G.R. No.

103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.

Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro
claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial
proceeded in his absence.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo
M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no.
3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents.
Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro
gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before
leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her
marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.

As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:

February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly
married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license
no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry Officer

Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license.
Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in
Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance
of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying
official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."

Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the
local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.

As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the
contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification issued
by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such license was
ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of
private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists
that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal
presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.

Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court
disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he
attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of
the subject marriage.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil
Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio. 5

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the
effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.

We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:

Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official
record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license
was issued and such other relevant data. 6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied
by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search
and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny
her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances
of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily
used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents
of the former.

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin
F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose
to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there
was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.

It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null
and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.

In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.

SO ORDERED.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; REQUISITES; ABSENCE; EFFECT. — At the time the
subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law
provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of
the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PROOF OF LACK OF RECORD; EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. — Section 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license
was issued and such other relevant data. The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of
Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.

3. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF THE PETITIONER; WHEN CORROBORATING TESTIMONY NOT NECESSARY; CASE AT
BAR. — The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground
to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a
city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase
but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or
both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to
the parents of the former. Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against
her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was dully served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite
receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent
cannot be faulted for her husband’s lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on
record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000,
dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. 4 They got married on
the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing
a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a
sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil
registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage
void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract 5 and its entry on file.6

Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14
October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with
whom he has three children.8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) per month as support
for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and

3. To pay the costs.11

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not
presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties’ marriage contract being a public document is
a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 13

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
 a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has
no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment
of the solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No.
7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the
Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this
Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of procedural
rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants. 14

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage
license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for
them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro
who solemnized the marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of
the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita
Almario"17 but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19

Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 21

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the
court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability
to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the
certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license
that would render the marriage void ab initio.

In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S.
Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony
took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case,
the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect
was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. 25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued
in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
serve.26

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by
no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.
Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being
lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite. 29

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent
is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s
marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. 30 An irregularity in any of the
formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.31

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states
that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not
impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals
the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, 32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was not
responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license.
Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it." 33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a
mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from
the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We
cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same
marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a
gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner. lavv phi1

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the
marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in
petitioner’s testimony as follows—

WITNESS: As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT: What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit
church.

WITNESS: I don’t remember your honor.

COURT: Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?

WITNESS: I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don’t know if it is good
enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT: In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage
Contract?

WITNESS: Yes your honor.

COURT: That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued
which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS: Yes your honor.35

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously,
the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the
civil wedding.36

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who
facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate
whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer
needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of
the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements
of law.38

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. 39 Every intendment
of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It
is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs.

ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a
marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage
license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
(trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child." 4

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save
her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get
parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife
and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid
because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and
thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child
when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity
of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove
the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his
being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein
he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State,
through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the
Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings.
The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his
wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent. 7 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1)
declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring
the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. 9 Hence this petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by the
evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the
affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and
respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute
to fill the absence of a marriage license. 10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a
prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing
several authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no
necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The
refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail
enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the
courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the
child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
their respective comments on the petition.13

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage
cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner
was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the
challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity
and filiation.15

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null
and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states
that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges
on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of
a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was
false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In
addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled
to support.18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of
petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. 19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. 20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity
of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass
upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. 23 In the instant case, it is clear from
the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage.
Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years.24 However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus—

ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five years
on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses
with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision
is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. 26 In the instant
case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional
tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better
Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the
latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner
was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which
ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced
to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3,"
"C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H,"
"H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on
petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the
petitioner.31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated
16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL
& PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito
and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that
the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage
of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to
their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate
an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"."
It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However,
upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is
that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared
or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity —
that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the
law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order
to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local
civil registrar thereof.

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath.

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof.

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall
note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license.

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the
same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The
Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital
affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance
of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one
as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after
his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse"
to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties
and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its
effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53
and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of
either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of
mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like
a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties
so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This
is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing
Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008
1

decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
2

(RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March
3

29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to
secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding
gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also
known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the
latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in
the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests. 4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. 5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil
sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the
aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document. She heard the petitioner
6

instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took
pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey. 7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each
other as husband and wife. Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos
8

Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple. 9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to
a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. 10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine
pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony
as he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. It further ruled that in
11

performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law
which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be
promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one
month, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these
laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00. 12
 The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in
"blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements. The RTC, 13

however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for
the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age. According to
14

the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a
requirement in a marriage ceremony. 15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent
on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code. 16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it
covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and
does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes
those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal
declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in
writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer. The petitioner likewise
17

maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife. Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical
18

affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony." 19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance
to the couple. 20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude
the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44
of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize
a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its
"illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from
Article 55 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law with no substantial
23 24

amendments. Article 6 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
25
marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife." Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
26 27

which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form
of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the
minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting
parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they
take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by
witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge
may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and
to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or
rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds
happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party. 28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it
from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances of
the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each
other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these
clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and
Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the State from
qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been
duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective
marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and
29

that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of
the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum
requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage
certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he
conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal requirements
of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the
absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present
case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the
requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall
be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections
39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the
Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force
when called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications
previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of
a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this
act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than
two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the regulations
to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable
in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case. As correctly found by the MTC, the
1âwphi 1

petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the
imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352
falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the
Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.
No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8014 March 14, 1955

PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent-appellant.

Claro M. Recto and Jose Nava for petitioner-appellant.

Josefina R. Phodaca and Naomi P. Salvador for respondent-appellant.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the
candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass was made, Vilar
obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the
latter as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold
office as mayor because he was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was
disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo
warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-
elect be declared null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu
of respondent Paraiso.

Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special
meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner
could not be declared elected to take his place.

After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and,
consequently, it declared his proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from declaring petitioner as mayor-
elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so. from this election both parties have appealed, respondent from that
portion finding him ineligible, and petitioner from that portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor for lack
of sufficient legal grounds to do so.

The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals. However, as the latter court found that while petitioner raises
in his brief only questions of law respondent raises both questions of law and fact, and both appeals are indivisible in
that they pertain to only one case, that court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the provisions of sections
17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, upon the theory that one of the appeals is exclusively cognizable by the
Supreme Court.

The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175
of the Revised Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and
his resignation duly accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability. As may be noted, this is a question of fact
the determination of which much depends upon the credibility and weight of the evidence of both parties.

The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of the Evangelical Church of the
Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that
since 1944 up to 1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without interruption
and has been renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of Public
Libraries; that on April 19, 1950, respondent transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been
assigned to work in the same place and chapel during the years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied
for, and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new church
up to the end of April, 1952; that said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church nor
respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly known as minister of the United
Church of Christ, but he has not attached to his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister.

The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends to show that while he was formerly a minister of the United
of Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed his resignation as such minister on August 21, 1951, because of his
desire to engage in politics; that said resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held
in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951; that respondent turned over his chapel and his office to the elder members of
his religious order on August 21, 1951, and since then he considered himself separated from his order and in fact he
has refrained ever since from conducting any religious services pertaining to that order.

Which of these versions is correct?

After careful examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its credibility and probative value, we have not
found any reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order
to which he belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a
mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office.
Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he
belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of
his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries.1 The importance of resignation cannot be
underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to
discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is
necessary for the protection of the public. This is specially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages,
the registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that
the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of
his organization or upon the official in charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such
cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who
in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate
of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run
for a municipal office.

It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by submitting as evidence certain documents purporting
to show the alleged resignation and its acceptance by the cabinet of his church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951,
but, considering said documents in the light of the shortcomings we have pointed out above, one cannot help but
brand them as self-serving or as documents merely prepared to serve the political designs of respondent in an attempt
to obviate his disqualification under the law. And this feeling appears strengthened if we examine the so-called minute
book wherein, according to witness Jose Agpalo, are entered the minutes of all the meeting of the church, because
upon an examination thereof one would at once get the impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not with
such seriousness and solemnity that should characterize the religious activities of a well established religious order.
As the trial court aptly remarked "All these lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the supposed resignation
and acceptance were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the respondent." We are therefore constrained to
hold that respondent is disqualified to hold the office of mayor as found by the trial court.

As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second
place in the elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already declared that this cannot be done in the absence
of an express provision authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such provision but
apparently seems to prohibit it. This is what we said in at least two cases where we laid down a ruling which is decisive
of the present case.

. . . . In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate
occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a
declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his
certificate of candidacy. (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645.)

Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the
contestee is declared ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered that the law
contemplates no such result, because it permits the filing of the contest by any registered candidate
irrespective of whether the latter occupied the next highest place or the lowest in the election returns.
(Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909

ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.

Domingo Franco, for appellant.

Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September,
1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.

There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and
consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff
and the defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice
of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed
by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the
presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually present in the office of the
justice on the same day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they
had there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero
as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed
by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907,
in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in the presence of
the witnesses on that day.

The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally married on the day named.
The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second.
The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time
named, together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document above
mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the
defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth.
The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court
of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice of
the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the time mentioned.

The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the peace
and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she signed it
in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to
ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.

There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think, when properly considered,
is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married brother and was
there for about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the house except in
her company. But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every morning and that on one
occasion the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force when the testimony
of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the
afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked
the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining
some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two rights left the store, but instead of going to the house
of the witness they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place; that after the
ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching, and that they thereupon hurriedly
left the office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.

The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after the
ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome
the positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that during her
first examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was
adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her
collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the office of the justice of the peace was
at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies the
claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by
the witness and we are satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they occurred.

There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said
she did not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were
all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was
proven. No. 9 is as follows:

ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed that we have
been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.

Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.

Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.

Yours, ROSAL.

Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law will not let me go
there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.

Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese
store, because I don't like to go without Pacita.

The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.

Yours, ROSAL.

It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the
afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before
the justice of the peace. It is as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you
see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.

Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the marriage at
this time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me
this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that
if I insist on being married I must do it right.

Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.

I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.

Yours, ROSAL.

Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:
 Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.

ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my
father's permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem proper, and, if
he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you must request his consent.

Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a matter of no
importance, as every thing may be carried out, with patience.

It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the
plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the defendant during
the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after
consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring
the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the decision
of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.

It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the
defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:

No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.

Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing
until after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married."
The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married
and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and
the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses
of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by
both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form,
the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is
proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had
contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually
agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice of the
peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the
Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in
this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.

The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these allegations
was a statement that the parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was afterwards
allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition
in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment. After the trial had
commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of paragraphs 2 and
3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this second amendment
destroyed completely the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to allege in his first
amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly
the opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied
that in this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She
proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.

The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant.
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
1

G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch
2

4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution of the appellate court, dated
3

September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City,
Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed
to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar,
Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
4

Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity
of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of
5

Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon
motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
 Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.

SO ORDERED. 7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
8

defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even
if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur, which held that the court of a country
9

in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining
a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is
not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial
court stressed that following People v. Bitdu, everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know
10

that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. 11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of
Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished
by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
12

dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy
case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be
accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public
13

policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by
14

a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People, allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for
15

good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. However, the denial was by a split vote.
16

The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the
opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared
void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES
PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
 COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND
EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT. 17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of
good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court.
He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would
not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant
case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good
faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent
to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract
a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but
flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, which held that bigamy can be
18

successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial
19

declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of
no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good
faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking
a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the
elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
20

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has
not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of
Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage
entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing
the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED. 21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the
22 23

Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no
marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all
intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that no
24

appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle
of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration
25

of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." 26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a
judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he
first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh
every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the
present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of
the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED
from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.