124
IMAGINATION
DECIDES
EVERYTHING
BLAISE PASCAL (1623–1662)
IN CONTEXT
BRANCH
Philosophy of mind
APPROACH
Voluntarism
BEFORE
c.350 BCE Aristotle says that
“imagination is the process by
which we say that an image
is presented to us,” and that
“the soul never thinks without
a mental image.”
1641 René Descartes claims
that the philosopher must
train his imagination for the
sake of gaining knowledge.
AFTER
1740 In his Treatise of Human
Nature, David Hume argues
that “nothing we imagine is
absolutely impossible.”
1787 Immanuel Kant claims
that we synthesize the
incoherent messages from
our senses into images, and
then into concepts, using
the imagination.
Imagination is a
powerful force in
human beings.
It can override our reason.
But it can lead either to
truths or falsehoods.
We may see beauty, justice, or
happiness where it does not
really exist.
Imagination leads
us astray.
P
ascal’s best-known book,
Pensées, is not primarily a
philosophical work. Rather,
it is a compilation of fragments from
his notes for a projected book on
Christian theology. His ideas were
aimed primarily at what he called
libertins—ex-Catholics who had
left religion as a result of the sort
of free thinking encouraged by
skeptical writers such as Montaigne.
In one of the longer fragments,
Pascal discusses imagination. He
offers little or no argument for his
claims, being concerned merely to
set down his thoughts on the matter.
Pascal’s point is that imagination
is the most powerful force in human
beings, and one of our chief sources
of error. Imagination, he says,
causes us to trust people despite
what reason tells us. For example,
because lawyers and doctors dress
up in special clothes, we tend to
trust them more. Conversely, we
pay less attention to someone who
looks shabby or odd, even if he is
talking good sense.
What makes things worse is that,
though it usually leads to falsehood,
imagination occasionally leads to
truth; if it were always false, then we
could use it as a source of certainty
by simply accepting its negation.

See also: Aristotle 56–63 ■ Michel de Montaigne 108–09
Immanuel Kant 164–71
After presenting the case against
imagination in some detail, Pascal
suddenly ends his discussion of it
by writing: “Imagination decides
everything: it produces beauty,
justice, and happiness, which is the
greatest thing in the world.” Out of
context, it might seem that he is
praising imagination, but we can
see from what preceded this
passage that his intention is very
different. As imagination usually
leads to error, then the beauty,
justice, and happiness that it
produces will usually be false.
Man is but a reed,
the weakest nature;
yet he is a thinking reed.
Blaise Pascal
Blaise Pascal
RENAISSANCE AND THE AGE OF REASON 125
■ René Descartes 116–23
In the wider context of a work of
Christian theology, and especially
in light of Pascal’s emphasis on the
use of reason to bring people to
religious belief, we can see that his
aim is to show the libertins that
the life of pleasure that they have
chosen is not what they think it is.
Although they believe that they
have chosen the path of reason,
they have in fact been misled by
the power of the imagination.
Pascal’s Wager
This view is relevant to one of the
most complete notes in the Pensées,
the famous argument known as
Pascal’s Wager. The wager was
designed to give the libertins a
reason to return to the Church, and
it is a good example of “voluntarism”,
the idea that belief is a matter of
decision. Pascal accepts that it is
not possible to give good rational
grounds for religious belief, but
tries to offer rational grounds for
wanting to have such beliefs.
These consist of weighing up
the possible profit and loss of
making a bet on the existence
Blaise Pascal was born in Clermont-
Ferrand, France. He was the son
of a government functionary who
had a keen interest in science and
mathematics and who educated
Pascal and his two sisters. Pascal
published his first mathematical
paper at the age of 16, and had
invented the first digital calculator
by the time he was 18. He also
corresponded with the famous
mathematician Pierre Fermat, with
whom he laid the foundations of
probability theory.
Pascal underwent two religious
conversions, first to Jansenism
(an approach to Christian teaching
■ David Hume 148–53 ■
According to Pascal, we are
constantly tricked by the imagination
into making the wrong judgments—
including judgements about people
based on how they are dressed.
of God. Pascal argues that betting
that God does not exist risks losing
a great deal (infinite happiness in
Heaven), while only gaining a little
(a finite sense of independence in
this world)—but betting that God
exists risks little while gaining a
great deal. It is more rational, on
this basis, to believe in God. ■
that was later declared heretical),
and then to Christianity proper.
This led him to abandon his
mathematical and scientific
work in favor of religious
writings, including the Pensées.
In 1660–62 he instituted the
world’s first public transport
service, giving all profits to the
poor, despite suffering from
severe ill health from the 1650s
until his death in 1662.
Key works
1657 Lettres Provinciales
1670 Pensées
126
IN CONTEXT

GOD IS THE CAUSE BRANCH

Metaphysics

OF ALL THINGS,
APPROACH
Substance monism

WHICH ARE IN HIM

BENEDICTUS SPINOZA (1632–1677)
BEFORE
c.1190 Jewish philosopher
Moses Maimonides invents
a demythologized version
of religion which later
inspires Spinoza.
16th century Italian scientist
Giordano Bruno develops a
form of pantheism.
1640 René Descartes publishes
his Meditations, another of
Spinoza’s influences.
AFTER
Late 20th century
Philosophers Stuart Hampshire,
Donald Davidson, and Thomas
Nagel all develop approaches
to the philosophy of mind that
have similarities to Spinoza’s
monist thought.

L
ike most philosophies of the
17th century, Spinoza’s
philosophical system has the
notion of “substance” at its heart.
This concept can be traced back to
Aristotle, who asked “What is it
about an object that stays the same
when it undergoes change?” Wax,
for example, can melt and change
its shape, size, color, smell, and
texture, and yet still remain “wax”,
prompting the question: what are
we referring to when we speak of
“the wax”? Since it can change in
every way that we can perceive, the
wax must also be something beyond
its perceptible properties, and for
Aristotle this unchanging thing is
the wax’s “substance.” More

See also: Aristotle 56–63 ■ Moses Maimonides 84–85
There is only
one substance.
...process of
formation,
generally, substance is anything
that has properties—or that which
underlies the world of appearance.
Spinoza employs “substance” in a
similar way, defining it as that which
is self-explanatory—or that which
can be understood by knowing its
nature alone, as opposed to all other
things that can be known only by
their relationships with other things.
For example, the concept “cart” can
only be understood with reference
to other concepts, such as “motion”,
“transport”, and so on. Moreover, for
Spinoza, there can only be one such
substance, for if there were two,
understanding one would entail
understanding its relationship with
the other, which contradicts the
RENAISSANCE AND THE AGE OF REASON 127
■ René Descartes 116–23
Everything that
exists is made of this
one substance.
It provides everything
in our universe with its…
... its purpose, ... its shape,
In these four ways, God
“causes” everything.
definition of substance. Furthermore,
he argues, since there is only one
such substance, there can, in fact,
be nothing but that substance, and
everything else is in some sense a
part of it. Spinoza’s position is
known as “substance monism”,
which claims that all things are
ultimately aspects of a single thing,
as opposed to “substance dualism”,
which claims that there are
ultimately two kinds of things in
the universe, most commonly
defined as “mind” and “matter.”
Substance as God or nature
For Spinoza, then, substance
underlies our experience, but it
can also be known by its various
■ Donald Davidson 338
This substance is
“God” or “nature.”
... and its matter.
attributes. He does not specify
how many attributes substance
has, but he says that human
beings, at least, can conceive of
two—namely, the attribute of
extension (physicality) and the
attribute of thought (mentality). For
this reason, Spinoza is also known
as an “attribute dualist”, and he
claims that these two attributes
cannot be explained by each other,
and so must be included in any
complete account of the world. As
for substance itself, Spinoza says
that we are right to call it “God” or
“nature” (Deus sive natura)—that
self-explaining thing which, in
human form, sees itself under the
attributes of body and mind. ❯❯
128 BENEDICTUS SPINOZA
All changes, from a change of mood
to a change in a candle’s shape, are,
for Spinoza, alterations that occur to
a single substance that has both
mental and physical attributes.
At the level of individual things,
including human beings, Spinoza’s
attribute dualism is intended in
part to deal with the question of
how minds and bodies interact.
The things that we experience as
individual bodies or minds are in
fact modifications of the single
substance as conceived under
one of the attributes. Each
modification is both a physical
thing (in so far as it is conceived
under the attribute of extension)
Benedictus Spinoza
and a mental thing (in so far as it
is conceived under the attribute
of thought). In particular, a human
mind is a modification of substance
conceived under the attribute of
thought, and the human brain is
the same modification of substance
conceived under the attribute of
extension. In this way, Spinoza
avoids any question about the
interaction between mind and
body: there is no interaction, only
a one-to-one correspondence.
However, Spinoza’s theory
commits him to the view that it is
not only human beings that are
minds as well as bodies, but
everything else too. Tables, rocks,
trees—all of these are modifications
of the one substance under the
attributes of thought and extension.
So, they are all both physical and
mental things, although their
mentality is very simple and they
are not what we should call minds.
This aspect of Spinoza’s theory is
difficult for many people either to
accept or to understand.
The world is God
Spinoza’s theory, which he explains
fully in Ethics, is often referred to
as a form of pantheism—the belief
Benedictus (or Baruch) Spinoza
was born in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands, in 1632. At the age
of 23 he was excommunicated
by the synagogue of Portuguese
Jews in Amsterdam, who probably
wished to distance themselves
from Spinoza’s teachings. Spinoza’s
Theological-Political Treatise
was later attacked by Christian
theologians and banned in
1674—a fate that had already
befallen the work of the French
philosopher René Descartes. The
furore caused him to withhold
publication of his greatest work,
the Ethics, until after his death.
Mind and body
are one.
Benedictus Spinoza
that God is the world, and that the
world is God. Pantheism is often
criticized by theists (people who
believe in God), who argue that
it is little more than atheism by
another name. However, Spinoza’s
theory is in fact much closer to
panentheism—the view that the
world is God, but that God is more
than the world. For in Spinoza’s
system, the world is not a mass of
material and mental stuff—rather,
the world of material things is a
form of God as conceived under
the attribute of extension, and the
world of mental things is that same
form of God as conceived under the
attribute of thought. Therefore the
Spinoza was a modest, intensely
moral man who turned down
numerous lucrative teaching
positions for the sake of his
intellectual freedom. Instead
he lived a frugal life in various
places in the Netherlands,
making a living by private
philosophy teaching and as
a lens grinder. He died from
tuberculosis in 1677.
Key works
1670 Theological-Political
Treatise
1677 Ethics