Fall 2019 221

Should We Engineer Species

in Order to Save Them?*
Ronald Sandler*

There are two strategies for engineering species for conservation purposes, de-extinction and
gene drives. Engineering species for conservation purposes is not in principle wrong, and on
common criteria for assessing conservation interventions there may well be cases in which
de-extinction and gene drives are evaluated positively in comparison to other possible strate-
gies. De-extinction is not as transformative a conservation technique as it initially appears. It
is largely dependent, as a conservation activity, upon traditional conservation practices, such as
captive breeding programs, species reintroductions, and habitat improvement and protection. In
contrast, gene drives have the potential to significantly restructure how conservation problems
are framed and approached. Gene drives are therefore a much more disruptive technology for
conservation philosophy and practice.

INTRODUCTION

Most ethical analysis and evaluation of genetically engineering nonhuman ani-

mals and plants has focused on agricultural applications—for example, genetically
modified crops and cloned farm animals. However, there is increasing interest in
using genetic engineering tools and techniques for conservation purposes. In some
cases, this would involve genetically engineering organisms that are the target of
conservation. For example, researchers have genetically modified the American
chestnut, once a forest keystone species in the Eastern United States, so that it is
resistant to a blight that has decimated its wild population.1 Other researchers are
interested in genetically modifying elephants so that they are phenotypically similar
to mammoths in ways that would enable introducing them into steppe landscapes in
Siberia.2 Still others are interested in engineering and reintroducing organisms that

* Department of Philosophy and Religion, Northeastern University, 419 Renaissance Park, 360
Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115; email r.sandler@northeastern.edu. Material in this article
was presented at conferences and colloquia at Universidad Católica de Chile, the 4TE Ethics Center,
University of Alaska-Anchorage, Texas A&M University, University of Buffalo, and University of
Washington. The author is grateful for the many excellent comments and suggestions received at those
talks, as well as for those from the reviewers at Environmental Ethics.
1 William Powell, “New Genetically Engineered American Chestnut will Help to Restore the Deci-

mated, Iconic Tree,” The Conversation (2016), https://theconversation.com/new-genetically-engineered-

american-chestnut-will-help-restore-the-decimated-iconic-tree-52191.
2 Sarah Knapton, “Wooly Mammoth will be Back from Extinction within Two Years, Say Harvard

Scientists,” Telegraph (2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/02/16/harvard-scientists-pledge-

bring-back-woolly-mammoth-extinction/; Ross Anderson, “Welcome to Pleistocene Park,” The Atlantic
(2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/04/pleistocene-park/517779.

221
222 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 41

are genetically similar to already extinct species, such as the passenger pigeon and
gastric brooding frog.3 In other cases of conservation-oriented genetic modification,
the target of the modification is organisms that interact with the conservation target.
For example, researchers are interested in using genetic modification to eliminate
invasive predators, such as introduced rats and mice on islands,4 and to eliminate
disease vectors, such as mosquitos that transmit avian malaria in Hawaii.5
In this article I focus on two strategies for engineering species for conservation
purposes, de-extinction and gene drives. De-extinction involves engineering organ-
isms so that they have high levels of genetic similarity to organisms of species that
have already gone extinct. Gene drives are genetic modifications that increase the
probability that a trait is inherited and thereby the rate at which it spreads through
a sexually reproducing population. In section one, I discuss the motivation for
engineering species for conservation purposes. In section two, I argue that it is
implausible that all cases of engineering species for conservation purposes are
ethically objectionable or wrong, and then propose some criteria that might be
used to assess conservation engineering on a case-by-case basis. In sections three
and four, I discuss de-extinction and gene drives in turn. I argue that each can be
justified in some cases, but that gene drives enable a significantly novel approach
to and conception of conservation. Although de-extinction captures the imagination
and has received much greater attention thus far, gene drives are potentially more
transformative and ethically complex with respect to conservation philosophy and
practice.

THE MOTIVATION FOR ENGINEERING SPECIES

FOR CONSERVATION PURPOSE6

One reason that there is growing interest in genetic engineering for conservation
purposes is that it provides novel strategies in contexts where traditional conserva-
tion methods have not been successful. For example, islands have high rates of
extinctions and endangered species. Up to eighty percent of recorded extinctions

3 Michael Archer, “Second Chance for Tasmanian Tigers and Fantastic Frogs,” TEDx DeExtinction/

National Geographic, Washington, D.C (2013), http://longnow.org/revive/tedxdeextinction/; Ben No-

vak, “How to Bring Passenger Pigeons All the Way Back,” TEDx De-extinction/National Geographic,
Washington, D.C. (2013), http://longnow.org/revive/tedxdeextinction.
4 Brian Owens, “Behind New Zealand’s Wild Plan to Purge All Pests,” Nature 541, no.7673 (2017):

148–50; doi: 10.1038/541148a.

5 Wei Liao, Carter T. Atkinson, Dennis A. LaPointe, and Michael D. Samuel, “Mitigating Future Avian

Malaria Threats to Hawaiian Forest Birds from Climate Change,” PLoS ONE 12, 1 (2017): e0168880.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0168880.
6 Some of the material in this and the next section is adapted from Ronald Sandler, “Gene Drives

and Species Conservation: An Ethical Analysis,” in Irus Braverman, ed., Gene Editing, Law, and
the Environment (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 39–54, and Ronald Sandler,
“De-extinction and Conservation Genetics in the Anthropocene,” Recreating the Wild: De-extinction,
Technology, and the Ethics of Conservation, Special Report, Hastings Center Report 47, no. 4 (2017).
Fall 2019 SHOULD WE ENGINEER SPECIES? 223

have been on islands, and as much as forty percent of threatened species are island
dwellers.7 Invasive mice and rats are among the primary drivers of native species
declines on islands. They have been widely introduced, leading to dozens of ex-
tinctions and hundreds of at risk species, and they significantly disrupt ecosystem
integrity and functioning.8 There have been numerous attempts to eradicate invasive
rodents from islands, primarily by using a general anticoagulant toxicant.9 The
success rates for such eradication tactics are much higher in temperate than in
tropical regions, where it is more difficult to reach all the target animals. Moreover,
the widespread application of a general toxicant can have detrimental impacts on
other native species, livestock, and people.10 Therefore, island conservationists
have a strong interest in developing strategies that are more effective in reaching
the entirety of the invasive rodent population and that are target specific.
Gene drive mechanisms appear to have the potential to address these difficulties.
As discussed above, gene drives are genomic modifications that cause a genetic
trait to spread rapidly through a sexually reproducing population. They work by
increasing the rate or frequency at which a gene sequence gets passed on to off-
spring. Sexually reproducing organisms receive one set of chromosomes from each
of their parents, and pass only one on to their offspring. The predominant gene
drive approach uses a system (called “CRISPR/Cas9”) that cuts the chromosome
inherited from the non-modified parent and inserts the desired genetic trait and
drive system. Thus, when the desired trait and drive system is engineered into an
organism it ensures that both sets of its offspring’s chromosomes (even the one
inherited from the non-modified parent) will contain the trait and drive system.
This, in turn, ensures that all of its offspring will pass on the trait and drive system
to all of their offspring, and that all of its offspring’s offspring will pass it on to all
of their offspring, and so on. Therefore, by engineering a strain of organism with a
desired trait and gene drive, mass-rearing them, and releasing them into the field,
it may be possible to genetically modify entire wild populations. With respect to
invasive rodents, some conservationists are interested in developing and deploying
them to drive maleness through their populations. If all offspring are male, then the
population will crash in just a few generations. Such an approach would be species
specific and could reach the entire target population. New Zealand, for example,

7 Taylor Ricketts et al., “Pinpointing and Preventing Imminent Extinctions,” Proceedings of the

National Academy of Sciences 102 (2005): 18497–501.

8 Ian Atkinson, “The Spread of Commensal Species of Rattus to Oceanic Islands and Their Effects

on Island Avifaunas,” in Philip J. Moors, ed., Conservation of Island Birds, International Council for
Bird Preservation Technical Publication No. 3 (Cambridge, UK: International Council for Birds Pres-
ervation, 1985), pp. 35–81; Tim S. Doherty et al., “Invasive Predators and Global Biodiversity Loss,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113 (2016): 11261–265.
9 James C. Russell and Nick D. Holmes, “Tropical Island Conservation: Rat Eradication for Species

Recovery,” Biological Conservation 185 (2015): 1–7.

10 Karl J. Campbell et al., “The Next Generation of Rodent Eradications: Innovative Technologies and

Tools to Improve Species Specificity and Increase their Feasibility on Islands,” Biological Conservation
185 (2015): 47–58.
224 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 41

has included the use of gene drives as an option in its plan to eliminate invasive
species from the country.11 Thus, one reason that conservationists are attracted to
genetic modification is that it might provide more effective or efficient ways of
accomplishing something they are already trying to do—e.g., eliminate invasive
species or disease vectors.
A related reason that conservationists are attracted to genetic modification is that
it can provide strategies for addressing ongoing conservation problems for which
there is no other available strategy. For example, a project has been proposed to
use synthetic genomics and interspecific somatic cell nuclear transfer as part of the
conservation of black-footed ferrets. Black-footed ferrets are the only ferret spe-
cies native to North America. They were thought to be extinct in the mid-twentieth
century due to disease (particularly sylvantic plague) and habitat and prey loss
(they feed largely on prairie dogs and use their burrows for shelter and denning,
but prairie dog populations had plummeted due to prairie to agriculture conversion,
eradication efforts, and introduced diseases). However, a remnant population of
black-footed ferrets was discovered in Wyoming in 1981. That population would
also ultimately go extinct in the wild, but a captive population was maintained. All
currently existing black-footed ferrets are descended from the seven individuals in
that founder population. Thousands of individuals have been produced from them,
many of which have been released into the wild at sites throughout their histori-
cal range. Yet the success of wild populations has been limited, with only a few
hundred remaining. One of the reasons for this is a lack of genetic diversity. There
is no way to use conventional breeding and management techniques to expand the
genetic pool for the population. However, there is additional black-footed ferret
genomic material in preserved specimens. If these genomes could be synthesized
using synthetic genomics and introduced into the breeding population using somatic
cell nuclear transfer or other methods, then the gene pool could be expanded. There
is a project in development that aims to do this using black-footed ferret specimens
from the San Diego Frozen Zoo.12 Thus, another reason that conservationists are
interested in genetic modification is that it can in some cases provide a strategy for
a conservation problem—e.g., increasing the genetic diversity of an endangered
population—for which there are no other available options.
Yet another reason that conservationists are attracted to genetic modification
is that it can enable novel types of conservation activities. This is thought to
be the case with de-extinction. As mentioned above, de-extinction is the use of
genomic techniques to create organisms with high levels of genetic similarity to
individuals of species that no longer exist. For example, passenger pigeons were

11 John Key, “New Zealand to be Predator Free by 2050,” New Zealand Government (25 July 2016),

https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-be-predator-free-2050; Owens, “Behind New Zea-

land’s Wild Plan to Purge All Pests.”
12 Samantha Wisely et al., “A Road Map for 21st Century Genetic Restoration: Gene Pool Enrichment

of the Black-Footed Ferret,” Journal of Heredity 106, 5 (2015): 581-92. doi: 10.1093/jhered/esv041.
Fall 2019 SHOULD WE ENGINEER SPECIES? 225

the most numerous bird species in North America when European settlers arrived.
It is estimated that there were between three and five billion passenger pigeons
and that they constituted twenty-five to forty percent of the total bird population
in what is now the United States. There were reports of nesting areas that covered
over 850 square miles and that contained over 100,000,000 birds. However, habi-
tat destruction and commercial hunting enabled by technological innovation and
dissemination in the nineteenth century (e.g., guns, railroads and the telegraph)
resulted in a rapid decline in their numbers. The last passenger pigeon died in the
Cincinnati Zoological Garden 100 years ago.13
There is interest in “reviving” the [assenger pigeon and it may be possible by
means of synthetic genomics and interspecific surrogacy. The plan is to recon-
struct a passenger pigeon genome so far as possible using DNA fragments from
preserved specimens; fill in missing segments using genetic information from the
closely related band tailed pigeon; synthesize the genome; insert it into enucleated
band-tailed pigeon stem cells that differentiate into germ cells, which would then
be injected into developing band-tailed pigeons. If the band tailed pigeons then
mate successfully, the result would be offspring with a high level of genetic simi-
larity to formerly existing passenger pigeons.14 Repeating this enough times with
sufficient genetic variation could, it is hoped, produce a founder population, from
which a larger population could be rebuilt. Other species that have been proposed
for de-extinction—and in some cases for which de-extinction is being actively
pursued—include the mammoth, thylacine (Tasmanian tiger), gastric brooding
frog, Caribbean monk seal, and heath hen.
There are thus several reasons that conservationists are led to explore conserva-
tion applications of genetic modification tools and techniques, such as gene drives,
synthetic genomics, gene editing, and cloning: efficiency (more effective strategies);
necessity (strategies for intractable conservation problems); and novelty (new forms
of conservation practice).15

IS ALL GENETIC ENGINEERING FOR

CONSERVATION PURPOSES WRONG?

As the foregoing makes clear, there is tremendous diversity in conservation-

oriented genetic engineering projects. Some involve plants, while others involve
animals. Some involve extant species, while others involve extinct species. Some
involve small numbers of modifications, while others involve synthesizing complete
genomes. Some involve modifying the conservation target, while others involve

13 Smithsonian, “The Passenger Pigeon,” Encyclopedia Smithsonian (2001), https://www.si.edu/

encyclopedia_si/nmnh/passpig.htm.
14 Novak, “How to Bring Passenger Pigeons All the Way Back.”
15 Antoinette J. Piaggio et al., “Is it Time for Synthetic Biodiversity Conservation?” Trends in Ecol-

ogy and Evolution 32, no. 2 (2017): 97–107.

226 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 41

modifying species that interact with them. Some involve in situ modification, while
others are done ex situ. But all involve intentional modification of the genome of
nonhuman species in ways that are not possible or that would not occur without
human intervention. Some might object to genetic modification for conservation
purposes on the grounds that all such interventions are problematic and should be
rejected.16
Sustaining this objection requires (1) a normative theory in which there are
things that are in principle wrong regardless of the circumstances; (2) a principle
within that system that would prohibit intentional genetic modification that could
not occur in the absence of human agency. Such a view is highly implausible.
Condition (1) is standardly associated with deontological normative theory.
However, the most prominent deontological environmental ethics do not take so
strong a position. The reason is that the condition holds not only that a thing is
prima facie wrong in all situations, but that it is all things considered wrong. Take,
for example, Paul Taylor’s respect for nature environmental ethic.17 On Taylor’s
view, there are several things that are prima facie wrong, such as harming wild
plants and animals and even interfering with them. However, there are conditions
under which these can be acceptable and even required on his view—for example
to make up for past harms or to avoid greater future harms. Therefore, the only
absolute (i.e., inviolable) duty is to not violate the prima facie duties in the absence
of compelling justification (i.e., an overriding duty). What is more, conservation
considerations such as preventing future harm and restitutive justice are just the sort
of reasons that are appealed to in order to justify conservation genetic engineering.
The same holds for Tom Regan’s deontological animal rights view.18 There are
adjudication principles within the ethic—the miniride and worse-off principles—
that function to indicate when it is permissible to harm or kill nonhuman animals
(i.e., violate their rights) in cases where rights come into conflict. Preventing future
wrongful harms (i.e., rights violations) is one consideration to which the principles
appeal. Moreover, because Regan’s is an animal rights view, the ethic will not
have any prohibitions against genetically engineering plants, since they are not
experiencing subjects of a life and therefore not rights bearers. On deontological
anthropocentric or ratiocentric views—i.e., human rights based views—neither
plants nor nonhuman animals will have rights, so engineering them would not be
intrinsically problematic.
The point here is not only that the most prominent deontological views in envi-
ronmental ethics would not support the prohibition in (2) above, but that exception-

16 Bjorn Myskja, “The Moral Difference Between Intragenic and Transgenic Modification of Plants,”

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (2006): 225–38; Henk Verhoog, “Naturalness and
the Genetic Modification of Animals,” Trends in Biotechnology 2, no. 7 (2003): 294–97; Lammerts Van
Bueren and P. C. Struik, “Integrity and Rights of Plants: Ethical Notions in Organic Plant Breeding and
Propagation,” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (2005): 479–93.
17 Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
18 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
Fall 2019 SHOULD WE ENGINEER SPECIES? 227

less rules/duties as described in (1) are extremely rare even among deontological
environmental ethics. In order to be justified, they require that there be something
of such importance or value that compromising it in some way is not only always
a reason against doing it, but always an overriding reason. Kant thought that ra-
tional agency possessed such value, for example. On his view, rational agency is
unconditionally and absolutely valuable such that it is wrong—under any set of
conditions—to treat rational beings as a mere means or not as an end in themselves.
Thus, manipulation and exploitation of them are always wrong.19 But not even the
deontological environmental ethics discussed above hold the view that species or
plants have such value. If they did, then it would always be wrong to use them as
a mere means to our ends. Cutting down trees for firewood, selective breeding for
agriculture, using plants for clothing or medicinal purposes, capturing animals for
breeding programs, and using them for biocontrol would all be unconditionally
wrong. This is a reductio ad absurdum of the view, which is why deontological
nonanthropocentrists do not hold it.
If the view is too absolutist for deontological environmental ethics, then it is
likely to be so for indirect consequentialist and virtue-oriented environmental eth-
ics as well (and even more so for pragmatic and atheoretical views). The reason
is that on such normative theories the justifications for the principles they endorse
and the extent to which principles are prioritized in application is conditional.
They depend, for example, on which rules if adopted would bring about the best
outcomes, or on what other virtues are operative in the situation. As a result, they
could countenance genetic engineering for conservation purposes under at least
some conditions. For instance, if adopting genetic engineering as a last resort con-
servation option would bring about better outcomes than total rejection of them,
then rule consequentialism would favor adopting them as a last resort. For these
reasons, rule-consequentialist and virtue-oriented theories are not likely to be able
to sustain (1) and (2) above.
There are thus two interrelated reasons to think that an absolute or unconditional
prohibition against all cases of genetically engineering for conservation purposes
is untenable. The normative and value commitments necessary to justify such a
prohibition are implausible; and the implications of a principle that would support
such a prohibition are absurd.20
If the foregoing is correct, then the particular techniques and applications
involved in genetic engineering for conservation purposes need to be evaluated
on a differentiated basis. As discussed in section one, conservation justifications
for engineering species include that it is a more effective or the only effective

19 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2012).

20 For an extended discussion of this argument as it relates to the value of species boundaries and

species integrity, as well as to conceptions of nature and naturalness, see Ronald Sandler, The Ethics
of Species (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
228 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 41

approach to accomplishing an already accepted conservation end, such as increasing

endangered species populations and eliminating invasive predators. Assessing such
claims requires having standards for evaluating competing conservation strategies.
Below are several criteria that are commonly appealed to in order to justify some
conservation programs or efforts and to criticize others. All other things being
equal, a conservation approach or strategy is generally considered preferable to
the extent that it:
• Sustainably conserves species. Efforts or strategies that are likely to only
forestall extinction are less preferable to ones that are more likely to maintain
species in the long run.
•Addresses the causes of population declines. Efforts or strategies that address
the underlying causes of species population declines are preferable to those
that do not. This is in large part because they are more likely to be sustainable
and they remediate anthropogenic ecological harms.
•Conserves species in their historical ranges. Efforts or strategies that are able
to conserve species in situ or in their historical ranges are preferable to con-
servation ex situ or outside of their historical range.
•Conserves the value of species. The value of a species population is very often
tied to its context. Ecological, cultural ,and natural value are all based on rela-
tional properties between the population and its ecosystem or social context.
This is a large part of why in situ conservation is preferable.
•Is scalable and has coarse filter. The magnitude of the conservation challenge
is such that approaches to species conservation that capture large numbers of
species or that can be scaled up are preferable to fine-filter approaches that
focus on one or a few species at a time.
•Has public support. Conservation projects and practices that have strong public
support are preferable to those that lack support or face opposition.
•Has ancillary benefits. Conservation projects and strategies that have a sec-
ondary benefit, such as maintaining ecosystem services, promoting economic
security, or protecting areas that are ecologically important for other species,
are preferable to those that do not.
•Is feasible and cost effective. Conservation funding and other conservation
resources—e.g., time and expertise—are finite and scarce. Therefore, ap-
proaches that are cost effective, have more straight-forward and immediate
implementation, and have a higher probability of success are preferable to
those that do not.
•Has acceptable risks. Conservation projects and strategies that pose reasonable
and manageable risks to ecosystem services, the organisms involved, other
species, and people are preferable to those that do not.
These considerations are all ceteris paribus (or “all other things being equal”)
Fall 2019 SHOULD WE ENGINEER SPECIES? 229

and admit exceptions. They are also largely comparative. That is, they evaluate
possible conservation efforts against alternative conservation approaches as well
as against refraining from conservation activities.

DE-EXTINCTION AS A CONSERVATION PRACTICE

When the above criteria are applied to some of the more prominently discussed
cases of de-extinction, they do not appear well justified. Consider, for example,
the proposal to create pigeons with high levels of genetic similarity to passenger
pigeons. First of all, as with all cases of de-extinction, this is not strictly a conser-
vation activity at all, because it does not prevent a species from going extinct; and
on many conceptions of what constitutes a species it also would not reconstruct a
species—i.e., the engineered birds would not be members of the species Ectopis-
tis migratorius.21 Moreover, it does not itself address the causes of the passenger
pigeon’s extinction, or involve reestablishing the passenger pigeon form of life,
which involved huge flocks of birds, in its co-evolved habitat. Several conservation
biologists have raised concerns about whether North American ecosystems have
moved too far on, whether it would be possible to create sufficient genetic diversity,
whether the birds would behave like passenger pigeons given the absence of exist-
ing models, and whether a similar microbiome could be engineered.22 For these
reasons, “passenger pigeon” de-extinction likely would not recreate the lost value
associated with passenger pigeon extinction or make up for the harms or wrongs
done in its extinction.23 Instead of wondrous independent flocks expressing the
passenger pigeon form of life in their co-evolved habitat, the result might well be
a small number of captive or highly managed passenger pigeonish birds. Rather
than a conservation success, they could continue to be a reminder of conservation
failure.24
What the passenger pigeon case highlights is that de-extinction is not itself a
conservation activity. All a successful de-extinction accomplishes, in itself, is the
creation of organisms. For de-extinction to become a robust conservation activity,
it must be combined with a captive breeding program, a habitat creation, improve-
ment or protection program, and a reintroduction and monitoring program. It is not

21 Helena Siipi, “The Authenticity of Animals,” in Markku Oksanen, ed., Ethics of Animal Re-

creation and Modification (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 77–96; Matthew Slater and H. Clatterbuck,
“A Pragmatic Approach to the Possibility of Deextinction,” Biology and Philosophy 33, no. 4 (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539–018–9615–5.
22 David Ehrenfeld, “Extinction Reversal? Don’t Count on It,” TEDx DeExtinction/National Geo-

graphic, Washington, D.C. (2013), http://longnow.org/revive/tedxdeextinction/

23 Ronald Sandler, “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” Conservation Biology 28 (2013):

354–60.
24 For a discussion of the symbolic value of passenger pigeon extinction and de-extinction, see Ben

Minteer, “Is it Right to Reverse Extinction?” Nature 509, 261 (2014), doi:10.1038/509261a; Stewart
Brand, “The Dawn of De-extinction: Are You Ready?” TED 2013. TED, Long Beach, Calif. (2013),
http://www.ted.com/talks/stewart_brand_the_dawn_of_de_extinction_are_you_ready.html .
230 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 41

a conservation success to create gastric brooding frogs in a lab, if their habitat is so

degraded that they cannot be released. It would be an incredible techno-scientific
accomplishment. It would in many ways be amazing to see a gastric brooding frog
alive, even if only in a highly monitored and controlled situation. It might have
ancillary scientific, technological, and even conservation benefits. But it would still
fall far short of reestablishing the value of the species, and of what would normally
be considered a conservation success for the species.25
For the reasons above, the IUCN’s Guiding Principles on Creating Proxies of
Extinct Species for Conservation Benefit appropriately frames de-extinction, when
considered as a conservation activity, as largely a variety of species translocation.
De-extinction—which the guidelines define rather inclusively as “any attempt to
create some proxy of an extinct species or subspecies (hereafter “species”) through
any technique, including methods such as selective back breeding, somatic cell
nuclear transfer (cloning), and genome engineering”26—is simply the source of
the translocated or reintroduced organisms. Once the organisms are created, the
conservation components are familiar and include such things as habitat improve-
ment, breeding, release, and monitoring. As the passenger pigeon case indicates,
there can be some particularly challenging components with conservation use of
organisms derived through de-extinction, particularly when the species has been
extinct for a considerable time—e.g., lack of genetic diversity, the absence of
behavioral models, limited behavioral and ecological knowledge of them, and
locating appropriate habitats. Therefore, recently extinct species for which there
remains largely intact habitat are regarded as the most favorable candidates for
conservation-oriented de-extinction.27 The longer a species has been extinct, the
less likely creating genetic likenesses is to be ecologically beneficial, make up
for past ecological harms or wrongs, maintain historical continuity, or reestablish
the ecological and evolutionary relationships that are the basis of species value.
For recently extinct species, suitable habitats are more likely to persist and their
ecological relationships (and associated values) are more likely to be reestablish-
able. This is particularly so in cases where the causes of extinction are local and
reversible—such as extermination programs or commercial harvesting—rather
than due to ecosystem transitions or changes to climatic and ecological background
conditions. On this view, the conservation justification for de-extinction is more
forward-looking than it is backward-looking. The point is not only to make up for

25 Sandler, “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.”

26 IUCN, IUCN SSC Guiding Principles on Creating Proxies of Extinct Species for Conservation
Benefit, version 1.0 (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, Species Survival Commission, 2016), p. 1.
27 Douglas J. Macauley et al., “A Mammoth Undertaking: Harnessing Insight From Functional Ecology

to Shape De-extinction Priority Setting,” Functional Ecology 31 (2017): 1003–1011. doi:10.1111/1365-

2435.12728; IUCN, IUCN SSC Guiding Principles on Creating Proxies of Extinct Species for Con-
servation Benefit; Phillip Seddon et al., “Reintroducing Resurrected Species: Selecting De-extinction
Candidates,” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 29, no. 3 (2014): 140-147; Sandler, “The Ethics of
Revising Long Extinct Species” and “De-extinction and Conservation Genetics in the Anthropocene.”
Fall 2019 SHOULD WE ENGINEER SPECIES? 231

conservation wrongs and recoup a conservation loss, but to “re-establish populations

of proxy species in suitable habitats to achieve ecosystem conservation benefits.”28
Given this forward-looking perspective, some conservation biologists have been
critical of conservation de-extinction on the grounds that it is an inefficient use of
scarce conservation resources.29 They argue that in almost all cases the conserva-
tion and ecological benefits versus costs are greater for using resources to conserve
endangered extant species, than they are likely to be for organisms derived from
de-extinction. However, there are several limitations with this cost-benefit approach
to evaluating candidate de-extinctions.30 For one thing, in many cases, the resources
that are flowing to de-extinction are not flowing from other conservation activities.
This is generally true of the genomic components of de-extinction—the organism
creation—but it holds in some cases for the conservation components as well. For
instance, there is an incipient effort to reconstitute an approximation of the heath
hen on Martha’s Vineyard in Massachusetts, the funding for which appears to be
private and raised specifically for the project.31
Moreover, there can be cases in which the resources and support that flow to a
de-extinction project are crucial to realizing broader conservation and ecological
goals. For example, the Heath Hen project is being set within a larger conserva-
tion context that prioritizes restoration of crucial Heath Hen habitat that will be
beneficial to many other species. Similarly, the primary justification offered in
favor of the mammoth project mentioned earlier is not that humans owe a debt of
justice to mammoths (i.e., it is not backward looking), but that reintroduction of
mammoth-like animals in Siberian landscapes will have a transformative effect on
tundra ecosystems in ways that likely will benefit other species and contribute to
maintaining the permafrost and greenhouse gas sequestration.32 There are a wide
variety of potential conservation projects involving organisms derived from de-
extinction, and it may well be that some score well on an inclusive conservation
cost-benefit analysis, even if many (or even most) others do not. Case-by-case
assessment is crucial.
Another reason that conservation cost-benefit arguments against de-extinction
are not always decisive is that there often are other values at stake besides strictly
conservation value. A candidate species might have sufficient cultural or symbolic
value to justify a non-optimal use of conservation resources, for example. This is
arguably the case with the California condor and giant panda captive breeding and

28 IUCN, IUCN SSC Guiding Principles on Creating Proxies of Extinct Species for Conservation

Benefit, p. 1.
29 Joseph Bennett et al., “Spending Limited Resources on De-extinction Could Lead to Net Biodi-

versity Loss,” Nature Ecology and Evolution 1(2017); doi: 10.1038/s41559-016-0053.

30 Ronald Sandler, “De-extinction: Costs, Benefits and Ethics,” Nature Ecology and Evolution 1

(2017); doi:10.1038/s41559-017-0105.
31 Sara Brown, “Heath Hen Tops De-extinction List,” Vineyard Gazette (2016), https://vineyardga-

zette.com/news/2016/07/28/heath-hen-tops-de-extinction-list.
32 Ross, “Welcome to Pleistocene Park.”
232 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 41

reintroduction programs. Even if they are not a maximally efficient use of resources
from a strictly conservation perspective, the value that these species have to people
are reasons in favor of them. The mammoth project has been defended on such
human-oriented grounds, for example.33
The point here is not to endorse any particular conservation de-extinction.
Rather, it is to emphasize that de-extinction, when evaluated as a conservation
activity, appears far less radical or revolutionary than it is sometimes portrayed.34
De-extinction itself is just the creation of organisms that genetically resemble organ-
isms of a type that currently do not exist more so than do any existing organisms.
When considered as a conservation practice subject to the same types of evaluation
as other conservation activities—feasibility, cost-benefit, risks, public support,
animal welfare, value analysis—it is likely that some de-extinctions can be part of
well-justified conservation activities while others are not.35 In fact, the diversity
of genetic engineering projects collected under the umbrella of “de-extinction”
suggests that “de-extinction” is not a particularly useful category for ethical evalu-
ation. De-extinctions differ with respect to types of organisms, methods, objectives,
funding sources, risks, costs, benefits, justifications, environments, and much more.
What matters ethically are the details of particular conservation projects involving
the creation of genetic likenesses, and that a project involves genetic likenesses is
only one aspect open to ethical evaluation.
A concern often raised regarding de-extinction is that it will function as a moral
hazard or problematic technofix.36 The worry is that it will foster a different way
of thinking about “extinction”—as not a final loss—and enable a “conservation
model” on which conserving species does not require keeping individuals of them
in existence, because they can always be brought back later as long as their genetic
information or tissue samples have been banked in frozen zoos. This could in turn be
used to justify continuing with policies and practices that cause species to become
at risk, according to the concern.37

33 Yasha Rohwer and Emma Marris, “An Analysis of the Potential Ethical Justifications for Mammoth

De-extinction And a Call for Empirical Research,” Ethics, Policy, and Environment 21, no. 1 (2018):
127-42.
34 Brand, “The dawn of de-extinction: are you ready?”
35 Sandler, “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.”
36 Jacob Sherkow and Henry Greely, “What If Extinction is Not Forever?” Science 340 (2013):

32–33; Stuart Pimm, “The Case Against Species Revival,” National Geographic (2013), http://news.
nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/03/130312--deextinction-conservation-animals-scienceextinction-
biodiversity-habitat-environment; Kent Redford et al., “Synthetic Biology and Conservation of Nature:
Wicked Problems and Wicked Solutions,” PLOS Biology 11, no. 4 (2013): 1–4; Siipi, “The Authenticity
of Animals.”
37 The worry here is analogous in many respects to those regarding the potential misuse of the prom-

ise of ecological restoration to justify degradative industrial activities on the grounds that ecological
spaces can always be reconstituted later—see, e.g., Eric Katz, “The Big Lie,” in William Throop, ed.,
Environmental Restoration (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2000), pp. 83–93 and Andrew Light,
“Restoration or Domination? A Reply to Katz,” in William Throop, ed., Environmental Restoration
(Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2000), pp. 95–112.
Fall 2019 SHOULD WE ENGINEER SPECIES? 233

The view that de-extinction reduces the need to try to maintain populations of
at risk species is clearly problematic, since it is insensitive to what makes species
valuable and involves implausible assumptions about what is likely to happen in
the future, among other things. But it is encouraged in part by the misleading nature
of the term de-extinction, which suggests that species can be brought back from
extinction without loss. As we have seen, this is typically not the case. Creation of
genetic likenesses does not constitute conservation. Species and what is valuable
about them are not resurrected by it. In most cases the genetic “replicas” would
retain large genetic and phenotypic differences from organisms of the extinct spe-
cies and are not properly of the same species. This is not to deny the political worry
involved. The idea of de-extinction may be misused to try to justify reducing the
urgency or resources for conserving extant at-risk species (though I am not aware
of anyone actually making that argument).
Whether or not de-extinction is a moral hazard, it does not enable a radically
new model of species conservation. As emphasized above, de-extinction projects
that have conservation goals need to be tied to traditional conservation activities if
they are to be well-justified and successful. The projects involve new genetic tools
(e.g., synthetic genomics), enable new possibilities (e.g., creating individuals with
genetic similarity to extinct species), and pose particularly acute challenges (e.g.,
genetic diversity and behavioral models), in many cases. But they do not cut out the
need for captive breeding, reintroduction, monitoring, and habitat improvements,
for example.

GENE DRIVES FOR CONSERVATION PURPOSES

Some applications of gene drives score quite well on the conservation criteria
above (section two) in comparison to the alternatives (including no intervention
at all). Consider, for example, the proposal discussed earlier to use a gene drive
system to skew sex ratios of nonnative rodent populations on Pacific islands. Gene
drive mechanisms appear to have the potential to address the difficulties of preci-
sion targeting and complete coverage with possibly lower risks than alternative
innovations such as species-specific toxicants or virus-vectored immunocontracep-
tion.38 Moreover, deploying gene drives in this way would address the cause of
at-risk species declines—i.e., the invasive rodents—and would do so by undoing
or removing a human introduced threat, thereby enabling at-risk species to persist
in their native habitats and reestablishing historical relationships. Thus, it is an
intervention that, if successful, would protect and promote diverse environmental
values, such as ecological integrity, biodiversity, and naturalness.
The foregoing is not intended to be a defense of the use of gene drives for rodent
eradications in general, let alone in any particular instances. Rather, it is meant to

38 Campbell et al., “The Next Generation of Rodent Eradications: Innovative Technologies and Tools

to Improve Species Specificity and Increase their Feasibility on Islands.”

234 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 41

demonstrate that there are likely to be some cases where gene drives are attractive
on many commonly recognized criteria. Eliminating widespread and difficult-to-
target invasive predators or non-native disease vectors (such as the non-native
mosquito that is spreading avian malaria to endangered Hawaiian birds) appears to
be one such type of application. Thus, when thoughtful and responsible researchers
begin to develop decision trees, matrixes, and maps for the use of novel genetic
conservation interventions there will be branches and pathways that lead to gene
drives.39 If the technology is effective, the risks are acceptable and manageable,
adequate oversight processes are in place, and there is sufficient public consultation
and support, then gene drives will in some cases provide a well-justified means to
accomplishing familiar conservation ends, such as invasive species eradication.
Gene drives also could be used to engineer wild populations so that they are
better fitted or adapted to obtaining ecological, social, and economic conditions.
Perhaps endangered mammals can be engineered so that their sex ratios skew
slightly female in order to help build back populations; perhaps frogs and bats can
be engineered to be resistant to fungal diseases that are decimating their populations
(chytridiomycosis and white-nose syndrome, respectively); perhaps corals can be
engineered so that they are more tolerant of warmer temperatures and more acidic
waters. When gene drives are considered in this way, as a means of modifying
the characteristics of the conservation target, they can potentially offer solutions
to what seem to be intractable conservation problems, including those associated
with macro-scale ecological change.40 However, because they modify the con-
servation target rather than the conditions or factors that are threats to them, such
applications would fail to satisfy many of the conservation criteria that make their
other applications attractive. For example, the interventions would not address the
underlying causes of species declines or reestablish the ecological relationships that
are the basis for species value. Instead, this use of gene drives would (unlike de-
extinction) represent a different approach to conservation and enable a new model
for conservation: creatively engineering at risk populations to be better adapted
to obtaining conditions. Rather than (or in addition to) focusing on the conditions
around the target species—e.g., air and water quality, invasive species, and habitat
integrity—gene drives make it possible to ask: How can we adapt the species so
that it is better suited to these conditions? The fix of the ecological problem will
be (at least in part) at the level of the species’ genome.
This is a new question for species conservation (though not for animal and plant
breeding). It involves a novel type of conservation perspective and an expanded
conception of what counts as conservation. It also connects to broader issues as-
sociated with responding to macroscale ecological change: Ought we to take a more

39 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Gene Drives on the Horizon: Advanc-

ing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values (Washington, D.C.:
The National Academies Press, 2016).
40 Sandler, “Gene Drives and Species Conservation: An Ethical Analysis.”
Fall 2019 SHOULD WE ENGINEER SPECIES? 235

engineering oriented approach toward the natural world, not merely in terms of
how conservation is accomplished—the tools and means—but with respect to the
ends? Should we try to make species and systems how we believe they ought or
need to be, rather than try to conserve them how they are? Should we try to take
greater control of ecological systems or try to reduce human impacts and influ-
ence? Similar questions already have arisen regarding the recovery of ecologically
degrades sites. Proponents of ecological restoration have begun to grapple with the
reality that historical reference conditions for assisted recoveries are less likely to
be reliable guides for future ecological integrity under conditions of high rate and
high magnitude anthropogenic change.41 The issue is how to modify restoration
philosophy and practice in response. Should restorations involve greater forward-
looking design and creativity? Or should recoveries involve less human design
and control and more space for ecological systems to reconfigure on their own?42
The point here is not to oppose creative gene drive applications or highly man-
aged ecological restorations. It is to try to elucidate what is novel about them and to
connect them to broader debates and issues. What gene drives offer is a new form
of “conservation”, one that focuses on remaking the target of conservation rather
than (or in addition to) addressing the social and ecological conditions around it.
This is why gene drives are qualitatively different from other forms of conserva-
tion genetics, such as conservation cloning or synthesizing genomes to diversify
populations. This qualitative difference warrants attentiveness and carefulness.
To see the potential significance of this new conservation perspective, consider
the genomic turn in medicine. Genetic medical technologies are powerful tools.
But they have also led to a substantial restructuring of medical practice—e.g., the
skills, knowledge systems, activities, equipment, infrastructure, costs, approaches,
and experiences of practitioner, patient, and backroom professionals. Moreover,
and of primary importance to the current discussion, these medical technologies
have led to a partial reconceptualization of health and illness by normalizing and
pathologizing genetic characteristics. Health and illness are often now conceptual-
ized at the genomic level, as characteristics of a person’s genome.
A genetic turn in conservation—and gene drives in particular—may produce
something similar. Instead of looking at the conditions in which species populations
are found, interventions could focus on the biology of the organisms themselves.
This is a new way of conceptualizing the problem. It is not only that habitat has
been degraded, but that the biology of the organism is not attuned (adapted) to its
ecological environment. Hence, in addition to the modes of intervention, skills,

41 James Harris, Richard J. Hobbs, Eric Higgs, and James Aronson, “Ecological Restoration and

Global Climate Change,” Restoration Ecology 17 (2006): 170–76; Eric Higgs et al., “The Changing
Role of History in Restoration Ecology,” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 12 (2014): 499–506;
Richard J. Hobbs, Eric Higgs, and James A. Harris, “Novel Ecosystems: Implications for Conservation
and Restoration,” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 24 (2009): 599–605.
42 Sandler, The Ethics of Species.
236 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 41

knowledge base, and techniques being novel, so too would be the way in which
conservation problems are framed. One concern is that this shift in perspective could
lead to a sort of pathologizing of threatened species, implying that the problem
is that they are not well fitted to the world. But, of course, the problem is that we
have made a world that is not hospitable for them. Corals, bats, and amphibians
do not have defective genomes.
In general, conservation genomics and synthetic biology pull toward a gene-
oriented analysis of, and approach to, environmental problems. But gene drives are
the true enabler of this kind of approach, since they allow engineered solutions to
reach into wild organisms. This allows adapting them to us and to an anthropogenic
world, rather than requiring us to adapt our lifestyles and production systems to
accommodate them.43

CONCLUSION

I have argued that engineering species for conservation purposes can be ethically
acceptable and that on common criteria for assessing conservation interventions
there may be cases where de-extinction and gene drives are evaluated positively
in comparison to other possible strategies. Of course, this will be the case only if
the technologies are successfully developed; and, if they are, determining whether
implementation is justified in a particular instance will requires detailed feasibil-
ity assessment, risk assessment, public engagement, ethics/values analysis, legal
analysis, and conservation cost-benefit analysis (among other things).
I have also argued that despite de-extinction receiving a considerable amount of
attention, and at times being cast as a powerful new conservation technique, it is
in fact not transformative and is largely dependent as a conservation activity upon
traditional conservation practices. In contrast, gene drives have the potential to
significantly restructure how conservation problems are framed and approached.
Gene drives enable asking how we ought to modify the targets of conservation so
that they are better fitted to a human modified world, rather than (or in addition
to) focusing on how we ought to change human practices and systems so that
they are more accommodating of at risk species. For this reason, gene drives are
a much more disruptive technology for conservation philosophy and practice, and
the ethics of gene drives (to an even greater extent than the ethics of de-extinction)
presses broader questions regarding whether people ought to take a more creative
and design oriented approach toward ecological systems and species conservation
under conditions of rapid and high magnitude anthropogenic change.

43 For elaboration on this point, see Ronald Sandler, “The Ethics of Genetic Engineering and Gene

Drives in Conservation,” Conservation Biology 32 (2019): 378–85.