Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on
the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law
as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an
office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any
act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
 trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194
N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession.
If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging
in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to
do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
 THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on
Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging
in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to
the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on
Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who
are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with
the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know
that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation
work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source
of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends
in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making"
and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily
in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional
context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly
with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management,
functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for
the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged
in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the

"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it
is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some
large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others
have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large
enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs
of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate
legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action,
or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This
can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short,
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the
running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is
practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is
one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak.
No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning:
(1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a
corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization
and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and
the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the
nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not
only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder
— in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches
from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms
of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from
other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways
both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool
for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise
the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and
risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used

directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
 instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be
used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major
part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar
facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change
to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of
"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession.
The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues,
including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma
of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will
he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank
and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various
companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-
General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before
the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with
the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying
for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo
 V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff
Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid.,
p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the
United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms

and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or
more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when
the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose
kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not
the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos.
3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer

in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority
to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it
is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages:
(1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years,
two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
 Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly
what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two
or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod
is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This
is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
 (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme
Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger,
and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator
calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it
does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination
by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due
assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I
voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the
position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification
for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even
embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's
disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence
already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification,
that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,

ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art.
IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
(63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is
the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge;
it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively,
habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as
head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary

actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services
(State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it

prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary

action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill
is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and,
one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert
and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law.
(Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
 3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence

of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which
requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching
law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his
profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10)
years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did
not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not
qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there
must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs.
Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the
discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to
our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of
the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply
because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have
been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification
practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock
broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal
with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-
A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not
affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe.
In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house
or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the
Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of
any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us
absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously
be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded
that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself,
but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has
occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a
businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even
if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban
reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers
like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that
his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of
the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant
talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2
voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion;
one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not
taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if
he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how
he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in
fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the
law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant
past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in
an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of
one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged
or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one
year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even
then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A.
and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How
could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International
Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and

affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt —

Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

 i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod
has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would
support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten
years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving
receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in
the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as
commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country
who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in
his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name
only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the
practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is
not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation
but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the
rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing
a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and
conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what

constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an
attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving
of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the
giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
 knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or
customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where
he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question
as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one
years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half
a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement
to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he
answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and
charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal,
he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an
answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the
broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as
real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right
to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of
real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he
has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another
to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to
appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional
persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's
in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may
be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of
law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of
clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client;
(2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his
client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as
 such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or
perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to
real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of
acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required

component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary

action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)."
(Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which
do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission
on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines.
As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business
transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143
SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for
such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court
to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion
in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it
does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination
by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due
assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I
voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the
position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification
for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even
embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's
disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence
already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification,
that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,

ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art.
IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
(63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is
the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge;
it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively,
habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as
head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary

actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services
(State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it

prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary

action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill
is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and,
one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert
and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law.
(Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence

of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which
requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching
law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his
profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10)
years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did
not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not
qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there
must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs.
Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the
discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to
our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of
the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply
because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have
been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification
practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock
broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal
with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-
A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not
affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe.
In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house
or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the
Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of
any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us
absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously
be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded
that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself,
but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has
occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a
businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even
if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban
reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers
like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that
his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of
the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant
talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2
voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion;
one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not
taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if
he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how
he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in
fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the
law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant
past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in
an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of
one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged
or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one
year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even
then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A.
and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How
could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International
Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco

Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and

affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt —

Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

 d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod
has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would
support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten
years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving
receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in
the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as
commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country
who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in
his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name
only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the
practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is
not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation
but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the
rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing
a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and
conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what

constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an
attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving
of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the
giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or
customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where
he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question
as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one
years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half
a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement
to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he
answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and
charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal,
he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an
answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the
broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as
real estate is concerned."
 xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right
to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of
real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he
has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another
to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to
appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional
persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's
in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may
be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of
law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of
clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client;
(2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his
client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as
such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or
perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to
real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of
acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required

component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil.
 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary

action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)."
(Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which
do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission
on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines.
As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business
transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143
SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for
such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court
to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion
in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Footnotes

1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.

2 14 SCRA 109

3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT

CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for
June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law
and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members
of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director
has been holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and
who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and
that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in
good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in
the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in
violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution
of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of
actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the
prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit
the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as
stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical
knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the
respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of
the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who
practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so
by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been
holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to
practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the
Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned
formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative,
in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the
patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is
included in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
 with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare
of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed
of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
(Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.
I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use
and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to
be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice
before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of
evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention
shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare.
Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or
used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any
printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the
application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for
more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the
right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the
grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation,
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent.
Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide
for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in
case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three
years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the
patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the
demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or
if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the
condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of the
patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the
Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary
to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for
which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions
of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts,
the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a
proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any
other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent
Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly
technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to
a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is
not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts
of the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and

extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the
duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the
legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new
and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a
patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide
not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior
public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable

to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed
to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of
course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members
of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the
preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an
invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application
for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons
desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are
already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned
after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases
prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled.
He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
 Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents
are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as
entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution
of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these
rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before
any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States
who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be
admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of
attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register
unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form
supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and
shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character
and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications
necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise
competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their
application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine
whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the
qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of
sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an
examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an
examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in
the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent
Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as
follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of
such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of
applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in
good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to
applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and
assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications
or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case
from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be
incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply
with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter,
 deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person
having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The
reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or
so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under
such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine.
(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination.
We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law,
for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the
United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the
qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the
necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their
clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by
the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention
has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to
determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe
forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious
and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws
relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937,
known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of
Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations
necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and
regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules
and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal
Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in
and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law
giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination
prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be
no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the
business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of
accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer
practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first
pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by
this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is
hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or
tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.
and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 In re: Albino Cunanan, 50 Off. Gaz. m, 1617, prom. March 18, 1954.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments
by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply
Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent

to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company,
as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my
consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab
initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to
my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and
quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on
record that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any
 legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be
annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which
actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner
above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had
been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking
for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable
from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he
said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby

annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract"
entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself
is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there
was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales
agent who concealed the real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April
15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales
agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa
& Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the
letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD
26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the

Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court.2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a
mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the
District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He
also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only
"the Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also
"a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying
his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any
abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage
- PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by
the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent
himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed
the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed
mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an
honest mistake.9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous"
with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal"
or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he
does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she
would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him;
despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject
of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says
Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the
next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those
regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December
15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5,
1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . .
(his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his)
will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense
of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who
had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees .
. at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More
than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and
employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the
most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as
to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy,
or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely
— to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The
law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court,
Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers.
As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect
for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary
norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he
had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors,"
in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree
in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the
title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of

excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

a Annexes B, B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996.

b Annexes F and G, id.

c Annex C-2, id.

1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were also
furnished the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, The Finance
Management and Budget Office and-the Financial Division of the Supreme Court.

2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.

3 Dated April 19, 1996.

4 Rollo at p. 23.

5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that

NOTICES (or communications informing) of Resolutions adopted by the
Court En Banc or any of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the parties by and over
the signature of the corresponding Clerk or Court or his Assistant, the Court's
Resolutions being incorporated verbatim in said notices.

6 Dated April 22, 1996.

7 Rollo at p. 28.

8 Id at p. 60.

9 id. at p. 32.

10 Id. at p. 34.

11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.

12 Id. at p. 35.

13 Id.

14 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et
seq.

15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.

16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.

17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the Act
with (1) a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary, or (2)
suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or (3) removal, depending on the gravity
of the offense, after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency,
and even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206
SCRA 491; Angeles v. Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 2109 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen, etc., 233
SCRA 68: SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.

19 Art. 19, Civil Code.

20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which should
apply by analogy to Members of the Shari'a Bar. The Code also proscribes
behavior in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule
7.03).

21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No. 681,
entitled "Petition to allow Shari'a lawyers to exercise their profession at the
regular courts;." SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court.
 EN BANC

B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,

vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit.
A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-
taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court
ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed
the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate
in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of
Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as
"counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading
as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative
body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of

acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter
engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.
In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a
lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however,
that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted
his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a
copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by
Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate
for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to
Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as
a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his claim that the
instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the
May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that
respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent
allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee.
Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer’s oath.
In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel for
George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the
"(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN."
Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as
his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the
candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the
petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged
in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p.
262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports
the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully
well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he
had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law
is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the
Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s
oath.1âwphi1 However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the
bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to
be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent
to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support
the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 105 Phil. 173 (1959).
2 G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210.
3 Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 211 Phil. 252 (1983).
4 In
the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name Ozaeta,
Romulo, etc., 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1.
5
Ui v. Bonifacio, Administrative Case No. 3319, 8 June 2000, 333 SCRA 38.
6 Bar Matter No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.
7 People v. Santocildes, Jr., G.R. No. 109149, 21 December 1999, 321 SCRA 310.
8 Diao v. Martinez, Administrative Case No. 244, 29 March 1963, 7 SCRA 475.
9 Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, B.M. No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.
10 Respondent’s Comment, Annex "A".
11
Ibid., Annex "B".
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A.
Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that
what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing
of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and "the
matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he
be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers
during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence
in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject
to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the
practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the
most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called
this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged
his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant
why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination
of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I
have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted
as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to
adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie
shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and
moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years
of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment."22

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of
his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-
taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a
valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the
act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose
to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney
or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt
of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any
finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed
against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed
under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot
suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this
Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we
likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is
warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing
any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR
after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for
his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to
practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.,
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On leave) (On official leave)

ARTURO D. BRION* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 (On leave)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

** On official leave
1 Rollo, p. 1; Petition dated 6 February 2012.
2 Id.
3
Id. at 2.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 10.
6 Id. at 2.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 3.
11 Id. at 4.
12 Id. at 20; TSN, 21 September 2012.
13 Id. at 35-43; Report and Recommendation of the OBC dated 24 January 2013.
14 Id. at 42.
15 Id.
16 Rollo, p. 28; Report and Recommendation of the OBC dated 24 January 2013.
17 Id. at 3; Petition dated 6 February 2012.
18 Id. at 22; TSN, 21 September 2012, p. 3.
19 Id. at 34; id. at 15.
20 Barcenas v. Alvero, A.C. No. 8159, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 1, 11.
21 Rollo, p. 35; TSN, 21 September 2012, p. 16.
22 Id. at 3; Petition dated 6 February 2012.
23 Wooden v. Civil Service Commission, 508 Phil. 500, 515 (2005).
24 Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 836 (2005).
25 Id.
26 Aguirre v. Rana, 451 Phil. 428, 435 (2003).
27
RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 3(e).
28 Tan v. Balajadia, 519 Phil. 632 (2006).
29 Id.
30 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 3.
31See Tapay v. Bancolo, A. C. No. 9604, 20 March 2013; Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente,
A. C. No. 7269, 23.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in
the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of
the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the
practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of
his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for
the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age,
of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a
certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics
of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of

another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer
who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must
first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject

to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to
the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,

Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Footnotes
1As evidence thereof, he submitted a copy of his Identification Certificate No. 07-16912
duly signed by Immigration Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan.
2In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A.
Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 612.
3 Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 329.
4 In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554.
5 Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
6 Id.
7 Sections 2, 5 and 6, id.
8 Sections 8 to 11 and 14, id.
9 Section 17, id.
10 Sections 18 and 19, id.
11In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22; In re
Atty. Marcial Edillon, supra note 3.
12 Section 139, RA 7160.
13
Resolution dated August 8, 2000 in Bar Matter No. 850 (Rules on Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education for Members of the IBP).
14
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R.
No. L-23959, 29 November 1971, 42 SCRA 302.
15 See last paragraph of Section 14, Article XII.
16 In re Bosque, 1 Phil. 88 (1902).
17 Section 2, RA 9225. Emphasis supplied.
18
Section 5(4), id.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE

PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several
documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar
petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of
law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in
March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his
ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and
intended to resume his practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the
right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who
intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice.3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately affected

with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following
documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau

of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good
moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator,

UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance
with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE.
After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has
met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to
the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to

the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject
to the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the
re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and
Bar.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On Leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On Leave per Special Order No. 1257 dated July 19, 2012.

** On Leave.
1 Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
2 Petition
for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, Petitioner, B.M. No.
1678, December 17, 2007.
3 R.A. No. 9225, Section 5.
4 Supra note 2.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at
959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu,
contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in
the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District
of Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation

meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer
and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of
Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task
with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties,
however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request.
He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After
evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline
respondent.7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed
against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By
so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section

7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice
of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government
Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government
service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service."
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
[they] had intervened while in said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.
Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession
of Elective Local Government Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who
are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving
the local government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when

the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
 (c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work
only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive
monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective
local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on
engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus
derogat generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service.
They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official
duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city
mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a
week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to
secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these
purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to
practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong
barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed
to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full
time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a
month.16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure
Prior Authority From The Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at
the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission
to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by
the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or
employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of
the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and
promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as
the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent
not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is
a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of
the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation
of the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall
furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Footnotes
1 Particularly described as lot no. 19, block no. 3, Pas-14849.
2 Complainant's sister-in-law.
3 Hereafter, "Elizabeth and Pastor."
4 Hereafter, "Barangay 723."
5 These were scheduled on March 15, 2001, March 26, 2001 and April 3, 2001.
6 Dated July 5, 2002. Rollo, pp. 2-23.
7Report and Recommendation dated October 15, 2004 of Commissioner Doroteo B.
Aguila of the IBP-CBD. Id., pp. 103-106.
8 The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
9 Supra note 7.
10 CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-476 dated November 4, 2004. Rollo, p. 102.
11 G.R. Nos. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 526. (emphasis in the original)
12 The Local Government Code of 1992.
13This rule of statutory construction means that a special law repeals a general law on the
same matter.
14Section 52(a), RA 7160. They may also hold special sessions upon the call of the local
chief executive or a majority of the members of the sanggunian when public interest so
demands. (Section 52[b], id.)
15This rule of statutory construction means that the express mention of one thing
excludes other things not mentioned.
16 Id.
17See Ramos v. Rada, A.M. No. P-202, 22 July 1975, 65 SCRA 179; Zeta v. Malinao,
A.M. No. P-220, 20 December 1978, 87 SCRA 303.
18 Ducat v. Villalon, 392 Phil. 394 (2000).
19
Id.
20 See Section 27, Rule 138, RULES OF COURT
 July 12, 2016

A.C. No. 11316

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant

vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan
(complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly
Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely
representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar
Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A.
Caronan. Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while
complainant was born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary education at
the Makati High School where complainant graduated in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon
his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in
Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for
Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he
married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years, complainant
rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in
Muntinlupa.9

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and
focused on helping their father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva
Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since then, respondent never went
back to school to earn a college degree.12

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the
former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13

Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar
Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the University of
Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and
take the Bar Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any
adverse consequences to him.15

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's
office in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since he
was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to support.17

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was
ordered to report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was
informed that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its
office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that
point, was using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009,
complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he
was interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school
records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation
Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's
University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and
his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni
Book of St. Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was
because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph
G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful
activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating
to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July
2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that
they be furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting
with him to discuss certain matters concerning respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-
member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also received a phone call
from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into
believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was
not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal
possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan,"
complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of
conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at
PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use
of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law.28

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a
defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the
administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared
closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to him,
complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to
humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and
criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both
parties failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On
such date, however, both paiiies again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue
an Order36 directing them to file their respective position papers. However, neither of the parties
submitted any.37

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating
Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally
and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records.39 He observed that
respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against him and did not present any proof to
prove his identity.40 On the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence
that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he
disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan
and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the
Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is
married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.43

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same
person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These,
according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed
complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely
assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No.
49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent
and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and
finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute
appropriate actions against respondent.47

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting
the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming
evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is
Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll
at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar
Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he
disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and
Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is
married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same
person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of
Makati bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used
complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant
- the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly
recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan,"
be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no
applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless
he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began
the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science,
logic, english, spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the
PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college
education and earn a law degree under his real name.1âwphi1 However, his false assumption of
his brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar.
The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the
2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar,
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59the Court explained the essence of good moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the
latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from
PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who would
be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which
exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.62

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary
qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged
unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him.
Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the
primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.63

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent)

is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant
Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations.
Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court
hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any
representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under
the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates
issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the
bulletin boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, "
Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a
statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Official Leave On Official Leave

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA* BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Footnotes
* On official leave.
** On official leave.
1 Dated October 10, 2013. Rollo, pp. 9-18.
2 "Porfirio" in some parts of the record.
3 Rollo, pp. 9-10.
4 Id. at 10.
5 Id. at 11.
6 Id. 10.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 11.
9 See id. at 10-12.
10 Id. at 11.
11 Id. at 10-11.
12 Id. at 11.
13 Id.
14
Id. at 12.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 12-13.
20
Id.at 13.
21 Id. at 13-14.
22 Id. 14.
23 Id. at 13.
24 Id. at 14.
25Id. Entitled "Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without
Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes," approved on April 3, 1979.
26 Id. at 16.
27 Id.
28
Id. at 17.
29 Dated May 5, 2015. Id at 77-80.
30 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XX-2012-649 dated December 29, 2012
issued by National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 110.
31See complaint for disbarment dated December 18, 2008, entitled "Joseph Garcia
Agtarap v. Atty. Patrick Atillo Caronan"; id. at 81-90.
32 See Minute Resolution dated October23, 2013; id. at 111-112.
33 See id. at 77-79.
34 See Minutes of the Hearing; id. at 71.
35 See Motion to Cancel/ Reset Mandatory Conference/ Hearing dated March 9, 2015; id.
at 72-73.
36 Dated April 20, 2015 issued by Commissioner Jose V. Cabrera. Id. at 76.
37 Id.at 127.
38 Id. at ll7-134.
39
Id. at 131.
40 Id. at 130.
41
Id. at 129.
42 Id. at 130.
43 Id. See also id. at 30.
44 Id. at 129. See also id. at 50-51 and 59.
45 Id. at 131.
46 Id. at 133.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 115-116.
49 Id. at 130. See also id. at 49.
50 Id at 130.
51 Id. See id. at 38.
52 Id. at 129. See also id. at 51 and 59.
53 Id. at 23-25.
54 Id. at 29.
55 Id. at 45-46.
56 See id. at 11. See also Application for the PMA; id. at 36-37.
57 In the Matter of the Admission to the Bar of Argosino, 316 Phil. 43, 46 (1995).
58
Id.
59 See B.M. No. 1154, June 8, 2004.
60 Id.
61 Supra note 56, at 46-50.
62 See Lizaso v. Amante, 275 Phil. I, 11 (1991).
63 Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 12121 (Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4322). June 27, 2018 ]

CELESTINO MALECDAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SIMPSON T. BALDO,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed with the Office of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Baguio-Benguet Chapter (IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter) by Complainant
Celestino Malecdan (Malecdan) against Respondent Atty. Simpson T. Baldo (Atty. Baldo), for the
latter's alleged violation of Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1508 (P.D. 1508), otherwise known
as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, which prohibits. the participation of lawyers in the
proceedings before the Lupon:

SEC. 9. Appearance of parties in person. - In all proceedings

provided for herein, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of counsel/representative, with the exception of
minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin
who are not lawyers. (Emphasis supplied)

The Factual Antecedents

Malecdan filed a letter of complaint for Estafa, Breach of Contract and Damages against
spouses James and Josephine Baldo, before the Lupon of Barangay Pico in La Trinidad, Benguet.

On August 14, 2014, Atty. Baldo appeared as counsel of spouses Baldo during the hearing on
the subject complaint before the Punong Barangay.2

On August 18, 2014, Malecdan filed a Complaint-Affidavit (Complaint) before the IBP
Baguio-Benguet Chapter praying that proper sanctions be imposed on Atty. Baldo for violating
Section 9 of P.D. 1508.

On August 20, 2014, the Committee on Ethics of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter furnished
Atty. Baldo with a copy of the complaint and set the case for a conciliation conference on
September 12, 2014.3

On September 15, 2014, the Complaint was endorsed to the Committee on Bar Discipline-IBP
(CBD-IBP) by the Committee on Ethics of IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter after the parties failed to
agree on a settlement.4

The CBD-IBP thereafter issued an Order5 dated September 17, 2014, requiring Atty. Baldo to
submit a duly verified Answer, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.6
 On January 14, 2015, the CBD-IBP issued a Notice7 setting the mandatory conference/hearing
of the subject complaint on February 18, 2015.8

On February 12, 2015, Malecdan filed his Mandatory Conference Brief.9

On February 23, 2015, the mandatory conference of the case was rescheduled to March 24,
2015 after Atty. Baldo failed to attend the same.10

In his Answer11 dated February 23, 2015, Atty. Baldo admitted that he was present during the
proceedings before the Punong Barangay. He explained that he was permitted by the parties to
participate in the said hearing, to wit:

1. The allegation in the complaint is admitted. However, the rest of

the truth to the matter is that, before entering the barangay session
hall, respondent asked permission from the officer-in-charge if he
will be allowed that before any hearing be conducted, he and the
respondent in the said barangay case, his uncle, James Baldo,
be allowed to talk to complainant Celestino Malecdan as they
may be able to amicably settle the matter on their own, of which
the officer in charge granted on the reason that the proceeding
was still in the dialogue stage;

2. Likewise, when he entered inside the barangay session hall where

complainant and his companion, Laila Alumno was
waiting, respondent again asked permission from complainant
and his companion, Laila Alumno if the latter will allow the
former to join them in the dialogue with James Baldo as the
parties may amicably settle the case on their own;

3. Since complainant already knew respondent as they had a

previous meeting at the office of complainant's lawyer, Atty.
Melissa QuitanCorpuz concerning the same case against James
Baldo, complainant readily permitted and allowed that parties have
a dialogue on their own with respondent joining them and without
the presence of any barangay officials.12 (Emphasis supplied)

In an Order13 dated March 24, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles gave
Malecdan a period of fifteen (15) days to file a supplemental complaint where he can incorporate
other facts and circumstances which he failed to indicate in his complaint. Atty. Baldo was likewise
given a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the supplemental complaint within which to
file his supplemental answer should he wish to do so.14

On March 31, 2015, Malecdan filed his Verified Supplemental Complaint

Affidavit,15 wherein he insisted that he vehemently objected to the presence of Atty. Baldo during
the proceedings before the Punong Barangay, to wit:
 2. Using his influence as a lawyer, Atty. Baldo prevailed
upon the Punong Barangay and the Barangay Secretary to let
him participate in the barangay proceedings intended for the
settlement of our grievance against Spouses Josephine Baldo
and James Baldo on August 14, 2014.

3. He did this over my vehement objections. I told him that he

was not supposed to be there but then he insisted. It even got to the
point that we were already arguing out loud. I resented the fact
that he was there assisting and representing his clients, the
Spouses Baldo while I was not represented by counsel. We were
in a situation that Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1508 sought
to prevent.16 (Emphasis supplied)

After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Robles rendered a Report and

Recommendation17 on June 2, 2015, recommending that Atty. Baldo be given a warning.
Commissioner Robles found that the language of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is not that
definite as to unqualifiedly bar lawyers from appearing before the Lupon, nor is the language that
clear on the sanction imposable for such an appearance.18 Commissioner Robles reasoned that the
matter of appearance or non-appearance before the Lupon is clearly addressed to a lawyer's taste
of propriety:

x x x. The respondent ought to have known that his attendance

thereat would have caused some ruckus. That respondent chose to
attend is some measure of his lack of propriety.

Although this Commission cannot legislate good taste or an

acute sense of propriety, the Commission can definitely remind the
respondent that another act of insensitivity to the rules of good
conduct will court administrative sanctions.19

The dispositive portion of Commissioner Robles' Report and Recommendation reads as

follows:

UPON THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that

the respondent Atty. Simpson T. Baldo be given a warning.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20

On June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution21 reversing and setting
aside the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead
recommended that Atty. Baldo be reprimanded, thus:

RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
 entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A",
considering Respondent's appearance as counsel for Spouses James
and Josephine Baldo in a Katarungan[g] Pambarangay hearing,
Thus, Respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED.22 (Emphasis in
the original and italics omitted)

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, the Court upholds
the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that the language of P.D. 1508 is mandatory
in barring lawyers from appearing before the Lupon.

As stated in the case of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,23 Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates
personal confrontation of the parties because:

"x x x a personal confrontation between the parties without

the intervention of a counsel or representative would generate
spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement
on the part of the disputants. In other words, the said procedure
is deemed conducive to the successful resolution of the dispute at
the barangay level."

xxxx

"To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal

confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the
effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as a
mode of dispute resolution, the above-quoted provision is
couched in mandatory language. Moreover, pursuant to the
familiar maxim in statutory construction dictating that 'expressio
unius est exclusio alterius', the express exceptions made regarding
minors and incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all
others not mentioned."24 (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Baldo's violation of P.D. 1508 thus falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:

CANON 1 -

A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY

THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.(awÞhi(

Rule 1.01 -
 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.1a⍵⍴h!1

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. A lawyer,
to the best of his ability, is expected to respect and abide by the law: and thus, avoid any act or
omission that is contrary to the same.25 A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks
of his character but it also inspires the public to likewise respect and obey the law.26 Rule 1.01,
on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers. Any act or omission
that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards
the law is unlawful.27 Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality
although the concept is broad enough to include such element.28

Here, Atty. Baldo admitted that he appeared and participated in the proceedings before
the Punong Barangay in violation of Section 9 of P.D. 1508. Atty. Baldo therefore violated Rule
1.01 of the CPR in connection with Section 9 of P.D. 1508 when he appeared as counsel for
spouses James and Josephine Baldo in a hearing before the Punong Barangay, Barangay Pico,
Municipality of La Trinidad in Benguet.

All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is sufficient to support the allegations
against Atty. Baldo.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Simpson T.

Baldo LIABLE for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and he is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stem warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 6-7.

2 Id. at 8-9.

3 Id. at 3.

4 Id. at 4.

5 Id. at 11.
6 Id.

7 Id. at 12.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 13-14.

10 Id at 18.

11 Id. at 19-21.

12 Id. at 19.

13 Id. at 28.

14 Id.

15 Id. at 29-30.

16 Id. at 29.

17 Id. at 39-40.

18 Id. at 39.

19 Id. at 39-40.

20 Id. at 40.

21 Id. at 37-38.

22 Id. at 37.

23 286 Phil. 917 (1992).

24 Id. at 924-925, citing Minister of Justice Opinion No. 135, s. 1981.

25 Maniquiz v. Atty. Emelo, A.C. No. 8968, September 26, 2017, p. 4.

26 Id.

27 Id.

28 Jimenez v. Atty. Francisco, 749 Phil. 551, 565 (2014).