, sudden contractions, sudden enlargements,
etc.
• the pressure margin (i.e. the tank pressure at nozzle shut-off) is therefore
approximately equal to:
pressure margin = (shut-off pressure) - (static head) – (dynamic head)
NOTE: all shut-off pressure and head loss data for the Banlaw refuelling nozzle is available in
Appendix A.2.
Alternatively a pressure gauge may be placed into the top of the tank, and the maximum pressure
at nozzle shut-off is observed.
Banlaw Pipeline technical staff can assist the end-user in determining the estimated maximum
tank pressure, provided the end-user contact Banlaw direct and provide any information required
by Banlaw to perform the calculations.
Any modifications performed e.g. welding, additional fittings, must be done in accordance with
the most recent design standard or code relevant to the tank. Such standards within Australia may
include; AS1200 “Pressure Equipment”, AS1554.1 “Structural Steel Welding – welding of steel
structures”, or AS/NZS3992 “Pressure Equipment – welding and brazing qualification”.
Depending upon the application of the tank i.e. fixed storage, vehicle fuel tank, or transportable
fuel pod, there may be other standards relevant to the tank construction and usage. In addition,
tank bunding, signage, support structure, ventilation, testing procedures and storage location
details remain the responsibility of the user. AS1940 “The Storage and Handling of Flammable
and Combustible Liquids”, is one such standard which may be used for reference. There are “site-
specific” design codes and standards of practice which apply to mines i.e. Mine Design
Guidelines, which may contain information on liquid storage tanks and their use. Site Engineers
should be aware of any such regulations and hence be able to ascertain any reference to tanks or
vessels likely to be associated with quick-fill refuelling.
The Banlaw vent is not designed as a full pressure relief device. The emergency relief feature
of the vent is designed as a partial relief device, to exhaust any excess vapour pressure from
within the tank interior. Should a full relief device be required, then a suitable item must be
installed. Such devices include burst discs and resettable poppet valves. Refer to Table 2.5.2 for
Banlaw vent specifications.
Tanks should be regularly inspected by a responsible person for damage, corrosion and other
factors that may jeopardise their safe operation. Inspection intervals and other details will depend
upon such factors as frequency of use, nature of liquid stored, and recommendations supplied by
the tank manufacturer or contained in the design code or standard for the tank. Banlaw is not a
tank manufacturer or supplier, and as such is not responsible for such details.

Rev. 3 2003
IMPORTANT NOTE: Although the consequence of risks associated with quick-fill refuelling
equipped tanks may be less than say a pressurised gas storage tank, unfortunately no specific
standard applies to quick-fill equipped tanks. The consequence of risks is greatly reduced by the
relatively low proportion of compressed vapour (air) in a tank, and the relatively low tank
pressures involved that are sustained for only a relatively brief period of time. Granted, these
factors do reduce the consequences of risks associated with tank rupture – compared to the
broader scope of AS1210 – however the fact remains that all tanks subject to a working pressure
>50kPa are required to comply with AS1210. The authors of this report therefore recommend that
all tanks fitted with quick-fill equipment do comply with the relevant sections of all applicable
Standards.
9.2 Correct Nozzle Operation
The nozzle is the main component of the refuelling operation. A safe working environment
depends upon the use of a nozzle within the bounds of both technical specification and correct
operating procedure. Refer to [8], [1], [2], [3], [4] and [5] for these details.
The correct procedure for nozzle operation is as follows :
1. remove receiver cap from receiver

2. remove nozzle from anchor, or remove plug from front of nozzle
3. check mating surfaces of nozzle and receiver are clean
4. ensure nozzle is locked in the OFF position
5. retract nozzle actuator fully towards rear of nozzle, then push nozzle onto receiver
6. allow and ensure actuator returns to its fully forward “home” position
7. pull back on nozzle and move slightly from side to side to ensure nozzle is firmly
connected to the receiver, whilst actuator remains fully forward
8. once connected, fuel flow is activated by releasing the operating handle catch and
rotating the handle into the ON position
9. the nozzle will automatically shut-off when additional fluid pressure is developed
within the tank once the tank vent closes at tank full condition. If nozzle fails to
remain on until vent closes, or fails to shut-off automatically after the vent closes,
manually turn nozzle OFF and contact an authorised Banlaw agent.
10. AT NO STAGE SHOULD THE NOZZLE BE MANUALLY HELD IN THE ON
POSITION. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO FORCE ADDITIONAL FUEL INTO TANK
ONCE VENT HAS CLOSED AND NOZZLE HAS TURNED OFF.
11. once nozzle has shut-off, ensure operating handle is locked in the OFF position
12. nozzle may be removed from receiver with operating handle locked OFF, by pulling
back with low force on nozzle whilst actuator is fully retracted
13. replace nozzle plug or return nozzle to anchor
14. replace receiver cap
The above operating guidelines are listed on the Banlaw Nozzle Operating Sign, available for
purchase from a Banlaw agent or Banlaw direct.

Rev. 3 2003
9.3 Specific Actions to Reduce Occurrence of High Probability & High
Consequence Risks
High probability and high consequence risks are those risks assigned a rank of 1, 2, or 3 as per the
risk ranking matrix detailed in Tables 7.4.1 and 7.4.2.
The authors of this report cannot determine with any certainty specific risks that fall into
this category. Competent persons employed by the end-user are responsible for the assessment of
such risks and are therefore responsible for specific actions to reduce or eliminate the probability
of such risks occurring for a particular site or refuelling installation.
The authors of this report consider that if all control measures outlined in earlier clauses of section
9 are duly considered and implemented, then no risk associated with the activity of quick-fill
refuelling using Banlaw equipment is deemed to be of “high probability and high consequence”.
The following risks are typically found to be the most common and unfortunately potentially the
most hazardous in quick-fill refuelling, and can thus be treated as high probability and high
consequence risks:
a) tank over-filling:
• nozzle spring setting too high – incorrect nozzle setting for tank and tank vents
• tank unable to properly pressurise once tank vent closes, thus leading to overfilling of the
tank and the risk of tank overpressurisation prior to nozzle shut-off. Such causes include;
faulty vent(s), leaks from tank or tank fittings, incorrect placement of the vent(s) within
the tank, refuelling whilst the tank is on a relatively high gradient or incorrect vent model
used for the subject tank (e.g. installing a standard length vent in a tank requiring a long
series vent).
• manually holding the nozzle in the ON position – either by hand or by the attachment of
weights or tie-down rope to the operating handle of the nozzle. Many operators do not
believe the tank is full until such time as fuel is sighted exhausting from the tank vent
• a mechanical fault with the nozzle – nozzle requires a service by an authorised Banlaw
repairer
b) premature nozzle shut-off:
• nozzle spring setting too low – incorrect setting for the tank and refuelling flowrate
• excessive restriction (pressure loss) within the refuelling line leading into the tank – such
causes include a partially closed valve, the recent installation of a check valve (or similar
fitting), or the recent replacement of hose or pipework with smaller diameter items
• recent change (increase or decrease) of the refuelling flowrate
• blockage of vent exhaust port – including the vent breather hose. Check all vents on the
tank, if more than one fitted.
• any other factor which has changed the line pressure through the nozzle
Specific control measures have been identified in earlier clauses of section 9.

Rev. 3 2003
9.4 Product Warranty and Disclaimer
All repairs, modifications, or upgrades to Banlaw Pipeline refuelling equipment must be

performed by an authorised Banlaw Pipeline repair agent. Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd cannot warrant
the use of its products if any repairs, modifications or upgrades have been performed by an
unauthorised repairer. It is also outside the scope of this report for the assessment of risks
associated with unauthorised repairs, modifications or otherwise tampering with Banlaw Pipeline
refuelling equipment.
The authors of this report are aware of persons conducting unauthorised repairs on Banlaw
refuelling equipment, and are willing to assist them in the proper repair of the equipment upon
request. However Banlaw Pipeline cannot offer any product warranty or guarantee of performance
unless the equipment is repaired – or inspected – by an authorised repair agent. In addition,
Banlaw Pipeline cannot offer any responsibility for actions or consequences as a result of
unauthorised repairs.
In summary, as a manufacturer and supplier of equipment, Banlaw Pipeline cannot accept any
responsibility for the proper operation of its refuelling equipment if said equipment has been
modified or repaired by an unauthorised repairer. As a manufacturer and supplier of equipment,
Banlaw Pipeline is however obligated to assist an end-user by reasonable means to ensure the safe
and proper use of its product. This may include the supply of repair guidelines to assist a person
in the proper repair of the equipment, however as the licensed holder of Patent and other
Intellectual Property rights for its equipment, Banlaw Pipeline reserves the right to refuse issue of
such information to any person whom it considers a threat to such rights.
9.5 Banlaw “Zero Tank Pressure” Refuelling
Banlaw Pipeline manufacture a tank level sensing system, designed to be incorporated into
existing quick-fill refuelling equipment (and other types of filling means). This system is called
“FillSafe™”, and consists of up to 4 main components to detect tank “full” condition and
promptly terminate the flow of fuel into the tank prior to any tank pressurisation. This system
thus greatly reduces the probability of tank overpressurisation and overfilling. In the event
of a fault with the System, the standard “pressurised” quick-fill system acts as a backup to
terminate the refuelling process.
The System comprises the following components:
• a level sensor unit, mounted on the tank

• a “transmitter” unit – used to monitor the status of the level sensor, and transmit its status to
the “receiver” unit. (Alternatively, the transmitter unit may be connected directly to the
solenoid valve, thus bypassing the receiver unit.)
• a “receiver” unit – used to control the solenoid valve (or pump control relay), in response to
the status message from the “transmitter” unit
• solenoid valve (optional) – used to physically control the flow of fuel into the tank. The valve
is optional, as the receiver unit can be set up to control the refuelling pump control relay
The FillSafe™ System offers significant advantages over similar systems on the market:
• cost effective to purchase and install

• relatively maintenance free
• robust components, built to withstand the often harsh operating environments
• completely compatible with existing quick-fill refuelling equipment
Rev. 3 2003
• operates as the primary means of detecting tank “full” condition, whilst the standard (existing)
quick-fill system remains as a back-up
• once the System detects the tank is full, no additional fuel can enter the tank – regardless of
whether the refuelling nozzle is manually held ON.
• may be used for any refuelling flowrate
From a risk reduction and control perspective, the installation of the FillSafe™ System brings
obvious benefits in the control of tank overpressurisation and overfilling – two key risks
identified in this report.
9.6 Fuel Monitoring and Accountability
Banlaw Pipeline have designed and developed an electronic fuel monitoring system called
“FuelTrack™”. This system is capable of providing accountability for every litre of fuel & oil
delivered to site. The System monitors both the amount of fuel/oil used, in addition to where the
fuel/oil is used i.e. what vehicle the liquid is dispensed into.
The System is available with 3 methods of identifying a vehicle; manual keypad entry, electronic
“Smart-Key”, and fully automatic identification. The System is modular, allowing the end-user to
customise the System to suit their individual requirements.
In terms of the objectives of this report, the FuelTrack™ System offers one key risk control
feature – accountability of fuel. The System will detect any loss of fuel from pipelines, storage
tanks and other means of transporting or storing fuel. Such a feature brings obvious benefits in the
endeavour to detect and minimise environmental contamination. Leaks in underground pipework
can often go unnoticed for extended periods of time, by which stage a large amount of fuel has
already contaminated the environment.

Rev. 3 2003
10 Risk Monitoring and Review
A program designed to monitor the occurrence of risks should be incorporated into any
workplace. Accident or near miss reporting protocol should apply to all facets of refuelling. Such
events must be investigated, regardless of their apparent severity, and safeguards instigated should
they be required. Any damage sustained to equipment must be promptly reported for immediate
attention. The extent and severity of any damage must be thoroughly investigated by a suitably
qualified person, and the appropriate action enforced.
A record of all accidents, near misses, or equipment damage must be kept for the purposes of
future reference. A risk monitoring program should incorporate an incident report recording such
information as:
• date, time, and location
• nature of the incident
• identity and number of people affected
• nature and severity of injury
• identity and type of machinery involved
• extent of damage detected
• outcome / results of the investigation
• further action i.e. recommendations and safeguards
• details of persons involved in the investigation
Such records will allow an assessment of incidents that have occurred, providing valuable insight
into the effectiveness of current risk management procedures. Regular reviews of incident records
will highlight areas in need of improvement i.e. worker training and education, improved
equipment maintenance, improved safeguards etc.
Risk management should be both proactive and reactive. The ability to foresee the occurrence of
hazards by both the analysis of historical records and effective risk identification establishes a
proactive approach, whilst the derivation and implementation of effective risk monitoring and
review strategies maintains a reactive and flexible management program.
To establish a practical risk management program for the equipment featured in this report, the
following details should be observed:
• any damage or malfunction to Banlaw Pipeline refuelling equipment likely to affect its
proper operation must be repaired promptly by an authorised Banlaw repair agent
• to assist all end-users in effective risk management, any high level risks that occur should be
reported to Banlaw Pipeline. The details of such events will be assessed and this report
revised where necessary
• all risk control measures discussed in section 9 must be considered when implementing a
workplace risk management strategy
• all risk management tasks created by this report should be incorporated into other existing
and future risk management programs
• risk management should be incorporated into other management activities i.e. operations
management
• a risk monitoring program be established to ensure all incidents are reported, addressed and
acted upon by qualified personnel
• existing and future risk review programs should be structured to best suit the findings of the
risk monitoring program
• risk management strategies should be regularly updated to incorporate the recommendations
of the risk review program

Rev. 3 2003
11 References
[1] Banlaw Pipeline Technical Publication: “800LPM System Schematic”
[2] Banlaw Pipeline Technical Bulletin: “800LPM System Installation Guidelines”
[3] Banlaw Pipeline Technical Bulletin: “Nozzle Shut-off Mechanism”
[4] Banlaw Pipeline Technical Publication: “1000LPM System Schematic”
[5] Banlaw Pipeline Technical Bulletin: “1000LPM System Installation Guidelines”
[6] Banlaw Pipeline Technical Bulletin: “Quick-Fill Tank Vents”
[7] NSW Dept Of Mineral Resources: “Risk Management Handbook for the Mining
Industry - MDG1010”, May 1997
[8] Banlaw Pipeline Technical Publication: “Hydrostatic Pressure & Flowrate Test Results”
[9] Banlaw Pipeline Technical Bulletin – “Break-away Valves”
[10] WorkCover Authority of NSW: “HAZPAK”, issue received June 1999
[11] Banlaw Pipeline Technical Publication: “Preventative Maintenance Program for Quick-
Fill Refuelling Equipment”
[12] NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act 2002
[13] NSW Dept Of Mineral Resources: “Guide to Reviewing a Risk Assessment of Mine
Equipment and Operations - MDG1014”, July 1997

Rev. 3 2003
APPENDIX
A.1 Adjustable Refuelling Nozzle
This section provides information specific to the adjustable piston spring retainer facility currently
used in the 45 series Banlaw adjustable nozzles.
The ability to calibrate the shut-off pressure of a refuelling nozzle to a particular application
provides the opportunity to minimize tank pressurization at nozzle shut-off. As all refuelling
applications are unique, differences in line pressure and flow-rate can be accounted for when
calibrating a nozzle on-site.
The principles of operation of the adjustable nozzle are identical to those of a conventional unit.
The operating procedure remains the same as that mentioned in Section 9.2.
Figure 2.4.1 - 45 Nozzle
To limit the amount of fine tuning required on-site, details of the nozzle installation are requested
by Banlaw prior to factory testing and shipment. These details will enable Banlaw to test and
subsequently set-up the nozzle to those conditions which the customer has supplied, including:
• flow-rate required
• maximum working or limiting pressure of the tank
• tank and delivery line layout i.e. magnitude of static head, bore of pipe/hose, nature
of delivery line “geometry”
If no such details are supplied, Banlaw chooses test conditions which it perceives the nozzle
would typically encounter during normal service.
Frequent on-site adjustment of the nozzle should not be required and is not recommended. A
single nozzle should not be used for a diverse range of refuelling conditions, requiring frequent
Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment I
Rev. 3 2003
retainer adjustment. The application of the adjustable nozzle remains the same as a conventional
non-adjustable model, such that a single nozzle should only be used for refuelling applications
with similar delivery head and flow-rate requirements. The adjustment facility of the nozzle is not
designed for frequent or repeated adjustment, but instead to allow fine tuning of a nozzle for a
number of similar refuelling tasks. Frequent retainer adjustment will create a greater probability
of risks associated with premature nozzle shut-off, over-pressurisation of tanks, and/or fuel
exhausting from tank vent.
Fine tuning of the nozzle shut-off pressure can be undertaken on-site by a competent person i.e.
fitter or engineer, by following these guidelines. Note that adjustment is easier with the nozzle in
the ON position, however adjustment should never be made whilst refuelling. Turn the supply
pump OFF, or disconnect the nozzle from the receiver during adjustment.
- 45 Nozzle Model -
1. remove threaded inspection plug from rear of nozzle
2. visual inspection of the end cap interior will identify the rear side of the piston, piston
spring, spring retainer, and operating handle links. The retainer is the threaded annular
member supporting the spring force applied to the piston. Holes are present on the rear
side of the retainer to assist in adjustment.
3. the position of the retainer may be varied by its rotation with respect to the end cap
Moving the retainer towards the front of the nozzle i.e. clockwise rotation, will
increase the force applied to the spring and hence raise the shut-down pressure of the
nozzle. Conversely, the spring force and hence shut-off pressure is decreased by
moving the retainer towards the rear of the nozzle by anti-clockwise rotation.
4. only subtle variations in retainer position are required for fine tuning the shut-down
pressure of the nozzle. Large increments of retainer adjustment towards the front of
the nozzle should be avoided unless dramatic increases in shut-off pressure are
required. Be aware of such risks as tank rupture and fuel exhausting from the vent
should the shut-off pressure be set too high.
5. the optimum shut-off pressure for all refuelling nozzles is that level obtained shortly
after the tank vent has closed at tank full condition. This level is also governed by the
nozzle just remaining in the ON position during refuelling at the required flow-rate
shortly prior to the tank becoming full. To ensure the nozzle remains on whilst
refuelling similar equipment, a low “safety margin” should be used to ensure the
nozzle remains on despite subtle differences in delivery head demands, such as
variations in flow-rate and intrinsic differences in similar machinery and storage tanks.
This safety margin will ensure the nozzle remains on for all the required refuelling
applications.
6. once adjustment is complete, the cover plug must be re-installed and secured with
Loctite, if deemed necessary, to discourage tampering and unauthorised adjustment
NOTE : As with all refuelling nozzles, the shut-off pressure must be maintained at a level such
that both the tank vent emergency relief pressure and the maximum recommended tank working
pressure are not exceeded.
Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment II

Rev. 3 2003
A.2 Nozzle Performance Specifications
Following are the results of testing conducted by Banlaw on their refuelling nozzle models :
• BAM800 Refuelling Nozzle – using the AUS21A029 Back Spring

- Shut-off pressure settings Light (L), Medium-Light (ML), and Medium (M)

- Shut-off pressure settings Medium-Heavy (MH), and Heavy (H)

- Shut-off pressure settings Medium-Light (ML), and Medium (M)

- Shut-off pressure settings Medium-Heavy (MH), and Heavy (H)
NOTE: All flow testing was conducted in the Banlaw Pipeline factory using diesel fuel as the test
medium.
Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment III

Rev. 3 2003

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RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT

BANLAW PIPELINE PTY LTD

Prepared By: Banlaw Pipeline Pty Ltd

The Refuelling Specialists

2.1 Principles of the Banlaw System 3

2.2 The 21 Series Nozzle 4

2.3 The 22 Nozzle 5

2.4 The 45 Nozzle 5

2.5 Receivers and Tank Vents 6

3.1 Strategic Context 9

3.2 Organisational Context 9

3.2.1 Health & Safety Obligations – Employer 10

3.2.2 Health & Safety Obligations – Designer, Manufacturer, Supplier 10

3.3 Risk Management Context 11

5. Outline of Risk Identification Methods 13

5.1 Action Error Analysis (AER) 13

5.2 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 13

5.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 13

6. Outline of Risk Assessment Methods 14

7.1 Action Error Analysis (AER) 15

7.2 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 16

7.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 17

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment i

9. Risk Reduction and Control Measures 23

9.1 Liquid Storage Tank Pressure Certification 26

9.2 Correct Nozzle Operation 28

9.3 Specific Actions to Reduce the Occurrence of High Probability Risks 29

9.4 Product Warranty & Disclaimer 30

9.5 Banlaw “Zero Tank Pressure” Refuelling 30

9.6 Fuel Monitoring & Accountability 31

10. Risk Monitoring and Review 32

A.1 Nozzle Performance Specifications

A.2 Additional Information

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment ii

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment 1

• higher refuelling rates - up to 1000 litres/min.

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment 2

Figure 2.1.1: Overview of Banlaw System

All Banlaw products are manufactured in accordance with of standard AS/NZS-ISO9001.

Figure 2.2.1 – 800 Series Nozzle with “T-style” Operating Handle

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment 4

2.3 The 1000 Series Nozzles

2.4 The 45 Nozzle

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment 5

2.5 Receivers and Tank Vents

Nozzle Receiver Flowrate Capacity

Table 2.5.1: Nozzle and mating Receiver

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment 6

Figure 2.5.1 - A Typical Dry-Break Receiver (AUS23 shown)

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment 7

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment 8

3.1 Strategic Context

3.2 Organisational Context

Contact details for management divisions within Banlaw Pipeline are:

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment 9

3.2.2 Health & Safety Obligations – Designer, Manufacturer, Supplier

Generic Refuelling Nozzle Risk Assessment 10