yom kippur war

syro-egyptian plans

● sadat succeeded nasser after his death on 28 september 1970 = he needed to

disassociate his leadership from nasser’s, even three years after coming into power he
was competing with nasser’s popular image
○ de-nasserize egyptian politics + also fix the failing economy, established state
programmes to help the poor large population = state was spending more
money than they were getting back, also nasser was very vocal in the arab
world = no foreign investors because they were worried
○ therefore sadat tried to change egypt’s image to try to attract more foreign
investors, nasser was really popular but his economic policies sucked, but also
sadat was very uncharismatic + also had to remilitarise after 1967 war
● tried to realign egypt diplomatically = 15000 soviet soldiers expelled in 1972, diplomatic
approach to israel rejected = the diplomatic method didn’t work so led to war
● also changed relationship with the soviet union because he was disillusioned by
moscow’s delayed arms shipments = expelled 15000 russian military advisors on the 18
july 1972
○ this was to try to gain us favour, wanted us’ help in relationship with israel + also
wanted them to invest in egypt
○ remove soviet influence from upcoming war
○ israel saw this as a sign of weakness, thought because of this and weakened
links with russia meant an arab attack was unlikely
● sadat also used diplomatic means to try and resolve the no war no peace policy with
israel = offered to open up the suez canal if israel retreated from the canal + would sign
a peace treaty with israel according to reso 242
○ israel didn’t want to withdraw from occupied territories = state security
dependent on it, they weren’t interested in any resolution at all at that stage
because they were superior to the arab states + the olympic assassinations =
the international community was on their side, no stimulus to want to participate
in negotiations
○ diplomatic initiatives contributed to israel’s estimates that egypt was not ready
for war
○ sadat still decided to go to war to persuade israel to agree to terms acceptable
to arabs
● sadat knew that there was no way he could win a war against israel, he just wanted to
win the land, hold onto it for dear life and then wait for the us or ussr to help pressure
israel into being more open in negotiations
 ○ limit the amount of isreli-occupied sinai to provoke a crisis where the us and
ussr would intervene
● had benefits of going to war with israel = would dissociate him from nasser, boost
regional standing, use victory as basis for negotiations on equal standing next time
○ only wanted a small military extradition, did not want total war = a limited war
○ distinction = 1948 war was a total war, no option for middle ground, always
trying for complete defeat of enemies, total annihilation of the enemy; 1967 war
was a limited war, win a little bit of land and hold it, sadat wanted, syria was a
little more ambition
○ sadat wanted more negotiations rights whereas syria was more territorially
ambitious
● talks with israel = to reclaim sinai and suez canal also because needed to distinguish
himself from nasser = nasser lost them so this would differentiate him
○ also needed to relieve defence burdens, economy collapsed after nasser’s state
control, aswan dam, yemen war and re-equipment of the army after 1967 war
● 30 november 1972, sadat + defense minister general ali plan to go to war, thought the
superpowers would prevent a victory on either side, coordinated with syrian pm al-asad
for a double front against israel
● 31 january 1973, syria + egypt’s forces under joint command
● needed arab backing = appealed to saudi king faisal, algeria president boumedienne +
financial contribution from libya
● syria joined war because asad had maneuvered his way into presidency = needed the
war to consolidate leadership, territorial war aims, determined to regain golan heights
bcs he lost it as defense minister + he basically became a dictator, had a bunch of
coups until he came into power
○ make up for 1967 war, want to make up for the loss of the golan heights
○ syria also had no interest in peace = wanted to defeat israel as badly as possible
● sadat also saw himself as a possible ‘successor’ to nasser, the arab world had just lost
its most charismatic leader = the fall of pan-arabism, wants to take place of nasser after
his death, syria to become leader of the arab world + anti-israel, 1967 war and golan
heights
○ doesn’t want a stalemate or negotiations, only after military victory
● surprise attack supposed to leave israel weak and caught off guard bcs us was
distracted by westgate/vietnam = can’t help
● israel’s position = diplomatic approach was seen as a sign of weakness; us support for
israel + soviet advisors withdrawn = israel has a cold war ally, egypt doesn’t;
international support for israel after munich ‘72 assassinations; failure of intelligence

course of the war

 ● 6 october 1973, the crossing, considered a huge success = an arab victory that
defeated israel
○ us diplomatic pressure on israel
● 12 october 1973, airlift to supply israel
● ussr puts troops on alert + threatening, said they would intervene if israel didn’t back off
● 22 october 1973, us + ussr —> un resolution = ceasefire broken
● 25 october = end of war

surprise attack

● basically it happened on the day of yom kippur (day of atonement) and israeli
intelligence had failed to predict the confrontation = they underestimated how frustrated
the arab states were over the occupied territories, saw the arabs as weak esp because
egypt had just expelled soviet military advisors
○ convinced of their own invincibility, thought the mobilisation of egyptian armies
were just annual manoeuvres
○ thought they were unprepared for war = probability of it happening was very low
● 6 october at 4am, defense minister dayan informed that syria and egypt would attack,
preemptive strike ruled out for fear of being alienated by us because they’re seen as the
aggressor
● us might not help israel = worried about drawing ussr into fight, alienating egypt which
would lead to an oil embargo + involvement in another foreign war
○ israeli mobilisation = heavy burden on economy + also us was in the middle of
an election, couldn’t risk anything
○ the us didn’t want to intervene at first = was told that syria and egypt didn’t
actually want to like off israel ya know
● egypt launched airstrike + artillery on israel + push forces back from suez canal, syria
invades golan heights and takes mount hermon while israel is still mobilising
○ syria has a similar air force to israel = comparable
○ israel flies over damascus, sadat loses his shit, recalls air force to defend
damascus, syrians in golan heights get fucked
● israel pushes into egypt, the third army gets cut off, us and ussr intervenes at this point
● israel came close to defeat the first few days because they weren’t fully prepared =
pushed back from positions
○ but easily mobilisation = reservists were at home or synagogue
○ still contained the threat, helped by american airlift of arms
○ us had previously been reluctant bcs sadat said he only intended it to be a
limited operation, just needed to force israel to withdraw from occupied
territories, would lead to peace settlement
 ● syrian forces repelled on 11 october, israeli forces cross suez by 18, driving back the
arab armies
● 20 october, kissinger drafts ceasefire agreement with communist party leader leonid
breznez, accepted by all sides 22 october, fighting ended 24 october, result of ussr put
own troops on alert and threatened intervention to relieve egyptian third army bcs they
were trapped
● some think superpower intervention was unavoidable, others think ussr wouldn’t have
sent troops, just wanted to put pressure on us to restrain israel, us went on red alert in
compliance with this demand
● 25 october egyptian third army resupplied
● arab dignity saved, us gains influence in egypt, israel emerges victorious
● oil weapon = to punish states that supported israel by imposing an embargo which
reduced overall oil exports by 25%, lasted until 1974
○ served to boost arab confidence
○ reduced the exports by 5% every month, racked the prices of oil up a lot, a
shock to global economy, went up four times
● first time arabs were not defeated militarily = created conditions that were a lot better
for negotiations

consequences

● arab victory politically, gave egypt confidence because from their perspective israel
won only because of american help
● sadat gained international renown, seen as a world statesman = nasser aspired but
never achieved = ‘hero of the crossing’
○ perception of vulnerability because of israel’s casualty rate + the success of the
crossing, not militarily weaker, just seen as weaker
● israeli military victory but confidence was shaken, public anger, their own people turned
on their government, against at pm golda meir + dm moshe dayan = full investigation by
agranat commission into intelligence failure
○ critical of military intelligence, discipline + training, didn’t address failure of
political leaders
○ heavy loses for the first time
○ internal politics = some people think that they’re undermining their own security
because the arabs would not stop fighting for their land = should just withdraw,
israel peace movement; others think they should control the arabs, the only way
to make sure arabs don’t continue attacking is if they’re in full control = still the
heart of israeli security debate
● human loss = 3000 israeli, 8500 egyptian + syrian killed; 8000 israeli and 20,000 syrians
wounded
 ○ first time israel had suffered such a high casualty rate = missing in action, pow,
○ led to israeli peace movement
● rise to israel’s religious rights = settlement policy for ideological reasons rather than
security reasons, emergence of gush emunim as a result of the idea of eretz yisrael =
right wing party which focused on settlement on west banks, gaza strip etc.
● arab-israeli peace settlements = egypt ready for settlement + syria willing to accept
reso 242
○ us thought egypt + syria ready for peace settlement; israel more flexible
because of economic and political turmoil
● arab solidarity = oil crisis (oct 1973-march 1974), all arab members of opec agreed to
increase prices of oil by 5% each month
○ nine countries ended up on embargo ist = us, netherlands, uk, canada, japan,
portugal (because us needed to refuel while flying), south africa, rhodesia
● united nations’ efforts = attempted to restart negotiations = reso 338, passed when
ceasefire was ordered 22 october 1973, called for termination of all military activity +
implementation of reso 242
○ american + soviet foreign ministers convened a peace conference in geneva, but
accomplished little, soviets thought only backed to give impression of
cooperation before having private conversations with sadat and meir gov. =
shuttle diplomacy = mediator that travels between two parties