Summa Theologica Cum Plure:

Minor Notes on Natural Law and Foreordination

Jonathan James Nale

GOV213: Freedom’s Foundations I

October 25, 2022

Word Count: 1826

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Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica is meant to be a comprehensive work on the

Christian religion. Thus, while occasional missteps in reasoning are only to be expected from any

human work, it is important that any possible flaws be noticed and addressed to prevent

confusion or error. Aquinas’ understanding of natural law invites several questions that are not

addressed and may lead to a misrepresentation of the concept. Specifically, the Theologica fails

to account for the implications of the doctrine of foreordination, which seems to create

contradictions when applied to natural law. When considering eternal and natural law, three

additional points should be noted: first, that only Christians can truly participate in natural law;

second, that foreordination seems to violate a condition for natural law; and third, that the

doctrine of compatibilism reconciles this violation.

The first necessary addendum to this doctrine is that participation in natural law must be

voluntary, and only Christians can meet this requirement. Aquinas consistently shows that

participation in natural law, in contrast to eternal law, is voluntary. He says that “human beings,

unlike other animals, have free choice.”1 The distinction between eternal law and natural law is

only necessary because animals cannot refuse eternal law; rational creatures can refuse natural

law. Humans participate “by using their intellect and reason,” while animals do not. 2 This implies

that humans must thoughtfully choose to adhere to natural law, a trait unique to us. Certainly, it

could be argued that humans seem to naturally adhere to this law, apart from reason. Aquinas

clarifies that humans are inclined by nature to “act in accord with reason.”3 However, human

nature is also corrupted – we are “slaves to sin” (John 8:34 [KJV]) and thus naturally inclined

towards evil, instead of virtue. However, if humans must exercise reason to do what is right, then
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province
1

(New York: Benziger Brothers, 1911-1925), Ia-IIae, q. 91, art 2.

2
Ibid.
3
Aquinas, Summa theologica, Ia-IIae, q. 94, art 2.
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only born-again believers can truly accomplish this. To fully participate in natural law is to do

what is good; Aquinas explains that pagans who “have natural law” are “conscious of good and

evil.”4 Natural law is the application of reason to the end of man set out in the eternal law; if this

results in an understanding of good and evil then eternal law must consist of what is good and

evil. Aquinas also clarifies that “the light of natural reason” is how we “discern good and evil.” 5

This discerning of good and evil is useful only insofar as we live accordingly, and thus to

participate in natural law is to live according to what is good. However, while those who do not

have the law “do by nature things prescribed by the law,” this still fails to meet the criteria of

doing what is good.6 The Bible makes very clear how well the unsaved can do what is good –

“There is none righteous, no, not one,” (Rom. 3:10) or “the natural man receiveth not the things

of the Spirit of God . . . neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned,” (1

Cor. 2:13) or even “all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth.” (Gen. 6:12) The most

virtuous of unbelievers fail to live well; their deeds are “as filthy rags” (Isa 64:6) and do not truly

participate in natural law. The end of human beings is heaven; The law directs humans to our

end, and we “are ordained for the end of eternal blessedness.”7 However, the only way to achieve

eternal blessing is through salvation; thus, the law directs humans toward salvation. This shows

that only the redeemed saints can truly conform to the principles of natural law.

The second necessary addendum to this doctrine is to consider the philosophy of

determinism. This belief, when held from a Christian perspective, raises questions when used to

view the Summa Theologica’s teachings on natural law. When considering determinism (more

4
Aquinas, Summa theologica, Ia-IIae, q. 91, art 2.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., art 4.
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accurately foreordination) with the previous points, the logical implications should be addressed.

Only Christians can choose to conform to natural law, and natural law must be chosen rationally

and voluntarily. However, the choice to live virtuously is not a voluntary one according to the

doctrine of foreordination. Indeed, no choice is voluntary. Foreordination is a term often used

interchangeably with predestination; however, predestination usually refers to the doctrine that

God has eternally chosen those whom he intends to save. This principle is often explained as

whether a person’s name is “written in the book of life of the Lamb.” (Revelation 13:8) Verses

such as 1 Peter 1:2 assert that we “have been chosen according to the foreknowledge of God…to

be…sprinkled with his blood.” For the purposes of this argument, however, foreordination refers

more generally to God’s sovereign knowledge of everything that is to come. As Acts 2:23 puts it,

foreordination is “the predetermined plan and foreknowledge of God.” Foreordination (as well as

predestination more prominently) is a heavily contested doctrine in scripture; this is partially due

to concerns that if the future is already set, then humans do not make voluntary choices, and

cannot be held responsible for their actions. However, foreordination is heavily supported in

scripture. Ephesians 1:11 claims we have been “predestinated according to His purpose,” which

is reaffirmed in Acts 4:28 (to do “whatsoever thy hand…hath determined before to be done”),

Romans 8:29 (“For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate”), 2 Timothy 1:9 (“which

was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began”), and several other passages. Consistently,

God’s sovereignty is shown to dictate what is to come – as the creator of everything, God has

created every event that has ever happened or will happen. As Paul writes, “we know that all

things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his

purpose.” (Romans 8:28) However, if God controls events, including the actions humans take,

then it seems to follow that no human choice is voluntary. If a person is bound by God to choose
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a certain option in a dilemma, how can he be held responsible for making that choice? As proven

before, true participation in natural law must be voluntary. However, if foreordination is a true

doctrine, then it seems that no human can make a voluntary decision. Thus, there can be no true

participation in natural law whatsoever; only an imitation ordained by God’s sovereignty.

The third necessary addendum to this doctrine must reconcile the need for voluntary

choice and God’s sovereign foreordination of events. The only way to do this is for human

choices to still matter despite being preset by God. The best solution to this problem is the

doctrine of Compatibilism. This idea attempts to reconcile free will and determinism; the two are

compatible despite how it might appear. It is true that humans operate only according to preset

actions – God has determined long before what will happen in each moment and what decisions

each person will make. However, this does not consider the will of an individual – man is still

free to make decisions from his own perspective. Man certainly has a will that he uses to make

decisions for which he is responsible. However, this will is often in bondage to sin: “Whosoever

committeth sin is the servant of sin.” (John 8:34) “Ye were the servants of sin…ye became the

servants of righteousness.” (Romans 6:17-18) Man is free to make moral decisions and exercise

his will in a variety of situations; man is not free to violate the laws of nature. The decision to

cross the street is within man’s power to make; the decision of whether he will make it across

safely remains outside of his control. Freedom here is not a total lack of constraint, but rather an

expression of agency. Determinism asserts that if a man’s actions were always going to occur, he

cannot be held accountable for them. However, this position is not supported by scripture.

Genesis 50 says, “But as for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good.” This

refers to Joseph’s brothers. They exercised their free agency to sell Joseph into slavery, an evil

deed. God, however, foreordained that this would happen in order that Joseph might be
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positioned to help the people of Egypt in their time of crisis. In Isaiah 10, God warns Israel that

he will use Assyria to bring about judgement upon the nation. However, “howbeit he meaneth

not so, neither doth his heart think so; but it is in his heart to destroy and cut off nations not a

few.” The Assyrians are exercising their agency in the decision to attack Israel; this is a sin. Yet,

God has foreordained it to happen in order that Israel will be judged. The most important

example of compatibilism is the crucifixion itself. The death of Jesus was carried out by Pontius

Pilate, Roman soldiers, an angry crowd of Jews, and various other individuals. These men

performed the most wicked deed in all of history; but they were “gathered together, For to do

whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.” (Acts 4:27-28) These things

were all foreordained by God, and he was use them to bring about the salvation of the entire

human race. These examples show that God often takes decisions that men make with their own

free agency, and for which they are responsible, and has still foreordained them for his own

purposes. Thus, it is possible for a man to make a voluntary choice while still having been

determined to do so.

For a discussion of natural law to be more comprehensive, three points should be

addressed: that only Christians can successfully adhere to natural law, that voluntary

participation in natural law seems contradictory to foreordination, and that compatibilism

explains how natural law retains moral weight in a predetermined universe. These three

addendums to Aquinas’ doctrine of natural law would not exhaust the subject but would be

welcome additions to clear up possible confusion. It may seem unreasonable to address this

specific issue, given the somewhat contentious standing of the doctrine of predestination in the

church. However, Aquinas certainly proved willing to tackle these matters; he already addressed

the topic of free will earlier in the work.8 There was not necessarily any reason to address this
8
Aquinas, Summa theologica, Ia, q. 83, art 1.
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issue at the time the Theologica was written – the doctrine of foreordination was not prevalent in

the church for two more centuries – but from the perspective of the modern reader it is important

that these objections be acknowledged to bring biblical balance and untangle thorny interactions

between difficult theological doctrines. The Summa Theologica is the perfect medium for these

questions, and hopefully addressing them here will provide aid to the struggling thinker.
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Bibliography

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.
New York: Benziger Brothers, 1911-1925.