Geotechnical risk on large scale

infrastructure projects
Dr Chris Bridges CEng FICE
(chris.bridges@smec.com)

19 November 2020
1
• https://australiangeomechanics.org/chapter/queensland/

2
Contents
• Introduction
• Understanding
• Impacts
• Recommendations

3
Introduction

4
Geotechnical engineering

Introduction
5
Geotechnical engineering

Introduction
6
 What is risk?
“Risk is like love: we all know what it is, but we don’t know how to define it”
(Joseph Stiglitz quoted in (Nguyen, 2007))
RISK = LIKELIHOOD x CONSEQUENCE
“……the fear of an evil ought to be proportionate, not only to its magnitude,
but also to its probability…”.
(from 1662 by Arnaud (Arnaud, 1850))

risco - danger risque FRENCH

ITALIAN
rischiare – run into danger risquer

Introduction
7
 Higher Risk

Lower Risk Lower Risk

Introduction
8
Understanding

9
Civil engineers do not understand
geotechnical engineering
“The major part of the college training of civil engineers consists in the
absorption of the laws and rules which apply to relatively simple and
well-defined materials, such as steel or concrete. This type of education
breeds the illusion that everything connected with engineering should
and can be computed on the basis of a priori assumptions.
Unfortunately, soils are made by nature and not by man, and the
products of nature are always complex.”
(Terzaghi, 1936)

Understanding
10
 This lack of understanding continues today

“… lack of investment in earlier site investigation, … lack

of technical understanding among project managers and
a trend towards reduced quality across the industry.”

(Kajastie, 2020)
Understanding
11
 A lack of appreciation of geotechnical risks
Project Management High level risks –
(General Geotechnical Risks) General lack of
appreciation of
geotechnical risks – i.e
Line Management of Different Project Risks
restrict geotechnical
budget
Specific Geotechnical Risks
Specific risks
Team
Contractural Technical Leadership and
Experience

Material
Geological Engineering
Properties

(Baynes, 2010)
Understanding
12
 Poor investment in investigation can have
impacts 180

160
As-built construction cost as % of engineers

140

120

Engineers estimate = 100%

estimate

100

80

60

40

20

0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Investigation cost as % of construction cost (excludes variations)

(National Research Council, 1984)

Understanding
13
 Geotechnical risks
Project Management High level risks –
(General Geotechnical Risks) General lack of
appreciation of
geotechnical risks – i.e
Line Management of Different Project Risks
restrict geotechnical
budget
Specific Geotechnical Risks
Specific risks
Team
Contractural Technical Leadership and
Experience

Material
Geological Engineering
Properties

(Baynes, 2010)
Understanding
14
 Contractual risks are the foundations
for poor project performance
Contractual
Man

Sup

• Risk transfer SC

• GBR - Crossrail
Organization
PC

Cons

Client: 35% PM 45% PC 10% Client

PM
PC: 25% PM 35% PC 20% Client
Consult: 35% PM 25% PC 30% Client Cl

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentage Risk Allocation

Cl PM Cons PC SC Sup Man

Cl = client; PM = project manager; Cons = consultants; PC = primary contractor; (Loosemore & McCarthy, 2008)
SC = subcontractor; Sup = supplier; and Man = manufacturer
Understanding
15
 Different parties to a contract view risks
differently

(Smith, 2019, Smith, 2018)

Understanding
16
Different parties to a contract view risks
differently

(Castro-Nova, Gad, Touran, Cetin, & Gransberg, 2018)

Understanding
17
Different parties to a contract view risks
differently

(Lo, Fung, & Tung, 2006 - Construction Delays in Hong Kong Civil Engineering Projects)
Understanding
18
Team risks are often forgotten Hydraulics/
Hydrology -
parameters for
scour
assessment,
climate change, Environmental -
Site
flooding acid sulfate soils,
Investigation

Team
contaminated
Contractor -
land, cultural
ground
heritage,
investigation
sensitive areas,
data
sustainability

• Leadership
• Availability Alignment -
Shallow in cuts
to avoid blasting, Contractor -
low constructability,

• Role separation embankments on

soft soil, batter
slope angles, Geotechnical
cost, temporary
works

cut/fill balance
Manager

Independent
Structures -
Verifier /
earth pressures /
Independent
foundation
Checking
parameters,
Engineer -
retaining wall
design
and foundation
verification &
design
compliance

Client - design
life,
Pavement -
maintenance,
subgrade
compliance,
properties,
whole-of-life
expansive soils
cost,
stakeholders 19
Geological risks are often considered as
the main geotechnical risks
• groundwater • strength and stiffness
• geological features • anthropogenic materials
• compressible soils • geomorphology and landform
• unstable slopes • problem soils

Understanding
20
 Material properties are critical to design
Undrained shear strength (kPa)
0 20 40 60 80
0

-5

-10

Depth below ground level (m)

-15

-20

-25

-30

-35

-40

(Bond & Harris, 2008)

Understanding
21
 Material properties are critical to design
Undrained shear strength (kPa)
0 20 40 60 80
0

Range of interpretations
-5

-10

Depth below ground level (m)

-15

-20

-25

-30

-35

-40

(Bond & Harris, 2008)

Understanding
22
Material properties are critical to design

Lower bound: c=0, f’=25

Upper bound: c=0, f’=39

Understanding
23
 Can we be sure of the data we receive

c. 9% variation c. 15% variation

Laboratory testing: Revealing consistency concerns

31 January, 2018 By GE Editorial Understanding
24
Understand where your data comes from

50mm (ID) x 500mm – 0.00098m3

Understanding
25
Understand its reliability
“Every experienced contractor knows that ground investigations can
only be 100% accurate in the precise locations in which they are carried
out. It is for an experienced contractor to fill in the gaps and take an
informed decision as to what the likely conditions would be overall”.

(Mr Justice Coulson (Van Oord UK Ltd & Anor v Allseas UK Ltd, 2015))

Understanding
26
Don’t believe all you see

Understanding
27
28
Understand the scale of your
information

Understanding
29
 Understand the scale of your
information

INB drilling accounted

for only about 10m3 of
soil/rock from
70,000m3 excavated
(0.015%)

30
Understand the limits of your analysis
1297kN

734kN

Sieffert & Bay-Gress (2000) Comparison of European bearing capacity calculation methods for shallow
foundations Proc. Instn Civ. Engrs Geotech. Engng, 143, 65-74 Understanding
31
 Understand the limits of your analysis
Bad (>150)

Poor (125-150) Over-estimate Shallow foundation on sand

Fair (115-125)

Good (105-115)
Bearing - 66% Poor / Bad
Within 25% Settlement - 90% Poor / Bad
Excellent (95-105) of the answer
Good (85-95)

Fair (75-85)

Poor (50-75)
Under-estimate
Bad (<50)

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

Bearing Capacity Settlement

(Morgenstern, 2000)
Understanding
32
DESIGN ELEMENT UNDER DESIGN OVER DESIGN ACCEPTABLE REFERENCE

(NO./%) (NO./%) (NO./%)

STEEL DRIVEN PILE CAPACITY: BASE 4 / 25 6 / 37.5 6 / 37.5 (Anon, 1999)

SHAFT 13 / 18.25 1 / 6.25 2 / 12.5

TOTAL
11 / 68.75 3 / 18.75 2 / 12.5
BASE GROUTED STEEL DRIVEN PILE (Anon, 1999)
CAPACITY: BASE 3 / 18.75 10 / 62.75 3 / 18.75
SHAFT
4 / 25 7 / 43.75 5 / 31.25
TOTAL
2 / 12.5 11 / 68.75 3 / 18.75
SHALLOW FOUNDATION ON SOFT CLAY: (Doherty et al.,
ULTIMATE CAPACITY 39 / 78 3/6 8 / 16 2018)

SETTLEMENT AT FAILURE
4/8 43 / 86 3/6
SHALLOW FOUNDATION ON SAND: (Morgenstern,
BEARING CAPACITY 10 / 34 9 / 31 10 / 34 2000)

SETTLEMENT
18 / 58 10 / 32.3 3 / 9.7
EMBANKMENT COLLAPSE HEIGHT 21 / 48.8 4 / 9.3 18 / 41.9 (Morgenstern,
2000)
EMBANKMENT ON SOFT GROUND, (Kelly et al., 2018)
SETTLEMENT WITH TIME: 106 DAYS 15 / 44 4 / 12 15 / 44
1095 DAYS
17 / 55 1/3 13 / 42 33
Impacts

34
 Geotechnical risks cause project impacts
GEOTECHNICAL CAUSE RANK RANK
1.2
(COST IMPACTS) (DELAY IMPACTS)
Lack of sufficient boring locations 1 1
38.3
Misclassified / mischaracterized 2 2
60.5
soils
Cost overrun (%) Higher groundwater table than 3 3
expected
Negative No impact Positive Dewatering due to seepage 4 3

Design changes to 4 2
2.5
superstructure
Prescribed soil treatment not 5 4
36.7 suitable
Variation of piling quantities due 5 3
60.8
to wrong pile type
Schedule overrun (%)
Mismatch in pile quantities 6 5
Negative No impact Positive Erosion and sediment control 7 6

(Shrestha & Neupane, 2010)

Impacts
35
 How good is engineering judgement?
CLAIM
CAUSE
Failure of flood protection system >$60 bn

Construction claim on volume losses in dredge-fill >$400 m

Concerns over future failures of MSW systems >$100 m

Excessive settlement of high-rise building >$200 m

Settlement of homes >$100 m

Property damage from failure of dam over 10 m high >$100 m

Delays and damages from excavation support system >$100 m

Heave of pavement subgrade >$100 m

Failure of tailings dams – 2008, 2015, 2019 >$1 bn each

(Marr, 2019)
Impacts
36
Case study literature

Impacts
37
 Mistakes can be expensive

(Peracha & Pengelly, 2020)

Impacts
38
The role of geotechnical sub-consultant
(temporary tunnel support)
• Geotechnical sub-consultant put forward 3 staff – only 1 accepted
(24/7 Operation)
• Provided with 3 juniors by the contractor who were not NATM
experienced
• Did not certify construction of the works they designed
• Inadequate computer software system for processing the monitoring
data

Impacts
39
Settlement at Camborne House
exceeded predicted settlement
(9mm) after only concourse
tunnel completed by about
20mm.

40
41
42
The findings
• lack of on-site NATM authority at Heathrow
• lack of experience among the field engineers, the tunnelling foremen
and the crews – design did not take this into account – poor
workmanship an issue
• lack of full-time geologists within an NATM supervision team
• Contractors geotechnical sub-contractor not kept in the loop
• Instrumentation - limited data available, poor quality, serious
omissions, "inadequate" computer software
• there was still enough data available to see what was happening

Impacts
43
Mistakes can be expensive
• Contractor fined £1.2M + £100k costs (contract value £60M)
• Recovery took nearly two years and cost around £150M - nearly
three times the cost of the original contract

Impacts
44
 ……and embarrassing

(Anon, 2020)
Impacts
45
Recommendations

46
 • Project details - scope, alignment etc
• Desk study, historical records etc.
Establishing
the Context • Site investigation data

detailing risk process. Process to be updated

Safety in design and project risk registers
throughout the design and construction
• Ground model development, parameter selection
• Developing concept design
Risk
Identification • Identifying geotechnical risks

• Combining identified risks with their likely consequences

Risk
Analyses

• Evaluating which risks require treatment

Risk
Evaluation

• Detailed design to eliminate or manage risks

Risk • Instrumentation and ongoing monitoring to manage risks
Treatment

• Reviewing site data as construction proceeds and update models

/ design as necessary
Establishing
the Context • Review risk process and update as necessary

47
In developing solutions and presenting
these to our clients we must be aware of
the limitations
• Investigations sample a very small amount of the site

• Laboratory and insitu testing is subject to errors and inconsistencies

• Engineers can derive a range of interpretations for a single set of test data

• Design methods can give significantly different answers

• Software outputs are only as good as the information we put in and need to be checked against what
we consider to be reasonable

• Team leadership and inexperience can seriously affect project outcomes and magnify the likely risks

Recommendations
48
Geotechnical engineers should be
• Engaging senior professionals early as possible in the project
• Using independent reviewers or verifiers
• Communicating and building relationships with the various parties and stakeholders (establishing
trust) as early as possible

• Adopting procedures based on precedence so that methods of analysis etc. are the same for each
project i.e. Department of Transport and Main Roads (2015) and United States Army Corps of
Engineers (2003)

• Expressing results with likely variability

• Explaining the design and design intent to the relevant site engineers prior to construction,
including likely risks and uncertainty

• Supporting and mentoring Team Leaders throughout the project

Recommendations
49
 Questions
• Introduction • Impacts
• Understanding • Recommendations

chris.bridges@smec.com

Bridges, C.A. (2019) Geotechnical risk: it’s not only the ground. Australian Geomechanics Recommendations
54(1) 27-38 50
References
• Anon. (2020). Piling design error leads to Sheffield building demolition. Ground Engineering(October), 6.
• Arnaud, A. (1850). Logic, or the Art of Thinking being the Port-Royal Logic (Translated from the French by Baynes) (T. S. Baynes, Trans.).
Edinburgh, UK: Sutherland and Knox.
• Baynes, F. J. (2010). Sources of geotechnical risk. Quarterly Journal of Engineering Geology and Hydrogeology, 43, 321-331.
• Bond, A., & Harris, A. (2008). Decoding Eurocode 7. Abingdon, UK: Taylor & Francis.
• Bridges, C. (2019). Geotechnical risk: it's not only the ground. Australian Geomechanics, 54(1), 27-38.
• Buxton, J. A., Henry, B., Crabtree, A., Waheed, A., & Coulthart, M. (2011). Using qualitative methods to investigate risk perception of
Canadian medical laboratory workers in relation to current prion disease infection control policies. Journal of Toxicology and Environmental
Health, Part A, 74, 241-247.
• Castro-Nova, I., Gad, G. M., Touran, A., Cetin, B., & Gransberg, D. D. (2018). Evaluating the Influence of Differing Geotechnical Risk
Perceptions on Design-Build Highway Projects. ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems, Part A: Civil Engineering,
4(4). doi:10.1061/AJRUA6.0000993
• Committee of Inquiry. (2005). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Incident at the MRT Circle Line workste that led to the collapse of
the Nicoll Highway on 20 April 2004 (Volume 1 (Part I)).
• Douglas, M. (1970). Natural symbols: explorations in cosmology. London, UK: Barrie & Rockliff.

51
References
• Kahan, D. M., Braman, D., Slovic, P., Gastil, J., & Cohen, G. (2007). The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of - and
Making Progress In - the American Culture War of Fact. Retrieved from New Haven, Connecticut, USA:
• Kajastie, N. (2020). Covid issues mask other concerns. Ground Engineering(October ), 3.
• Kasperson, R. E. (2012). A Perspective on the Social Amplification of Risk. The Bridge, 42(3), 23-27.
• Lo, D. O. K., & Cheung, W. M. (2005). Assessment of landslide risk of man-made slopes in Hong Kong (GEO Report No. 177). Retrieved from
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, PRC:
• Lo, T. Y., Fung, I. W. H., & Tung, K. C. F. (2006). Construction Delays in Hong Kong Civil Engineering Projects. Journal of Construction
Engineering and Management, 132(6), 636-649. doi:10.1061/ASCE0733-93642006132:6636
• Loosemore, M., & McCarthy, C. S. (2008). Perceptions of Contractual Risk Allocation in Construction Supply Chains. Journal of Professional
Issues in Engineering Education and Practice, 134(1), 95-105.
• Marsden, E. (2017, 31 July 2017). Risk perception. Retrieved from https://risk-engineering.org/static/PDF/slides-risk-perception.pdf
• Morgenstern, N. R. (2000). Performance in Geotechnical Practice. Paper presented at the The Inaugural Lumb Lecture, Hong Kong.
• National Research Council. (1984). Geotechnical Site Investigations for Underground Projects: Volume 1: Overview of Practice and Legal
Issues, Evaluation of Cases, Conclusions and Recommendations. Retrieved from Washington, DC, USA:
• Nguyen, N. C. (2007). Risk management strategies and decision support tools for dry land farmers in southwest Queensland. Australia.
(PhD), University of Queensland, Gatton. Queensland. Australia.

52
References
• Peracha, Q., & Pengelly, E. (2020, 27 Jan 2020). The day tunnels below Heathrow collapsed and created giant crater between runways.
Retrieved from https://www.getsurrey.co.uk/news/surrey-news/day-tunnels-below-heathrow-collapsed-17601515
• Sbaraini, A., Carter, S. M., Evans, R. W., & Blinkhorn, A. (2011). How to do a grounded theory study: a worked example of a study of dental
practices. BMC Medical Research Methodology, 11(128). doi:https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-11-128
• Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1979). Rating the Risks. Environment, 21(3), 14-39.
• Smith, C. (2018, 13 June 2018). HS2 £1bn over target costs following geotechnical risk warning. Retrieved from
https://www.geplus.co.uk/news/hs2-1bn-over-target-costs-following-geotechnical-risk-warning-13-06-2018/
• Smith, C. (2019). HS2 plans to reduce ground risk cost described as “carnage”. Retrieved from https://www.geplus.co.uk/news/hs2-plans-to-
reduce-ground-risk-cost-described-as-carnage-28-01-2019
• Willingham, R. (2019, 9 December 2019). Melbourne Metro Tunnel project grinds to a halt amid dispute over deadlines and costs. Retrieved
from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-09/melbourne-metro-tunnel-project-grinds-to-halt-amid-dispute/11779986

53
Appendices

54
 Driven Steel Pile
Total Capacity (kN)
Bad (>150)
Base Capacity (kN)

Poor (125-150) Over estimate Shaft Capacity (kN)

Fair (115-125)
Accuracy of Prediction (%)

Good (105-115) Shaft - 88% Poor / Bad

Excellent (95-105) Base - 63% Poor / Bad

Good (85-95)
Total - 88% Poor / Bad
Fair (75-85)

Poor (50-75)
Under estimate
Bad (<50)

0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Number of Predictions

55
 Jet Grouted Pile

Bad (>150)

Poor (125-150) Over estimate

Fair (115-125)
Accuracy of Prediction (%)

Good (105-115) Shaft - 69% Poor / Bad

Total Pile Capacity (kN)
Excellent (95-105) Base Capacity (kN) Base - 81% Poor / Bad
Shaft Capacity (kN)
Good (85-95)
Total - 81% Poor / Bad
Fair (75-85)

Poor (50-75) Under estimate

Bad (<50)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of Predictions

56
 Embankment Collapse Height

Bad (>150)

Poor (125-150)
Non-conservative
Fair (115-125)
Accuracy of Prediction (%)

Muar Embankment
Good (105-115) Prediction Competition
60% Poor / Bad – majority
on the conservative side of
Excellent (95-105) MIT Embankment prediction
Prediction Competition
Good (85-95)

Fair (75-85)

Poor (50-75)

Bad (<50)
Conservative

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Number of Predictions

57