Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Hcal000753 2017
Hcal000753 2017
HCAL 753/2017
B B
[2019] HKCFI 1431
C IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE C
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
D COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE D
_______________
F F
BETWEEN
G G
YEUNG CHU WING Applicant
H H
and
I I
SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE Respondent
J J
RAINBOW ACTION Interested Party
K _______________ K
L L
Before: Hon Au J in Court
M Date of Hearing: 27 September 2018 M
P P
JUDGMENT
Q Q
A. INTRODUCTION
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1. This is the applicant’s judicial review asking the court to
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declare seven provisions (collectively “the Provisions”) in the Crimes S
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Ordinance (Cap 200) (“the CO”) to be unconstitutional. The applicant T
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says the Provisions are discriminatory against male homosexuals and thus
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inconsistent with Article 25 of the Basic Law (“BL25”) and Article 22 of
1
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(7) section 141(c). I
1
BL25 provides: “All Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law.”
S 2
BOR22 provides: “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any S
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
T discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other T
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
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E 4. Given the SJ’s said position, the real issues arising in this E
application are a narrower one: whether the court could and should make
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the remedial interpretations as submitted by the SJ respectively of
G sections 118C, 118I and 141(c). G
H H
5. The applicant is represented by Mr Hectar Pun SC, leading
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Mr Anson Wong Yat Yu. The SJ is represented by Mr Raymond Leung
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SC, leading Ms Grace Chow. J
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6. Before I consider the remedial interpretation issues, as urged
L by Mr Pun, I should still first briefly set out below the reasons why the L
A man who—
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C
(b) being under the age of 16 commits an act of C
gross indecency with another man,
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8. For the following reasons, in the court’s view, the SJ is right
M in accepting that these provisions are unconstitutional as they are M
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10. Hence, the principle of equality is about like cases being
T treated alike, and unlike cases should be treated differently. The law T
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D
comparable situations, no question of discrimination arises as the law D
does not require them to be treated identically. However, if they can be
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regarded as to be in comparable situations, there would be prima facie
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discrimination unless the differential treatment can be justified under the F
justification test.
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HKCFAR 150, the Court of Final Appeal affirmed (at paragraph 86) the
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addition to the justification test of “the fourth step involving
J consideration of whether a reasonable balance had been struck between J
the societal benefits of the encroachment on the one hand, and the inroads
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made into the constitutionally protected rights of the individual on the
L other, asking in particular whether pursuit of the societal interest results L
N 12. In QT, the Court of Final Appeal also re-iterated the need for N
scrutiny and that “the correct approach is to examine every alleged case
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of discrimination to see if the difference in treatment can be justified” at
P paragraphs 81 - 83 (footnotes omitted): P
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3
See also the observations in Fok Chun Wa v Hospital Authority (2012) 15 HKCFAR 409 at
T paragraphs 56 - 59 per Ma CJ that in most questions involving the right to equality, there will T
be an overlap in the application of the two-stage test set out in Yau Yuk Lung.
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declared section 118C4 and section 118H5 to be unconstitutional due to D
the different age requirements for homosexual and heterosexual buggery
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and gross indecency respectively. The Court of Final Appeal in
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Secretary for Justice v Yau Yuk Lung also declared section 118F(l)6 to be F
unconstitutional for only criminalising homosexual buggery otherwise
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than in private but not comparable heterosexual acts.
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M M
N N
4
The then section 118C provides that:
O “A man who: O
(a) commits buggery with a man under the age of 21; or
(b) being under the age of 21 commits buggery with another man,
P shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment P
for life.”
5
The then section 118H provides that:
Q “A man who: Q
(a) commits an act of gross indecency with a man under the age of 21; or
(b) being under the age of 21 commits an act of gross indecency with another man,
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment
R R
for two years.”
6
The then section 118F(1) provides that:
“A man who commits buggery with another man otherwise than in private shall be guilty of
S an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for five years.” S
7
Leung v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 211 (CA) at paragraph 47 per Ma CJHC (as
the learned CJ then was).
T 8
[2005] 3 HKLRD 657. T
9
Agreed by Ma CJHC at paragraph 49 of the Court of Appeal judgment.
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D
Provisions amount to differential treatment which target only male D
homosexuals (but not heterosexuals or female homosexuals):
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(1) Both sections 118G and 118K target only male homosexuals
F but no comparable offences exist for heterosexuals or female F
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S 10
The SJ however has pointed out that the existence of section 89 of the Criminal Procedure S
Ordinance (Cap 221) (which states that a person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the
commission by another person of any offence shall be guilty of the like offence) may deal
T with the same mischief. T
11
See the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Leung v Secretary for Justice, supra, at paragraph 128.
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I 17. The SJ has not provided any justification for any of the I
struck down.
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Provisions read as they are now would amount to prima facie differential
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treatment against male homosexuals and thus inconsistent with BL25 and
P BOR22. However, Mr Leung SC asks this court to adopt a remedial P
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S S
12
Section 146(1) provides: “…a person who commits an act of gross indecency with or towards a
child under the age of 16, or who incites a child under the age of 16 to commit such an act
T with or towards him or her or another, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on T
conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.”
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19. It is now firmly established that the court has the implied
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power to adopt remedial interpretation for the purpose of making a
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statutory provision Basic Law or BOR compliant. Striking down a
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legislative provision for being not constitutional is appropriate only D
where a remedial interpretation is impossible. The rationale is that the
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court interferes less with the exercise of legislative power than it would if
F
it cannot engage in a remedial interpretation. See: HKSAR v Lam F
Kwong Wai (2006) 9 HKCFAR 574 at 611B - D, H - I,
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per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ; Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557
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20. The court in adopting remedial interpretation may make use
J of the well-known techniques of severance, reading in, reading down and J
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22. In this respect, the court should not make decisions for
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which they are not equipped such as where their choice amongst several
Q
ways of making a provision Basic Law or BOR compliant may involve Q
issues that should be deliberated by the legislature: Ghaidan at
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paragraph 33, per Lord Nicholls. Further, it is not permissible for the
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H 24. The court must and can only exercise that power in H
13
See also Wong Chi Fung v Secretary for Justice [2016] 3 HKLRD 835 at paragraph 72 and the
T authorities cited therein. T
14
Derived from Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, supra.
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26. Mr Leung has helpfully drawn the court’s attention to a
I number of recent cases where the Hong Kong courts have applied I
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Indian Penal Code (which provides that it is not rape if a man has sexual D
intercourse with a girl, being his wife, who is above 15 of age) as “sexual
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intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being
F
under eighteen years of age, is not rape” in order to make it consonance F
with the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, the spirit of
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other pro-child legislations and the human rights of a married girl child
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28. In relation to the SJ’s submissions asking the court to
J remedially interpret the Contested Provisions, Mr Pun SC emphasizes that J
Q (1) Mr Pun indeed agrees (subject to the court’s own view) to the Q
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under the age of 16, which includes buggery with a boy under the age of 13.
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The SJ accepts that as it is, the provision amounts to differential treatment
I against male homosexuals to the extent that: I
S
man and woman are regarded as being similar. S
Accordingly, the maximum sentence should be the same.
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D “A man who— D
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35. Mr Leung submits that, by: (1) striking out the words “or
J (b) being under the age of 16 commits buggery with another man”, the J
man under 16 is no longer criminally liable if the other man with whom
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he commits buggery is above 16; and (2) reading down the maximum
L L
sentence for buggery for imprisonment to five years if committed with a
M
boy under the age of 16 but is or above the age of 13 brings it in line with M
the sentence for unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under section 124;
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section 118C will be Basic Law-compliant.
O O
36. I agree with Mr Leung that the court should adopt this
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remedial interpretation for section 118C.
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still consistent with this principle. The interpretation also will not have
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any effect of creating new offence. Quite to the contrary, if anything, it
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has the effect of making a man under 16 no longer being criminally liable
D
if he commits buggery with another man above 16, as he would have been D
under the originally worded section 118C.
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interpretation does not go beyond the limits set out in paragraphs 25(3)
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and (4) above16. The legislature would have intended its legislative
H provision to have a valid, even if reduced, operation than to have no H
K K
39. Section 118I provides as follows:
L L
“1181. Gross indecency by man with male mentally
incapacitated person
M M
(1) Subject to subsection (2), a man who commits an
act of gross indecency with another man who is a
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mentally incapacitated person shall be guilty of an
offence and shall be liable on conviction on
O indictment to imprisonment for 2 years. O
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T 16
As I mentioned above, Mr Pun for the applicant indeed agrees that the proposed interpretation T
of section 118C falls within the principles governing remedial interpretation.
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41. Leading counsel submits that however, section 118I aims to
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protect male mentally incapacitated persons (“MIPs”). There are no
F other provisions in the CO which afford equal or similar protection of F
K
girl and invited her to touch his penis. It was held that an K
invitation to another to touch the person making the
L invitation could not amount to an assault on the person L
held that the direction was wrong in law, as the former act
T T
could not amount to an indecent assault, because there had
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44. As pointed out by the SJ, section 118I was one of the new
P sections incorporated in the CO by the Crimes (Amendment) Bill 1991 P
(“the 1991 Bill”) which followed closely the main commendations of the
Q Q
1983 Law Reform Commission Report on Laws Governing Homosexual
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Conduct. In introducing the 1991 Bill, Legislative Council Brief SCR
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2/2801/83 at paragraphs 2, 5 and 21 state as follows: S
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B “BACKGROUND B
…
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5 The provisions of the Bill implement the main
recommendations of the 1983 Law Reform Commission Report
H on Laws Governing Homosexual Conduct. A clause-by-clause H
description of the Bill can be found in the explanatory
I memorandum attached to the Bill. The following paragraphs I
give a description and analysis of the provisions of the Bill by
subject.
J J
…
K 21 At Annex B is a list of all the existing protective K
measures for females found in the Crimes Ordinance; against
L this list are the proposals to extend the offence to protect males L
from the corresponding homosexual or heterosexual conduct
(or, where one or both are not proposed to be extended, an
M explanation).” (emphasis added) M
N N
45. Similarly, the Extracts of Hansard Records 17 provides
O relevantly at pp 6 - 7 as follows when introducing the 1991 Bill for O
second reading:
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protection18.
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mean “person”, means that both female and male MIPs will be equally
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protected, while male homosexuals will no longer be targeted as it would
S cover female homosexuals and heterosexuals. Such protection offered S
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18
See also Affirmation of Chiu Man Hin at paragraph 20(ii).
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man, but not an act of gross indecency with a woman nor an underage girl
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to be on the premises or vessel for the purpose of committing an act of
J gross indecency with a man or a woman. J
K K
53. As pointed out by Mr Leung, section 141(c) is a separate and
L L
distinct offence from the offence created by section 146 19 which
19
Q Section 146 provides: Q
“146. Indecent conduct towards child under 16
(1) Subject to subsection (3), a person who commits an act of gross indecency with or
towards a child under the age of 16, or who incites a child under the age of 16 to commit
R R
such an act with or towards him or her or another, shall be guilty of an offence and shall
be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for 10 years.
(2) It shall not be a defence to a charge under this section to prove that the child consented to
S the act of gross indecency. S
(3) A person who commits an act of gross indecency with or towards a child or who incites a
child to commit such an act with or towards him or her is not guilty of an offence under
T this section if that person is, or believes on reasonable grounds that he or she is, married T
to the child.”
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there will be a legal vacuum (for example, the problems of sex parties in
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premises and vessel could not be tackled) and there is reduced protection
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for a male under the age of 2120.
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54. Mr Leung therefore submits that the court should remedially
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interpret section 141(c) as follows:
F F
“An owner or occupier of any premises or vessel, and any
person who manages or assists in the management or control of
G any premises or vessel, who induces or knowingly suffers— G
…
H H
(c) a boy person under the age of 21 16 to resort to or be on
such premises or vessel for the purpose of committing an
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act of gross indecency with a man another person,
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55. By reading “boy” expansively to mean “person” and
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substituting “another person” for “a man”, male homosexuals will not be
O 56. For the following reasons, I agree with Mr Leung that the O
T T
20
See also See Affirmation of Chiu Man Hin, paragraph 20(iii).
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intercourse”21) such that both buggery and gross indecency with a man
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was covered: see Legislative Council Brief SCR 2/2801/83, paragraphs 2,
C 21 (as quoted above) and Annex B, which relevantly provides that “the C
D
protection” at the present section 141(b) and (c) “overs both homosexual D
and heterosexual buggery[,] boys are additionally protected in respect of
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gross indecency with a man”.
F F
O O
60. For the same analysis I have made at paragraphs 48 and 49
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above, the remedial interpretation does not:
Q (1) change in any aspect the way to protect the subject young Q
T T
21
This original offence has come under section 141(a) after the amendment.
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61. In the premises, it is the similarly court’s judicial duty to
I remedially interpret section 141(c) as proposed instead of striking it down. I
J J
62. However, to maintain consistency in the wording of
K section 141 as a whole (where section 141(a) and (b) use the word “girl” or K
O … O
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63. For all the above reasons, I will adopt the respective
T
remedial interpretation as set out above in relation to the Contested T
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Sub-Committee”) has published its third and final consultation paper (on
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Miscellaneous Sexual Offences)22 and the consultation period for that
H paper also ended on 15 August 2018. H
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65. In light of this, Mr Pun has submitted that the court should
J perhaps be cautious in adopting the proposed remedial interpretation to J
M M
66. For this, I agree with Mr Leung that I should still adopt the
N proposed interpretations once I am satisfied that they do fall within the N
O
limitations concerning the technique of remedial interpretations. I will O
explain why.
P P
S 22
On 16 May 2018. S
23
Mr Pun has drawn my attention to the fact that the Sub-Committee in its consultation papers
respectively dated November 2016 and May 2018 recommended that offences created by,
T among others, sections 118C, 118G, 118H, 118I, 118J, 118K and 124 “should be abolished T
upon the enactment of the new legislation” (my emphasis).
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D. DISPOSITION
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D
section 141(c) (as set out at paragraph 62 above). In light of the remedial D
interpretations, they are consistent with BL25 and BOR22 and thus
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constitutional. The applicant’s challenge against them in this
F
application fails. F
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72. Given my above reasons, the applicant is essentially
H successful in this application. I will therefore make a costs order nisi that H
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73. Lastly, it remains for me to thank counsel for their helpful
L assistance. L
M M
N N
O O
(Thomas Au)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
P P
High Court
Mr Hectar Pun SC and Mr Anson Wong Yu Yat, instructed by Vidler &
Q Co, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the applicant Q
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