Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis
5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then
twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and
the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful).
(The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by
a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition
for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case
No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female"
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted
several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a
plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name
in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was
made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard
P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles
of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like
a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is
not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community
in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due
notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of
Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s
first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial
court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of
birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition,
set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407
to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the
trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil
registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of
name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article
376 of the Civil Code provides:
 ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. –
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of
first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers.
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first
name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name
does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using
his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that
court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it
could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
 ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work
in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality,
age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur
after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and
sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages,
adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities)
of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27
 The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis
supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil
status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of
birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is
not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such
other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is
immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of
a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary
usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities
of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at
the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains
unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First,
even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his
male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties
who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which
apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of
entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything
else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of
their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and
orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for
them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DMSION

March 23, 2015

G.R. No. 202805

ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT, Petitioner,

vs.
WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the February 14, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
1 2

CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 affirming with modification the May 26, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
3

Bulacan, Branch 10 in LRC Case No. P-443-99, as well as its July 26, 2012 Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
4

Reconsideration of the herein assailed judgment.

5

Factual Antecedents

Adriano M. Tambuyat (Adriano) and respondent Wenifreda Balcom- Tambuyat (Wenifreda) were married on September
16, 1965. During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700-square meter parcel of land
6

located at Barangay Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (the subject property), which was bought on November 17,
7

1991. The deed of sale over the said property was signed by Adriano alone as vendee; one of the signing witnesses to
8

the deed of sale was petitioner Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat (Banguis), who signed therein as "Rosario Banguis." When 9

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-145321(M) (TCT T-145321) covering the subject property was issued, however, it was
made under the name of "ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS." 10

All this time, petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco (Nolasco). They were married on October 15, 1975,
and at all times material to this case, Nolasco was alive, and his marriage to petitioner subsisted and was never
annulled.11

On June 7, 1998, Adriano died intestate. 12

On October 18, 1999, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT T-145321, which was docketed as LRC Case
13

No. P-443-99 and assigned to Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (Malolos RTC). She alleged
therein that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; that TCT T-145321 was erroneously registered and made in the
name of "ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS;" that per annexed Marriage Contract, Banguis
was still married to Nolasco; that Banguis could not have been married to Adriano; that the issuance of the title in
Banguis’s name as Adriano’s spouse was due to "an insidious machination by her and the person who brokered the sale
of the subject property, allegedly a cousin or relative of hers;" and that consequently, she suffered damages. Thus,
14

Wenifreda prayed that TCT T-145321 be cancelled; that a new certificate of title be made out in Adriano’s name, with her
as the spouse indicated; that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT T-145321; and that moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of litigation be adjudged in her favor.

In her Opposition to the petition for cancellation, Banguis denied specifically that the subject property was acquired by
15

Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage. She claimed that on the other hand, she alone bought the subject property
using her personal funds; that she and Adriano were married on September 2, 1988 and thereafter lived together as a
married couple; that their union produced a son, who was born on April 1, 1990; that the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the petition for cancellation, which is merely a summary proceeding – considering that a thorough determination will have
to be made as to whether the property is conjugal or exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose
rights will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case; and that Wenifreda is guilty of forum-shopping in filing LRC
Case No. P-443-99, considering that a prior similar case was already filed by her and dismissed on April 22, 1999 by
Branch 76 of the Malolos RTC. Banguis prayed for the dismissal of LRC Case No. P-443-99 and to be paid moral
damages and attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim.

During the course of the proceedings, the parties presented the following evidence, among others:
 1.Marriage Contract of Adriano and Wenifreda; 16

2.Publication of Adriano’s death; 17

3.Social Security System (SSS) data record of Adriano indicating that Wenifreda is his spouse; 18

4.Barangay Council Certificate indicating that Adriano and Wenifreda were legally married and residents of No. 13
Hyacinth Road, Phase V, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City since 1981; 19

5.Marriage Contract of Banguis and Nolasco dated October 15, 1975; 20

6.Banguis’s SSS Member’s Data Change or Addition Report indicating that Banguis: a) sought to change her
name from "Rosario E. Banguis" to "Rosario B. Nolasco"; b) listed Nolasco as her husband; and c) changed her
civil status to "married;"
21

7.Banguis’s correspondence at work – Ocean East Agency Corporation (Ocean East), which was owned and
operated by Adriano – in which she signed as "Rosario B. Nolasco;" 22

8.Banguis’s résumé on file with Ocean East, reflecting that she was married; 23

9.Negative Certification of Marriage issued by the Civil Registrar of Bulacan to the effect that the Civil Register
does not have any record of Adriano and Banguis’s marriage which was supposedly solemnized on September 2,
1988; 24

10.Certification dated April 17, 2002 issued by Rev. Fr. Narciso Sampana, Parish Priest of St. Joseph Parish, to
the effect that the parish never had a parish priest by the name of Fr. Roberto de Guzman – who is claimed to
have solemnized the alleged marriage between Adriano and Banguis; 25

11.Banguis’s testimony on direct examination that she and Adriano were married on September 2, 1988; that they
had a son named Adrian; that Adriano purchased the subject property on November 17, 1991 per Deed of Sale –
executed in Manila and with Adriano as the purchaser – entered as "Document No. 173; Page No. 3550; series of
1990" in the notarial registry of Mr. Julian B. Tubig; that she paid for the same with her own money; and that she
stayed at the subject property each Friday night up to Sunday night; 26

12.Banguis’s testimony on cross-examination that she is married to Nolasco, who is still alive; that her marriage to
the latter is still subsisting and has not been annulled; and that she knew that Adriano was married to someone
else;27

13.Photographs depicting Adriano and Banguis as a couple and with a child, supposedly taken at the subject
property. 28

On May 26, 2003, the Malolos RTC rendered its Decision, decreeing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby RENDERED in favor of the petitioner herein, as follows:

1.Directing the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan to cancel TCT No. T-145321 (M) and in lieu thereof to
issue a new certificate of title in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Wenifreda "Winnie" Balcom
Tambuyat;

2.Directing the defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco of 1714 Ibarra St., Sampaloc, Manila to surrender to the
Register of Deeds for Meycauayan, Bulacan, the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T- 145321 (M) within five (5)
days from receipt of the order, failing which the Register of Deeds should proceed with the cancellation of said
TCT.

3.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as and by way of moral
damages.
 4.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as and by way of
exemplary damages; and

5.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner attorney’s fees in the amount of P100,000.00,
and the cost of suit.

Accordingly, the counterclaim of the oppositor is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 29

In arriving at the above pronouncement, the trial court held among others that under Section 112 of Act No. 496 or the
Land Registration Act – now Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) or the Property Registration
Decree – court authorization is required for any alteration or amendment of a certificate of title when any error, omission
30

or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate, or when there
is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of the title; that it has been established that Wenifreda is the
surviving spouse of Adriano, and the subject property was acquired during their marriage, but it was erroneously
registered in the name of another; that Banguis had a subsisting marriage with Nolasco when TCT T-145321 was issued
with her being erroneously included and referred to therein as Adriano’s spouse; that Adrian’s filiation may not be proved
collaterally through LRC Case No. P-443-99; that Wenifreda is entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages
without proof of pecuniary loss, for the damage caused upon her reputation and social standing caused by the wanton,
fraudulent, malicious and unwarranted inclusion of Banguis’s name in the title; and that Wenifreda is likewise entitled to
attorney’s fees as she was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect her interests by reason of Banguis’s
unjustified act.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner appealed the trial court’s Decision with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84954, the appeal basically
revolved around the thesis that the trial court erred in applying Section 108 of PD 1529; that with the serious objections
raised by Banguis and considering that she is the actual owner and possessor of the subject property, a proper action in a
different court exercising general jurisdiction should be filed, rather than in the current trial court which sits merely as a
land registration court; that the trial court disregarded Article 148 of the Family Code which provides for the division of
31

properties acquired by individuals united in a defective marriage; that the trial court erred in awarding damages, attorney’s
fees and costs of suit; that the trial court erred in granting execution pending appeal despite the absence of any good or
special reasons; and that the denial of her counterclaim was improper. 32

Meanwhile, on October 30, 2003, Wenifreda moved for execution pending appeal. It appears that Banguis failed to
oppose the motion; she did not appear during the scheduled hearings on the motion as well. As a result, the trial court
issued a March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Such writ was thus issued on April 14, 2004.
TCT T-145321 was cancelled, and a new title – TCT T-433713(M) – was issued in its place.

On February 14, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 26, 2003 issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 10 of Malolos, Bulacan is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit in favor of Wenifreda Tambuyat is hereby deleted.

SO ORDERED. 33

The CA sustained the trial court’s application of Section 108 of PD 1529, noting that Banguis’s name was included in TCT
T-145321 by error or mistake. It held that the evidence adduced proved that Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is the lawful
wife of Adriano; that there is a valid and subsisting marriage between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted to
such fact during the course of the proceedings in the trial court; and that Banguis’s opposition to Wenifreda’s petition for
cancellation of TCT T-145321 is not real and genuine as to place the latter’s title to the subject property in doubt.
34

The CA added that contrary to Banguis’s position, a separate and different proceeding is not necessary to resolve her
opposition to the petition in LRC Case No. P-443-99, as: 1) she in effect acquiesced and freely submitted her issues and
concerns to the trial court for complete determination, submitting all her relevant documentary and other evidence to the
court in order to prove her allegations – particularly that she is the lawful spouse of Adriano and that she is the actual
owner and possessor of the subject property; and 2) pursuant to law and jurisprudence, the distinction between the trial
35 36

court sitting as a land registration court and as a court of general jurisdiction has been eliminated with the passage of PD
1529. It held further that, based on the evidence adduced, Adriano and Banguis are not co-owners of the subject property
as it has been shown that: a) both of them had valid and subsisting marriages when they conducted their adulterous
relations; b) Banguis failed to present even a modicum of evidence that she contributed to the purchase of the subject
property; and c) the deed of sale itself indicated that Adriano alone was the vendee. Finally, in denying Wenifreda’s
pecuniary awards and Banguis’s counterclaim, the CA held that the parties are not entitled thereto as there is no legal and
factual basis to grant them.

Banguis moved for reconsideration, but in a July 26, 2012 Resolution, the CA was unconvinced. Hence, the present
Petition.

Issues

Banguis cites the following issues for resolution:

I.THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH CANCELLED AND
CORRECTED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M) FROM "ROSARIO E. BANGUIS" TO
"WENIFREDA ‘WINNIE’ BALCOM TAMBUYAT" UNDER SECTION 108 OF THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION
DECREE DESPITE THE LACK OF JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE SAME IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS AND
WEIGHTY OBJECTIONS OF THE PETITIONER AND THAT THE INSTITUTION OF ESTATE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE LATE ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT AND THE CONSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF AN EXECUTOR OR
ADMINISTRATOR WHICH IS THE PROPER REMEDY WHO CAN GO AFTER HIS PROPERTIES HELD BY
OTHER PERSONS.

II.THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH CORRECTED AND
CANCELLED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M) THROUGH AN ABSOLUTE AND
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE PROOF OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION BY THE PETITIONER OVER
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

III.THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH CORRECTED AND
CANCELLED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M) IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 148
OF THE FAMILY CODE PROVIDING FOR THE SHARING OF PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY PERSONS
UNITED IN A DEFECTIVE MARRIAGE.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH GRANTED THE
IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF ITS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE SEASONABLE APPEAL OF THE
PETITIONER AND THE UTTER LACK OF ANY GOOD OR SPECIAL REASONS JUSTIFYING THE SAME. 37

Petitioner’s Arguments

In her Petition and Reply seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and thus dismiss Wenifreda’s
38

petition for cancellation in LRC Case No. P-443-99, Banguis insists on her original position adopted below that Section
108 of PD 1529 cannot apply in view of the contentious and controversial nature of her opposition to the petition for
cancellation, which can be threshed out only in a separate proper proceeding where the court sits not merely as a land
registration court, but as a court of general jurisdiction. She cites Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, Liwag v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Arceo v. Court of Appeals, which made pronouncements to such
39 40 41

effect.

Banguis adds that the instant case involved the partition of Adriano’s estate which in effect transfers the subject property
to Wenifreda and thus divests her and her son Adrian of their rights and interests therein; that based on the evidence she
introduced, it should be concluded that the property belongs to her as it was acquired using solely her own funds and
money borrowed from her sister, and because she has been in constant possession thereof, introducing improvements
thereon through the years; that the subject property is owned in common by her and Adriano since it was acquired during
their cohabitation; and that the CA erred in refusing to rule on the propriety of the trial court’s grant of execution pending
appeal.

Respondent’s Arguments

In Wenifreda’s Comment, it is stressed that the distinction between the trial court acting as a land registration court, on
42

one hand, and its acting as a court of general jurisdiction, on the other, has been removed with the effectivity of PD 1529;
thus, trial courts are no longer fettered by their former limited jurisdiction which enabled them to grant relief in land
registration cases only when there is unanimity among the parties, or when none of them raises any adverse claims or
serious objections. It is further argued that Banguis’s claim of ownership cannot stand, for the evidence fails to indicate
that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property, even as the deed of sale to the property itself shows that
Adriano alone is the vendee thereof, and Banguis signed merely as a witness thereto. Finally, respondent explains that
during the proceedings covering the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, Banguis was accorded
the opportunity to participate, but she did not; as a result, the old title was cancelled and a new one was accordingly
issued in its stead.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was not precluded from resolving the objections raised by Banguis in her
opposition to the petition for cancellation; a separate action need not be filed in a different court exercising general
jurisdiction. Banguis should be considered to have acquiesced and freely submitted the case to the trial court for complete
determination on her opposition, when she went to trial and adduced and submitted all her relevant evidence to the court.
"The active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the
jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the
court or body’s jurisdiction."
43

Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be
resorted to in seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the
certificate; (3) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on
any duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (5) when the registered
owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or
creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not
conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or
alteration of title. The present case falls under (3) and (7), where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in
44

issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of "Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis" when, in truth and in fact,
respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse.

Proceedings under Section 108 are "summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are
only clerical but certainly not controversial issues." Banguis’s opposition to the petition for cancellation ostensibly raised
45

controversial issues involving her claimed ownership and the hereditary rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her son
by Adriano. However, apart from the fact that evidence of Banguis’s ownership is irrelevant in Wenifreda’s petition, the
evidence apparently indicates that Banguis could not be the owner of the subject property, while a resolution of the issue
of succession is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete determination of Wenifreda’s petition. The Court is thus led to
the conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply erred in including Banguis in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s
spouse.

As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate
spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence – among others, the parties’ respective marriage contracts, which, together
with marriage certificates, are considered the primary evidence of a marital union – indicates that Adriano was married to
46

Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to Nolasco – and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of
the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were
husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently,
Banguis cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege belonged to
Wenifreda alone.

x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
1âw phi 1

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that
they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect
that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras,
interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried
Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to ‘spouse’, the same must be the legitimate ‘spouse’ (not
common-law spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for
purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused
mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to
the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis
Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime. (Emphasis supplied)
47

The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is – who should be included in the title to the
subject property as Adriano’s spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there error in placing Banguis’s name in the title as
Adriano’s spouse? If Banguis is Adriano’s spouse, then there would be no need to amend or even cancel the title. On the
other hand, if Wenifreda is Adriano’s spouse, the inclusion of Banguis would then be erroneous, and TCT T-145321 would
have to be cancelled. All that is required in resolving this issue is to determine who between them is Adriano’s spouse; it
was unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the property. Title to the property is different from
the certificate of title to it.

x x x. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction between title and the certificate of title:

The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses
certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof
can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of
a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance
of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under
co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties
may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the
equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the
certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. x x x.

Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give the holder any
better title than what he actually has.
48

Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is the true owner of the subject property
in order to convince the trial court that there is no need to cancel TCT T-145321, then she was not precluded from
presenting evidence to such effect. Understandably, with the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and other evidence,
Banguis may have felt obliged to prove that beyond the certificate of title, she actually owned the property. Unfortunately
for her, this Court is not convinced of her claimed ownership; the view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and
Adriano could not have been co-owners of the subject property as she failed to present sufficient proof that she
contributed to the purchase of the subject property, while the deed of sale covering the subject property showed that
Adriano alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier of facts, so it must rely on the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals, which are thus considered conclusive and binding. Moreover, the Court notes that while Banguis claims that
49

she alone paid for the property using her own funds and money borrowed from her sister, she nonetheless acknowledges
that Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its acquisition. Such contradictory statements cast
serious doubts on her claim; basically, if she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be logical and natural
for her to require that her name be placed on the deed of sale as the vendee, and not as mere witness – which is what
actually occurred in this case. On the other hand, if Adriano contributed to its purchase, Banguis would have required that
her name be placed on the deed as a co-vendee just the same. Her failure to explain why – despite her claims that she is
the purchaser of the property – she allowed Adriano to be denominated as the sole vendee, renders her claim of
ownership doubtful. "Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against
him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference against him." One cannot also
50

ignore the principle that "the rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense." 51

Neither can the Court believe Banguis’s assertion that Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCT T-145321 is in reality a
partition of Adriano’s estate which in effect transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests Banguis and her
son Adrian of their rights and interests therein. LRC Case No. P- 443-99 is simply a case for the correction of the wrongful
entry in TCT T-145321; it simply aims to reflect the truth in the certificate of title – that Adriano is married to Wenifreda –
and nothing else. It would have been a summary proceeding, but Banguis complicated matters by injecting her claims of
ownership, which are irrelevant in the first place for, as earlier stated, registration is not the equivalent of title.

Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the petitioner,
particularly those relating to the trial court’s March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal, as well as the April 14, 2004 Writ of Execution issued, as they have become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 14, 2012 Decision and July 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION *

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE **

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty.
Julieta A. Omaña (Omaña).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice on
whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document
entitled "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang
naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa
pagkakasunod-sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t
bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;

2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at
Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa
ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;

3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang
ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya
ay naninirahan;

4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan
nito ay pupunan ng ina;

6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo)
ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;

7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-
sariling pag-aari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.
 (Sgd) (Sgd)
ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started
implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of
the property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed
by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She
admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña
alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to
notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract. Omaña presented Marantal’s "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaña further presented a
letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaña’s knowledge,
consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaña arrived at his residence together with a girl whom he later
recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaña was not in her office when the contract was
notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa’s desistance did not put an end to the
proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaña had failed to
exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-
CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaña who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but
then later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity
to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two years as a notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaña’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and
Espinosa’s "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is
void.2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging
the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, 3 which is exactly what Omaña did in this case. 1avvphi1

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents
as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and
allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a document entitled "Legal Separation" where
the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each
other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each other; 6 preparing a document authorizing a married
couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against the
other;7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved. 8

We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that
Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed
Omaña’s negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial
register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries 9 or any member of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Omaña knew fully well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaña may
be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaña’s notarial
commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision
be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., Respondents.

Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.

F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals modifying
that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child
and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her
motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month,
which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a decision the
dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of
defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of
thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of
FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as
attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.

On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory
damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry. The pertinent facts are:chanrobles virtual law library

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial
High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and
were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and
became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since
one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Esca�o," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in
the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a
private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence,
the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of
damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:

ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court shall
entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the concurrence
of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one
who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may have
incurred by reason of the promised marriage. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
 The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought within one year,
computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.

Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil.,
866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the
Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the
Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:

Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the
Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also
in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to betrothal.
Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of
marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken.

Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I
thereof:

Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered into by a male
between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such
consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in case of
breach of the promise. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even though
approved by the parent or guardian. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for seduction shall
not be affected. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor without the
assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the
action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses but also
compensation for mental and moral suffering. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties, who cause a
marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is
rejected. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return what he or she
has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.

These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the
corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote: chanrobles virtual law library

The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It
is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American
States.

See statutes of:

Florida 1945 - pp. 1342 - 1344

Maryland 1945 - pp. 1759 - 1762
Nevada 1943 - p. 75
Maine 1941 - pp. 140 - 141
New Hampshire 1941 - p. 223
California 1939 - p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 - p. 326
Indiana 1936 - p. 1009
Michigan 1935 - p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450

The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation when it provided for
breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in
consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction.
(Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)

The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of
our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the
lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:

Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by

her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we
hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under
the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those
following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the
"seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised
Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner
is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant - who
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent
are supposed to be - when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court
of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for
him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy." chanrobles virtual law library

The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support
of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and
shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00,
as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 - consisting of P144.20, for
hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing expenses
incurred to support the child - and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore,
in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision of the
1

respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38
(Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or
not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in
2

said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on
the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's
attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting
to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the
3

complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that
he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and
approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to
his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur
expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order embodying the stipulated facts
4

which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is
single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1,
1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine,
second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City
since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees;
5

the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as
moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as
atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

3. All other claims are denied. 6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such
acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality,
good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter
alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent in
the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend
before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to
her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on
which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs
Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff,
were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents
thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and
they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were
in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together
in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's
hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that
made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship,
 plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that
he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff
left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the
barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted
that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as
stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to
marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by
looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV
No. 24256. In his Brief, he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal
9

basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of
10

16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the
time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her
unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court,
a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have
allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to
marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts
or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not
have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as
those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that
plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the
town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1,
1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.).
Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to
plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship
between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the
owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her,
also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal
(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so
low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied
in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another
woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising,
then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her.
11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and
 deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying
the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of
learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered
him to do in its decision in this case.
12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of
whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and
he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an
Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to
marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then
alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common
law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for
the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of
the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his
Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda,
which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that
questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court
having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying,
unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the
parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs. Asistio, Jr., this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
16

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin
v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or
impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v.
People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v.
Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30,
1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately
17

eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth
in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the
18

United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter
of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither
can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she
and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents
would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in
Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are
22

injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to
marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In
24

short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, this Court denied recovery of
25

damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of
age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed
to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed
by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had
the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction,
26

recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening
disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction,
that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil.
595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or

inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If
she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is
no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from
the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is
the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a
recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for
the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such
 cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is
here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by
the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined
28

that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56
(sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE
be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See
Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29

is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the
30

present article in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
31

was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that
there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances,
because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have
been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he
did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are
in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, the 32

private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private
respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, for: 33

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice
that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51,
January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his
proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated
the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be
said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by
the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out
that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." At most, it could
35

be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37

We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the
other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the
fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent
and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the
deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after
giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon
them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

 SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
MARIATEGUI, respondents.

Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.

Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario Mariategui.

Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R.
No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he
begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by
her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also
died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana
who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children, namely:
Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco
Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).

At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried (Brief for
respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of
the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).

On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana,
Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the
Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the
adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus,
on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered
owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title
were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).

On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the
lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by
their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the
third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10).
Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling
defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the
plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record
on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the
complaint was one for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial
court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:

It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the
defendants are of erroneous application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).

However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court, in its
decision stating thus:

The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous
enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain
either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)

The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court committed an error ". . . in not
finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding
(that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . "
(Rollo, pp. 14-15).

On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo
Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in
the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually
acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall
reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a
project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding
legal obligations.

The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition which was given due course by the court on December 7, 1981.

The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to
demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed
the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues
hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private
respondents.

The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . .
and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as
his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their
relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are
entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be
declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of
the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).

A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally one of partition. The
allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the
estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in
court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
282 [1988]).

It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the law, it does not
characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts
alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1
Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of
Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on
the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was
able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal."
The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no
marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover,
the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity
are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws
presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb),
(cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA
502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction
is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
the constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of
Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor
contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, supra).

The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However, considering the
effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set
of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children —
legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro
vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).

Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth
referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the
lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in
evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.

While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as to certain dates and
names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable
length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death
in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of
Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang
mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs
of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is
inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the
action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing
Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation
of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore,
an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]).
On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding
the private respondents and registered the properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid
repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the
subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private respondents
filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).

In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling defendants
in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record
on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully
refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents
who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about
their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del
Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a
house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.
In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by

repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-
owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-
owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been
our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that
the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the
long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed
to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots
involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is
Affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,

vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where the cause
celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a retired member of the
Judiciary.

In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda.
de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, with gross immorality
and grave misconduct.1

After an answer2 and a reply3 were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, in its Resolution
dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid Criminal Case
No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent, former Justice Onofre A.
Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court on removal or suspension of attorneys, and therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, commencing from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent facts in his
aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his disposition of this case may be
duly appreciated:

Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while respondent
former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime Commission (PACC) headed
by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada.

Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced Special Proceeding
No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares presumptively dead, after
an absence of sixteen (16) years.

Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding before
Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite and
now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their marriage was the culmination of a long
engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit
Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since
then, respondent became a close family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After the
wedding, they received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the
newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day,
respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the condominium
unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was a
woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent on the
identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the wrong number".
 What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a point when respondent
called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa
bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and have it burned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent
left complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the
complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant rationalized, contrary to
her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for what
happened (TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996.

Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the complainant
learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that he (Judge Makasiar)
solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated
and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent,
such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").

On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent, the
complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D"
and "D-1").

Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered by
complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that
the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez.
This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the
truth, complainant lamented. Also presented for complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and
respondent (Exh. "B"); Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E");
and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and
respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").

Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on January 7,
1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he voluntarily signed the
Marriage Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case for
immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993.
Respondent theorized that when his marriage with complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano,
his marriage with Librada Peña, his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment
of such marriage had not yet become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet
published as required by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Peña having been made by
publication, and subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B.
Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4").

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of
Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding respect and dignity.4 He himself asserts that at the
time of his marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada
Peña, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another
woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his
previous marriage had been annulled.

Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his actuations.
Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does
not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated
by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court
and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a
marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites.5

On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating Justice Purisima which
we quote with approval:

That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a Marriage Contract
with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
 of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnize a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under
oath by respondent himself, he could not be forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p.
15a).

That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and the
evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the
Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male and a female; consent freely
given in the presence of the solemnizing officer; authority of the solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license
except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony
with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age,
were satisfied and complied with.

The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a "sham" marriage
is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered into subject marriage
in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of
the intention of respondent in saying "I do" with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of
a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was
authorized by law to solemnize the civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to
contract such marriage.

Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the criminal case of
Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in Civil
Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between respondent and Librada Pena had
not attained complete finality due to non publication of said judgment in a newspaper of general circulation;
that circumstance, alone, only made subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage
between complainant and respondent void.

Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada
Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife
by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he
took herein complainant as his wife by a second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Peña was
subsisting and unannulled.

But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not respondent can be
adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue pending
determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, even
assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham"
marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is — that what respondent perpetrated was a gross
misconduct on his part as a member of the Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even
granting that the immorality charge against herein complainant in the administrative case instituted against
her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded, respondent was not justified in resorting to a "sham"
marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely
conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any
immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her
in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in said
administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in
said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis.

In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of marriage and the
family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery thereof and perform a sham
marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of
the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent that what was entered into by him and
complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a "sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him
from liability for his gross misconduct, nay sacrilege.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued
membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person
of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.6 Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The
commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers.7

However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive conduct during some
episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age;
and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels
that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as
recommended, would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.

WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should
he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr.,
J.J., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., took no part.

Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000

ARTHUR TE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division,
dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178 and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996
1 2

denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not
live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave
birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.
3

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with
a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).4

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about
petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.
5 6

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to
private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her
pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.7

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their
knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to
petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with
Santella that he was still single.8

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of
court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during
the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the same
could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused. The 9

RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.10

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel; (2)
violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence
even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges
promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for
conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971. 11

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for the
revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency
of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98,
respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16,
12

1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its
13

discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative
case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render
nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-
sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the
pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in
other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178. 14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions.
The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any concrete
evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of
petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law. The Court of
15

Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth
persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the
existence of the elements of bigamy. 16

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion
to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no
prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action
involved is a civil case.
17

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. 18

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL

[CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF. 19

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has
rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and
academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts
and rules. 20

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
21

question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 22

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for
bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge
of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s
23

argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal
proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him
from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no
24 25

judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The
prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be
invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under
the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In Landicho vs. Relova, we held that:
26 27

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. 28

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and
subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before
the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have
previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. 29

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC
Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the
existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body
against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed
before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently
with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or
quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the
issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral
conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and
for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. The existence of these other charges justified the continuation
30

of the proceedings before the PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in
the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second
marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and private
respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the
requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract
between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was
no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took place. 31

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. In this case, the Court of
32

Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on
two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second,
petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate
court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such
evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the trial court’s
33

finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense. 34

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of
the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for
the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an
adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether
or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie case
35

against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that
petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be
the conclusion. Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was
36

precisely because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in
his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been
granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested
that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the
judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been
filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit
for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a
medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to
evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to
petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant
of his motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show
that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held
37 38

that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section
1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear
and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. 39

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge
Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons
other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for
determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. The
40

instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not
deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the
criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything
unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered
an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel
to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the
judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly. 41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as the
Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The
appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial
court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.

The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the
prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Facts

The appellate court recited the facts as follows:

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O.
NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally
dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second
marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her
co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."

Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of
not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when
arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held and both the prosecution and defense entered
the following stipulation of facts:

"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized
on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte;

2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8,
2001 in Quezon City;

3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted the second
marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;

4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;

5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her Counter-
Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTC’s resolution is whether or not the second marriage is
bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial
ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as follows:

"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while
she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on
April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit ‘A’).
While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and
emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in
the Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-
accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit ‘B’) when she secured a certification as to the civil status of
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November 2003.

Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter’s workplace in CBW,
FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which
Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew
that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was
brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latter’s residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend and she heard everything that they were
talking about.

Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing
income opportunity in the amount of ₱34,000.00 a month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages she
suffered, she declared that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide.
She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
left her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her
sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount of ₱50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-
14).

Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the private complainant and Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the
private complainant to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She
declared that the private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that Rowena P.
Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but
she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).

Evidence for the Defense

The defense’s version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:

"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa
Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on
January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is
allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.

To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by
one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since
January 19, 1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’ ‘3’ and ‘4’). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated
January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit
‘7’).

He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage because she [sic] told this
fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due
to hatred having learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that Rowena P.
Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell her this fact because
Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.

He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but that
he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the
religion ‘Catholic’ was also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not
approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a
secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).

Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño testified that he is the founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh
Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority to convert any applicant to the
Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was
then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’) and after receiving the application,
said accused was indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.

In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because of the filing of the instant case.
On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim
convert since January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their ‘Imam’ also issued a Pledge of
Conversion (Exhibit ‘7’). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran.
However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be
secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages
2-12).

During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith,
the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able
to treat them equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the second. Since his
second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered
as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).

Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that
she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed.
She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since December
8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted
the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and
the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after
she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after
learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the
Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant that she was sought by the private complainant
and that they had a confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private
complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that
she only came to know the private complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007,
pages 2-8)."5

The Trial Court’s Ruling

In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.

The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 7 of the Family Code, or
Executive Order No. 209, and Article 1808 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree
No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the
qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife
unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in
exceptional cases."

In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision further stated thus:

The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only with
the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife subject to certain requirements. This is
because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on
Personal Status in the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65).
Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the
Shari’a Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or
wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure
the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain
her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).

Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the
above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages,
indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can
just marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an
unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Shari’a law
imposes, that is, he should have notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be
furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no
moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the
Shari’a law. It is the Shari’a Court that has this authority.

In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim
rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.

The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient
evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is
the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,]
being open to several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to
the latter’s house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their
conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she and
Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably presumed that
Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very
circumstance favoring accused’s innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must survive the test of reason
and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court,
therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment imposing
upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus accessory penalties provided by law.

b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

SO ORDERED.9

Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the same bail bond pending
appeal. The trial court granted Nollora’s motion.

Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10

The Appellate Court’s Ruling

On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision. 11
The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his Islamic
religion and was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and
practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nollora’s two
1avv phi 1

marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the
Philippines should apply. Nollora’s claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in
protecting the general welfare.

In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nollora’s motion for reconsideration. The allegations
in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nollora’s earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the
appellate court to modify its 30 September 2009 Decision.

Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.

The Court’s Ruling

Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.

Elements of Bigamy

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13

The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; 14 (2)
Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted
the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16

The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were married at Sapang Palay
IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the
IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage states that
Nollora and Geraldino were married at Max’s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December
2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.

A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:

We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968 from ATILANO M.
NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to
2002 with the following information:

Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District)19

Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his religion
allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of
both marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
read:

Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain
extent fix the property relations of the spouses.

Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are
complied with:

(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;

(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper
guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and

(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.

Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the
age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract
marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.

x x x.

Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage
shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The
declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses,
and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent
to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.

Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:

(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;

(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to solemnize
marriage; or

(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person designated by the judge,
should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.

Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge, office of
the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.

Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-musamma)
before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper
dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social standing of the
parties.

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or
Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an
issue here. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his
professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. 21

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nollora’s
marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion in
the marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s
liability for bigamy. Nollora’s false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.

[ATTY. CALDINO:]

Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion, Catholic Pentecostal,
and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you
are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no
indication here that you have indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?

[NOLLORA:]

A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didn’t know why they did not place any Catholic there.

xxx

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract with your co-
accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness, considering that you said that
you are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino,
you indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?

A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being my Balik-
Islam, that’s why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesn’t approve a Catholic to marry
another, that’s why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.

Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that you’re single, Mr. Witness?

A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married.22 (Emphasis supplied)

xxx

[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]

Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic when in fact you were
already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?

xxx

[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the Catholic rights [sic]
because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.

xxx

Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure the permission of your
first wife to get married?

A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?

A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she was always very
mad, ma’am.23

In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to Geraldino. Nollora may not impugn
1avvphi 1

his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to
allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30
September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.

Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA* JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA**
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision of the Court of
1

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8
2

of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio
Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in
Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a
Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II,
records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification was issued by the LCR.
3

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March
1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on
15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children
were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in
1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims
must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties
acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, essentially averring that she is the legal surviving
4

spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St.
Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right
and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged
prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol; 5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila; 6
 c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually filed in the Office of the
Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932; 7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to
the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila; 8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido; 9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.; 10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido; 11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30
September 1942; 12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued by the Office of
the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the
Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido; 13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla; 14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina. 15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her
life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal
wife, but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio. Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate her
16

allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;
17

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted marriage with the
petitioner although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely:
Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido; 18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria,
Surigao del Norte; and 19

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del
Norte. 20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the
properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision denying Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive
21

portion thereof reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby
DISMISSED. 22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence of her
marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision, the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while
23

pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who
testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942
at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum dated 5 June 2008, raises the
25

following legal issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a subsequent
marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the execution or
existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the existence of a valid
marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the witness stand. 26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of
Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her
certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as
regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating
that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are
presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952.
Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between
[Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol. 27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it
considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her
own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared
that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported
themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno,
created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its
appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni, we said, citing precedents, that:
28

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence
of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly
delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals. Thus:
29

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused
the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this
misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court
confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence
when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a
matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of
secondary evidence of the contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol
testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish
its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even
there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The
Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually
kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony,
and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating
priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove
the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence
furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the
event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the
marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who
testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942
at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence
of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:
32

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
1âwphi1

contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always
presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the
unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED.
The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.

Isabelo V. Castro for plaintiff-appellant.

Arturo A. Romero for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Manila, of a
complaint for annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya,
plaintiff vs. Fernando O. Palaroan, defendant."

The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were
married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January
1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September
1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's
counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the
judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital
secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it
had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going
thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the
contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.

Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the complaint and denied having had
pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he
had escaped from her and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he denied
having committed any fraud against her. He set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for her
having prayed in Civil Case No. 21589 for the validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had
been granted her. He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did not
pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."

Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:

(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and pretended to shower
her with love and affection not because he really felt so but because she merely happened to be the
first girl available to marry so he could evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate
members of her family were threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative);

(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not because he loved
her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital duties and obligations
appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with her;

(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely concretized for him,
when in order to placate and appease the immediate members of the family of the first girl (referent
 being the close relative) and to convince them of his intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a
courtship with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and had several
children during the whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated between
them (parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)

Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26 August 1966 but it was
postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was
legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage, and, on the authority of Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, holding:

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can
take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any
legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record. —

the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed. Plaintiff
Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but the court found it inadequate and
thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the dismissal of the complaint; it also denied
reconsideration.

The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause
for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his
wife, as the case may be;

This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud
enumerated in Article 86, as follows:

ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of
marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in
Article 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and
voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in
general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and
specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating the
specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous conviction, and concealment of
pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such
intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage."

Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the
article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul
a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby
cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent
was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is
interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with
the rule or not.

But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-divulgement" (the word chosen by her)
of the pre-marital relationship of her husband with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has, likewise,
alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his marital
duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower
court erred in ignoring these allegations in her reply.

This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and absence of intention to perform
duties of consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the
second set of allegations is "apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the Complaint ..." (Record on
Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a party-
plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76
Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply.
Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.

On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the husband's part
not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action
for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since appellant's
wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared
already barred.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition
for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his
marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that
he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he
later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.4

In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner
freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage;
that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him
personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born
prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of
suit.

SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs,
but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following
assigned errors:
 I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT
GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN
OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE
PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE
ALLOWED BY LAW.7

The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent;
and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

The petition is partly granted.

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant
case, are generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so,
thus –

To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced consent which
supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or
after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the
same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that
this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster
his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already
pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly
decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present
case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this
Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court,
he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is,
therefore, understandable.

But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent
to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from
the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of
the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member
of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied
him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.

The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was
allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that
time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the
proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to
bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his
school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform
the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter
was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated
the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at
worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also
conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also
 narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was
consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.

Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to undermining the
credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a year
off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.

To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is no
controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the
cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988,
matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the
appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date
of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence that put August
29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.

Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues in his
argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December 1987,
then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial,
because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s impression that
she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on
August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in
January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain
that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.

Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him to the
appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the
seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by
the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under
duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship
of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm
by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the admission, where did he find the
temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by
a hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the
absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate
the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent,
insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit
with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.9

We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that
attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant
case.

We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing
in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying the award,
the Court of Appeals merely said thus:

It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as
the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10

However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private respondent
detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:

In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed,
respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his
claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as they
were extremely personal to him.

As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is
clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he
is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed
upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated
damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be
awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.12 In the instant case, private
respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to
exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment
of his marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages
is DELETED for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,

vs.
REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision 1 dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No.
664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to respondent
Rey C. Alcazar.

The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner
alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the
latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown
of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s
abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with
petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a
half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines.
Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at
2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez
St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their
marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility
of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.

Per the Sheriff’s Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of petitioner’s Complaint, was served upon
respondent on 30 September 2002.4

On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion5 to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the
case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.

As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an Order 6 directing the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear in all stages of the
proceedings to see to it that evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.

On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that she had
conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but respondent never participated therein. Public
Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent suppression
of evidence between them. She then recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether petitioner’s Complaint
was meritorious or not.

Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.

On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag
(Tayag) as witnesses.

Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioner’s
testimony.

Petitioner’s third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be free from any underlying personality
aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage.
On the other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and
respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the respondent is harboring, making him psychologically
incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.

People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior),
need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or
more) of the following:

1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be recognized as superior without
commensurate achievements)

2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love

3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or should associate with, other special or
high status people (institutions)

4. requires excessive admiration

5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his
or her expectations

6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends

7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others

8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her

9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.

The root cause of respondent’s personality disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years with predisposing psychosocial
factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that respondent is the first child of his mother’s second family. Obviously,
unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate environment in his growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe
longing for attention from his father who had been unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was left alone to fend for the
family needs. More so that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and
overlooked the love and attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-object to help him maintain a cohesive
sense of self-such so great that everything other people offer is "consumed." Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with other
(sic) beyond this need. There is no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.

The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed long before he entered
into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n] integral part of his
personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and incurable. 7

Tayag concluded in the end that:

As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist and have their different
life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic
cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support, and commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With
due consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage between
petitioner and respondent.8

On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced
Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of petitioner’s evidence and manifested that she would no
longer present evidence for the State.

On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner’s Complaint for annulment of her marriage to respondent, holding
in substance that:

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the
moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are
incurable.

That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED. 9

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 10 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order11 dated 19 August 2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a Decision12 dated 24 May
2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in
finding that petitioner failed to prove respondent’s psychological incapacity. Other than petitioner’s bare allegations, no other
evidence was presented to prove respondent’s personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,13 the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to
establish that at least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have known the
marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly assumed the same. At most, respondent’s
abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code. 1avvphi1

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution 14 dated 28 August 2008.

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY

INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS. 15

At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of marriage based
on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

xxxx

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. 16 Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on
the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.17 Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the
husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to
chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic
causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage
act.18

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his
marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after
their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondent’s part, then, there is
no ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Petitioner’s Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.

One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and the
observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent based on the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or gross ignorance.19 But
even said reason cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts,
even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique. 20 Although this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of
exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his client’s
substantive rights,21 petitioner failed to convince us that such exceptional circumstances exist herein.

Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.23

The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
 (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of evidence
presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their
wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to live with
his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact
petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondent’s psychological state.

Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able
to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite Tayag’s invitation. 25 Tayag, in evaluating
respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more
prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner,
was hardly impartial.

Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latter’s
experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly
describe the "pattern of behavior" that showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to
explain how such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We
emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that
such psychological disorder renders him "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."26 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital life and, as a result, we
perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love
and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his wife.

To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling
out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate
ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific
situation – a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason
of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital
life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.27
1avvphi1

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos28]:

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. x x x.

Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity.29

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity of
respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion 30 dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was informed by one
Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with another
woman named "Sally."

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again,
petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. 31

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life
and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.32 Presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.33 In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that respondent’s failure
to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are
grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We are not downplaying petitioner’s frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer
working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing
petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice